1. Leung Yee v Strong Machinery
On a relevant date, while Punsalan was still the possessor of the land,
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11658 February 15, 1918
LEUNG YEE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FRANK L. STRONG MACHINERY COMPANY and J. G.
WILLIAMSON, defendants-appellees.
Booram and Mahoney for appellant.
Williams, Ferrier and SyCip for appellees.
In 1913, Compania Agricola Filipina (CAF) was indebted to two
personalities: Leung Yee and Frank L. Strong Machinery Co. CAF
purchased some rice cleaning machines from Strong Machinery. CAF
installed the machines in a building. As security for the purchase
price, CAF executed a chattel mortgage on the rice cleaning
machines including the building where the machines were installed.
CAF failed to pay Strong Machinery, hence the latter foreclosed the
mortgage the same was registered in the chattel mortgage registry.
CAF also sold the land (where the building was standing) to Strong
Machinery. Strong Machinery took possession of the building and the
land.
On the other hand, Yee, another creditor of CAF who engaged in the
construction of the building, being the highest bidder in an auction
conducted by the sheriff, purchased the same building where the
machines were installed. Apparently CAF also executed a chattel
mortgage in favor Yee. Yee registered the sale in the registry of land.
Yee was however aware that prior to his buying, the property has
been sold in favor of Strong Machinery evidence is the chattel
mortgage already registered by Strong Machinery (constructive
notice).
ISSUE: Who is the owner of the building?
HELD: The SC ruled that Strong Machinery has a better right to the
contested property. Yee cannot be regarded as a buyer in good faith
as he was already aware of the fact that there was a prior sale of the
same property to Strong Machinery.
The SC also noted that the Chattel Mortgage Law expressly
contemplates provisions for chattel mortgages which only deal with
personal properties. The fact that the parties dealt the building as if
its a personal property does not change the nature of the thing. It is
still a real property. Its inscription in the Chattel Mortgage registry
does not modify its inscription the registry of real property.
2. Antonio Punzalan et al v Remedios Lacsamana
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55729 March 28, 1983
ANTONIO PUNSALAN, JR., petitioner,
vs.
REMEDIOS VDA. DE LACSAMANA and THE HONORABLE
JUDGE RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, respondents.
Benjamin S. Benito & Associates for petitioner.
Expedito Yummul for private respondent.
FACTS:
Punsalan was the owner of a piece of land, which he mortgaged in
favor of PNB. Due to his failure to pay, the mortgage was foreclosed
and the land was sold in a public auction to which PNB was the
highest bidder.
it secured a permit for the construction of a warehouse.
A deed of sale was executed between PNB and Punsalan. This
contract was amended to include the warehouse and the improvement
thereon. By virtue of these instruments, respondent Lacsamana
secured title over the property in her name.
Petitioner then sought for the annulment of the deed of sale. Among
his allegations was that the bank did not own the building and thus, it
should not be included in the said deed.
Petitioners complaint was dismissed for improper venue. The trial
court held that the action being filed in actuality by petitioner is a real
action involving his right over a real property.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of
improper venue.
W/N the warehouse is an immovable and must be tried in the
province where the property lies.
HELD:
Warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an immovable or
real property. Buildings are always immovable under the Code. A
building treated separately from the land on which it is stood is
immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a contract
seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which
it stood in no wise changed its character as immovable property.
3. Standard Oil Co., v Jaranillo
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20329 March 16, 1923
THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, petitioner,
vs.
JOAQUIN JARAMILLO, as register of deeds of the City of
Manila, respondent.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for petitioner.
City Fiscal Revilla and Assistant City Fiscal Rodas for respondent.
FACTS
Gervasia de la Rosa, Vda. de Vera, who was renting a parcel of land
in Manila, constructed a building of strong materials thereon, which
she conveyed to Standard Oil Company of New York by way
of chattel mortgage.
When the mortgagee presented the deed to the Register of Deeds of
Manila for registration in the Chattel Mortgage Registry, Joaquin
Jaranillo, the Registrar refused to allow the registration on the ground
that the building was a real property, and therefore could not be the
subject of a valid chattel mortgage.
ISSUES
1. May the deed be registered in the chattel mortgage registry?
2. Whether the interests conveyed in the instrument are real or
personal.
HELD
1. Yes. The Registrar's duty is MINISTERIAL in character.
There is no legal provision conferring upon him any judicial or quasi-
judicial power to determine or qualify the nature of the document
presented before him.
The determination of the nature of the property lies with the courts of
justice, and not by the Register of Deeds.
Moreover, the act of recording a chattel mortgage operates as
constructive notice of the existence of the contract, and the legal
effects of the contract must be discovered in the instrument itself in
relation with the fact of notice. Registration adds nothing to the
instrument and affects nobody's rights except as a speciefies of notice.
As such, the Registrar should therefore accept the legal fees being
tendered, and place the document on record.
2. Art.334 and 335 of the Civil Code do not supply an absolute
criterion for discriminating between real and personal property for
the purpose of applying the Chattel Mortgage Law.
It should also be noted that under given conditions property may have
character different from that imputed in said articles. Parties to a
contract may, by agreement, treat as personal property that which by
nature would be real property.
It is undeniable that the parties to a contract may by agreement treat
aspersonal property that which by nature would be a real property, as
long as no interest of third parties would be prejudiced thereby.
However, it should be reiterated that the determination of the nature
of the property, with reference to the placing of the document on
record, is neither a function or an authority granted to the Registrar of
the Registry of Deeds.
4. Davao Sawmill Co. v Castillo
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-40411 August 7, 1935
DAVAO SAW MILL CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
APRONIANO G. CASTILLO and DAVAO LIGHT & POWER
CO., INC., defendants-appellees.
Arsenio Suazo and Jose L. Palma Gil and Pablo Lorenzo and Delfin
Joven for appellant.
J.W. Ferrier for appellees.
A tenant placed machines for use in a sawmill on the landlord's land.
FACTS
Davao Sawmill Co., operated a sawmill. The land upon which the
business was conducted was leased from another person. On the land,
Davao Sawmill erected a building which housed the machinery it
used. Some of the machines were mounted and placed on foundations
of cement. In the contract of lease, Davo Sawmill agreed to turn over
free of charge all improvements and buildings erected by it on the
premises with the exception of machineries, which shall remain with
the Davao Sawmill. In an action brought by the Davao Light and
Power Co., judgment was rendered against Davao Sawmill. A writ of
execution was issued and the machineries placed on the sawmill were
levied upon as personalty by the sheriff. Davao Light and Power Co.,
proceeded to purchase the machinery and other properties auctioned
by the sheriff.
ISSUE
Are the machineries real or personal property?
HELD
Art.415 of the New Civil Code provides that Real Property consists
of:
(1) Lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to
the soil;xxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by
the owner pf the tenement for an industry ot works which may be
carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly
to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
Appellant should have registered its protest before or at the time of
the sale of the property. While not conclusive, the appellant's
characterization of the property as chattels is indicative of intention
and impresses upon the property the character determined by the
parties.
Machinery is naturally movable. However, machinery may
be immobilized by destination or purpose under the following
conditions:
General Rule: The machinery only becomes immobilized if placed
in a plant by the owner of the property or plant.
Immobilization cannot be made by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any
person having only a temporary right.
Exception: The tenant, usufructuary, or temporary possessor acted as
agent of the owner of the premises; or he intended to permanently
give away the property in favor of the owner.
As a rule, therefore, the machinery should be considered as Personal
Property, since it was not placed on the land by the owner of the said
land.
5. Board of Assessment of Appeals v anila Electric
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15334 January 31, 1964
BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, CITY ASSESSOR and
CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners,
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, respondent.
FACTS
On November 15, 1955, the QC City Assessor declared the
MERALCO's steel towers subject to real property tax. After the
denial of MERALCO's petition to cancel these declarations, an
appeal was taken to the QC Board of Assessment Appeals, which
required respondent to pay P11,651.86 as real property tax on the
said steel towers for the years 1952 to 1956.
MERALCO paid the amount under protest, and filed a petition for
review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) which rendered a decision
ordering the cancellation of the said tax declarations and the
refunding to MERALCO by the QC City Treasurer of P11,651.86.
ISSUE
Are the steel towers or poles of the MERALCO considered real or
personal properties?
HELD
Pole long, comparatively slender, usually cylindrical piece of wood,
timber, object of metal or the like; an upright standard to the top of
which something is affixed or by which something is supported.
MERALCO's steel supports consists of a framework of 4 steel
bars/strips which are bound by steel cross-arms atop of which are
cross-arms supporting 5 high-voltage transmission wires, and their
sole function is to support/carry such wires. The exemption granted
to poles as quoted from Part II, Par.9 of respondent's franchise is
determined by the use to which such poles are dedicated.
It is evident that the word poles, as used in Act No. 484 and
incorporated in the petitioner's franchise, should not be given a
restrictive and narrow interpretation, as to defeat the very object for
which the franchise was granted. The poles should be taken and
understood as part of MERALCO's electric power system for the
conveyance of electric current to its consumers.
Art. 415 of the NCC classifies the following as immovable property:
(1) Lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to
the soil;
xxx
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a
way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the
material or deterioration of the object;
xxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by
the owner pf the tenement for an industry ot works which may be
carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly
to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
Following these classifications, MERALCO's steel towers should be
considered personal property. It should be noted that the steel towers:
(a) are neither buildings or constructions adhered to the soil;
(b) are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner they can be
separated without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;
are not machineries, receptacles or instruments, and even if they
are, they are not intended for an industry to be carried on in the
premises.
6. Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. v Wearever Textile Mills, Inc.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-58469 May 16, 1983
MAKATI LEASING and FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
WEAREVER TEXTILE MILLS, INC., and HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS
Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. executed a chattel mortgage contract in favor of
Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation covering certain raw materials and
machinery. Upon default, Makati Leasing fi led a petition for judicial
foreclosure of the properties mortgaged. Acting on Makati Leasings
application for replevin, the lower court issued a writ of seizure. Pursuant
thereto, the sheriff enforcing the seizure order seized the machinery subject
matter of the mortgage. In a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the Court
of Appeals ordered the return of the machinery on the ground that the same
can-not be the subject of replevin because it is a real property pursuant to
Article415 of the new Civil Code, the same being attached to the ground by
means of bolts and the only way to remove it from Wearever textiles plant
would be to drill out or destroy the concrete fl oor. When the motion for
reconsideration of Makati Leasing was denied by the Court of Appeals,
Makati Leasing elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether the machinery in suit is real or personal property from the
point of view of the parties.
HELD
There is no logical justification to exclude the rule out the present
case from the application of the pronouncement in Tumalad v
Vicencio, 41 SCRA 143. If a house of strong materials, like what
was involved in the Tumalad case, may be considered as personal
property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as
long as the parties to the contract so agree and no innocent third
party will be prejudicedthereby, there is absolutely no reason why a
machinery, which is movable in its natureand becomes immobilized
only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such.
This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from the
denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.
In rejecting petitioners assertion on the applicability of
the Tumalad doctrine, the CA lays stress on the fact that the house
involved therein was built on a land that did not belong to the owner
of such house. But the law makes no distinction with respect to the
ownership of the land on which the house is built and We should
not lay down distinctions not contemplated by law.
It must be pointed out that the characterization by the private
respondent is indicative of the intention and impresses upon the
property the character determined by the parties. As stated
in Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, it
is undeniable that the parties to a contract may, by agreement, treat
as personal property that which by nature would be a real
property as long as no interest of third parties would be prejudiced
thereby.
The status of the subject matter as movable or immovable property
was not raised as an issue before the lower court and the CA, except
in a supplemental memorandum in support of the petition filed in the
appellate court. There is no record showing that the mortgage has
been annulled, or that steps were taken to nullify the same. On the
other hand, respondent has benefited from the said contract.
Equity dictates that one should not benefit at the expense of
another.
As such, private respondent could no longer be allowed to impugn
the efficacy of the chattel mortgage after it has benefited therefrom.
Therefore, the questioned machinery should be considered as
personal property.
7. Mindanao Bus. Company v City Assessor
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17870 September 29, 1962
MINDANAO BUS COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE CITY ASSESSOR & TREASURER and the BOARD OF
TAX APPEALS of Cagayan de Oro City,respondents.
Facts: Petitioner is a public utility company engaged in the transport
of passengers and cargo by motor vehicles in Mindanao with main
offices in Cagayan de Oro (CDO). Petitioner likewise owned a land
where it maintains a garage, a repair shop and blacksmith or
carpentry shops. The machineries are placed thereon in wooden and
cement platforms. The City Assessor of CDO then assessed a P4,400
realty tax on said machineries and repair equipment. Petitioner
appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals but it sustained the City
Assessor's decision, while the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) sustained
the same.
Note: This is merely a case digest to aid in remembering the
important points of a case. It is still advisable for any student of law
to read the full text of assigned cases.
Issue: Whether or not the machineries and equipments are
considered immobilized and thus subject to a realty tax
Held: The Supreme Court decided otherwise and held that said
machineries and equipments are not subject to the assessment of real
estate tax.
Said equipments are not considered immobilized as they are merely
incidental, not esential and principal to the business of the petitioner.
The transportation business could be carried on without repair or
service shops of its rolling equipment as they can be repaired or
services in another shop belonging to another
8. Caltex (Ph) in. v Central Board of Assessment Appeals and City
Assessor of Pasay
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-50466 May 31, 1982
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES) INC., petitioner,
vs.
CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS and CITY
ASSESSOR OF PASAY, respondents.
This case is about the realty tax on machinery and equipment
installed by Caltex (Philippines) Inc., in its gas stations located on
leased land.
FACTS
Caltex loaned machines and equipment to gas station operators under
an appropriate lease agreement or receipt. The lease contract
stipulated that upon demand, the operators shall return to Caltex the
machines and equipment in good condition as when received,
ordinary wear and tear excepted.
The lessor of the land, where the gas station is located, does not
become the owner of the machines and equipment installed therein.
Caltex retains the ownership thereof during the term of the lease.
The City Assessor of Pasay City characterized the said items of gas
station equipment and machinery as taxable realty. However, the City
Board of Tax Appeals ruled that they are personalty. The Assessor
appealed to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
The Board held on June 3, 1977 that the said machines are real
property within the meaning of Ses. 3(k) & (m) and 38 of the Real
Property Tax Code, PD 464, and that the Civil Code definitions of
real and personal property in Articles 415 and 416 are not applicable
in this case.
ISSUE
WON the pieces of gas station equipment and machinery
permanently affixed by Caltex to its gas station and pavement should
be subject to realty tax.
HELD
Sec.2 of the Assessment Law provides that the realty tax is due on
real property, including land, buildings, machinery, and other
improvements not specifically exempted in Sec.3 thereof.
Sec.3 of the Real Property Tax Code provides the following
definitions:
k) Improvements a valuable addition made to property or
an amelioration in its conditionmore than mere repairs or
replacement of wasteintended to enhance its value,
beauty, or utility
m) Machinery machines, mechanical contrivances,
instruments, appliances, and apparatus attached to the real
estateincludes the physical facilities available for
productioninstallation and appurtenant service facilities.
The subject machines and equipment are taxable improvement and
machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real
Property Tax Code, because the same are necessary to the operation
of the gas station and have been attached/affixed/embedded
permanently to the gas station site.
Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty even though
they might be considered personalty. It is a familiar phenomenon
to see things classified as real property for purposes of taxation which
on general principle might be considered personal property
(Standard Oil Co., vs Jaramillo, 44 PHIL 630).
This case is also easily distinguishable from Board of Assessment
Appeals vs. Manila Electric Co., (119 Phil. 328) where Meralco's
steel towers were exempted from taxation. The steel towers were
considered personalty because they were attached to square metal
frames by means of bolts and could be moved from place to place
when unscrewed and dismantled.
Nor are Caltex's gas station equipment and machinery the same as the
tools and equipment in the repair shop of a bus company which were
held to be personal property not subject to realty tax (Mindanao Bus
Co. vs. City Assessor, 116 Phil. 501).
The Central Board of Assessment Appeals did not commit a grave
abuse of discretion in upholding the City Assessor's imposition of the
realty tax on Caltex's gas station and equipment.
9. Sergs Products inc. v Pci Leasing and Finance, Inc.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 137705 August 22, 2000
SERG'S PRODUCTS, INC., and SERGIO T.
GOQUIOLAY, petitioners,
vs.
PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., respondent.
FACTS:
PCI Leasing and Finance filed a complaint for sum of money,
with an application for a writ of replevin.
Judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and
deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5
days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses.
The sheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory, seized one
machinery, with word that he would return for other
machineries.
Petitioner (Sergs Products) filed a motion for special protective
order to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin.
PCI Leasing opposed the motion on the ground that the
properties were still personal and therefore can still be subjected
to seizure and writ of replevin.
Petitioner asserted that properties sought to be seized were
immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code.
Sheriff was still able to take possession of two more
machineries
In its decision on the original action for certiorari filed by the
Petitioner, the appellate court, Citing the Agreement of the parties,
held that the subject machines were personal property, and that they
had only been leased, not owned, by petitioners; and ruled that the
"words of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the true
intention of the contracting parties."
ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries became real property by
virtue of immobilization.
Ruling:
Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory
were not proper subjects of the Writ issued by the RTC, because they
were in fact real property.
Writ of Replevin: Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of
replevin are issued for the recovery of personal property only.
Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code provides that machinery, receptacles,
instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for
an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a
piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said
industry or works
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of
Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built on their own
land.They were essential and principal elements of their chocolate-
making industry.Hence, although each of them was movable or
personal property on its own, all of them have become immobilized
by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the
industry.
However, contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real
property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation,
they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.Under the
principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded
from denying the truth of any material fact found therein.
Section 12.1 of the Agreement between the parties provides The
PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal
property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof
may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed or attached
to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real property or any
building thereon, or attached in any manner to what is permanent.
The machines are personal property and they are proper subjects of
the Writ of Replevin
10. Tumalad v Vicencio
G.R. No. L-30173 September 30, 1971
GAVINO A. TUMALAD and GENEROSA R.
TUMALAD, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ALBERTA VICENCIO and EMILIANO SIMEON, defendants-
appellants.
FACTS:
Vicencio and Simeon executed a chattel mortgage in favor of
plaintiffs Tumalad over their house, which was being rented by
Madrigal and company. This was executed to guarantee a loan,
payable in one year with a 12% per annum interest.
The mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed upon failure to pay the
loan. The house was sold at a public auction and the plaintiffs were
the highest bidder. A corresponding certificate of sale was issued.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an action for ejectment against the
defendants, praying that the latter vacate the house as they were the
proper owners.
ISSUE:
W/N the chattel mortgage was null and void ab initio because only
personal properties can be subject of a chattel mortgage.
HELD:
Certain deviations have been allowed from the general doctrine that
buildings are immovable property such as when through stipulation,
parties may agree to treat as personal property those by their nature
would be real property. This is partly based on the principle of
estoppel wherein the principle is predicated on statements by the
owner declaring his house as chattel, a conduct that may conceivably
stop him from subsequently claiming otherwise.
In the case at bar, though there be no specific statement referring to
the subject house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or
transferring a property through chattel mortgage could only have
meant that defendant conveys the house as chattel, or at least,
intended to treat the same as such, so that they should not now be
allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.
11. Ago v CA
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17898 October 31, 1962
PASTOR D. AGO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MONTANO A. ORTIZ,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan, THE PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF OF SURIGAO and GRACE PARK ENGINEERING,
INC., respondents
FACTS
Ago bought sawmill machineries and equipments from Grace Park
Engineer Domineering, Inc. (GPED) A chattel mortgage was executed
over the said properties to secure the unpaid balance of P32,000, which
Ago agreed to pay in installment basis.
Because Ago defaulted in his payment, GPED instituted extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings of the mortgage. To enjoin the foreclosure, Ago
instituted a special civil case in the CFI of Agusan. The parties then
arrived at a compromise agreement.
However, a year later, Ago still defaulted in his payment. GPED filed a
motion for execution with the lower court, which was executed on
September 23, 1959.
Acting upon the writ of execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Surigao
levied upon and ordered the sale of the sawmill machineries and
equipment.
Upon being advised that the public auction sale was set on December 4,
1959, Ago filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on December 1,
1959 with the CA. He alleged that his counsel only received the copy of
the judgment on September 25, 1959 two days after the execution of the
writ; that the order of sale of the levied properties was in grave abuse of
discretion and in excess of jurisdiction; and that the Sheriff acted illegally
by levying the properties and attempting to sell them without prior
publication of the notice of sale thereof in some newspaper of general
circulation as required by the Rules of Court.
The CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the Sheriff, but it
turned out that the properties were already sold on December 4, 1959.
The CA ordered the Sheriff to suspend the issuance of the Certificate of
Sale until the decision of the case. The CA then rendered its decision on
November 9, 1960.
ISSUES
1. Is the fact that petitioner was present in open court as the judgment was
rendered, sufficient notice of the said judgment?
2. Was the Sheriff's sale of the machineries and equipment at a public
auction valid despite lack of publication of the notice of sale?
HELD
1) No. The mere pronouncement of the judgment in open court does not
constitute a rendition of judgment.
The filing of the judge's signed decision with the Clerk of Court
constitutes the rendition of a valid and binding judgment.
Sec. 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court require that all judgments be
rendered in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge,
and signed by him, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based, filed with the clerk of the court.
Prior to the filing, the decision could still be subject to amendment and
change and may not constitute the real judgment of the court.
Moreover, the hearing of the judgment in open court does not constitute
valid notice thereof. No judgment can be notified to the parties unless it
has previously been rendered.
Sec.7 of Rule 27 expressly requires that final orders or judgments be
served either personally or by registered mail.
The signed judgment not having been served upon the petitioner, said
judgment could not be effective upon him who had not received it. As a
consequence, the issuance of the writ of execution is null and void,
having been issued before petitioner was served a copy of the decision,
personally or by registered mail.
2) The subject sawmill machineries and equipment became real estate
properties in accordance with the provision of Art. 415 (5) of the NCC:
ART. 415 The following are immovable property: xxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the
owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on
in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the
needs of the said industry or works;
The installation of the sawmill machineries in the building of Gold
Pacific Sawmill, Inc., for use in the sawing of logs carried on in the said
building converted them into Real Properties as they became a necessary
& permanent part of the building or real estate on which the same was
constructed.
And if they are judicially sold on execution without the necessary
advertisement of sale by publication in a newspaper as required
in Sec.16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the sale made by the sheriff
would be null and void.