Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Pascual Vs CA
Pascual Vs CA
Pascual Vs CA
When Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 took effect, the petition was reassigned to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig, Branch 162, presided by Judge Manual Padolina. On November 4, 1985, the
DR. OLIVIA S. PASCUAL, in her capacity as special administratrix of the estate of the late heirs of the decedent moved for the approval of their Compromise Agreement, stipulating that three
DON ANDRES PASCUAL and as executrix of the testate estate of the late DOA ADELA S. fourths (3/4) of the estate would go to Doa Adela and one fourth (1/4) to the other heirs. The
PASCUAL, petitioner, intestate court approved said Agreement on December 10, 1985.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch On August 18, 1987, while the settlement was still pending, Doa Adela died, leaving a will which
162; DEPUTY SHERIFF CARLOS G. MAOG; and ATTY. JESUS I. SANTOS, respondents. named the petitioner as the sole universal heir. The latter filed at the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon, Branch 72, a petition for the probate of said will.
On September 30, 1987, the RTC of Pasig denied the motion to reiterate hereditary rights, which
PANGANIBAN, J.: was filed by petitioner and her brother. The Court reasoned that, as illegitimate children of the
brother of the decedent, they were barred from acquiring any hereditary right to her intestate estate
under Article 992 of the Civil Code. 5 On December 17, 1987, it ordered that the private
The extraordinary action to annul a final judgment is restricted to the grounds provided by law, in respondent's lien in the hereditary share of Doa Adela be entered into the records.
order to prevent it from being used by a losing party to make a complete farce of a duly
promulgated decision that has long become final and executory.
Six years after Doa Adela's death, on January 19, 1994, to be exact, Judge Padolina rendered a
Decision which disposed as follows: 6
The Case
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let the manner of partition of the
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the June 7, 1995 Decision of the Court estate of Don Andres Pascual be as follows:
of Appeals 1 in CA-GR SP-No. 34487, denying the Petition for Annulment of Judgment. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads: 2
One-fourth (1/4) of the properties, personal and real, to
the heirs of Don Andres Pascual in accordance with the
WHEREFORE, and upon all the foregoing considerations, the petition is provisions of the Compromise Agreement of October 16,
hereby DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. 1985.
As stated earlier, the appellate court dismissed the petition, ruling that the intestate court had The Issues
jurisdiction to make the questioned award and that petitioner had been accorded due process. It
noted that the private respondent had filed his claim as early as the first quarter of 1974; and that,
In her Memorandum, 13 petitioner alleges that the reversal of the assailed Decision is called for, in Petitioner insistently argues that the January 19, 1994 RTC Decision, insofar as it awarded
view of the following "compelling reasons": 14 attorney's fees, was void from the beginning because the intestate court had lost jurisdiction over
the person of Doa Adela (the attorney's client) due to her death.
a. The portion of the decision dated January 19, 1994 awarding attorney's
fees is void from the beginning because it was made after . . . [the] trial court The argument is untenable. The basic flaw in the argument is the misapplication of the rules on the
had lost its jurisdiction over the attorney's client by reason of her death[;] extinction of a civil action 19 in special proceeding. The death of Doa Adela did not ipso
facto extinguish the monetary claim of private respondent or require him to refile his claim with the
b. The questioned portion of the decision of . . . [the] trial court is void because court hearing the settlement of her testate estate. Had her filed the claim against Doa Adela
it deprived the heirs of Doa Adela due process of law[:] personally, the rule would have applied. However, he did so against the estate of Don Andres.
c. The questioned portion of the decision of respondent trial court is void from Thus, where an appointed administrator dies, the applicable rule is Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules
the beginning because the body of the decision does not state the facts and of Court, which requires the appointment of a new administrator, viz.:
the law upon which the award is based[;]
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator.
d. Petitioner has not lost her right to question the conclusion of respondent Proceedings upon death, resignation or removal . . . When an executor or
trial court on the amount of attorney's fees[;] and administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letter to
someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator,
e. The writ of execution was wrongfully issued.
administration may be granted to any suitable person.
The Court believes that the resolution of this case hinges on the following issues: (1) Did the trial The rule does not have the effect of divesting the instance court of jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction
court have jurisdiction to make the questioned award of attorney's fees? (2) Were the heirs of Doa subsists because the proper party in this case is the estate of Don Andres, which is distinct and
Adela, who were represented by petitioner, deprived of due process? (3) Were there factual and separate from that of Doa Adela who merely served as the former's administratrix. Doa Adela
legal bases for the award of attorney's fees? Additionally, the Court will dispose of Crisanto S.
was merely a representative party. 20 and the claim was an item of the administrative expenses of
Cornejo's "Omnibus Motion." Don Andres' estate. It is well-settled that a monetary claim against the person administering an
estate, in relation to his or her acts of administration, in its ordinary course, can be filed at the court
The Court's Ruling where a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate is pending. 21
The Petition is devoid of merit. Likewise, the Omnibus Motion is unmeritorious. Hence, in spite of the death of the appointed administratrix, it was the duty of the intestate court to
determine whether the private respondent's claim was allowable as administrative expense if it
The failure to perfect an appeal in the manner and within the period fixed by law renders the was obtained in reference to the management of the estate; the performance of legal services
decision final and executory. Consequently, no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review which the administratrix herself could not perform; the prosecution or defense of actions or suits on
such decision. 15 Upon the other hand, the extraordinary action to annul a final judgment is limited behalf of or against the estate; or the discovery, recovery or preservation of properties of the
to the grounds provided by law and cannot be used as a stratagem to reopen the entire estate. 22 In other words, the intestate court has a mandate to resolve whether the said claim is a
controversy and thereby make a complete farce of a duly promulgate decision that has long "necessary expense in the care, management and settlement of the estate." 23 For the same
become final and executory. 16 Accordingly, this review shall consider only matters pertaining to the reason, the fact that the private respondent's lien was recorded four months after the administratrix
jurisprudential grounds for the annulment of a final judgment: 17 had died is of no moment.
. . . Annulment of judgment may . . . be based on the ground that [either] a Payment of Separate Docket
judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or the judgment was obtained by
extrinsic fraud. . . . . 16 Fees Is Not Necessary
Petitioner does not allege extrinsic fraud, but bases her petition only on alleged lack of jurisdiction While not exactly a ground for annulment, the Court has held that it is the payment of the
and due process. prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of
the actin. 24 Petitioner avers that the intestate court had no jurisdiction to award the disputed
First Issue: attorney's fees before private respondent paid docket fees, as required in Lacson v. Reyes. 25
Second Issue: Besides, the petitioner had ample time to contest the claim. From her appointment as special
administratrix until January 19, 1994 when the RTC Decision was rendered, she had all the time to
Heirs of Doa Adela Were Not Deprived of Due Process oppose the claim. This was the proper time to raise any objection. When she received said
Decision on February 8, 1994, again she had the chance to question the claim in a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal, and yet she opted not to take advantage of these remedies.
Asserting that she and the other heirs of the deceased administratrix were denied due process of
law, petitioner disputes the following finding of the
CA: 27 Such facts conclusively prove that petitioner was not deprived of due process, the essence of
which is the right to be heard. 30 Where a person is not heard because he or she has chosen not to
give his or her side of the case, such right is not violated. 31 If one who has a right to speak
We can neither view with favor the petitioner's contention that the award was chooses to be silent, one cannot later complain of being unduly silenced.
made without giving the heirs of Doa Adela due process of law. It must be
remembered that long before the . . . Judge's questioned Decision was
rendered, the petitioner was named special administratrix of the 3/4 share of Third Issue:
Doa Adela in the estate of Don Andres . . . . As such special administratrix,
the petitioner should have been aware of all her duties and responsibilities, Factual and Legal Bases of the Award of Attorney's Fees
one of which was to protect the estate from any disbursements based on
claims not chargeable to the estate. She should have known that notice to her Petitioner alleges that the award of attorney's fees contained in the fallo is void ab initio, as the
of the attorney's lien would have amounted to notice to the heirs of Doa intestate court failed to state the factual or legal bases therefor in the body of the Decision, in
Adela as well. violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution. 32
According to her, want to due process prevented the heirs from contesting the claim and submitting The Court disagrees. The legal and factual bases of the award were stated in the body of the
evidence to show that partial payments had been previously given to private respondent. January 19, 1994 RTC Decision. In recounting the "significant events leading to [the] eventual
culmination" 33 of the case, the trial court revealed the importance of the services of private
The Court is not convinced. If admitted by the administrator or executor, a claim according to Rule respondent who represented the estate, argued for the intestate court's approval of the
86 of Section 11 28 may be allowed by the court without any hearing. Respondent court found that Compromise Agreement, and rendered legal advice on the final distribution of the properties of the
the claim was indeed admitted and uncontested, as shown below: estate.
. . . From the date of her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of One must also consider that, unlike in the cases cited by petitioner, 34 the awards of attorney's fees
Doa Adela on September 28, 1989 up to and beyond the time the challenged herein is not in the concept of damages based on Article 2208 of the Civil Code which, as an
Decision became final and executory, there was nary a pip from the petitioner exception to the general rule not to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, is but a compensation
as such administratrix in opposition satisfaction of the subject attorney's lien. for services rendered. Thus, the legal proceedings that took place and the agreement between
To repeat what the respondent Judge said in his aforementioned Order, "there attorneys and client were more than sufficient proof of the legality of the award. These factual and
has been no opposition nor any hint of discord or resistance from the special legal bases, unlike in cases where attorney's fees are granted in the concept of damages, are not
administratrix or any other party as to this fact." unknown to the parties in the case at bar.
As if this were not enough, in a tacit acknowledgment of the validity of the Reasonable Attorney's Fees
subject contract of attorney's fees and acceptance of the enforcement thereof,
Petitioner avers that she has not lost her right to question the amount of attorney's fees awarded to merely a nominal party in an action for annulment of a final judgment. That private respondent filed
the private respondent, insisting that it was unreasonable, as "it countenance[d] exploitation for Civil Case No. 95-102-MN to collect his attorney's fees does not affect the validity or finality of the
speculative profit on account of the estate's enormous value." January 19, 1994 Decision or the award of attorney's fees in the settlement of the estate of the
husband of Doa Adela. In fact, it was dismissed for violation of the rule against forum shopping.
The Court disagrees. Although attorney's fees are always subject to judicial control, 35 delving into As the reopening of the probate of the latter's will not relevant to the annulment of said award, the
its reasonableness involves going into its merits, an action that is procedurally impermissible at this consolidation of the cases mentioned was similarly improper. Inexistent is the connection between
late time and in these proceedings. Be it remembered that petitioner filed not an appeal, but a the settlement of both decedents' estate and that of Toribia Tolentino Soldevilla's. It is very clear
Petition to Annul a Final Judgment. In any event, the Court finds no evidence to show that the that the motion for intervention has absolutely no merit.
stipulated amount of attorney's fees was illegal immoral; or in contravention of law, good morals,
good customs, public order or public policy. It is therefore enforceable as the law between the WHEREFORE, the Petition and the Omnibus Motion are hereby DENIED, and the assailed
parties. 36 Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
The reasonableness of the stipulated attorney's fees finds support in Law Firm of Raymundo A.
Armovit v. Court of Appeals, 37 which upheld the payment of "twenty percent of all recoveries" as
attorney's fees in a foreclosure case, in which counsel succeeded in preventing the foreclosure of
his client's property and in obtaining for the latter P2.7 million in unpaid rentals. In the present case,
petitioner's averment that the fees in question are not proportionate to the services rendered by
private respondent fails to consider the numerous properties involved and the private respondent's
labor for thirteen years, during which time he became responsible for the estate of Don Andres. In
fact, the established standards in fixing attorney's fees calls for the upholding of the award. 38
Additional Issue:
Clearly understood, the Omnibus Motion is really a disguised motion for intervention.
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 which was already in effect when the Omnibus
Motion was filed on October 21, 1997, provides the guidelines for intervention:
Sec. 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. (2[a]. [b]a.
R12)
Cornejo and his co-movants claim that their inheritance is being dissipated; thus, they seek
permission to intervene in this case. Obviously, however, they filed the motion beyond the
prescribed period. Section 2 of the aforecited Rule allows intervention at "any time before rendition
of judgment by the trial court." This motion was filed only after the parties had submitted their
memoranda and many years after both the RTC and the CA had rendered their decisions.
Further, the motion lacks substance. Any misconduct or violation of judicial responsibility allegedly
committed by Judge Padolina is not a proper subject of intervention. The reason is simple: he is