Insolubles

The medieval name for paradoxes like the famous Liar Paradox (This proposition is
false) was insolubles or insolubilia, [1] though besides semantic paradoxes, they included
epistemic paradoxes, e.g., You do not know this proposition. From the late-twelfth
century to the end of the Middle Ages and beyond, such paradoxes were discussed at length
by an enormous number of authors. Yet, unlike twentieth century interest in the paradoxes,
medieval interest seems not to have been prompted by any sense of theoretical crisis.

The history of the medieval discussions can be divided into three main periods: (a) an early
stage, from the late-twelfth century to the 1320s; (b) a period of especially intense and
original work, during roughly the second quarter of the fourteenth century; (c) a late period,
from about 1350 on.

1. Origins of the Medieval Discussion

The Liar Paradox was well known to antiquity. Its discovery is often credited to Eubulides
the Megarian (4th century BCE), on the basis of a remark by Diogenes Laertius (Lives of
the Philosophers II.108), although in fact Diogenes says only that Eubulides discussed the
paradox, not that he discovered it.[2] A little later, the poet and grammarian Philetus (or
Philitas) of Cos (c. 330-c. 270 BCE), if we are to believe the story in Athenaeus of
Naucratis's Deipnosophists IX.401e, worried so much over the Liar that he wasted away
and died of insomnia, as, according to Athenaeus, his epitaph recorded:

Philetus of Cos am I
Twas The Liar who made me die,
And the bad nights caused thereby. [3]

Diogenes Laertius also reports (VII.19698) that, in addition to a huge number of other
works on a variety of topics, the Stoic logician Chrysippus (c. 279206 BCE) wrote:

Introduction to the Liar;

Liar Propositions: An Introduction;

six books on the Liar itself;

 Reply to Those Who Think There Are Propositions That Are Both True and False;

Reply to Those Who Solve the Liar Proposition by Division;

On the Solution to the Liar (in three books);

Reply to Those Who Say The Liar Argument Has False Premises.

1.1 Unlikely Ancient Sources

Nonetheless, it does not appear that medieval interest in insolubles was derived directly
from these or any other known ancient sources that discuss the Liar. Many of the relevant
works were lost (e.g., the works of Chrysippus), while others were never translated into
Latin and so were effectively unavailable to the Latin Middle Ages, though things may be
different for the Arabic and Byzantine traditions, which are only starting to be studied.
(See, e.g., Alwishah and Sanson 2009.) Indeed, it is not at all clear just what it was that
prompted medieval interest. One might have supposed that, even if particular theories about
the Liar were not transmitted to the Latin West from antiquity, at least formulations of Liar-
type paradoxes must have been known and available to stimulate the medieval discussions.
In fact, however, there are strikingly few possibilities.

Seneca (Epistle 45.10), for instance, mentions the Liar paradox by its Greek
name pseudomenon, but does not actually formulate it. Again, St Augustine perhaps has the
Liar in mind in his Against the Academicians (III.13.29), where he refers to the most lying
calumny, if it is true [it is] false, if it is false it is true. But neither passage would likely
be sufficient by itself to suggest the special problems of the Liar to anyone not already
familiar with them.

Somewhat more explicit is Aulus Gellius's (2nd century CE) Attic Nights (XVIII.ii.10),
When I lie and say I am lying, am I lying or speaking the truth? But Gellius was not
widely read in the Middle Ages, and no known medieval author cites him in the context of
insolubles.[4] Again, Cicero's Academica priora, II.xxix.95-xxx.97, contains a fairly clear
formulation: If you lie and speak that truth, are you lying or speaking the truth? ... If you
say you lie, and you speak the truth, you lie; but you say you lie, and you speak the truth;
therefore, you lie. But this passage is never cited in the insolubilia-literature. Moreover
Cicero, who wrote in Latin and so did not have to be translated to be available to the
Middle Ages, calls such paradoxes inexplicables (inexplicabilia). If he was the catalyst
for the medieval discussions, we would have expected to find that term in the insolubilia-
literature, and we do not; the unanimous medieval term is insolubles.

1.2 St. Paul's Reference to Epimenides

One initially plausible stimulus for the medieval discussions would appear to be the Epistle
to Titus 1:12: One of themselves, even a prophet of their own, said, The Cretians
[= Cretans] are always liars, evil beasts, slow bellies. The Cretan in question is
traditionally said to have been Epimenides. For this reason, the Liar Paradox is nowadays
sometimes referred to as the Epimenides. Yet, blatant as the paradox is here, and
authoritative as the Epistle was taken to be, not a single medieval author is known to have
discussed or even acknowledged the logical and semantic problems this text poses. When
medieval authors discuss the passage at all, for instance in Scriptural commentaries, they
seem to be concerned only with why St. Paul should be quoting pagan sources.[5] It is not
known who was the first to link this text with the Liar Paradox.

1.3 Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations

By contrast with these passages, none of which was cited in the insolubilia-literature, there
is a text from Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations 25, 180a27-b7, that, from almost the very
beginning of the insolubilia-literature to the end of the Middle Ages, served as the
framework for discussing insolubles. It occurs in Aristotle's discussion of the fallacy of
confusing things said in a certain respect (secundum quid) with things said absolutely
or without qualification (simpliciter). In this context, Aristotle supposes a man who takes
an oath that he will become an oath-breaker, and then does so. Absolutely or without
qualification, Aristotle says, such a man is an oath-breaker, even though with respect to
the particular oath to become an oath-breaker he is an oath-keeper. Then Aristotle adds the
intriguing remark, The argument is similar too concerning the same man's lying and
speaking the truth at the same time (180b23). It was this sentence that many medieval
authors took to be a reference to the Liar Paradox, which therefore, on the authority of
Aristotle, could be solved as a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter.
The widespread appeal to this passage throughout the history of the insolubilia-literature
indicates that the text did play some role in prompting medieval interest in insolubles. This
suggestion is reinforced by the fact that the earliest known medieval statement of the Liar
occurs in 1132, around the time the Sophistical Refutations first began to circulate in
Western Europe in Latin translation. (See Section 2 below.)

Nevertheless, it is not immediately obvious how Aristotle's remarks can be made to fit the
Liar Paradox. The oath-breaker, as the example was generally interpreted, takes two oaths:
one, which he keeps, that he will commit perjury, and a second (it does not matter what it
is) that he breaks, thereby fulfilling the first oath. The man is an oath-breaker and an oath-
fulfiller, but with respect todifferent oaths; by breaking his second oath, rendering it false,
he fulfills the first oath, making it true. However, it is possible to interpret the passage as
referring to a single oath, when the oath is broken at the same time as it is made. Seen that
way, it connects the Liar paradox with the fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter.[6]

In short, it seems clear that the Sophistical Refutations was instrumental in prompting
medieval interest in insolubles. But more must have been involved too. Martin (1993)
suggests a connection with theories of obligations (cf. Section 3.3). Before medieval
logicians could formulate genuine Liar-type paradoxes, they first had to go well beyond
anything found in Aristotle's text. At present we cannot say whether they did this on the
basis of some still unidentified ancient source or whether it was through their own
intellectual power and logical insight.