ASSIGNMENT FOR JANUARY 30, 2017

SECTIONS 13 AND 14 OF ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 13

WHAT IS BAIL? WHEN IS IT A MATTER OF RIGHT, A MATTER OF DISCRETION AND WHEN IT SHOULD BE DENIED? WHAT ARE
THE FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN FIXING A BAIL?

SECTION 14

WHAT ARE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED?

CASES FOR DIGEST:

RIGHT TO BAIL SECTION 13

1. People vs. Fortes and Fortes vs. Judge Guan, 223 SCRA 619

2. Arula vs. Espino, 28 SCRA 540

3. Government of the US vs. Judge Puruganan and Mark Jimenez, GR 148571, 12/17/02 t

4. Government of Hong Kong vs. Hon. Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr., GR 153675, 4/19/07

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

5. People vs. Hubert Webb, GR 123792, 8/17/99

6. People vs. Sta. Teresa, GR 130663, 3/20/01

7. Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392

8. Flores vs. Ruiz, 90 SCRA 428

9. People vs. Monje, GR 146689, 9/27/02

10. Reynaldo Jaylo vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 183152, 1/21/15

1. People vs. Fortes and Fortes vs. Judge Guan, 223 SCRA 619

Facts: Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old
daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by the accused.
Following this, the accused was apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was granted for accuseds provisional release.
The MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to RTC was filed, the request for the fixing of bond was denied. Now accused assails
denial of bail on the ground that the same amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional right to bail.

Issue: Whether or Not the accuseds right to bail violated.

Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, that before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged
is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the offense charged is
punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The
court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the
part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court.
2. Arula vs. Espino, 28 SCRA 540

b) Traditionally, the right to bail is not available to the military.

In Comendador V. de Villa, 200 SCRA 80, it was held that traditionally, the right to bail has not
been recognized and is not available to the military, as an exception to the Bill of Rights.
This much was suggested in Arula v. Espino, 28 SCRA 540, where the Court observed that
"the right to speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does
not exist. The denial; of the right to bail to the military does not violate the equal protection
clause because there is substantial distinction between the military and civilians.

3 . Government of the US vs. Judge Puruganan and Mark Jimenez, GR 148571, 12/17/02

FACTS:
Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr.
Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. On May 18, 2001,
the Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition
praying for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of
Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion
praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez
submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post
bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary
liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted
provisional liberty.

Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take
cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.

ISSUES:
i. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant
under Section 6 of PD No. 1069
ii. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
iii. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.

i. YES.

By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely
to get a good first impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and
detention of the accused. The prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an
arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the
matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation
that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at
this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the
request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and
execute an escape which neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended.

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself
requires only the examination under oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may produce.

The Proper Procedure to Best Serve The Ends Of Justice In Extradition Cases
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as
possible, a prima facie finding whether
a) they are sufficient in form and substance
b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c) the person sought is extraditable

At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and
witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be
dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the
magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the
petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or
notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate
the proceedings.

ii. Yes.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the
Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended finds application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant
him one in the present case. Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is
charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each
case. Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing
1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the
highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of
justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and
emphatic forcefulness.

It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public
knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Therefore, his constituents were or should have been
prepared for the consequences of the extradition case. Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his election to public office
is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.

Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him
the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition
proceedings even more. Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with
the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and
technicalities that may negate that purpose.

That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach
of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.

iii. NO.

Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine of right to due
process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity to be
heard is enough. He will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy
fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been
conducted in that country. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

Other Doctrines:

Five Postulates of Extradition

1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime

In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in
order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.

2) The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of
the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.

3) The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

An extradition proceeding is sui generis:

a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. It does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in
the court of the state where he will be extradited.
b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for
conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case
d) Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our
courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.

Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime
is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is
only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is
extraditable.

4) Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Treaty. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper

5) There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent:
a) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and
b) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is
charged with are bailable

Extradition is Essentially Executive

Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign
relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power
of implementation.

4. Government of Hong Kong vs. Hon. Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr., GR 153675, 4/19/07

Juan Muoz was charged before a Hong Kong Court with several counts of offenses in violation of Hong Kong laws. If convicted,
he faces a jail term of 7 to 14 years for each charge. After Juan Muoz was arrested in the Philippines, the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of Juan Muoz. On December 20, 2001, Judge X
of RTC-Manila allowed Juan Muoz to post bail. However, the government of Hong Kong alleged that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting him to bail because there is nothing in the
Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings. May Juan Muoz, a potential extradite, be granted bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that he is
not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. In a unanimous decision the SC remanded to the Manila RTC, to determine whether Juan Muoz is entitled to bail on the
basis of clear and convincing evidence. If Muoz is not entitled to such, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail
bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases.
Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it
cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceeding where the innocence or guilt of the person
detained is not in issue, the Court said.

Citing the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, the Court saw the need to reexamine
its ruling in Government of United States of America v. Judge Purganan which limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings. (visit fellester.blogspot.com)

It said that while our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, there is no provision prohibiting him
or her from filing a motion for bail, a right under the Constitution.

It further said that even if a potential extradite is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not
punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It added that extradition is not a trial to
determine the guilt or innocence of potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative
in character. (GR No. 153675, Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Judge Olalia, Jr. and Muoz, April
19, 2007)

Note: In Government of United States of America v. Judge Purganan, September 24, 2002, The SC ruled that Mark Jimenez is
not entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending except upon a clear and
convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2)
that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

5. People vs. Hubert Webb, GR 123792, 8/17/99

In People v. Hubert Webb, G.R. No. 132577, August 17, 1999, the Supreme Court said that there was no denial of due process
where the trial court refused to grant the petition of Webb to take the deposition of witnesses residing abroad, considering
that the testimony of the witnesses would be merely corroborative, the defense had already presented 57 witnesses and 464
documentary exhibits, and the trial court had already admitted the exhibits on which the said witnesses would have testified.

6. People vs. Sta. Teresa, GR 130663, 3/20/01

Plea of guilt to a capital offense. In People v. Sta. Teresa, G.R. No. 130663, March 20, 2001, the Court enumerated the stringent
constitutional standards impelled by the due process clause whenever the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, viz: [1] The
trial court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences
thereof; [2] The prosecution shall be required to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of
his culpability; and [3] The accused must be asked if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he so
desires. In People v. Ostia, G.R. No. 131804, February 26, 2003, the Supreme Court said that the procedure is mandatory, and a
judge who fails to observe with fealty the said rule commits grave abuse of discretion. The Court has cautioned trial judges to
proceed with meticulous care whenever the imposable penalty for the crime charged is death.

7.Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392

Presumption of innocence.

a)Every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must betaken into account. The proof against him must survive the
test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment [People v. Austria, 195 SCRA 700], Thus, in
Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392, the provision of an election statute which disqualified from running for public office any
person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State provided that the filing of charges for the commission of such
crimes before a civil court or military tribunal shall be prima facie evidence of such fact, was declared unconstitutional for
being violative of the presumption of innocence clause. Likewise, in People v. Lomboy, G.R. No. 129691, June 29, 1999, it was
held that the acquittal of the accused is inevitable if inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt.

Facts:
Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor
in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.

He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal
protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is
entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to
be elecOted, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.

He claimed that the aforecited provision was directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based
on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.

His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidcay of a person who was convicted of a crime given that
there was judgment for conviction and the prima facie nature of the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes.

He also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53,
on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any
public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." Apart form this, hey also attacked the term of office
and the election period. These were Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4; Sec 6, and Sec 1 of BP 52.

Issue:
1. Did petitioners have standing
2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the Constitution?

Held:
1. No
2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted.
Petition granted

Ratio:
1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In order to determine judicial review, three requisites are present:
a. actual case and controversy
b. proper party
c. existence of a constitutional question

a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition has yet been filed for his disqualification. It was only a hypothetical
question.
b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement? No one has yet been adversely affected by the operation of the
statutes.
c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and
procedural regularity would require that his suit be dismissed.

8. Flores vs. Ruiz, 90 SCRA 428

G.R. No. L-35707 May 31, 1979
FLORES vs JUDGE RUIZ
DE CASTRO, J:
DOCTRINE: The right to counsel during trial CANNOT be waived.

FACTS: Flores filed a petition for Habeas Corpus filed after he has been allegedly arrested and detained illegally by Orderof
Judge Ruiz finding him guilty of indirect contempt. Flores was actually arrested on August 28, 1972 and has since been detained
in the Provincial Jail of Cagayan until his release by virtue of a bond of P500.00. The reason for the delayed arrest
is that Flores was given a period "to inform the court whether or not he relinquishes his possession over the land in question."
The land in question was levied upon and sold on execution to satisfy the award of damages against Flores in a civil case. Flores
failed to redeem the property sold in the auction sale. Hence, Judge Ruiz ordered Flores to place in possession the heirs of
Mandac (plaintiff in the civil case). For the refusal of Flores to vacate the disputed land, contempt proceedings were instituted
against Flores which led to his arrest and detention.
Flores questions the legality of the proceedings for not having been assisted by counsel during the hearing of the motion for
contempt, and for not having been duly informed of the contempt charge by being furnished a copy of the motion, or properly
"arraigned" before trial. Flores claims to have been deprived due process of law which voided the proceedings against him as
for lack of jurisdiction of the court to inflict the penalty imposed on him.Judge Ruiz contends that Flores has waived his right to
counsel as evidenced by the transcript of the stenographic
notes. Flores alleges that no such proceedings took place, and that, in any event, the transcript was not signed by the
stenographer. According to Flores, when Judge Ruiz learned that he was without counsel, Ruiz told Flores to deliver possession
of the premises within 10 days. In spite of the plan of Flores that the hearing on that date be postponed so that his counsel of
record could appear for him or that a new counsel would be hired to appear in his behalf, Judge Ruiz,
however, demurred, and with the assistance of a certain Atty. Pastores, Flores was made to sign an understanding to deliver up
the premises within the period indicated by the judge on pain of being imprisoned.

ISSUE: WON Flores was denied due process of law

HELD: YES. The right of the accused to counsel in criminal proceedings has never been considered subject to waiver. The
practice has always been for the trial court to provide the accused with a counsel de officio, if he has no counsel of his own
choice, or cannot afford one. This is because even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of
the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because
he does not know how to establish his innocence and this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated.
Here, it cannot be disputed that the respondent court failed in its duty designed to satisfy the constitutional right of
an accused to counsel. Flores does not appear to have been duly notified of the contempt charge, nor was properly "arraigned,"
since he was not assisted by counsel during the hearing. Admittedly with a counsel of record, Flores could not have willingly
submitted to go to trial when his counsel failed to appear. It is certainly much easier to believe that Flores
asked for postponement, because of the absence of his counsel, but that Judge Ruiz denied the plea. Neither has Judge Ruiz
denied the allegation that there was a denial of right to due process for Flores was not duly informed of the contempt charge,
nor was his counsel furnished a copy thereof, as Flores is entitled to one as a matter of right and as a matter-of duty of the
court. All that Judge Ruiz said in his comment is that "defendant Flores has been granted his day in court to defend himself
from the charges presented by reason of his contumacious acts."
Therefore, the proceedings on the contempt charge has been vitiated by lack of due process, entitling petitioner to the writ of
habeas corpus he seeks.Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person
whose liberty is illegally restrained. Such defects results in the absence or loss of 'jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial
and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be
challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy
which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. 'No court of justice under our system of government has
the power to deprive him of that right. If the accused does not waive his right to be heard but on the contrary invokes the right,
and the court denies it to him, that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed; it has no power to sentence the accused
without hearing him in his defense; and the sentence thus pronounced is void and may be conaterany attacked in a habeas
corpus proceeding.

9. People vs. Monje, GR 146689, 9/27/02

Facts:

In the evening of 24 April 1997 at around 9:00 o'clock Imee Diez Paulino asked permission from her mother to play bingo at the
house of their barangay captain at Francisco Homes, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.Three (3) days later, Imee's lifeless body was
found lying in the rice fields naked, except for her brassiere, withseveral injuries including a fractured skull that caused massive
brain haemorrhage. The body was already in a stateof decomposition. The medico-legal officer surmised that the injuries on the
skull were caused by fist blows or by ahard blunt instrument. The genital examination disclosed that Imee was brutally raped
before she was killed. Her hymen was completely lacerated and there was a 2.5-centimeter laceration of the perineum. The
medico-legalofficer further opined that such laceration could not have been caused by an ordinary-sized penis but by a much
bigger object forcibly inserted to the vagina. The blood clots in the vaginal area showed that Imee was still alivewhen the object
was forced into her.During the wake, Michael Cordero, a tricycle driver plying the vicinity of Francisco Homes, told MariaIsabel
Diez Paulino, mother of Imee, that in the evening of 24 April 1997 at around 11:00 o'clock he saw the victim back-riding with
accused-appellant Fernando Monje with three (3) other persons in the sidecar whom he did notknow. From a distance of about
six (6) arms length he allegedly saw Imee, accused-appellant Monje, and the three(3) unidentified persons alight from the
tricycle and walk towards the ricefields. At about 1:00 o'clock the followingmorning only Monje and his three (3) companions
returned to the tricycle.When placed on the witness stand Cordero identified the three (3) companions of Monje as Lordino
Maglaya, also atricycle driver, Christopher Baustista, a taxi driver, and Michael Castro, a bus conductor, all residents of
FranciscoHomes.Apparently, the case for the prosecution is woven principally around the testimony of witness MichaelCordero.
It must be emphasized however that his testimony was not sufficiently tested on the crucible of cross-examination, specifically,
that significant portion of his direct examination where he purportedly saw the accusedand three (3) unidentified persons
returning to the tricycle from the rice field without the victim around 1:00 o'clock the following morning.After his initial cross-
examination by defense counsel, witness Cordero failed and refused to return to courtfor the continuation of his cross-
examination. In other words, except for his brief cross-examination which had barely scratched the surface, so to speak, and
despite the insistence of the defense counsel to pursue his cross-examination and the repeated warnings from the trial court
that it would be constrained to strike out and disregardhis testimony should he fail to appear again, the witness stubbornly
refused to return to court for his cross-examination.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused may invoke the right to cross-examination, to meet the witnesses face to face.

Held:

Yes, cross-examination of a witness is an absolute right, not a mere privilege, of the party against whom heis called. With regard
to the accused, it is a right guaranteed by the fundamental law as part of due process. ArticleIII, Sec. 14, par., of the 1987
Constitution specifically mandates that the accused shall enjoy the right to meet thewitnesses face to face, and Rule 115, Sec.
1, par. (f), of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure enjoins that in allcriminal prosecutions the accused shall be entitled to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at thetrial. Cross-examination serves as a safeguard to combat unreliable
testimony, providing means for discrediting awitness' testimony, and is in the nature of an attack on the truth and accuracy of
his testimony. The purpose of cross-examination, however, is not limited to bringing out a falsehood, since it is also a leading
and searchinginquiry of the witness for further disclosure touching the particular matters detailed by him in his direct
examination,and it serves to sift, modify, or explain what has been said, in order to develop new or old facts in a view
favorableto the cross-examiner. The object of cross-examination therefore is to weaken or disprove the case of onesadversary,
and break down his testimony in chief, test the recollection, veracity, accuracy, honesty and bias or prejudice of the witness,
his source of information, his motives, interest and memory, and exhibit the improbabilitiesof his testimony.

10. Reynaldo Jaylo vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 183152, 1/21/15

REYNALDO H. JAYLO, et. al. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 183152-54, January 21, 2015, 746 SCRA 452

FACTS: On September 8, 1992, an information was filed before the Sandiganbayan against Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona and Habalo
for the murder of De Guzman, Calanog and Manguera.

On April 17, 2007, the Sandiganbayan found Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona and Habalo guilty of homicide, however, during that
promulgation, none of the accused appeared despite notice. The court promulgated the Decision in absentia, and the judgment
was entered in the criminal docket. The bailbonds of the accused were cancelled and issued warrants for their arrest.

On April 30, 2007, the counsel of the accused filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision.

On November 29, 2007, the Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion for reconsideration and ordered the implementation
for the arrest of the convicted accused.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the Sandiganbayan was correct in not taking cognizance of the Motion for Reconsideration by the accused.

(2) What are the effects of non-appearance of the accused without justifiable cause in the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction?

(3) Whether the right to file motion for reconsideration is a statutory right and not merely a remedy under Section 6, Rule 120
of the Rules of Court.

(4) Whether Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of the accused.

HELD: (1) YES. The Sandiganbayan was correct in not taking cognizance of the Motion for Reconsideration by the accused. While
the motion was filed on April 30, 2007, it did not operate to regain the standing of the accused in court. For one, it is not an act
of surrender that is contemplated by Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, nowhere in the motion was indicated
that accused were asking for leave to avail of the remedies against the judgment of conviction, or that there were valid reason
for their absence at the promulgation.

For the failure of the accused to regain their standing in court and avail of the remedies against the judgment of conviction, the
decision of the Sandiganbayan attained finality, 15 days reckoned from 17 April 2007.

(2) If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose the following
remedies:

(a) filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121); and

(b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).

(3) YES. Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant or privilege.

As a statutory right, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised in accordance with and in the manner provided
by law.

Thus, a party filing a motion for reconsideration strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.

(4) NO. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases. This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases - delay
arising from the simple expediency of non-appearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of
conviction.

In this case, the accused have just shown their lack of faith in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by not appearing before it
for the promulgation of the judgment on their cases. Surely, they cannot later on expect to be allowed to invoke the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to grant them relief from its judgment of conviction.