SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998]

FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,* respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J .:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May
1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship
soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She
submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their
agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23
July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a
certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the
U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration
concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina
Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo
Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan,
named in the petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for
the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter.
Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon.
On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified
photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between
petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.

On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and
the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as
well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same
day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the
declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed
without the required documents being submitted.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaoi[1] which held that "a foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386)
was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,"ii[2] disregarded the divorce between
petitioner and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the
death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal
properties due to lack of judicial approval.iii[3] On the other hand, it opined that there was no
showing that marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown
that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her.
As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987iv[4] only
petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal
adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs.v[5]

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs
that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who
was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus
on 15 February 1988vi[6] partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with
the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and
petitioner to the other half.vii[7] Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was
stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947,
their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous
marriage to petitioner.

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a
hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.

Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11
September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988
order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.viii[8] On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.ix[9]

Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that
there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the
heirship of the Padlan children or as to their respective shares in the intestate estate of the
decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the
proper heir of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on
established facts and admissions of the parties.

We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.

We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children
to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by
him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;x[10] nor as to their
respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving
spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the
scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and
distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of
the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.

We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the
issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she
had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above
quoted procedural rule.xi[11] To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such
remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained.xii[12] Reading between the
lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce
from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid
of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either
supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in
her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.

Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she
stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr.xiii[13] that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that
the case be set for hearing.xiv[14] Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the
issue on her citizenship.xv[15] The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a
hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were
"Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines."xvi[16] It maintained that their divorce
obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction.
We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as
the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of
their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce
was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved
that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship;xvii[17] it did not merit
enlightenment however from petitioner.xviii[18] In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship
is brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the
transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of
the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate
copy thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen
petitioner answered that she was since 1954.xix[19] Significantly, the decree of divorce of
petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a
reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a
factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent
appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited
only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's
claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22
April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a
bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship.xx[20]

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared in
contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping,xxi[21] the same
lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same
essential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter
and issue.xxii[22] The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent
petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate
copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no
reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering
the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void
its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is
AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-
half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's
brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the
reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as
the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present
petition for forum shopping is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Mendoza, and Martinez, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-52242 November 17, 1980

MIGUEL R. UNSON III, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO AND EDITA N. ARANETA, respondents.

BARREDO, J.:

Petition for certiorari to have the order of respondent judge of December 28, 1979 ordering
petitioner to produce the child, Maria Teresa Unson, his daughter barely eight years of age,
with private respondent Edita N. Araneta and return her to the custody of the later, further
obliging petitioner to "continue his support of said daughter by providing for her education and
medical needs," allegedly issued without a "hearing" and the reception of testimony in
violation of Section 6 of Rule 99.

Petitioner and private respondent were married on April 19, 1971 1 and out of that marriage the
child in question, Teresa, was born on December 1, 1971. However, as stated in a decision rendered on August
23, 1974 in Civil Case No. 7716 of respondent judge himself, on July 13, 1974 they executed an agreement for
the separation of their properties and to live separately, as they have in fact been living separately since June
1972. The agreement was approved by the Court. The parties are agreed that no specific provision was
contained in said agreement about the custody of the child because the husband and wife would have their own
private arrangement in that respect. Thus, according to the affidavit of petitioner attached to his supplement to
petition, submitted in compliance with the directive of this Court during the hearing of this case, he affirms that:

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(8) That when Maria Teresa started pre-school in 1976 at the Early Learning Center in San
Lorenzo, very near petitioner's residence, and later, when she started school at Assumption
College, Maria Teresa would stay with petitioner during school days and spend weekends with
her mother, but there were times when her mother would not even bother to pick her up during
non-school days;
 (9) That during the early part of 1978 petitioner personally acquired knowledge that his wife
Edita Araneta has been living with her brother-in-law Agustin F. Reyes, in an apartment at C.
Palma St., Makati, Metro Mla. and so petitioner tightened his custody over his daughter,
especially after:

a. he found out that Agustin F. Reyes was confined at the Makati Medical Center
from October 13 up to December 3, 1977 for "Manic Depressive" disorder,
under the care of Dr. Baltazar Reyes;

b. he found out that his wife Edita Araneta delivered a child fathered by Agustin
F. Reyes on September 24, 1978, (Please see Birth Certificate attached hereto
as Annex "A-1");

c. he found out that Agustin F. Reyes had been confined again for the same
ailment at the Makati Medical Center from June 27 up to August 29, 1978 under
the care of the same doctor .

(10) That on May 21, 1980 Edita Araneta delivered another child fathered by Agustin F. Reyes.
(Please see Birth Certificate attached hereto as Annex "A-2");

(11) That aside from the foregoing circumstances, the following militate against custody of Maria
Teresa in favor of Edita Araneta:

a. Agustin F. Reyes is the child's godfather/baptismal sponsor;

b. Agustin F. Reyes and Edita Araneta have left the Roman Catholic Church and
have embraced a protestant sect (Please see Annex "A-2" hereof, which lists
the occupation of Agustin F. Reyes as a seminarian);

(12) That Maria Teresa is almost nine (9) years old, born and reared under the Roman Catholic
faith, impressionable, and should not be exposed to an environment alien to the Catholic way of
life, which is the upbringing and training petitioner, as her father is committed to;

(13) That petitioner is executing this affidavit for all legal purposes. (Pp. 81-82 of Record)

Upon the other hand, private respondent affirms in her affidavit Annex "A" aforementioned that:

xxx xxx xxx

6. Since the birth of Maria Teresa, she has always lived with affiant, her mother, who has reared
and brought up the child to the best of her ability. Affiant has not in any way spoken ill of nor
turned the child against her father, herein petitioner;

7. In fact, it was affiant who was always insistent that petitioner have custody of Maria Teresa
every week end and half of summer and Christmas vacation so that the child could establish a
healthy and viable relationship with her father, herein petitioner;

8. This was especially so when affiant noticed that petitioner's parents showed more interest in
the child than petitioner; since it was petitioner's parents who would more often pick up Maria
Teresa and bring her back to and from affiant's home;

9. This fact was even noticed by the child; thus affiant immediately requested petitioner to spend
more time with Maria Teresa;
 10. From 1972 to 1978, affiant had always exercised full custody of Maria Teresa. It was affiant
who voluntarily gave custody of the child to petitioner on weekends and half of the summer and
Christmas vacations. In view of this amicable arrangement, no specific terms were agreed and
stipulated upon by affiant and petitioner regarding custody of the child in their petition for
separation of property before the lower court;

11. From 1972 to September, 1979, affiant and petitioner have always had a cordial and
amicable relationship. Even from 1973 when affiant started living with her brother-in-law, Agustin
F. Reyes at San Lorenzo, Makati, affiant and petitioner retained a cordial relationship. Petitioner,
since 1973, always knew about affiant's relationship with Agustin F. Reyes. In fact, petitioner
would visit Maria Teresa at affiant's home. Petitioner was always welcome to pick up Maria
Teresa at any time.

12. When petitioner left for Australia in 1974 for a period of one year, petitioner left Maria Teresa
to stay with affiant at San Lorenzo. During this time, Maria Teresa was always allowed to visit
with and to be picked up at any time by petitioner's parents;

13. Petitioner, his family, affiants family (Mr. and Mrs. Teodoro Araneta), affiant's relatives and
friends, since 1973, have long known of and accepted the circumstances involving private
respondent and Agustin F. Reyes;

14. Affiant admits that her present circumstances at first impression might seem socially if not
morally unacceptable; but in reality this is not so. Maria Teresa has been reared and brought up
in an atmosphere of Christian love, affection and honesty to the import of the situation. Further,
the quality and capacity of affiant of being a good mother has always remained; (Pars. 6 to 14 of
Annex "A" of Record)

It is axiomatic in Our jurisprudence that in controversies regarding the custody of minors the sole and foremost
consideration is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the
respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. Never has this Court diverted
from that criterion.

With this premise in view, the Court finds no difficulty in this case in seeing that it is in the best interest of the
child Teresa to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral influence, that the situation in
which private respondent has placed herself, as admitted by her, might create in the moral and social outlook of
Teresa who is now in her formative and most impressionable stage in her life. The fact, that petitioner might have
been tolerant about her stay with her mother in the past when she was still too young to distinguish between
right and wrong and have her own correct impressions or notions about the unusual and peculiar relationship of
her mother with her own uncle-in-law, the husband of her sister's mother, is hardly of any consequence now that
she has reached a perilous stage in her life. No respectable father, properly concerned with the moral well-being
of his child, specially a girl, can be expected to have a different attitude than petitioner's in this case. Under the
circumstances thus shown in the record, the Court finds no alternative than to grant private respondent no more
than visitorial rights over the child in question. Anyway, decisions even of this Supreme Court on the custody of
minor children are always open to adjustment as the circumstances relevant to the matter may demand in the
light of the inflexible criterion We have mentioned above. We deem it a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent judge to have acted precipitably in issuing his order of December 28, 1979 here in question.

As to the issue of jurisdiction, that is, whether or not, after the decision on separation of properties had become
final, the matter of the custody of the child should be the subject of a separate proceeding under Rule 99. We
are inclined to agree with respondents that, considering that in the decision on the separation of properties
mention is made of support for the child, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, and since under Sec- tion 6 of Rule
99, the matter of the custody of children of separated spouses may be brought before the Court of First Instance
by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the respondent court had jurisdiction to decide the question
of custody here. And as regards the petitioner's claim of denial of hearing and due process before the issuance
by respondent judge of his order of December 28, 1979, We find that-petitioner was given sufficient time and
opportunity to be heard, as, in fact, he filed his written opposition. With the facts in this case practically
uncontroverted, We do not see the need for the calling of witnesses and the hearing of testimony in open court.

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge is hereby set aside, the restraining order heretofore issued is
made permanent and the parties are ordered to submit to this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof
their own agreement as to the visitorial rights of private respondent, otherwise, the Court will take it upon itself to
fix the terms and conditions thereof. No costs.

Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur

Footnotes

1 In her affidavit attached as Annex "A" of comment on supplement to petition, private respondent states that there is a "Roman
Catholic Church annulment of the marriage" evidenced by Annex "A" of said decision rendered by Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Diocese of Bacolod on April 4, 1976, on the legal effect of which, for purposes of this case, the Court prefers not to make any
pronouncement as anyway, private respondent is not actually relying thereon.

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