1. BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES v
HON BALINDONG,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011
Facts:
COA issued a resolution defining its policy in auditing the
BSP, characterizing the BSP as a public corporation (1)
under CA 111 (amended by PD 460 and RA 7278), (2) in
BSP v NLRC, the SC ruled that it was a GOCC under its
charter, and (3) regarded as an instrumentality under the
Administrative Code.
BSP National President Binay sought for reconsideration of
the COA through a letter. According to Binay, the BSP was
classified as a GOCC in BSP v NLRCbecause of government
participation in the National Executive Board of the BSP,
however, when RA 7278 was enacted after the decision was
rendered, the statute eliminated substantial government
participation in the board. Further, the government does not
have funds invested in the BSP, neither does the BSP
administer special funds.
COA furnished BSP with a memorandum arguing the the (1)
character of the BSPs purposes and functions, including
teaching the youth of patriotism, courage, self-reliance, etc.,
which are sovereign functions enshrined in the Constitution
and (2) the statutory designation of the BSP as a public
corporation evince that it is a public corporation within COAs
jurisdiction. COA also argued that BSP is an attached agency
to the DECS.
Issue:
Is the BSP a public corporation such that it falls within the
jurisdiction of the COA?
Ruling:
Yes. The BSP is a public corporation subject to the
jurisdiction of COA.
First, Art. 44(2) of the Civil Code makes the BSP a public
corporation since it is an institution created by law for public
interest or purpose.
CA 111 which created the BSP lays out the functions of the
entity. Subsequent amendments in PD 460 and RA 7278 also
contain provisions supporting COAs argument that BSP
performs sovereign functions. The BSP exists to implement
the State policy declared in Art II, Sec 13 of the Constitution.
Second, it is a public corporation under the 1987
Administrative Code. Title VI, Chapter 8, Sec 20 lists the BSP
as an attached agency to the DECS. As an attached agency,
there is at least one government representative in its
governing board.
Finally, the BSP is not subject to the test of government
ownership or control and economic viability. Art XII, Sec 16
of the Constitution should not be construed to mean that
Congress is prohibited from creating a public corporation.
BSP is a public corporation performing functions that are
impressed with public interest.
2. MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL v.
GR No. 193340, Jan. 11, 2017
Facts:
Private respondents as heirs of Macalabo Ampo filed a
complaint for recovery of possession against Municipality of
Tangkal with the Shari'a District Court. The private
respondents contend that since the parties to the case are
muslim, then Shari'a District Court has jurisdiction over the
case. The premise is that since the Mayor of Tangkal is a
Muslim then as the representative of Tangkal it is now
considered under Article 143(2)(b) of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws actions "wherein the parties involved are
Muslims
Municipality of Tangkal filed a motion to dismiss (MTD) on
the ground of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction. It
argued that the municipality has no religious affiliation and
represents no cultural or ethnic tribe, it cannot be
considered as a Muslim under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws. The Mayor was only a representative of the
Municipality but the real party in interest is the municipality
and not the mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City has
jurisdiction in an action for recovery of possession filed by
Muslim individuals against a municipality whose mayor is a
Muslim.
Ruling:
NO. Although the definition does not explicitly distinguish
between natural and juridical persons, it nonetheless
connotes the exercise of religion, a personal right which by
nature is restricted to natural persons. Juridical persons are
considered persons only by virtue of legal fiction. The
Municipality of Tangkal falls under this category.
Under the Local Government Code, a municipality is a
body politic and corporate that exercises powers as a
political subdivision of the national government and
as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of
its territory. Furthermore, as a government
instrumentality, the Municipality of Tangkal can only act for
secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular
effects-consistent with the non-establishment clause.
The Shari'a District Court appears to have understood the
foregoing principles, as it conceded that the Municipality of
Tangkal "is neither a Muslim nor a Christian." Yet it still
proceeded to attribute the religious affiliation of the mayor
to the municipality. This is manifest error on the part of the
Shari'a District Court. The municipality has a separate and
distinct personality form the officers composing it.
In view of the foregoing, the Shari'a District Court had no
jurisdiction under the law to decide private respondents'
complaint because not all of the parties involved in the
action are Muslims.
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3. EMMANUEL PELAEZ v.THE AUDITOR GENERAL
GR No. L-23825, December 24, 1965
Facts:
The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant
to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued
Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129;
creating thirty-three (33) municipalities in 1964.
Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the
Philippines and as taxpayer, then instituted the present
special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as
well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit
any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
executive orders and/or any disbursement by said
municipalities.
Pelaez alleges that said executive orders are null and void on
the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed
by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370
became effective, Sec 3(3) of the acts provides that barrios
may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their
names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the
corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority
of the voters in the areas affected" and the
"recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated."
Pelaez argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new
law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios,
since barrios are units of municipalities?"
The Auditor General alleges that the power of the President
to create municipalities under this section does not amount
to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying
upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of
Binagonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it.
Issue:
Is the act of the President in creating the municipalities
through Executive Orders valid?
Ruling:
No. President cannot create a municipal corporation; it is a
legislative function.
Whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order
to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature
involving the adoption of means and ways to carry into
effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to
create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in
nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a
legislative function" or "solely and exclusively the exercise
of legislative power".
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
Government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential that
said law: (a) be complete in itself and (b) fix a standard, to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy,
the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy,
which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate
has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation
of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It
does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President. Neither does it give a
standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above
referred to.
Although under the last clause of the first sentence of
Section 68, the President:
... may change the seat of the government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may
require.
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section
68. As indicated, the creation of municipalities, is not
an administrative function, but one which is essentially
and eminently legislative in character. The question of
whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of
such power is not one of fact. It is "purely a
legislative question", or a political question.
Even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative
powers, as it certainly does, said Section 68, as part of the
Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917,
must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of
the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and
inconsistent with said statutory enactment.
The allegation of the Auditor General invoking the case of
Municipality of Cardona is likewise untenable for said case
involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a
mere transfer of territory from an already
existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality
(Binagonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to
said transfer in consequence of the fixing and definition,
pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries of two
municipalities.
Thus, SC declared the Executive Orders in question null and
void ab initio and the Auditor General permanently
restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any
disbursement by the municipalities above referred to.
4. MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ v. BAZ, JR
265 SCRA 182
Facts:
The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive
Order No. 258.By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No
171, dated November 22, 1988, Sinacaban laid claim to a
portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao,
Adorable, Sinara Baja, and Sinara Alto, based on the
technical description in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed
with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the
Municipality of Jimenez.
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In its answer, the Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding
that under E.O. No. 258 the disputed area is part of
Sinacaban, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of
an agreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban.
Furthermore, Jimenez alleged that, in accordance with the
decision in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the power to create
municipalities is essentially legislative and consequently
Sinacaban, which was created by an executive order, had no
legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim vis-
a-vis Jimenez, of which it remains part.
Issue:
Whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim.
Ruling:
The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not
validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling in
Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal
corporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore
the President was without power to create by executive
order the Municipality of Sinacaban. However, we have since
held that where a municipality created as such by executive
order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded
legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned.
In this case, different factors are present so as to confer on
Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal
corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been
recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban
had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v.
Auditor General was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the
validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been
questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that
its existence was questioned and only because it had laid
claim to an area that apparently is desired for its revenue.
This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, Sec.
16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against a
corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced
within five (5) years from the time the act complained of
was done or committed. On the contrary, the State and even
the Municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized
Sinacaban's corporate existence. Under Administrative Order
No. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated by
Sec. 31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P.
Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit
for purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier
recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement
with it regarding their common boundary. The agreement
was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board
of Misamis Occidental.
Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of
the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution,
apportioning legislative districts throughout the country,
which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of
Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the ruling in
Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., Sec.
442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be
deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of
Sinacaban. This provision states:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this
Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing
municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at
the time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.
Second. Jimenez claims, however, that R.A. No. 7160, Sec.
442(d) is invalid, since it does not conform to the
constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of
plebiscites in the creation of new municipalities.
This contention will not bear analysis. Since, as previously
explained, Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the
time the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987,
it is not subject to the plebiscite requirement. This
requirement applies only to new municipalities created for
the first time under the Constitution. Actually, the
requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in Art. XI,
3 of the previous Constitution which took effect on January
17, 1973. It cannot, therefore, be applied to municipal
corporations created before, such as the Municipality of
Sinacaban in the case at bar.
4. MUNICIPALITY OF NARCISO v. MENDEZ
Facts:
On 1958, Executive Order No. 353 created the municipal
district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the
municipality of San Narciso of the same province,
the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy,
Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.
On 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition
for quo warranto with the Regional Trial Courtagainst the
officials of the Municipality of San Andres.The petition
sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No.
353. Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor
General, the petitioning municipality contended that
Executive Order No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear
usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in
violation of the constitutional principle of separation of
powers. Hence, , the officials of the Municipality or Municipal
District of San Andres had no right to exercise the duties and
functions of their respective offices that righfully belonged to
the corresponding officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.
On 27 November 1991, the Municipality of San Andres filed
anew a motion to dismiss alleging that the case had become
moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, which took effect on 01 January 1991. The movant
municipality cited Section 442(d) of the law, reading thusly:
Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. . . .
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of
this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.
Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at
the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.
Issue:
Whether the status of amunicipality created by a null and
void presidential order may be attacked
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Ruling:
While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic
ActNo. 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San
Andres into a de facto municipality, they, however, contend
that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior
to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had
acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of Executive
Order No. 353, and any attempt to apply Section 442 of
Republic Act 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative
of due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had
the case been seasonably brought. Executive Order No. 353
creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on
20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30)
years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San
Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the
executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and
later the Municipality, of San Andres, began and continued
to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local
government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a
public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to
hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an
action belatedly filed, so also, if not indeed with greatest
imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing
the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely
raised. Public interest
demands it.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity
for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in
this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider
the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a
status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in
fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation.
Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the
Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more
than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v.
Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have
sounded the call for a similar declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not
to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts
all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued
existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more
than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No.
174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class
municipality after having surpassed the income requirement
laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas
PambansaBlg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as municipal circuits,
in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
country, certain municipalities that comprised the municipal
circuits organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated
13 June 1978, issued by this Court pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order, the
Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th
Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the
province of Quezon.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the
municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance
(adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the
House of Representatives, appended to the 1987
Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been
considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities
composing the Third District of the province of Quezon.
Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government
Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective sets of elective municipal
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the)
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities." The power to create political subdivisions is a
function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has
incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws,
which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving
"validity to acts done that would have been invalid under
existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with,"
are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual
qualification against impairment of vested rights.
5. THE MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY, BOHOL, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE MUNICIPALITY OF
ALICIA, BOHOL
Facts:
The case revolves around the controversy on territorial
jurisdiction of the Municipality of Alicia, Bohol.
It was adjudged by the RTC that Barangay Pagahat is within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Candijay. RTC
permanently enjoined defendant Municipality of Alicia to
respect petitioner's control, possession and political
supervision of Barangay Pagahat
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the judgment of
the
Regional Trial Court. It ruled that the trial court committed
an error in declaring that Barrio Pagahat is within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Candijay. If
allowed, the Municipality of Candijay will not only engulf the
entire barrio of Pagahat, but also of many other barrios.
Candijay will eat up a big chunk of territories far exceeding
her territorial jurisdiction under the law creating her.CA also
found, after an examination of the respective survey plans
both plans are inadequate insofar as identifying the
monuments of the boundary lines.
Hence, the Municipality of Candijay now files a petition for
review on certiorari of the Decision of the CA
During the proceedings in the trial court, after presentation
of evidence by the Municipality of Candijay, the latter asked
the trial court to bar the Municipality of Alicia from
presenting its evidence on the ground that it had no juridical
personality.
Petitioner contended that EO 265 issued by President
Quirino on September 16, 1949 creating respondent
municipality is null and void ab initio, inasmuch as Section
68 of the Revised Administrative Code, on which said
Executive Order was based, constituted an undue delegation
of legislative powers to the President of the Philippines, and
was therefore declared unconstitutional, per this Court's
ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General.
Issue:
Is petitioner Municipality of Candijay correct in arguing that
respondent Municipality of Alicia has no juridical personality
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in as much as the EO creating respondent is null and void ab
initio?
Ruling:
No. Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code states
that: Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity
of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.
Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at
the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.
Respondent municipality's situation is strikingly similar to
that of the municipality of San Andres. Respondent
municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of Executive
Order No. 265 in 1949, or ten years ahead of the
municipality of San Andres, and therefore had been in
existence for all ofsixteen years when Pelaez vs. Auditor
General was promulgated. And various governmental acts
throughout the years all indicate the State's recognition and
acknowledgment of the existence thereof (i.e. the
Municipality of Alicia is one of twenty municipalities
comprising the Third District of Boholunder the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution)
As such respondent municipality of Alicia should likewise
benefit from the effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local
Government Code, and should henceforth be considered as
a regular, de jure municipality.
6. SULTAN OSOP CAMID v. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, GR No. 161414, Jan. 17, 2005
Note: Correct me if Im wrong, but no issue on creation or
conversion is identified in the case.
Facts:
Sultan Osop Camid, as a resident of Andong and private
citizen, files a petition for certiorari and mandamus
contending that the legal existence of Andong subsists
despite its earlier nullification. (The earlier case of Pelaez v.
Auditor General [1965] nullified the Executive Orders
creating 33 municipalities, including Andong)
Camid presents various pieces of evidence (CENRO
certification, appointed officials, certification of 14,000
population) that prove its recognition and certification, and
states that Section 442(d) of the LGC applies to the
Municipality of Andong.
Section 442. Requisites for Creation. - xxx
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of
this Code shall continue to existand operate as such. Existing
municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuancesor executive orders and which have their respective
sets of elective municipal officials holdingoffice at the time of
the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered
as regularmunicipalities.
Issues:
1. W/N the executive department may create municipal
corporations
2. W/N a municipality whose creation by executive fiat and
later voided by the SC may attain recognition in the
absence of any curative or reimplementing statute
Ruling:
Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit; Sec. 442(d) is not a
blanket curative law; Municipal corporations with a de facto
status may be cured by Sec. 442(d)
MODE OF ACTION TAKEN
The recognition of a de facto corporation requires factual
ascertainment; one that the trial court may look into. The
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, thus the special civil
action for certiorari and mandamus should not be
entertained.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT CANNOT CREATE
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
As per ruling of Pelaez v. Auditor General, the SC held that
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet
the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of
legislative power to the executive branch and is
unconstitutional.
ON THE MERITS (regardless of the wrong action
taken by petitioner)
EO 107 (which established Andong) was declared null and
void ab initio in 1965. The phrase ab initio means from the
beginning, at first, from the inception. The Pelaez case was
never reversed by the SC but rather it was expressly
affirmed in the cases of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva,
Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,and Municipality of
Kapalong v. Moya.No subsequent ruling by this Court
declared Pelaez as overturned or inoperative. No subsequent
legislation has been passed since 1965 creating a
Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly
any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a
duly constituted municipality.
Unlike the municipalities of San Narciso, Alicia, and
Sinacaban, Andong remained inexistent because there was
no legislative enactment that recreated it after the
Pelaezcase. (San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinabacan were listed
as apportioned districts in an Ordinance appended to the
1987 Philippine Constitution)
Section 442(d) of the LGC was also admittedly not complied
with. Itrequired elective officials holding office at the time of
the effectivity of LGC. Camid admitted that there were no
elected officials, but only appointed ones.
The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence
of elections in the municipality in the last four decades
areindications of its non-recognition by the State of the
existence of the town. The certifications relied upon by
Camid, cannot be given weight because these certifications
qualify that they were issued upon the request of Camid, to
support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of
Andong, Lanao del Sur, thus obviously conceding that the
municipality is at present inoperative.
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7. MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG v. BENITO (1969)
Facts:
The petitioner Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao
del Sur, while the respondent Bonito is the mayor, and the
rest of the respondents are the councilors, of the
municipality of Balabagan of the same province. Balabagan
was formerly a part of the municipality of Malabang, having
been created by E.O. 386 of the then President Garcia. The
petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullify E.O.
386 and to restrain the respondent municipal officials from
performing the functions of their respective office.
On the other hand, the respondents, nevertheless argue that
the municipality of Balabagan is at least a de
facto corporation. It is contended that as a de
facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally
attacked, although it may be inquired into directly in an
action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not
of an individual like the petitioner Balindong.
Issue:
Whether or not the Municipality of Balabagan is a de facto
corporation and if it is, can it be collaterally attacked?
Ruling:
The court ruled that said Municipality was not a de facto
corporation. (However, this is not the important topic here).
Can it be collaterally attacked? Yes. It is indeed true that,
generally, an inquiry into the legal existence of a
municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo
warranto or other direct proceeding, and that only in a few
exceptions may a private person exercise this function of
government. But the rule disallowing collateral attacks
applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a de
facto corporations. For where it is neither a corporation de
jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence
may be, questioned collaterally or directly in any action or
proceeding by any one whose rights or interests ate affected
thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated
unless they are estopped by their conduct from doing so.
8. ZOOMZAT, INC., vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ROMULO S. RODRIGUEZ, JR., et.al.
Facts:
Gingoog City passed resolution No 261 which resolved to
express willingness of the City of Gingoog to allow Zoomzat
to install and operate a cable TV system. Zoomzat applied
then for a mayors permit but was not acted upon by the
mayors office. Subsequently the City passed an ordinance
(Ordinance No. 19) which granted a franchise to
GingoogSpacelink Cable TV to operate for a period of 10
years/ Hence Zoomzat filed a complaint with the Office of
the Ombudsman to against respondents (Members of the
SangunianPanlungsod of Gingoog City) fpr violation of RA
3019. The case went to the Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan
asked the Special Prosecutor to restudy the case, where the
latter recommended its dismissal. The Sandiganbayan then
issued a resolution ordering the withdrawal of the petition.
This was assailed in the instant petition.
Zoomzat disagrees with the finding of the prosecutor that it
is the NTC (National Telecommunications Commission) that
has the power to allow or disallow the operation of cable
television and not the LGU. It contends that under the LGC,
the LGU can grant permits licenses and franchises by virtue
of their regulatory or revenue raising powers.
Zoomzat also contends that the grant of exclusive franchise
to Spacelink for a period of ten (10) years subject to
automatic renewal, contravenes Section 2 of Executive Order
No. 205, which provides that a certificate of authority to
operate a CATV by the Commission shall be on a non-
exclusive basis and for a period not to exceed 15 years.
Issues:
1. Who has the power to authorize the operation of cable
television in the City of Gingoog City? The LGU or NTC?
2. Was the LGU in violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019
Ruling:
1. THE NTC
EO 205, expressly provides that the LGU does not have the
authority to issue licenses and permits pertaining to the
operation of Cable TV, only the NTC has.
Hence, the City of Gingoog was not authorized or charged
with the grant of licenses.Our pronouncement in
BatangasCATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals is pertinent:
Today, pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, only
persons, associations, partnerships, corporations or
cooperatives granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate of
Authority by the NTC may install, operate and maintain a
cable television system or render cable television service
within a service area
Plainly, the SangguniangPanlungsod of Gingoog City
overstepped the bounds of its authority when it usurped the
powers of the NTC with the enactment of Ordinance No. 19.
2.
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to
acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant
of licenses or permits or other concession
Hence, the officer involved should be authorized to issue
permitrs and other concessions. Being a void legislative act,
Ordinance No. 19 did not confer any right nor vest any
privilege to Spacelink. As such, petitioner could not claim to
have been prejudiced or suffered injury thereby. There is no
violation of said law because the LGU was not authorized to
give permits.
6
In addition, petitioner could not impute manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence on the part
of the respondents when they enacted Ordinance No. 19. A
perfunctory reading of Resolution No. 261 shows that the
SangguniangPanlungsod did not grant a franchise to it but
merely expressed its willingness to allow the petitioner to
install and operate a cable television.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
DENIED
9. RODOLFO T. GANZON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
LUIS T. SANTOS G.R. No. 93252, August 5, 1991
Facts:
Ten administrative complaints were filed against Mayor
Ganzon, mayor of Iloilo, by various city officials for various
charges of abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct,
disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable
violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention. The
Department of Local Government of Iloilo, acting through
the Secretary of Local Government, ordered for Ganzons
three successive 60-day preventive suspension. Ganzon filed
a petition for prohibition with the CA to bar Secretary Santos
from implementing the said orders. His primary argument is
that the Secretary of Local Government is devoid, in any
event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials,
since under the 1987 Constitution, he merely exercises
supervisory powers to support and strengthen local
autonomy.
Issue:
Can the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's
alter ego, suspend and/or remove local officials?
Ruling:
Yes.The president, as granted by Constitution, is granted the
power of supervision over local government officials.
Supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
Difference between Power of Control and Power of
Supervision
The two terms, control and supervision, are two different
things which differ one from the other in meaning and
extent. "In administration law, supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
It cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of
supervision of the President over local government officials
does not include the power of investigation when in his
opinion the good of the public service so requires.
Caveat (from transcript in previous years)
Bretch: But note that this was the ruling before where the
president still has the power to remove local officials under
the previous LGC. However, under Sec. 60 of the present
LGC, the president can no longer remove local officials. Such
power is already lodged to the regular courts.
10. CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION v.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 79956
Facts:
The constitutionality of EO 220 which created the Cordillera
Administrative Region is assailed on the primary ground that
it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the
Congress and the creation of the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a
plebiscite.
Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President Aquino in
the exercise of her legislative powers, created CAR to
accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to
prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in
the Cordilleras. Its main function is to coordinate the
planning and implementation of programs and services in
the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local
government units as well as with the executive departments
of the National Government in the supervision of field offices
and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting
projects and activities in the region. It shall also monitor the
implementation of all ongoing national and local government
projects in the region. The CAR and the Assembly and
Executive Board shall exist until such time as the
autonomous regional government is established and
organized.
Issue 1:
W/N EO No. 220 pre-empted the enactment of an organic
act by the Congress and the creation of the autonomous
region in the Cordilleras.
Ruling:
No. E.O No. 220 did not pre-empt the enactment by
Congress of an organic act.
1. E.O. No. 220 simply provides for the consolidation and
coordination of the delivery of services of line
departments and agencies of the National Government
in the areas covered by the administrative region as a
step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the
Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region
contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for
transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of
an organic act and the creation of an autonomous
region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy.
2. The Constitution provides for a basic structure of
government in the autonomous region composed of an
elective executive and legislature and special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction. Using this
as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 did not establish
an autonomous regional government. It created a
region, covering a specified area, for administrative
purposes with the main objective of coordinating the
planning and implementation of programs and services.
3. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the
existing local governmental structure, nor are they
7
 autonomous government agencies. They merely
constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings
together the existing local governments, the agencies of
the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or
tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a
concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
Issue 2:
Ruling:
While the wordings of Section 1 have a commanding tone,
the Court accepts that it is merely advisory and does not
constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with
local autonomy. In this regard, Section 1 is deemed valid.
Section 4, on the other hand, is invalid since it encroaches
on the fiscal autonomy of local governments.

W/N EO 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new Jurisprudential precepts

territorial and political subdivision.
Supervision v. Control
Ruling:
Section 4 of Constitution vests in the President the power of
E.O. No. 220 did not create a new territorial and political general supervision over LGUs. Such power excludes the
subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision. power of control. Control and Supervision are different in
CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political meaning and extent.
subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality,
unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it Control Supervision
vested with the powers that are normally granted to public Means the power of an officer Overseeing or the power or
corporations. As stated earlier, the CAR was created to alter or modify or nullify or authority of an officer to
primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of set aside what a subordinate see that subordinate
programs and services in the covered areas. officer has done in the officers perform their
performance of his duties and duties. If the latter fail or
Issue 3: to substitute the judgment of neglect to fulfil them, the
the former for that of the former may take such
Whether the creation of CAR contravened the constitutional latter. action or step as prescribed
guarantee of local autonomy for the provinces which by law to make them
compose the CAR. perform their duties.
Includes restraining authority Mere oversight over an
No. As mentioned earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory over inferior body inferior body
coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for Officers lay down the rules in It does not cover laying
political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting the performance or down of rules. Officer
gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent accomplishment of an act. If merely sees to it that the
territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or these rules are not followed, rules are followed; they do
administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested they may, in their discretion, not have the discretion to
with political autonomy. order the act undone or modify or replace them.
redone by their subordinates
11. PIMENTEL v. AGUIRRE, July 19, 2000 or even decide to do it
themselves.
Facts:
Under the present system of government, executive power is
President Ramos issued Administrative Order 372 which was vested in the President. Members of the Cabinet and other
a cash management measure adopted by the government to executive officials are merely alter egos; as such, they are
match expenditures with available resources which were subject to the power of control of President. On the other
presumably depleted at the time due to economic difficulties hand, heads of political subdivisions are elected by the
brought about by peso depreciation. Petitioners filed instant people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the
petition to (1) nullify Sec. 1 of AO 372 which directs the electorate, therefore, they are subject to the Presidents
LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% and (2) enjoin supervision only, not control.
respondents from implementing Sec. 4 of such AO which
withholds 10% of the internal revenue allotments (modified Extent of Local Autonomy
to 5% by AO 43) pending the assessment and evaluation by
the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the Hand in hand with constitutional restraint on Presidents
emerging fiscal situation. Petitioners contend that the power over local governments is the state policy of ensuring
President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the local autonomy. Local autonomy signified a more responsive
power of control over LGUs, not merely general supervision and accountable local government structure instituted
which was granted to it by the Constitution. through a system of decentralization. Decentralization
means the devolution of national administration, not power,
Issue: to local governments. Local officials remain accountable to
the central government as the law may provide.
WON Sections 1 and 4 of AO 372 are valid exercises of the
Presidents power of general supervision over local Decentralization of Decentralization of
governments administration power
The central government This involves an abdication
delegates administrative of political power in the
powers to political favor of LGUs declared to be

8
subdivisions in order to autonomous. The Section 4 is not valid exercise
broaden the base of autonomous government is
government power and in free to chart its own destiny Basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic
the process to make local and shape its future with release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal
governments more minimum intervention from revenue, as mandated by the Constitution. LGC provides
responsive and accountable central authorities. that the release shall be made directly to LGUs and shall not
and ensure their fullest be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by
development as self-reliant This power amounts to self- the national government for whatever purpose. Term shall
communities and make them immolation since the is a word of command that must be given compulsory
more effective partners in autonomous government meaning.
the pursuit of national becomes accountable not to
government and social the central authorities but to Section 4 orders the withholding of 10% of IRA pending the
progress. its constituency. assessment by Development Budget Coordinating
Committee. This is equivalent to a holdback which means
It relieves the central something held back or withheld, often temporarily.
government of the burden of Temporary nature of retention does not matter. Any
managing local affairs and retention is prohibited.
enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. 12. PIMENTEL, et. al, v Executive Sec. OCHOA and
(DSWD) Sec. JULIANO-SOLIMAN, July 17, 2012
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, national
government has not completely relinquished all its powers Assailed in a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is the
over LGUs. Only administrative powers over local affairs are constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 10147 or the
delegated to political subdivisions, the purpose of which is to General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2011 which provides a
make governance more directly responsive and effective at P21 Billion budget allocation for the Conditional Cash
the local levels. Transfer Program (CCTP) headed by the DSWD. Petitioners
sought to enjoin respondents from implementing said
Fiscal autonomy program on the ground that it amounts to a
recentralization of government functions that have already
Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the been devolved from the national government to the LGUs.
power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to
their equitable share in the national taxes released by the Ruling: The allocation of a P21 billion budget for an
national government, as well as the power to allocate their intervention program formulated by the national government
resources in accordance with their own priorities. It does not itself but implemented in partnership with the local
however rule out any manner of national government government units to achieve the common national goal
intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that development and social progress can by no means be an
local programs are consistent with national goals. The encroachment upon the autonomy of local governments.
President, being the head of economic and planning agency
of the government, may interfere in local fiscal matters, Facts:
provided that:
1. There is unmanaged public sector deficit of the national Petitioners challenged before the Court the disbursement of
government. public funds and the implementation of the CCTP
2. There are consultations with presiding officers of the (Conditional Cash Transfer Program) which are alleged to
Senate and House of Reps and the presidents of the have encroached into the local autonomy of the LGUs. They
various local league. admit that the wisdom of adopting the CCTP as a poverty
3. Corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of reduction strategy for the Philippines is with the legislature.
DOF, DILG, and DBM They take exception, however, to the manner by which it is
4. Adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than being implemented, that is primarily through a national
30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes agency like DSWD instead of the LGUS to which the
of the 3rd fiscal year preceding the current one (Sec. responsibility and functions of delivering social welfare,
284, LGC) agriculture and health care services have been devolved
pursuant to Sec. 17 of RA 7160, also known as the Local
Section 1 is valid exercise of power of general Government Code of 1991, in relation to Sec. 25, Art.
supervision II&Sec. 3, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners assert
that giving the DSWD full control over the identification of
The Court agrees that the requirements are not satisfied: (1) beneficiaries and the manner by which services are to be
no showing of unmanageable public sector deficit, and (2) delivered or conditionaities are to be complied with, instead
no consultations with league of local governments. However, of allocating the P21 Billion CCTP budget directly to the
the Court accepts the assurance of solicitor general that LGUs that would have enhanced the delivery of basic
Section 1 is merely advisory to prevail upon local executives services, results in the recentralization of basic
to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of government functions, which is contrary to the precepts of
economic difficulty. It is understood, however, that no legal local autonomy and the avowed policy of decentralization.
sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who
do not follow such advice.

9
Issue:
Whether or not the local autonomy of LGUs enshrined in Art.
II, Sec. 25 & Art. X, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution in
relation to Sec. 17 of the LGC of 1991 had been violated.
Ruling:
The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure
the autonomy of local governments and even devotes a full
article on the subject of local governance which includes the
following pertinent provisions:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code
which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and provide for the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
x xx
Section 14. The President shall provide for regional
development councils or other similar bodies composed of
local government officials, regional heads of departments
and other government offices, and representatives from
non-governmental organizations within the regions for
purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the
autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the
economic and social growth and development of the units in
the region. (Underscoring supplied)
In order to fully secure to the LGUs the genuine and
meaningful autonomy that would develop them into self-
reliant communities and effective partners in the attainment
of national goals, Section 17 of the Local Government Code
vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to
the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. (a) Local
government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall
continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties
and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also
discharge the functions and responsibilities of national
agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this
Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such
other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental
to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and
facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not
limited to, x xx.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to
take on the functions and responsibilities that have already
been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the
aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their
respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision
provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services,
thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof,
public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities,
programs and services funded by the National Government
under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special
laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or
partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under
this Section, except in those cases where the local
government unit concerned is duly designated as the
implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs
and services. (Underscoring supplied)
The essence of this express reservation of power by the
national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power
over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general
appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery
of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
In Pimentel v. Aguirre, the Court defined the extent of the
local government's autonomy in terms of its partnership with
the national government in the pursuit of common national
goals, referring to such key concepts as integration and
coordination. Thus:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national
government has not completely relinquished all its powers
over local governments, including autonomous regions.
Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated
to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to
make governance more directly responsive and effective at
the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social
development at the smaller political units are expected to
propel social and economic growth and development. But to
enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and
policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated
towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for
the entire country still lies in the President and Congress.
Certainly, to yield unreserved power of governance to the
local government unit as to preclude any and all involvement
by the national government in programs implemented in the
local level would be to shift the tide of monopolistic power to
the other extreme, which would amount to a
decentralization of power explicated in Limbona v. Mangelin
as beyond our constitutional concept of autonomy xxx. A
complete relinquishment of central government powers on
the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot
be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs
against it. The national government is, thus, not precluded
from taking a direct hand in the formulation and
implementation of national development programs especially
where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs
concerned.
13. LIMBONA v. MANGELIN
Facts:
Petitioner Sultan AlimbusarLimbona was appointed as a
member of the SangguniangPampook, Regional Autonomous
Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur.On
March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the
Regional Legislative Assembly or BatasangPampook of
Central Mindanao. Subsequently, Congressman
DatuGuimidMatalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier
10
Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and
the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly.
Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram
to Acting Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to
wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in
November as "our presence in the house committee hearing
of Congress takes precedence over any pending business in
batasangpampook. Acting secretary sent a telegram to
members of the assembly informing them of the cancelled
assembly on that certain day.
However, despite the prior notice, the assembly still met and
a meeting took place. After declaring the presence of a
quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to
preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the
Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the
affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the
Speaker vacant.
Petitioner prays for the injunction of the said action done by
the assembly. He also prays that the assembly be considered
invalid.
Pending further proceedings, this Court, received a
resolution filed by the SangguniangPampook, "EXPECTING
ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE
SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS REGION XII," on
the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner "had
caused to be prepared and signed by him paying the salaries
and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered
resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for
Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in the last
May 11, elections. . . and nothing in the record of the
Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by
Abdula was ever made . . ." and that "such action of Mr.
Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments
without authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a
usurpation of the power of the Assembly," that the petitioner
"had recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash
from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the
salaries and emoluments of some Assembly.
Issues:
1. Whether or not they Limbonawas afforded due process?
2. Whether the so-called autonomous governments of
Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the
jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what
is the extent of self-government given to the two
autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?
Ruling:
I.
We hold that the expulsion in question is of no force and
effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the
Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or
not the petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming
that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the
opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what appears in
the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the
respondents) that "since November, 1987 up to this writing,
the petitioner has not set foot at the SangguniangPampook."
"To be sure, the private respondents aver that "The
Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come
to Cotabato City," but that was "so that their differences
could be threshed out and settled." Certainly, that avowed
wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how
conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice
and hearing contemplated by law.
While we have held that due process, as the term is known
in administrative law, does not absolutely require notice and
that a party need only be given the opportunity to be heard,
it does not appear herein that the petitioner had, to begin
with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of
graft and corruption before his collegues. It cannot be said
therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut
their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now
levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant
expulsion.
II.
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized
in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No. 1618.
Among other things, the Decree established "internal
autonomy" in the two regions "within the framework of the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic
of the Philippines and its Constitution," with legislative and
executive machinery to exercise the powers and
responsibilities specified therein.
It requires the autonomous regional governments to
"undertake all internal administrative matters for the
respective regions," except to "act on matters which are
within the jurisdiction and competence of the National
Government," "which include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange,
banking and quasi-banking, and external
borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation
or utilization of all natural resources;
(6) Air and sea transport
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational
planning; and
(12) General auditing.
In relation to the central government, it provides that "The
President shall have the power of general supervision and
control over the Autonomous Regions.
11
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process
to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable," "and ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners
in the pursuit of national development and social progress."
At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
"general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that
local affairs are administered according to law." He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case,
the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny
and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation,"
since in that event, the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy
Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves,
truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere
administration is a question foreign to this petition, since
what is involved herein is a local government unit
constituted prior to the ratification of the present
Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that
controversy now, in this case, since no controversy in fact
exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the proper
case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy
autonomy in these two senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided. 29
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy
local autonomy. 30
xxx xxx xxx
See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and
the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines. 31
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the
latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject
alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and
accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy."
On the other hand, an autonomous government of the
former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the
national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). 32 If the
SangguniangPampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous
in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the
domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the
internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former
category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An
examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that
they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second
sense, that is, in which the central government commits an
act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the
first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions." 33 In the second place, the SangguniangPampook,
their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly
administrative services, thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the SangguniangPampook. The
SangguniangPampook shall exercise local legislative powers
over regional affairs within the framework of national
development plans, policies and goals, in the following
areas:
(1) Organization of regional administrative system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the
Autonomous Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs
for the Autonomous Region;
(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous
Region;
(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous
Region;
(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as
provided for in this Decree;
(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools
established by the Autonomous Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health,
welfare and other social services, programs and facilities;
(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions,
languages and culture indigenous to the Autonomous
Region; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by
law,including the enactment of such measures as may be
necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people in the Autonomous Region.
The President shall exercise such powers as may be
necessary to assure that enactment and acts of the
SangguniangPampook and the
LupongTagapagpaganapngPook are in compliance with this
Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and programs.
The SangguniangPampook shall maintain liaison with the
BatasangPambansa. 34
12
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an
inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more
reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
14. MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION
Facts:
In 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand their casino operations
into Cagayan de Oro and leased a portion of a building
owned by Pryce Properties. The city along with other civic
groups wanted to stop PAGCOR from operating a casino in
Cagayan de Oro (herein, CDO), calling such an affront to
the welfare of the city.
Therefore, the SangguniangPanlungsod (herein, SP) of CDO
enacted Ordinance 3353 which would prohibit and cancel
business permits of establishments allowing or using its
premises (or a portion of it) for casino operations.
Furthermore, the SP enacted another Ordinance (Ordinance
3375-93) which outright prohibits the operation of Casinos
as a measure to suppress any activity inimical to public
morals and general welfare of the people and/or regulate or
prohibit such activity pertaining to amusement or
entertainment in order to protect social and moral welfare of
the community.
Pryce Properties (owner of the portion of the lot to be leased
to PAGCOR) assailed both mentioned ordinances before the
CA which succeeded. The CA subsequently declared the
ordinances invalid. However, the Mayor brought the case to
the SC to have the ordinances declared to be valid.
The Mayors argument for the validity of the assailed
ordinances prohibiting operating casinos in CDO are as
follows:
1. CDO is empowered to enact ordinances and vested with
police power under the General Welfare Clause (Section
16 of the LGC) and pursuant to such Clause, a Local
Government Units Powers, Duties, Functions (Section
458 of the LGC) include the power to enact
ordinances to prevent, suppress, and impose appropriate
penalties for..gambling and other prohibited games of
chance.
2. Under these provisions, the SP has the power to prohibit
casinos and all other games of chances in the city. Even
if PD 1869 (PAGCORs charter) permits operating
casinos, it is subordinate to whatever ordinances
enacted by the LGU pursuant to the LGC
3. The Mayor also argues that this is consistent with the
policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution.
4. Using Statutory Construction, the fact that the LGC
expressly authorized the local government units to
prevent and suppress gambling and other prohibited
games of chance, it meant all forms of gambling. Ubilex
non distinguit, necnosdistingueredebemosor where the
law does not distinguish, one does not distinguish. It
further argued that if the law would have expressly
excluded gambling authorized by special law, it would
have done so. Instead of stating gambling and other
prohibited games of chance it should have stated
gambling and other prohibited games of chance
EXCEPT those authorized by special law
5. The Mayor also argues that the LGC has already
modified PD 1869 since the LGC was a later enactment
than PD 1869. Basing on this argument, the LGC has
modified pro tanto or modified PD 1869 only to the
extent regarding operation of casinos in LGUs. The
mayor argues that with the enactment of the LGC,
PAGCOR which used to have the power to operate
casinos anywhere in the country, can now only do so
without objection from the local government unit where
it will be operating since the LGC has modified PD 1869.
6. Lastly, the mayor argues that gambling is intrinsically
harmful
Issue:
Can a local government unit, pursuant to the general welfare
clause and Section 458 of the LGC, enact an ordinance to
prohibit the operation of Casinos within its territorial
jurisdiction despite the fact that PAGCORs charter (PD 1869)
empowers it to operate casinos nationwide?
Ruling:
No, a local government cannot enact an ordinance in
contravention of a statute.
An ordinance is valid provided it follows the following
substantive requirements:
1. It must not contravene the constitution or any statute
2. It must not be unfair or oppressive
3. It must not be partial or discriminatory
4. It must not prohibit but may regulate trade
5. It must be general and consistent with public policy
6. It must not be unreasonable
Under Sec. 458, LGUs are empowered to prohibit gambling
and other prohibited games of chance. The SC explained
that what the LGU is allowed to prohibit are games of
chance that are prohibited. Logically, an LGU is not allowed
to prohibit, by ordinance or otherwise, games of chance that
are no prohibited by law.
Furthermore, the ordinances enacted by the SP of CDO are
invalid since it contravenes a statute (PD 1869). The
argument of the Mayor that the LGC modified pro tanto PD
1869 so that PAGCOR can now only operate casinos if the
LGUs do not object to it, is flawed.
As pointed out by the SC, the Mayors argument was merely
playing with words when they averred that the LGC
modified pro tanto PD 1869. What the Mayor was actually
saying in that argument was that the LGC has already
repealed PD 1869 since the Code, using the Mayors
argument, has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and
regulate casinos. Basically, the SC explained that using the
Mayors argument that Section 458 mandates the prohibition
of all kinds of gambling (illegal or legal) by the LGUs, then
PAGCOR can no longer operate casinos anywhere at all.
Therefore, there is a clash between the LGC and PD 1869 IF
we were to use the argument of the Mayor.
However, there is no proof of express repeal of PD 1869 by
the LGC since the repealing clause (sec. 534) listed down
the laws and provisions expressly repealed by the LGC and
PD 1869 is not included.
13

Furthermore, there is also no implied repeal in this case
given the principle that implied repeal is frowned upon by
our legal system and the Court must exert all effort to
harmonize all laws before accepting an implied repeal. In the
case at bar, there is no indication at all of an implied repeal
of PD 1869. In fact, PD 1869 and the LGC can be
harmonized: under the LGC, local government units shall
suppress all kinds of gambling EXCEPT those allowed by
statutes like PD 1869.
15. LINA V. PANO, GR No. 129093, Aug. 30, 2001
Facts:
Calvento was appointed as agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install a terminal for the
operation of lotto. He was also tasked to apply for the
necessary mayors permit to operate a lotto outlet in San
Pedro.
Unfortunately, no permit was issued for Calvento on the
ground that KapasiyahanBlg. 508 Taon 1995, a local
ordinance of the SangguniangPanlalawigan of Laguna,
prohibited gambling (i.e. operation of lotto).
Calvento filed an action for Declaratory Relief with prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO)
The trial court ruled the issue in favour of Calvento and thus
enjoining the Province of Laguna from implementing the
prohibition on gambling.
Issue:
1. WON KapasiyahanBlg. 508, Taon 1995 of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan of Laguna is valid
2. WON the consequent denial to issue a mayors permit
due to the prohibition of the said ordinance is valid
Ruling:
Both are invalid.
KapasiyahanBlg. 508, Taon 1995 merely states the disfavor
of the SangguniangPanlalawigan to gambling. In itself is not
self-executing as it is merely a policy statement on the part
of the Sanggunian. Thus, it cannot be held as a valid ground
to justify any act of prohibition on the proliferation of
gambling and all its forms in Laguna, including the lotto
system subject of the inquiry.
If we were to look at the policy statement in itself, the
existence of such is valid as the Sanggunian is allowed by
law to raise and forward their sentiments through
resolutions or other legislative measure. This is a
manifestation of the local autonomy of the local government
units; they are free to air out their views. However, this does
not give the local government units the power to enact
ordinances that will contravene the laws created by
Congress. Hence, the prohibition of the Sanggunian of the
operation of the lotto system based on the ground of a mere
policy statement is an error on their part. It went beyond the
scope of its authority.
Also, ordinances should not contravene the Constitution as
well as national legislations. This is grounded on the idea
that local governments are mere agents of the national
government, thus, their local councils only exercise
delegated legislative powers from Congress. The delegate
cannot be superior than the principal and as such, is
prohibited to exercise powers higher than those of the
principals. The spring cannot be higher than its source.
The question if gambling should be prohibited is one that is
lodged in the Congress. Applying in the case at bar, since
Congress allowed PCSO to operate lotteries in Laguna, the
SanggunianPanlalawigan of the latter therefore does not
have the authority to nullify the said operation.
16. SAN JUAN vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSSION
GR No. 92299, April 19, 1991
Facts:
This case involved a vacancy in the position of Provincial
Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO). The governor of Rizal, a
certain San Juan nominated Dalisay Santos for the position
and the latter quickly assumed position. However, Director
Abella of Region IV Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and recommended
private respondent Cecilia Almajose as PBO because she was
the most qualified. This appointment was subsequently
approved by the DBM through the issuance of a circular.
Petitioner protested the appointment of Almajose before the
DBM and the Civil Service Commission who both dismissed
his complaints. His arguments rest on his contention
that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend
the nominees to the position of PBO and that the
appointee should come only from his nominees. In
support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No.
112.
Issue:
Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a PBO who
was not expressly nominated by the provincial governor.
Ruling:
NO. Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the petitioner's power
to recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by
existing laws for the position of PBO. Consequently, if the
recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of
the required standards, the appointing authority,
public respondent DBM is expected to reject the
same. However, if the appointee is not qualified, DBM does
not have the right to appoint their own choice.
Petitioners arguments are on point. Petitioner states that
the phrase of said law: "upon recommendation of the
local chief executive concerned" must be given
mandatory application in consonance with the state
policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987
Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof.
He further argues that his power to recommend cannot
validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of
public respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up
any existing vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do
not meet the qualification requirements as embodied in
public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31 dated
February 9, 1988.
14
This case involves the application of a most important
constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy.
We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in
favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the
other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must
be weighed in favor of autonomy.
The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power
over local governments to "general supervision . . . as may
be provided by law." The President controls the
executive departments. He has no such power over
local governments. He has only supervision and that
supervision is both general and circumscribed by
statute.
Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set
aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified
recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is
qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the
Governor explaining why no one meets the legal
requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the
necessary eligibilities and qualifications.
17. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CA
December 7, 1995
Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created
through Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia,
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all
surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the
said region including navigation, construction, and operation
of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991.
The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its
provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave
municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue
fishing privileges within their municipal waters.
Issue:
Which agency of the Government the Laguna Lake
Development Authority or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the
Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of
permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
Ruling:
Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive
Order No. 927, cited above, specifically provide that the
Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water
for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region,
including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens,
fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local
Government Code of 1991, has granted to the municipalities
the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in
municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery
privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other
aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the
municipal waters.
SPECIAL LAW vs GENERAL LAW
We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not
necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the
Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter
water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake
region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any
express provision which categorically expressly repeal the
charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there
was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of
laws should be made clear and expressed.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic
Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a
general law.
It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a
later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed
to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this
jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular
case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent
statute, general in its terms, provisions and application,
unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the
terms of the general law are broad enough to include the
cases embraced in the special law."
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a
special statute, the special statute should prevail since it
evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general
statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the
general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a
contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not
favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all
enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be
repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law
by mere implication.
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority
should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the
Authority, which are environmental protection, navigational
safety, and sustainable development, there is every
indication that the legislative intent is for the Authority to
proceed with its mission.
"Managing the lake resources would mean the
implementation of a national policy geared towards the
protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable
development of the region with due regard to the inter-
generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this
part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have
foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law the
special law designed to govern the management of our
Laguna de Bay lake resources."
POWER OF LGU TO ISSUE FISHING PRIVILEGES
The power of the local government units to issue fishing
privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is
evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local
Government Code empowering local governments to issue
15
fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of
Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific
Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power
Of Local Government Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant
permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and
monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2,
Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and
management.
It does partake of the nature of police power which is the
most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding
of all State powers including the power of taxation.
Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a
valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de
Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de
Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for
the proper sharing of fees collected.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions
of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority,
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended.
Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue
permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de
Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and
the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter
vested on it.
Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing
authority will render nugatory its avowed purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region.
Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power would render
useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if
not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development Authority. This,
the Local Government Code of 1991 had never intended to
do.
18. THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS v. ROMULO
G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004
Facts:
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 48 entitled ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM
FOR DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION. The
Oversight Committee (referred to as the Devolution
Committee in E.O. No. 48) constituted under Section 533(b)
of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code of
1991) has been authorized to issue the implementing rules
and regulations governing the equitable allocation and
distribution of said fund to the LGUs.
In Republic Act No. 8745, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations (GAA) of 1999, the program was renamed as
the LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND
(LGSEF). Under said appropriations law, the amount
of P96,780,000,000 was allotted as the share of the LGUs in
the internal revenue taxes. Internal Revenue Allotment of
Rep. Act No. 8745 contained the following proviso:
... PROVIDED, That the amount of FIVE BILLION PESOS
(P5,000,000,000) shall be earmarked for the Local
Government Service Equalization Fund for the funding
requirements of projects and activities arising from the full
and efficient implementation of devolved functions and
services of local government units pursuant to R.A. No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That such amount shall be
released to the local government units subject to the
implementing rules and regulations, including such
mechanisms and guidelines for the equitable allocations and
distribution of said fund among local government units
subject to the guidelines that may be prescribed by the
Oversight Committee on Devolution as constituted pursuant
to Book IV, Title III, Section 533(b) of R.A. No. 7160. The
Internal Revenue Allotment shall be released directly by the
Department of Budget and Management to the Local
Government Units concerned.
Under Rep. Act No. 8760, otherwise known as the GAA of
2000, the amount of P111,778,000,000 was allotted as the
share of the LGUs in the internal revenue taxes. As in the
GAA of 1999, the GAA of 2000 contained a proviso
earmarking five billion pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF. This
proviso, found in Item No. 1, Special Provisions, Title XXXVII
A. Internal Revenue Allotment, was similarly worded as that
contained in the GAA of 1999.
In view of the failure of Congress to enact the general
appropriations law for 2001, the GAA of 2000 was deemed
re-enacted, together with the IRA of the LGUs therein and
the proviso earmarking five billion pesos thereof for the
LGSEF.
The Oversight Committee passed OCD Resolutions providing
for the allocation schemes covering the said five billion pesos
and the implementing rules and regulations therefor. The
release of the LGSEF to the LGUs only upon their compliance
with the implementing rules and regulations, including the
guidelines and mechanisms, prescribed by the Oversight
Committee.
Issue:
WON the assailed provisos contained in the GAAs and the
OCD resolutions, insofar as they earmarked the amount of
five billion pesos of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and
2001 for the LGSEF and imposed conditions for the release
thereof, violate the Constitution and the Local Government
Code of 1991.
Ruling:
The assailed provisos in the General Appropriations Acts of
1999, 2000 and 2001, and the assailed OCD Resolutions, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating the constitutional
precept on local autonomy.
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share,
as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall
be automatically released to them.
16
The Local Government Code of 1991, among its salient
provisions, underscores the automatic release of the LGUs
just share in this wise:
Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources. Local
government units shall have the power and authority to
establish an organization that shall be responsible for the
efficient and effective implementation of their development
plans, program objectives and priorities; to create their own
sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges
which shall accrue exclusively for their use and disposition
and which shall be retained by them; to have a just share in
national taxes which shall be automatically and directly
released to them without need of further action;
...
Sec. 286. Automatic Release of Shares. (a) The share of
each local government unit shall be released, without need
of any further action, directly to the provincial, city,
municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a
quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end of each
quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or
holdback that may be imposed by the national government
for whatever purpose.
(b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood to diminish
the share of local government units under existing laws.
Construing Section 286 of the LGC, we held in Pimentel, Jr.
v. Aguirre,viz:
A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the National
internal revenue. As a rule, the term SHALL is a word of
command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The
provision is, therefore, IMPERATIVE.
To the Courts mind, the entire process involving the
distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally
impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of
the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution
and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and
regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms
unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time
to time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs
of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the
release not automatic, a flagrant violation of the
constitutional and statutory mandate that the just share of
the LGUs shall be automatically released to them. The LGUs
are, thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight Committee.
The concept of local autonomy was explained in Ganzon v.
Court of Appeals in this wise:
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means a
more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization. The
Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to
break up the monopoly of the national government over the
affairs of local governments and as put by political
adherents, to liberate the local governments from the
imperialism of Manila. Autonomy, however, is not meant to
end the relation of partnership and interdependence
between the central administration and local government
units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The
Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local
governments, under the Constitution, are subject to
regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than
precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.
As we observed in one case, decentralization means
devolution of national administration but not power to the
local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration
or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process
to make local governments more responsive and
accountable and ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners
in the pursuit of national development and social
progress. At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises general supervision over them, but only
to ensure that local affairs are administered according to
law. He has no control over their acts in the sense that he
can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the [sic] favor of local
governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to self-immolation, since
in that event, the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
Local autonomy includes both administrative and fiscal
autonomy. The fairly recent case of Pimentel v. Aguirre is
particularly instructive. The Court declared therein that local
fiscal autonomy includes the power of the LGUs to, inter alia,
allocate their resources in accordance with their own
priorities:
Under existing law, local government units, in addition to
having administrative autonomy in the exercise of their
functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy
means that local governments have the power to create
their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable
share in the national taxes released by the national
government, as well as the power to allocate their resources
in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the
preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have
to work within the constraints thereof. They are not
formulated at the national level and imposed on local
governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and
resources or not ..
Further, a basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the
constitutionally mandated automatic release of the shares of
LGUs in the national internal revenue.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001,
and the OCD resolutions constitute a withholding of a
portion of the IRA. They put on hold the distribution and
release of the five billion pesos LGSEF and subject the same
to the implementing rules and regulations, including the
guidelines and mechanisms prescribed by the Oversight
Committee from time to time. Like Section 4 of A.O. 372, the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and
the OCD resolutions effectively encroach on the fiscal
autonomy enjoyed by the LGUs and must be struck
down. They cannot, therefore, be upheld.
17
19. TANO vs. SOCRATES
Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
assailing the constitutionality of:
(1) Ordinance No. 15-92 enacted by the
SangguniangPanlungsodng Puerto Princesa City entitled: "AN
ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH
AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM
JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,1998 AND PROVIDING
EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
THEREOF";
(2) Office Order No. 23, which then Acting City Mayor
Amado L. Lucero issued to implement said city ordinance,
requiring any person engaged or intending to engage in
any business, trade, occupation, calling or profession or
having in his possession any of the articles for which a
permit is required to be had, to obtain first a Mayors permit
and authorizing and directing to check or conduct necessary
inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being
shipped out from Puerto Princesa; and
(3) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 enacted by the
SangguniangPanlalawigan, Provincial Government of
Palawan, entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE
CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLGING
AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINECORAL
DWELLINGAQUATIC ORGANISMS
The petitioners contended that:
1. the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law,
their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the
practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article
XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution.
2. Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor
condition under which the Mayors permit could be
granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the
absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue
permit.
3. As Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan
altogether prohibited the catching, gathering,
possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine
coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction
whether it was caught or gathered through lawful
fishing method, the Ordinance took away the right of
petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful
ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline
Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly
prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering
into contracts which are proper, necessary, and
essential to carry out their business endeavors to a
successful conclusion.
Public respondents defended the validity of the ordinance
arguing that:
1. It is a valid exercise of the Provincial Governments
power under the general welfare clause (Section 16 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 [hereafter, LGC]),
2. Its specific power to protect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger
the environment under Section 447 (a) (1) (vi), Section
458 (a) (1) (vi), and Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the
LGC.
3. They claimed that in the exercise of such powers, the
Province of Palawan had the right and responsibility to
insure that the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells
[sic], within its territory remain healthy for the future
generation.
4. The Ordinance covered only live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms which were enumerated in the
ordinance and excluded other kinds of live marine
aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral reefs; besides
the prohibition was for only five (5) years to protect
and preserve the pristine coral and allow those
damaged to regenerate.
5. There was no violation of due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution. As to the former,
public hearings were conducted before the enactment
of the Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a lawful
purpose and employed reasonable means; while as to
the latter, a substantial distinction existed between a
fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of
selling it live, and a fisherman who catches live fish
with no intention at all of selling it live, i.e., the former
uses sodium cyanide while the latter does not. Further,
the Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to
one class.
Issue:
Are the Ordinances contrary to Section 2, Article XII and
Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution?
Ruling:
No, the Ordinances are not contrary to Section 2, Article XII
and Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution as
having been transgressed by the Ordinances.
There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners
qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. In their
petition, petitioner Airline Shippers Association of Palawan is
described as a private association composed of Marine
Merchants; petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, as
merchants; while the rest of the petitioners claim to be
fishermen, without any qualification, however, as to their
status.
Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a
definition of the terms subsistence or marginal fishermen,
they should be construed in their general and ordinary
sense.
Amarginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing
whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as
measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield
a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish.
A subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but
the irreducible minimum for his livelihood.
Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines a
marginal farmer or fisherman as an individual engaged
in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be limited to
the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or marine
products produced by himself and his immediate family. It
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bears repeating that nothing in the record supports a finding
that any petitioner falls within these definitions.
Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use
of communal marine and fishing resources, but of their
protection, development, and conservation. The ordinances
in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our
marine resources to the end that their enjoyment by the
people may be guaranteed not only for the present
generation, but also for the generations to come.
The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal
fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all
absolute, since it is limited by the Regalian Doctrine.
Decentralization
Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of
decentralization as expressly mandated by the Constitution.
Devolution refers to the act by which the National
Government confers power and authority upon the various
local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.
One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of
the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves.
This necessarily includes enactment of ordinances to
effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal
waters.
In light then of the principles of decentralization and
devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted to
local government units under Section 16 (the General
Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi),
458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably
involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the
questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.
It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two
principal objectives or purposes:
(1) to establish a closed season for the species of fish or
aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years,
and
(2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of the City of
Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further
destruction due to illegal fishing activities.
The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the
devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters,
such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment of
closed seasons. The devolution of such power has been
expressly confirmed in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5
April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Interior and Local Government.
The realization of the second objective falls within both the
general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate
thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts
which endanger the environment.
The nexus then between the activities barred by Ordinance
No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa and the prohibited
acts provided in Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993 of the
Province of Palawan, on one hand, and the use of sodium
cyanide, on the other, is painfully obvious. In sum, the
public purpose and reasonableness of the Ordinances may
not then be controverted.
As to Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by Acting
City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of the City of Puerto Princesa,
we find nothing therein violative of any constitutional or
statutory provision. The Order refers to the implementation
of the challenged ordinance and is not the Mayors Permit.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
20. LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
DENR AND SECRETARY
GR. No. 175368, April 11, 2013
Petitioner: League of Provinces - a duly organized league of
local governments incorporated under the Local Government
Code; it is composed of 81 provincial governments, including
the Province of Bulacan
Respondent: DENR and DENR Secretary Angelo Reyes
Other parties:
Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation (Golden
Falcon) applicant for a Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA); filed before Mines and Geosciences
Bureau, Regional Office No. III (MGB-RO); application was
denied twice
Mercado, Cruz, Cruz and Sembrano (MCCS) applicants for
Quarry Permit; filed before the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan
Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) applicant
for Exploration Permit; filed before the PENRO of Bulacan
Facts:
Golden Falcon applied for FTAA before the MGB-RO. On April
29, 1998,MGB-ROdenied GoldenFalcons application for FTAA
on for failure to secure the required area clearances from
the Forest Management Sector and Lands Management
Sector of the DENR-RO.Golden Falcon appealed the denial
with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau-Central Office (MGB-
CO).
On February 10, 2004, pending Golden Falcon's appeal to
the MGB-CO, MCCS filed with the PENRO of Bulacan their
applications for quarry permit covering the same area
subject of Golden Falcon's FTAA application.MGB-CO finally
denied Golden Falcons appeal on July 16, 2004.
AMTC filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an application for
exploration permit covering the same subject area on
September 13, 2004. Confusion of rights resulted from the
overlapping applications of AMTC and the persons applying
for quarry permits the contention was the date the area of
Golden Falcons application became open to other permit
applications from other parties
On October 19, 2004, upon query by MGB-RO Director
Cabantog, DENR-MGB Director Ramos stated that the denial
of GoldenFalcons application became final on August 11,
2004, or fifteen days after Golden Falcon received the order
of denial of its application.Hence, the area of Golden
Falcons application became open to permit applications only
on that date.
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Subsequently, the Provincial Legal Officer of Bulacan issued
a legal opinion on the issue, stating that the subject area
became open for new applications on the date of the first
denial on April 29, 1998 (MGB-ROs order of denial), as
MGB-COs order of denial on July 16, 2004 was a mere
reaffirmation of the MGB-ROs April 29 order; hence, the
reckoning period should be April 29.
Based on this legal opinion, MGB-RODirector
Cabantogendorsed the applications for quarry permit, now
apparently converted to applications for small-scale mining
permit, to the Governor of Bulacan. PENRO of Bulacan
recommended to the Governor the approval of said
applications. Eventually, the Governor issued the small-scale
mining permits. AMTC appealed to the DENR Secretary.
The DENR Secretary decided in favor of the AMTC and
nullified and cancelled the governors issuance of small-scale
mining permits. It agreed with DENR-MGB Director Ramos
that the area was open to mining location only on August
11, 2004 (15 days after the MGB-CO denial). Hence, the
applications for quarry permit filed on February 10, 2004
were null as these were filed when the area was still closed
to mining location. On the other hand,AMTC filed its
application when the area was already open to other mining
applicants, hence, its application was valid. The small-scale
mining permits were also issued in violation of Section 4 of
R.A. No. 7076 and beyond the authority of the Governor
pursuant to Sec. 43 of RA 7942 because the area was never
proclaimed to be under the small-scale mining program.
The petitioner League of the Provinces of the Philippines
filed this petition saying that that this is not an action of one
province alone, but the collective action of all provinces
through the League, as a favorable ruling will not only
benefit one province, but all provinces and all local
governments.
Issues:
1. Whether DENRs act of nullifying the small-scale mining
permits amounts to executive control, not merely
supervision and usurps the devolved powers of all
provinces, as the DENR Secretary substituted the
judgment of the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.
2. Whether or not Section 17, b(3)(III) of the Local
Government Code and Section 24 of the Small-Scale
Mining Act, which confer upon DENR and the DENR
Secretary the power of control are unconstitutional, as
the Constitution states that the President (and Exec
Depts) has the power of supervision only, not control
over acts of LGUs
Ruling:
[The Court finds that petitioner has legal standing to file this
petition because it is tasked under Section 504 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 to promote local autonomy at the
provincial level; adopt measures for the promotion of the
welfare of all provinces and its officials and employees; and
exercise such other powers and perform such other duties
and functions as the league may prescribe for the welfare of
the provinces.]
DENR Secs act was valid and authorized pursuant to its
power of review under the RA 7076 and its IRR; Assailed
statutes did not overcome the presumption of
constitutionality, hence, are not unconstitutional.
Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining
in the provinces is granted by three statutes: (1) R.A. 7061
or The LocalGovernment Code of 1991; (2) R.A. 7076 or the
People's Small ScaleMining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No.
7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his/her duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for the latter. Supervision isthe
power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers
perform their function in accordance with law.
The Constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Article
X, Sec. 2 of the Constitution refers to the administrative
autonomy of the LGUs or the decentralization of government
authority. It does not make local governments within the
State. Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of
powers, but it is still subject to limitations, like following
national policies or standardsand those provided by the
Local Government Code, as the structuring of LGUs and the
allocation of powers/responsibilities/resources among the
LGUs and local officials are placed by the Constitution to
Congress under Article X Section 3.
It is the DENR which is in-charge of carrying out the States
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development and utilization of the countrys
natural resources, pursuant to the provisions of Section 17,
b(3)(III) of the LGC.Hence, the enforcement of the small-
scale mining law by the provincial government is subject to
the supervision, control and review of the DENR.The LGC did
not fully devolve to the provincial government the
enforcement of the small-scale mining law.
RA 7076 or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining program was
established to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in
coordination with other government agencies (Section 4, RA
7076). Section 24 of the law makes the Provincial/ Mining
Regulatory Board under the direct supervision and control of
the Secretary, its powers and functions subject to review by
the same.
Under Section 123 of DENR AO No. 23, small-scale mining
applications should be filed with the PMRB and the permits
shall be issued by the provincial governor, for applications
outside the mineral reservations.
DENR Administrative Order No. 34 (1992) which contains the
IRR of RA 7076 likewise provides that the DENR Secretary
shall exercise direct supervision and control over the
Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program, and that the
Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Boards (PMRB) powers
and functions shall be subject to review by the DENR
Secretary. DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 or the
Revised IRR of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 provides
that applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits shall be filed
with the Provincial Governor/City Mayor through their
respective Mining Regulatory Boards for areas outside the
Mineral Reservations, and further, that the LGUs in
coordination with the Bureau/Regional Offices shall approve
applications for small-scale mining, sand and gravel, quarry
xxx and gravel permits not exceeding 5 hectares.
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Petitioners contention that the aforementioned laws and
rules did not confer upon DENR and DENR Secretary the
power to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits
issued by the Provincial Governor or small-scale mining
contracts entered into by the Board are without merit
because the DENR Secretary was granted the power of
review in the PMRBs resolution of disputes under Sec. 24 of
RA 7076 and Section 22 of its IRR. The decision of the DENR
Secretary to nullify and cancel the Governors issuance of
permits emanated from its power of review under RA 7076
ad its IRR. Its power to review and decide on the validity of
the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the
Provincial Governor is a quasi-judicial function which involves
the determination of what the law is and what the legal
rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the
matter in controversy and on the basis thereof and the facts
obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.

The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under

RA 7076 and its IRR to the extent necessary in settling
disputes, conflicts, or litigations over conflicting claims. This
quasi-judicial power of the DENR can neither be equated
with substitution of judgment of the Provincial Governor in
issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor control over the
said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of
the rights of the AMTC over conflicting claims based on the
law.

In Beltran v. Secretary of Health, the Court held that every

law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For
a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for
nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. In this
case, the grounds raised by the petitioner to challenge the
constitutionality of Sec. 17b(3)(iii) of the LGC and Section 24
of RA 7076 has failed to overcome the constitutionality of
the said provisions of the law.

Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

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