INSIDE THIS ISSUE: FAA Course:

Pg 1. FAA Course. Failure to Follow Procedures.

Unsecured Aircraft.
The FAA has added a new Maintenance Course to its Online Course Catalog. This new
course is provided as part of the FAA's FAAST (FAA Safety Team) Program and can be
Pg 2. Stats. found at

Pg 3. 145 Bleed System http://faasafety.gov/gslac/ALC/course_catalog.aspx

SNL.
E-Jet Newsletter. This course highlights the consequences of failing to follow procedures with specific
emphasis and best practices presented in the areas of installation, inspection, and mainte-
EMB 145 SNL. nance.

It is free to register and can be taken at your leisure over multiple sessions.

UNSECURED AIRCRAFT.
TSA has conducted aircraft security inspections throughout the system.

During these inspections TSA has found, in various locations, that Chautauqua
aircraft have been unattended and unsecured.

To prevent unauthorized access to the aircraft, we must ensure that all aircraft
are secure.
Therefore, someone must either attend the aircraft or accomplished the following
prior to leaving the aircraft unattended;
Shut and secure the cabin door (s).
Move loading bridges away from the aircraft.
Move stairs away from the aircraft and out of reach of the cabin door.
Close and secure all exterior accessible compartments and cargo doors
not in use.

While on the ramp it is also your responsibility to challenge unauthorized indi-

viduals and unbadged individuals, who are not displaying the appropriate airport
or aircraft operator ID badge, in non-public areas and report the presence of such
individuals to Security.

If you should have any questions regarding these policies, please contact your
supervisor.

PAGE 1
 Chautauqua STATS. Republic STATS.

Date Canx Orig. Sys. Delays

Date Canx. Orig. Sys. Delays Delays
Delays
1/08 99.7 97.5 96.7
1/08 99.7 97.6 96.8
2/08 99.7 96.4 96.1
2/08 99.6 97.1 96.5

MAINT. PERFORMANCE.
MAINT. PERFORMANCE.
EMB135 DELAYS CANX. EMB170 DELAYS CANX.

1/08 96.6 99.6

1/08 98.4 99.9

2/08 96.1 99.7

2/08 97.9 99.9
EMB175 DELAYS CANX.
EMB140 DELAYS CANX.

1/08 96.8 99.8

1/08 96.0 99.8
2/08 96.0 99.7
2/08 96.9 99.9
Shuttle STATS.
EMB145 DELAYS CANX

Date Canx Orig. Sys. Delays

1/08 96.5 99.6 Delays
1/08 99.5 96.7 96.3
2/08 96.2 99.4 2/08 99.7 97.0 99.6

CRJ DELAYS CANX

MAINT. PERFORMANCE.
EMB170 DELAYS CANX.
1/08 96.6 99.5

1/08 96.3 99.5

2/08 96.1 99.5
2/08 96.6 99.7

PAGE 2
 EMB 145 Bleed System Service Newsletter (SNL)
The following Service Newsletter (SNL) is to inform Operators about the EMBRAER guidelines, actions and procedures aimed
at avoiding and /or reducing BLEED LEAK messages on EICAS and also to help Troubleshoot them.

Click on link below to read the SNL.

SNL145-36-0017R00

EMB 170 EJET Newsletter.

Click on the link below to read the Feb.08 E-Jet Newsletter from Embraer.

EJet

EMB 145 Service Newsletter

Click on the link below to read the Service Newsletter (SNL) about a New Fuel flapper Valve. For the EMB 145.

SNL145-28-0013R00

PAGE 3
 SERVICE NEWSLETTER

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE SYSTEM RELIABILITY

APPLICABILITY: To all the EMB-135( ), EMB-140( ), and EMB-145( ) aircraft in operation.

VALIDITY: This SNL remains valid until it is canceled or superseded by a subsequent revision.

SCOPE: To inform the operators about the Embraer guidelines, actions and procedures aimed at
avoiding and/or reducing the "BLEED LEAK" messages displayed on the EICAS and also to
help troubleshooting them when applicable.

DESCRIPTION:

With the focus on keeping a maximum dispatch reliability for the EMB-145 aircraft fleet, Embraer
presents a list of documents, actions and Service Bulletins beneficial to aircraft operation.

MAINTENANCE TASKS

PUBLICATION
DESCRIPTION SPECIAL REMARKS
REFERENCE

AMM Task Procedure for V-band clamp

V-band clamp maintenance practices
20-10-10-910-801-A installation revised.

AMM Task Instructions about the alignment

Bleed duct line general and
inspection and correction of small
alignment inspection and correction 36-11-09-200-802-A misalignments.

AMM Tasks Instructions to correctly install the

supports, O-rings, clamps and
O-ring removal and installation 36-11-10-000-801-A
sleeves revised as per the latest
36-11-10-400-801-A recommendations.

Informs the boundaries of Bleed

System 1, Bleed System 2 and
Bleed Leak Indication System APU Bleed System, to help with
SNL 145-36-0005
boundaries troubleshooting of EICAS warning
messages "BLD1 (2) LEAK" and
"BLD APU LEAK".

DATE: 13/Feb/08 SNL 145-36-0017

CHANGE No.: __ - __/__/__ PAGE: 1 of 3

Embraer Copyright 2007. All Rights Reserved.
 SERVICE NEWSLETTER

When performing the O-rings installation or bleed distribution lines troubleshooting, inspect the silicon
sleeves joints for correct installation, as per AMM Task 36-11-10-400-801. Pay special attention to the
joint numbers 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 19, 20, 21, and 22 (See figure 1).

Figure 1

TROUBLESHOOTING PROCEDURES

PUBLICATION
INDICATION SPECIAL REMARKS
REFERENCE

36-20-00-810-801-A
Bleed Leak Msg on EICAS 36-20-00-810-802-A
36-20-00-810-803-A
Troubleshooting tasks for BLD 1 (2)
LEAK and BLD APU LEAK
messages on EICAS.

AMM Task Inspection procedure for bleed leak

Bleed line leak inspection
36-11-09-200-803-A detection, using infrared device.

Section dedicated to Bleed Leak

QRT - Quick Reference Troubleshooting QRT 36-11 contains troubleshooting tips and is
available on the Aerochain.

SNL 145-36-0017 DATE: 13/Feb/08

PAGE: 2 of 3 CHANGE No.: __ - __/__/__

Embraer Copyright 2007. All Rights Reserved.
 SERVICE NEWSLETTER

PUBLICATION SUGGESTED
TITLE SUMMARY
REFERENCE OPORTUNITY

Recommended O-rings:
O-rings IPC 36-00-00 "C" Check
PN 403039-15, PN 403039-20, PN 403039-25.

Replaces the "Y" shaped duct with new PN made

IPC 36-11-00 of Inconel and featuring an increased thickness;
PNs 145-38590-401/402.

Engine Bleed System

On attrition
"Y" Shapped Duct Replaces the "Y" shaped ducts with new PN made
SB 145-36-0041
of Inconel and featuring an increased thickness.

SNL 145-36-0016 Recommends the new PN.

Recommended reinforced "T" ducts, located in the

cargo compartment and in the rear electronic bay.
Preferred reinforced PN families:
IPC 36-17-00 On attrition
"T" ducts 145-02380-4XX, 145-04740-4XX, 145-0471-4XX,
145-04742-4XX, 145-04743-4XX, and PN
145-02383-4XX.

Recommended PNs:
Preferable stainless
Clamps: A36115C (1.5in) and CA36120C (2.0in).
steel Gamah clamps IPC 36-00-00 "C" Check
Sleeves: PNs G30015C (1.5in) and G30020C
and sleeves
(2.0in).

DATE: 13/Feb/08 SNL 145-36-0017

CHANGE No.: __ - __/__/__ PAGE: 3 of 3

Embraer Copyright 2007. All Rights Reserved.
Issue No. 15 February 2008
February 2008 Issue No. 15

From the Editor

E-JETS NEWS is a publication that presents EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft technical

items. This newsletter, compiled by EMBRAER Fleet Technical Center (EFTC),
brings the latest developments and shares in-service knowledge and maintenance
best practices. It also provides troubleshooting tips to optimize aircraft utilization
and efficiency in daily operation.

E-JETS NEWS addresses Operators concerns with maintenance support and

dispatchability of EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft. It has relevant information to be
shared with the technical departments, such as Engineering and Maintenance.
Recipients are encouraged to distribute this newsletter to EMBRAER Customers.

Earlier editions of E-JETS NEWS publication can be found at CIS / Aerochain at

http://www.aerochain.com

- Login (enter username and password);

- Select Technical Services and then EMBRAER Customer Services;

- Select Maintenance Support;

- Select E-JETS NEWS;

- Click on desired E-JETS NEWS.

If any additional information regarding the in-service items covered in the E-JETS
NEWS is needed, please contact the local EMBRAER Field Service
Representative. General questions or comments about the E-JETS NEWS
publication can be addressed to:

E-JETS NEWS

Tel: +55 12 3927 7075

Fax: +55 12 3927 5996

E-mail: ejets.news@embraer.com.br

PROPRIETARY NOTICE

The articles published in E-JETS NEWS are for information only and are an EMBRAER S/A
property. This newsletter must not be reproduced or distributed in whole or in part to a third
party without EMBRAERs written consent. Also, no article published should be considered
authority-approved data, unless specifically stated.

Page 1
February 2008
Removal of Engine Driven
Pump Pressure Attenuators
Update
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170
As informed in release No. 9 of E-Jets
NEWS, after the first reports of EDP
quick disconnect coupling leakages,
EMBRAER confirmed that the high
pressure ripple level at that region was
causing these failures.
During investigation, it has been found
that the removal of pressure attenuators
reduced the ripple level.
Thus, SB 170-29-0020 was issued on
July/2007 instructing how to remove
these attenuators from No.1 and No.2
hydraulic systems.
Recent tests performed by the quick
disconnect supplier confirmed that the
current design is in accordance with
ripple levels found after attenuator
removal.
Additionally, investigation of EDP
leakages concluded that one root cause
for the failures was also associated with
the high pressure ripple level, which once
more justifies the incorporation of this SB.
Based on exposed above, EMBRAER
expects a reduction of EDP leakages for
aircraft without pressure attenuators and
recommends operators to consider the
accomplishment of this SB at the next
opportunity.
For EMBRAER 190, the reduction of
pressure ripple is also being developed,
and since the removal of the attenuator
did not lead to a satisfactory result, an
installation redesign is under
development in order to achieve the
required ripple levels.
Issue No. 15
MLG Downlock Harness
Damage Update
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170
E-Jets NEWS Release No.11 issued in
October/2007, brought information about
occurrences of MLG downlock sensor
harness failure caused by fatigue stress
during normal operation of the MLG.
These events have occurred because the
heat-shrinkable sleeve is not flexible
enough to allow the harness to curve
smoothly during MLG retraction.
As a consequence, the stress is
concentrated at the heat-shrinkable tip,
causing fatigue to the metal braid and
wires. An incorrect installation of the
clamps that attach the harness to the
structure may contribute to this scenario,
once it can increase the stress in that
region.
This scenario is usually identified through
the LG NO DISPATCH warning CAS
message associated with RIGHT/ LEFT
MLG DOWNLOCK1/2 SNSR / WRG
FAULT maintenance message. There
are two possible solutions under analysis:
1. Harness inspection to confirm its
integrity. In positive case, the heat-
shrinkable sleeve is removed and
the harness is re-routed through a
new bracket that separates the
harness from the LG structure. It will
avoid shafing and stress. The
harness manufacturer is analyzing if
there is a positive way to inspect
and confirm that the harness is still
in a good condition to be kept in
operation.
2. Complete harness replacement and
introduction of the same bracket
above mentioned.
The defined solution will be informed
soon.
As previously informed, EMBRAER has
required operators to report any new
event that occurs in the fleet.
Page 2
February 2008
CF34-8E TR Spring Retainer
Interference with Engine
Hydraulic Tubes Update
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170
As presented in E-Jets NEWS Release
No. 13, EMBRAER was informed of the
occurrence of spring retainer chafing
against engine hydraulic and fuel tubes.
The spring retainer has been introduced
by GE SB 78-0024 to avoid interference
between left central thermal blanket PN
EME335602D or EME335602E (EIPC
78-33-01), installed inside the left thrust
reversers, and engine fuel tube PN
2161M26P01 or 4187T10P01.
Figure 1 Damaged Suction Line
The root cause was identified as a batch
of parts with an improper orientation
marking (arrow marked on the flat
surface, associated with an UP
indication). The arrow marking had been
inverted and this condition can lead the
mechanics performing part installation to
rotate the part and install it in an incorrect
position, upside down, thus creating
interference with the tubes.
Figure 2 - Incorrect and Correct Installation
Issue No. 15
MHD (Thrust Reverser manufacturer)
issued a Service Letter (MHD 78-33-582)
informing the operators to inspect the
thrust reversers to make sure that the
spring retainers are correctly installed
and to identify damaged tubes.
GE Service Bulletin CF34-8E-AL S/B 78-
0047 was released in December 2007 to
support these inspections and SB 78-
0024 R01 (Spring Retainer Introduction)
was revised to highlight the need to have
the correct orientation during installation.
Pack Air Cycle Machine (ACM)
Contamination Update
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
As an update of E-Jets NEWS No. 8 and
No. 12, EMBRAER informs that a new
AMM task for the dual heat exchanger
on-wing cleaning will be released in
March 2008.
Regarding the two RH contaminated heat
exchangers removed from revenue
service operation for sampling purposes,
EMBRAER and Hamilton Sundstrand
confirmed that their performance
degradation was caused by liquids
disposed in the forward galley sink plus
atypical gravels incrustation.
It is always important to highlight that
disposal of liquids different from water in
the forward galley sink is not
recommended, as per SNL 170-25-0004 /
190-25-0007.
Autopilot Operational Test
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
EMBRAER would like to inform that a
new Autopilot operational test will be
available in the next AMM Part II
scheduled revision (Task 22-11-00-710-
802-A). This task was created aiming at
simplifying and reducing the time
required to perform the current autopilot
functional test (Task 22-11-00-720-802-
A).
Page 3
February 2008 Issue No. 15

LOAD 21.2 Side Effects Fire extinguishing bottles

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
EMBRAER has released revision 1 of
Service Newsletters 170-00-0032 and
190-00-0028. This new revision provides
information about the side effects found
in Load 21.2.
Pylon Heat Shield
Improvements
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170
removals under investigation
Update
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
Pacific Scientific, the manufacturer of the
fire extinguishing (firex) bottles that equip
the E-Jets, updated EMBRAER with
more results of the investigation
concerning the reason of firex bottles
removals increase in the fleet, as
reported on E-Jets NEWS Release No.
14.

Pylon heat shield damage due to high

temperature and vibration has been
reported since the beginning of the
EMBRAER 170 operation.

Service Bulletins SB170-54-0004 and

SB170-54-0005 were issued to replace
portions of the inboard skin and trailing
edge of the pylon aft fairings (which were
initially made from composite or
aluminum) with new ones made from
stainless steel.
These service bulletins also give
instructions to apply a thermal insulation
protection and perform a structural re-
design of the aft pylon fairing shields.
Deeper inspections confirmed the initial
suspicion on the TCPS conducting to
erroneous low pressure indications. Such
erroneous indications were caused due
to liquid, maybe moisture, contamination
of the TCPS contacts, reducing the
impedance between pins A and C (see
figure above), which conducted to
transient low pressure signals.

After small corrections, Revision 01 of

SB170-54-0004 and SB170-54-0005 are
available for application.
Figure 1. Contamination Traces local

Page 4
February 2008
Figure 2. Contamination Traces
In order to avoid future occurrences,
Pacific Scientific decided to improve the
quality of the TCPS sealing in their
production line, adding more room-
temperature vulcanizing silicone rubber
(RTV the white material shown in the
picture above) on a cleaner Kaizen
process that may guarantee a better
sealing for this component. Besides that,
they also implemented a new production
test to verify the insulation resistance of
the TCPS wiring, which detects
contamination possibilities before bottle
installation in the aircraft.
Pacific Scientific is providing spares of
the better sealed TCPS to the authorized
repair shops, reducing the downtime to
replace this device, when necessary.
Some Pacific Scientific sites are also
provided with rotable firex bottles for
emergencies. EMBRAER is closely
following up the actions to solve the
events of low pressure in the firex bottles
that are affecting E-Jets operators.
A new update may be issued in the
following E-Jets NEWS edition and, when
the final solution concerning the TCPS
improvement is defined, a service letter
with dispositions is also intended to be
issued.
SPDA Block 11.1
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
EMBRAER released Service News
Letters 170-24-0026 and 190-24-0020 to
inform the Operators about the contents
and improvements of the new Secondary
Power Distribution Assembly (SPDA) -
Block 11.1 Software.
Issue No. 15
Passenger Address/ Cabin
Interphone Controller (PACIC)
Improvement
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
The PACIC modification consists in the
enhancement of the flight attendant
microphone gain level, thus raising the
microphones volume.
No circuitry is affected by this product
improvement and, after the change; the
PNs will receive MOD level A (for PN
5682-1-2) and MOD B (for PN 5682-1-1)
designation on the front panel of PA/CIC.
This modification can be performed at the
operators discretion, contacting either
Avtech or Avtechs authorized
representative. For additional information,
EMBRAER issued SNLs 170-44-0001
th
and 190-44-0001 in January 14 , 2008.
Commanded IFSD due to
Erratic Engine Parameters
Effectivity: EMBRAER 190
EMBRAER has recently been informed
about an event involving one EMBRAER
190 aircraft which resulted in a
commanded engine shutdown during
flight.
The report indicated that while cruising at
36,000 ft, the number one engine N1, N2
and fuel flow indications became erratic.
The engine presented two compressor
stalls and thereafter the caution message
"ENG 1 CONTROL FAULT" was
displayed on the EICAS. The crew
decided to shutdown engine one and
landing occurred without further incident.
Initial investigations point out to a fault of
the engine one T1.2 sensor as the root
cause for the event. The sensor fault was
duplicated in lab tests. The exact root
cause for the abnormal sensor reading is
still unknown. A full tear down of the
component is being carried out.
EMBRAER and GE will continue to
analyze all available data and keep
operators updated on the progress of the
investigation.
Page 5
February 2008 Issue No. 15

EMBRAER 190 MLG Internal Forward Lavatory harness

Nitrogen leakage interference
Effectivity: EMBRAER 190 Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190

EMBRAER has received some reports An event was reported by an EMBRAER

from the field regarding the MLG H
dimension (visible chrome length) out of
specified in the servicing charts. After
analysis, a damaged seal on the floating
piston was revealed. The purpose of the
floating piston seal is to isolate the
nitrogen bottom chamber from the oil
chamber in the MLG shock absorber. If
the seal does not isolate properly, the
nitrogen flows from the nitrogen chamber
to the oil chamber and the MLG H
dimension will be out of the dimension
specified in the servicing chart.
190 operator in which the forward
lavatory flush system was found
inoperative. Troubleshooting indicated
that the event could be related to the
wiring. During inspection, evidence of
arcing was found in one wire bundle
located behind the forward lavatory
ceiling panel, which can be reached
through the smoke detector access
panel.

EMBRAER is evaluating some actions to

mitigate the impact in the fleet, such as:
issuing AMM tasks for replacement of the
MLG seal and inspection for nitrogen
internal leakage, and providing a kit of
main components for the shock absorber
to reduce aircraft down time for MLG seal
replacement on wing.

The final solution under evaluation is a

new type of seal that is being tested in
the rig (endurance test). The tests are
expected to be finished by the end of
March/2008. The implementation plan will
be informed after the accomplishment of
the endurance tests. EMBRAER would
like to ask the operators to report any
new occurrence of the E190 MLG H
dimension out of specified by means of
the servicing chart. This will ensure
continued monitoring of the events in the
worldwide fleet.

Figure 1 Interference between harness and smoke

detector installation.

Investigations showed that one of the

bolts of the smoke detector assembly
could interfere with the mentioned wire
bundle, causing friction and potentially
leading to this kind of event.

Production line and in-service aircraft will

be modified as necessary. EMBRAER
will shortly issue a service bulletin to
inspect and rework the affected
components.
Page 6
February 2008 Issue No. 15

Emergency Light System One Potable Water System Leakage

Minute Test and Freezing
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190

EMBRAER has released SNLs 170-33- An EMBRAER 170 operator reported an

0017 and 190-33-0023 about the event of Potable Water System leakage
alternative procedures for the emergency and ice formation under the forward
light system test on the forward FAP cargo compartment floor panels along the
(Flight Attendant Panel). aileron cable route, which led to stiffness
of aileron movement.
Investigations indicated a malfunction on
the circuit board of the ELPU (Emergency The leakage can be caused either by the
Light Power Unit) for the daily test clamshell being out of position or cracked
performed by the FAP test button. T-fitting due to freezing cycle of water
kept in the Potable Water System lines
The alternative procedures will avoid when the aircraft is parked outside under
possible events of emergency lights freezing temperatures.
remaining ON for more than one minute
or not being turned OFF after the test.
The test can be accomplished either by
turning the cockpit switch or by pressing
the FAP ON/Armed button. For detailed
information, please refer to the
mentioned SNLs.

The AMM will be updated to include ice

formation check on the forward fuselage
(underneath the forward cargo
compartment) through the fuselage
drains (TASK 10-30-01-500-802-A
SUBTASK 580-002-A item 10).

Figure 1 Emergency Light Switch Locations

The definite solution will be available by

the second quarter of 2008.

Page 7
February 2008 Issue No. 15

Refer to SNL 170-38-0014 and 190-39- CMC LDI x FADEC Sofware

0015 for maintenance action Versions
recommended for aircraft exposed to
extreme cold weather operation. Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190

EMBRAER has released new LDIs to

implement the compatibility between the
FLT CTRL FAULT CAS recent Load and FADEC versions. The
Message after Engine table below provides a quick reference
Shutdown guide about LDI versions released for
Load 4.3/17.3 and on.
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190

EMBRAER received some field reports

from operators concerning the EMBRAER 170/175
occurrence of FLT CTRL FAULT,
GROUND SPOILERS FAIL, RUDDER Load Pre FADEC v5.40 FADEC v5.40
LIMITER FAIL and ELEV THR COMP
FAIL CAS Messages appearing in the
EICAS after engine shutdown. 21.x 170LDI21V17.7-X-V08 170LDI21V17.7-X-V08.1

During aircraft engine shutdown, the

FADEC resets automatically when N2 is 19.x 170LDI19.3V17.6-X- 170LDI19.4V17.6-X-
below 5%, providing invalid data for V06 V07.1
approximately 2.5 seconds when the
aircraft is on the ground. This behavior
makes the following messages to be 17.x 170LDI17.5V17.1-X- 170LDI17.5V17.1-X-
temporarily displayed on the CAS: V05.1 V05.2

GROUND SPOILERS FAIL

RUDDER LIMITER FAIL

EMBRAER 190/195
ELEV THR COMP FAIL
Load Pre FADEC v5.32 FADEC v5.32
FLT CTRL FAULT

Final solution is already available in 21.x 190LDI21V17.7-X-V08 190LDI21V17.7-X-V08.1

Primus EPIC LOAD 19.

19.x 190LDI19.4V17.6-X- 190LDI19.4V17.6-X-

V06.1 V07.1
Load 21.2 - Flight level limited
to FL 370 due to a/c power
4.x 190LDI4.5V17.1-X- 190LDI4.5V17.1-X-
cycle before loading new APM V05.1 V05.2
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
Note: X means the customized
EMBRAER has released SNL 170-00- configuration (A, B, C, etc.).
0034 and 190-00-0030 to inform about
the Flight Level setting limitation, if an a/c
power cycle is done prior to the complete
loading.

Page 8
February 2008
EMBRAER 190/195 - FADEC
Software v5.32
Effectivity: EMBRAER 190
EMBRAER has issued Service Bulletin
190-73-0010 related to the new FADEC
software version 5.32 applicable to the
EMBRAER 190/195 fleet.
This software brings relevant corrections
and improvements that have direct
impact on aircraft dispatchability, such as
improved logic for engine start in cold
weather and high altitudes.
Therefore, EMBRAER recommends the
accomplishment of this Service Bulletin.
Regarding the software implementation, it
is important to observe that it has always
been an obligatory dispatch condition to
have the same FADEC software version
installed in both engines.
However, in the FADEC software version
5.20 and prior, there was no CAS
message associated to a disagreement in
the FADEC software versions of both
engine. With FADEC software version
5.32, if this scenario is detected, an ENG
NO DISPATCH CAS message will be
annunciated, correlated to an ND XENG
SOFTWARE VERSION DISAGREE
message on the CMC, and the proper
software will need to be uploaded in both
FADECs to allow aircraft dispatch.
Tail Strike Avoidance
Effectivity: EMBRAER 190
As introduced in SNL 190-00-0023,
EMBRAER would like to stress that the
PRIMUS EPIC LOAD 19.3 and higher
versions introduce the TSA (Tail Strike
Avoidance) function in order to limit the
maximum pitch angle when the aircraft is
close to the ground for preventing tail
strike occurrences.
This function is only available during
takeoff and landing, under the following
conditions:
Issue No. 15
TAKEOFF
1. The AOA Limiter function is available;
2. The estimated altitude is less than
200 ft;
3. The single sensor altitude rate at the
CG position is valid OR the calibrated
airspeed is less than 60 knots;
4. At least three weight-on-wheel
sensors are valid.
LANDING
1. The AOA Limiter function is available;
2. The estimated altitude is equal to or
greater than 200 ft;
3. The dual sensor compensated radar
altitude is valid.
The TSA function is enabled when all the
following conditions are satisfied:
1. The TSA function is available;
2. The estimated altitude is less than 20
ft OR
The estimated altitude is greater than
or equal to 200 ft AND
The radio altitude at the landing gear
position is less than 70 ft;
The TSA function is disabled when one
of the available conditions is not satisfied,
and the message TAIL STRIKE PROT
FAIL is displayed.
If the TSA is unavailable (failed) and the
conditions for available are found again,
the TSA function turns back to available
state. The TSA function is unavailable
(failed) for the rest of the flight when the
function fails (becomes unavailable)
seven times. The failure counter resets
when the aircraft is ON-GROUND and
the calibrated airspeed is less than 60
knots. In addition, the EMBRAER DDPM
34-31-00 will be reviewed to inform that
TAILSTRIKE PROT FAIL Advisory
EICAS message will be displayed during
flight when one of the Radar Altimeter
Systems is inoperative.
Also, EMBRAER would like to inform that
the delivered aircraft with PRIMUS EPIC
Page 9
February 2008
LOAD 19.3 and higher versions installed
have already had the TSA (Tail Strike
Avoidance) functionality enabled on the
applicable APM Options, but aircraft that
have incorporated Load 19.3 or 19.4
through Service Bulletin, do not have this
functionality enabled. SB 190-31-0017
(APM Options - TSA Installation) is
already available enabling TSA
functionality for aircraft equipped with
Load 19.3 or 19.4. The released SB 190-
31-0015 (LOAD 21.2 Upload) already has
the TSA functionality enabled on the
applicable APM Options.
EMBRAER 190/195 Engine
Thrust Reverser (T/R), Ground
Maintenance Override Switch
(GMO) improvement
Effectivity: EMBRAER 190/195
EMBRAER 190/195 fleet has been
experiencing the occurrence of ENG 1 (2)
REV TLA FAIL EICAS message due to
GMO failure in the closed state or during
T/R functional test using GMO (covered
by EMBRAER SNL 190-73-0010, issued
on May/2007).
GMO manufacturers investigation has
revealed a potential moisture ingression
into the switch body could result in an
electrical short.
The manufacturer made improvements to
the switch which will prevent, from now
on, this kind of contamination. Goodrich
released a field recommendation in All
Operators Letter, AOL EMB/190/195/
CF34-10-03, issued on January 2008.
EMBRAER recommends customers in
the field to follow the above mentioned
AOL for maintenance action and material
support.
Copy of Goodrich, All Operators Letter,
AOL EMB/190/195/ CF34-10-03 can be
requested to your local EMBRAER
Representative or Goodrich Technical
representative by e-mail to
enrique.chavez@goodrich.com. Also, the
AOL can be requested to EMBRAER at
170propulsion@embraer.com.br
Issue No. 15
AMS Processor Failures
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
EMBRAER has recently helped
troubleshooting an aircraft with failed
AMS Processor Boards. In such event,
the ECS synoptic display shows some
valves intermittently opening and closing,
and flow lines going gray and green; and
not-correlated RECIRC SMK DET FAIL
CAS message is displayed on the CAS
during the aircraft power-up.
Afterwards, some aircraft have presented
the same faults during production and
delivery flights, in which one or both AMS
processor boards were declared failed.
Hamilton Sundstrand is still evaluating
the failed boards in order to define the
necessary corrective actions. EMBRAER
is planning to release a SNL as soon as
the investigation is completed.
Meanwhile, in case of events similar to
the one described above, EMBRAER
recommends the replacement of the
affected AMS processor board (channel 1
or 2).
Cross Bleed Valve
Contamination
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
EMBRAER received a report concerning
a Cross Bleed Valve stuck in the closed
position which affected engine cross start
when the aircraft was on the ground.
Inspection of the valve revealed an
external contamination coming from a
drain located above the valve as root
cause. The same contamination was also
found in other aircraft from the same
customer.
The new design will introduce a hose to
direct the fluid to the fairing drain, thus
bypassing the valve and avoiding its
contamination.
The solution will be introduced in the fleet
by means of a Service Bulletin, expected
for July, 2008.
Page 10
February 2008 Issue No. 15

In case of "XBLEED FAIL" CAS LDI = Loadable Diagnostic Information

messages or a "XBLEED VLV (CLOSED)
[C1(C2)]/WRG FAULT" maintenance LRU = Line Replaceable Unit
messages, please refer to applicable FIM
tasks. MLG = Main Landing Gear

MMEL = Master Minimum Equipment List

OB = Operational Bulletins
Acronyms
PACIC = Passenger Address/ Cabin
AD = Airworthiness Directive
Interphone Controller
AIPC = Aircraft Illustrated Parts Catalog
PN = Part Number
AMM = Aircraft Maintenance Manual
SB = Service Bulletin
AMS = Air Management System
SN = Serial Number
ANAC = Agncia Nacional de Aviao
SNL = Service Newsletter
Civil (Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority)
SPDA = Secondary Power Distribution
AOA = Angle of Attack
Assembly
AOM = Airplane Operations Manual
TCPS = Temperature Compensated
APM = Aircraft Personality Module Pressure Switch

CAS = Crew Alerting System TR = Thrust Reverser

CMC = Central Maintenance Computer TSA = Tail Strike Avoidance

CMM = Component Maintenance Manual Note: All abbreviations used in

EMBRAER Maintenance Manuals can be
DLS = Data Load System found in the Introduction to AMM Part II.

ECS = Environmental Control System

EDP = Engine Driven Pump

EIPC = Engine Illustrated Parts Catalog

ELPU = Emergency Light Power Unit

EMM = Engine Maintenance Manual

FADEC = Full Authority Digital Electronic

Control

FAP = Flight Attendant Panel

FH = Flight Hour

FHDB = Fault History Database

FIM = Fault Isolation Manual

FOL = Flight Operations Letter

GMO = Ground Maintenance Override

IFSD = In-Flight Shut down

Page 11
 SERVICE NEWSLETTER

SUBJECT: NEW FUEL FLAPPER VALVE PN 2770138-103 RIB #19

APPLICABILITY: To all the EMB-145 aircraft in operation.

VALIDITY: This SNL remains valid until it is superseded or canceled by a subsequent revision.

SCOPE: To inform the operators about the availability of new fuel flapper valve PN 2770138-103, which
will improve the performance of the valves installed at RIB #19.

DESCRIPTION:
Embraer has received reports from operators about some occurrences regarding wing fuel leakage
related to the RIB#19 flapper valve PN 2770138-101.
RIB #19 fuel flapper valve is installed in the surge fuel tank of each half-wing of the EMB-145 aircraft.
These surge tanks collect fuel in flight, in a wing-down position and uncoordinated maneuvers. The fuel
eventually collected by the surge vent tank returns to the fuel tank through RIB#19 flapper valves after
these maneuvers. If the surge tank is flooded, fuel may leak outboard through the flame arrestor and
NACA air intake, at the wing tip lower skin (Refer to SNL 145-28-0011 for details).
In order to improve the performance of those valves installed at RIB #19, a new fuel flapper valve
PN 2770138-103 has been recently released to the field as an improved Part Number to
PN 2770138-101.
New PN 2770138-103 will be included in the Embraer Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) - ATA Chapter
28-10-00, at the same time PIL145-28-0020 is issued.
New fuel flapper valve P/N 2770138-103 has improvements both on the hinge and seat element, in order
to minimize the possibility of damage to the rubber. Additionally, the rubber is glued to the metal plate
(metal plate detached in red in Figure 1) on the opposite side of the limiter element, as per Figure 1.

DATE: 29/Feb/08 SNL 145-28-0013

CHANGE No.: __ - __/__/__ PAGE: 1 of 2

Embraer Copyright 2008. All Rights Reserved.
 SERVICE NEWSLETTER

Furthermore Embraer recommends that new fuel flapper valves PN2770138-103 be used only in
RIB #19, in order to minimize fuel leakage at wing tip (See Figure 2 for further details).

NOTE: After the flapper valve replacement, perform the leak check for zones 551 and 651, in
accordance with AMM Task 28-11-00-700-801-A or AMM Task 28-11-00-700-803-A, as
applicable.

SNL 145-28-0013 DATE: 29/Feb/08

PAGE: 2 of 2 CHANGE No.: __ - __/__/__

Embraer Copyright 2008. All Rights Reserved.