AUSTRALIAN GROUP

Objectives of the Group

Chemical and biological weapons (CBW) are indiscriminate in their application and their
deadly effects have been known since ancient times. They were first used on a large
scale in the First World War, with soldiers being exposed to poisonous gases, including
phosgene and sulphur mustard (a blistering agent). The result was over one million
casualties and approximately 100,000 fatalities. Since that time, CBW technology has
become more advanced, and hence even more lethal. The use by Iraq of CW in the
form of nerve agents and sulphur mustard in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, and the
1995 poison gas (sarin) attack on the Tokyo underground, provide chilling examples of
the indiscriminate and inhumane effects of these weapons.

The principal objective of Australia Group participants is to use licensing measures to

ensure that exports of certain chemicals, biological agents, and dual-use chemical and
biological manufacturing facilities and equipment, do not contribute to the spread of
CBW. The Group achieves this by harmonising participating countries national export
licensing measures. The Groups activities are especially important given that the
international chemical and biotechnology industries are a target for proliferators as a
source of materials for CBW programs.

Participants have recognised from the outset that export licensing measures are not a
substitute for the strict and universal observance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the
1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC). All participants in the Australia Group are States Parties to both the
BWC and the CWC. Support for these regimes and their aims remains the overriding
objective of Australia Group participants. Export licensing measures instituted by
individual members assist in implementing key obligations under the CWC (Article I, 1
(a) and (d)) and the BWC (Articles I and III).

Export licensing measures also demonstrate participants determination of members to

avoid not only direct but also inadvertent involvement in the spread of CBW, and to
express their opposition to the use of these weapons. It is also in the interestS of
commercial firms and research institutes and of their governments to ensure that they
do not inadvertently supply chemicals, chemical equipment, biological agents or
biological equipment for use in the manufacture of CBW. Global chemical and biological
industries have firmly supported this principle.
 WASSENAAR AGREEMENT

The Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement are:

Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic
of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and
United States.

The Wassenaar Arrangement has been established in order to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting
transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising
accumulations. Participating States seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the
development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are not diverted to support such capabilities.

The decision to transfer or deny transfer of any item is the sole responsibility of each Participating State. All measures with respect to the
Arrangement are taken in accordance with national legislation and policies and are implemented on the basis of national discretion. Therefore,
for specifics on Export Controls in Participating States contact the National Authorities in that country.

Representatives of Participating States meet regularly in Vienna where the Wassenaar Arrangement's Secretariat is located.

The WA Plenary is the decision-making and governing body of the Arrangement. It is composed of representatives of all Participating States
who normally meet once a year, usually in December. The Plenary Chair is subject to annual rotation among Participating States.

The Plenary establishes subsidiary bodies for the preparation of recommendations for plenary decisions and calls ad hoc meetings for
consultations on issues related to the functioning of the WA. At present, the WA main subsidiary bodies are: the General Working
Group (GWG) dealing with policy-related matters and the Experts Group (EG) addressing issues related to the lists of controlled items. Once
a year, a Licensing and Enforcement Officers Meeting (LEOM) is held under the auspices of the GWG.

Vienna Points of Contact (VPOC) are called for periodic meetings under the Plenary Chair to facilitate intersessional information flow and
communications between/among Participating States and the Secretariat.

The Secretariat provides necessary support to WA operations from Vienna where it is located.

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The Missile Technology Control Regime

The Missile Technology Control Regime is an informal and voluntary association of countries which
share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of
mass destruction, and which seek to coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing
their proliferation. The MTCR was originally established in 1987 by Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Since that time, the number of MTCR partners has
increased to a total of thirty-four countries, all of which have equal standing within the Regime.

The MTCR was initiated partly in response to the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), i.e., nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The risk of proliferation of WMD is
well recognized as a threat to international peace and security, including by the UN Security Council in
its Summit Meeting Declaration of January 31, 1992. While concern has traditionally focussed on state
proliferators, after the tragic events of 11 September 2001, it became evident that more also has to
be done to decrease the risk of WMD delivery systems falling into the hands of terrorist groups and
individuals. One way to counter this threat is to maintain vigilance over the transfer of missile
equipment, material, and related technologies usable for systems capable of delivering WMD.

The MTCR rests on adherence to common export policy guidelines (the MTCR Guidelines) applied to an
integral common list of controlled items (the MTCR Equipment, Software and Technology Annex). All
MTCR decisions are taken by consensus, and MTCR partners regularly exchange information about
relevant national export licensing issues.

National export licensing measures on these technologies make the task of countries seeking to
achieve capability to acquire and produce unmanned means of WMD delivery much more difficult. As a
result, many countries, including all MTCR partners, have chosen voluntarily to introduce export
licensing measures on rocket and other unmanned air vehicle delivery systems or related equipment,
material and technology.

The current Chairman of the Regime is Ambassador Roberto Garcia Moritn of Argentina.

Indias Connect Central Asia Policy

Indias Connect Central Asia Policy is a broad-based approach, including political, security, economic
and cultural connections. on 12 June 2012 India's Minister Of State for External AffairsShri E.
Ahamed gave a Keynote address at First India-Central Asia Dialogue.

He outlined some of the elements of Indias Connect Central Asia policy as follows:

1. India will continue to build on our strong political relations through the exchange of high level visits. Its
leaders will continue to interact closely both in bilateral and multilateral fora.

2. India will strengthen its strategic and security cooperation. India already has strategic partnerships in
place with some Central Asian countries. In focus will be military training, joint research, counter-terrorism
coordination and close consultations on Afghanistan.

3. India will step up multilateral engagement with Central Asian partners using the synergy of joint efforts
through existing fora like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Eurasian Economic Community (EEC)
and the Custom Union. India has already proposed a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement
to integrate its markets with the unifying Eurasian space.

4. India looks to Central Asia as a long term partner in energy, and natural resources. Central Asia
possesses large cultivable tracts of land and it sees potential for India to cooperate in production of
profitable crops with value addition.

5. The medical field is another area that offers huge potential for cooperation. India is ready to extend
cooperation by setting up civil hospitals/clinics in Central Asia.
6. Indias higher education system delivers at a fraction of the fees charged by Western universities.
Keeping this in mind, India would like to assist in the setting up of a Central Asian University in Bishkek
that could come up as a centre of excellence to impart world class education in areas like Information
Technology, management, philosophy and languages.

7. India is working on setting up a Central Asian e-network with its hub in India, to deliver, tele-education
and tele-medicine connectivity, linking all the five Central Asian States.

8. Indian companies can showcase its capability in the construction sector and build world class
structures at competitive rates. Central Asian countries, especially Kazakhstan, have almost limitless
reserves of iron ore and coal, as well as abundant cheap electricity. India can help set up several medium
size steel rolling mills, producing its requirement of specific products.

9. As for land connectivity, India has reactivated the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
India & Central Asian nations need to join our efforts to discuss ways to bridge the missing links in the
Corridor at the earliest and also work on other connecting spurs along the route.

10. Absence of a viable banking infrastructure in the region is a major barrier to trade and investment.
Indian banks can expand their presence if they see a favourable policy environment.

11. India will jointly work to improve air connectivity between our countries. India is one of the biggest
markets for outbound travelers estimated at USD 21 billion in 2011. Many countries have opened tourist
offices in India to woo Indian tourists. Central Asian countries could emerge as attractive holiday
destinations for tourists and even for the Indian film industry which likes to depict exotic foreign locales in
its films.

12. Connections between our peoples are the most vital linkages to sustain our deep engagement. I
would particularly like to emphasise exchanges between youth and the future leaders of India and Central
Asia. India already has a robust exchange of students. India will encourage regular exchanges of
scholars, academics, civil society and youth delegations to gain deeper insights into each others cultures.

Non-Alignment 2.0

The buzzword or mantra amongst the Indian strategic community of recent times has been
'strategic autonomy'. This loosely implies that, in matters relating to international affairs
and geopolitics, India will not be cajoled, enticed or coerced into actions that would
jeopardise its standing as a responsible and restrained regional power with the potential to
emerge as a major power to reckon with in the years to come. So far so good!

In hindsight, decisions not to send troops to Iraq and Afghanistan as part of an

international force, and participate instead in developmental and reconstruction work, were
the right ones. India's 'Look East' policy of recent times is not part of any grand combined
strategy to marginalise China, but merely a realisation that historical ties with Southeast
Asia needed to be resuscitated on a stand-alone basis; a revival of ancient ties and harbinger
of regional stability.

Many western commentators identify this quest for autonomy as a hangover from the days
of non-alignment and argue that any country aspiring for great power status has to be
prepared to take 'strategic risks' and clearly define whether it is on the side of liberal
democracy, freedom and globalisation, or whether it is comfortable with supporting
authoritarian, repressive or extremist regimes. This view is flawed because it does not take
into consideration the fact that India's quest for strategic autonomy is as recent as the onset
of economic liberalisation in the early 1990s.

Let's face it; India's non-aligned posture during the Cold War was, by no yardstick, a
reflection of strategic autonomy. This was primarily because it just did not have enough
economic and military muscle to drive autonomy. The economic reforms of 1991 paved the
way for development of independent strategic thought within the country that sought to
question the emerging post-Cold War uni-polar world. Here again, while many scholars
talked about the benefits of a multi-polar world, they were unable to cement India's place in
this world because of the lack of adequate comprehensive national power.

The coming of age of any strategic discourse is reflected by the number of divergent views
that exist on issues related to national security, and the speed with which discourses change
when the international security environment changes. Take the example of the US. From an
unabashedly aggressive and neoconservative uni-polar posture in the early 1990s, the mood
has turned sombre with the strategic community split down the middle.

While the neocons continue to push for 'global dominance' in furtherance of national
interests, realists are calling for 'selective engagement', 'partnerships' and 'coalitions' to
protect democracy, sustain globalisation, check the spread of regional hegemony,
particularly when it threatens regional stability and, most importantly, continue the global
war on terror. There are even voices that are calling for a complete disengagement of the US
from global affairs and a return to 'isolation'.
From an Indian perspective too, the last few years have seen healthy debates on issues
ranging from our nuclear doctrine, relations with China, contours of the India-US strategic
partnership, non-traditional threats to security like water and energy security, suitable
response mechanisms to tackle the proxy war in the state of Jammu & Kashmir, terrorism in
the hinterland and, most importantly, growing left-wing extremism. There is also a near
unanimity that, in the medium term, it is India's economic well-being and ability to plug
internal cracks that will drive its quest for strategic autonomy.

All this is good to hear, but is executable only if economic power is complemented by
sufficient 'hard power' and control over critical technologies. This is where India may need
to continuously re-evaluate its handling of the soft and hard power balance, and take a
closer look at the ingredients of a 'smart power' strategy.

One cannot but help look at the way the French have skilfully managed strategic autonomy,
both during the Cold War era and in recent times. The essence of that attempt has been in
their ability to combine the immense soft power of French culture, art, food and wine, and
the deve-lopment of credible military power with control over critical technologies without
relying too much on the US. It was a conscious national choice, so different from the
choice of their neighbours across the Channel.
The hawks and pessimists may say that India's current strategic posture on critical national
security issues does not match its international standing, and leaves it vulnerable to
aggression on multiple fronts due to numerous fissures and cracks. The pragmatists or the
realists would counter this by saying that the hawks ignore the 'big picture', and that being
responsible, resilient and restrained is a demonstration of the 'idea of India'. The debate
goes on, as it should in a liberal and multicultural democracy like India.

The bottom line is that unbridled economic growth is only possible if India has the requisite
capabilities to deter, deny, coerce and punish. Strategic autonomy will remain a mere
concept till India is prepared to back it with intent and hard power.