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Why Has US Policy Uncertainty Risen Since 1960
Why Has US Policy Uncertainty Risen Since 1960
Why Has US Policy Uncertainty Risen Since 1960
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.5.56
0 20
I. Rising Policy Uncertainty
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
There appears to be a strong upward drift in
policy-related uncertainty after 1960. As evi- Figure 1. US Economic Policy Uncertainty and
dence, Figure 1 plots a newspaper-based index Government Activity
of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) for the
Notes: US Economic Policy Uncertainty Index from Baker,
United States, showing a secular rise over the last Bloom, and Davis (2013); total government spending (fed-
half century. The EPU index, drawn from Baker, eral, state, and local) as a percent of GDP from BEA; Code
Bloom, and Davis (2013), relies on scaled fre- of Federal Regulations page count from Dawson and Seater
quency counts of newspaper articles that contain (2013), spliced to data from Crews (2013, Figure 12) for
2006 to 2012. The EPU and CFR data are scaled to 100 from
terms pertaining to the economy, uncertainty, 1949 to 2012.
and economic policy.1 Baker, Bloom, and Davis
(2013) also find a strong rise in the frequency of
compiles all federal regulations in effect in a median voter, the economic policy positions of
given year. The index rose more than six-fold the parties most prominent figures have diverged
after 1950, highlighting a tremendous expansion sharply. At the same time, partisan control of
in the extent and complexity of federal regula- Congress has switched frequently, and presi-
tions. Uncertainty about the existence, mean- dential elections have been competitive. Thus,
ing, and enforcement of government regulations national elections often produce spikes in policy
likely increases with their scale and complex- uncertainty, especially around close presidential
ity. The size and complexity of the US tax code contests (e.g., Canes-Wrone and Park 2012 and
also grew dramatically in recent decades, as dis- Baker, Bloom, and Davis 2013).
cussed in Joint Committee on Taxation (2001) Even amidst partisan rancor, investors in the
and National Taxpayer Advocate (2012). US economy traditionally take solace in the
In summary, secular growth in government extensive checks and balances embedded in the
spending and taxes relative to GDP and the US Constitution. Divided government, Senate
greater scale and complexity of both govern- obstructionism, and opposition from co-partisan
ment regulations and the tax code are likely con- legislators often derail presidential policy ini-
tributors to the rise in policy-related economic tiatives. In recent years, however, these sources
uncertainty. The payoffs associated with private of status quo bias often reinforced rather than
economic decisions are increasingly affected reduced policy uncertainty. The status quo is unat-
by government activities and policies that are tractive when the debt ceiling must be raised to
subject to change. Of course, an expanded role avoid default, or fiscal adjustment is required for
for government could bring benefits that out- a sustainable debt path. Yet change from the status
weigh the costs, and a greater role for govern- quo under American-style separation of powers
ment could lower overall economic uncertainty typically requires the agreement of both parties,
even as it raises policy-related uncertainty. For creating tensions that can lead to high-stakes bar-
example, an expansive tax-funded social safety gaining scenarios in which political incentives for
net serves as an automatic fiscal stabilizer that brinkmanship create high levels of uncertainty.
dampens fluctuations in output and employ- Political polarization can also increase policy
ment. Moreover, many financial regulations uncertainty in more subtle ways. Presidents of
seek to reduce uncertainty associated with finan- both parties have increasingly politicized the
cial crises and their spillovers to the rest of the bureaucracy by appointing partisan loyalists and
economy. Nevertheless, Figure 1 suggests that shifting key policy decisions to White House
the secular growth in government is one reason operatives not subject to Senate confirmation
for rising policy uncertainty.2 (e.g., Moe 1985). In contrast to the early post-
war period, when appointed regulators held the
III. Political Polarization and Policy Uncertainty upper hand vis--vis political appointees, the
policy environment is now more prone to rapid
Another class of explanations for rising policy swings between an aggressive regulatory stance
uncertainty stresses the potential for political and a more hands-off approach. The tendency
polarization to produce more extreme policies, toward rapid switching of regulatory regimes
less policy stability, and less capacity of policy intensifies when presidents respond to legisla-
makers to address pressing problems. In recent tive gridlock by implementing policy agendas
years, American politics appears at odds with the through executive orders and other forms of
classic model of two-party electoral competition. unilateral action (e.g., Howell 2003). Because
Rather than converging on preferences of the successor presidents can readily reverse unilat-
eral executive actions, the effect is to increase
long-term policy uncertainty.
2
The online Appendix shows that newspaper-based
indexes of sectoral economic uncertainty (for agriculture, A. Polarization of Voters and Districts?
manufacturing and finance, insurance and real-estate) vary
with sectoral shares of aggregate output. This pattern indi- The most popular measure of Congressional
cates that larger sectors typically attract more media cover-
age about economic uncertainty, supporting the view that the polarization is based on the NOMINATE scores
growth in government leads to more concern about govern- of Poole and Rosenthal (1985), which estimate
ment-related economic uncertainty. the ideological locations of legislators based on
58 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 2014
Policy uncertainty
and Republicans has been increasing since the 200 Voter perception of party diff.
1
1960s according to this measure. Several alter- 150
native Congress-based measures, including ones 0
based on campaign finance records (Bonica 100
as moderates. Rather, they opt for a strategy of threats may influence roll call voting incentives.
mobilizing core supporters who are more likely However, most states introduced congressional
to turn out, especially in primary elections. The primaries before the rise in polarization, and even
growing availability of household-level data for in states that adopted primaries more recently,
use in micro-targeted campaign materials only electoral reform is not associated with increased
enhances the appeal of this strategy. within-state polarization (Hirano et al. 2010).
Two other factors frequently mentioned as A more significant change to elections and
explanations for rising political polarization campaigns since the 1970s involves campaign
are rising media polarization and rising income finance. In particular, individual donors have
inequality. While media polarization does not replaced political action committees (PACs) as
appear to have directly polarized voters or dis- the most important source of campaign finance.
tricts, this phenomenon has perhaps encouraged While PACs tend to be ideologically moder-
politicians to cater to core supporters rather than ate and flexible, individual donors tend to be
independents. Research finds that the direct link more extreme and rigid. Barber (2013) links
between partisan media and political polariza- these developments to polarization; when states
tion is weak. Polarization began more than increase individual donor limits, state-level leg-
a decade before the advent of Fox News and islative polarization increases.
MSNBC, political views have been relatively
constant, and notably, most voters either avoid IV.Conclusion
partisan news altogether or select an ideological
spectrum of programming (e.g., Gentzkow and As the reach of government has expanded, the
Shapiro 2011). At the same time, however, cable rhetoric of the major parties has become more
TV itself may have contributed to polarization by polarized, and legislators have found fewer
letting viewers choose entertainment over news, incentives to cast the bipartisan votes needed to
thereby decreasing politicians exposure to fewer solve basic problems in a political system with
partisan voters and incentivizing their focus on divided powers. These trends closely track a sec-
politically active partisans (Prior 2013). ular increase in policy-related economic uncer-
Likewise, rising income inequality could facil- tainty. We hope this paper serves to introduce a
itate legislative polarization in a number of ways, nascent research agenda aimed at explaining the
even if mass opinion has not polarized. One pos- interplay of uncertainty, polarization, and gov-
sibility is that greater income inequality raises ernment growth. The next step in this agenda is
the political stakes for the rich as they realize the a focus on causality, which will require invest-
median voter has more to gain from redistributive ment in cross-state and cross-national analysis
policies. A related argument is that politicians are as well as historical research.
more responsive to rich than poor voters (e.g.,
Gilens 2012). Thus, as the right tail of the income References
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Copyright of American Economic Review is the property of American Economic Association
and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without
the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or
email articles for individual use.