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November 2013
Between Expectations and Disillusion
Iran and the Arab Spring:
GIGA Research Programme:

___________________________
Violence and Security

Henner Frtig

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No 241
GIGAWorkingPapers 241/2013

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GIGAWorkingPapers 241/2013
 IranandtheArabSpring:
BetweenExpectationsandDisillusion

Abstract

The 1979 Iranian Revolution undoubtedly belongs to the great revolutions of modern
timesallofwhichwerecharacterizedbyuniversalisticeffortsandtheclaimtohaveset
new social, political and cultural norms with global validity. In this sense, the Iranian
revolutionaries felt the obligation to actively reintroduce Islam as a revelation for the
whole world, not only for Muslims. Yet, they soon became aware that most Muslims
viewedtheirexportstrategyaseitheranattempttoenforceShiism,orevenworseto
concealmerenationalmegalomania.Therefore,thecurrentleadershiparguesthattherevo
lution should no longer be exported actively, but that Iran should serve as an example.
Consequently,SupremeLeaderKhameneicalledtheeventsoftheArabSpringanatural
enlargement of Irans Islamic revolution of 1979 and credited his country for being the
catalystofthisIslamicawakening.Thepresentarticlewillanalyzeselectedregionalreac
tionstotheIslamicawakeningconcept,whichdidnotaltogethermeetIranianexpectations.

Keywords:ArabSpring,Iran,politicalIslam,MiddleEast,regionalsystem

Prof.Dr.HennerFrtig
isdirectoroftheGIGAInstituteofMiddleEastStudiesandfullprofessorintheDepart
mentofHistoryattheUniversityofHamburg.
Contact: <henner.fuertig@gigahamburg.de>
Website: <www.gigahamburg.de/en/team/fuertig>

241/2013 GIGAWorkingPapers
 IranandtheArabSpring:
BetweenExpectationsandDisillusion

HennerFrtig

ArticleOutline
1 Introduction
2 IranianForeignPolicyandtheArabSpring
3 ReactionsintheArabWorld
4 TheStruggleforthePrerogativeofInterpretationoftheArabSpringinsideIran
5 Conclusion
References

1 Introduction

On11February2011,themaincelebrationsinTehrantomarktheanniversaryoftheIranian
Revolution were heavily influenced by the recent upheavals that had occurred in theArab
worlditsimmediateneighborhood.TheTunisianrulerBenAlihadfledthecountryatthe
beginning of the year, and on the day of the celebrations in Iran, public anger forced the
Egyptianpresident,HosniMubarak,tostepdown.TheArabSpringhadstarted,andhardly
anystateintheMiddleEastorNorthAfricawasabletoavoidtheeffectsofitsforce.Onthis
veryday,theleadershipoftheIslamicRepublicofIranwasjubilant.Addressinghisbrothers
in faith in Tunisia and Egypt, Supreme Leader Khamenei declared that the events taking

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HennerFrtig:IranandtheArabSpring:BetweenExpectationsandDisillusion 5

placeintheirhomecountriesconstitutedanaturalcontinuationoftheIranianrevolutionof
1979 (Alfoneh 2011: 36) and had special meaning for the Iranian nation. [] [It was] the
sameasIslamicawakening,which[was]theresultofthevictoryofthebigrevolutionofthe
Iranian nation (Kurzman 2012: 162). Such statements were generally not expressions of
sympathy for or recognition of the courage and resolve of the protesters in Tunisia and
Egypt,butratherthemanifestationofafirmdeterminationtoexclusivelydefinetherevolu
tions as an Islamic awakening and thus force them it into a trajectory that began with the
IranianRevolutionof1979.Khameneiandotherleaderstriedtocreateanunderstandingthat
theIranianmodelwasobviouslystillattractiveenoughtoserveasarolemodelforothersin
spiteofitssetbacksandbeingcondemnedbyWesternandregionalopponents.TheIslamic
RepublicofIranhadthusnotonlyreceivedsubsequentrecognitionastheinitiatorofthisIs
lamicawakening,butwasalsoaccordingtothelogicofitsleadersthenaturalleaderin
theregion.
Yet,theIranianregime(muchtoitsdispleasure)wasnotaclearbeneficiaryoftheArab
Spring, because Tehrans interpretation of the uprisings root causes was challenged right
from the beginning not least in Iran itself. The opposition Green Movement, which had
facedrelentlesspersecutionsincethedisputedpresidentialelectionsof2009,appliedacom
pletely different interpretation to what was taking place in the Arab world. At the end of
January 2011, one of the movements most prominent leaders, Mir Hossein Mousavi, de
claredthattheeventsinTunis,Sana,Cairo,AlexandriaandSuezcouldbetracedbacktothe
secondhalfofJune2009whenmillionsofIranianprotestersdemandedthattheirdemocratic
rights be respected (Kurzman 2012: 162). On 14 February 2011, Mousavi and the Green
Movementscoleader,MehdiKarrubi,calledforapowerfulrallyinsolidaritywiththepro
testersintheArabworld,asthesepeoplewerestrugglingforthesameaimsastheoppressed
oppositioninIran:theremovalofautocracies.TheInteriorMinistryimmediatelyprohibited
thedemonstrations,andacountrywidewaveofpersecutionensued.
IftheofficialinterpretationoftheArabSpringmetanundeniableresistanceinsideIran,
howwasitreceivedinitsneighborhood?Thefollowingparagraphsintendtohighlightthe
motivesandambitionsofIranianforeignpolicyandanalyzeitscurrentimpactintheregion.

2 IranianForeignPolicyandtheArabSpring

TheIslamicRepublicofIranconstitutesaclearexceptionwithintheinternationalcommunity
giventhattheRevolutionof1979(whichprecededtheRepublicsfoundation)isoneofthe
fewgenuinemassrevolutionsofthemodernage.TheIranianRevolutionsharescomparable
developmentstagesandtraitswiththeFrenchRevolutionof1789andtheRussianRevolu
tionof1917.Asearlyas1953,CraneBrinton,adoyenofUSpoliticalscience,attributedtoall
socialmassrevolutionsastrongmissionaryingredientthatconsistedoftheaimtoconvince
theentireworldoftheeternalvalidityoftheirvisions(Brinton1953:196).In1789,thisap

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6 HennerFrtig:IranandtheArabSpring:BetweenExpectationsandDisillusion

pliedtocivilliberties;in1917,tocommunism.In1979,thecharismaticleaderoftheIranian
Revolution,Ayatollah Khomeini, made no attempt to conceal his intent to (re)instate Islam
withworldwidesignificance.

2.1 MotivesoftheIranianClaimtoLeadership

For Ayatollah Khomeini, Islam constituted a complete and perfect system that provided
normsandofferedguidanceforallaspectsoflife.HealsobelievedthattheIslamicreligion
haduniversalvalidity,andheappealedtoallMuslimstoriseupagainsttheirpowerfulbut
degeneraterulersandcreateanIslamicstate(Husain1995:234).Theummaoftheeraof
Muhammad the Prophet and Imam Ali represented his ideal of what should be reestab
lished.KhomeiniviewedtheIslamicworldinitsentirety(i.e.,allnationstateswhereMus
limsformthemajorityofthepopulation)asthecurrentmanifestationoftheumma.Here
gardedtheIranianRevolutionasnothinglessthanthestartingpointforspreadingtheidea
ofanIslamicstatethroughouttheworldonceagain.TheRevolutionwassupposedtobethis
movementscoreaswellasaleadingexample:

TheIranianRevolutiondoesnotexclusivelybelongtoIran,forIslamisnotexclusively
ownedbyonespecificpeople.Islamisarevelationmadetoallmankind,notonlyIran.
[]AnIslamicmovementcanthereforenotbelimitedtoonespecificcountry,noteven
justtoIslamiccountries,foritisthecontinuationoftheProphetsrevolution.1

ThisstatementoutlinedwhatbecamethedefiningcredoofearlyIranianforeignpolicy:ex
portoftherevolution(SudreEnqelb).AsKhomeinihimselfdeclared:Weshallexportour
revolutiontotheentireworldbecauseitisanIslamicrevolution.[]Aslongaspeopleon
thiseartharebeingoppressed,ourstruggleshallcontinue(Khomeini1979:28).Sections11,
152and154oftheIranianConstitutionmakedirectreferencetothistaskandremaininforce
today.
In the eyes of Khomeini, the Revolution was thus not exclusively Shiite. He regarded
himselfandIranianMuslims,irrespectiveoftheirdenomination,ashavingbeenchosenby
GodtoreinstateIslamsworldwidesignificance.Inthissense,theaugmentationoftherevo
lutionaryobjectivewiththeaimofliberatingalloppressedpeopleintheworld(mostazafin)
includingnonMuslimswasamoreimportantpartofKhomeinisagendathanwastheim
plementationofspecialShiiteinterests.
After Khomeinis death in 1989, his successor as supreme leader,Ayatollah Khamenei,
tooktheendoftheColdWarasthestartingpointforanewinterpretationofthemissionde
finedbyKhomeini.Heconsciouslyanddeliberatelyaffirmedanewbipolarityintheinterna
tionalarenacharacterizedbytheIslamicRepublicofIranasthecoreofarevitalizedandpo

1 Ettelaat,Tehran,3November1979.

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HennerFrtig:IranandtheArabSpring:BetweenExpectationsandDisillusion 7

liticizedIslamontheonesideandtheWest,itsleadingpowertheUnitedStatesinparticular,
ontheotherside.Khameneiclaimedthat:

InthepasttheWestassignedprioritytotheSovietUnionandMarxism,butnowithas
focuseditsconcentrationonourregion,whichhasbecomethemostimportantregion
foronereason,andthatisbecauseitwasherethattheIslamicRevolutionenteredthe
world.2

Hebelievedthatthechallengewasimmenseas:

[Iranian revolutionaries] must prove that Western values and the Western way of life
arenotuniversallyvalid,butcanbereplacedbyconsciousadherencetoIslamicnorms.
Theeyesofothercountriesareonus,successandfailurearebeingexactlyweighedup
againsteachother.ItdependsonustomakeIslamanattractivealternative.3

Intermsofbeinganexample,itwasnolongernecessaryfortheIslamicRepublicofIranto
actively export its revolution. Nevertheless, it was not until 1993 that Khamenei officially
abandonedthismission.
Indoingso,hewasimplicitlyadmittingthattheconceptassuchhadfaileddespiteinitial
humblesuccessesinLebanon,Bahrain,SaudiArabia,IraqandAfghanistan.Hispredecessor,
Khomeini,hadalreadytriedtoblamethesinisterpracticesoftheWestanditsregionalal
lies(e.g.,encouragingSaddamHusseintowagewaragainstIran,19801988)forthecurtail
ment of revolutionary momentum. However, Khomeini was completely unable to see that
his doctrine of exporting the revolution had repelled those he persistently soughtto reach:
oppressedMuslims.ThemajorityofthemwereSunnites,andtheyhadclearmemoriesofthe
hegemonic ambitions of Iran during the Shahs era. In broad consent with their respective
governmentswhomtheyusuallyviewedskepticallytheyinterpretedthisIslamicsenseof
missionasanIraniancravingforstatus,thistimecloakedinShiiteapparel.

2.2 ProblemsandAmbitionsoftheIranianClaimtoLeadership

AfterKhomeinisdeath,thedefactodefeatinthewaragainstIraqandtheconcomitantcrisis
ofthesystem,theregimecommenceditssearchin1989/1990foranewapproachwithwhich
toimplementthestillvalidsenseofitsmission.Thisnewmethodwasnotsupposedtoin
clude any direct form of exporting the revolution. Rather, the Islamic leadership declared
that primacy was to be assigned to economic reconstruction in the end, the revolution
wouldsurviveorfailwithaprosperingeconomy.AnIslamicrepublicasapolitical,economic
andculturalsuccessstorywouldautomaticallyprevailintheArabworld.Iranwasthusto
be transformed into a model society (madneye nemneh), meaning that the revolution

2 BBCSWB,Reading,ME/1284A/1,22January1992.
3 Ettelaat,Tehran,3June1990.

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8 HennerFrtig:IranandtheArabSpring:BetweenExpectationsandDisillusion

wouldnolongerhavetobeexported.Instead,itwouldpresentitselftoallMuslimsasanal
ternativefitforemulation.
The first two presidents under Khameneis aegis acted in accordance with this concept
eventhougheachofthemhadindividualsetsofpriorities.PresidentRafsanjaniadvocateda
pragmaticcourseaccordingtowhichforeignpolicywasprimarilysupposedtoserveIrans
economicrecoveryafterthedevastatingwaragainstIraqanapproachcontinued,inprinciple,
by President Khatami. However, Khatami added a dialogue of the civilizations compo
nent,whichconsistedofperseveringlycourtingthepoliticalandeconomicdecisionmakers
ofEuropeanstatesaswellasChinaandJapan.Thisstrategywasintendedtoindirectlycom
peltheUnitedStatestoactionandthusdeemedasuitableinstrumenttoovercomeIranspo
liticalisolationonalongtermbasis.
Thus, MahmudAhmadinejads visit to Khomeinis tomb inAugust 2005 immediately
afterhisfirstelectionaspresidentconstitutedmorethanasymbolicact.Afterward,hede
claredthatthewayofImamKhomeiniistheabsolutewayoftheIslamicRepublic.Accord
ingtoAhmadinejad,KhomeiniwasnotonlytheleaderduringtheRevolution,heremained
itsguide.4Withthisstatement,thepresidentgavetheimpressionthattheIranianRevolution
had,onahigherlevel,returnedtoitspointofdeparture.ThepragmatismofRafsanjanistwo
termsinofficebelongedtothepastandKhatamiswillingnesstoopenthecountryandseek
dialogue was forgotten. In contrast, Ahmadinejad and his mentor Khamenei reactivated
KhomeinisdepictionoftheIslamicRepublicofIranasthetruedefenderofIslamagainst
theWestacontextinwhichacloselinkbetweenpowerconsolidationandregionalpower
ambitionsbecameapparent.
Itisnocoincidencethatalsoin2005,SupremeLeaderKhameneideclaredthepolicypaper
20YearVisionPlanasthebindingforeignpolicyguidelineaccordingtowhichIranwould
assume the leading economic, scientific and technological position in the region by 2025.
AchievingthisgoalwouldnotonlyseetheIslamicRepublicofIranbecomeadevelopment
modelfortheIslamicworld,itwouldalsoconstitutetherealizationofthemodelsocietypro
jectthathadbeencultivatedsinceKhomeinisdeath.Additionally,Iranwouldbecomearole
model due to its pioneering role in the antiimperialist struggle, which was in keeping
with the slogan justice among the peoples and the states. Thus, the mission could not
simplybereducedtoataskforShiitesorMuslimsingeneral.Inordertoconsolidatetheim
age of a pioneer, Iran constantly reminds the rest of the Islamic world of its merits in the
struggleagainstimperialismandZionism.Themore,forexample,thePalestinianprob
lembecomesdetachedfromitspredominantlyArabcontext,thegreaterareIranschancesto
implementitscurrentforeignpolicyaimtoinfluencepoliticallyactiveIslamiccommunities
aroundtheworld.ConsideringtheproWesternattitudeofmostauthoritarianArabregimes
priortotheArabSpring,AhmadinejadsaggressivecriticismoftheUnitedStatesandIsrael

4 InternationalHeraldTribune,Paris,21December2005.

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HennerFrtig:IranandtheArabSpring:BetweenExpectationsandDisillusion 9

wasatleastpartiallysuccessfulingainingapprovalfromtheMusliminthestreet.Forthe
samereason,healsorejectedtheofferofnormalizedrelationsmadetohimbyhisUScoun
terpart,BarackObama.Infact,USandIsraelioppositionwasapreconditionfortheimple
mentationofhisforeignpolicyandsecuritypolicystrategies.
Since the ousting of Saddam Hussein and the war in Iraq, the position of the Middle
EasterncenterofresistanceagainstUSandZionistdespotismhadbecomevacantarole
Iranwaseagertofill.UntiltheArabSpring(orIslamicawakeningaccordingtoTehransver
sion of events), Irans ambition to play the leading role in the creation of a chain of re
sistancestartinginTehranandpassingthroughBaghdad,Damascus,BeirutandRamallah
beforeendinginGazawasbasedonitsexcellentrelationswithHezbollah,stablecontacts
withthePalestinianresistance,strongrootswithintheregionsShiitecommunities,tremen
dous natural resources and ability to exert massive influence on the events in Iraq (Hroub
2006:32).Ifsuccessfulincreatingthischain,itwouldbeabletosubstantiallyharmthepoliti
calaimsoftheWest.
Nevertheless, Tehrans regained selfconfidence was not so much a result of new con
cepts,butratherofblatantlyweakandunpopularArabgovernmentsunabletocounterthe
Iranian offensive. In fact, Irans leadership claim had fallen short of regime expectations.
Thus,inFebruary2011,itsawahugeopportunitytousurptherebellionstakingplaceinthe
regionforitsownproject.

3 ReactionsintheArabWorld

Therewerevariousconditionsthat,atleasttosomedegree,nurturedIransleadershipambi
tions.Fordecades,manyinhabitantsofNorthAfricaandtheMiddle Easthadnoticedthat
they had no access to the accelerated and increasingly globalized political, economic and
technological developments. Economic recovery, prosperity and progress occurred in other
partsoftheworld,whilethesqualidconditionsinthedeprivedareasofKhartoum,Algiers
or Cairo, for example, had not changed. On the one hand, these destitute communities
blamed past colonial and current neocolonial Western policies in the Islamic world for this
misery;ontheotherhand,theycondemnedtheirowngovernmentsfortheimplementation
ofWesterndevelopmentandmodernizationmodels.Thelatterhadfailedgloriously,leav
ing behind impoverished people whose cultural and religious identities were endangered.
Asalogicalconsequence,ideologicalimportsfromtheWest(suchasnationalism,socialism
and communism) had proved useless in changing autocratic political and stagnating eco
nomicconditions.Subsequently,manydeprivedpeople(re)discoveredtheirreligion,Islam,
asanapproachtodealingwiththeircurrentsituations.Accordingly,Islamssignificancein
creased substantially, including in everyday culture. Against this background, there was
growingsupportforallthosewhoclaimedthatIslamneedonlybestrippedofitsfolkloristic
elements and external additions in order to function as a progressive and dynamic re

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10 HennerFrtig:IranandtheArabSpring:BetweenExpectationsandDisillusion

formingfactorappropriateforMuslims.Islamistswhotrussedthatnotionbecamethemost
influentialorganizedoppositionforceintheregion.
While the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists and other Islamist groups increasingly gained
approval and respect as consistent and authentic representatives of an Islamic solution,
they remained opposition forces; up to that point in 2011, they had only managed to seize
powerinIranin1979.ThislatterfactwastheprimaryreasonthattheleadersoftheIslamic
RepublicofIranconsideredthemselvespioneersandpraisedtheircountryasaleadingex
ample.Inaninterview,thethenforeignminister,AliAkbarSalehi,referredtothepowerof
factsandstatedthatthepeopleoftheregiondidnotliveinavacuum:evenifIranwasnot
omnipresentintheirthoughts,theyhadbeenastutelyawarethatIranwastheonlystatein
theregionwhereIslamhadbecomethedominantpoliticalpower.Thus,thecommitmentto
andstruggleforanIslamicstatewouldberewarded(Salehi2011:3).Asearlyas27February
2011 and for the purpose of consolidating this impression, Iranian leaders invited Muslim
leadersfromaroundtheworldtoaconferenceinTehranontheprospectsandconsequences
oftheIslamicawakening.TheyparticularlyappreciatedthecommentsmadebytheEgyp
tian Muslim Brotherhood (the oldest and most influential Islamist organization) delegate
KamalalHelbawy,whoaccordingtotheIranianmediaexpressedhisdeepgratitudeand
recognitionofIransleadingrevolutionaryrole.5
Yet,noleadingIranianpoliticianreferredtothefactthatthedemonstrationsleadingto
regimechangeinTunisiaandEgyptbytheendofFebruary2011hadoccurredwithoutany
Islamicsymbols,slogansordemands.Bread,libertyandhumandignitywerethecore
demandsoftheprotestorsinTunisandCairobynomeanstheinceptionofanIslamicor
deroradivinestatepursuanttotheIranianmodel.Infact,Iransinfluencewasevenless
significantthanfearedbyTehran.Thiswillbeanalyzedindetailedcasesstudiesofparticular
importancetoIransforeignpolicystrategy.

3.1 Egypt

An assessment of the blogs produced during the first weeks of the uprising in Egypt re
vealed that a mere 69 of 42,466 tweets made any reference to Iran, and only three of these
werewritteninArabic.AsurveyconductedinAlexandriaandCairojustaweekbeforethe
oustingofMubarakshowedthatonly18percentofthosesurveyedhadanysympathiesfor
the Islamic Republic of Iran, while 47 percent vehemently rejected it. The remaining re
spondentsexpressedthattheyhadnointerestinIran(Kurzman2012:162).EventheMus
limBrotherhood,whichwasheavilycourtedbyIran,displayedanextraordinary degreeof
reserve.BackinCairo,KamalalHelbawywhohadbeenlaudedinTehrandeclaredthat
while his organization was grateful for Irans support, it should be noted that the circum

5 Conference on Islamic awakening held in Tehran. Online: <www.mehrnews.com/en/newsdetail.aspx?News

ID=1263085>(25June2012).

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HennerFrtig:IranandtheArabSpring:BetweenExpectationsandDisillusion 11

stancesinEgyptwereverydifferenttothoseinIranandthattheEgyptianRevolutionwas
notanIslamicone(Kurzman2012:163).MuhammadMursi,whosubsequentlybecamethe
Muslim Brotherhoodspresidential candidate,stated his clear opposition to any Iranian in
fluence: We are not responsible for statements in Iran [] we are against a religious state
[]becauseIslamisagainstit.6Atthesametimehemadereferencetothepluralisticand
democratic positions that the Muslim Brotherhood had long been advocating (Wickham
2011).MursiandotherleadersoftheBrotherhoodwereostensiblywellawareofthefactthat
adoptingacoursethatmadethemappeartoofriendlywithIrancouldcostthemthehearts
andmindsoftheEgyptianstheyneededintheforthcomingelections.
Consciousofthis,theIraniangovernmentlaunchedacharmoffensiveandtriedtocreate
theperceptionofanequalfootingbetweenthetwoIslamiccenters.ViatheIranianmedia,
TehrandepictedIranandEgyptas:

twowingsoftheIslamicworld.OnewingbegantoflapwiththeIranianIslamicRevo
lutionstriumph,buttheotherwingwaswounded.Theotherwing,too,hasstartedto
flap following the revolution in Egypt and is now in recovery. The Muslim Brother
hoodandtheIslamicRevolutionmoveshouldertoshoulderinregardtotheregional
policiesintheMiddleEast.7

As an initial common goal, Iran would probably seek the cancellation of the Camp David
Accords(i.e.,thepeacetreatybetweenEgyptandIsrael),whichhasbeendescribedasoneof
themostpainfulwoundsinthebodyoftheIslamiccommunity.8TheEgyptians,however,
wouldpresumablydismisssuchassessmentsandproposalsaspaternalisticbecausethey
givetheimpressionthatIranwasthearenaofthefirstsuccessfulmanifestationofanIslamic
RenaissanceinmodernhistoryandthatMuslimmovementsinallotherIslamiccountries
remained in the opposition even those as strong and influential as the Muslim Brother
hood.Oneshouldnotforgetthat,accordingtotheIranianConstitution,theleaderoftheIs
lamicRepublicofIranisalsotheleaderofallMuslimsthroughouttheworld.9
Nevertheless,whenMuhammadMursibecamepresident,hehadgoodreasonstowrite
new chapters in his countrys foreign policy and to widen his leeway by normalizing rela
tions with Iran a step that his predecessor Mubarak had always vehemently rejected. In
August 2012, Mursi took part in the 16th Summit of the NonAligned Movement (NAM)
hosted by Tehran. Although this was not an official state visit, Mursi was in fact the first
EgyptianpresidenttovisitIransincePresidentSadatin1978.ShortlybeforeleavingCairo,
hedeclaredthatEgyptwelcomesagoodrelationshipwithIran.10Tehransoughttomaximize

6 AlShuruq,Cairo,10February2011.
7 TehraneEmroz,Tehran,28June2012.
8 Ibid.
9 QuotedinAlSharqalawsat,London,17June2011.
10AlSafir,Beirut,28August2012.

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12 HennerFrtig:IranandtheArabSpring:BetweenExpectationsandDisillusion

this opportunity, treating Mursi as a state guest and offering him both a lengthy meeting
withSupremeLeaderKhameneiandavisittothenuclearfacilitiesinBushehr,Natanzand
Isfahan.Mursinotonlydeclinedbothoffers,healsousedtheopeninghearingofthesummit
to call for the ousting of theAssad regime in Syria thereby indirectly criticizingAssads
foreignsupporters,includingIran.MursileftIranonthesameday.
The new Egyptian presidents message to Tehran was clear: a good relationship is fine,
butitshouldnotharmfruitfulrelationswithothercountries,especiallythoseontheArabian
Peninsula. Most Gulf leaders had boycotted the NAM summit in Iran. They, along with
manyotherArabandWesternleaders,weresuspiciousoftherealintentionsbehindIrans
implementationofaregionalprojectdrivenbynationalratherthanIslamicinterests.Mursi
wouldhaveriskedbeingcutofffromthevitaleconomicandfinancialsupportprovidedby
theGulfmonarchiesifhehadsupportedtheIranianpositionunconditionally.
Indomesticpolitics,MursihadtoappeasetheSalafists,whowererunnersupinthefirst
parliamentaryelectionsafterthedownfallofHusniMubarak.Oneoftheirmostprominent
preachers,SheikhAliGhallab,calledMursisvisittoIrantreasontothebloodoftheSyri
ans,11whileotherSalafileaderspaintedadarkpictureoftheShiitesledbyIranconquer
ingtheSunniheartlandofEgypt.ExtremeantiShiiterhetoricisahallmarkoftheSalafists,
whobelievetheShiiteshaveabandonedthetruefaith.Consequently,Iransclaimtoleader
shipandselfdepictionasamodelfortheIslamicworldwasseentoconstituteathinlyveiled
attempttoimposeupontrueMuslimsyetanotherunIslamicsysteminadditiontothe
failedWesternmodels.12TheMuslimBrotherhoodquicklyrespondedtothoseaccusationsby
describingMursisvisittoTehranasaninitiativetopressureIrantohaltitssupportforthe
Assad regime and by promising that they will never allow Iran to spread Shiism in Sunni
countries.
TheparadoxicalelementinthisdisputeisthatIranneverhadanyintentionofspreading
the Shia faith in Egypt or anywhere else in the Islamic world. This would fundamentally
contradict the Islamic Republics claim of representing an Islamic rather than a pure Shia
modelforMuslimstoemulate.OnecouldhardlyimagineamoresevereblowtoIransinten
tions than only being recognized as the leader of the worlds Shiites instead of the entire
Muslimcommunity.Thisdispute,however,wasabruptlyendedbytheterminationofMursis
presidencyon3July2013.EventhoughMursididnotmeetalltheirexpectations,theIranian
hierarchywasbyandlargesatisfiedwithhisnormalizationofrelationsgivenformerpresi
dent Mubaraks refusal to deal with Tehran. Consequentially, all media mouthpieces con
demnedthecoupdtatagainsttheelectedEgyptianpresident.Asinthefollowingpas
sage,theyalsoemployedthewellknownpropagandaclichsofadarkcoalitionofZionists,
reactionaryArabcountriesandtheWest:

11Ibid.
12AlShuruq,Cairo,6March2011.

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HennerFrtig:IranandtheArabSpring:BetweenExpectationsandDisillusion 13

AstowhethertheEgyptianarmyisinalliancewiththiscoalitionornotorithasbeen
embroiledintheirgame,isanotherissue.But[]bypushingthearmyintoaconfron
tation with the people, they will, on the one hand, execute the plan to ensure the re
movalofIslamistsfromthepoliticalarenaand,ontheotherhand,createconditionsfor
theperpetuationofthecrisisinEgypt.Regionallyalso,the[]coalitionofZionists,reac
tionaryArab countries and the West, which through the exploitation of the Egyptian
army [] not only killed Egyptians and intensified the crisis in this country, has
sought to silence the cries of oppression of the people of Bahrain and Palestine and
preventtheworldfrompayingattentiontotheirlostrights.13

Instrategicterms,theoustingofMuhammadMursiandthepoliticalmarginalizationofthe
MuslimBrotherhoodwasanothersevereblowtoIransIslamicawakeninginterpretationof
postArabSpringdevelopments.

3.2 Libya

TheeventsinEgyptinthesummerof2013confirmedtheviewthatIransplantoenhanceits
politicalimagebyinterpretingtheArabSpringasanIslamicawakeningheldlittlepromise
indeed, it was a claim that became increasingly difficult to maintain with each passing
month. Not only had developments in Tunisia and Egypt become increasingly complex in
nature,subsequenteventsinLibya,BahrainandYemenunfoldeddifferentlythanexpected
by Iran. UN Security Council Resolution 1973 and the subsequent NATO military action
againsttheGaddafiregimeprovidedtheIranianleadershipwithitsfirstopportunitytorein
initsIslamicawakeningpropagandainfavoroftriedandtestedantiUSandantiWestslo
gans.Tehrancondemnedtheoperationasthecontinuationofaseriesofincidentswherethe
West,drivenbyitsbarelyconcealedinterestingainingcontroloverLibyanoil,disregarded
internationallaw(HanauSantiniandAlessandri2011:1).

3.3 SaudiArabiaandtheGulf

When Saudiled intervention troops entered Bahrain in March 2011 to thwart the popular
uprisingagainstthefamilyruleoftheAlKhalifa,Iranwaspresentedwiththechancetoopen
anotherfrontinitspropagandawar.AccordingtotheIranianmedia,theSaudikingandthe
other monarchs of theArabian Peninsula had intervened in Bahrain for fear of the revolu
tionary tide reaching them especially if one takes into account geographic proximity and
theexistenceofacommonborder.OnereportcontendedthattheuprisinginBahrainhas
hadgreatcostsforArabcountries,particularlySaudiArabiaandtheWest,becauseithasre
vealedtheBahrainipeoplesdynamism,whichcanconstitutearolemodelforthepeopleof

13SiyasateRuz,Tehran,15August2013.

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14 HennerFrtig:IranandtheArabSpring:BetweenExpectationsandDisillusion

SaudiArabia.14BytoleratingtheuprisinginBahrain,theothermonarchswouldhavebeen
permanentlyconcernedaboutthetopplingoftheoldrulingregimeandtheintroductionofa
newone,whichbyallexpectationswould behostiletothemandrefusetosuccumbto
theirauthority.
In fact, the Iranian medias assessment of the Gulf rulers motives for intervening mili
tarily in Bahrain was not so dissimilar to more neutral, even academic, interpretations. For
example,theprominentanthropologistfromtheUniversityofLondon,MadhawialRashid,
wrotethefollowing:

At this level, the blatant Saudi interference is seen at the level of three revolutions. It
oppressed the revolution in Bahrain in a direct way, contained it in Yemen and sup
porteditinSyria,whichraisesnumerousquestionsregardingtheSaudiroleinthere
gion. Saudi Arabia perceived the toppling of the Bahraini regime as being a direct
threattoit,asitheraldedthechangingoftheroyalsheikhdomsystemofgovernance
whichisnotonlydeeplyrootedinSaudiArabia,butalsointheentireGulfregion.[]
In Yemen, SaudiArabia wished to contain the repercussions of the revolution which
heralded the changing of the ruling team that is controlled by it on the political and
economic levels, thus introducing an initiative to save that old team and the submis
siontoRiyadh.15

TheAlSaudandotherGulfrulers,however,didnotonlyfeartheknockoneffectofapopu
laruprising,butalsoanimminentIranianvictory.ThepresenceofaShiitemajorityinBah
raingaverisetotheirsuspicionsthataninsurgentvictorywould,infact,constituteasuccess
for Tehran. Bahrains relationship with Saudi Arabia has often been compared to that be
tween Puerto Rico and the United States: an associated free state. How would Washington
reacttoanantiUSchangeofpowerinSanJuan(Teitelbaum2011:2)?Hence,asinthecaseof
Egypt,theprominentroleofthedenominationalfactorinthebattleoverBahrainwasabitter
pilltoswallowfortheIranianleadership.HowcoulditupholdthemythofanIslamicawak
eningoftheentireMuslimcommunitywhentheuprisinginBahrainwasbeingmisinterpret
ed(inTehranseyes)asasimpleconflictbetweentheShiitemajorityagainsttheSunnimi
nority?Inresponse,IranattemptedtoostentatiouslyignoretheShiiteaspectoftheconflict
andaccusedtheSaudileadersofrepeatedlyopposingtheclearlyaudiblewishforchangeon
theArabianPeninsulainabidtopreservetheirownpowerandthepoweroftheWest(Ha
nauSantini and Alessandri 2011: 2). Although Bahrain might have had some potential for
IransvisionofanIslamicawakening,thedevelopmentstherewereclearlymarginalizedby
theeventsinSyria.

14Ibid.
15Al-Quds al-Arabi, London, 6 August 2012.

GIGAWorkingPapers WP241/2013
HennerFrtig:IranandtheArabSpring:BetweenExpectationsandDisillusion 15

3.4 Syria

TothedismayofTehran,theuprisinginSyriaputIraninasimilarsituationtotheonethat
SaudiArabiawasfacinginBahrain.Syria,underthefriendlygovernmentofBasharalAssad,
isofextraordinarystrategicsignificancetoIran.SincethebeginningoftheIraqIranWarin
1980,SyriahasbeenIransmosttrustworthyallyintheregionandhasprovidedTehranwith
theabilitytoinfluenceeventsintheEasternMediterraneanespeciallydevelopmentscon
cerning theArabIsraeli conflict. One could argue that losing Syria would constitute Irans
biggest strategic defeat for 30 years, resulting in a loss of strategic access to Hezbollah in
Lebanon, Hamas and the Palestinian issue, as well as a physical presence along the Israeli
border(Salem2011:1).Givenitsgeopoliticalsignificance,TehranclearlysidedwithBashar
alAssadandtheSyrianregimefromtheoutset.Although,itdidnotsendtroopstointervene
(asdidSaudiArabiainBahrain),IransuppliedDamascuswitharms,moneyandmilitaryin
structors.Iranssupport,however,couldnotcompensatefortheSyrianregimeslackofknow
howindealingwithcivilprotests.Duringthefirstdaysoftheuprising,itwasthearmyra
therthanaspeciallytrainedpoliceforcethatwasputtingdowntheprotests.Thisresulted
in extensive casualties among both the protesters and government forces (Venetis 2011: 20).
Eventually, there was increasing evidence that Iran was contributing special units from its
RevolutionaryGuardforcestosupportAssadseffortstodealwiththeuprising.
ThemoreIraniansupportforAssadbecameobvious,themoreregimeopponentsinside
and outside of Iran began to sardonically ask whether Iran only supported the peoples
will in countries whose governments had alliances with the West, and not in those allied
withIran(Alfoneh2011:35).Asaconsequence,theentireconstructionoftheIranianinter
pretationoftheArabSpringasanIslamicawakeningriskedbeingunderminedbyitsactions
inSyria.Toaddressthiscontradiction,Iranianpropagandabegantoallegethattheeventsin
SyriacouldnotbecomparedtothoseinEgyptandTunisia,becausetheformerwerenotpart
ofarealrevolutionastheylackedcertainrequirements(e.g.,thecommitmentofthepeople,
aclearideologyandastringentleadership).Tehranargued,thatthesituationinSyriawas,
onthecontrary,akintoacivilwargiventhepresenceofspecificdemands(e.g.,territorialse
cession,autonomyandindependence),whichhadbeenincitedbyforeignerspursuingtheir
owninterests.
This external interference became the second ingredient of Irans counterpropaganda
concerningSyria.IranslinktotheArabEastandtotheMiddleEastconflictviaSyriawasre
interpretedasachainofresistanceagainstbotharrogantandWesternpowers.Theyhad
no intention of daring to use the differences between Shiites and Sunnites to weaken that
bond. The editorial of a conservative newspaper stated that the chain was like a spiritual
linkthathad:

infused the spirit of resistance in many countries in the Middle East region. If they
wereabletocutoffthemiddlelinkinthatchainbymakinguseofthepotentialsofthe

WP241/2013 GIGAWorkingPapers
16 HennerFrtig:IranandtheArabSpring:BetweenExpectationsandDisillusion

SalafiandTakfirimovementsandbysowingtheseedsofdissensionamongMuslims
[] they would have been able to disconnect the main link, which is the Islamic Re
public of Iran, and the third and fourth links, which are Hezbollah in Lebanon and
HamasinPalestine,respectively.16

Later,theeditorialquotedSupremeLeaderKhamenei:TherealityabouttheSyrianissueis
thatthearrogantfrontisintentondestroyingthechainofresistanceintheregion,whichex
istsintheneighborhoodoftheusurpingZionistregime.17Interestinglyenough,thenotion
oftheIslamicawakeningwasremovedfromthepropagandaarsenalintheSyriancase.

4 TheStruggleforthePrerogativeofInterpretationoftheArabSpringinsideIran

Since the severe crisis caused by the presidential elections of 2009, the Iranian regime had
beeneagerlylookingforchancestoregainlegitimacy.Inthiscontext,aregionalandinterna
tionalrecognitionofaninterpretationoftheArabSpringasthelongoverdueconfirmationof
Iranianrevolutionarypolicieswouldhavebeenmorethanwelcome.Fromadiametrically
opposedposition,theremorselesslypersecutedGreenMovementnotonlyhadaninterestin
refusingtheregimesclaim,butalsoinbrandingitasanachronisticandsimilartotheArab
dictatorshipsthathadjustbeenousted.Thedemonstratorswhohaddespiteprohibition
gatheredinseveralIraniancitieson14February2011usedslogansthatwereunambiguous
(e.g.,Mubarak,BenAli,itisnowtheturnofSeyedAli[Khamenei])andreferredtoviolent
repression(e.g.,ThoseinIranwithmotorcyclesorthoseinCairowithcamels,deathtothe
dictator) (Alfoneh 2011: 3738). For the Iranian opposition, it was important to create the
impression of a stable connection between the Green Movement in Iran and the protest
movement in the Arab world. In this regard, the Green Movement posted the following
statementononeofitswebsites:In2009theEgyptianssawtheprotestrallieswithmillions
ofIraniansandaskedthemselves:Whycantwedothesame?Whyareweweakandwith
outstrength?(Borszik2011:5).ThelogicalconclusionshouldbethattheGreenMovement
wasaprecursoroftheArabSpringithadinspiredpeopleinEgyptandTunisia,andthe
success of the protests in the Arab world was, in turn, catalyzing the Iranian opposition
movement. Some bloggers even went as far as to term the people striving for freedom in
Iran, Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan and Algeria as Green Movements of the regional nations
(Borszik2011:5).WiththeincreasingpersecutionoftheGreenMovementbytheregime,the
optimisticanalysisoftheformerwasreplacedwithacertainsobriety.Inthelongrun,how
ever,thecharacterizationoftheprotestmovementsasaregional(notonlyArab)phenome
nonremainedimportant.AsMohammadi(2011)pointsout:

16Resalat,Tehran,20November2012.
17Ibid.

GIGAWorkingPapers WP241/2013
HennerFrtig:IranandtheArabSpring:BetweenExpectationsandDisillusion 17

Theprotestmovementmayhavemanycomponents,butitscommondenominatorisits
strongrootswithinthepeopleanditsstrivingfordemocracy.[]Neitherasingleparty,
nor a specific ideology dominate the protests, nor are prominent leaders discernible
[]thustheshareddemandsarewhatdefineitasaunit.

IntheearlydaysoftheArabrevolts,theIranianleadershiptoleratedvoicesinthelocalmedia
thatcalledforunconditionalsupportofallpopularuprisingsagainstauthoritarianrulers.An
editorialinareformistdailycommented,forexample,thatonemustnotabandonthesup
portofpeoplesdemandsinSyria,asinthelongtermitwouldharmIransforeignpolicy.18
But the speed with which the supposedly stable regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya were
swept away and the pace with which the regimes in Syria and Yemen came under sudden
pressureundoubtedlygaverisetogreatconcernswithintheIranianleadershipandsignifi
cantlycontributedtoitskneejerk,harshreaction.Thealternativeofyieldingtothe(partial)
demandsofthereformmovementdidnotevenmeritconsideration.Onthecontrary,Syria
becametheonlycasewheretheIranianleadershipclaimedandpropagatedsimilaritieswith
thedomesticeventsof2009inIraninbothcases,unresthadbeencausedbyforeignele
ments(Granmayeh2011:2).
Thetwopresidents,BenAliandMubarak,facedasimilardecision.Theirrelianceonthe
beliefthattheoppositionwasdisorganized,withoutprogramandthusweakdidnotprevent
theirousting.Therefore,Tehranmayhavealsomadethewrongdecisionbychoosingastrategy
ofrelentlessrepressionthoughtheIranianhierarchystilldeemeditspositionfundamentally
differenttothatoftheoustedpotentatesinCairo,TunisandTripoliasitbelievedthatarevo
lutionagainstthistypeofregimehadalreadyoccurredinIranin1979.Therefore,theGreen
Movementandevensomemoderatereformersconstitutedthecounterrevolution.Conse
quently,theregimesinterpretationoftheArabSpringandthatoftheoppositionremained
incompatible.

5 Conclusion

The interpretation of the Arab Spring as a delayed extension of the Iranian Revolution of
1979 is farfetched. The international circumstances at the end of the 1970s were largely
shapedbytheColdWar,andtheclergyinIranmonopolizedtherevolutionaryagendatoan
extentthatwasandhasremainedunparalleled.Carriedbyamessianicmartyrcult,Ayatollah
KhomeiniimplementedaprogrammaticallycoherentmodelforanIslamicstatewithinone
yearoftheShahsousting.EventhoughKhomeinineverceasedemphasizingtheecumenical,
panIslamicnatureoftheIranianRevolution,Shiismwasamajorfactorbehindthesuccess
of1979.IranianTwelverShiism,forinstance,obligatesthefaithfultoagreewiththedoctrine
ofajurisconsult,thusfirmlyestablishingtheprincipleofadherence.Inthiscontext,Khomeini

18MardomSalari,Tehran,7April2011.

WP241/2013 GIGAWorkingPapers
18 HennerFrtig:IranandtheArabSpring:BetweenExpectationsandDisillusion

onlyhadtotransferthisprinciplefromthereligioustothepoliticalsphereinarevolutionary
act.Conversely,SunniIslamdoesnotendowclergymenwithsuchsuperiorpositions.With
the exception of the founder, Hassan alBanna, and one of the most influential spiritual
guides,SeyedQutb,theleadersoftheMuslimBrotherhoodhavelittletheologicaleducation
ifanyatall(Keddie2012:151).AfterKhomeinisdeath,theIranianleadershipconcludedthat
itwouldbecounterproductivetoexporttheirspecificrevolution.Insteaditwasdeemedfar
moreimportanttopresentanexemplarysuccessstorythatcouldbeemulated.Underthese
circumstances,Iran(accordingtoTehransofficialinterpretation)wouldalsoremaintheun
disputedoriginatoroftheArabawakening.
TheIranianleadershipwasnotreallysurprisedbythereactionoftheneighboringArab
regimes, especially the monarchies. For rulers in the Gulf, it does not make any difference
whetherIranianforeignpolicygoalsarebasedonregionalinterests,sectarianbeliefs,orna
tionalisticrootsdatingbacktotheeraofthePersianEmpire.Indeed,allthisrepresentsan
extensionoftheforeignpoliticsandanaturalreflectionoftheIranianstate,whichisbased
ontheprincipleofthe[Walayetal]Faqihrule.19WhattheIranianleadersreallylamented
wastheirfailuretobringtheIslamistsonside,especiallytheMuslimBrotherhoodbranches
inEgypt,SyriaandLebanon.Insteadofestablishingarelationshipwiththemonthebasisof
Islam(arelationshipthatwoulduniteallIslamistsintheentireregionwiththeaimofestab
lishingIslamicregimes,whichwouldrulebyshariaandconfrontallsortsofexternalchal
lenges),themoderateIslamistsmadeifatallpoliteandverygeneralexpressionsofsym
pathy to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Salafists, however, explicitly projected an anti
IranianandantiShiiteimage.Therefore,onbalance,Iranwasnotamongthebeneficiariesof
theArabSpring.ThenotionofanIslamicawakeningdidnotresonatewiththeArabinsur
gents, while favoritism toward individual insurgent movements like that in Bahrain was
generallyinterpretedasaselectivemeasureemployedinpursuanceofIransownhegemonic
ambitions.
Meanwhile, the analysis of theArab Spring by the Iranian Green Movement primarily
served propagandistic and political rather thanacademic interests. Yet,it cannot be denied
thattheparallelsbetweenIranin2009andtheArabworldin2011particularlywithregard
totheinternationalframeworkconditionsarefarmoreapparentthanthosebetween1979
and 2011. The main demands of the Green Movement were the same as those of theArab
Spring insurgents: freedom, respect for human rights, social justice, and an end to corrup
tion, nepotism and isolation from the international community. According to ratings by
FreedomHouse,TransparencyInternationalandtheWorldBank,Iranevenexceedsthefig
uresoftheoustedregimesofBenAliandMubarakinTunisiaandEgyptwithregardtocor
ruption, mismanagement and oppression (Sadjadpour 2011: 3). However, these demands
originatefromtheinterestsofthemiddleclassesintheurbancentersofNorthAfricaandthe

19Al-Jazirah, al-Riyadh, 13 May 2012.

GIGAWorkingPapers WP241/2013
HennerFrtig:IranandtheArabSpring:BetweenExpectationsandDisillusion 19

MiddleEast,notfromtheoppressedanddisenfranchisedwhowerethetargetgroupof
Khomeiniandhisfollowersmessage.
Nevertheless,despitethesesimilarities,theGreenMovementalwaysforgetstomention
thatitsinitialaimwasnotregimechange,butrathertherepealofelectionresults.Mousavi
andKarrubiarenotonlywellknownasfigureheadsoftheGreenMovement,butalsoasrep
resentatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran the former served as prime minister (1981
1989), and the latter was Speaker of Parliament(19891996,20002004).They haveendeav
oredtobringaboutreformsoftheIslamicRepublicssystem,notitsabolition.Inthewakeof
therepressionithasfaced,theGreenMovementhasbecomeradicalized.Butthosefighting
fortheendoftheruleofthejurisconsult,andthusforadifferentrepublic,haveneithera
concise alternative program nor leaders with sufficient integrative power. In consequence,
theirappealandtheirpotentialasaleadingexamplefortheArabSpringhasremainedlim
ited. Wael Ghonim, one of the bestknown activists of the Egyptian insurgency, was once
askedifhewaswearinghisgreenarmbandasatokenofsolidaritywiththeIranianopposi
tion.Surprised,heansweredthatthecolorwasjustacoincidence,buthewashappythe
connection had been made (Kurzman 2012: 162). Slightly more aware of probable similari
ties,oneofGhonimscompanionsincludedtheGreenMovementinachainofotherrecent
protest movements, including the Salt March in India, Solidarity in Poland, the Orange
Revolution in Ukraine, the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon and the Lilly Revolution in
Kyrgyzstan. This demonstrates a respect for the Green Movement, but does not assign it a
prominentorleadingrole.Consequently,boththeregimeandtheGreenMovementshould
refrain from claiming that they exerted a defining influence onthe eventsthat were taking
placeinArabstates.Withregardtotheregime,formerpresidentRafsanjanimadethefollow
ingsoberjudgment:ImaintainthattheIslamicrevolutionservesmanyMuslimsworldwide
as an inspiration. Our current policies, however, make it extraordinarily hard for them to
admitthis.20
However, the Islamic Republic of Iran may, in fact, become a beneficiary of the Arab
Springinanunexpectedway.Theprotestsandrevoltsarealteringtheoverallstrategiccon
stellation of the region. Old factions are dissolving; new ones, emerging. In general, Arab
foreignpolicyhasbecomemoreselfconfidentandisnolongerdirectedbyexternalpowers.
ArabgovernmentsnolongerautomaticallyacceptthepariahstatusassignedtoIranbythe
West.
ThesestatesarenowsettingforeignpolicyaccordingtonationalratherthanWesternin
terests.Overall,Iranisprofitingfromthesepragmaticconsiderationsthoughitisstillnota
directbeneficiaryaswishedbytheregime.Onthewhole,Iranhasplayedafarmoremar
ginalroleintheArabSpringthanimaginedinTehran.Thebenefitsofthechangesmaybe
comeapparentinanindirectmannerand,atbest,inthelongrun.

20JomhoriyeEslami,Tehran,9August2011.

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20 HennerFrtig:IranandtheArabSpring:BetweenExpectationsandDisillusion

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