(Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No.

L-7995, [May 31, 1957], 101 PHIL

|||

1155-1195)

VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation

a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by
legislature decisive.
We now come to due process as a limitation on the
exercise of the police power. It has been stated by the highest
authority in the United States that:
". . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often
been held, demands only that the law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the
subject sought to be attained. . . ."
xxx xxx xxx
"So far as the requirement of due process is
concerned and in the absence of other constitutional
restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic
policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public
welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted
to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to
declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the
legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to
have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose,
and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial
determination to that effect renders a court functus
officio. . . ." (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
". . . Too much significance cannot be given to the
word 'reasonable' in considering the scope of the police
power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to
determine the constitutionality of the means employed by
the legislature is to inquire whether the restrictions it
imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of
 Rights are unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any
restrictions on such rights. . . ."
xxx xxx xxx
". . . A statute to be within this power must also be
reasonable in its operation upon the persons whom it
affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular
class, and must not be unduly oppressive." (11 Am. Jur.
Sec. 302, pp. 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388, it was
also held:
". . . To justify the state in thus interposing its
authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that
the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require such interference; and
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. . . ."
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR,
389, 395, fixes this test of constitutionality:
"In determining whether a given act of the
Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police power to
regulate the operation of a business, is or is not
constitutional, one of the first questions to be considered
by the court is whether the power as exercised has a
sufficient foundation in reason in connection with the
matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive, and
capricious use of that power, without substantial relation
to the health, safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare
of the public."
b. Petitioner's argument considered.
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common,
ordinary occupation, one of those privileges long ago
recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men; that it is a gainful and honest occupation and
therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and
penalize. This argument overlooks fact and reality and rests on
an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country
where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has been
so engaged by him, by the alien, in an honest creditable and
unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens
and without ultimate danger to their economic peace,
tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we
have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so
grossly abused by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of
pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a
monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a deadly
stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national
security in times of crisis and emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by
petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and
circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens
from the retail trade unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious,
taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and
manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein?
As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in
question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the
desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy
from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily
unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges
(11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a
law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all
circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose
into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which
is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be
considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation
of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the
explanatory note that accompanied the bill, which later was
enacted into law:
"This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its
purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the
Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic
life. If the persons who control this vital artery of our
economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance to this
 Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free
institutions, and who have no permanent stake in our
people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our own
destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security,
will be at the mercy of other people.
"In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we
do not propose to deprive persons who are not citizens of
the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill
seeks to take away from the hands of persons who are not
citizens of the Philippines a power that can be wielded to
paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our
national security it respects existing rights.

"The approval of this bill is necessary for our

national survival."
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a
people, then economic independence is none the less
legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the
people are subject to the economic control and domination of
others, especially if not of their own race or country. The
removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic
control and domination, is one of the noblest motives that a
national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive
that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the
constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of a
legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the
limits of legislative authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be
within the sphere of legislative action.
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended
to impose the constitutional restrictions of due process on the
attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic
control and domination, thru the exercise of the police power.
The fathers of the Constitution must have given to the
legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that
would promote the supreme happiness of the people, their
freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us, they
expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution
expressing their belief that the legislation in question is within
the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared in their
Resolution:
"'That it is the sense of the Convention that the
public interest requires the nationalization of retail trade;
but it abstains from approving the amendment introduced
by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this
matter because it is convinced that the National Assembly
is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino
and American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail
trade.'" (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, 662- 663, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the
Memorandum for the Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency
manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. Thus in
the preamble, a principal objective is the conservation of the
patrimony of the nation and as corollary thereto the provision
limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation,
development and utilization of its natural resources. And in
Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that "no franchise,
certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation
of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade is only a
continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as
a primary objective of the Constitution. Can it be said that a
law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many
of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid
and unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the
plight of the nationals as manifested in the approval of the
radical measure is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been
recreant to its duties towards the country and its people would
it view the sorry plight of the nationals with complacency and
refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the
demands of public interest and national survival. As the
repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the
Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet,
through adequate measures, the danger and threat that alien
domination of retail trade poses to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately
reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the Legislature has
been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right
and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to
continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar
recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of
aliens. The right or privilege is denied to those only upon
conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the Court
on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege
should not have been denied to children and heirs of aliens
now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat
the law itself, its aims and purposes. Besides, the exercise of
legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review It is well
settled that the Court will not inquire into the motives of the
Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative
judgment. The Legislature is primarily the judge of the
necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and
every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the
Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law,
it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the
legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law
attacked as a violation of due process, is not its
reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the
provisions are not unreasonable. These principles also answer
various other arguments raised against the law, some of which
are: that the law does not promote general welfare; that
thousands of aliens would be thrown out of employment; that
prices will increase because of the elimination of competition;
that there is no need for the legislation; that adequate
replacement is problematical; that there may be general
breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners;
etc. Many of these arguments are directed against the
supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the
legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORPORATION (PHILPHOS)
assails the decision of the Secretary of Labor of 7 August 1990
affirming the order of the Mediator-Arbiter of 28 March 1990
which directed the immediate conduct of a certification election
among the supervisory, professional or technical,
and confidential employees of petitioner corporation. prLL

On 7 July 1989, Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for

brevity), filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a
petition for certification election among the supervisory
employees of petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union duly
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment it was
seeking to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine
Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation.LibLex

The petition for certification election filed by PMPI was not

opposed by PHILPHOS. In fact, on 11 August 1989, PHILPHOS
submitted a position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter stating that
its management welcomed the creation of a supervisory
employees' union provided the necessary requisites of law were
properly observed, but exempting from the union
itssuperintendents who were managerial and not supervisory
employees as they managed a division, subdivision or section,
and were vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies. PHILPHOS also asserted that
its professional or technical employees were not within the
definition of supervisory employees under the Labor Code as they
were immediately under the direction and supervision of its
superintendents and supervisors. Moreover, the professional and
technical employees did not have a staff of workers under them.
Consequently, petitioner prayed for the exclusion of
its superintendents and professional/technical employees from
the PMPI supervisory union.
On 13 October 1989, Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued an
order directing the holding of a certification election among
the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom
the superintendents and the professional and technical
employees. He also directed the parties to attend the pre-
election conference on 19 April 1990 for the determination of the
mechanics of the election process and the qualifications and
eligibility of those allowed to vote.
On 15 November 1989, PMPI filed an amended petition with the
Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to repreyyyyysent not only
the supervisory employees of petitioner but also
itsprofessional/technical and confidential employees. The
amended petition was filed in view of the amendment to the PMPI
Construction which included in its membership
theprofessional/technical and confidential employees.
On 14 December 1989, the parties therein agreed to submit their
respective position papers and to consider the amended petition
submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related
documents.
On 28 March 1990, Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order
granting the petition and directing the holding of a certification
election among the "supervisory, professional (engineers,
analysts, mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives,
etc.), technical, and confidential employees" 1 to comprise the
proposed bargaining unit.
On 16 April 1990, PHILPHOS appealed the order of 28 March 1990
to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who on 7 August 1990
rendered a decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido
Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the instant
petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondents in rendering the assailed rulings. Cdpr

On 8 July 1991, this Court issued a temporary restraining order

enjoining respondents from holding the certification election
among petitioner's supervisory, professional/technical,
andconfidential employees scheduled on 12 July 1991.
There are two (2) issues raised by petitioner: (1) whether it was
denied due process in the proceedings before respondent
Mediator-Arbiter; and, (2) whether
its professional/technical andconfidential employees may validly
join respondent PMPI union which is composed of supervisors.
PHILPHOS claims that it was denied due process when
respondent Mediator-Arbiter granted the amended petition of
respondent PMPI without according PHILPHOS a new opportunity
to be heard.
We do not see it the way PHILPHOS does here. The essence of
due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side
or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. 2 Where, as in the instant case, petitioner
PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-
Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the
basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was
sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as
petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its
side. 3 Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on
a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other
party. But it did not; 4 instead, it opted to submit its position
paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the
opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the
Secretary of Labor.
As regards the second issue, we are with petitioner that being
a supervisory union, respondent PMPI cannot represent
the professional/technical and confidential employees of
petitioner whose positions we find to be more of the rank and file
than supervisory.
With the enactment in March 1989 of R.A. 6715, employees were
thereunder reclassified into three (3) groups, namely: (a)
managerial employees, (b) supervisory employees, and (c) rank
and file employees. The category of supervisory employees is
once again recognized in the present law.
Article 212, par. (m), of the Labor Code, as amended, provides
that "(s)upervisory employees are those who, in the interest of
the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if
the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical
in nature but requires the use of independent judgment." The
definition of managerial employees is limited to those having
authority to hire and fire, while those who only recommend
effectively the hiring or firing or transfer of personnel are
considered closer to rank and file employees. The exclusion
therefore of mid-level executives from the category of managers
has brought about a third classification, the supervisory
employees. The peculiar role of supervisors is such that while
they are not managers, when they recommend action
implementing management policy or ask for the discipline or
dismissal of subordinates, they identify with the interests of the
employer and may act contrary to the interests of the rank and
file. 5
In its position paper submitted to the Mediator-Arbiter, petitioner
described the positions and functions of
its professional/technical employees, (engineers, analysts,
mechanics, accountants, nurses, and midwives). The guidelines,
which were not refuted by respondent PMPI, state:
. . . Professional and Technical positions are those whose
primary duty consists of the performance of work directly
related to management programs; who customarily,
regularly and routinarily exercise judgment in the
application of concepts, methods, systems and procedures
in their respective fields of specialization; who regularly
and directly assist a managerial and/or supervisory
employee, execute under general supervision, work along
specialized or technical lines requiring special training,
experience or knowledge, or execute under general
supervision special assignments and tasks . . . They are
immediately under the direction and supervision of
supervisors or superintendents. They have no men under
them but are regularly called upon by their supervisors or
superintendents on some technical matters. 6

Moreover, Herculano A. Duhaylungsod, Personnel Officer of

petitioner, attested that there was no community of interests
between the supervisors of petitioner and
theprofessional/technical employees; that as of 25 July 1990,
personnel records showed that there were 125 supervisors and
271 professional/technical employees; that of the
271professional/technical employees, 150 were directly under
and being supervised by supervisors, while the rest were staff
members of superintendents. 7
The certification of Personnel Officer Duhaylungsod that
its professional/technical employees occupy positions that are
non-supervisory is evidence that said employees belong to
the rank and file. 8 Quite obviously,
these professional/technical employees cannot effectively
recommend managerial actions with the use of independent
judgment because they are under the supervision of
superintendents and supervisors. Because it is unrefuted that
theseprofessional/technical employees are performing non-
supervisory functions, hence considered admitted, they should
be classified, at least for purposes of this case, as rank and
file employees. Consequently, these professional/technical
employees cannot be allowed to join a union composed of
supervisors. Conversely, supervisory employees cannot join a
labor organization of employees under their supervision but
may validly form a separate organization of their own. 9 This is
provided in Art. 245 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No.
6715, to wit:
. . . Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or
form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall
not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of
the rank and file employees but may join, assist or form
separate labor organizations of their own. llcd

Respondent PMPI is supposed to be a union of 125 supervisors. If

the professional/technical employees are included as members,
and records show that they are 271 in all or much more than
the supervisors, then PMPI will turn out to be a rank and
file union with the supervisors as members.
This is precisely the situation which the law prohibits. It would
create an obvious conflict of views among the members, or at
least between two (2) groups of members espousing opposing
interests. The intent of the law is to avoid a situation
where supervisors would merge with the rank and file, or where
the supervisors' labor organization would represent conflicting
interests, especially where, as in the case at bar, the supervisors
will be commingling with those employees whom they directly
supervise in their own bargaining unit. Members of the
supervisory union might refuse to carry out disciplinary
measures against their co-member rank and file employees. 10
Supervisors have the right to form their own union or labor
organization. What the law prohibits is a union whose
membership comprises of supervisors merging with the rank and
file employees because this is where conflict of interests may
arise in the areas of discipline, collective bargaining and
strikes. 11 The professional/technical employees of petitioner
therefore may join the existing rank and file union, or form a
union separate and distinct from the existing union organized by
the rank and file employees of the same company.
As to the confidential employees of the petitioner, the latter has
not shown any proof or compelling reason to exclude them from
joining respondent PMPI and from participating in the
certification election, unless these confidential employees are
the same professional/technical employees whom we find to be
occupying rank and file positions.LibLex

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of

respondent Secretary of Labor of 7 August 1990, as well as the
order of the respondent Mediator-Arbiter of 28 March 1990, is SET
ASIDE. The professional/technical employees of petitioner
Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (PHILPHOS) are
declared disqualified from affiliating with respondent Philphos
Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI).
The Department of Labor is directed to order immediately the
conduct of certification election among the supervisory
employees of petitioner, particularly excluding therefrom its
professional and technical employees.
SO ORDERED.
(Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. v. Torres, G.R. No.
|||

98050, [March 17, 1994])

The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary
investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence
so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners
be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution
of the same.
Petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to
Dismiss 13 dated 2 April 2001. They contended therein that they
did not make any false or untruthful statements in their
application for registration. They avowed that they intended to
reside in Burauen, Leyte, since the year 1989. On 9 May 2000,
they took actual residence in Burauen, Leyte, by leasing for five
(5) years, the house of Juanito and Fe Renomeron at No. 935, San
Jose Street in Burauen, Leyte. On even date, the Barangay
District III Council of Burauen passed a Resolution of Welcome,
expressing therein its gratitude and appreciation to petitioner
Carlos S. Romualdez for choosing the Barangay as his official
residence. 14
On 28 November 2003, Atty. Maria Norina S. Tangaro-Casingal,
COMELEC Investigating Officer, issued a Resolution,
recommending to the COMELEC Law Department (Investigation
and Prosecution Division), the filing of the appropriate
Information against petitioners, disposing, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department
(Investigation and Prosecution Division), RECOMMENDS to
file the necessary information against Carlos Sison
Romualdez before the proper Regional Trial Court for
violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45
(j) of Republic Act 8189 and to authorize the Director IV of
the Law Department to designate a Comelec Prosecutor to
handle the prosecution of the case with the duty to submit
periodic report after every hearing of the case. 15

On 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Banc found no reason to

depart from the recommendatory Resolution of 28 November
2003, and ordered, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Law Department is
hereby directed to file the appropriate information with
 the proper court against respondents CARLOS S.
ROMUALDEZ AND ERLINDA ROMUALDEZ for violation of
Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of
the Republic Act No. 8189. 16

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon.

Acting on the Motion, the COMELEC found no cogent reason to
disturb the assailed En Banc Resolution of 11 June
2004, 17 rationalizing, thus:
However, perusal of the records reveal (sic) that the
arguments and issues raised in the Motion for
Reconsideration are merely a rehash of the arguments
advanced by the Respondents in [their] Memorandum
received by the Law Department on 17 April 2001, the
same [w]as already considered by the Investigating
Officer and was discussed in her recommendation which
eventually was made as the basis for the En Banc's
resolution.
As aptly observed by the Investigating Officer, the filing of
request for the cancellation and transfer of Voting
Registration Record does not automatically cancel the
registration records. The fact remains that at the time of
application for registration as new voter of the herein
Respondents on May 9 and 11, 2001 in the Office of
Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte their registration in
Barangay 4419-A, Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame
Quezon City was still valid and subsisting. 18

On 12 January 2006, Alioden D. Dalaig, Director IV, Law

Department of the COMELEC filed with the RTC, Burauen, Leyte,
separate Informations against petitioner Carlos S.
Romualdez 19 for violation of Section 10 (g), in relation to Section
45 (j) of Republic Act No. 8189, and against petitioner Erlinda R.
Romualdez 20 for violation of Section 10 (g), in relation to Section
45 (j) of Republic Act No. 8189, subsequently docketed as Crim.
Case No. BN-06-03-4185 and Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4183,
respectively. Moreover, separate Informations for violation of
Section 10 (j), in relation to Section 45 (j) of Republic Act No.
8189 were filed against petitioners. 21
Hence, petitioners come to us via the instant Petition, submitting
the following arguments:
I
RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN
EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION; and
II
COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
PREMISED ITS RESOLUTION ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS AND FAILED TO CONSIDER CERTAIN RELEVANT
FACTS THAT WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION

(Spouses Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

|||

167011, [April 30, 2008], 576 PHIL 357-470)

Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on
the claim that the election offenses charged against them by
private respondent are entirely different from those for which
they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as charged by the
COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity
between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and
the Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the
denomination by private respondent of the alleged violations to
be covered by Section 261 (y) (2) and Section 261 (y) (5) of
the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic Act No.
8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the
COMELEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with
the RTC, were based on the same set of facts as originally
alleged in the private respondent's Complaint-Affidavit.
Petitioners buttress their claim of lack of due process by relying
on the case of Lacson v. Executive
Secretary. 28 Citing Lacson, petitioners argue that the real nature
of the criminal charge is determined by the actual recital of facts
in the Complaint or Information; and that the object of such
written accusations was to furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him, as will enable him to make
his defense. Let it be said that, in Lacson, this court resolved the
issue of whether under the allegations in the subject
Informations therein, it is the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial
Court which has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case
against therein petitioner and intervenors. In Lacson, we
underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court
is determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information,
and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the
trial. 29 Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real nature of
the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
Complaint or Information. 30
Petitioners' reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their
claim of lack of due process because, as we have said, the
charges contained in private respondent's Complaint-Affidavit
and the charges as directed by the COMELEC to be filed are
based on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the criminal
charges in private respondent's Complaint-Affidavit and that of
the charges contained in the Informations filed with the RTC,
pursuant to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such
that, petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to refute or
submit documentary evidence against the charges that the
COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due
process because they were granted the opportunity to refute the
allegations in private respondent's Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April
2001, in opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a
Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss with the Law
Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum
before the said body. Finding that due process was not dispensed
with under the circumstances in the case at bar, we agree with
the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners
were reasonably apprised of the nature and description of the
charges against them. It likewise bears stressing that
preliminary investigations were conducted whereby petitioners
were informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted
against them. They were given the opportunity to adduce
controverting evidence for their defense. In all these stages,
petitioners actively participated.
The instant case calls to our minds Orquinaza v.
People, 31 wherein the concerned police officer therein
designated the offense charged as sexual harassment; but, the
prosecutor found that there was no transgression of the anti-
sexual harassment law, and instead, filed an Information
charging therein petitioner with acts of lasciviousness. On a
claim that there was deprivation of due process, therein
petitioner argued that the Information for acts of lasciviousness
was void as the preliminary investigation conducted was for
sexual harassment. The court held that the designation by the
police officer of the offense is not conclusive as it is within the
competence of the prosecutor to assess the evidence submitted
and determine therefrom the appropriate offense to be charged.

Accordingly, the court pronounced that the complaint contained

all the allegations to support the charge of acts of lasciviousness
under the Revised Penal Code; hence, the conduct of another
preliminary investigation for the offense of acts of lasciviousness
would be a futile exercise because the complainant would only
be presenting the same facts and evidence which have already
been studied by the prosecutor. 32 The court frowns upon such
superfluity which only serves to delay the prosecution and
disposition of the criminal complaint. 33
Second. Petitioners would have this court declare Section 45 (j)
of Republic Act No. 8189 vague, on the ground that it contravenes
the fair notice requirement of the1987 Constitution, in particular,
Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2), Article III of thereof. Petitioners
submit that Section 45 (j) of Republic Act No. 8189 makes no
reference to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which
would constitute an election offense.
We are not convinced.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially
invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application.
(Spouses Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
|||

167011, [April 30, 2008], 576 PHIL 357-470)

A facial invalidation of a
statute is allowed only in free
speech cases, wherein certain
rules of constitutional
litigation are rightly excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and
impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of
terrorism 46 under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce
the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are
nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard
to measure the prohibited acts.
Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines
of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in
the present case since these doctrines apply only to free
speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not
speech.
For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these
doctrines, it is imperative to outline the schools of thought on
whether the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines
are equally applicable grounds to assail a penal statute.
Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting
toward the idea of limiting the application of the two doctrines
to free speech cases. They particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan 47 and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan. 48
The Court clarifies.
At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the
word "intervene" in Section 5 49 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act was intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad.
The Court stated that "the overbreadth and the vagueness
doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases,"
and are "not appropriate for testing the validity of penal
statutes." 50 It added that, at any rate, the challenged
provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is
not vague. 51
 While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v.
Commission on Elections, 52 the Court stated that a facial
invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, it
nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and
concluded that the therein subject election
offense 53 under the Voter's Registration Act of 1996, with
which the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in
precise language. 54
The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate
Opinion 55 of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in the Estrada case,
where the Court found the Anti-Plunder Law (Republic Act No.
7080) clear and free from ambiguity respecting the definition
of the crime of plunder.
The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates
these two doctrines to the concept of a "facial" invalidation as
opposed to an "as-applied" challenge. He basically postulated
that allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do
not justify a facial review of its validity. The pertinent portion
of the Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza, which was
quoted at length in the main Estrada decision, reads:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The
theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify
allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated
by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible
harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to
go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory
effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from
their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowedfor
this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the
area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have
special application only to free speech cases. They are
inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S.
Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth'
doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled
that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in
cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth
claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to
be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has
been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is
the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since
the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."
As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may
challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its
possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some
conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the
vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech casesor, as they are
called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken
as applying to other persons or other situations in which
its application might be unconstitutional." As has been
pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as
a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as
applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is
no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the
Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in
striking them down entirely on the ground that they might
be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities
are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure
from the case and controversy requirement of the
Constitution and permits decisions to be made without
concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.
But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v.
Harris:
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute,
pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction
of these deficiencies before the statute is put into
effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the
judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness
of the controversy, the impact on the legislative
process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required
line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . .
ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly
unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions,
whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes
has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is
generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality
of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to
have been violated in a case must be examined in the light
of the conduct with which the defendant is
charged. 56 (Underscoring supplied.)
 The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking
relation of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as
grounds for a facial or as-applied challenge against a penal
statute (under a claim of violation of due process of law) or a
speech regulation (under a claim of abridgement of the
freedom of speech and cognate rights).
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of
overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect
of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. 57 The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that
a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. 58 DCcIaE

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the

overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand
what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected. 59
A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-
applied challenge.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which
considers only extant facts affecting real litigants,
a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its
actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or
prediction that its very existence may cause others not before
the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities. 60
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle 61 in his
concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge , are not applicable
to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount
a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either
vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases
is justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on
protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times
be abridged. 62 As reflected earlier, this rationale is
inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an " in
terrorem effect" in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact,
the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly
considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from
diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights. 63
The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by
which a criminal statute may be challenged" and "underscored
that an 'on-its-face' invalidation of penal statutes . . . may not
be allowed." 64
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes
on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may
ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge.
The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal
statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong
criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case
of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively
go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an
existing and concrete controversy before judicial power
may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against
a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It
would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties
who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to
 the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal
statutes, such a test will impair the State's ability to deal
with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can
hinder an accused from defeating the State's power to
prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third
parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad,
notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to
him. 65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the

overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge
and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge,
applicable only to free speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily
apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of
protected speech, inevitably almost alwaysunder situations
not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute
cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad
if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the
litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique
is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of
constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant
claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him
or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights
of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court
invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as
applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes
unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes
it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to
depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern
with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad
statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring
 suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law's "very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An
overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent
effect on the speech of those third parties. 66 (Emphasis in
the original omitted; underscoring supplied.)

In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech

claims, the Court, in at least two cases, 67 observed that the
US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment, 68 and that
claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate
only spoken words. 69 In Virginia v. Hicks, 70 it was held that
rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a
law or regulation that is not specifically addressed
to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad
statutes are justified by the "transcendent value to all society
of constitutionally protected expression."
(Sourthern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-
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Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890,

179157, 179461, [October 5, 2010], 646 PHIL 452-496)