H.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be
Ruben Villaluz vs Calixto Zaldivar
15 SCRA 710 Political Law Control Power Removal Power
Appointees
Ruben Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor
Vehicles Office in 1958. In 1960, Congressman Joaquin Roces alleged
that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and had caused losses to the
government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz.
Consequently, Executive Secretary Calixto Zaldivar suspended Villaluz
and ordered a committee to investigate the matter. After investigation,
it was recommended that Villaluz be removed. The president then
issued an Administrative Order removing Villaluz from his post. Villaluz
averred that the president has no jurisdiction to remove him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the
President to be removed considering that he is an appointee of the
president.
HELD: Yes. The president has jurisdiction and not the Civil
Service. The President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate
and remove him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to
the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of Republic
Act No. 2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the
non-competitive or unclassified service of the government and as such
he can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing
by the President of the Philippines under the principle that the power
to remove is inherent in the power to appoint .
There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the
President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove
officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they
are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service
for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint but not with regard to those officers or
employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that
inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of
our Constitution which says that the Congress may by law vest the
appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the
courts, or in heads of department.
Read full text
TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v THE
COURT OF APPEALS
527 SCRA 746 G.R. No. 167324
Facts:
1. In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda
(HSRA). It provided for five general areas of reform:
A. To provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals;
B. Secure funding for priority public health programs;
C. Promote the development of local health systems and
ensure its effective performance;
D. Strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies;
E. Expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance
Program (NHIP)
F. On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled Redirecting the
Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,
which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and
organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed
executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from
being the sole provider of health services to being a
provider of specific health services and technical
assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services
to local government units.
G. A petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform
Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department
of Health (DOH); and Executive Order No. 102,
Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the
Department of Health,
declared void for violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18
of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of
Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the
1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the
duty of the State to protect and promote the peoples right
to health and well-being. It reasoned that the
aforementioned provisions of the Constitution are not self-
executing; they are not judicially enforceable constitutional
rights and can only provide guidelines for legislation.
I. 5. The Court of Appeals held that Executive Order No.
102 is detrimental to the health of the people cannot be
made a justiciable issue. The question of whether the
HSRA will bring about the development or disintegration
of the health sector is within the realm of the political
department.
Issue:
Whether or not the HSRA and EO NO. 102 violates the constitution?
Held:
The Court finds the present petition to be without merit.
1. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are
considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation
for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-
executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily
nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions
have already been categorically declared by this Court as non
self-executing. Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in
the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution
specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 the
provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non self-
executing in the aforecited case of Taada v. Angara, wherein
the Court specifically set apart the sections as non self-
executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative
enactments before they can be implemented. Moreover, the
records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA
supposedly violated the equal protection and due process
clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of
the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since they
failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were
breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the
relevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, in
annulling the HSRA.
2. Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven
by the petitioners, they would still not invalidate Executive Order
No. 102. Any serious legal errors in laying down the
compensation of the DOH employees concerned can only
invalidate the pertinent provisions of Department Circular No.
312, Series of 2000. Likewise, any questionable appointments or
transfers are properly addressed by an appeal process provided
under Administrative Order No. 94, series of 2000; and if the
appeal is meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be
invalidated. The validity of Executive Order No. 102 would,
nevertheless, remain unaffected. Settled is the rule that courts
are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may
be abused or disabused, and may afford an opportunity for
abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or
ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its
efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a
particular case. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
clearly states: [T]he president shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices. Section 31, Book III, Chapter
10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative
Code of 1987. It is an exercise of the Presidents constitutional
power of control over the executive department, supported by
the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other
statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.
Page |1of 2THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENTNon-Judicial Wo ! fo
Judge"A #$ % &ec 12
Meralco vs. Pasay Trans Co., 57 Phil. 600 (1932)Fast acts
The case at bar relates with a petition of the Manila Electric
Company (MEC, pet), requesting the members of the SC,
 sittingas a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which
certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use
the asigbridge of the MEC and the compensation to be
paid to the MEC by suchtransportation companies!
!ct "#. 1$$6, %ection 11
"elates with the legal act of the members of the SC, sitting as a
board of arbitrators, to act on the petition!
&ss'eConcerns the le al ri ht o the e *ers o the %C,
sittin as a *oar+ o ar*itrators the +ecision o a a ority
o -ho shall *e inal, to act in that ca acity./el+ atio
#ct $%%&, Section $$ contra'enes the maxims which guide
the operation of a democratic go'ernment
constitutionallyestablished, and that it would be improper
and illegal for the members of the SC, sitting as a board or
arbitrators, the decisionof a ma ority of whom shall be final,
to act on the petition of the MEC!The decisions of the oard
of #rbitration shall go through the regular court system (Trial
Courts * Court of #ppeals * SC)!They will be re'iewed by the
lower courts and will ultimately be re'iewed by themsel'es!
The SC cannot sit as members of the oard of #rbitration
because it is not within their urisdiction to decided on cases
on purely contractual situations!
TELEBAP vs COMELEC Case Digest
Telecommunications And Broadcast Attorneys Of The Phils. Vs.
COMELEC
289 SCRA 337
G.R. No. 132922
April 21, 1998
Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and
television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal
standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to
show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of
the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the
requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner
operates radio and television broadcast stations in
thePhilippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No.
881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which
provides:
Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television
time to be known as the Comelec Time which shall be allocated
equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of
coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the
franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge,
during the period of campaign.
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires
COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with
payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by
COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles
out radio and television stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos
in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential
election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even
more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim
that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations
is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to
provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private
property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in
providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this years
elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs
requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for
such.
Issue:
Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television
broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of
property without due process of law and without just compensation.
Held: Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether
radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave
frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who
want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and
television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not
own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit
broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may
reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some
form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast
stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends
considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television
stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines
which require payment of just compensation for the print space they
may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast
industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the
case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free
air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no
private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time
to the COMELEC.
Bayan vs Zamora
G. R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000
Bayan vs Zamora
Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed,
among others, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which
culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel
Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary
Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May
27, 1999, the senate approved it by (2/3) votes.
Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987
constitution is applicable and not Section 21, Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the
Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so
required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is
applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and
effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members
of the senate.
ISSUE:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of
Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?
HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving
foreign military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant
case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the
provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to
the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes
required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.
The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and
permanent. We find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires
foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the
Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as
an executive agreement because, under international law, an
executive agreement is as binding as a treaty
G ARRIDO vs. G ARRIDO
Facts:The petitioner, the respondents legal wife, filed a complaint-
affidavit and a supplementalaffidavit for disbarment against the
respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P.Valencia
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Discipline,
chargingthem with gross immoralit y, in viol ation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.0 1, of the Cod e of Professional Responsibility. The
complaint arose after the petitioner caught wind through her
daughter that her husb and wa s having a n affair wit h a
wom an other tha n his wife a nd alread y ha d achild with her;
and the sam e inform ation was confirm ed wh en on er of
her d aug hters sa w thather husband walking in a Robinsons mall
with the other respondent, Atty. Valencia, with their child in
to w. After a much further investigation into the matter, the time and eff
ort given yielded resultstelling her that Atty. Valencia and her legal
husband had been married in Hong Kong.Moreover, on June 1993, her
husband left their conjugal home and joined Atty. RamonaPaguida
Valencia at their residence, and has since failed to render much
needed financialsupport. In their defense, they postulated that they
were not lawyers as of yet when theycomm itted the supposed
imm orality, so as such, they were not guilt y of a viol ation
of Cano n1, Rul e 1.01.
Issue:Whether or not Atty. Garridos and Valencias actions constitute
a violation of Canon 1, Rule1.01 and thus a good enough cause for
their disbarment, despite the offense beingsupposedly comm itted
when th ey were not la wye rs.
Held:Yes. Mem bership i n the Bar is a privil ege, a nd as a
privi leg e besto we d by l a w th roug h theSup rem e Cou rt,
m em bership in the Bar can b e withdra wn whe re
circumstances show thelawyers lack of the essential qualifications
required of lawyers, be they academic or moral.In the present case,
the Court had resolved to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel
E.Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for the reason of their blatant
violation of Canon 1,Rule 1.01 o f the Code of Professional
Responsibilit y, which commands that a lawyer shallnot
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Furthermore, Thecontention of respondent that they were not yet
lawyers when they got married shall notafford them exem ption
from sanctions; good m oral character was already required
as acondition precedent to admission to the
Bar. As a lawyer, a person whom the community looked up to, Atty. Ga
rrido and Valencia wereshouldered with the expectation that they
would set a good example in promoting obedienceto the Constitution
and the laws. When they violated the law and distorted it to cater to
hisown personal needs and selfish motives, not only did their actions
discredit the legalprofession. Such actions by themselves, without
even including the fact of Garridosabandonment of paternal
responsibility, to the detriment of his children by the petitioner; or the
fact that Valencia married Garrido despite knowing of his other
marriages to two other women including the petitioner, are clear
indications of a lack of moral values not consistentwith the proper
conduct of practicing lawyers within the country. As such, their
disbarment isaffirm ed.
Statement of UP Professors. While the statement was meant to
reflect the educators opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against
Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an
established fact, but a truth. They expressed dissatisfaction over
Justice Del Castillos explanation on how he cited the primary sources
of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those
of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized. The statement
bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The first
paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The authors also
not only assumed that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism, they
went further by directly accusing the Court of perpetrating
extraordinary injustice by dismissing the petition of the comfort women
in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. They further attempt to educate this
Court on how to go about the review of the case. The insult to the
members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately
delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of
polluted sources, the Courts alleged indifference to the cause of
petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the
members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and
respect.
The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law
regarding the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court was totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of
misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge is the ongoing investigation
precisely to determine the truth of such allegations. More importantly,
the motion for reconsideration of the decision alleged to contain
plagiarized materials is still pending before the Court. We made it clear
in the case of In re Kelly that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting
upon the court, the jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the
counsel with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision
of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable.
The UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against
a resolution that would not reverse the Vinuya decision. This runs
contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court
to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which
they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys,
and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.Re: Letter
of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement
by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law
on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC. October 19, 2010.