1. Merlin Magallona vs.

Secretary Eduardo Ermita

655 SCRA 476 (2011)
G.R No. 187167

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines and
classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
The Antecedents
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) 2 demarcating the maritime
baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State. 3 This law followed the framing of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I),4 codifying,
among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their territorial sea, the breadth of
which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of
negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046
remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic
Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of
baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under
scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the
Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. 6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-
land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines 7 and
sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. 8 Complying
with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some
basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely,
the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands
whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as
citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators, 9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of
RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime
territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine states sovereign power, in violation of
Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, 10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris 11 and ancillary
treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the countrys waters landward of the baselines to maritime
passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national
security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
violation of relevant constitutional provisions. 13
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as regime of islands
not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners
facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included its failure to reference either the
Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS IIIs framework of regime of islands to
determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the
petitions compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded
on petitioners alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and
prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended
RA 9522 as the countrys compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine
territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not
undermine the countrys security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the
Philippines claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners
assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the
islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under
the Treaty of Paris.
We left unacted petitioners prayer for an injunctive writ.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. Preliminarily
a) Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
b) Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit
as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the
constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522
unconstitutional.
On the Threshold Issues Petitioners Possess Locus Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and
taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative 15 nor
misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and implementation of RA 9522.
Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners locus standi as citizens with constitutionally
sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues
of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature
of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing a more direct and
specific interest to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting
citizenship standing.17
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition Are Proper Remedies to Test the
Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict
observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs
cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the
part of petitioners.18
Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court
exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed
the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality
of statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of government. 20 Issues of constitutional
import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal
interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court
inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues
raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute
sought to be reviewed here is one such law.
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Countrys Maritime Zones and
Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 dismembers a large portion of the national
territory21 because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under
the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national
territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this
constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines
sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty
of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the
Treaty of Paris technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends
hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular
area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.22
Petitioners theory fails to persuade us.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral
treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial
waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the
baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and
continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-
long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of
States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic
States graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their
coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States
parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn,
either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth
of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States
like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. The breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be
measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with Article 47. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties
to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn,
this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime
space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights,
namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to
enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33),
and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone
(Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the
waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the
Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the
only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be
drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty
of Paris, but from the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago. 24
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or,
as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology,
States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and
prescription,25 not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or
enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental
shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead
governed by the rules on general international law. 26
RA 9522s Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime
Zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines
Claim of Sovereignty Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands framework to
draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the
KIG, weakens our territorial claim over that area. 27 Petitioners add that the KIGs (and
Scarborough Shoals) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the
loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters, prejudicing the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen.28 A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA
3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled
with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis--vis the
Philippines obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522
merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that
RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one
baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the maximum length of
baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie
outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable
cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners argument branding RA 9522 as a
statutory renunciation of the Philippines claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are
relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners assertion of loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters
under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by
optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines total maritime space
(covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216
square nautical miles, as shown in the table below: 29

Extent of maritime
area using RA 3046,
as amended, taking
Extent of maritime area using RA
into account the
9522, taking into account UNCLOS
Treaty of Paris
III (in square nautical miles)
delimitation (in
square nautical
miles)

Internal
or archipelagic 166,858 171,435
waters

Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106

Exclusive Economic
Zone
382,669TOTAL440,994586,210
Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA
9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under
the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of
opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in
accordance with UNCLOS III.30
Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the
baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section
2 of the law commits to text the Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction
over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise
exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as Regime of Islands under
the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the
Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would
have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS
III requires that [t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general configuration of the archipelago. Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS
III requires that the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, save for
three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical
miles.31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG 32 and the
Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable
distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, 33 such that any straight
baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably depart to an
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took
pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and
the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside
our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which
states: The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago. So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit
ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila
sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is
defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo
ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba,
that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis
pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles,
hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the
rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS IIIs limits. The
need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using
current maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the
outer limits of its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner
provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446,
the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit:
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil
Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under
Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that The length of such baselines shall not
exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines
enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical
miles.
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or
deleted from the baselines system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of
water.
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by
geodetic survey methods. Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west
coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be located either inland or on water,
not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47. 35
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as Regime[s] of
Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 36 of UNCLOS
III manifests the Philippine States responsible observance of its pacta sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any naturally
formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide, such as
portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of regime of islands, whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones. 37
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines
claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522
did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago
as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of
the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which
the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis
supplied)
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not Incompatible with the Constitutions Delineation of
Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law
unconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these
waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including
overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine
internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution. 38
Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the Constitution 39 or as
archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space
over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and
of their bed and subsoil.
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic
waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as
to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other
respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the
exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air
space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and
international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if
not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international
navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus,
domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent
discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within
the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. 40 Indeed, bills drawing
nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress. 41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS
III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters,
subject to the treatys limitations and conditions for their exercise. 42 Significantly, the right of
innocent passage is a customary international law, 43 thus automatically incorporated in the
corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely
forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law
without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of
innocent passage and sea lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis--
vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of
innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The
imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a
concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters
landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast,
as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the
recognition of archipelagic States archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines
as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands
under UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the
waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States
territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS
III.47
Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of
Principles and State Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers
the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, do
not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x. 49 Article II provisions serve as
guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting
executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a
healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present
petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other
provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2,
paragraph 251) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 7 52), are not violated by RA
9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive
economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living
resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community
since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is
contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to
be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates
a sui generis maritime space the exclusive economic zone in waters previously part of
the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the
resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. 53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves
the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond
the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was
not bound to pass RA 9522.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III55 and
we find petitioners reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option
belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes
at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State
like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where
the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-
fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and
exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago;
and second, it weakens the countrys case in any international dispute over Philippine
maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and
adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation
of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore
a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent
with the Constitution and our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad,
Villarama, Jr., Portugal Perez (on leave), Mendoza, Sereno, JJ., concur.
 2. Province of North Cotabato vs. Government of the Republic of the
Philippines
568 SCRA 402 (2008)
G.R No. 183591

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in
pursuing the peace process. While the facts surrounding this controversy center on
the armed conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the
country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court
is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate
the bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it
must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the
freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive
precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively.
I. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONS

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and
the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels,
were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the
leadership of the late Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among
others, of what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from
an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations.[1]

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to
materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed
their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding
of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the
GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace
Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following
year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27,
1998.

The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by

stating that the same contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to
pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with
sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from
the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on
the substantive agenda are on-going.[2]

Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing
in the GRP-MILF peace process. Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the
MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in March
2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.[3] In
response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and carried out an all-out-war
against the MILF.

When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive

against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the
peace talks.The MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially responded
with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the Government of
Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF
to return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to
seriously discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP.[4]

The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being
facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties signing on the same date the
Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between
the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions.[5]
Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-
22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace
(Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the
following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect,
and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the
parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed that the same be discussed further
by the Parties in their next meeting.

A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7,
2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security
Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the
parties. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian
Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which
was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many
incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to
2003.

Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13,
2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace
negotiator of the MILF.Murads position as chief peace negotiator was taken over
by Mohagher Iqbal.[6]

In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur,
eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as
mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.

II. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious consensus ever embodied
in an instrument the MOA-AD which is assailed principally by the present
petitions bearing docket numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962.
Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain[7] and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes
Esperon, Jr.

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato[8] and Vice-Governor

Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order.[9] Invoking the right to information on matters of
public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish
them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments,
and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the
contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation
thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional.[10]

This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No.
183752, also for Mandamus and Prohibition[11] filed by the City of Zamboanga,
[12]
Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma. Isabelle Climaco and Rep. Erico Basilio
Fabian who likewise pray for similar injunctive reliefs. Petitioners herein moreover
pray that the City of Zamboangabe excluded from the Bangsamoro Homeland
and/or Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and, in the alternative, that the MOA-AD be
declared null and void.

By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining

Order commanding and directing public respondents and their agents to cease and
desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.[13] The Court also required the Solicitor
General to submit to the Court and petitioners the official copy of the final draft of
the MOA-AD,[14] to which she complied.[15]

Meanwhile, the City of Iligan[16] filed a petition for Injunction and/or

Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R. No. 183893, praying that respondents be
enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or, if the same had already been signed, from
implementing the same, and that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioners herein additionally implead Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita as respondent.
 The Province of Zamboanga del Norte,[17] Governor Rolando Yebes, Vice-
Governor Francis Olvis, Rep. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep. Cesar Jalosjos, and
the members[18] of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Norte filed
on August 15, 2008 a petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition,
[19]
docketed as G.R. No. 183951. They pray, inter alia, that the MOA-AD be
declared null and void and without operative effect, and that respondents be
enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.

On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel
III filed a petition for Prohibition,[20] docketed as G.R. No. 183962, praying for a
judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally
signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom
or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and
illegal. Petitioners herein additionally implead as respondent the MILF Peace
Negotiating Panel represented by its Chairman Mohagher Iqbal.
Various parties moved to intervene and were granted leave of court to file
their petitions-/comments-in-intervention. Petitioners-in-Intervention include
Senator Manuel A. Roxas, former Senate President Franklin Drilon and Atty. Adel
Tamano, the City of Isabela[21] and Mayor Cherrylyn Santos-Akbar, the Province of
Sultan Kudarat[22] and Gov. Suharto Mangudadatu, the Municipality of Linamon in
Lanao del Norte,[23] Ruy Elias Lopez of Davao City and of the Bagobo
tribe, Sangguniang Panlungsod member Marino Ridao and businessman Kisin
Buxani, both of Cotabato City; and lawyers Carlo Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario
Awat, Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The Muslim Legal
Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement
for Peace and Development (MMMPD) filed their respective Comments-in-
Intervention.

By subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the consolidation of the

petitions. Respondents filed Comments on the petitions, while some of petitioners
submitted their respective Replies.

Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008, stated that

the Executive Department shall thoroughly review the MOA-AD and pursue
further negotiations to address the issues hurled against it, and thus moved to
dismiss the cases. In the succeeding exchange of pleadings, respondents motion
was met with vigorous opposition from petitioners.

The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and 29, 2008 that
tackled the following principal issues:

1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic

(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the

disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA); and

(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government

Units is concerned, if it is considered that consultation has
become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft;

2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for
adjudication;

3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines

Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA
vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;

4. Whether there is a violation of the peoples right to information on

matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7)
under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including
public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]

If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy;

5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of

the Philippines would be BINDING itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as

a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision
not recognized by law;
 b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform
to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic

Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic
Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT
OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII
(DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
DOMAINS)[;]

If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority

to so bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines;

6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato,

Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of
Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the
projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and

7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid
commitments of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
[24]

The Court, thereafter, ordered the parties to submit their respective

Memoranda. Most of the parties submitted their memoranda on time.

III. OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD

As a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections raised in the subject

five petitions and six petitions-in-intervention against the MOA-AD, as well as the
two comments-in-intervention in favor of the MOA-AD, the Court takes an
overview of the MOA.

The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF.

Under the heading Terms of Reference (TOR), the MOA-AD includes not
only four earlier agreements between the GRP and MILF, but also two agreements
between the GRP and the MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, and the Final Peace
Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, signed on
September 2, 1996 during the administration of President Fidel Ramos.

The MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes the organic act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)[25] and the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act (IPRA),[26] and several international law instruments the ILO
Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries in relation to the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous
Peoples, and the UN Charter, among others.

The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of compact rights
entrenchment emanating from the regime of dar-ul-muahada (or
territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace agreement) that
partakes the nature of a treaty device.

During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see the
world through a simple dichotomy: there was the dar-ul-Islam (the Abode
of Islam) and dar-ul-harb (the Abode of War). The first referred to those lands
where Islamic laws held sway, while the second denoted those lands where
Muslims were persecuted or where Muslim laws were outlawed or ineffective.
[27]
This way of viewing the world, however, became more complex through the
centuries as the Islamic world became part of the international community of
nations.

As Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with distant
States and inter-governmental organizations, the classical division of the world
into dar-ul-Islam and dar-ul-harb eventually lost its meaning. New terms were
drawn up to describe novel ways of perceiving non-Muslim territories. For
instance, areas like dar-ul-muahada (land of compact) and dar-ul-sulh (land
of treaty) referred to countries which, though under a secular regime, maintained
peaceful and cooperative relations with Muslim States, having been bound to each
other by treaty or agreement. Dar-ul-aman (land of order), on the other hand,
referred to countries which, though not bound by treaty with Muslim States,
maintained freedom of religion for Muslims.[28]
It thus appears that the compact rights entrenchment emanating from the regime
of dar-ul-muahada and dar-ul-sulh simply refers to all other agreements between
the MILF and the Philippine government the Philippines being the land of compact
and peace agreement that partake of the nature of a treaty device, treaty being
broadly defined as any solemn agreement in writing that sets out understandings,
obligations, and benefits for both parties which provides for a framework that
elaborates the principles declared in the [MOA-AD].[29]

The MOA-AD states that the Parties HAVE AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED
AS FOLLOWS, and starts with its main body.

The main body of the MOA-AD is divided

into four strands, namely, Concepts and
Principles, Territory, Resources, and
Governance.

A. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES

This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros and all
Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as
Bangsamoros. It defines Bangsamoro people as the natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether
mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.[30]

Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD,

includes not only Moros as traditionally understood even by Muslims,[31] but
all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds
that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this
freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined.

The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro homeland, the ownership of

which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of
their prior rights of occupation.[32] Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge
that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.[33]
The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance,
which right is said to be rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under
the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku
Ranaw. The sultanates were described as states or karajaan/kadatuan resembling a
body politic endowed with all the elements of a nation-state in the modern sense.[34]

The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people
on the past suzerain authority of the sultanates. As gathered, the territory defined as
the Bangsamoro homeland was ruled by several sultanates and, specifically in the
case of the Maranao, by the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation of
independent principalities (pangampong) each ruled by datus and sultans, none of
whom was supreme over the others.[35]

The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as the First

Nation with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into
treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations.
The term First Nation is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous peoples of
that territory, particularly those known as Indians. In Canada, each of these
indigenous peoples is equally entitled to be called First Nation, hence, all of them
are usually described collectively by the plural First Nations. [36] To that extent, the
MOA-AD, by identifying the Bangsamoro people as the First Nation suggesting its
exclusive entitlement to that designation departs from the Canadian usage of the
term.

The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral
Domain and AncestralLands of the Bangsamoro.[37]

B. TERRITORY

The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as
the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain
and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region.[38]
More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of
the ARMM thus constituting the following areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,
Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Significantly, this core also includes
certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM in
the 2001 plebiscite.[39]

Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities,

municipalities and barangays, which are grouped into two categories, Category A
and Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on
different dates, years apart from each other. Thus, Category A areas are to be
subjected to a plebiscite not later than twelve (12) months following the signing of
the MOA-AD.[40] Category B areas, also called Special Intervention Areas, on the
other hand, are to be subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the
signing of a separate agreement the Comprehensive Compact.[41]

The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all
natural resources within its internal waters, defined as extending fifteen (15)
kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area; [42] that the BJE shall also
have territorial waters, which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to
the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of
mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the
Central Government (used interchangeably with RP) shall
exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources.
[43]
Notably, the jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly described as
joint.

The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on

the territorial waters between the Central Government and the BJE, in favor of the
latter, through production sharing and economic cooperation agreement.[44] The
activities which the Parties are allowed to conduct on the territorial waters are
enumerated, among which are the exploration and utilization of natural resources,
regulation of shipping and fishing activities, and the enforcement of police and
safety measures.[45] There is no similar provision on the sharing of minerals and
allowed activities with respect to the internal waters of the BJE.
C. RESOURCES

The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation
and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish
trade missions in those countries. Such relationships and understandings, however,
are not to include aggression against the GRP. The BJE may also enter into
environmental cooperation agreements.[46]

The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central
Government. The Central Government is also bound to take necessary steps to
ensure the BJEs participation in international meetings and events like those of the
ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. The BJE is to be entitled to
participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of
border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing
of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the
islands forming part of the ancestral domain.[47]

With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential
sources of energy, petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural gas, the
jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested in the BJE as the party having
control within its territorial jurisdiction. This right carries the proviso that, in times
of national emergency, when public interest so requires, the Central Government
may, for a fixed period and under reasonable terms as may be agreed upon by both
Parties, assume or direct the operation of such resources.[48]

The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production
pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE.[49]
The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people
arising from any unjust dispossession of their territorial and proprietary rights,
customary land tenures, or their marginalization shall be acknowledged. Whenever
restoration is no longer possible, reparation is to be in such form as mutually
determined by the Parties.[50]

The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts
or agreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production and Sharing Agreements
(MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA), and other land tenure
instruments granted by the Philippine Government, including those issued by the
present ARMM.[51]

D. GOVERNANCE
The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and
monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Compact. This compact is to
embody the details for the effective enforcement and the mechanisms and
modalities for the actual implementation of the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD
explicitly provides that the participation of the third party shall not in any way
affect the status of the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE.
[52]

The associative relationship

between the Central Government
and the BJE

The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the
BJE as associative, characterized by shared authority and responsibility. And it
states that the structure of governance is to be based on executive, legislative,
judicial, and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the
Comprehensive Compact.

The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring amendments to the existing
legal framework shall take effect upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact and
upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the non-derogation
of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the
Comprehensive Compact. As will be discussed later, much of the present
controversy hangs on the legality of this provision.

The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own
institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral, financial and banking, education,
legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force, judicial system and
correctional institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the negotiation
of the comprehensive compact.
As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 by
Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal, Chairpersons of the Peace Negotiating Panels
of the GRP and the MILF, respectively. Notably, the penultimate paragraph of the
MOA-AD identifies the signatories as the representatives of the Parties, meaning
the GRP and MILF themselves, and not merely of the negotiating panels. [53] In
addition, the signature page of the MOA-AD states that it is WITNESSED BY
Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia,
ENDORSED BY Ambassador Sayed Elmasry, Adviser to Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General and Special Envoy for Peace Process
in Southern Philippines, and SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF Dr. Albert G.
Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of RP and Dato Seri Utama Dr. Rais Bin
Yatim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, all of whom were scheduled to sign
the Agreement last August 5, 2008.

Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective

lists cum maps of the provinces, municipalities, and barangays under Categories A
and B earlier mentioned in the discussion on the strand on TERRITORY.

IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES

A. RIPENESS

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies.

[54]
Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned
problems, or mere academic questions.[55] The limitation of the power of judicial
review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary
in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into
areas committed to the other branches of government.[56]

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion

of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal
rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence.[57] The Court can decide the constitutionality of an act or treaty only
when a proper case between opposing parties is submitted for judicial
determination.[58]

Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the

requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. [59] For a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had
then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come
into the picture,[60] and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. [61] He must show that
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of the act complained of.[62]

The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is

ripe for judicial review in the present petitions, reasoning that

The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points

subject to further negotiations and legislative enactments as well as
constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final peaceful
agreement. Simply put, the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal that does
not automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations until
the list of operative acts required have been duly complied with. x x x

xxxx

In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable

Court has no authority to pass upon issues based on hypothetical or
feigned constitutional problems or interests with no concrete
bases. Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD, there are
no concrete acts that could possibly violate petitioners and intervenors
rights since the acts complained of are mere contemplated steps toward
the formulation of a final peace agreement. Plainly, petitioners and
intervenors perceived injury, if at all, is merely imaginary and illusory
apart from being unfounded and based on mere
conjectures. (Underscoring supplied)

The Solicitor General cites[63] the following provisions of the MOA-AD:

 TERRITORY

xxxx

2. Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following

stipulations:
xxxx

d. Without derogating from the requirements of prior

agreements, the Government stipulates to conduct and
deliver, using all possible legal measures, within twelve
(12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD, a
plebiscite covering the areas as enumerated in the list
and depicted in the map as Category A attached herein
(the Annex). The Annex constitutes an integral part of
this framework agreement. Toward this end, the Parties
shall endeavor to complete the negotiations and resolve
all outstanding issues on the Comprehensive Compact
within fifteen (15) months from the signing of the
MOA-AD.

xxxx

GOVERNANCE

xxxx

7. The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the actual
implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the
Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable
it to occur effectively.

Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the

existing legal framework shall come into force upon the
signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to
non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated
timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.
[64]
(Underscoring supplied)
 The Solicitor Generals arguments fail to persuade.

Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present
controversy ripe. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre,[65] this Court held:

x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the

approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into
a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.

xxxx

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our

constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts. [66]

In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, [67] the United States

Supreme Court held that the challenge to the constitutionality of the schools policy
allowing student-led prayers and speeches before games was ripe for adjudication,
even if no public prayer had yet been led under the policy, because the policy was
being challenged as unconstitutional on its face.[68]

That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate
ripeness. For example, in New York v. United States,[69] decided in 1992, the United
States Supreme Court held that the action by the State of New York challenging the
provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act was ripe for
adjudication even if the questioned provision was not to take effect until January 1,
1996, because the parties agreed that New York had to take immediate action to
avoid the provision's consequences.[70]

The present petitions pray for Certiorari, [71] Prohibition, and

Mandamus. Certiorari and Prohibition are remedies granted by law when any
tribunal, board or officer has acted, in the case of certiorari, or is proceeding, in the
case of prohibition, without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [72] Mandamus is a remedy
granted by law when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use or enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. [73] Certiorari,
Mandamus and Prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive
officials.[74]

The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order

No. 3 (E.O. No. 3), issued on February 28, 2001.[75] The said executive order
requires that [t]he government's policy framework for peace, including the
systematic approach and the administrative structure for carrying out the
comprehensive peace process x x x be governed by this Executive Order.[76]

The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon
drafted the terms of the MOA-AD without consulting the local government units or
communities affected, nor informing them of the proceedings. As will be discussed
in greater detail later, such omission, by itself, constitutes a departure by
respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3.

Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate
the Constitution. The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD
requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon
the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes
to the legal framework, implying an amendment of the Constitution to
accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF
the amendment of the Constitution.Such act constitutes another violation of its
authority. Again, these points will be discussed in more detail later.
As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of
respondent that exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3
and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima
facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or
controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.[77]

B. LOCUS STANDI

For a party to have locus standi, one must allege such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.[78]

Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is
likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this
interest in the constitutional question raised.[79]

When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is
about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that
he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or
act complained of.[80] When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the
petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.[81]

For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds
are illegally disbursed or deflected to an illegal purpose, or that there is a wastage
of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
[82]
The Court retains discretion whether or not to allow a taxpayers suit.[83]

In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that

injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial
injury that can be questioned by legislators. A member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.[84]

An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members, [85] but
the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the
legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not suffice to clothe it
with standing.[86]
As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or
vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs.[87]

Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that
satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention, [88] such as a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties.

In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus
standi, given the liberal attitude it has exercised, highlighted in the case of David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo,[89] where technicalities of procedure were brushed aside, the
constitutional issues raised being of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance deserving the attention of the Court in view of their seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents.[90] The Courts forbearing stance on locus
standi on issues involving constitutional issues has for its purpose the protection of
fundamental rights.

In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the Constitution to
determine whether the other branches of government have kept themselves within
the limits of the Constitution and the laws and have not abused the discretion given
them, has brushed aside technical rules of procedure.[91]

In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No.

183591) Province of Zamboanga del Norte (G.R. No. 183951), City of
Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City of Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752) and
petitioners-in-intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of
Isabela and Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view of the direct and
substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would suffer as their territories, whether in
whole or in part, are to be included in the intended domain of the BJE. These
petitioners allege that they did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM which
would be expanded to form the BJE territory. Petitioners legal standing is thus
beyond doubt.

In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino
Pimentel III would have no standing as citizens and taxpayers for their failure to
specify that they would be denied some right or privilege or there would be
wastage of public funds. The fact that they are a former Senator, an incumbent
mayor of Makati City, and a resident of Cagayan de Oro, respectively, is of no
consequence. Considering their invocation of the transcendental importance of the
issues at hand, however, the Court grants them standing.

Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as

taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the conduct of an
illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score
alone, they can be given legal standing. Their allegation that the issues involved in
these petitions are of undeniable transcendental importance clothes them with
added basis for their personality to intervene in these petitions.

With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his being a
member of the Senate and a citizen to enforce compliance by respondents of the
publics constitutional right to be informed of the MOA-AD, as well as on a
genuine legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success or failure of either
of the parties. He thus possesses the requisite standing as an intervenor.

With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman of the

3rd district of Davao City, a taxpayer and a member of the Bagobo tribe; Carlo B.
Gomez, et al., as members of the IBP Palawan chapter, citizens and
taxpayers; Marino Ridao, as taxpayer, resident and member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cotabato City; and Kisin Buxani, as taxpayer, they failed to allege
any proper legal interest in the present petitions. Just the same, the Court exercises
its discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi given the
paramount public interest in the issues at hand.

Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and

Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and
prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc.,
a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers, allege that they stand to be
benefited or prejudiced, as the case may be, in the resolution of the petitions
concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for the denial of the petitions on the grounds
therein stated. Such legal interest suffices to clothe them with standing.

B. MOOTNESS
Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with the
satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the subsequent
pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that [n]o matter what the Supreme
Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA.[92]

In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out that the
President had already disbanded the GRP Peace Panel.[93]

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[94] this Court held that the moot and academic
principle not being a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in
resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that
(a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; [95] (b) the situation is of
exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved;[96] (c) the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public; [97] and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.[98]

Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where there is

a voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer. Thus,
once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it does
not automatically deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case and
does not render the case moot especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays
for injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the violation.[99]

The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them into the
domain of judicial review. The grounds cited above in David are just as applicable
in the present cases as they were, not only in David, but also in Province of
Batangas v. Romulo[100] and Manalo v. Calderon[101] where the Court similarly
decided them on the merits, supervening events that would ordinarily have
rendered the same moot notwithstanding.

Petitions not mooted

Contrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the MOA-AD
and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not moot the present
petitions. It bears emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did not push through
due to the Courts issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.

Contrary too to respondents position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere

list of consensus points, especially given its nomenclature, the need to have it
signed or initialed by all the parties concerned on August 5, 2008, and the far-
reaching Constitutional implications of these consensus points, foremost of
which is the creation of the BJE.

In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part
of respondents to amend and effect necessary changes to the existing legal
framework for certain provisions of the MOA-AD to take effect. Consequently,
the present petitions are not confined to the terms and provisions of the MOA-AD,
but to other on-going and future negotiations and agreements necessary for its
realization. The petitions have not, therefore, been rendered moot and academic
simply by the public disclosure of the MOA-AD,[102] the manifestation that it will
not be signed as well as the disbanding of the GRP Panel not withstanding.

Petitions are imbued with paramount

public interest

There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public
interest, involving a significant part of the countrys territory and the wide-ranging
political modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-AD is
subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional
amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case,
the government and its negotiating entity.

Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al.[103] where the Court did not pontificat[e]
on issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy [as
this] will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole.
The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico,
what was assailed and eventually cancelled was a stand-alone government
procurement contract for a national broadband network involving a one-time
contractual relation between two partiesthe government and a private foreign
corporation. As the issues therein involved specific government procurement
policies and standard principles on contracts, the majority opinion in Suplico found
nothing exceptional therein, the factual circumstances being peculiar only to the
transactions and parties involved in the controversy.
The MOA-AD is part of a series of
agreements

In the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of

agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The MOA-AD
which dwells on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli Agreement is the
third such component to be undertaken following the implementation of
the Security Aspect in August 2001 and the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and
Development Aspect in May 2002.

Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of August 28,

2008 to the Solicitor General, has stated that no matter what the Supreme Court
ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA[-AD], mootness will
not set in in light of the terms of the Tripoli Agreement 2001.

Need to formulate principles-guidelines

Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be

drawn up to carry out the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement
2001, in another or in any form, which could contain similar or significantly drastic
provisions. While the Court notes the word of the Executive Secretary that the
government is committed to securing an agreement that is both constitutional and
equitable because that is the only way that long-lasting peace can be assured, it is
minded to render a decision on the merits in the present petitions to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, most
especially, the government in negotiating with the MILF regarding Ancestral
Domain.
Respondents invite the Courts attention to the separate opinion of then Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban in Sanlakas v. Reyes[104] in which he stated that the
doctrine of capable of repetition yet evading review can override mootness,
provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continue to be
prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their issuance. They contend that the
Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter for the doctrine to be invoked.

The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which this
Court exercises original jurisdiction. While G.R. No. 183893 (City of Iligan v.
GRP) is a petition for Injunction and Declaratory Relief, the Court will treat it as
one for Prohibition as it has far reaching implications and raises questions that
need to be resolved.[105] At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the
rest of the petitions.

Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the
doctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a number of landmark
cases.[106]There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the
Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities
of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be
subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents actions are capable of
repetition, in another or any form.

It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have become moot,
respondents having, by Compliance of August 7, 2008, provided this Court and
petitioners with official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its
annexes. Too, intervenors have been furnished, or have procured for themselves,
copies of the MOA-AD.
V. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

As culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are basically two
SUBSTANTIVE issues to be resolved, one relating to the manner in which the
MOA-AD was negotiated and finalized, the other relating to its provisions, viz:
1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed
the MOA-AD?

2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?
ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE

Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of

public concern, as provided in Section 7, Article III on the Bill of Rights:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public

concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.[107]

As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta,[108] the Court has recognized the statutory
right to examine and inspect public records, a right which was eventually accorded
constitutional status.

The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution
and the 1987 Constitution, has been recognized as a self-executory constitutional
right.[109]

In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,[110] the Court ruled that access
to public records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on
matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the pubic has a
legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance.

x x x The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition

of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a
democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the
nations problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they
are denied access to information of general interest. Information is
needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of
 the times. As has been aptly observed: Maintaining the flow of such
information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its
dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably
ceases. x x x[111]

In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest aids the people in
democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues
confronting the nation[112] so that they may be able to criticize and participate in the
affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by
ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed
public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by the people.
[113]

The MOA-AD is a matter of public

concern

That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of
public concern[114] faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the
MOA-AD is indeed of public concern.[115] In previous cases, the Court found that
the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, [116] the
need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, [117] the civil service
eligibility of a public employee,[118] the proper management of GSIS funds
allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, [119] the recovery of the Marcoses
alleged ill-gotten wealth,[120] and the identity of party-list nominees,[121] among
others, are matters of public concern.Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the
present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at
large.

Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and
negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as
to the executory nature or commercial character of agreements, the Court has
categorically ruled:
 x x x [T]he right to information contemplates inclusion of negotiations
leading to the consummation of the transaction. Certainly, a
consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to
information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no
contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late
for the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until
the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or
even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full
transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers
of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will
prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of
any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in
the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a
constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. [122] (Emphasis
and italics in the original)

Intended as a splendid symmetry[123] to the right to information under the Bill of

Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the
Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State

adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.[124]

The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section

28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public
concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of
the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of
officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.[125]

The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the
conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the peoples right to
know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following
such policy.[126] These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of
expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the
people.[127]

Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of the

Constitutional Commission so disclose:

MR. SUAREZ. And since this is not self-executory, this policy

will not be enunciated or will not be in force and effect until after
Congress shall have provided it.

MR. OPLE. I expect it to influence the climate of public ethics

immediately but, of course, the implementing law will have to be
enacted by Congress, Mr. Presiding Officer.[128]

The following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., sought

clarification on the issue, is enlightening.

MR. DAVIDE. I would like to get some clarifications on this. Mr.

Presiding Officer, did I get the Gentleman correctly as having said that
this is not a self-executing provision? It would require a legislation by
Congress to implement?

MR. OPLE. Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but

I accepted an amendment from Commissioner Regalado, so that the
safeguards on national interest are modified by the clause as may be
provided by law

MR. DAVIDE. But as worded, does it not mean that this will
immediately take effect and Congress may provide for reasonable
safeguards on the sole ground national interest?

MR. OPLE. Yes. I think so, Mr. Presiding Officer, I said earlier that
it should immediately influence the climate of the conduct of public
affairs but, of course, Congress here may no longer pass a law revoking
it, or if this is approved, revoking this principle, which is inconsistent
with this policy.[129] (Emphasis supplied)
Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the
passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely
directed to provide for reasonable safeguards. The complete and effective exercise
of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-
hand, it is absurd to say that the broader [130] right to information on matters of
public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to
disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an
enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing
legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy.

An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or

process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the
interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to
the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the peoples will.
[131]
Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure is
the design for feedback mechanisms.

MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding

Officer, will the people be able to participate? Will the government
provide feedback mechanisms so that the people can participate and
can react where the existing media facilities are not able to provide
full feedback mechanisms to the government? I suppose this will be
part of the government implementing operational mechanisms.

MR. OPLE. Yes. I think through their elected representatives and

that is how these courses take place. There is a message and a feedback,
both ways.

xxxx

MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just make

one last sentence?

I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are not

talking about public officials but also network of private business
o[r] community-based organizations that will be reacting. As a matter
of fact, we will put more credence or credibility on the private network of
 volunteers and voluntary community-based organizations. So I do not
think we are afraid that there will be another OMA in the making.
[132]
(Emphasis supplied)

The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is

evident in the marching orders to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to
disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda
and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. [133] The preambulatory clause of
E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil
society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the peoples
participation.
One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is
that it should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles
important to all Filipinos and shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by
the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community.
[134]
Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-
building and empowerment for peace, which includes continuing consultations on
both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process,
and the mobilization and facilitation of peoples participation in the peace process.
[135]

Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to

effectuate continuing consultations, contrary to respondents position that
plebiscite is more than sufficient consultation.[136]

Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one
of which is to [c]onduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF)
and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments,
recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the
progress of the comprehensive peace process. [137] E.O. No. 3 mandates the
establishment of the NPF to be the principal forum for the PAPP to consult with
and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors
of society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of the
comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue
and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives.[138]
In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners right to be consulted on the peace
agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right to information and
disclosure.

PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of

discretion

The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the
pertinent consultation. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed
and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority , and amounts to
a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.

The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation in a
particular way or manner. It may, however, require him to comply with the law
and discharge the functions within the authority granted by the President.[139]

Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to respondents
retort in justifying the denial of petitioners right to be consulted. Respondents
stance manifests the manner by which they treat the salient provisions of E.O. No.
3 on peoples participation. Such disregard of the express mandate of the President
is not much different from superficial conduct toward token provisos that border on
classic lip service.[140] It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

As for respondents invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is not

tenable under the premises. The argument defies sound reason when contrasted
with E.O. No. 3s explicit provisions on continuing consultation and dialogue on
both national and local levels. The executive order even recognizes the exercise
of the publics right even before the GRP makes its official recommendations or
before the government proffers its definite propositions.[141] It bear emphasis that
E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit relevant advice, information, comments and
recommendations from the people through dialogue.

AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive

privilege in view of their unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final
draft of the MOA-AD. By unconditionally complying with the Courts August 4,
2008 Resolution, without a prayer for the documents disclosure in camera, or
without a manifestation that it was complying therewith ex abundante ad cautelam.

Petitioners assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a
State policy to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic
consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and
people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any
project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions [142] is well-
taken. The LGC chapter on intergovernmental relations puts flesh into this avowed
policy:

Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be

implemented by government authorities unless the consultations
mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior
approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That
occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not
be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. [143] (Italics and
underscoring supplied)

In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Pao,[144] the Court held that the above-stated policy and above-
quoted provision of the LGU apply only to national programs or projects which are
to be implemented in a particular local community. Among the programs and
projects covered are those that are critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people
residing in the locality where these will be implemented.[145] The MOA-AD is one
peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a
vast territory to the Bangsamoro people,[146] which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.

With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples

(ICCs/IPs), whose interests are represented herein by petitioner Lopez and are
adversely affected by the MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA, the right
to participate fully at all levels of decision-making in matters which may affect
their rights, lives and destinies.[147] The MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing
ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with the clear-cut
mechanisms ordained in said Act,[148] which entails, among other things, the
observance of the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs.
Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government
agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement or compromise. The recognition of the ancestral domain is the raison
detre of the MOA-AD, without which all other stipulations or consensus points
necessarily must fail. In proceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral
domain, without complying with the IPRA, which is cited as one of the TOR of the
MOA-AD, respondents clearly transcended the boundaries of their
authority. As it seems, even the heart of the MOA-AD is still subject to necessary
changes to the legal framework. While paragraph 7 on Governance suspends the
effectivity of all provisions requiring changes to the legal framework, such clause
is itself invalid, as will be discussed in the following section.

Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to
public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if the
country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all
government authority emanating from them.[149]

ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE

With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they
cannot all be accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Respondents
have admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court, and the MOA-AD
itself recognizes the need to amend the existing legal framework to render effective
at least some of its provisions. Respondents, nonetheless, counter that the MOA-
AD is free of any legal infirmity because any provisions therein which are
inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until the
necessary changes to that framework are made. The validity of this argument will
be considered later. For now, the Court shall pass upon how
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws as presently
worded.

In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers
conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE
exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go
beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers
that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to
a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-
AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-
AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its
provisions with it in mind.

Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on

RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned
provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe
the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.

4. The relationship between the Central Government and the

Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by
shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance
based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions
with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A
period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace
compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government
and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The nature of the associative relationship may have been intended to be

defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive
Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of association in international
law, and the MOA-AD by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR
placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be
brought to bear in understanding the use of the term associative in the MOA-AD.

Keitner and Reisman state that

 [a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily
establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate,
delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while
maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations
represent a middle ground between integration and independence. x
x x[150] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated
States of Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands,[151] are associated states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of
Free Association. The currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their
very close ties with the U.S., yet they issue their own travel documents, which is a
mark of their statehood. Their international legal status as states was confirmed by
the UN Security Council and by their admission to UN membership.

According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and

the FSM generally have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own name
and right, such capacity extending to matters such as the law of the sea, marine
resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and cultural relations. The U.S.
government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is obligated to consult with the
governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S.
government) regards as relating to or affecting either government.

In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S.
government has the authority and obligation to defend them as if they were part of
U.S. territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the option of establishing and
using military areas and facilities within these associated states and has the right to
bar the military personnel of any third country from having access to these
territories for military purposes.

It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free

association is understood as an international association between sovereigns. The
Compact of Free Association is a treaty which is subordinate to the associated
nations national constitution, and each party may terminate the association
consistent with the right of independence.It has been said that, with the admission
of the U.S.-associated states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the
American model of free association is actually based on an underlying status
of independence.[152]

In international practice, the associated state arrangement has usually been used as
a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full
independence. Examples of states that have passed through the status of associated
states as a transitional phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since become independent states.[153]

Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the
international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJEs
capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the
commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJEs participation in
meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the
continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external
defense. Moreover, the BJEs right to participate in Philippine official missions
bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and
sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the
islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the
governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S.
government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.

These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed
to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status
closely approximating it.

The concept
of association is not recognized under the
present Constitution

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under

our laws as having an associative relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever
granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less
does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine
territory for independence.

Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-ADs provisions, therefore,
already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions,
specifically the following provisions of Article X:

SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of

the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim

Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and
the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.

The BJE is a far more powerful

entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution

It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its

relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that
of the ARMM.Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a
state laid down in the Montevideo Convention,[154] namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations
with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any
portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself by
its use of the concept of association runs counter to the national sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Republic.
 The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national
government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is
not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the
formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the
laws.

Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that [t]he creation of the

autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided
that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. (Emphasis supplied)

As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous region in the constitutional
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under
paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic
area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which
voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite Baloi, Munai,
Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal are automatically part of the BJE
without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and
B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM
and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001,
however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution,
precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the
ARMM, not the BJE.

The MOA-AD, moreover, would not

comply with Article X, Section 20 of
the Constitution

since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows:

 SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of
the general welfare of the people of the region. (Underscoring
supplied)

Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the
MOA-AD would require an amendment that would expand the above-quoted
provision. The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of
said constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that might vest
in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other
provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass
legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate
paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states: The BJE is free to enter
into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided,
however, that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression
against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x. Under our
constitutional system, it is only the President who has that power. Pimentel v.
Executive Secretary[155] instructs:

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is

regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is
the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief
architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece
with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with
the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or
withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into
treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In
 the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to
negotiate with other states. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme
envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states:
The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity and
development. (Underscoring supplied) An associativearrangement does not uphold
national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative
ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of
Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been
a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to nationalunity.

Besides being irreconcilable with the

Constitution, the MOA-AD is
also inconsistent with prevailing statutory
law, among which are R.A. No. 9054[156] or
the Organic Act of the ARMM, and
the IPRA.[157]

Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption
of the definition of Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1
on CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES states:

1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples

of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as
Bangsamoros. The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives
or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of
conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full
blood. Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The
freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall be respected.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X,
Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather than lumping together the identities of
the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in Mindanao,
clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples, as
follows:

As used in this Organic Act, the phrase indigenous cultural community

refers to Filipino citizens residing in the autonomous region who are:

(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and
economic conditions distinguish them from other sectors of the national
community; and

(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in
Islam and who have retained some or all of their own social,
economic, cultural, and political institutions.

Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and
recognition of ancestral domains. The MOA-ADs manner of delineating the
ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that
procedure. By paragraph 1 of TERRITORY, the Parties simply agree that, subject
to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules, [t]he Bangsamoro homeland and
historic territory refer to the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial
and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it,
embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.

Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed procedure, as
illustrated in the following provisions thereof:

SECTION 52. Delineation Process. The identification and delineation of

ancestral domains shall be done in accordance with the following
procedures:

xxxx

b) Petition for Delineation. The process of delineating a specific

perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP with the consent of the ICC/IP
concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation filed with the NCIP, by
a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs;
c) Delineation Proper. The official delineation of ancestral domain
boundaries including census of all community members therein, shall be
immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon filing of
the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be done in
coordination with the community concerned and shall at all times
include genuine involvement and participation by the members of the
communities concerned;

d) Proof Required. Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the

testimony of elders or community under oath, and other documents
directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or occupation of the area
since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners which
shall be any one (1) of the following authentic documents:

1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;

2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution;

3) Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old

improvements, burial grounds, sacred places and old villages;

4) Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning

boundaries entered into by the ICCs/IPs concerned with other
ICCs/IPs;

5) Survey plans and sketch maps;

6) Anthropological data;

7) Genealogical surveys;

8) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests

and hunting grounds;

9) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as

mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges, hills, terraces and the like; and

10) Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of
the community.
e) Preparation of Maps. On the basis of such investigation and the
findings of fact based thereon, the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP
shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical descriptions, and
a description of the natural features and landmarks embraced therein;

f) Report of Investigation and Other Documents. A complete copy of the

preliminary census and a report of investigation, shall be prepared by the
Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP;

g) Notice and Publication. A copy of each document, including a

translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be
posted in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy
of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial and regional
offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other
claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from date of
such publication: Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper
exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid substitute: Provided,
further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper
and radio station are not available;

h) Endorsement to NCIP. Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and

of the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a
report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is
deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed
insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission
of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office
shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after
inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection,
the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy
furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial
shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases
where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of
ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the
contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a
preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full
adjudication according to the section below.

xxxx
 To remove all doubts about the irreconcilability of the MOA-AD with the
present legal system, a discussion of not only the Constitution and domestic
statutes, but also of international law is in order, for

Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution

states that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the
land.

Applying this provision of the Constitution, the Court, in Mejoff v. Director of

Prisons,[158] held that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is part of the law
of the land on account of which it ordered the release on bail of a detained alien of
Russian descent whose deportation order had not been executed even after two
years. Similarly, the Court in Agustin v. Edu[159] applied the aforesaid constitutional
provision to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals.

International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of peoples,

understood not merely as the entire population of a State but also a portion
thereof. In considering the question of whether the people of Quebec had a right to
unilaterally secede from Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court in REFERENCE
RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC[160]had occasion to acknowledge that the right of a
people to self-determination is now so widely recognized in international
conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond convention and is
considered a general principle of international law.
Among the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights[161] and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights[162] which state, in Article 1 of both covenants, that all peoples, by
virtue of the right of self-determination, freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.

The peoples right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as

extending to a unilateral right of secession. A distinction should be made between
the right of internal and external self-determination. REFERENCE RE
SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again instructive:
 (ii) Scope of the Right to Self-determination

126. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right
to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled
through internal self-determination a peoples pursuit of its political,
economic, social and cultural development within the framework of
an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this
case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to
unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and,
even then, under carefully defined circumstances. x x x

External self-determination can be defined as in the following

statement from the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra, as

The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free

association or integration with an independent State or the
emergence into any other political status freely determined by
a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-
determination by that people. (Emphasis added)

127. The international law principle of self-determination has

evolved within a framework of respect for the territorial integrity of
existing states. The various international documents that support the
existence of a peoples right to self-determination also contain parallel
statements supportive of the conclusion that the exercise of such a right
must be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an existing states
territorial integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign states.

x x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases in which the right
to external self-determination can arise, namely, where a people is under colonial
rule, is subject to foreign domination or exploitation outside a colonial context, and
less definitely but asserted by a number of commentators is blocked from the
meaningful exercise of its right to internal self-determination. The Court ultimately
held that the population of Quebec had no right to secession, as the same is not
under colonial rule or foreign domination, nor is it being deprived of the freedom
to make political choices and pursue economic, social and cultural development,
citing that Quebec is equitably represented in legislative, executive and judicial
institutions within Canada, even occupying prominent positions therein.

The exceptional nature of the right of secession is further exemplified in the

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF JURISTS ON THE
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE AALAND ISLANDS QUESTION.
[163]
There, Sweden presented to the Council of the League of Nations the question
of whether the inhabitants of the Aaland Islandsshould be authorized to determine
by plebiscite if the archipelago should remain under Finnish sovereignty or be
incorporated in the kingdom of Sweden. The Council, before resolving the
question, appointed an International Committee composed of three jurists to submit
an opinion on the preliminary issue of whether the dispute should, based on
international law, be entirely left to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland. The
Committee stated the rule as follows:

x x x [I]n the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the

right of disposing of national territory is essentially an attribute of
the sovereignty of every State. Positive International Law does not
recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate
themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple
expression of a wish, any more than it recognizes the right of other
States to claim such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant or
refusal of the right to a portion of its population of determining its
own political fate by plebiscite or by some other method, is,
exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty of every State which is
definitively constituted. A dispute between two States concerning such
a question, under normal conditions therefore, bears upon a question
which International Law leaves entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of
one of the States concerned. Any other solution would amount to an
infringement of sovereign rights of a State and would involve the risk of
creating difficulties and a lack of stability which would not only be
contrary to the very idea embodied in term State, but would also
endanger the interests of the international community. If this right is not
possessed by a large or small section of a nation, neither can it be held
by the State to which the national group wishes to be attached, nor by
any other State. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Committee held that the dispute concerning the Aaland Islands did not refer to
a question which is left by international law to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland,
thereby applying the exception rather than the rule elucidated above. Its ground for
departing from the general rule, however, was a very narrow one, namely,
the Aaland Islands agitation originated at a time when Finland was undergoing
drastic political transformation. The internal situation of Finland was, according to
the Committee, so abnormal that, for a considerable time, the conditions required
for the formation of a sovereign State did not exist. In the midst of revolution,
anarchy, and civil war, the legitimacy of the Finnish national government was
disputed by a large section of the people, and it had, in fact, been chased from the
capital and forcibly prevented from carrying out its duties. The armed camps and
the police were divided into two opposing forces. In light of these
circumstances, Finland was not, during the relevant time period, a definitively
constituted sovereign state. The Committee, therefore, found that Finland did not
possess the right to withhold from a portion of its population the option to separate
itself a right which sovereign nations generally have with respect to their own
populations.

Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term has
been used, in scholarship as well as international, regional, and state practices, to
refer to groups with distinct cultures, histories, and connections to land (spiritual
and otherwise) that have been forcibly incorporated into a larger governing society.
These groups are regarded as indigenous since they are the living descendants of
pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. Otherwise stated,
indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive groups that
find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and
conquest.[164] Examples of groups who have been regarded as indigenous peoples
are the Maori of New Zealand and the aboriginal peoples of Canada.

As with the broader category of peoples, indigenous peoples situated within states
do not have a general right to independence or secession from those states under
international law,[165] but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed
above as the right to internal self-determination.
In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly
adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN
DRIP) throughGeneral Assembly Resolution 61/295. The vote was 143 to 4,
the Philippines being included among those in favor, and the four voting against
being Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. The Declaration clearly
recognized the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, encompassing the
right to autonomy or self-government, to wit:

Article 3

Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of

that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.

Article 4

Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination,

have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to
their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for
financing their autonomous functions.

Article 5

Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their

distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while
retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political,
economic, social and cultural life of the State.

Self-government, as used in international legal discourse pertaining to indigenous

peoples, has been understood as equivalent to internal self-determination. [166] The
extent of self-determination provided for in the UN DRIP is more particularly
defined in its subsequent articles, some of which are quoted hereunder:
Article 8
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected
to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.
2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and
redress for:
 (a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of
their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values
or ethnic identities;
(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing
them of their lands, territories or resources;
(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim
or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights;
(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;

(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite

racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them.
Article 21

1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the

improvement of their economic and social conditions, including,
inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training
and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security.
2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special
measures to ensure continuing improvement of their economic and
social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and
special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and
persons with disabilities.

Article 26

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and

resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or
otherwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control
the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of
traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well
as those which they have otherwise acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands,
territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with
due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the
indigenous peoples concerned.

Article 30
1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of
indigenous peoples, unless justified by a relevant public interest or
otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous peoples
concerned.

2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous

peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular
through their representative institutions, prior to using their lands or
territories for military activities.

Article 32

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities

and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories
and other resources.

2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous
peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in
order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval
of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources,
particularly in connection with the development, utilization or
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.

3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for
any such activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to
mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or
spiritual impact.

Article 37

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and

enforcement of treaties, agreements and other constructive
arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have
States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other
constructive arrangements.

2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or

eliminating the rights of indigenous peoples contained in treaties,
agreements and other constructive arrangements.

Article 38
 States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall
take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve
the ends of this Declaration.

Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,
must now be regarded as embodying customary international law a question which
the Court need not definitively resolve here the obligations enumerated therein do
not strictly require the Republic to grant the Bangsamoro people, through the
instrumentality of the BJE, the particular rights and powers provided for in the
MOA-AD. Even the more specific provisions of the UN DRIP are general in scope,
allowing for flexibility in its application by the different States.
There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now
guarantee indigenous peoples their own police and internal security force. Indeed,
Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will provide protection for
indigenous peoples against acts like the forced dispossession of their lands a
function that is normally performed by police officers. If the protection of a right
so essential to indigenous peoples identity is acknowledged to be the responsibility
of the State, then surely the protection of rights less significant to them as such
peoples would also be the duty of States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an
acknowledgement of the right of indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and
atmospheric space. What it upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right of indigenous
peoples to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned,
occupied or otherwise used or acquired.

Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to

autonomy, does not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-
independent status of an associated state. All the rights recognized in that
document are qualified in Article 46 as follows:

1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any

State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or
to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations
or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which
 would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.

Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the validity
of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws unnecessary.

It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that
cannot be reconciled with the Constitution and the laws as presently
worded. Respondents proffer, however, that the signing of the MOA-AD alone
would not have entailed any violation of law or grave abuse of discretion on their
part, precisely because it stipulates that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the
laws shall not take effect until these laws are amended. They cite paragraph 7 of
the MOA-AD strand on GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but which is reproduced
below for convenience:

7. The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the
actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the
Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to
occur effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing
legal framework shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive
Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and
within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive
Compact.
Indeed, the foregoing stipulation keeps many controversial provisions of the
MOA-AD from coming into force until the necessary changes to the legal
framework are effected. While the word Constitution is not mentioned in the
provision now under consideration or anywhere else in the MOA-AD, the
term legal framework is certainly broad enough to include the Constitution.

Notwithstanding the suspensive clause, however, respondents, by their mere

act of incorporating in the MOA-AD the provisions thereof regarding the
associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government, have
already violated the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March
1, 2001, which states that the negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with x
x x the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of
the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)Establishing an associative relationship
between the BJE and the Central Government is, for the reasons already discussed,
a preparation for independence, or worse, an implicit acknowledgment of an
independent status already prevailing.

Even apart from the above-mentioned Memorandum, however, the MOA-

AD is defective because the suspensive clause is invalid, as discussed below.

The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to negotiate with the MILF is
founded on E.O. No. 3, Section 5(c), which states that there shall be established
Government Peace Negotiating Panels for negotiations with different rebel groups
to be appointed by the President as her official emissaries to conduct negotiations,
dialogues, and face-to-face discussions with rebel groups. These negotiating panels
are to report to the President, through the PAPP on the conduct and progress of the
negotiations.

It bears noting that the GRP Peace Panel, in exploring lasting solutions to
the Moro Problem through its negotiations with the MILF, was not restricted by
E.O. No. 3 only to those options available under the laws as they presently
stand. One of the components of a comprehensive peace process, which E.O. No. 3
collectively refers to as the Paths to Peace, is the pursuit of social, economic, and
political reforms which may require new legislation or even constitutional
amendments. Sec. 4(a) of E.O. No. 3, which reiterates Section 3(a), of E.O. No.
125,[167] states:

SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. The components of the

comprehensive peace process comprise the processes known as the Paths
to Peace. These component processes are interrelated and not mutually
exclusive, and must therefore be pursued simultaneously in a
coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall include, but may not be
limited to, the following:

a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL

REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous
implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and
 projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal armed
conflicts and social unrest. This may require administrative
action, new legislation or even constitutional amendments.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably be perceived as an attempt of

respondents to address, pursuant to this provision of E.O. No. 3, the root causes of
the armed conflict in Mindanao. The E.O. authorized them to think outside the box,
so to speak. Hence, they negotiated and were set on signing the MOA-AD that
included various social, economic, and political reforms which cannot, however,
all be accommodated within the present legal framework, and which thus would
require new legislation and constitutional amendments.

The inquiry on the legality of the suspensive clause, however, cannot stop here,
because it must be asked

whether the President herself may

exercise the power delegated to
the GRP Peace Panel under E.O. No. 3,
Sec. 4(a).
The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not
possess. May the President, in the course of peace negotiations, agree to pursue
reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments, or
should the reforms be restricted only to those solutions which the present laws
allow? The answer to this question requires a discussion of

the extent of the Presidents power to

conduct peace negotiations.

That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups
is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such
authority. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,[168] in issue was the authority of the
President to declare a state of rebellion an authority which is not expressly
provided for in the Constitution.The Court held thus:
 In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis
into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the
President's power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The
rationale for the majority's ruling rested on the President's

. . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the

grant of executive power and which are necessary for
her to comply with her duties under the
Constitution.The powers of the President are not
limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article
on the Executive Department and in scattered
provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding
the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as
a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos,
for the result was a limitation of specific powers of the
President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-
chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of
executive power.
Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs
in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same
time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. x x
x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, the Presidents power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly
included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief
Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace,
and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and
suppress rebellion and lawless violence.[169]

As the experience of nations which have similarly gone through internal armed
conflict will show, however, peace is rarely attained by simply pursuing a military
solution.Oftentimes, changes as far-reaching as a fundamental reconfiguration of
the nations constitutional structure is required. The observations of Dr. Kirsti
Samuels are enlightening, to wit:

x x x [T]he fact remains that a successful political and governance

transition must form the core of any post-conflict peace-building
mission. As we have observed in Liberia and Haiti over the last ten
 years, conflict cessation without modification of the political
environment, even where state-building is undertaken through technical
electoral assistance and institution- or capacity-building, is unlikely to
succeed. On average, more than 50 percent of states emerging from
conflict return to conflict. Moreover, a substantial proportion of
transitions have resulted in weak or limited democracies.

The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process can

play an important role in the political and governance
transition. Constitution-making after conflict is an opportunity to create a
common vision of the future of a state and a road map on how to get
there. The constitution can be partly a peace agreement and partly a
framework setting up the rules by which the new democracy will
operate.[170]
In the same vein, Professor Christine Bell, in her article on the nature and legal
status of peace agreements, observed that the typical way that peace agreements
establish or confirm mechanisms for demilitarization and demobilization is by
linking them to new constitutional structures addressing governance, elections,
and legal and human rights institutions.[171]

In the Philippine experience, the link between peace agreements and

constitution-making has been recognized by no less than the framers of the
Constitution. Behind the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous
regions[172] is the framers intention to implement a particular peace agreement,
namely, the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between the GRP and the MNLF, signed by
then Undersecretary of National Defense Carmelo Z. Barbero and then MNLF
Chairman Nur Misuari.

MR. ROMULO. There are other speakers; so, although I have

some more questions, I will reserve my right to ask them if they are not
covered by the other speakers. I have only two questions.
I heard one of the Commissioners say that local autonomy
already exists in the Muslim region; it is working very well; it has, in
fact, diminished a great deal of the problems. So, my question is: since
that already exists, why do we have to go into something new?

MR. OPLE. May I answer that on behalf of Chairman

Nolledo. Commissioner Yusup Abubakar is right that certain definite
steps have been taken to implement the provisions of
 the Tripoli Agreement with respect to an autonomous region
in Mindanao. This is a good first step, but there is no question that
this is merely a partial response to the Tripoli Agreement itself and to
the fuller standard of regional autonomy contemplated in that
agreement, and now by state policy.[173] (Emphasis supplied)

The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to

them have, to the credit of their drafters, been partly successful. Nonetheless, the
Filipino people are still faced with the reality of an on-going conflict between the
Government and the MILF. If the President is to be expected to find means for
bringing this conflict to an end and to achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then she
must be given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions
that may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. Being
uniquely vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups,
the President is in a singular position to know the precise nature of their grievances
which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities.

The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that
she considers viable, but she may not be prevented from submitting them as
recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them
pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision. In
particular, Congress would have the option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1
and 3 of the Constitution, to propose the recommended amendments or revision to
the people, call a constitutional convention, or submit to the electorate the question
of calling such a convention.

While the President does not possess constituent powers as those powers may be
exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through
initiative and referendum she may submit proposals for constitutional change to
Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers.

In Sanidad v. COMELEC,[174] in issue was the legality of then President Marcos act
of directly submitting proposals for constitutional amendments to a referendum,
bypassing the interim National Assembly which was the body vested by the 1973
Constitution with the power to propose such amendments. President Marcos, it will
be recalled, never convened the interim National Assembly. The majority upheld
the Presidents act, holding that the urges of absolute necessity compelled the
President as the agent of the people to act as he did, there being no interim
National Assembly to propose constitutional amendments. Against this ruling,
Justices Teehankee and Muoz Palma vigorously dissented. The Courts concern at
present, however, is not with regard to the point on which it was then divided in
that controversial case, but on that which was not disputed by either side.

Justice Teehankees dissent,[175] in particular, bears noting. While he disagreed

that the President may directly submit proposed constitutional amendments to a
referendum, implicit in his opinion is a recognition that he would have upheld the
Presidents action along with the majority had the President convened the interim
National Assembly and coursed his proposals through it. Thus Justice Teehankee
opined:

Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential

departments of government, defines and delimits the powers of each and
prescribes the manner of the exercise of such powers, and the constituent
power has not been granted to but has been withheld from the President
or Prime Minister, it follows that the Presidents questioned decrees
proposing and submitting constitutional amendments directly to the
people (without the intervention of the interim National Assembly in
whom the power is expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional and
legal basis.[176] (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the President in
the course of conducting peace negotiations may validly consider implementing
even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she
may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or
act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty.

Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly
propose amendments through initiative and referendum, the President may also
submit her recommendations to the people, not as a formal proposal to be voted on
in a plebiscite similar to what President Marcos did in Sanidad, but for their
independent consideration of whether these recommendations merit being formally
proposed through initiative.

These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the

Presidents suggestions to the people, for any further involvement in the process of
initiative by the Chief Executive may vitiate its character as a
genuine peoples initiative. The only initiative recognized by the Constitution is that
which truly proceeds from the people. As the Court stated in Lambino v.
COMELEC:[177]

The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the people's

voice. However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the
COMELEC, that ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda
of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional
reforms. The Lambino Group thus admits that their people's initiative is
an unqualified support to the agenda of the incumbent President to
change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of
incantations of people's voice or sovereign will in the present initiative.
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of
[178]
office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power
does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to
recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to
recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for
constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be
construed as an unconstitutional act.

The foregoing discussion focused on the Presidents authority to

propose constitutional amendments, since her authority to propose
new legislation is not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice for
Presidents in this jurisdiction to propose new legislation. One of the more
prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the yearly State of the Nation
Address of the President to Congress. Moreover, the annual general appropriations
bill has always been based on the budget prepared by the President, which for all
intents and purposes is a proposal for new legislation coming from the President.
[179]
The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD
viewed in light of the above-discussed
standards

Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose constitutional

amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required
amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a
plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations
either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however, that all

provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and
laws shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon
effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework. This stipulation does not
bear the marks of a suspensive condition defined in civil law as a future
and uncertain event but of a term. It is not a question of whether the necessary
changes to the legal framework will be effected, but when. That there is no
uncertainty being contemplated is plain from what follows, for the paragraph goes
on to state that the contemplated changes shall be with due regard to non
derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained
in the Comprehensive Compact.

Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for the GRP to effect

the changes to the legal framework contemplated in the MOA-AD which changes
would include constitutional amendments, as discussed earlier. It bears noting that,

By the time these changes are put in

place, the MOA-AD itself would be
counted among the prior agreements
from which there could be no derogation.
What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact would merely be the
implementing details for these consensus points and, notably, the deadline for
effecting the contemplated changes to the legal framework.
 Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with
the limits of the Presidents authority to propose constitutional amendments, it
being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the consensus points found
in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional.

A comparison between the suspensive clause of the MOA-AD with a similar

provision appearing in the 1996 final peace agreement between the MNLF and the
GRP is most instructive.

As a backdrop, the parties to the 1996 Agreement stipulated that it would be

implemented in two phases. Phase I covered a three-year transitional period
involving the putting up of new administrative structures through Executive Order,
such as the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) and the Southern
Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), while Phase II covered
the establishment of the new regional autonomous government through amendment
or repeal of R.A. No. 6734, which was then the Organic Act of the ARMM.

The stipulations on Phase II consisted of specific agreements on the structure

of the expanded autonomous region envisioned by the parties. To that extent, they
are similar to the provisions of the MOA-AD. There is, however, a crucial
difference between the two agreements. While the MOA-AD virtually guarantees
that the necessary changes to the legal framework will be put in place, the
GRP-MNLF final peace agreement states thus: Accordingly, these provisions [on
Phase II] shall be recommended by the GRP to Congress for incorporation in the
amendatory or repealing law.

Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a binding
international law obligation on the part of the Philippines to change its Constitution
in conformity thereto, on the ground that it may be considered either as a binding
agreement under international law, or a unilateral declaration of the Philippine
government to the international community that it would grant to the Bangsamoro
people all the concessions therein stated. Neither ground finds sufficient support in
international law, however.
 The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in the overview thereof, would have
included foreign dignitaries as signatories. In addition, representatives of other
nations were invited to witness its signing in Kuala Lumpur. These circumstances
readily lead one to surmise that the MOA-AD would have had the status of a
binding international agreement had it been signed. An examination of the
prevailing principles in international law, however, leads to the contrary
conclusion.

The Decision on CHALLENGE TO JURISDICTION: LOM ACCORD

AMNESTY[180] (the Lom Accord case) of the Special Court of Sierra Leone is
enlightening. The Lom Accord was a peace agreement signed on July 7, 1999
between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF), a rebel group with which the Sierra Leone Government had been in armed
conflict for around eight years at the time of signing. There were non-contracting
signatories to the agreement, among which were the Government of the Togolese
Republic, the Economic Community of West African States, and the UN.

On January 16, 2002, after a successful negotiation between the UN

Secretary-General and the Sierra Leone Government, another agreement was
entered into by the UN and that Government whereby the Special Court of Sierra
Leone was established. The sole purpose of the Special Court, an international
court, was to try persons who bore the greatest responsibility for serious violations
of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the
territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996.

Among the stipulations of the Lom Accord was a provision for the full
pardon of the members of the RUF with respect to anything done by them in
pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization since the conflict began.

In the Lom Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord created
an internationally binding obligation not to prosecute the beneficiaries of the
amnesty provided therein, citing, among other things, the participation of foreign
dignitaries and international organizations in the finalization of that
agreement. The Special Court, however, rejected this argument, ruling that the
Lome Accord is not a treaty and that it can only create binding obligations and
rights between the parties in municipal law, not in international law. Hence, the
Special Court held, it is ineffective in depriving an international court like it of
jurisdiction.

37. In regard to the nature of a negotiated settlement of an internal armed

conflict it is easy to assume and to argue with some degree of
plausibility, as Defence counsel for the defendants seem to have
done, that the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the
conflict, the document formalizing the settlement is signed by
foreign heads of state or their representatives and
representatives of international organizations, means the
agreement of the parties is internationalized so as to create
obligations in international law.

xxxx

40. Almost every conflict resolution will involve the parties to the
conflict and the mediator or facilitator of the settlement, or persons
or bodies under whose auspices the settlement took place but who
are not at all parties to the conflict, are not contracting parties and
who do not claim any obligation from the contracting parties or
incur any obligation from the settlement.

41. In this case, the parties to the conflict are the lawful authority of
the State and the RUF which has no status of statehood and is to
all intents and purposes a faction within the state. The non-
contracting signatories of the Lom Agreement were moral
guarantors of the principle that, in the terms of Article XXXIV
of the Agreement, this peace agreement is implemented with
integrity and in good faith by both parties. The moral
guarantors assumed no legal obligation. It is recalled that the UN
by its representative appended, presumably for avoidance of doubt,
an understanding of the extent of the agreement to be implemented
as not including certain international crimes.

42. An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must create

rights and obligations regulated by international law so that a
breach of its terms will be a breach determined under international
law which will also provide principle means of enforcement. The
Lom Agreement created neither rights nor obligations capable
of being regulated by international law. An agreement such as
 the Lom Agreement which brings to an end an internal armed
conflict no doubt creates a factual situation of restoration of
peace that the international community acting through the
Security Council may take note of. That, however, will not
convert it to an international agreement which creates an
obligation enforceable in international, as distinguished from
municipal, law. A breach of the terms of such a peace agreement
resulting in resumption of internal armed conflict or creating a
threat to peace in the determination of the Security Council may
indicate a reversal of the factual situation of peace to be visited with
possible legal consequences arising from the new situation of
conflict created. Such consequences such as action by the Security
Council pursuant to Chapter VII arise from the situation and not
from the agreement, nor from the obligation imposed by it. Such
action cannot be regarded as a remedy for the breach. A peace
agreement which settles an internal armed conflict cannot be
ascribed the same status as one which settles an international
armed conflict which, essentially, must be between two or more
warring States. The Lom Agreement cannot be characterised as
an international instrument. x x x (Emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)

Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of States
and international organizations not parties to the Agreement would not have
sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law.

In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD would amount to
a unilateral declaration of the Philippine State, binding under international law, that
it would comply with all the stipulations stated therein, with the result that it would
have to amend its Constitution accordingly regardless of the true will of the
people. Cited as authority for this view is Australia v. France,[181] also known as
the Nuclear Tests Case, decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia challenged before the ICJ the legality of
Frances nuclear tests in the South Pacific. France refused to appear in the case, but
public statements from its President, and similar statements from other French
officials including its Minister of Defence, that its 1974 series of atmospheric tests
would be its last, persuaded the ICJ to dismiss the case. [182] Those statements, the
ICJ held, amounted to a legal undertaking addressed to the international
community, which required no acceptance from other States for it to become
effective.

Essential to the ICJ ruling is its finding that the French government intended
to be bound to the international community in issuing its public statements, viz:

43. It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts,

concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of
creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and
often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State
making the declaration that it should become bound according
to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the
character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth
legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with
the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and
with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context
of international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances,
nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent
acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from
other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such
a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral
nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State
was made.

44. Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State
may choose to take up a certain position in relation to a
particular matter with the intention of being boundthe intention
is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act. When States
make statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a
restrictive interpretation is called for.

xxxx

51. In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be

the last, the French Government conveyed to the world at large,
including the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate
these tests. It was bound to assume that other States might take
note of these statements and rely on their being effective. The
validity of these statements and their legal consequences must
 be considered within the general framework of the security of
international intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are
so essential in the relations among States. It is from the actual
substance of these statements, and from the circumstances
attending their making, that the legal implications of the
unilateral act must be deduced. The objects of these statements
are clear and they were addressed to the international
community as a whole, and the Court holds that they constitute
an undertaking possessing legal effect. The Court
considers *270 that the President of the Republic, in deciding upon
the effective cessation of atmospheric tests, gave an undertaking to
the international community to which his words were addressed. x x
x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As gathered from the above-quoted ruling of the ICJ, public statements of a state
representative may be construed as a unilateral declaration only when the
following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the
international community, the state intended to be bound to that community by its
statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be
detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral
declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances.

The limited applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling was recognized in a later
case decided by the ICJ entitled Burkina Faso v. Mali,[183] also known as the Case
Concerning the Frontier Dispute. The public declaration subject of that case was a
statement made by the President of Mali, in an interview by a foreign press agency,
that Maliwould abide by the decision to be issued by a commission of the
Organization of African Unity on a frontier dispute then pending
between Mali and Burkina Faso.
Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that the statement of Malis
President was not a unilateral act with legal implications. It clarified that its ruling
in the Nuclear Tests case rested on the peculiar circumstances surrounding the
French declaration subject thereof, to wit:

40. In order to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral act,

account must be taken of all the factual circumstances in which the
act occurred. For example, in the Nuclear Tests cases, the Court
 took the view that since the applicant States were not the only
ones concerned at the possible continuance of atmospheric
testing by the French Government, that Government's
unilateral declarations had conveyed to the world at large,
including the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate
these tests (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 269, para. 51; p. 474, para.
53). In the particular circumstances of those cases, the French
Government could not express an intention to be bound
otherwise than by unilateral declarations. It is difficult to see
how it could have accepted the terms of a negotiated solution
with each of the applicants without thereby jeopardizing its
contention that its conduct was lawful. The circumstances of the
present case are radically different. Here, there was nothing to
hinder the Parties from manifesting an intention to accept the
binding character of the conclusions of the Organization of
African Unity Mediation Commission by the normal method: a
formal agreement on the basis of reciprocity. Since no agreement
of this kind was concluded between the Parties, the Chamber finds
that there are no grounds to interpret the declaration made by Mali's
head of State on 11 April 1975 as a unilateral act with legal
implications in regard to the present case. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would not have
amounted to a unilateral declaration on the part of the Philippine State to the
international community. The Philippine panel did not draft the same with the clear
intention of being bound thereby to the international community as a whole or to
any State, but only to the MILF. While there were States and international
organizations involved, one way or another, in the negotiation and projected
signing of the MOA-AD, they participated merely as witnesses or, in the case
of Malaysia, as facilitator. As held in the Lom Accord case, the mere fact that in
addition to the parties to the conflict, the peace settlement is signed by
representatives of states and international organizations does not mean that the
agreement is internationalized so as to create obligations in international law.

Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not to
give legal effect to such commitments would not be detrimental to the security of
international intercourse to the trust and confidence essential in the relations
among States.

In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOA-AD are

closer to that of Burkina Faso wherein, as already discussed, the Mali Presidents
statement was not held to be a binding unilateral declaration by the ICJ. As in that
case, there was also nothing to hinder the Philippine panel, had it really been its
intention to be bound to other States, to manifest that intention by formal
agreement. Here, that formal agreement would have come about by the inclusion in
the MOA-AD of a clear commitment to be legally bound to the international
community, not just the MILF, and by an equally clear indication that the
signatures of the participating states-representatives would constitute an
acceptance of that commitment. Entering into such a formal agreement would not
have resulted in a loss of face for the Philippine government before the
international community, which was one of the difficulties that prevented the
French Government from entering into a formal agreement with other
countries. That the Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal agreement
suggests that it had no intention to be bound to the international community. On
that ground, the MOA-AD may not be considered a unilateral declaration under
international law.

The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under
international law notwithstanding, respondents almost consummated act
of guaranteeing amendmentsto the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to
constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they
considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state,
but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign
Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such
an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested
only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through
the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the
outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference
with that process.

The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a

portion of its own territory to the Moros for the sake of peace, for it can change the
Constitution in any it wants, so long as the change is not inconsistent with what, in
international law, is known as Jus Cogens.[184] Respondents, however, may not
preempt it in that decision.

SUMMARY

The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult
the local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by
respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents exceeded
their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the
Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of
government is a proper matter for judicial review.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public

interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners,
petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in
keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.

Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and
the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the
Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the moot and
academic principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved;
(b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the
need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out

the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the
MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or
another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar
provisions compared to the original.
The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot
in view of the respondents action in providing the Court and the petitioners with
the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes.
The peoples right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article
III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II
of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the
right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable
safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.

The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving

public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information
contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract,
jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial
character of the agreement.
An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue
or process of communication between the government and the people. Corollary to
these twin rights is the design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public
consultation was envisioned to be a species of these public rights.

At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify
the exercise of the peoples right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the
peace agenda.

One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on
both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In
fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct
regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all
national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to
the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction
of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented
therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally
vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could
pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number
of inhabitants from their total environment.

Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral
domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior
informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous
Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any
government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain
claim by mere agreement or compromise.

The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general

right to information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various
explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event,
respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the
official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and
public scrutiny.

IN SUM, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of
discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as
mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The
furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to
and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of
positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not
only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the
associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the
BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is
a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof
inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that
framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of
provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the
BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of
Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government
peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the
necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in
place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make
such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation
of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or
the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the
Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue
influence or interference with that process.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or

unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law,
respondents act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional
violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.

WHEREFORE, respondents motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and

intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE COURSE and hereby GRANTED.

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of

the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared CONTRARY TO
LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION.

SO ORDERED.

3. Kilosbayan vs. Morato

246 SCRA 540
G.R. No. 118910 November 16, 1995

RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case. They insist that the decision in the first
case has already settled (1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and (2)
whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
can enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery.
Consequently, petitioners contend, these questions can no longer be reopened.

Because two members of the Court did not consider themselves bound by the decision in the first
case, petitioners suggest that the two, in joining the dissenters in the first case in reexamining the
questions in the present case, acted otherwise than according to law. They cite the following
statement in the opinion of the Court:

The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous case was a narrow one, with
seven (7) members sustaining petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners'
right to bring the suit. The majority was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be
maintained in any subsequent litigation. In addition, there have been changes in the
membership of the Court, with the retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin and the
appointment of the writer of this opinion and Justice Francisco. Given this fact it is
hardly tenable to insist on the maintenance of the ruling as to petitioners' standing.

Petitioners claim that this statement "conveys a none too subtle suggestion, perhaps a
Freudian slip, that the two new appointees, regardless of the merit of the Decision in the first
Kilosbayan case against the lotto (Kilosbayan, et al. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994))
must of necessity align themselves with all the Ramos appointees who were dissenters in
the first case and constitute the new majority in the second lotto case." And petitioners ask,
"why should it be so?"

Petitioners ask a question to which they have made up an answer. Their attempt at psychoanalysis,
detecting a Freudian slip where none exists, may be more revealing of their own unexpressed wish
to find motives where there are none which they can impute to some members of the Court.

For the truth is that the statement is no more than an effort to explain rather than to justify the
majority's decision to overrule the ruling in the previous case. It is simply meant to explain that
because the five members of the Court who dissented in the first case (Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug
and Kapunan, JJ.) and the two new members (Mendoza and Francisco, JJ.) thought the previous
ruling to be erroneous and its reexamination not to be barred by stare decisis, res judicata or
conclusiveness of judgment, or law of the case, it was hardly tenable for petitioners to insist on the
first ruling.

Consequently to petitioners' question "What is the glue that holds them together," implying some
ulterior motives on the part of the new majority in reexamining the two questions, the answer is:
None, except a conviction on the part of the five, who had been members of the Court at the time
they dissented in the first case, and the two new members that the previous ruling was erroneous.
The eighth Justice (Padilla, J.) on the other hand agrees with the seven Justices that the ELA is in a
real sense a lease agreement and therefore does not violate R.A. No. 1169.

The decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. With the retirement of one of the original
majority (Cruz, J.) and one of the dissenters (Bidin, J.) it was not surprising that the first decision in
the first case was later reversed.
It is argued that, in any case, a reexamination of the two questions is barred because the PCSO and
the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation made a " formal commitment not to ask for a
reconsideration of the Decision in the first lotto case and instead submit a new agreement that would
be in conformity with the PCSO Charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) and with the Decision of the
Supreme Court in the first Kilosbayan case against on-line, hi-tech lotto."

To be sure, a new contract was entered into which the majority of the Court finds has been purged of
the features which made the first contract objectionable. Moreover, what the PCSO said in its
manifestation in the first case was the following:

1. They are no longer filing a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of this
Honorable Court dated May 5, 1994, a copy of which was received on May 6, 1994.

2. Respondents PCSO and PGMC are presently negotiating a new lease agreement
consistent with the authority of PCSO under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended
by B.P. Blg. 42) and conformable with the pronouncements of this Honorable Court in
its Decision of May 5, 1995.

The PGMC made substantially the same manifestation as the PCSO.

There was thus no "formal commitment" but only a manifestation that the parties were not filing
a motion for reconsideration. Even if the parties made a "formal commitment," the six (6) dissenting
Justices certainly could not be bound thereby not to insist on their contrary view on the question of
standing. Much less were the two new members bound by any "formal commitment" made by the
parties. They believed that the ruling in the first case was erroneous. Since in their view
reexamination was not barred by the doctrine of stare decisis, res judicata or conclusiveness of
judgment or law of the case, they voted the way they did with the remaining five (5) dissenters in the
first case to form a new majority of eight.

Petitioners ask, "Why should this be so?" Because, as explained in the decision, the first decision
was erroneous and no legal doctrine stood in the way of its reexamination. It can, therefore, be
asked "with equal candor": "Why should this not be so?"

Nor is this the first time a split decision was tested, if not reversed, in a subsequent case because of
change in the membership of a court. In 1957, this Court, voting 6-5, held in Feliciano v. Aquinas,
G.R. No. L-10201, Sept. 23, 1957 that the phrase "at the time of the election" in 2174 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 meant that a candidate for municipal elective position must be
at least 23 years of age on the date of the election. On the other hand, the dissenters argued that it
was enough if he attained that age on the day he assumed office.

Less than three years later, the same question was before the Court again, as a candidate for
municipal councilor stated under oath in her certificate of candidacy that she was eligible for that
position although she attained the requisite age (23 years) only when she assumed office. The
question was whether she could be prosecuted for falsification. In People v. Yang, 107 Phi. 888
(1960), the Court ruled she could not. Justice, later Chief Justice, Benison, who dissented in the first
case, Feliciano v. Aquinas, supra, wrote the opinion of the Court, holding that while the statement
that the accused was eligible was "inexact or erroneous, according to the majority in the Feliciano
case," the accused could not be held liable for falsification, because

the question [whether the law really required candidates to have the required age on
the day of the election or whether it was sufficient that they attained it at the
beginning of the term of office] has not been discussed anew, despite the presence
 of new members; we simply assume for the purpose of this decision that the doctrine
stands.

Thus because in the meantime there had been a change in the membership of the Court with the
retirement of two members (Recess and Flex, JJ.) who had taken part in the decision in the first
case and their replacement by new members (Barrera and Gutierrez-David, JJ.) and the fact that the
vote in the first case was a narrow one (6 to 5), the Court allowed that the continuing validity of its
ruling in the first case might well be doubted. For this reason it gave the accused the benefit of the
doubt that she had acted in the good faith belief that it was sufficient that she was 23 years of age
when she assumed office.

In that case, the change in the membership of the Court and the possibility of change in the ruling
were noted without anyone much less would-be psychoanalysts finding in the statement of the
Court any Freudian slip. The possibility of change in the rule as a result of change in membership
was accepted as a sufficient reason for finding good faith and lack of criminal intent on the part of
the accused.

Indeed, a change in the composition of the Court could prove the means of undoing an erroneous
decision. This was the lesson of Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457 (1871). The Legal Tender Acts, which
were passed during the Civil War, made U.S. notes (greenbacks) legal tender for the payment of
debts, public or private, with certain exceptions. The validity of the acts, as applied to preexisting
debts, was challenged in Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (1869). The Court was then composed of
only eight (8) Justices because of Congressional effort to limit the appointing power of President
Johnson. Voting 5-3, the Court declared the acts void. Chief Justice Chase wrote the opinion of the
Court in which four others, including Justice Grier, concurred. Justices Miller, Swayne and Davis
dissented. A private memorandum left by the dissenting Justices described how an effort was made
"to convince an aged and infirm member of the court [Justice Grier] that he had not understood the
question on which he voted," with the result that what was originally a 4-4 vote was converted into a
majority (5-3) for holding the acts invalid.

On the day the decision was announced, President Grant nominated to the Court William Strong and
Joseph P. Bradley to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Justice Grier and to restore the
membership of the Court to nine. In 1871, Hepburn v. Griswold was overruled in the Legal Tender
Cases, as Knox v. Lee came to be known, in an opinion by Justice Strong, with a dissenting opinion
by Chief Justice Chase and the three other surviving members of the former majority. There were
allegations that the new Justices were appointed for their known views on the validity of the Legal
Tender Acts, just as there were others who defended the character and independence of the new
Justices. History has vindicated the overruling of the Hepburn case by the new majority. The Legal
Tender Cases proved to be the Court's means of salvation from what Chief Justice Hughes later
described as one of the Court's "self-inflicted wounds." 1

We now consider the specific grounds for petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

I. We have held that because there are no genuine issues of constitutionality in this case, the rule
concerning real party in interest, applicable to private litigation rather than the more liberal rule
on standing, applies to petitioners. Two objections are made against that ruling: (1) that the
constitutional policies and principles invoked by petitioners, while not supplying the basis for
affirmative relief from the courts, may nonetheless be resorted to for striking down laws or official
actions which are inconsistent with them and (2) that the Constitution, by guaranteeing to
independent people's organizations "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political and economic decision-making" (Art. XIII, 16), grants them standing to sue on
constitutional grounds.
The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner read:

Art. II, 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by
all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Id., 12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government.

Id., 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being.
It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs.

Id., 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts,
culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress,
and promote total human liberation and development.

As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer rights which
can be enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or executive action. By
authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined that consistently with
these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why
we said with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of
gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal
with the activity as it sees fit." (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]).

It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the
contract entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore,
does not raise issues of constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners, not being privies
to the agreement, cannot raise.

Nor does Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization give it the requisite personality to question
the validity of the contract in this case. The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the
role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the
democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and
lawful means," that their right to "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political,
and economic decision-making shall not be abridged." (Art. XIII, 15-16)

These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with
standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in
cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art.
VIII, 5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates
decision-making in the courts from decision-making in the political departments of the government
and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.

Petitioners quote extensively from the speech of Commissioner Garcia before the Constitutional
Commission, explaining the provisions on independent people's organizations. There is nothing in
the speech, however, which supports their claim of standing. On the contrary, the speech points the
way to the legislative and executive branches of the government, rather than to the courts, as the
appropriate fora for the advocacy of petitioners' views. 2 Indeed, the provisions on independent people's
organizations may most usefully be read in connection with the provision on initiative and referendum as
a means whereby the people may propose or enact laws or reject any of those passed by Congress. For
the fact is that petitioners' opposition to the contract in question is nothing more than an opposition to the
government policy on lotteries.

It is nevertheless insisted that this Court has in the past accorded standing to taxpayers and
concerned citizens in cases involving "paramount public interest." Taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens and legislators have indeed been allowed to sue but then only (1) in cases involving
constitutional issues and
(2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these requirements on standing.

Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds. (Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phi. 331 (1960); Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA
333 (1976); Bugnay Const. & Dev. v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 (1989); City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon,
47 SCRA 325 [1972]) or where a tax measure is assailed as unconstitutional. (VAT Cases [Tolentino
v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA 630 [1994]) Voters are allowed to question the validity of
election laws because of their obvious interest in the validity of such laws. (Gonzales v. Comelec, 21
SCRA 774 [1967]) Concerned citizens can bring suits if the constitutional question they raise is of
"transcendental importance" which must be settled early. (Emergency Powers Cases [Araneta v.
Dinglasan], 84 Phi. 368 (1949); Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Ass'n v. Feliciano, 121 Phi. 358
(1965); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 122 Phi. 894 (1965); CLU v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317
[1991]) Legislators are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim
infringes their prerogatives qua legislators. (Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 506 (1994); Guingona v.
PCGG, 207 SCRA 659 (1992); Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); Tolentino v. Comelec,
41 SCRA 702 (1971); Tatad v. Garcia, G.R. No. 114222, April 16, 1995 (Mendoza, J., concurring))

Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners assert
an interest as taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits
as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392, 403 (1980), to wit:

While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public

moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money
is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against
abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a
misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of
Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine
Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine
Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution
of a taxpayer's suit, per se, is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in
Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief
Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit
should be entertained. (Emphasis added)

Petitioners' suit does not fall under any of these categories of taxpayers' suits.

Neither do the other cases cited by petitioners support their contention that taxpayers have standing
to question government contracts regardless of whether public funds are involved or not.
In Gonzales v. National Housing, Corp., 94 SCRA 786 (1979), petitioner filed a taxpayer's suit
seeking the annulment of a contract between the NHC and a foreign corporation. The case was
dismissed by the trial court. The dismissal was affirmed by this Court on the grounds of res
judicata and pendency of a prejudicial question, thus avoiding the question of petitioner's standing.
On the other hand, in Gonzales v. Raquiza, 180 SCRA 254 (1989), petitioner sought the annulment
of a contract made by the government with a foreign corporation for the purchase of road
construction equipment. The question of standing was not discussed, but even if it was, petitioner's
standing could be sustained because he was a minority stockholder of the Philippine National Bank,
which was one of the defendants in the case.

In the other case cited by petitioners, City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon, 47 SCRA 325 (1972),
members of the city council were allowed to sue to question the validity of a contract entered into by
the city government for the purchase of road construction equipment because their contention was
that the contract had been made without their authority. In addition, as taxpayers they had an
interest in seeing to it that public funds were spent pursuant to an appropriation made by law.

But, in the case at bar, there is an allegation that public funds are being misapplied or
misappropriated. The controlling doctrine is that of Gonzales v. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624 (1975) where
it was held that funds raised from contributions for the benefit of the Cultural Center of the
Philippines were not public funds and petitioner had no standing to bring a taxpayer's suit to question
their disbursement by the President of the Philippines.

Thus, petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained. Nor as concerned citizens can they
bring this suit because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who are
members of Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not
complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators.

Finally, in Valmonte v. PCSO, G.R. No. 78716, September 22, 1987, we threw out a petition
questioning another form of lottery conducted by the PCSO on the ground that petitioner, who
claimed to be a "citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three minor children," had no direct and
personal interest in the lottery. We said: "He must be able to show, not only that the law is invalid, but
also that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
complained of." In the case at bar, petitioners have not shown why, unlike petitioner in the Valmonte
case, they should be accorded standing to bring this suit.

The case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. 224 SCRA 792 (1993) is different. Citizens' standing to bring a
suit seeking the cancellation of timber licenses was sustained in that case because the Court
considered Art. II, 16 a right-conferring provision which can be enforced in the courts. That
provision states:

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. (Emphasis)

In contrast, the policies and principles invoked by petitioners in this case do not permit of
such categorization.

Indeed, as already stated, petitioners' opposition is not really to the validity of the ELA but to lotteries
which they regard to be immoral. This is not, however, a legal issue, but a policy matter for Congress
to decide and Congress has permitted lotteries for charity.

Nevertheless, although we have concluded that petitioners do not have standing, we have not
stopped there and dismissed their case. For in the view we take, whether a party has a cause of
action and, therefore, is a real party in interest or one with standing to raise a constitutional question
must turn on whether he has a right which has been violated. For this reason the Court has not
ducked the substantive issues raised by petitioners.

II. R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P No . 42, states:

1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. The Philippine Charity

Sweepstakes Office, hereinafter designated the Office, shall be the principal
government agency for raising and providing for funds for health programs, medical
assistance and services and charities of national character, and as such shall have
the general powers conferred in section thirteen of Act Numbered One Thousand
Four Hundred Fifty-Nine, as amended, and shall have the authority:

A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar
activities, in such frequency and manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such
rules and regulations as shall be promulgated by the Board of Directors.

B. Subject to the approval of the Minister of Human Settlements, to engage in health

and welfare-related investments, programs, projects and activities which may be
profit-oriented, by itself or in collaboration, association or joint venture with any
person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign, except for the
activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A), for the purpose of providing for
permanent and continuing sources of funds for health programs, including the
expansion of existing ones, medical assistance and services, and/or charitable
grants: Provided, That such investments will not compete with the private sector in
areas where investments are adequate as may be determined by the National
Economic and Development Authority.

Petitioners insist on the ruling in the previous case that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity
sweepstakes, lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration, association or joint venture with
any other party because of the clause "except for the activities mentioned in the preceding
paragraph (A)" in paragraph (B) of 1. Petitioners contend that the ruling is the law of this case
because the parties are the same and the case involves the same issue, i.e., the meaning of this
statutory provision.

The "law of the case" doctrine is inapplicable, because this case is not a continuation of the first one.
Petitioners also say that inquiry into the same question as to the meaning of the statutory provision
is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The general rule on the "conclusiveness of judgment,"
however, is subject to the exception that a question may be reopened if it is a legal question and the
two actions involve substantially different claims. This is generally accepted in American law from
which our Rules of Court was adopted. (Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 59 L.Ed.2d 147, 210
(1979); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 2d, ON JUDGMENTS, 28; P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P.
MISHKIN AND D. SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058, n.2
[3rd Ed., 1988]) There is nothing in the record of this case to suggest that this exception is
inapplicable in this jurisdiction.

Indeed, the questions raised in this case are legal questions and the claims involved are
substantially different from those involved in the prior case between the parties. As already stated,
the ELA is substantially different from the Contract of Lease declared void in the first case.

Borrowing from the dissenting opinion of Justice Feliciano, petitioners argue that the phrase "by itself
or in collaboration, association or joint venture with any other party" qualifies not only 1 (B) but also
1 (A), because the exception clause ("except for the activities mentioned in the preceding
paragraph [A]") "operates, as it were, as a renvoi clause which refers back to Section 1(A) and in this
manner avoids the necessity of simultaneously amending the text of Section 1(A)."

This interpretation, however, fails to take into account not only the location of the phrase in
paragraph (B), when it should be in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking
authority, but also the phrase "by itself." In other words, under paragraph (B), the PCSO is prohibited
from "engag[ing] in . . . investments, programs, projects and activities" if these involve sweepstakes
races, lotteries and other similar activities not only "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with
any other party but also "by itself." Obviously, this prohibition cannot apply when the PCSO conducts
these activities itself. Otherwise, what paragraph (A) authorizes the PCSO to do, paragraph (B)
would prohibit.

The fact is that the phrase in question does not qualify the authority of the PCSO under paragraph
(A), but rather the authority granted to it by paragraph (B). The amendment of paragraph (B) by B.P.
Blg. 42 was intended to enable the PCSO to engage in certain investments, programs, projects and
activities for the purpose of raising funds for health programs and charity. That is why the law
provides that such investments by the PCSO should "not compete with the private sector in areas
where investments are adequate as may be determined by the National Economic and Development
Authority." Justice Davide, then an Assemblyman, made a proposal which was accepted, reflecting
the understanding that the bill they were discussing concerned the authority of the PCSO to invest in
the business of others. The following excerpt from the Record of the Batasan Pambansa shows this
to be the subject of the discussion:

MR. DAVIDE. May I introduce an amendment after "adequate". The intention of the
amendment is not to leave the determination of whether it is adequate or not to
anybody. And my amendment is to add after "adequate" the words AS MAY BE
DETERMINED BY THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY.
As a mater of fact, it will strengthen the authority to invest in these areas, provided
that the determination of whether the private sector's activity is already adequate
must be determined by the National Economic and Development Authority.

Mr. ZAMORA. Mr. Speaker, the committee accepts the proposed amendment.

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

(2 RECORD OF THE BATASAN PAMBANSA, Sept. 6, 1979,

p. 1007)

Thus what the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in
sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities. It is prohibited from doing so whether "in
collaboration, association or joint venture" with others or "by itself." This seems to be the only
possible interpretation of 1 (A) and (B) in light of its text and its legislative history. That there is
today no other entity engaged in sweepstakes races, lotteries and the like does not detract from the
validity of this interpretation.

III. The Court noted in its decision that the provisions of the first contract, which were considered to
be features of a joint venture agreement, had been removed in the new contract. For instance, 5 of
the ELA provides that in the operation of the on-line lottery, the PCSO must employ "its own
competent and qualified personnel." Petitioners claim, however, that the "contemporaneous
interpretation" of PGMC officials of this provision is otherwise. They cite the testimony of Glen
Barroga of the PGMC before a Senate committee to the effect that under the ELA the PGMC would
be operating the lottery system "side by side" with PCSO personnel as part of the transfer of
technology.

Whether the transfer of technology would result in a violation of PCSO's franchise should be
determined by facts and not by what some officials of the PGMC state by way of opinion. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, it must be presumed that 5 reflects the true intention of the parties.
Thus, Art. 1370 of the Civil Code says that "If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt
upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control." The
intention of the parties must be ascertained from their "contemporaneous and subsequent acts."
(Art. 1371; Atlantic Gulf Co. v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 166 [1908]) It cannot simply be judged
from what one of them says. On the other hand, the claim of third parties, like petitioners, that the
clause on upgrading of equipment would enable the parties after a while to change the contract and
enter into something else in violation of the law is mere speculation and cannot be a basis for
judging the validity of the contract.

IV. It is contended that 1 of E.O. No. 301 covers all types of "contract[s] for public services or for
furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment to the government or to any of its branches,
agencies or instrumentalities" and not only contracts of purchase and sale. Consequently, a lease of
equipment, like the ELA, must be submitted to public bidding in order to be valid. This contention is
based on two premises: (1) that 1 of E.O. No. 301 applies to any contract whereby the government
acquires title to or the use of the equipment and (2) that the words "supplies," "materials," and
"equipment" are distinct from each other so that when an exception in 1 speaks of "supplies," it
cannot be construed to mean "equipment."

Petitioners' contention will not bear analysis. For example, the term "supplies" is used in paragraph
(a), which provides that a contract for the furnishing of "supplies" in order to meet an emergency is
exempt from public bidding. Unless "supplies" is construed to include "equipment," however, the
lease of heavy equipment needed for rescue operations in case of a calamity will have to be
submitted to public bidding before it can be entered into by the government.

In dissent Justice Feliciano says that in such a situation the government can simply resort to
expropriation, paying compensation afterward. This is just like purchasing the equipment through
negotiation when the question is whether the purchase should be by public bidding, not to mention
the fact that the power to expropriate may not be exercised when the government can very well
negotiate with private owners.

Indeed, there are fundamental difficulties in simultaneously contending (1) that E.O. No. 301, 1
covers both contracts of sale and lease agreements and (2) that the words "supplies,"
"materials" and "equipment" can not be interchanged. Thus, under paragraph (b) of 1, public
bidding is not required "whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or activity
which cannot be delayed without causing detriment to the public service." Following petitioners'
theory, there should be a public bidding before the government can enter into a contract for the lease
of bulldozers and dredging equipment even if these are urgently needed in areas ravaged by lahar
because, first, lease contracts are covered by the general rule and, second, the exception to public
bidding in paragraph (b) covers only "supplies" but not equipment.

To take still another example. Paragraph (d), which does away with the requirement of public bidding
"whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least two
consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders or the offers received in each instance were
exorbitant or nonconforming to specifications." Again, following the theory of the petitioners, a
contract for the lease of equipment cannot be entered into even if there are no bids because, first,
lease contracts are governed by the general rule on public bidding and, second, the exception to
public bidding in paragraph (d) applies only to contracts for the furnishing of "supplies."

Other examples can be given to show the absurdity of interpreting 1 as applicable to any contract
for the furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment and of considering the words "supplies,"
"materials" and "equipment" to be not interchangeable. Our ruling that 1 of E.O. No. 301 does not
cover the lease of equipment avoids these fundamental difficulties and is supported by the text of 1,
which is entitled "Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts" and by the fact that the only provisions of
E.O. No. 301 on leases, namely, 6 and 7, concern the lease of buildings by or to the government.
Thus the text of 1 reads:

1. Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts. Any provision of law, decree, executive

order or other issuances to the contrary notwithstanding, no contract for public
services or for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the government or
any of its branches, agencies or instrumentalities shall be renewed or entered into
without public bidding, except under any of the following situations:

a. Whenever the supplies are urgently needed to meet an emergency

which may involve the loss of, or danger to, life and/or property;

b. Whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project

or activity which cannot be delayed without causing detriment to the
public service;

c. Whenever the materials are sold by an exclusive distributor or

manufacturer who does not have subdealers selling at lower prices
and for which no suitable substitute can be obtained elsewhere at
more advantageous terms to the government;

d. Whenever the supplies under procurement have been

unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least two consecutive times, either
due to lack of bidders or the offers received in each instance were
exhorbitant or non-conforming to specifications;

e. In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the needed

supplies through negotiated purchase is most advantageous to the
government to be determined by the Department Head concerned;
and

f. Whenever the purchase is made from an agency of the

government.

Indeed, the purpose for promulgating E.O. No. 301 was merely to decentralize the system of
reviewing negotiated contracts of purchase for the furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment
as well as lease contracts of buildings. Theretofore, E.O. No. 298, promulgated on August 12, 1940,
required consultation with the Secretary of Justice and the Department Head concerned and the
approval of the President of the Philippines before contracts for the furnishing of supplies, materials
and equipment could be made on a negotiated basis, without public bidding. E.O. No. 301 changed
this by providing as follows:
 2. Jurisdiction over Negotiated Contracts. In line with the principles of
decentralization and accountability, negotiated contracts for public services or for
furnishing supplies, materials or equipment may be entered into by the department or
agency head or the governing board of the government-owned or controlled
corporation concerned, without need of prior approval by higher authorities, subject
to availability of funds, compliance with the standards or guidelines prescribed in
Section 1 hereof, and to the audit jurisdiction of the commission on Audit in
accordance with existing rules and regulations.

Negotiated contracts involving P2,000,000 up to P10,000,000 shall be signed by the

Secretary and two other Undersecretaries.

xxx xxx xxx

7. Jurisdiction Over Lease Contracts. The heads of agency intending to rent

privately-owned buildings or spaces for their use, or to lease out government-owned
buildings or spaces for private use, shall have authority to determine the
reasonableness of the terms of the lease and the rental rates thereof, and to enter
into such lease contracts without need of prior approval by higher authorities, subject
to compliance with the uniform standards or guidelines established pursuant to
Section 6 hereof by the DPWH and to the audit jurisdiction of COA or its duly
authorized representative in accordance with existing rules and regulations.

In sum, E.O. No. 301 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and
equipment, and it was merely to change the system of administrative review of emergency
purchases, as theretofore prescribed by E.O. No. 298, that E.O. No. 301 was issued on July 26,
1987. Part B of this Executive Order applies to leases of buildings, not of equipment, and therefore
does not govern the lease contract in this case. Even if it applies, it does not require public bidding
for entering into it.

Our holding that E.O. No. 301, 1 applies only to contracts of purchase and sale is conformable to
P.D. No. 526, promulgated on August 2, 1974, which is in pari materia. P.D. No. 526 requires local
governments to hold public bidding in the "procurement of supplies." By specifying "procurement of
supplies" and excepting from the general rule "purchases" when made under certain circumstances,
P.D. No. 526, 12 indicates quite clearly that it applies only to contracts of purchase and sale. This
provision reads:

12. Procurement without public bidding. Procurement of supplies may be made

without the benefit of public bidding in the following modes:

(1) Personal canvass of responsible merchants;

(2) Emergency purchases;

(3) Direct purchases from manufacturers or exclusive distributors;

(4) Thru the Bureau of Supply Coordination; and

(5) Purchase from other government entities or foreign governments.

Sec. 3 broadly defines the term "supplies" as including

 everything except real estate, which may be needed in the
transaction of public business, or in the pursuit of any undertaking,
project, or activity, whether of the nature of equipment, furniture,
stationery, materials for construction, or personal property of any sort,
including non-personal or contractual services such as the repair and
maintenance of equipment and furniture, as well as trucking, hauling,
janitorial, security, and related or analogous services.

Thus, the texts of both E.O. No. 301, 1 and of P.D. No. 526, 1 and 12, make it clear that only
contracts for the purchase and sale of supplies, materials and equipment are contemplated by the
rule concerning public biddings.

Finally, it is contended that equipment leases are attractive and commonly used in place of contracts
of purchase and sale because of "multifarious credit and tax constraints" and therefore could not
have been left out from the requirement of public bidding. Obviously these credit and tax constraints
can have no attraction to the government when considering the advantages of sale over lease of
equipment. The fact that lease contracts are in common use is not a reason for implying that the rule
on public bidding applies not only to government purchases but also to lease contracts. For the fact
also is that the government leases equipment, such as copying machines, personal computers and
the like, without going through public bidding.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the motion for reconsideration of petitioners is DENIED with
finality.

SO ORDERED.

4. Tanada vs Angara
272 SCRA 18
G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
 The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the
membership thereto of the vast majority of countries has revolutionized international
business and economic relations amongst states. It has irreversibly propelled the world
towards trade liberalization and economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization,
deregulation and privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, are ushering in a new
borderless world of business by sweeping away as mere historical relics the heretofore
traditional modes of promoting and protecting national economies like tariffs, export
subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency
controls. Finding market niches and becoming the best in specific industries in a
market-driven and export-oriented global scenario are replacing age-old beggar-thy-
neighbor policies that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic producers of
goods and services. In the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru,
Increased participation in the world economy has become the key to domestic economic
growth and prosperity.

Brief Historical Background

To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World
War, plans for the establishment of three multilateral institutions -- inspired by that grand
political body, the United Nations -- were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton
Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and
reconstruction of war-ravaged and later developing countries; the second, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal with currency problems; and the
third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to foster order and
predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite
challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of reasons,
including its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never
took off. What remained was only GATT -- the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. GATT was a collection of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty
adherents with no institutionalized body administering the agreements or dependable
system of dispute settlement.
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the
Kennedy Round, the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth
to that administering body -- the World Trade Organization -- with the signing of the
Final Act in Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO Agreement by its
members. [1]

Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding
member with the goal, as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the
Senate (infra), of improving Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major
trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural
and industrial products. The President also saw in the WTO the opening of new
opportunities for the services sector x x x, (the reduction of) costs and uncertainty
associated with exporting x x x, and (the attraction of) more investments into the
country. Although the Chief Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter, the
Philippines - - and this is of special interest to the legal profession - - will benefit from
the WTO system of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through the independent
WTO settlement bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate
Tribunal.Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly through negotiations where
solutions were arrived at frequently on the basis of relative bargaining strengths, and
where naturally, weak and underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.

The Petition in Brief

Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines to place nationals and
products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products and
(2) that the WTO intrudes, limits and/or impairs the constitutional powers of both
Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO
Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give
preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods.
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization? Does it prescribe Philippine
integration into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These
are the main questions raised in this petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying (1) for the nullification, on
constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by
the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its
implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the
assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government
properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned
therewith. This concurrence is embodied in Senate Resolution No. 97, dated December
14, 1994.

The Facts

On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of

the Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act,
for brevity).
By signing the Final Act, Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the
[2]

Philippines, agreed:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their
respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in
accordance with their procedures; and

(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.

On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated
August 11, 1994 from the President of the Philippines, stating among others that the
[3]

Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant
to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter
from the President of the Philippines likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated
[4]

among others that the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding
on Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the
immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled Concurring in the Ratification of
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. [5]

On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization. The text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of
[6]

Volume I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and

includes various agreements and associated legal instruments (identified in the said
Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively referred to as Multilateral
Trade Agreements, for brevity) as follows:

ANNEX 1

Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994

Agreement on Agriculture

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and

Phytosanitary Measures

Agreement on Textiles and Clothing

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade

 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures

Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994

Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General on

Tariffs and Trade 1994

Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection

Agreement on Rules of Origin

Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures

Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating Measures

Agreement on Safeguards

Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes

Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

ANNEX 2

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement

of Disputes

ANNEX 3

Trade Policy Review Mechanism

On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed the Instrument of
[7]

Ratification, declaring:

NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the

Republic of the Philippines, after having seen and considered the aforementioned
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the agreements and
associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
Agreement which are integral parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15
April 1994, do hereby ratify and confirm the same and every Article and Clause
thereof.
 To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is
composed of the Agreement Proper and the associated legal instruments included in
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts
thereof.
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the
WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial
Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996, the Solicitor General describes
[8]

these two latter documents as follows:

The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and decisions
on a wide range of matters, such as measures in favor of least developed countries,
notification procedures, relationship of WTO with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and agreements on technical barriers to trade and on dispute settlement.

The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other

things, standstill or limitations and qualifications of commitments to existing non-
conforming measures, market access, national treatment, and definitions of non-
resident supplier of financial services, commercial presence and new financial service.

On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on
respondents comment and petitioners reply thereto, the Court resolved on December
12, 1995, to give due course to the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their
respective memoranda. The Court also requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the
Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to
submit a paper, hereafter referred to as Bautista Paper, for brevity, (1) providing a
[9]

historical background of and (2) summarizing the said agreements.

During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:

(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in
controversy and (2) the transcript of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and

(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine
treaties signed prior to the Philippine adherence to the WTO Agreement, which
derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the multi-volume WTO
Agreement and other documents mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as possible.

After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case
submitted for resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor
General submitted a printed copy of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed the various
bilateral or multilateral treaties or international instruments involving derogation of
Philippine sovereignty. Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted their Compliance dated
January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.
 The Issues

In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as
follows:

A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.

B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the

deliberations and voting leading to the concurrence are estopped from
impugning the validity of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization or of the validity of the concurrence.

C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade

Organization contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and
12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade

Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty
specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987
Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines;

E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade

Organization interfere with the exercise of judicial power.

F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they voted for
concurrence in the ratification of the constitutionally-infirm Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization.

G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they concurred
only in the ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, and not with the Presidential submission which included the
Final Act, Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents synthesized the
several issues raised by petitioners into the following:
[10]

1. Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement cited by petitioners directly
contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and
Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair
the exercise of legislative power by Congress.

3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial
power by this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.

4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate in the ratification by the President of
the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization implied
rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.

By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners,
the Solicitor General has effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition
presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-
members of the Senate (Wigberto E. Taada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are
estopped from joining this suit; and (3) whether the respondent-members of the Senate
acted in grave abuse of discretion when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of
the WTO Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with
these three issues thus:

(1) The political question issue -- being very fundamental and vital, and being a
matter that probes into the very jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide this case
-- was deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be ruled upon as the first issue;

(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and
the respondents have effectively waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings;
in any event, this issue, even if ruled in respondents favor, will not cause the petitions
dismissal as there are petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable
to the defense of estoppel; and

(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
senators will be taken up as an integral part of the disposition of the four issues raised
by the Solicitor General.

During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not
question the locus standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived
the benefit of such issue. They probably realized that grave constitutional issues,
expenditures of public funds and serious international commitments of the nation are
involved here, and that transcendental public interest requires that the substantive
issues be met head on and decided on the merits, rather than skirted or deflected by
procedural matters. [11]
 To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE
CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A
POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES
CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF
THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT,
RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY
CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE
OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING RULES ON
EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND
ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT
INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS,
AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?

The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it

contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather than
political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
[12]

constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a
legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [13]

The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters raised in the petition is
[14]

clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution, as follows:

[15]

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial departments duty and power to strike
down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. As explained by
[16]

former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
[17]

question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk,
[18]

digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in
matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,
committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in
holding that this petition should be given due course and the vital questions raised
therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this, we
have no equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court
will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting
the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy
espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the
governments economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative
restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional
duty to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO
Agreement and its three annexes.

Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic Nationalism

This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the letter, spirit and intent of the Constitution
mandating economic nationalism are violated by the so-called parity provisions and
national treatment clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement
and its annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
Specifically, the flagship constitutional provisions referred to are Sec. 19, Article II,
and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Constitution, which are worded as follows:

Article II

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

xx xx xx xx
Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.

xx xx xx xx

Article XII

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

xx xx xx xx

Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation
and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

xx xx xx xx

Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them
competitive.

Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the
following WTO provisions quoted in their memorandum: [19]

a) In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for

brevity):

Article 2

National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.

1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994. no

Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of
Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994.

2. An Illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of

general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph I of
Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this
Agreement. (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27,
Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p.22121, emphasis supplied).
 The Annex referred to reads as follows:

ANNEX

Illustrative List

1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment

provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those
which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under
administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an
advantage, and which require:

(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from

any domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in
terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of proportion of volume
or value of its local production; or

(b) that an enterprises purchases or use of imported products be limited to an

amount related to the volume or value of local products that it exports.

2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of

quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT
1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic laws or
under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain
an advantage, and which restrict:

(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to the local

production that it exports;

(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local

production by restricting its access to foreign exchange inflows attributable
to the enterprise; or

(c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of particular products,
in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a preparation of
volume or value of its local production. (Annex to the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round Legal Documents,
p.22125, emphasis supplied).

The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as follows:

The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use. the provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of
differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the
economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the
product. (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the Protocol Modifying Part II, and
Article XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in relation to paragraph
1(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round,
Legal Instruments p.177, emphasis supplied).

b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for
brevity):

Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less
favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of
intellectual property... (par. 1, Article 3, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of
Intellectual Property rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p.25432
(emphasis supplied)

(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:

National Treatment

1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any conditions and
qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and
service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting
the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than it accords to its
own like services and service suppliers.

2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by according to

services and service suppliers of any other Member, either formally
identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to its
own like services and service suppliers.

3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be

less favourable if it modifies the conditions of completion in favour of
services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or
service suppliers of any other Member. (Article XVII, General Agreement
on Trade in Services, Vol. 28, Uruguay Round Legal Instruments, p.22610
emphasis supplied).
 It is petitioners position that the foregoing national treatment and parity provisions of
the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of the
Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by
Filipinos. The constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context
of the clear duty imposed on the Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the
conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as
provided in the annexed agreements. Petitioners further argue that these provisions
[20]

contravene constitutional limitations on the role exports play in national development

and negate the preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such
Charter provisions are not self-executing and merely set out general policies; (2) that
these nationalistic portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be read
in isolation but should be related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly
Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with
the Constitution; and (4) that the WTO Agreement contains sufficient provisions to
protect developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade
liberalization.
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.

Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state
policies. The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the basic
[21]

political creed of the nation by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are
[22]

not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts.
They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of
[23]

judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading
case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies
[24]

enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts.They
do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor that broad constitutional principles
[25]

need legislative enactments to implement them, thus:

On petitioners allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12

(Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article
XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution,
suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and policies. As
such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by
Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives
addressed to the executive and to the legislature. If the executive and the legislature
failed to heed the directives of the article, the available remedy was not judicial but
political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the
executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2).

The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad

constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and the
lack of judicial authority to wade into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy
making. Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Oposa vs.
Factoran, Jr., explained these reasons as follows:
[26]

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more
specific legal right -- a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of
generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution -- that is or may be violated by the
actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the
trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To
my mind, the court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific
legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy
principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment
Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so
to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a

cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons.One is that unless the legal right claimed
to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in
other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration -- where a specific violation of law or

applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back
on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of
Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. x x x

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphases supplied)

When substantive standards as general as the right to a balanced and healthy ecology
and the right to health are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the result will
be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental
protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence
and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments -- the legislative and
executive departments -- must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts
should intervene.

Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to

Attain Balanced Development of Economy

On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down
general principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and
understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13
thereof which read:

Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding
productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound
agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and
efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country
shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. x x x

xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and
utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national
economic development, as follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation
for the benefit of the people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially
the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic
nationalism (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony and [27]

in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods; (2) by
mandating the State to adopt measures that help make them competitive; and (3) by
[28]

requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy

effectively controlled by Filipinos. In similar language, the Constitution takes into
[29]

account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade policy that
serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity; and speaks of industries which are competitive in
[30]

both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service
Insurance System, et al., this Court held that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
[31]

Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which

needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable. However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is
enforceable only in regard to the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It
refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of
Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there
are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices
that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
[32]

policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of
the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry
of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them
either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning
only on foreign competition that is unfair.

WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies

Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in
advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast
majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and
veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of
sovereign equality, with each members vote equal in weight to that of any other. There
is no WTO equivalent of the UN Security Council.

WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial

Conference and the General Council shall be taken by the majority of the votes cast,
except in cases of interpretation of the Agreement or waiver of the obligation of a
member which would require three fourths vote. Amendments would require two
thirds vote in general. Amendments to MFN provisions and the Amendments
provision will require assent of all members. Any member may withdraw from the
Agreement upon the expiration of six months from the date of notice of withdrawals. [33]

Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through
the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the
WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda
more decisively than outside the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical
alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying
the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to
share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development. These basic principles are found in the preamble of the WTO
[34]

Agreement as follows:

The Parties to this Agreement,

Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should
be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and
a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and
expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the
optimal use of the worlds resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at
different levels of economic development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that
developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share
in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development,

Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and

mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs
and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international trade relations,

Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral

trading system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results
of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations,

Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying
this multilateral trading system, x x x. (underscoring supplied.)

Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries

So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and consistent with the
foregoing basic principles, the WTO Agreement grants developing countries a more
lenient treatment, giving their domestic industries some protection from the rush of
foreign competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs in general, preferential treatment is
given to developing countries in terms of the amount of tariff reduction and the period
within which the reduction is to be spread out. Specifically, GATT requires an average
tariff reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be effected within a period of six
(6) years while developing countries -- including the Philippines -- are required to effect
an average tariff reduction of only 24% within ten (10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed countries to reduce
domestic support to agricultural products by 20% over six (6) years, as compared
to only 13% for developing countries to be effected within ten (10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT requires developed
countries to reduce their budgetary outlays for export subsidy by 36% and export
volumes receiving export subsidy by 21% within a period of six (6) years. For
developing countries, however, the reduction rate is only two-thirds of that prescribed for
developed countries and a longer period of ten (10) years within which to effect such
reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign
competition and trade practices including anti-dumping measures, countervailing
measures and safeguards against import surges. Where local businesses are
jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these
measures. There is hardly therefore any basis for the statement that under the WTO,
local industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived of
control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations
like the Philippines have been taken into account; thus, there would be no basis to say
that in joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their discretion.True, they
have made a bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of
economic liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion, simply because we disagree with it or simply because we believe
only in other economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of this
case will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an
economic policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the
Senate committed grave abuse of discretion.

Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition

Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national

economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
[35]

services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the

international community. As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:

Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly

aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does
not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the
international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign
control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the
development of natural resources and public utilities. [36]

The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without
discrimination cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of
equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade
policy based on equality and reciprocity, the fundamental law encourages industries
[37]

that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby demonstrating a
clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the
gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign
markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and
tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino
entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to
grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or Enterprises

 The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business
or enterprise, nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies
should be pampered with a total
proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand, respondents claim that
WTO/GATT aims to make available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and
services obtainable anywhere in the world at the most reasonable prices. Consequently,
the question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the
public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to
reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos general welfare because it will --
as promised by its promoters -- expand the countrys exports and generate more
employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at
the most reasonable rates to the Filipino public?
The responses to these questions involve judgment calls by our policy makers, for
which they are answerable to our people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such
questions and the answers thereto are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on
grave abuse of discretion.

Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and Contingencies

No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was
drafted and ratified in 1987. That does not mean however that the Charter is necessarily
flawed in the sense that its framers might not have anticipated the advent of a
borderless world of business. By the same token, the United Nations was not yet in
existence when the 1935 Constitution became effective. Did that necessarily mean that
the then Constitution might not have contemplated a diminution of the absoluteness of
sovereignty when the Philippines signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively
surrendering part of its control over its foreign relations to the decisions of various UN
organs like the Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only
the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future
and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can
withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the
refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent political
law writer and respected jurist explains:
[38]

The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the
blossom, the base and framework only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the
core of the dream that must take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of our
delegates, but slowly in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts, where it will in time
develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and finally achieve its
substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown
from the brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an
instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace
with the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism
and vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law
attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.

Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power

The WTO Agreement provides that (e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its
laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the
annexed Agreements. Petitioners maintain that this undertaking unduly limits, restricts
[39]

and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power which under Sec. 2,
Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the
Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because this
means that Congress could not pass legislation that will be good for our national interest
and general welfare if such legislation will not conform with the WTO Agreement, which
not only relates to the trade in goods x x x but also to the flow of investments and
money x x x as well as to a whole slew of agreements on socio-cultural matters x x x. [40]

More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power
to tax, which is lodged in the Congress. And while the Constitution allows Congress to
[41]

authorize the President to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, such authority is subject to specified limits
and x x x such limitations and restrictions as Congress may provide, as in fact it did
[42]

under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.

Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties

This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners
stressed their arguments on this issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally
been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however
subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly
or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did
not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." By [43]

the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of

international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One
[44]

of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda --
international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty engagement is not a
mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A
state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations undertaken. [45]

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of

sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state
power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or
pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually
covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of
their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements
between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of
naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of
conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations,
the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the
establishment of international organizations. The sovereignty of a state therefore
[46]

cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the
picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations
and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy,
Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is
over. The age of interdependence is here. [47]

UN Charter and Other Treaties Limit Sovereignty

Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter
members, it consented to restrict its sovereign rights under the concept of sovereignty
as auto-limitation.47-A Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, (a)ll members shall give the
United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present
Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United
Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action. Such assistance includes payment
of its corresponding share not merely in administrative expenses but also in
expenditures for the peace-keeping operations of the organization. In its advisory
opinion of July 20, 1961, the International Court of Justice held that money used by the
United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the Congo were expenses of
the United Nations under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Hence, all its
members must bear their corresponding share in such expenses. In this sense, the
Philippine Congress is restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to
appropriate funds whether it agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or not. So too,
under Article 105 of the said Charter, the UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic
privileges and immunities, thereby limiting again the exercise of sovereignty of members
within their own territory. Another example: although sovereign equality and domestic
jurisdiction of all members are set forth as underlying principles in the UN Charter,
such provisos are however subject to enforcement measures decided by the Security
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the
Charter. A final example: under Article 103, (i)n the event of a conflict between the
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligation under the present
charter shall prevail, thus unquestionably denying the Philippines -- as a member -- the
sovereign power to make a choice as to which of conflicting obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international
pacts -- both bilateral and multilateral -- that involve limitations on Philippine
sovereignty. These are enumerated by the Solicitor General in his Compliance dated
October 24, 1996, as follows:

(a) Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on income, where
the Philippines agreed, among others, to exempt from tax, income received in
the Philippines by, among others, the Federal Reserve Bank of the United
States, the Export/Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation of the United States. Likewise, in said convention,
wages, salaries and similar remunerations paid by the United States to its
citizens for labor and personal services performed by them as employees or
officials of the United States are exempt from income tax by the Philippines.

(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the avoidance
of double taxation with respect to taxes on income.

(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of double
taxation.

(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of double
taxation.

(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines agreed to
exempt from all customs duties, inspection fees and other duties or taxes
aircrafts of South Korea and the regular equipment, spare parts and supplies
arriving with said aircrafts.

(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines agreed to
exempt from customs duties, excise taxes, inspection fees and other similar
duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment,
stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine soil.

(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines granted
Belgian air carriers the same privileges as those granted to Japanese and
Korean air carriers under separate air service agreements.
 (h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas where
the Philippines exempted Israeli nationals from the requirement of obtaining
transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the Philippines not exceeding 59 days.

(I) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the
requirement of obtaining transit and visitor visa for a sojourn not exceeding 59
days.

(j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines agreed that
premises of Special Missions in the Philippines are inviolable and its agents
can not enter said premises without consent of the Head of Mission
concerned. Special Missions are also exempted from customs duties, taxes and
related charges.

(k) Multilateral Convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the

Philippines agreed to be governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.

(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory

jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The International Court of
Justice has jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a
treaty, any question of international law, the existence of any fact which, if
established, would constitute a breach of international obligation.

In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise
of its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The underlying
consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the
other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines,
its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine
commitments under WTO-GATT.

International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human rights, the

environment, the law of the sea, or trade, constrain domestic political sovereignty
through the assumption of external obligations. But unless anarchy in international
relations is preferred as an alternative, in most cases we accept that the benefits of the
reciprocal obligations involved outweigh the costs associated with any loss of political
sovereignty. (T)rade treaties that structure relations by reference to durable, well-
defined substantive norms and objective dispute resolution procedures reduce the risks
of larger countries exploiting raw economic power to bully smaller countries, by
subjecting power relations to some form of legal ordering. In addition, smaller
countries typically stand to gain disproportionately from trade liberalization. This is
due to the simple fact that liberalization will provide access to a larger set of potential
new trading relationship than in case of the larger country gaining enhanced success to
the smaller countrys market. [48]

The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may
be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of x x x cooperation and amity with all nations.

Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power

Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic
Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning
[49]

pleading, practice and procedures. [50]

To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS, it will be fruitful to
[51]

restate its full text as follows:

Article 34

Process Patents: Burden of Proof

1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the rights
of the owner referred to in paragraph 1(b) of Article 28, if the subject matter of a
patent is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial authorities shall have the
authority to order the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an identical
product is different from the patented process. Therefore, Members shall provide,
in at least one of the following circumstances, that any identical product when
produced without the consent of the patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the patented process:

(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new;

(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by
the process and the owner of the patent has been unable through
reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used.

2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in
paragraph 1 shall be on the alleged infringer only if the condition referred to in
subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition referred to in subparagraph
(b) is fulfilled.
 3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of defendants
in protecting their manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken into account.

From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (note
the words in the absence of proof to the contrary) presumption that a product shown to
be identical to one produced with the use of a patented process shall be deemed to
have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such
product obtained by the patented product is new, or (2) where there is substantial
likelihood that the identical product was made with the use of the said patented process
but the owner of the patent could not determine the exact process used in obtaining
such identical product. Hence, the burden of proof contemplated by Article 34 should
actually be understood as the duty of the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such
presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually refers to the burden of
evidence (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or fake)
product to show that his product was produced without the use of the patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the burden of proof since,
regardless of the presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still
has to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that
it is identical to the genuine one produced by the patented process and the fact of
newness of the genuine product or the fact of substantial likelihood that the identical
product was made by the patented process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as
the present law on the subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as
the Patent Law, provides a similar presumption in cases of infringement of patented
design or utility model, thus:

SEC. 60. Infringement. - Infringement of a design patent or of a patent for utility

model shall consist in unauthorized copying of the patented design or utility model for
the purpose of trade or industry in the article or product and in the making, using or
selling of the article or product copying the patented design or utility model. Identity
or substantial identity with the patented design or utility model shall constitute
evidence of copying. (underscoring supplied)

Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a

disputable presumption applies only if (1) the product obtained by the patented process
is NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the
process and the process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to
determine the process used. Where either of these two provisos does not obtain,
members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third
issue -- derogation of legislative power - will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to
say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually
exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is
with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our
judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on
patents, trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure
will not be substantial.
[52]

Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and Not in Other
Documents Contained in the Final Act

Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its
annexes -- but not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the
Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services -- is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of
discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed
because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document signed
by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon authority of the
President. They contend that the second letter of the President to the Senate which [53]

enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence
of the Senate.
A final act, sometimes called protocol de clture, is an instrument which records
the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a
reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts
agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference. It is not the
[54]

treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which

may have taken place over several years. The text of the Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations is contained in just one
page in Vol. I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By
[55]

signing said Final Act, Secretary Navarro as representative of the Republic of the
Philippines undertook:

"(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their
respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and

(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions."

The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the
Final Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO
Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for
ratification. They were approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT
which provides that representatives of the members can meet to give effect to those
provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to
facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement.
[56]

The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in

Marrakesh does not apply to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which
have indicated in their respective schedules of commitments on standstill, elimination of
monopoly, expansion of operation of existing financial service suppliers, temporary entry
of personnel, free transfer and processing of information, and national treatment with
respect to access to payment, clearing systems and refinancing available in the normal
course of business.[57]

On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral
agreements are deemed included as its integral parts, as follows:
[58]

Article II

Scope of the WTO

1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of
trade relations among its Members in matters to the agreements and associated
legal instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement.

2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and

3 (hereinafter referred to as Multilateral Agreements) are integral parts of this
Agreement, binding on all Members.

3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4

(hereinafter referred to as Plurilateral Trade Agreements) are also part of this
Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, and are binding on those
Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either obligation or
rights for Members that have not accepted them.

4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in annex 1A

(hereinafter referred to as GATT 1994) is legally distinct from the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947, annexed to the Final Act
adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, as subsequently
rectified, amended or modified (hereinafter referred to as GATT 1947).

It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as
shown by the members deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of
President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely
[59]

dissected what the Senate was concurring in, as follows: [60]

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the submission came up
in the first day hearing of this Committee yesterday. Was the observation made by
Senator Taada that what was submitted to the Senate was not the agreement on
establishing the World Trade Organization by the final act of the Uruguay Round
which is not the same as the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization?
And on that basis, Senator Tolentino raised a point of order which, however, he agreed
to withdraw upon understanding that his suggestion for an alternative solution at that
time was acceptable. That suggestion was to treat the proceedings of the Committee as
being in the nature of briefings for Senators until the question of the submission could
be clarified.

And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new... is he making
a new submission which improves on the clarity of the first submission?

MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there should be no
misunderstanding, it was his intention to clarify all matters by giving this letter.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

Can this Committee hear from Senator Taada and later on Senator Tolentino since
they were the ones that raised this question yesterday?

Senator Taada, please.

SEN. TAADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear that what is
being submitted to the Senate for ratification is not the Final Act of the Uruguay
Round, but rather the Agreement on the World Trade Organization as well as the
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding and Commitments in
Financial Services.

I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President Ramos.

SEN. TAADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Taada. Can we hear from Senator
Tolentino? And after him Senator Neptali Gonzales and Senator Lina.

SEN TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission actually
transmitted to us but I saw the draft of his earlier, and I think it now complies with the
provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final Act itself. The Constitution does not
require us to ratify the Final Act. It requires us to ratify the Agreement which is now
being submitted. The Final Act itself specifies what is going to be submitted to with
the governments of the participants.

In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:

By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit as
appropriate the WTO Agreement for the consideration of the respective competent
authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their
procedures.

In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to the
governments for ratification or acceptance as whatever their constitutional procedures
may provide but it is the World Trade Organization Agreement. And if that is the one
that is being submitted now, I think it satisfies both the Constitution and the Final Act
itself.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call on Senator Gonzales.

SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a matter of
record. And they had been adequately reflected in the journal of yesterdays session
and I dont see any need for repeating the same.

Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante cautela.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want to make
any comment on this?

SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by Senator
Gonzales out of the abundance of question. Then the new submission is, I believe,
stating the obvious and therefore I have no further comment to make.

Epilogue

In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement,
petitioners are invoking this Courts constitutionally imposed duty to determine whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate
Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of
discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it is
amply shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
[61]

enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an

arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so
patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Failure on the part
[62]

of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the
petition.
[63]

In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is
under review, is one of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great
respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent and coordinate, and
thus its actions are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof
and persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court
will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition of grave
abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senates processes, this
Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senates
exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of
Article VII of the Constitution.
[64]

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the

State to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos;
and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally
produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles -- while serving as judicial and
legislative guides -- are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there
are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which
mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all
forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity and the
promotion of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,
thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of
sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption
of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all
nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave
its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a
legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no patent and gross
arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion or personal hostility in such exercise. It
is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even
agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down
Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of
discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave
abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty.Ineludably, what the Senate did
was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or
viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the
elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the
worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that
our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO
Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a
member.
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an
Asian Renaissance where the East will become the dominant region of the world
[65]

economically, politically and culturally in the next century. He refers to the free market
espoused by WTO as the catalyst in this coming Asian ascendancy. There are at
present about 31 countries including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for
membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on
national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral
trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. The
alternative to WTO is isolation, stagnation, if not economic self-destruction. Duly
enriched with original membership, keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages
of globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed with a vision of the future, the
Philippines now straddles the crossroads of an international strategy for economic
prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through their duly
authorized elected officers, make their free choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, and Vitug, JJ., in the result.

5. PKSMMN vs Executive Secretary

669 SCRA 49 (2012)
G.R. Nos. 147036-37
 DECISION
ABAD, J.:

These are consolidated petitions to declare unconstitutional certain presidential

decrees and executive orders of the martial law era relating to the raising and use
of coco-levy funds.

The Facts and the Case

On June 19, 1971 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 6260 [1] that established a
Coconut Investment Fund (CI Fund) for the development of the coconut industry
through capital financing.[2] Coconut farmers were to capitalize and administer the
Fund through the Coconut Investment Company (CIC)[3] whose objective was,
among others, to advance the coconut farmers interests. For this purpose, the law
imposed a levy of P0.55 on the coconut farmers first domestic sale of every 100
kilograms of copra, or its equivalent, for which levy he was to get a receipt
convertible into CIC shares of stock.[4]

About a year following his proclamation of martial law in the country or on August
20, 1973 President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) 276,
[5]
which established a Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCS Fund), to
address the crisis at that time in the domestic market for coconut-based consumer
goods. The CCS Fund was to be built up through the imposition of a P15.00-levy
for every first sale of 100 kilograms of copra resecada.[6] The levy was to cease
after a year or earlier provided the crisis was over. Any remaining balance of the
Fund was to revert to the CI Fund established under R.A. 6260.[7]

A year later or on November 14, 1974 President Marcos issued P.D. 582, [8] creating
a permanent fund called the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CID Fund) to
channel for the ultimate direct benefit of coconut farmers part of the levies that
they were already paying. The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was to
provide P100 million as initial capital of the CID Fund and, thereafter, give the
Fund at least P0.20 per kilogram of copra resecada out of the PCAs collection of
coconut consumers stabilization levy. In case of the lifting of this levy, the PCA
was then to impose a permanent levy of P0.20 on the first sale of every kilogram of
copra to form part of the CID Fund.[9] Also, under P.D. 582, the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), then owned by the Government, was to receive on deposit,
administer, and use the CID Fund.[10] P.D. 582 authorized the PNB to invest the
unused portion of the CID Fund in easily convertible investments, the earnings of
which were to form part of the Fund.[11]
In 1975 President Marcos enacted P.D. 755[12] which approved the acquisition of a
commercial bank for the benefit of the coconut farmers to enable such bank to
promptly and efficiently realize the industrys credit policy. [13] Thus, the PCA
bought 72.2% of the shares of stock of First United Bank, headed
by Pedro Cojuangco.[14] Due to changes in its corporate identity and purpose, the
banks articles of incorporation were amended in July 1975, resulting in a change in
the banks name from First United Bank to United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).
[15]

On July 14, 1976 President Marcos enacted P.D. 961,[16] the Coconut Industry
Code, which consolidated and codified existing laws relating to the coconut
industry. The Code provided that surpluses from the CCS Fund and the CID Fund
collections, not used for replanting and other authorized purposes, were to be
invested by acquiring shares of stock of corporations, including the San Miguel
Corporation (SMC), engaged in undertakings related to the coconut and palm oil
industries.[17] UCPB was to make such investments and equitably distribute these
for free to coconut farmers.[18] These investments constituted the Coconut Industry
Investment Fund (CIIF). P.D. 961 also provided that the coconut levy funds (coco-
levy funds) shall be owned by the coconut farmers in their private capacities.
[19]
This was reiterated in the PD 1468[20] amendment of June 11, 1978.

In 1980, President Marcos issued P.D. 1699, [21] suspending the collections of the
CCS Fund and the CID Fund. But in 1981 he issued P.D. 1841[22] which revived the
collection of coconut levies. P.D. 1841 renamed the CCS Fund into the Coconut
Industry Stabilization Fund (CIS Fund).[23] This Fund was to be earmarked
proportionately among several development programs, such as coconut hybrid
replanting program, insurance coverage for the coconut farmers, and scholarship
program for their children.[24]
In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.)
312,[25] establishing a Sagip Niyugan Program which sought to provide immediate
income supplement to coconut farmers and encourage the creation of a sustainable
local market demand for coconut oil and other coconut products. [26] The Executive
Order sought to establish a P1-billion fund by disposing of assets acquired using
coco-levy funds or assets of entities supported by those funds. [27] A committee was
created to manage the fund under this program. [28] A majority vote of its members
could engage the services of a reputable auditing firm to conduct periodic audits.[29]

At about the same time, President Estrada issued E.O. 313, [30] which created an
irrevocable trust fund known as the Coconut Trust Fund (the Trust Fund). This
aimed to provide financial assistance to coconut farmers, to the coconut industry,
and to other agri-related programs. [31] The shares of stock of SMC were to serve as
the Trust Funds initial capital.[32] These shares were acquired with CII Funds and
constituted approximately 27% of the outstanding capital stock of SMC. E.O. 313
designated UCPB, through its Trust Department, as the Trust Funds trustee
bank. The Trust Fund Committee would administer, manage, and supervise the
operations of the Trust Fund.[33] The Committee would designate an external
auditor to do an annual audit or as often as needed but it may also request the
Commission on Audit (COA) to intervene.[34]
To implement its mandate, E.O. 313 directed the Presidential Commission on
Good Government, the Office of the Solicitor General, and other government
agencies to exclude the 27% CIIF SMC shares from Civil Case 0033,
entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al., which was
then pending before the Sandiganbayan and to lift the sequestration over those
shares.[35]

On January 26, 2001, however, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered

the suspension of E.O.s 312 and 313.[36] This notwithstanding, on March 1, 2001
petitioner organizations and individuals brought the present action in G.R. 147036-
37 to declare E.O.s 312 and 313 as well as Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468
unconstitutional. On April 24, 2001 the other sets of petitioner organizations and
individuals instituted G.R. 147811 to nullify Section 2 of P.D. 755 and Article III,
Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 also for being unconstitutional.

The Issues Presented

The parties submit the following issues for adjudication:

Procedurally

1. Whether or not petitioners special civil actions of certiorari under Rule 65

constituted the proper remedy for their actions; and
2. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to bring the same to court.

On the substance

3. Whether or not the coco-levy funds are public funds; and

4. Whether or not (a) Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b) Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s
961 and 1468, (c) E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313 are unconstitutional.

The Rulings of the Court

First. UCPB questions the propriety of the present petitions

for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 on the ground that there are no
ongoing proceedings in any tribunal or board or before a government official
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. [37] UCPB insists that the
Court exercises appellate jurisdiction with respect to issues of constitutionality or
validity of laws and presidential orders.[38]

But, as the Court previously held, where there are serious allegations that a
law has infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but the duty of the
Court to look into such allegations and, when warranted, uphold the supremacy of
the Constitution.[39] Moreover, where the issues raised are of paramount importance
to the public, as in this case, the Court has the discretion to brush aside
technicalities of procedure.[40]

Second. The Court has to uphold petitioners right to institute these

petitions. The petitioner organizations in these cases represent coconut farmers on
whom the burden of the coco-levies attaches. It is also primarily for their benefit
that the levies were imposed.
 The individual petitioners, on the other hand, join the petitions as
taxpayers. The Court recognizes their right to restrain officials from wasting public
funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. [41] This so-called
taxpayers suit is based on the theory that expenditure of public funds for the
purpose of executing an unconstitutional act is a misapplication of such funds.[42]

Besides, the 1987 Constitution accords to the citizens a greater participation

in the affairs of government. Indeed, it provides for people's initiative, the right to
information on matters of public concern (including the right to know the state of
health of their President), as well as the right to file cases questioning the factual
bases for the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or declaration of
martial law. These provisions enlarge the peoples right in the political as well as
the judicial field. It grants them the right to interfere in the affairs of government
and challenge any act tending to prejudice their interest.

Third. For some time, different and conflicting notions had been formed as
to the nature and ownership of the coco-levy funds. The Court, however, finally
put an end to the dispute when it categorically ruled in Republic of the Philippines
v. COCOFED[43] that these funds are not only affected with public interest; they
are, in fact, prima facie public funds. Prima facie means a fact presumed to be true
unless disproved by some evidence to the contrary.[44]

The Court was satisfied that the coco-levy funds were raised pursuant to law
to support a proper governmental purpose. They were raised with the use of the
police and taxing powers of the State for the benefit of the coconut industry and its
farmers in general. The COA reviewed the use of the funds. The Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) treated them as public funds and the very laws governing coconut
levies recognize their public character.[45]

The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds are in the
nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose.[46] Taxes are enforced
proportional contributions from persons and property, levied by the State by virtue
of its sovereignty for the support of the government and for all its public needs.
[47]
Here, the coco-levy funds were imposed pursuant to law, namely, R.A. 6260
and P.D. 276. The funds were collected and managed by the PCA, an independent
government corporation directly under the President.[48] And, as the respondent
public officials pointed out, the pertinent laws used the term levy,[49] which
means to tax,[50] in describing the exaction.

Of course, unlike ordinary revenue laws, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276 did not
raise money to boost the governments general funds but to provide means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry, the coconut industry, which
is so affected with public interest as to be within the police power of the State.
[51]
The funds sought to support the coconut industry, one of the main economic
backbones of the country, and to secure economic benefits for the coconut farmers
and farm workers. The subject laws are akin to the sugar liens imposed by Sec.
7(b) of P.D. 388,[52] and the oil price stabilization funds under P.D. 1956, [53] as
amended by E.O. 137.[54]

Respondent UCPB suggests that the coco-levy funds are closely similar to
the Social Security System (SSS) funds, which have been declared to be not public
funds but properties of the SSS members and held merely in trust by the
government.[55] But the SSS Law[56] collects premium contributions. It does not
collect taxes from members for a specific public purpose. They pay contributions
in exchange for insurance protection and benefits like loans, medical or health
services, and retirement packages. The benefits accrue to every SSS member, not
to the public, in general.[57]

Furthermore, SSS members do not lose ownership of their

contributions. The government merely holds these in trust, together with his
employers contribution, to answer for his future benefits. [58] The coco-levy funds,
on the other hand, belong to the government and are subject to its administration
and disposition. Thus, these funds, including its incomes, interests, proceeds, or
profits, as well as all its assets, properties, and shares of stocks procured with such
funds must be treated, used, administered, and managed as public funds.[59]

Lastly, the coco-levy funds are evidently special funds. In Gaston v.

Republic Planters Bank,[60] the Court held that the State collected stabilization fees
from sugar millers, planters, and producers for a special purpose: to finance the
growth and development of the sugar industry and all its components. The fees
were levied for a special purpose and, therefore, constituted special fund when
collected. Its character as such fund was made clear by the fact that they were
deposited in the PNB (then a wholly owned government bank) and not in the
Philippine Treasury. In Osmea v. Orbos,[61] the Court held that the oil price
stabilization fund was a special fund mainly because this was segregated from the
general fund and placed in what the law referred to as a trust account. Yet it
remained subject to COA scrutiny and review. The Court finds no substantial
distinction between these funds and the coco-levy funds, except as to the industry
they each support.

Fourth. Petitioners in G.R. 147811 assert that Section 2 of P.D. 755 above is
void and unconstitutional for disregarding the public character of coco-levy
funds. The subject section provides:

Section 2. Financial Assistance. x x x and since the operations,

and activities of the Philippine Coconut Authority are all in accord with
the present social economic plans and programs of the Government, all
collections and levies which the Philippine Coconut Authority is
authorized to levy and collect such as but not limited to the Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Levy, and the Coconut Industry Development
Fund as prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 582 shall not be
considered or construed, under any law or regulation, special and/or
fiduciary funds and do not form part of the general funds of the
national government within the contemplation of Presidential Decree
No. 711. (Emphasis ours)

The Court has, however, already passed upon this question in Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic of the Philippines.
[62]
It held as unconstitutional Section 2 of P.D. 755 for effectively authorizing the
PCA to utilize portions of the CCS Fund to pay the financial commitment of the
farmers to acquire UCPB and to deposit portions of the CCS Fund levies with
UCPB interest free. And as there also provided, the CCS Fund, CID Fund and like
levies that PCA is authorized to collect shall be considered as non-special or
fiduciary funds to be transferred to the general fund of the Government, meaning
they shall be deemed private funds.

Identical provisions of subsequent presidential decrees likewise declared

coco-levy funds private properties of coconut farmers. Article III, Section 5 of P.D.
961 reads:
 Section 5. Exemptions. The Coconut Consumers Stabilization
Fund and the Coconut Industry Development Fund as well as all
disbursements of said funds for the benefit of the coconut farmers as
herein authorized shall not be construed or interpreted, under any
law or regulation, as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the
general funds of the national government within the contemplation of
P.D. No. 711; nor as a subsidy, donation, levy, government funded
investment, or government share within the contemplation of P.D.
898, the intention being that said Fund and the disbursements
thereof as herein authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers
shall be owned by them in their own private capacities. (Emphasis
ours)

Section 5 of P.D. 1468 basically reproduces the above provision, thus

Section 5. Exemption. The Coconut Consumers Stabilization

Fund and the Coconut Industry Development Fund, as well as all
disbursements as herein authorized, shall not be construed or
interpreted, under any law or regulation, as special and/or fiduciary
funds, or as part of the general funds of the national
government within the contemplation of P.D. 711; nor as subsidy,
donation, levy government funded investment, or government share
within the contemplation of P.D. 898, the intention being that said
Fund and the disbursements thereof as herein authorized for the
benefit of the coconut farmers shall be owned by them in their
private capacities: Provided, however, That the President may at any
time authorize the Commission on Audit or any other officer of the
government to audit the business affairs, administration, and condition of
persons and entities who receive subsidy for coconut-based consumer
products x x x. (Emphasis ours)

Notably, the raising of money by levy on coconut farm production, a form of

taxation as already stated, began in 1971 for the purpose of developing the coconut
industry and promoting the interest of coconut farmers. The use of the fund was
expanded in 1973 to include the stabilization of the domestic market for coconut-
based consumer goods and in 1974 to divert part of the funds for obtaining direct
benefit to coconut farmers. After five years or in 1976, however, P.D. 961 declared
the coco-levy funds private property of the farmers. P.D. 1468 reiterated this
declaration in 1978. But neither presidential decree actually turned over possession
or control of the funds to the farmers in their private capacity. The government
continued to wield undiminished authority over the management and disposition of
those funds.

In any event, such declaration is void. There is ownership when a thing

pertaining to a person is completely subjected to his will in everything that is not
prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another. [63] An owner is free
to exercise all attributes of ownership: the right, among others, to possess, use and
enjoy, abuse or consume, and dispose or alienate the thing owned. [64] The owner is
of course free to waive all or some of these rights in favor of others. But in the case
of the coconut farmers, they could not, individually or collectively, waive what
have not been and could not be legally imparted to them.

Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 961, and Article III,
Section 5 of P.D. 1468 completely ignore the fact that coco-levy funds are public
funds raised through taxation. And since taxes could be exacted only for a public
purpose, they cannot be declared private properties of individuals although such
individuals fall within a distinct group of persons.[65]

The Court of course grants that there is no hard-and-fast rule for determining
what constitutes public purpose. It is an elastic concept that could be made to fit
into modern standards. Public purpose, for instance, is no longer restricted to
traditional government functions like building roads and school houses or
safeguarding public health and safety.Public purpose has been construed as
including the promotion of social justice. Thus, public funds may be used for
relocating illegal settlers, building low-cost housing for them, and financing both
urban and agrarian reforms that benefit certain poor individuals. Still, these uses
relieve volatile iniquities in society and, therefore, impact on public order and
welfare as a whole.

But the assailed provisions, which removed the coco-levy funds from the
general funds of the government and declared them private properties of coconut
farmers, do not appear to have a color of social justice for their purpose. The levy
on copra that farmers produce appears, in the first place, to be a business tax
judging by its tax base. The concept of farmers-businessmen is incompatible with
the idea that coconut farmers are victims of social injustice and so should be
beneficiaries of the taxes raised from their earnings.

It would altogether be different of course if the laws mentioned set apart a

portion of the coco-levy fund for improving the lives of destitute coconut farm
owners or workers for their social amelioration to establish a proper government
purpose. The support for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty and has
long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common
good.[66] But the declarations do not distinguish between wealthy coconut farmers
and the impoverished ones. And even if they did, the Government cannot just
embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or
otherwise.[67] Consequently, such declarations are void since they appropriate
public funds for private purpose and, therefore, violate the citizens right to
substantive due process.[68]
On another point, in stating that the coco-levy fund shall not be construed or
interpreted, under any law or regulation, as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as
part of the general funds of the national government, P.D.s 961 and 1468 seek to
remove such fund from COA scrutiny.

This is also the fault of President Estradas E.O. 312 which deals with P1
billion to be generated out of the sale of coco-fund acquired assets. Thus

Section 5. Audit of Fund and Submission of Report. The

Committee, by a majority vote, shall engage the services of a reputable
auditing firm to conduct periodic audits of the fund. It shall render a
quarterly report on all pertinent transactions and availments of the fund
to the Office of the President within the first three (3) working days of
the succeeding quarter. (Emphasis ours)

E.O. 313 has a substantially identical provision governing the management

and disposition of the Coconut Trust Fund capitalized with the substantial SMC
shares of stock that the coco-fund acquired. Thus

Section 13. Accounting. x x x

The Fund shall be audited annually or as often as necessary by

an external auditor designated by the Committee. The
 Committee may also request the Commission on Audit to conduct an
audit of the Fund. (Emphasis ours)

But, since coco-levy funds are taxes, the provisions of P.D.s 755, 961 and
1468 as well as those of E.O.s 312 and 313 that remove such funds and the assets
acquired through them from the jurisdiction of the COA violate Article IX-D,
Section 2(1)[69] of the 1987 Constitution. Section 2(1) vests in the COA the power
and authority to examine uses of government money and property. The cited P.D.s
and E.O.s also contravene Section 2[70] of P.D. 898 (Providing for the Restructuring
of the Commission on Audit), which has the force of a statute.

And there is no legitimate reason why such funds should be shielded from
COA review and audit. The PCA, which implements the coco-levy laws and
collects the coco-levy funds, is a government-owned and controlled corporation
subject to COA review and audit.

E.O. 313 suffers from an additional infirmity. Its title, Rationalizing the Use
of the Coconut Levy Funds by Constituting a Fund for Assistance to Coconut
Farmers as an Irrevocable Trust Fund and Creating a Coconut Trust Fund
Committee for the Management thereof tends to mislead. Apparently, it intends to
create a trust fund out of the coco-levy funds to provide economic assistance to the
coconut farmers and, ultimately, benefit the coconut industry.[71] But on closer look,
E.O. 313 strays from the special purpose for which the law raises coco-levy funds
in that it permits the use of coco-levy funds for improving productivity in other
food areas. Thus:

Section 2. Purpose of the Fund. The Fund shall be established for

the purpose of financing programs of assistance for the benefit of the
coconut farmers, the coconut industry, and other agri-related
programs intended to maximize food productivity, develop business
opportunities in the countryside, provide livelihood alternatives, and
promote anti-poverty programs. (Emphasis ours)

xxxx

Section 9. Use and Disposition of the Trust Income. The Coconut

Trust Fund Committee, on an annual basis, shall determine and establish
 the amount comprising the Trust Income. After such determination, the
Committee shall earmark, allocate and disburse the Trust Income for the
following purposes, namely:

xxxx

(d) Thirty percent (30%) of the Trust Income shall be used to

assist and fund agriculturally-related programs for the Government,
as reasonably determined by the Trust Fund Committee, implemented for
the purpose of: (i) maximizing food productivity in the agriculture areas
of the country, (ii) enhancing the upliftment and well-being of the living
conditions of farmers and agricultural workers, (iii) developing viable
industries and business opportunities in the countryside, (iv) providing
alternative means of livelihood to the direct dependents of agriculture
businesses and enterprises, and (v) providing financial assistance and
support to coconut farmers in times of economic hardship due to
extremely low prices of copra and other coconut products, natural
calamities, world market dislocation and similar occurrences, including
financial support to the ERAPs Sagip Niyugan Program established
under Executive Order No. 312 dated November 3, 2000; x x x.
(Emphasis ours)

Clearly, E.O. 313 above runs counter to the constitutional provision which
directs that all money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be
treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. [72] Assisting other
agriculturally-related programs is way off the coco-funds objective of promoting
the general interests of the coconut industry and its farmers.

A final point, the E.O.s also transgress P.D. 1445,[73] Section 84(2),[74] the
first part by the previously mentioned sections of E.O. 313 and the second part by
Section 4 of E.O. 312 and Sections 6 and 7 of E.O. 313. E.O. 313 vests the power
to administer, manage, and supervise the operations and disbursements of the Trust
Fund it established (capitalized with SMC shares bought out of coco-levy funds) in
a Coconut Trust Fund Committee. Thus

Section 6. Creation of the Coconut Trust Fund Committee. A

Committee is hereby created to administer, manage and supervise
the operations of the Trust Fund, chaired by the President with ten
(10) members, as follows:
 (a) four (4) representatives from the government sector, two
of whom shall be the Secretary of Agriculture and the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform who shall act as Vice
Chairmen;
(b) four (4) representatives from coconut farmers
organizations, one of whom shall come from a list of
nominees from the Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation Inc. (COCOFED);
(c) a representative from the CIIF; and
(d) a representative from a non-government organization
(NGO) involved in agricultural and rural development.

All decisions of the Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall be determined

by a majority vote of all the members.

The Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall perform the functions and
duties set forth in Section 7 hereof, with the skill, care, prudence and
diligence necessary under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in like capacity would exercise.

The members of the Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall be appointed

by the President and shall hold office at his pleasure.

The Coconut Trust Fund Committee is authorized to hire administrative,

technical and/or support staff as may be required to enable it to
effectively perform its functions and responsibilities. (Emphasis ours)

Section 7. Functions and Responsibilities of the Committee. The

Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall have the following functions and
responsibilities:
(a) set the investment policy of the Trust Fund;
(b) establish priorities for assistance giving preference to small
coconut farmers and farmworkers which shall be reviewed
periodically and revised as necessary in accordance with changing
conditions;
(c) receive, process and approve project proposals for financing
by the Trust Fund;
(d) decide on the use of the Trust Funds income or net
earnings including final action on applications for assistance,
grants and/or loans;
 (e) avail of professional counsel and services by retaining an
investment and financial manager, if desired;
(f) formulate the rules and regulations governing the
allocation, utilization and disbursement of the Fund; and
(g) perform such other acts and things as may be necessary proper
or conducive to attain the purposes of the Fund. (Emphasis ours)

Section 4 of E.O. 312 does essentially the same thing. It vests the
management and disposition of the assistance fund generated from the sale of
coco-levy fund-acquired assets into a Committee of five members. Thus, Section 4
of E.O. 312 provides

Section 4. Funding. Assets acquired through the coconut levy

funds or by entities financed by the coconut levy funds identified by the
President for appropriate disposal or sale, shall be sold or disposed to
generate a maximum fund of ONE BILLION PESOS
(P1,000,000,000.00) which shall be managed by a Committee
composed of a Chairman and four (4) members to be appointed by
the President whose term shall be co-terminus with the Program. x
x x (Emphasis ours)

In effect, the above transfers the power to allocate, use, and disburse coco-
levy funds that P.D. 232 vested in the PCA and transferred the same, without
legislative authorization and in violation of P.D. 232, to the Committees mentioned
above. An executive order cannot repeal a presidential decree which has the same
standing as a statute enacted by Congress.
UCPB invokes the principle of separability to save the assailed laws from
being struck down. The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as
repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
susceptible to being separated from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. When
the parts of a statute, however, are so mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the
rest. In which case, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions
which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected must consequently fall with
them.[75]
 But, given that the provisions of E.O.s 312 and 313, which as already stated
invalidly transferred powers over the funds to two committees that President
Estrada created, the rest of their provisions became non-operational. It is evident
that President Estrada would not have created the new funding programs if they
were to be managed by some other entity. Indeed, he made himself Chairman of
the Coconut Trust Fund and left to his discretion the appointment of the members
of the other committee.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition in G.R. 147036-

37, PARTLY GRANTS the petition in G.R. 147811, and declares the
following VOID:

a) E.O. 312, for being repugnant to Section 84(2) of P.D. 1445,

and Article IX-D, Section 2(1) of the Constitution; and

b) E.O. 313, for being in contravention of Section 84(2) of P.D.

1445, and Article IX-D, Section 2(1) and Article VI, Section 29(3) of
the Constitution.

The Court has previously declared Section 2 of P.D. 755 and Article III,
Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 unconstitutional.

SO ORDERED.

6. Belgica vs. Executive Secretary

710 SCRA 1 (2013)
G.R. Nos. 147036-37

DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These are consolidated petitions to declare unconstitutional certain presidential
decrees and executive orders of the martial law era relating to the raising and use
of coco-levy funds.

The Facts and the Case

On June 19, 1971 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 6260 [1] that established a
Coconut Investment Fund (CI Fund) for the development of the coconut industry
through capital financing.[2] Coconut farmers were to capitalize and administer the
Fund through the Coconut Investment Company (CIC)[3] whose objective was,
among others, to advance the coconut farmers interests. For this purpose, the law
imposed a levy of P0.55 on the coconut farmers first domestic sale of every 100
kilograms of copra, or its equivalent, for which levy he was to get a receipt
convertible into CIC shares of stock.[4]

About a year following his proclamation of martial law in the country or on August
20, 1973 President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) 276,
[5]
which established a Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCS Fund), to
address the crisis at that time in the domestic market for coconut-based consumer
goods. The CCS Fund was to be built up through the imposition of a P15.00-levy
for every first sale of 100 kilograms of copra resecada.[6] The levy was to cease
after a year or earlier provided the crisis was over. Any remaining balance of the
Fund was to revert to the CI Fund established under R.A. 6260.[7]

A year later or on November 14, 1974 President Marcos issued P.D. 582, [8] creating
a permanent fund called the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CID Fund) to
channel for the ultimate direct benefit of coconut farmers part of the levies that
they were already paying. The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was to
provide P100 million as initial capital of the CID Fund and, thereafter, give the
Fund at least P0.20 per kilogram of copra resecada out of the PCAs collection of
coconut consumers stabilization levy. In case of the lifting of this levy, the PCA
was then to impose a permanent levy of P0.20 on the first sale of every kilogram of
copra to form part of the CID Fund.[9] Also, under P.D. 582, the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), then owned by the Government, was to receive on deposit,
administer, and use the CID Fund.[10] P.D. 582 authorized the PNB to invest the
unused portion of the CID Fund in easily convertible investments, the earnings of
which were to form part of the Fund.[11]
In 1975 President Marcos enacted P.D. 755[12] which approved the acquisition of a
commercial bank for the benefit of the coconut farmers to enable such bank to
promptly and efficiently realize the industrys credit policy. [13] Thus, the PCA
bought 72.2% of the shares of stock of First United Bank, headed
by Pedro Cojuangco.[14] Due to changes in its corporate identity and purpose, the
banks articles of incorporation were amended in July 1975, resulting in a change in
the banks name from First United Bank to United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).
[15]

On July 14, 1976 President Marcos enacted P.D. 961,[16] the Coconut Industry
Code, which consolidated and codified existing laws relating to the coconut
industry. The Code provided that surpluses from the CCS Fund and the CID Fund
collections, not used for replanting and other authorized purposes, were to be
invested by acquiring shares of stock of corporations, including the San Miguel
Corporation (SMC), engaged in undertakings related to the coconut and palm oil
industries.[17] UCPB was to make such investments and equitably distribute these
for free to coconut farmers.[18] These investments constituted the Coconut Industry
Investment Fund (CIIF). P.D. 961 also provided that the coconut levy funds (coco-
levy funds) shall be owned by the coconut farmers in their private capacities.
[19]
This was reiterated in the PD 1468[20] amendment of June 11, 1978.

In 1980, President Marcos issued P.D. 1699, [21] suspending the collections of the
CCS Fund and the CID Fund. But in 1981 he issued P.D. 1841[22] which revived the
collection of coconut levies. P.D. 1841 renamed the CCS Fund into the Coconut
Industry Stabilization Fund (CIS Fund).[23] This Fund was to be earmarked
proportionately among several development programs, such as coconut hybrid
replanting program, insurance coverage for the coconut farmers, and scholarship
program for their children.[24]

In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.)
312,[25] establishing a Sagip Niyugan Program which sought to provide immediate
income supplement to coconut farmers and encourage the creation of a sustainable
local market demand for coconut oil and other coconut products. [26] The Executive
Order sought to establish a P1-billion fund by disposing of assets acquired using
coco-levy funds or assets of entities supported by those funds. [27] A committee was
created to manage the fund under this program. [28] A majority vote of its members
could engage the services of a reputable auditing firm to conduct periodic audits.[29]

At about the same time, President Estrada issued E.O. 313, [30] which created an
irrevocable trust fund known as the Coconut Trust Fund (the Trust Fund). This
aimed to provide financial assistance to coconut farmers, to the coconut industry,
and to other agri-related programs. [31] The shares of stock of SMC were to serve as
the Trust Funds initial capital.[32] These shares were acquired with CII Funds and
constituted approximately 27% of the outstanding capital stock of SMC. E.O. 313
designated UCPB, through its Trust Department, as the Trust Funds trustee
bank. The Trust Fund Committee would administer, manage, and supervise the
operations of the Trust Fund.[33] The Committee would designate an external
auditor to do an annual audit or as often as needed but it may also request the
Commission on Audit (COA) to intervene.[34]
To implement its mandate, E.O. 313 directed the Presidential Commission on
Good Government, the Office of the Solicitor General, and other government
agencies to exclude the 27% CIIF SMC shares from Civil Case 0033,
entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al., which was
then pending before the Sandiganbayan and to lift the sequestration over those
shares.[35]

On January 26, 2001, however, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered

the suspension of E.O.s 312 and 313.[36] This notwithstanding, on March 1, 2001
petitioner organizations and individuals brought the present action in G.R. 147036-
37 to declare E.O.s 312 and 313 as well as Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468
unconstitutional. On April 24, 2001 the other sets of petitioner organizations and
individuals instituted G.R. 147811 to nullify Section 2 of P.D. 755 and Article III,
Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 also for being unconstitutional.

The Issues Presented

The parties submit the following issues for adjudication:

Procedurally
 1. Whether or not petitioners special civil actions of certiorari under Rule 65
constituted the proper remedy for their actions; and
2. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to bring the same to court.

On the substance

3. Whether or not the coco-levy funds are public funds; and

4. Whether or not (a) Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b) Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s
961 and 1468, (c) E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313 are unconstitutional.

The Rulings of the Court

First. UCPB questions the propriety of the present petitions

for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 on the ground that there are no
ongoing proceedings in any tribunal or board or before a government official
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. [37] UCPB insists that the
Court exercises appellate jurisdiction with respect to issues of constitutionality or
validity of laws and presidential orders.[38]

But, as the Court previously held, where there are serious allegations that a
law has infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but the duty of the
Court to look into such allegations and, when warranted, uphold the supremacy of
the Constitution.[39] Moreover, where the issues raised are of paramount importance
to the public, as in this case, the Court has the discretion to brush aside
technicalities of procedure.[40]

Second. The Court has to uphold petitioners right to institute these

petitions. The petitioner organizations in these cases represent coconut farmers on
whom the burden of the coco-levies attaches. It is also primarily for their benefit
that the levies were imposed.

The individual petitioners, on the other hand, join the petitions as

taxpayers. The Court recognizes their right to restrain officials from wasting public
funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. [41] This so-called
taxpayers suit is based on the theory that expenditure of public funds for the
purpose of executing an unconstitutional act is a misapplication of such funds.[42]

Besides, the 1987 Constitution accords to the citizens a greater participation

in the affairs of government. Indeed, it provides for people's initiative, the right to
information on matters of public concern (including the right to know the state of
health of their President), as well as the right to file cases questioning the factual
bases for the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or declaration of
martial law. These provisions enlarge the peoples right in the political as well as
the judicial field. It grants them the right to interfere in the affairs of government
and challenge any act tending to prejudice their interest.

Third. For some time, different and conflicting notions had been formed as
to the nature and ownership of the coco-levy funds. The Court, however, finally
put an end to the dispute when it categorically ruled in Republic of the Philippines
v. COCOFED[43] that these funds are not only affected with public interest; they
are, in fact, prima facie public funds. Prima facie means a fact presumed to be true
unless disproved by some evidence to the contrary.[44]

The Court was satisfied that the coco-levy funds were raised pursuant to law
to support a proper governmental purpose. They were raised with the use of the
police and taxing powers of the State for the benefit of the coconut industry and its
farmers in general. The COA reviewed the use of the funds. The Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) treated them as public funds and the very laws governing coconut
levies recognize their public character.[45]

The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds are in the
nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose.[46] Taxes are enforced
proportional contributions from persons and property, levied by the State by virtue
of its sovereignty for the support of the government and for all its public needs.
[47]
Here, the coco-levy funds were imposed pursuant to law, namely, R.A. 6260
and P.D. 276. The funds were collected and managed by the PCA, an independent
government corporation directly under the President.[48] And, as the respondent
public officials pointed out, the pertinent laws used the term levy,[49] which
means to tax,[50] in describing the exaction.
 Of course, unlike ordinary revenue laws, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276 did not
raise money to boost the governments general funds but to provide means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry, the coconut industry, which
is so affected with public interest as to be within the police power of the State.
[51]
The funds sought to support the coconut industry, one of the main economic
backbones of the country, and to secure economic benefits for the coconut farmers
and farm workers. The subject laws are akin to the sugar liens imposed by Sec.
7(b) of P.D. 388,[52] and the oil price stabilization funds under P.D. 1956, [53] as
amended by E.O. 137.[54]

Respondent UCPB suggests that the coco-levy funds are closely similar to
the Social Security System (SSS) funds, which have been declared to be not public
funds but properties of the SSS members and held merely in trust by the
government.[55] But the SSS Law[56] collects premium contributions. It does not
collect taxes from members for a specific public purpose. They pay contributions
in exchange for insurance protection and benefits like loans, medical or health
services, and retirement packages. The benefits accrue to every SSS member, not
to the public, in general.[57]

Furthermore, SSS members do not lose ownership of their

contributions. The government merely holds these in trust, together with his
employers contribution, to answer for his future benefits. [58] The coco-levy funds,
on the other hand, belong to the government and are subject to its administration
and disposition. Thus, these funds, including its incomes, interests, proceeds, or
profits, as well as all its assets, properties, and shares of stocks procured with such
funds must be treated, used, administered, and managed as public funds.[59]

Lastly, the coco-levy funds are evidently special funds. In Gaston v.

Republic Planters Bank,[60] the Court held that the State collected stabilization fees
from sugar millers, planters, and producers for a special purpose: to finance the
growth and development of the sugar industry and all its components. The fees
were levied for a special purpose and, therefore, constituted special fund when
collected. Its character as such fund was made clear by the fact that they were
deposited in the PNB (then a wholly owned government bank) and not in the
Philippine Treasury. In Osmea v. Orbos,[61] the Court held that the oil price
stabilization fund was a special fund mainly because this was segregated from the
general fund and placed in what the law referred to as a trust account. Yet it
remained subject to COA scrutiny and review. The Court finds no substantial
distinction between these funds and the coco-levy funds, except as to the industry
they each support.

Fourth. Petitioners in G.R. 147811 assert that Section 2 of P.D. 755 above is
void and unconstitutional for disregarding the public character of coco-levy
funds. The subject section provides:

Section 2. Financial Assistance. x x x and since the operations,

and activities of the Philippine Coconut Authority are all in accord with
the present social economic plans and programs of the Government, all
collections and levies which the Philippine Coconut Authority is
authorized to levy and collect such as but not limited to the Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Levy, and the Coconut Industry Development
Fund as prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 582 shall not be
considered or construed, under any law or regulation, special and/or
fiduciary funds and do not form part of the general funds of the
national government within the contemplation of Presidential Decree
No. 711. (Emphasis ours)

The Court has, however, already passed upon this question in Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic of the Philippines.
[62]
It held as unconstitutional Section 2 of P.D. 755 for effectively authorizing the
PCA to utilize portions of the CCS Fund to pay the financial commitment of the
farmers to acquire UCPB and to deposit portions of the CCS Fund levies with
UCPB interest free. And as there also provided, the CCS Fund, CID Fund and like
levies that PCA is authorized to collect shall be considered as non-special or
fiduciary funds to be transferred to the general fund of the Government, meaning
they shall be deemed private funds.

Identical provisions of subsequent presidential decrees likewise declared

coco-levy funds private properties of coconut farmers. Article III, Section 5 of P.D.
961 reads:

Section 5. Exemptions. The Coconut Consumers Stabilization

Fund and the Coconut Industry Development Fund as well as all
 disbursements of said funds for the benefit of the coconut farmers as
herein authorized shall not be construed or interpreted, under any
law or regulation, as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the
general funds of the national government within the contemplation of
P.D. No. 711; nor as a subsidy, donation, levy, government funded
investment, or government share within the contemplation of P.D.
898, the intention being that said Fund and the disbursements
thereof as herein authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers
shall be owned by them in their own private capacities. (Emphasis
ours)

Section 5 of P.D. 1468 basically reproduces the above provision, thus

Section 5. Exemption. The Coconut Consumers Stabilization

Fund and the Coconut Industry Development Fund, as well as all
disbursements as herein authorized, shall not be construed or
interpreted, under any law or regulation, as special and/or fiduciary
funds, or as part of the general funds of the national
government within the contemplation of P.D. 711; nor as subsidy,
donation, levy government funded investment, or government share
within the contemplation of P.D. 898, the intention being that said
Fund and the disbursements thereof as herein authorized for the
benefit of the coconut farmers shall be owned by them in their
private capacities: Provided, however, That the President may at any
time authorize the Commission on Audit or any other officer of the
government to audit the business affairs, administration, and condition of
persons and entities who receive subsidy for coconut-based consumer
products x x x. (Emphasis ours)

Notably, the raising of money by levy on coconut farm production, a form of

taxation as already stated, began in 1971 for the purpose of developing the coconut
industry and promoting the interest of coconut farmers. The use of the fund was
expanded in 1973 to include the stabilization of the domestic market for coconut-
based consumer goods and in 1974 to divert part of the funds for obtaining direct
benefit to coconut farmers. After five years or in 1976, however, P.D. 961 declared
the coco-levy funds private property of the farmers. P.D. 1468 reiterated this
declaration in 1978. But neither presidential decree actually turned over possession
or control of the funds to the farmers in their private capacity. The government
continued to wield undiminished authority over the management and disposition of
those funds.

In any event, such declaration is void. There is ownership when a thing

pertaining to a person is completely subjected to his will in everything that is not
prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another. [63] An owner is free
to exercise all attributes of ownership: the right, among others, to possess, use and
enjoy, abuse or consume, and dispose or alienate the thing owned. [64] The owner is
of course free to waive all or some of these rights in favor of others. But in the case
of the coconut farmers, they could not, individually or collectively, waive what
have not been and could not be legally imparted to them.

Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 961, and Article III,
Section 5 of P.D. 1468 completely ignore the fact that coco-levy funds are public
funds raised through taxation. And since taxes could be exacted only for a public
purpose, they cannot be declared private properties of individuals although such
individuals fall within a distinct group of persons.[65]

The Court of course grants that there is no hard-and-fast rule for determining
what constitutes public purpose. It is an elastic concept that could be made to fit
into modern standards. Public purpose, for instance, is no longer restricted to
traditional government functions like building roads and school houses or
safeguarding public health and safety.Public purpose has been construed as
including the promotion of social justice. Thus, public funds may be used for
relocating illegal settlers, building low-cost housing for them, and financing both
urban and agrarian reforms that benefit certain poor individuals. Still, these uses
relieve volatile iniquities in society and, therefore, impact on public order and
welfare as a whole.

But the assailed provisions, which removed the coco-levy funds from the
general funds of the government and declared them private properties of coconut
farmers, do not appear to have a color of social justice for their purpose. The levy
on copra that farmers produce appears, in the first place, to be a business tax
judging by its tax base. The concept of farmers-businessmen is incompatible with
the idea that coconut farmers are victims of social injustice and so should be
beneficiaries of the taxes raised from their earnings.
 It would altogether be different of course if the laws mentioned set apart a
portion of the coco-levy fund for improving the lives of destitute coconut farm
owners or workers for their social amelioration to establish a proper government
purpose. The support for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty and has
long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common
good.[66] But the declarations do not distinguish between wealthy coconut farmers
and the impoverished ones. And even if they did, the Government cannot just
embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or
otherwise.[67] Consequently, such declarations are void since they appropriate
public funds for private purpose and, therefore, violate the citizens right to
substantive due process.[68]
On another point, in stating that the coco-levy fund shall not be construed or
interpreted, under any law or regulation, as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as
part of the general funds of the national government, P.D.s 961 and 1468 seek to
remove such fund from COA scrutiny.

This is also the fault of President Estradas E.O. 312 which deals with P1
billion to be generated out of the sale of coco-fund acquired assets. Thus

Section 5. Audit of Fund and Submission of Report. The

Committee, by a majority vote, shall engage the services of a reputable
auditing firm to conduct periodic audits of the fund. It shall render a
quarterly report on all pertinent transactions and availments of the fund
to the Office of the President within the first three (3) working days of
the succeeding quarter. (Emphasis ours)

E.O. 313 has a substantially identical provision governing the management

and disposition of the Coconut Trust Fund capitalized with the substantial SMC
shares of stock that the coco-fund acquired. Thus

Section 13. Accounting. x x x

The Fund shall be audited annually or as often as necessary by

an external auditor designated by the Committee. The
Committee may also request the Commission on Audit to conduct an
audit of the Fund. (Emphasis ours)
 But, since coco-levy funds are taxes, the provisions of P.D.s 755, 961 and
1468 as well as those of E.O.s 312 and 313 that remove such funds and the assets
acquired through them from the jurisdiction of the COA violate Article IX-D,
Section 2(1)[69] of the 1987 Constitution. Section 2(1) vests in the COA the power
and authority to examine uses of government money and property. The cited P.D.s
and E.O.s also contravene Section 2[70] of P.D. 898 (Providing for the Restructuring
of the Commission on Audit), which has the force of a statute.

And there is no legitimate reason why such funds should be shielded from
COA review and audit. The PCA, which implements the coco-levy laws and
collects the coco-levy funds, is a government-owned and controlled corporation
subject to COA review and audit.

E.O. 313 suffers from an additional infirmity. Its title, Rationalizing the Use
of the Coconut Levy Funds by Constituting a Fund for Assistance to Coconut
Farmers as an Irrevocable Trust Fund and Creating a Coconut Trust Fund
Committee for the Management thereof tends to mislead. Apparently, it intends to
create a trust fund out of the coco-levy funds to provide economic assistance to the
coconut farmers and, ultimately, benefit the coconut industry.[71] But on closer look,
E.O. 313 strays from the special purpose for which the law raises coco-levy funds
in that it permits the use of coco-levy funds for improving productivity in other
food areas. Thus:

Section 2. Purpose of the Fund. The Fund shall be established for

the purpose of financing programs of assistance for the benefit of the
coconut farmers, the coconut industry, and other agri-related
programs intended to maximize food productivity, develop business
opportunities in the countryside, provide livelihood alternatives, and
promote anti-poverty programs. (Emphasis ours)

xxxx

Section 9. Use and Disposition of the Trust Income. The Coconut

Trust Fund Committee, on an annual basis, shall determine and establish
the amount comprising the Trust Income. After such determination, the
 Committee shall earmark, allocate and disburse the Trust Income for the
following purposes, namely:

xxxx

(d) Thirty percent (30%) of the Trust Income shall be used to

assist and fund agriculturally-related programs for the Government,
as reasonably determined by the Trust Fund Committee, implemented for
the purpose of: (i) maximizing food productivity in the agriculture areas
of the country, (ii) enhancing the upliftment and well-being of the living
conditions of farmers and agricultural workers, (iii) developing viable
industries and business opportunities in the countryside, (iv) providing
alternative means of livelihood to the direct dependents of agriculture
businesses and enterprises, and (v) providing financial assistance and
support to coconut farmers in times of economic hardship due to
extremely low prices of copra and other coconut products, natural
calamities, world market dislocation and similar occurrences, including
financial support to the ERAPs Sagip Niyugan Program established
under Executive Order No. 312 dated November 3, 2000; x x x.
(Emphasis ours)

Clearly, E.O. 313 above runs counter to the constitutional provision which
directs that all money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be
treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. [72] Assisting other
agriculturally-related programs is way off the coco-funds objective of promoting
the general interests of the coconut industry and its farmers.

A final point, the E.O.s also transgress P.D. 1445,[73] Section 84(2),[74] the
first part by the previously mentioned sections of E.O. 313 and the second part by
Section 4 of E.O. 312 and Sections 6 and 7 of E.O. 313. E.O. 313 vests the power
to administer, manage, and supervise the operations and disbursements of the Trust
Fund it established (capitalized with SMC shares bought out of coco-levy funds) in
a Coconut Trust Fund Committee. Thus

Section 6. Creation of the Coconut Trust Fund Committee. A

Committee is hereby created to administer, manage and supervise
the operations of the Trust Fund, chaired by the President with ten
(10) members, as follows:
 (a) four (4) representatives from the government sector, two
of whom shall be the Secretary of Agriculture and the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform who shall act as Vice
Chairmen;
(b) four (4) representatives from coconut farmers
organizations, one of whom shall come from a list of
nominees from the Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation Inc. (COCOFED);
(c) a representative from the CIIF; and
(d) a representative from a non-government organization
(NGO) involved in agricultural and rural development.

All decisions of the Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall be determined

by a majority vote of all the members.

The Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall perform the functions and
duties set forth in Section 7 hereof, with the skill, care, prudence and
diligence necessary under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in like capacity would exercise.

The members of the Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall be appointed

by the President and shall hold office at his pleasure.

The Coconut Trust Fund Committee is authorized to hire administrative,

technical and/or support staff as may be required to enable it to
effectively perform its functions and responsibilities. (Emphasis ours)

Section 7. Functions and Responsibilities of the Committee. The

Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall have the following functions and
responsibilities:
(a) set the investment policy of the Trust Fund;
(b) establish priorities for assistance giving preference to small
coconut farmers and farmworkers which shall be reviewed
periodically and revised as necessary in accordance with changing
conditions;
(c) receive, process and approve project proposals for financing
by the Trust Fund;
(d) decide on the use of the Trust Funds income or net
earnings including final action on applications for assistance,
grants and/or loans;
 (e) avail of professional counsel and services by retaining an
investment and financial manager, if desired;
(f) formulate the rules and regulations governing the
allocation, utilization and disbursement of the Fund; and
(g) perform such other acts and things as may be necessary proper
or conducive to attain the purposes of the Fund. (Emphasis ours)

Section 4 of E.O. 312 does essentially the same thing. It vests the
management and disposition of the assistance fund generated from the sale of
coco-levy fund-acquired assets into a Committee of five members. Thus, Section 4
of E.O. 312 provides

Section 4. Funding. Assets acquired through the coconut levy

funds or by entities financed by the coconut levy funds identified by the
President for appropriate disposal or sale, shall be sold or disposed to
generate a maximum fund of ONE BILLION PESOS
(P1,000,000,000.00) which shall be managed by a Committee
composed of a Chairman and four (4) members to be appointed by
the President whose term shall be co-terminus with the Program. x
x x (Emphasis ours)

In effect, the above transfers the power to allocate, use, and disburse coco-
levy funds that P.D. 232 vested in the PCA and transferred the same, without
legislative authorization and in violation of P.D. 232, to the Committees mentioned
above. An executive order cannot repeal a presidential decree which has the same
standing as a statute enacted by Congress.
UCPB invokes the principle of separability to save the assailed laws from
being struck down. The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as
repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
susceptible to being separated from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. When
the parts of a statute, however, are so mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the
rest. In which case, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions
which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected must consequently fall with
them.[75]
 But, given that the provisions of E.O.s 312 and 313, which as already stated
invalidly transferred powers over the funds to two committees that President
Estrada created, the rest of their provisions became non-operational. It is evident
that President Estrada would not have created the new funding programs if they
were to be managed by some other entity. Indeed, he made himself Chairman of
the Coconut Trust Fund and left to his discretion the appointment of the members
of the other committee.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition in G.R. 147036-

37, PARTLY GRANTS the petition in G.R. 147811, and declares the
following VOID:

a) E.O. 312, for being repugnant to Section 84(2) of P.D. 1445,

and Article IX-D, Section 2(1) of the Constitution; and

b) E.O. 313, for being in contravention of Section 84(2) of P.D.

1445, and Article IX-D, Section 2(1) and Article VI, Section 29(3) of
the Constitution.

The Court has previously declared Section 2 of P.D. 755 and Article III,
Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 unconstitutional.

SO ORDERED.

7. Metropolitan Bank vs. Tobias

664 SCRA 165 (2012)
G.R. No. 177780

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal assails the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) that dismissed
1

the petition for certiorari brought by the petitioner to nullify and set aside the
resolutions issued by the Secretary of Justice on July 20, 2004 and November 18,
2

2005 directing the City Prosecutor of Malabon City to withdraw the information in
3

Criminal Case No. 27020 entitled People v. Antonino O. Tobias III.

We affirm the CA in keeping with the principle of non-interference with the

prerogative of the Secretary of Justice to review the resolutions of the public
prosecutor in the latters determination of the existence of probable cause, absent any
showing that the Secretary of Justice thereby commits grave abuse of his discretion.

Antecedents
In 1997, Rosella A. Santiago, then the OIC-Branch Head of Metropolitan Bank &
Trust Company (METROBANK) in Valero Street, Makati City, was introduced to
respondent Antonino O. Tobias III (Tobias) by one Jose Eduardo Gonzales, a valued
client of METROBANK. Subsequently, Tobias opened a savings/current account for
and in the name of Adam Merchandising, his frozen meat business. Six months later,
Tobias applied for a loan from METROBANK, which in due course conducted trade
and credit verification of Tobias that resulted in negative findings. METROBANK
next proceeded to appraise the property Tobias offered as collateral by asking him for
a photocopy of the title and other related documents. The property consisted of four
4

parcels of land located in Malabon City, Metro Manila with a total area of 6,080
square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-16751. Based
5

on the financial statements submitted by Tobias, METROBANK approved a credit

line for P40,000,000.00. On August 15, 1997, Joselito Bermeo Moreno, Lead Internal
Affairs Investigator of METROBANK, proceeded to the Registry of Deeds of
Malabon to cause the annotation of the deed of real estate mortgage on TCT No. M-
16751. The annotation was Entry No. 26897. 6

Thereafter, Tobias initially availed himself of P20,000,000, but took out the balance
within six months. He paid the interest on the loan for about a year before defaulting.
7

His loan was restructured to 5-years upon his request. Yet, after two months, he again
defaulted. Thus, the mortgage was foreclosed, and the property was sold to
METROBANK as the lone bidder. On June 11, 1999, the certificate of sale was issued
8

in favor of METROBANK. 9
When the certificate of sale was presented for registration to the Registry of Deeds of
Malabon, no corresponding original copy of TCT No. M-16751 was found in the
registry vault. Atty. Sarah Principe-Bido, Deputy Register of Deeds of Malabon, went
on to verify TCT No. M-16751 and learned that Serial No. 4348590 appearing therein
had been issued for TCT No. M-15363 in the name of one Alberto Cruz; while TCT
No. 16751 (now TCT No. 390146) appeared to have been issued in the name of
Eugenio S. Cruz and Co. for a parcel of land located in Navotas.10

Given such findings, METROBANK requested the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime

Task Force (PAOCTF) to investigate. In its report dated May 29, 2000, PAOCTF
11 12

concluded that TCT No. M-16751 and the tax declarations submitted by Tobias were
fictitious. PAOCTF recommended the filing against Tobias of a criminal complaint
for estafa through falsification of public documents under paragraph 2 (a) of Article
315, in relation to Articles 172(1) and 171(7) of the Revised Penal Code.13

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged Tobias with estafa
through falsification of public documents through the following information, viz:
14

xxx
That on or about the 15 th day of August, 1997 in the Municipality of
Malabon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of deceit, false pretense,
fraudulent acts and misrepresentation executed prior to or simultaneous
with the commission of fraud, represented to METROBANK, as
represented by MS. ROSELLA S. SANTIAGO, that he is the registered
owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. M-16751 which he
represented to be true and genuine when he knew the Certificate of Title
No. M-16751 is fake and spurious and executed a Real Estate Mortgage
in favor of Metrobank and offered the same as collateral for a loan and
Rosella S. Santiago relying on said misrepresentation gave to accused,
the amount of P20,000,000.00 and once in possession of the amount,
with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously failed to
deliver the land covered by spurious title and misappropriate, misapply
and converted the said amount of P20,000,000.00 to his own personal
use and benefit and despite repeated demands accused failed and refused
and still fails and refuses to return the amount to complainant
METROBANK, and/or delivered the land covered in the spurious title in
the aforementioned amount of P20,000,000.00.
 CONTRARY TO LAW. 15

Tobias filed a motion for re-investigation, which was granted.

16

In his counter-affidavit submitted during the re-investigation, Tobias averred that he

17

had bought the property from one Leonardo Fajardo through real estate brokers
Augusto Munsuyac and Carmelito Pilapil; that Natalio Bartolome, his financial
consultant from Carwin International, had convinced him to purchase the property due
to its being an ideal site for his meat processing plant and cold storage business; that
the actual inspection of the property as well as the verification made in the Registry of
Deeds of Malabon City had ascertained the veracity of TCT No. 106083 under the
name of Leonardo Fajardo; that he had applied for the loan from METROBANK to
pay the purchase price by offering the property as collateral; that in order for the final
application to be processed and the loan proceeds to be released, METROBANK had
advised him to have the title first transferred to his name; that he had executed a deed
of absolute sale with Fajardo covering the property, and that said instrument had been
properly registered in the Registry of Deeds; that the transfer of the title, being under
the account of the seller, had been processed by seller Fajardo and his brokers
Munsuyac and Pilapil; that his title and the property had been inspected and verified
by METROBANKs personnel; and that he did not have any intention to defraud
METROBANK.

Nonetheless, on December 27, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Malabon still found
probable cause against Tobias, and recommended his being charged with estafa
through falsification of public document. 18

Tobias appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On July 20, 2004, then Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez
issued a resolution directing the withdrawal of the information filed against Tobias, to
19

wit:

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and

SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Malabon City is directed to cause
the withdrawal of the Information in Crim. Case No. 27020 against
 respondent Antonino O. Tobias III, and report the action taken thereon
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

Acting Secretary of Justice Gutierrez opined that Tobias had sufficiently established
his good faith in purchasing the property; that he had even used part of the proceeds of
the loan to pay the seller; that it was METROBANK that had caused the annotation of
the mortgage on the TCT, thereby creating an impression that the title had been
existing in the Registry of Deeds at that time; that, accordingly, the presumption that
the possessor of a falsified document was the author of the falsification did not apply
because it was always subject to the qualification or reference as to the approximate
time of the commission of the falsification.

METROBANK moved to reconsider, arguing that Tobias had employed deceit or

20

false pretense in offering the property as collateral by using a fake title; and that the
presumption that the possessor of the document was the author of the falsification
applied because no other person could have falsified the TCT and would have
benefitted therefrom except Tobias himself.

On November 18, 2005, Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez denied

METROBANKs motion for reconsideration. 21

Ruling of the CA

METROBANK challenged the adverse resolutions through certiorari.

On December 29, 2006, the CA promulgated its decision, dismissing 22

METROBANKs petition for certiorari by holding that the presumption of authorship

might be disputed through a satisfactory explanation, viz:

We are not unaware of the established presumption and rule that when it
is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified document and
makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is that such person
is the forger (Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651 [2003]),
citing Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192 SCRA 533, 546-547 [1990]). Yet,
the Supreme Court declared that in the absence of satisfactory
explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and
who used it is presumed to be the forger (citing People vs. Sendaydiego,
81 SCRA 120, 141 [1978]). Very clearly then, a satisfactory explanation
could render ineffective the presumption which, after all, is merely a
disputable one.

It is in this score that We affirm the resolution of the Department of

Justice finding no probable cause against private respondent Tobias for
estafa thru falsification of public document. The record speaks well of
Tobias good faith and lack of criminal intention and liability. Consider:

(a) Tobias has in his favor a similar presumption that good

faith is always presumed. Therefore, he who claims bad faith
must prove it (Prinsipio vs. The Honorable Oscar Barrientos,
G.R. 167025, December 19, 2005). No such evidence of bad
faith of Tobias appears on record;

(b) Tobias actuation in securing the loan belies any criminal

intent on his part to deceive petitioner Bank. He was not in a
hurry to obtain the loan. He had to undergo the usual process of
the investigative arm or machine of the Bank not only on the
location and the physical appearance of the property but
likewise the veracity of its title. Out of the
approved P40,000,000.00 loan he only availed
of P20,000,000.00, for his frozen meat business which upon
investigation of the Bank failed to give negative results;

(c) Tobias paid the necessary interests for one (1) year on the
loan and two (2) installments on the restructured loan; and

(d) More importantly, the loan was not released to him until
after the mortgage was duly registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Malabon City and even paid the amount of P90,000.00
for the registration fees therefor.

These actuations, for sure, can only foretell that Tobias has the least
intention to deceive the Bank in obtaining the loan. It may not be
surprising to find that Tobias could even be a victim himself by another
person in purchasing the properties he offered as security for the loan. 23
 The CA stressed that the determination of probable cause was an executive
function within the discretion of the public prosecutor and, ultimately, of the Secretary
of Justice, and the courts of law could not interfere with such determination; that the
24

private complainant in a criminal action was only concerned with its civil aspect; that
should the State choose not to file the criminal action, the private complainant might
initiate a civil action based on Article 35 of the Civil Code, to wit:

In the eventuality that the Secretary of Justice refuses to file the criminal
complaint, the complainant, whose only interest is the civil aspect of the
case and not the criminal aspect thereof, is not left without a remedy. In
Vda. De Jacob vs. Puno, 131 SCRA 144, 149 [1984], the Supreme Court
has this for an answer:

The remedy of complainant in a case where the Minister of

Justice would not allow the filing of a criminal complaint
against an accused because it is his opinion that the evidence is
not sufficient to sustain an information for the complaint with
which the respondents are charged of, is to file a civil action as
indicated in Article 35 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a

criminal offense, charges another with the same, for
which no independent civil action is granted in this Code
or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no
reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to
institute criminal proceedings, the complainant may bring
a civil action for damages against the alleged offender.
Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of
evidence. Upon the defendants motion, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the
defendant in case the complainant should be found to be
malicious.

If during the pendency of the civil action, an information

should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil
action shall be suspended until the termination of the
criminal proceedings. 25
METROBANK sought reconsideration, but the CA denied its motion for that purpose,
emphasizing that the presumption that METROBANK firmly relied upon was
overcome by Tobias sufficiently establishing his good faith and lack of criminal
intent. The CA relevantly held:

Petitioner should be minded that the subject presumption that the

possessor and user of a forged or falsified document is presumed to be
the falsifier or forger is a mere disputable presumption and not a
conclusive one. Under the law on evidence, presumptions are divided
into two (2) classes: conclusive and rebuttable. Conclusive or absolute
presumptions are rules determining the quantity of evidence requisite for
the support of any particular averment which is not permitted to be
overcome by any proof that the fact is otherwise, if the basis facts are
established (1 Greenleaf, Ev 44; 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence 164; 1 Jones on
Evidence 6 ed, page 132). Upon the other hand, a disputable
presumption has been defined as species of evidence that may be
accepted and acted on when there is no other evidence to uphold the
contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other
evidence (31A C.J.S., p. 197; People v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 106025,
Feb. 9, 1994; Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. VI, 1999 Edition, pp. 40-41).
In fact, Section 3 of Rule 131 provides that the disputable presumptions
therein enumerated are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence. Thus, as declared in Our
decision in this case, private respondent had shown evidence of good
faith and lack of criminal intention and liability that can overthrow the
controversial disputable presumption.26

Issue
In this appeal, METROBANK raises the lone issue of

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS

DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE PROBABLY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS
OF THIS HONORABLE COURT AND THUS, COMMITTED PATENT
ERROR IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED DECISION DATED 29
DECEMBER 2006, DISMISSING METROBANKS PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTIONS DATED 20
JULY 2004 AND 18 NOVEMBER 2005 OF THE HON. SECRETARY
OF JUDTICE AND IN DENYING METROBANKS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.
METROBANK submits that the presumption of authorship was sufficient to establish
probable cause to hold Tobias for trial; that the presumption applies when a person is
found in possession of the forged instrument, makes use of it, and benefits from it;
that contrary to the ruling of the CA, there is no requirement that the legal
presumption shall only apply in the absence of a valid explanation from the person
found to have possessed, used and benefited from the forged document; that the CA
erred in declaring that Tobias was in good faith, because good faith was merely
evidentiary and best raised in the trial on the merits; and that Tobias was heavily
involved in a modus operandi of using fake titles because he was also being tried for a
similar crime in the RTC, Branch 133, in Makati City.
METROBANK maintains that what the Secretary of Justice did was to determine the
innocence of the accused, which should not be done during the preliminary
investigation; and that the CA disregarded such lapse.

On the other hand, Tobias posits that the core function of the Department of Justice is
to prosecute the guilty in criminal cases, not to persecute; that although the
prosecutors are given latitude to determine the existence of probable cause, the review
power of the Secretary of Justice prevents overzealous prosecutors from persecuting
the innocent; that in reversing the resolution of Malabon City Assistant Prosecutor
Ojer Pacis, the Secretary of Justice only acted within his authority; that, indeed, the
Secretary of Justice was correct in finding that there was lack of evidence to prove
that the purported fake title was the very cause that had induced the petitioner to grant
the loan; and that the Secretary likewise appropriately found that Tobias dealt with the
petitioner in good faith because of lack of proof that he had employed fraud and deceit
in securing the loan.

Lastly, Tobias argues that the presumption of forgery could not be applied in his case
because it was METROBANK, through a representative, who had annotated the real
estate mortgage with the Registry of Deeds; and that he had no access to and contact
with the Registry of Deeds, and whatever went wrong after the annotation was beyond
his control.

Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide
matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive
Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the
27

Executive Branch, represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled
28

policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable
cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
29

evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to

act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. For instance, in Balanganan v.
30

Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City, the Court ruled that the
31

Secretary of Justice exceeded his jurisdiction when he required hard facts and solid
evidence in order to hold the defendant liable for criminal prosecution when such
requirement should have been left to the court after the conduct of a trial.

In this regard, we stress that a preliminary investigation for the purpose of

determining the existence of probable cause is not part of a trial. At a preliminary
32

investigation, the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice only determines

whether the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Probable
33

cause refers to facts and circumstances that engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. There is
34

no definitive standard by which probable cause is determined except to consider the

attendant conditions; the existence of probable cause depends upon the finding of the
public prosecutor conducting the examination, who is called upon not to disregard the
facts presented, and to ensure that his finding should not run counter to the clear
dictates of reason.
35

Tobias was charged with estafa through falsification of public document the elements
of which are: (a) the accused uses a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or employs other similar deceits; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act
or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or
property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (d) as a
result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. It is required that the false
36

statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive
that induced the complainant to part with the thing.37

METROBANK urges the application of the presumption of authorship against Tobias

based on his having offered the duplicate copy of the spurious title to secure the loan;
and posits that there is no requirement that the presumption shall apply only when
there is absence of a valid explanation from the person found to have possessed, used
and benefited from the forged document.

We cannot sustain METROBANKs urging.

Firstly, a presumption affects the burden of proof that is normally lodged in the
State. The effect is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima
38

facie case that shall prevail in the absence of proof to the contrary. As such, a
39

presumption of law is material during the actual trial of the criminal case where in the
establishment thereof the party against whom the inference is made should adduce
evidence to rebut the presumption and demolish the prima facie case. This is not so in
40

a preliminary investigation, where the investigating prosecutor only determines the

existence of a prima facie case that warrants the prosecution of a criminal case in
court.
41

Secondly, the presumption of authorship, being disputable, may be accepted and acted
upon where no evidence upholds the contention for which it stands. It is not correct to
42

say, consequently, that the investigating prosecutor will try to determine the existence
of the presumption during preliminary investigation, and then to disregard the
evidence offered by the respondent. The fact that the finding of probable cause during
a preliminary investigation is an executive function does not excuse the investigating
prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice from discharging the duty to weigh the evidence
submitted by the parties. Towards that end, the investigating prosecutor, and,
ultimately, the Secretary of Justice have ample discretion to determine the existence of
probable cause, a discretion that must be used to file only a criminal charge that the
43

evidence and inferences can properly warrant.

The presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is its forger
applies only in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. Accordingly, we cannot hold
44
that the Secretary of Justice erred in dismissing the information in the face of the
controverting explanation by Tobias showing how he came to possess the spurious
document. Much less can we consider the dismissal as done with abuse of discretion,
least of all grave. We concur with the erudite exposition of the CA on the matter, to
wit:

It would seem that under the above proposition of the petitioner, the
moment a person has in his possession a falsified document and has
made use of it, probable cause or prima facie is already established and
that no amount of satisfactory explanation will prevent the filing of the
case in court by the investigating officer, for any such good explanation
or defense can only be threshed out in the trial on the merit. We are not
to be persuaded. To give meaning to such argumentation will surely
defeat the very purpose for which preliminary investigation is required in
this jurisdiction.

A preliminary investigation is designed to secure the respondent

involved against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. A
preliminary investigation is an inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime
has been committed, and (b) whether there is probable cause to believe
that the accused is guilty thereof (De Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice,
480 SCRA 71 [2006]). It is a means of discovering the person or persons
who may be reasonably charged with a crime (Preferred Home
Specialties, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 478 SCRA 387, 410 [2005]).
Prescindingly, under Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the respondent must be informed of the accusation against
him and shall have the right to examine the evidence against him and
submit his counter-affidavit to disprove criminal liability. By far,
respondent in a criminal preliminary investigation is legally entitled to
explain his side of the accusation.

We are not unaware of the established presumption and rule that when it
is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified document and
makes use of the same the presumption or inference is that such person
is the forger (Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651 [2003]),
citing Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192 SCRA 533, 546-547 [1990]). Yet,
the Supreme Court declared that in the absence of satisfactory
explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and
who used it is presumed to be the forger (citing People vs. Sendaydiego,
81 SCRA 120, 141 [1978]). Very clearly then, a satisfactory explanation
 could render ineffective the presumption which, after all, is merely a
disputable one.45

We do not lose sight of the fact that METROBANK, a commercial bank dealing in
real property, had the duty to observe due diligence to ascertain the existence and
condition of the realty as well as the validity and integrity of the documents bearing
on the realty. Its duty included the responsibility of dispatching its competent and
46

experience representatives to the realty to assess its actual location and condition, and
of investigating who was its real owner. Yet, it is evident that METROBANK did not
47

diligently perform a thorough check on Tobias and the circumstances surrounding the
realty he had offered as collateral. As such, it had no one to blame but itself. Verily,
banks are expected to exercise greater care and prudence than others in their dealings
because their business is impressed with public interest. Their failure to do so
48

constitutes negligence on its part.

49

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari,

and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on December 29,
2006. The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 8. Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons
90 Phil 70 (1951)
G.R. No. L-4254 September 26, 1951

TUASON, J.:

This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff, the first having been denied in a decision
of this Court of July 30, 1949. The history of the petitioner's detention was thus briefly set forth in that
decision, written by Mr. Justice Bengzon:

The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country
from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in
these Islands. Upon liberation he was arrested as a Japanese spy, by U.S. Army Counter
Intelligence Corps. Later he was handed to theCommonwealth Government for disposition in
accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 682. Thereafter, the People's Court ordered his
release. But the deportation Board taking his case up, found that having no travel documents
Mejoff was illegally in this country, and consequently referred the matter to the immigration
authorities. After the corresponding investigation, the Board of commissioners of Immigration
on April 5, 1948, declared that Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944, without
inspection and admission by the immigration officials at a designation port of entry and,
therefore, it ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to Russia. The
petitioner was then under custody, he having been arrested on March 18, 1948. In May 1948
he was transferred to the Cebu Provincial Jail together with three other Russians to await the
arrival of some Russian vessels. In July and August of that year two boats of Russian
nationality called at the Cebu Port. But their masters refused to take petitioner and his
companions alleging lack of authority to do so. In October 1948 after repeated failures to
ship this deportee abroad, the authorities removed him to Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa
where he has been confined up to the present time, inasmuch as the Commissioner of
Immigration believes it is for the best interests of the country to keep him under detention
while arrangements for his departure are being made.

The Court held the petitioner's detention temporary and said that "temporary detention is a
necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending
arrangements for his deportation, the Government has the right to hold the undesirable alien under
confinement for a reasonable lenght of time." It took note of the fact, manifested by the Solicitor
General's representative in the course of the of the oral argumment, that "this Government desires to
expel the alien, and does not relish keeping him at the people's expense . . . making efforts to carry
out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land." No period was fixed within which the
immigration authorities should carry out the contemplated deportation beyond the statement that
"The meaning of 'reasonable time' depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of
obtaining a passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements with the
governments concerned and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away;" but the Court warned
that "under established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus."
Mr. Justice Paras, now Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Perfecto, and the writer of this
decision dissented. Mr. Justice Feria and Mr. Justice Perfecto voted for outright discharge of the
prisoner from custody. Mr. Justice Paras qualified his dissent by stating that he might agree "to
further detention of the herein petitioner, provided that he be released if after six months, the
Government is still unable to deport him." This writer joined in the latter dissent but thought that two
months constituted reasonable time.

Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the Government has
not found way and means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are in sight,
although it should be said in justice to the deportation authorities, it was through no fault of theirs
that no ship or country would take the petitioner.

Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein (Sowapadji vs. Wixon, Sept.
18, 1946, 157 F. ed., 289, 290), even if they are "stateless," which the petitioner claims to be. It is no
less true however, as impliedly stated in this Court's decision, supra, that foreign nationals, not
enemy against whom no charge has been made other than that their permission to stay has expired,
may not indefinitely be kept in detention. The protection against deprivation of liberty without due
process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land is not limited to
Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.
Whether an alien who entered the country in violation of its immigration laws may be detained for as
long as the Government is unable to deport him, is a point we need not decide. The petitioner's entry
into the Philippines was not unlawful; he was brought by the armed and belligerent forces of a de
facto government whose decrees were law furing the occupation.

Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal
Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of which
the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty
and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was there
resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that
"Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social
origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2): that "Every one has the right to an effective remedy by
the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile"
(Art. 9); etc.

In U. S. vs. Nichols, 47 Fed. Supp., 201, it was said that the court "has the power to release from
custody an alien who has been detained an unreasonably long period of time by the Department of
Justice after it has become apparent that although a warrant for his deportation has been issued, the
warrant can not be effectuated;" that "the theory on which the court is given the power to act is that
the warrant of deportation, not having been able to be executed, is functus officio and the alien is
being held without any authority of law." The decision cited several cases which, it said, settled the
matter definitely in that jurisdiction, adding that the same result had reached in innumerable cases
elsewhere. The cases referred to were United States ex rel. Ross vs. Wallis, 2 Cir. 279 F. 401, 404;
Caranica vs. Nagle, 9 Cir., 28 F. 2d 955; Saksagansky vs. Weedin, 9 Cir., 53 F. 2d 13, 16 last
paragraph; Ex parte Matthews, D.C.W.D. Wash., 277 F. 857; Moraitis vs. Delany, D.C. Md. Aug. 28,
1942, 46 F. Supp. 425.

The most recent case, as far as we have been able to find, was that of Staniszewski vs. Watkins
(1948), 90 Fed. Supp., 132, which is nearly foursquare with the case at hand. In that case a
stateless person, formerly a Polish national, resident in the United States since 1911 and many times
serving as a seaman on American vessels both in peace and in war, was ordered excluded from the
United States and detained at Ellis Island at the expense of the steamship company, when he
returned from a voyage on which he had shipped from New York for one or more European ports
and return to the United States. The grounds for his exclusion were that he had no passport or
immigration visa, and that in 1937 had been convicted of perjury because in certain documents he
presented himself to be an American citizen. Upon his application for release on habeas corpus, the
Court released him upon his own recognizance. Judge Leibell, of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, said in part:

When the return to the writ of habeas corpus came before this court, I suggested that all
interested parties . . . make an effort to arrange to have the petitioner ship out of some
country that he would receive him as a resident. He is, a native-born Pole but the Polish
Consul has advised him in writing that he is no longer a Polish subject. This Government
does not claim that he is a Polish citizen. His attorney says he is a stateless. The
Government is willing that he go back to the ship, but if he were sent back aboard a ship and
sailed to the Port (Cherbourg, France) from which he last sailed to the United States, he
would probably be denied permission to land. There is no other country that would take him,
without proper documents.

It seems to me that this is a genuine hardship case and that the petitioner should be
released from custody on proper terms. . . .

What is to be done with the petitioner? The government has had him in custody almost
seven months and practically admits it has no place to send him out of this country. The
steamship company, which employed him as one of a group sent to the ship by the Union,
with proper seaman's papers issued by the United States Coast Guard, is paying $3 a day
for petitioner's board at Ellis Island. It is no fault of the steamship company that petitioner is
an inadmissible alien as the immigration officials describe him. . . .

I intend to sustain the writ of habeas corpus and order the release of the petitioner on his
own recognizance. He will be required to inform the immigration officials at Ellis Island by
mail on the 15th of each month, stating where he is employed and where he can be reached
by mail. If the government does succeed in arranging for petitioner's deportation to a country
that will be ready to receive him as a resident, it may then advise the petitioner to that effect
and arrange for his deportation in the manner provided by law.

Although not binding upon this Court as a precedent, the case aforecited affords a happy solution to
the quandry in which the parties here finds themselves, solution which we think is sensible, sound
and compatible with law and the Constitution. For this reason, and since the Philippine law on
immigration was patterned after or copied from the American law and practice, we choose to follow
and adopt the reasoning and conclusions in the Staniszewski decision with some modifications
which, it is believed, are in consonance with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the
Philippines.

It was said or insinuated at the hearing ofthe petition at bar, but not alleged in the return, that the
petitioner was engaged in subversive activities, and fear was expressed that he might join or aid the
disloyal elements if allowed to be at large. Bearing in mind the Government's allegation in its answer
that "the herein petitioner was brought to the Philippines by the Japanese forces," and the fact that
Japan is no longer at war with the United States or the Philippines nor identified with the countries
allied against these nations, the possibility of the petitioner's entertaining or committing hostile acts
prejudicial to the interest and security of this country seems remote.
If we grant, for the sake of argument, that such a possibility exists, still the petitioner's unduly
prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if the only purpose of the
detention be to eliminate a danger that is by no means actual, present, or uncontrolable. After all, the
Government is not impotent to deal with or prevent any threat by such measure as that just outlined.
The thought eloquently expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court in
connection with the appliccation for bail of ten Communists convicted by a lower court of advocacy
of violent overthrow of the United States Government is, in principle, pertinent and may be availed of
at this juncture. Said the learned Jurist:

The Governmet's alternative contention is that defendants, by misbehavior after conviction,

have forfeited their claim to bail. Grave public danger is said to result from what they may be
expected to do, in addition to what they have done since their conviction. If I assume that
defendants are disposed to commit every opportune disloyal to act helpful to Communist
countries, it is still difficult to reconcile with traditional American law the jailing of persons by
the courts because of anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes. lmprisonment to protect
society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and
so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort it, even as a
discretionary judicial technique to supplement conviction of such offenses as those of which
defendants stand convicted.

But the right of every American to equal treatment before the law is wrapped up in the same
constitutional bundle with those of these Communists. If an anger or disgust with these
defendants we throw out the bundle, we alsocast aside protection for the liberties of more
worthy critics who may be in opposition to the government of some future day.

xxx xxx xxx 1wphl.nt

If, however, I were to be wrong on all of these abstract or theoretical matters of principle,
there is a very practical aspect of this application which must not be overlooked or
underestimated that is the disastrous effect on the reputation of American justice if I
should now send these men to jail and the full Court later decide that their conviction is
invalid. All experience with litigation teaches that existence of a substantial question about a
conviction implies a more than negligible risk of reversal. Indeed this experience lies back of
our rule permitting and practice of allowing bail where such questions exist, to avoid the
hazard of unjustifiably imprisoning persons with consequent reproach to our system of
justice. If that is prudent judicial practice in the ordinary case, how much more important to
avoid every chance of handing to the Communist world such an ideological weapon as it
would have if this country should imprison this handful of Communist leaders on a conviction
that our highest Court would confess to be illegal. Risks, of course, are involved in either
granting or refusing bail. I am naive enough to underestimate the troublemaking propensities
of the defendants. But, with the Department of Justice alert to the the dangers, the worst they
can accomplish in the short time it will take to end the litigation is preferable to the possibility
of national embarrassment from a celebrated case of unjustified imprisonment of Communist
leaders. Under no circumstances must we permit their symbolization of an evil force in the
world to be hallowed and glorified by any semblance of martyrdom. The way to avoid that
risk is not to jail these men until it is finally decided that they should stay jailed.

If that case is not comparable with ours on the issues presented, its underlying principle is of
universal application. In fact, its ratio decidendi applies with greater force to the present petition,
since the right of accused to bail pending apppeal of his case, as in the case of the ten Communists,
depends upon the discretion of the court, whereas the right to be enlarged before formal charges are
instituted is absolute. As already noted, not only are there no charges pending against the petitioner,
but the prospects of bringing any against him are slim and remote.

Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from
custody upon these terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration
authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he
keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be
reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of
First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. He shall also put up a bond for the above
purpose in the amount of P5,000 with sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the Commissioner of
Immigration is authorized to exact by section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.

No costs will be charged.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PABLO, M., disidente:

Disiento

En decision disada por este Tribunal en la primera causa de habeas corpus incoada por el
solicitante Boris Mejoff (G.R. No. L-2855, Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons)*, se declaro que el habia
venido a Filipinas procedente de Shanghai como espia japones; en la liberacion, el ejercito
americano le arresto por se espia, habiendo sido mas tarde entregado al Gobierno del
Commonwealth para ser tratado de acuerdo con la ley No.682; pero como bajo el Codgo Penal
Revisado, antes de su enmienda por la Orden Ejecutiva No. 44, (mayo 31, 1945) no se castiga al
extranjero que comete traicion, Mejoff fue puesto en libertad. Despues de una debida investigacion,
la Junta de Departacion encontra que el solicitante no tenia permiso para entrar en Filipinas; fue
entregado a la Junta de Inmigacion, la cual ordeno su deportacion a Rusia por el primer transporte
disponible por haber vendo aqui ilegalmente; fue enviado a Cebu para que alli se embarcase, pero
los dos barcos de nacionalidad rusa que llegaron a dicho puerto en julio y agosto de 1948 rehusaron
admitirle. Por no encontrar transportacion para su departacion, Mejoff fue enviado a la Prison de
Muntinglupa, donde esta actualmente de tenido mientras el Gobierno no encuenra medio de
transportarle a Rusia.

La mayoria contiende que "The Petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not unlawful; he was
brought by the armed and belligerent forces of a de facto government whose decrees were law
during the occupation." Es tan ilegal la entrada del solicitante como la del ejercito al que sirvio como
espia. Ninguno tiene derecho a permanecer aqui. Puesto que fue vencido el ejercito invasor que le
trajo, el solicitante no tiene derecho a pemanecer aqui ni un minuto mas. Si desea proteccion, debe
acudir al Gobierno Japones a cuyo ejercito el sirvio; el hecho de que ya esta aqui no le da titulo para
permanecer libre aqui. El que ha venido como espia de enemigo del Pueblo de Filipinas no tiene
derecho a pedir igual trato que aquel ha entrado de buena fe. Es que Filipinos tiene la obligacion
de acoger a un ciudadano indeseable de Rusia? Desde cuando tiene que allanarse una nacion a
ser residencia de una extranjero que entro como enemigo o, peor aun, como espia? Un Estado
tiene indiscutible derecho a deportar y expulsar de su territorio a todo extranjero indeseable.
El solicitante sostiene que no tiene estado. Eso no es razon para que tenga derecho a permanecer
aqui. Puede ser departado a Rusio o a Shanghai de donde vino. Si todos los rusos que, por alguno
que otro motivo, o por odio al comunisomo, dejasen su pais y emigrasen aqui reclamando igual
derecho, no habria territorio suficiente para ellos. Se puede decir otro tanto de los chinos que, so
pretexto de no querer someterse al regimen comunista, optasen por resider para siempre aqui. Y si
los mismos communistas chinos viniesen clandestinamente y despues reclamasen igual proteccion
como la concedida a Mejoff, tendreos que darles por el gusto?

Se invoca la resolucion aprobada por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, titulada
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights", en la que se establece, entre otras cosas, que "no one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." Yo soy de los que creen firmemente en lo
sagrado de esta resolucion; no puedo permitir que se detenga y se arreste a alguien sin motivo
justificado, de una manera arbitraria; pero el solicitante no esta detenido de esta manera, lo esta de
una manera provisional. Tan pronto como haya barco disponible para su deportacion o tan pronto
como pueda embarcarse en algun barco para el extenjero o para cualquier otro punto a donde
quiera ir, dejara de ser detenido. Conste que no esta preso como un criminal condenado por un
delito; esta tratado como cualquier otro extranjero sujeto a deportacion. Si el solicitante no hubiera
sido espia, si no hubiera venido aqui para ayudar a las hordas japonesas en la subyugacion del
pueblo filipino, si hubiera venido como visitante, por ejemplo, y, por azares de la fortuna, no pudo
salir, yo seria el primero en abogar por su liberacion inmediata.

Se cita el caso de Staniszewski vs. Watkins, (1948 A.M.C. 931, 42 American Journal of International
Law, 732) en el cual el recurrente estuvo detenido ya casi siete meses cuando se decreto su libertad
en un recurso de habeas corpus. En nuestra opinion, dicho caso no tiene simulitud con la causa
presente. Staniszewski era residente de los Estados desde 1911; estuvo sirviendo como marino en
barcos mercantes americanos en tiempo de guerra y se ordeno su detencion en Ellis Island cuando
volvio a America procedente de un viaje a Europa por no tener papeles de inmigracion.
Staniszewski no habia entrado en los Estados Unidos como espia, estuvo residiendo en dicho pais
por varios aos, era ya habitante de los Estados unidos. La ocupacion de marino es honrosa, la del
espia mercenario, detestable. El espia es peor que el enemigo. Este lucha cara a cara, y el espia,
con disimulo y arte engaosa, escucha lo que a Staniszewski se le haya puesto en libertad. Poner
en libertad a un espia es poner en peligro la seguridad del Estado.

En cuanto a la duracion de la detencion provisional del recurrente, no hay regla fija, depende de la
cincunstancia de cada caso particular. Es evidente que los medios de comunicacion entre Filipinas y
Rusia o Shanghai, debico a fala de relciones diplomaticas, son completamente anormales. No es
culpa del gobierno el que no encuentre medios de transportacion para el.

La Comision de Inmigracion ha dado pasos para que la International Refugee Organziation of the
United Nations (IRO0 se hiciera cargo del recurrente para que pueda ser repartriado o enviado a
otro pais extranjero, pero el Jefe de dicha organizacion contesto que no estaba en condicines para
aceptar dicha recomendacion.

William Martin Jurgans fue arrestado en 9 de enero de 1920, en 20 de mayo se decreto su

deportacion por el Sub Secretario del Tarabajo por violacion de la Ley de Inmigracion; solicto su
libertad bajo el recurso de Habeas Corpus, y en 16 de febrero de 1927 se denego su peticion; no se
le pudo deportar porque "the necessary arrangements for his deportation could obviously not be
made." (District Court of Minnesota, 17 F. 2nd series, 507). Como se vera, la detencion provisional
de William Martin Jurgans duro mas de seis aos; la de Mejoff no ha sido mas que de 31 meses, y
no porque el gobierno no quiere deportarle, sino porque no hay medio disponible para realizarlo.

En Moraitis vs. Delany, 46 F. Supp., 425, se dijo:

 What constitutes a reasonable time for the detention of the petitioner in custody for
deportation depends upon the facts and circumstances of particular cases. This court cannot
shut its eyes to the vitally important interests of this country at this time with respect to the
bottleneck of shipping, when every available ship, domestic and foreign, must be utilized to
the utmost without delay consequent upon the lack of avilable seamen. Under these present
conditions the court should be liberal indeed in aiding the executive branch of the govenment
in the strict enforcement of laws so vitally necessary in the common defns. There is sound
authority for this view in United States ex. rel. Schlimm vs. Howe, D C.N. U Y. 222 F. 96, 97,
where Circuit Judge Lacombe refused to release an alien who had come here from Germany
and was ordered deported in 1915 when, by reason of the then existing war between
Germany and England, his deportation to Germany was not possible. It was said:

At the present time there is no regular passenger ocean service to German ports, so the
authorities are unable to forward him, and are holding him until some opportunity of returning
him to Germany may present itself. His continual detention is unfortunate, but certainly is not
illegal. His present condition can be alleviated only by the action of the executive branch of
the government. A federal court would not be justified in discharging him. . . .

If he is not really fit for sea service, it is not probable that he would be forced into it, although
he may be able to serve his government in some other capacity. But however that may be,
while this country has no power under existing legislation to impress him into sea service
against his will, he has no just cause to be relieved from the strict enforcement of our
deportation laws, and to remain at liberty in this country as a sanctuary contrary to our laws.

No es arbitraria la detencion de Mejoff. Esta jutificada por las circunstancias anormales.

La proposicion de vigilar al recurrente hasta que el gobierno encuentre transporte para su

deportacion, supon un gasto innecesario.
 9. Mijares vs. Ranada
455 SCRA 397 (2005)
[G.R. No. 139325. April 12, 2005]

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

Our martial law experience bore strange unwanted fruits, and we have yet
to finish weeding out its bitter crop. While the restoration of freedom and the
fundamental structures and processes of democracy have been much lauded,
according to a significant number, the changes, however, have not sufficiently
healed the colossal damage wrought under the oppressive conditions of the
martial law period. The cries of justice for the tortured, the murdered, and
the desaparecidos arouse outrage and sympathy in the hearts of the fair-
minded, yet the dispensation of the appropriate relief due them cannot be
extended through the same caprice or whim that characterized the ill-wind of
martial rule. The damage done was not merely personal but institutional, and
the proper rebuke to the iniquitous past has to involve the award of
reparations due within the confines of the restored rule of law.
The petitioners in this case are prominent victims of human rights
violations who, deprived of the opportunity to directly confront the man who
[1]

once held absolute rule over this country, have chosen to do battle instead
with the earthly representative, his estate. The clash has been for now
interrupted by a trial court ruling, seemingly comported to legal logic, that
required the petitioners to pay a whopping filing fee of over Four Hundred
Seventy-Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in order that they be able to
enforce a judgment awarded them by a foreign court. There is an
understandable temptation to cast the struggle within the simplistic confines of
a morality tale, and to employ short-cuts to arrive at what might seem the
desirable solution. But easy, reflexive resort to the equity principle all too often
leads to a result that may be morally correct, but legally wrong.
Nonetheless, the application of the legal principles involved in this case
will comfort those who maintain that our substantive and procedural laws, for
all their perceived ambiguity and susceptibility to myriad interpretations, are
inherently fair and just. The relief sought by the petitioners is expressly
mandated by our laws and conforms to established legal principles. The
granting of this petition for certiorari is warranted in order to correct the legally
infirm and unabashedly unjust ruling of the respondent judge.
The essential facts bear little elaboration. On 9 May 1991, a complaint was
filed with the United States District Court (US District Court), District of Hawaii,
against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(Marcos Estate). The action was brought forth by ten Filipino citizens who [2]

each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary

detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during the
Marcos regime. The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District
[3]

Courts jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for tortious
violations of international law. These plaintiffs brought the action on their own
[4]

behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, particularly

consisting of all current civilian citizens of the Philippines, their heirs and
beneficiaries, who between 1972 and 1987 were tortured, summarily executed
or had disappeared while in the custody of military or paramilitary groups.
Plaintiffs alleged that the class consisted of approximately ten thousand
(10,000) members; hence, joinder of all these persons was impracticable.
The institution of a class action suit was warranted under Rule 23(a) and
(b)(1)(B) of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the provisions of which
were invoked by the plaintiffs. Subsequently, the US District Court certified the
case as a class action and created three (3) sub-classes of torture, summary
execution and disappearance victims. Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury
[5]

rendered a verdict and an award of compensatory and exemplary damages in

favor of the plaintiff class. Then, on 3 February 1995, the US District Court,
presided by Judge Manuel L. Real, rendered a Final Judgment (Final
Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine Hundred
Sixty Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety
Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgment was eventually affirmed by
the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision rendered on 17
December 1996. [6]

On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional
Trial Court, City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the Final
Judgment. They alleged that they are members of the plaintiff class in whose
favor the US District Court awarded damages. They argued that since the
[7]

Marcos Estate failed to file a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme Court
after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the Final Judgment, the
decision of the US District Court had become final and executory, and hence
should be recognized and enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to Section 50,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force. [8]
 On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising,
among others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees. It alleged that
petitioners had only paid Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) as docket and
filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a monetary
amount of damages in the amount of over Two and a Quarter Billion US
Dollars (US$2.25 Billion). The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular
No. 7, pertaining to the proper computation and payment of docket fees. In
response, the petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of a
foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of
only Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was proper, pursuant to Section 7(c)
of Rule 141.[9]

On 9 September 1998, respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada of the [10]

Makati RTC issued the subject Order dismissing the complaint without
prejudice. Respondent judge opined that contrary to the petitioners
submission, the subject matter of the complaint was indeed capable of
pecuniary estimation, as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court
ordering the payment of definite sums of money, allowing for easy
determination of the value of the foreign judgment. On that score, Section 7(a)
of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would find application, and the
RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately Four
Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos, which obviously had not been paid.
Not surprisingly, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
Judge Ranada denied in an Order dated 28 July 1999. From this denial,
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 assailing the twin orders
of respondent judge. They prayed for the annulment of the questioned
[11]

orders, and an order directing the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 97-1052
and the conduct of appropriate proceedings thereon.
Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as
the subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not
an action for the collection of a sum of money or recovery of damages. They
also point out that to require the class plaintiffs to pay Four Hundred Seventy
Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate and render
inutile the liberal construction ordained by the Rules of Court, as required by
Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly the inexpensive
disposition of every action.
Petitioners invoke Section 11, Article III of the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution, which provides that Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial
bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by
reason of poverty, a mandate which is essentially defeated by the required
exorbitant filing fee. The adjudicated amount of the filing fee, as arrived at by
the RTC, was characterized as indisputably unfair, inequitable, and unjust.
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was permitted to intervene in
this case. It urged that the petition be granted and a judgment rendered,
[12]

ordering the enforcement and execution of the District Court judgment in

accordance with Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. For
the CHR, the Makati RTC erred in interpreting the action for the execution of a
foreign judgment as a new case, in violation of the principle that once a case
has been decided between the same parties in one country on the same issue
with finality, it can no longer be relitigated again in another country. The CHR
[13]

likewise invokes the principle of comity, and of vested rights.

The Courts disposition on the issue of filing fees will prove a useful
jurisprudential guidepost for courts confronted with actions enforcing foreign
judgments, particularly those lodged against an estate. There is no basis for
the issuance a limited pro hac vice ruling based on the special circumstances
of the petitioners as victims of martial law, or on the emotionally-charged
allegation of human rights abuses.
An examination of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court readily evinces that the
respondent judge ignored the clear letter of the law when he concluded that
the filing fee be computed based on the total sum claimed or the stated value
of the property in litigation.
In dismissing the complaint, the respondent judge relied on Section 7(a),
Rule 141 as basis for the computation of the filing fee of over P472 Million.
The provision states:

SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.-

(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim

against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a
third-party, fourth-party, etc., complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for
all clerical services in the same time, if the total sum claimed, exclusive of
interest, or the started value of the property in litigation, is:

1. Less than P 100,00.00 P 500.00

2. P 100,000.00 or more - P 800.00
but less than P 150,000.00
3. P 150,000.00 or more but - P 1,000.00
less than P 200,000.00
4. P 200,000.00 or more but
less than P 250,000.00 - P 1,500.00
 5. P 250,000.00 or more but
less than P 300,00.00 - P 1,750.00
6. P 300,000.00 or more but
not more than P 400,000.00 - P 2,000.00
7. P 350,000.00 or more but not
more than P400,000.00 - P 2,250.00
8. For each P 1,000.00 in excess of
P 400,000.00 - P 10.00

...

(Emphasis supplied)

Obviously, the above-quoted provision covers, on one hand, ordinary

actions, permissive counterclaims, third-party, etc. complaints and complaints-
in-interventions, and on the other, money claims against estates which are not
based on judgment. Thus, the relevant question for purposes of the present
petition is whether the action filed with the lower court is a money claim
against an estate not based on judgment.
Petitioners complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is
clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. The
provision does not make any distinction between a local judgment and a
foreign judgment, and where the law does not distinguish, we shall not
distinguish.
A reading of Section 7 in its entirety reveals several instances wherein the
filing fee is computed on the basis of the amount of the relief sought, or on the
value of the property in litigation. The filing fee for requests for extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage is based on the amount of indebtedness or the
mortgagees claim. In special proceedings involving properties such as for
[14]

the allowance of wills, the filing fee is again based on the value of the
property. The aforecited rules evidently have no application to petitioners
[15]

complaint.
Petitioners rely on Section 7(b), particularly the proviso on actions where
the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated. The provision reads in
full:

SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.-

(b) For filing

1. Actions where the value
of the subject matter
cannot be estimated --- P 600.00
2. Special civil actions except
judicial foreclosure which
shall be governed by
paragraph (a) above --- P 600.00
3. All other actions not
involving property --- P 600.00

In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated
value, thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the
fees.

It is worth noting that the provision also provides that in real actions, the
assessed value or estimated value of the property shall be alleged by the
claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees. Yet again, this provision
does not apply in the case at bar. A real action is one where the plaintiff seeks
the recovery of real property or an action affecting title to or recovery of
possession of real property. Neither the complaint nor the award of damages
[16]

adjudicated by the US District Court involves any real property of the Marcos
Estate.
Thus, respondent judge was in clear and serious error when he concluded
that the filing fees should be computed on the basis of the schematic table of
Section 7(a), as the action involved pertains to a claim against an estate
based on judgment. What provision, if any, then should apply in determining
the filing fees for an action to enforce a foreign judgment?
To resolve this question, a proper understanding is required on the nature
and effects of a foreign judgment in this jurisdiction.
The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a
usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious
under certain conditions that may vary in different countries. This principle
[17]

was prominently affirmed in the leading American case of Hilton v. Guyot and [18]

expressly recognized in our jurisprudence beginning with Ingenholl v. Walter

E. Olsen & Co. The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and
[19]

enforcement of a foreign judgment were originally contained in Section 311 of

the Code of Civil Procedure, which was taken from the California Code of Civil
Procedure which, in turn, was derived from the California Act of March 11,
1872. Remarkably, the procedural rule now outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 of
[20]

the Rules of Civil Procedure has remained unchanged down to the last word
in nearly a century. Section 48 states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a

foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the
title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a

right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.

There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in

rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is
deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an
action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive,
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title. However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible
[21]

to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or

notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus,
[22] [23] [24]

the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the
enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there
should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the
court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.[25]

It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order

to enforce a foreign judgment , even if such judgment has conclusive effect
[26]

as in the case of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the losing
party an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, and in order for the
court to properly determine its efficacy. Consequently, the party attacking a
[27]

foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.
[28]

The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be undertaken in

order to enforce a foreign judgment in the Philippines. But there is no question
that the filing of a civil complaint is an appropriate measure for such purpose.
A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, and clearly an action to enforce a foreign judgment is in
[29]
essence a vindication of a right prescinding either from a conclusive judgment
upon title or the presumptive evidence of a right. Absent perhaps a statutory
[30]

grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the claim for enforcement of

judgment must be brought before the regular courts. [31]

There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of

action arising from the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that arising
from the facts or allegations that occasioned the foreign judgment. They may
pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an essential difference in the
right-duty correlatives that are sought to be vindicated. For example, in a
complaint for damages against a tortfeasor, the cause of action emanates
from the violation of the right of the complainant through the act or omission of
the respondent. On the other hand, in a complaint for the enforcement of a
foreign judgment awarding damages from the same tortfeasor, for the violation
of the same right through the same manner of action, the cause of action
derives not from the tortious act but from the foreign judgment itself.
More importantly, the matters for proof are different. Using the above
example, the complainant will have to establish before the court the tortious
act or omission committed by the tortfeasor, who in turn is allowed to rebut
these factual allegations or prove extenuating circumstances. Extensive
litigation is thus conducted on the facts, and from there the right to and
amount of damages are assessed. On the other hand, in an action to enforce
a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof is the foreign judgment itself, and
not the facts from which it prescinds.
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally
restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal
notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The limitations on review is in
consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues. Otherwise known as the policy of
[32]

preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous

litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that
the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same
disputes, and in a larger sense to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrers
Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: rest and quietness. If every
[33]

judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would
be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the
previously concluded litigation.[34]

Petitioners appreciate this distinction, and rely upon it to support the

proposition that the subject matter of the complaintthe enforcement of a
foreign judgmentis incapable of pecuniary estimation. Admittedly the
proposition, as it applies in this case, is counter-intuitive, and thus deserves
strict scrutiny. For in all practical intents and purposes, the matter at hand is
capable of pecuniary estimation, down to the last cent. In the
assailed Order, the respondent judge pounced upon this point without
equivocation:

The Rules use the term where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated. The
subject matter of the present case is the judgment rendered by the foreign court
ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs definite sums of money, as and for compensatory
damages. The Court finds that the value of the foreign judgment can be estimated;
indeed, it can even be easily determined. The Court is not minded to distinguish
between the enforcement of a judgment and the amount of said judgment, and
separate the two, for purposes of determining the correct filing fees. Similarly, a
plaintiff suing on promissory note for P1 million cannot be allowed to pay only P400
filing fees (sic), on the reasoning that the subject matter of his suit is not the P1
million, but the enforcement of the promissory note, and that the value of such
enforcement cannot be estimated. [35]

The jurisprudential standard in gauging whether the subject matter of an

action is capable of pecuniary estimation is well-entrenched. The Marcos
Estate cites Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill and Raymundo v. Court of Appeals,
which ruled:

[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend
on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or
a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as
cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and
are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

On the other hand, petitioners cite the ponencia of Justice JBL Reyes
in Lapitan v. Scandia, from [36]
which the rule
in Singsong and Raymundo actually derives, but which incorporates this
additional nuance omitted in the latter cases:

xxx However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum
of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the
contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of
judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as
cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and
are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. [37]

Petitioners go on to add that among the actions the Court has recognized
as being incapable of pecuniary estimation include legality of conveyances
and money deposits, validity of a mortgage, the right to support, validity of
[38] [39] [40]

documents, rescission of contracts, specific performance, and validity or

[41] [42] [43]

annulment of judgments. It is urged that an action for enforcement of a

[44]

foreign judgment belongs to the same class.

This is an intriguing argument, but ultimately it is self-evident that while the
subject matter of the action is undoubtedly the enforcement of a foreign
judgment, the effect of a providential award would be the adjudication of a
sum of money. Perhaps in theory, such an action is primarily for the
enforcement of the foreign judgment, but there is a certain obtuseness to that
sort of argument since there is no denying that the enforcement of the foreign
judgment will necessarily result in the award of a definite sum of money.
But before we insist upon this conclusion past beyond the point of
reckoning, we must examine its possible ramifications. Petitioners raise the
point that a declaration that an action for enforcement of foreign judgment
may be capable of pecuniary estimation might lead to an instance wherein a
first level court such as the Municipal Trial Court would have jurisdiction to
enforce a foreign judgment. But under the statute defining the jurisdiction of
first level courts, B.P. 129, such courts are not vested with jurisdiction over
actions for the enforcement of foreign judgments.

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate
and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the
value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal
property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged:
Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or
different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be
the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes
of action arose out of the same or different transactions;
 (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.[45]

Section 33 of B.P. 129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or

subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights and interests over property or
a sum of money. But as earlier pointed out, the subject matter of an action to
enforce a foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and the cause of
action arising from the adjudication of such judgment.
An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the instant
complaint for enforcement of a foreign judgment, even if capable of pecuniary
estimation, would fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, thus
negating the fears of the petitioners. Indeed, an examination of the provision
indicates that it can be relied upon as jurisdictional basis with respect to
actions for enforcement of foreign judgments, provided that no other court or
office is vested jurisdiction over such complaint:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:

xxx

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions.

Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the complaint to

enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary
estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment
against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule
141. What provision then governs the proper computation of the filing fees
over the instant complaint? For this case and other similarly situated
instances, we find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does,
other actions not involving property.
 Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise
that it was an action incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the
same amount required for other actions not involving property. The petitioners
thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of
discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable
rule and dismissed the complaint.
There is another consideration of supreme relevance in this case, one
which should disabuse the notion that the doctrine affirmed in this decision is
grounded solely on the letter of the procedural rule. We earlier adverted to the
the internationally recognized policy of preclusion, as well as the principles of
[46]

comity, utility and convenience of nations as the basis for the evolution of the
[47]

rule calling for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The US
Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot relied heavily on the concept of comity, as
[48]

especially derived from the landmark treatise of Justice Story in his

Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws of 1834. Yet the notion of comity has
[49]

since been criticized as one of dim contours or suffering from a number of

[50]

fallacies. Other conceptual bases for the recognition of foreign judgments

[51]

have evolved such as the vested rights theory or the modern doctrine of
obligation. [52]

There have been attempts to codify through treaties or multilateral

agreements the standards for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, but these have not borne fruition. The members of the European
Common Market accede to the Judgments Convention, signed in 1978, which
eliminates as to participating countries all of such obstacles to recognition
such as reciprocity and rvision au fond. The most ambitious of these
[53]

attempts is the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign

Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, prepared in 1966 by the Hague
Conference of International Law. While it has not received the ratifications
[54]

needed to have it take effect, it is recognized as representing current

[55]

scholarly thought on the topic. Neither the Philippines nor the United States
[56]

are signatories to the Convention.

Yet even if there is no unanimity as to the applicable theory behind the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments or a universal treaty
rendering it obligatory force, there is consensus that the viability of such
recognition and enforcement is essential. Steiner and Vagts note:

. . . The notion of unconnected bodies of national law on private international law,

each following a quite separate path, is not one conducive to the growth of a
transnational community encouraging travel and commerce among its members.
There is a contemporary resurgence of writing stressing the identity or similarity of
the values that systems of public and private international law seek to further a
community interest in common, or at least reasonable, rules on these matters in
national legal systems. And such generic principles as reciprocity play an important
role in both fields.
[57]

Salonga, whose treatise on private international law is of worldwide

renown, points out:

Whatever be the theory as to the basis for recognizing foreign judgments, there can be
little dispute that the end is to protect the reasonable expectations and demands of the
parties. Where the parties have submitted a matter for adjudication in the court of one
state, and proceedings there are not tainted with irregularity, they may fairly be
expected to submit, within the state or elsewhere, to the enforcement of the judgment
issued by the court. [58]

There is also consensus as to the requisites for recognition of a foreign

judgment and the defenses against the enforcement thereof. As earlier
discussed, the exceptions enumerated in Section 48, Rule 39 have remain
unchanged since the time they were adapted in this jurisdiction from long
standing American rules. The requisites and exceptions as delineated under
Section 48 are but a restatement of generally accepted principles of
international law. Section 98 of The Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws,
states that a valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a
contested proceeding will be recognized in the United States, and on its face,
the term valid brings into play requirements such notions as valid jurisdiction
over the subject matter and parties. Similarly, the notion that fraud or
[59]

collusion may preclude the enforcement of a foreign judgment finds affirmation

with foreign jurisprudence and commentators, as well as the doctrine that the
[60]

foreign judgment must not constitute a clear mistake of law or fact. And [61]

finally, it has been recognized that public policy as a defense to the

recognition of judgments serves as an umbrella for a variety of concerns in
international practice which may lead to a denial of recognition. [62]

The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a

foreign judgment has been recognized in this jurisdiction. This defense [63]

allows for the application of local standards in reviewing the foreign judgment,
especially when such judgment creates only a presumptive right, as it does in
cases wherein the judgment is against a person. The defense is also
[64]

recognized within the international sphere, as many civil law nations adhere to
a broad public policy exception which may result in a denial of recognition
when the foreign court, in the light of the choice-of-law rules of the recognizing
court, applied the wrong law to the case. The public policy defense can
[65]
safeguard against possible abuses to the easy resort to offshore litigation if it
can be demonstrated that the original claim is noxious to our constitutional
values.
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that
requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure
for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form
part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules
[66]

accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the

established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion
as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice
in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
[67]

While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and

enforcement of foreign judgments have not been authoritatively established,
the Court can assert with certainty that such an undertaking is among those
generally accepted principles of international law. As earlier demonstrated,
[68]

there is a widespread practice among states accepting in principle the need

for such recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of varying
degrees. The fact that there is no binding universal treaty governing the
practice is not indicative of a widespread rejection of the principle, but only a
disagreement as to the imposable specific rules governing the procedure for
recognition and enforcement.
Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the procedure for
recognition and enforcement is embodied in the rules of law, whether statutory
or jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. In the Philippines,
this is evidenced primarily by Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
has existed in its current form since the early 1900s. Certainly, the Philippine
legal system has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural
rules the viability of an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as
the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally
accepted doctrines. Again, there may be distinctions as to the rules adopted
by each particular state, but they all prescind from the premise that there is a
[69]

rule of law obliging states to allow for, however generally, the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment. The bare principle, to our mind, has
attained the status of opinio juris in international practice.
This is a significant proposition, as it acknowledges that the procedure and
requisites outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 derive their efficacy not merely from
the procedural rule, but by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution. Rules of procedure are promulgated by the Supreme Court,
and could very well be abrogated or revised by the high court itself. Yet the
[70]

Supreme Court is obliged, as are all State components, to obey the laws of
the land, including generally accepted principles of international law which
form part thereof, such as those ensuring the qualified recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. [71]

Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it

emerges that there is a general right recognized within our body of laws, and
affirmed by the Constitution, to seek recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, as well as a right to defend against such enforcement on the
grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this
country merely due to an exhorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to
generally accepted practices and principles in international law. Indeed, there
are grave concerns in conditioning the amount of the filing fee on the
pecuniary award or the value of the property subject of the foreign decision.
Such pecuniary award will almost certainly be in foreign denomination,
computed in accordance with the applicable laws and standards of the forum.
[72]
The vagaries of inflation, as well as the relative low-income capacity of the
Filipino, to date may very well translate into an award virtually unenforceable
in this country, despite its integral validity, if the docket fees for the
enforcement thereof were predicated on the amount of the award sought to be
enforced. The theory adopted by respondent judge and the Marcos Estate
may even lead to absurdities, such as if applied to an award involving real
property situated in places such as the United States or Scandinavia where
real property values are inexorably high. We cannot very well require that the
filing fee be computed based on the value of the foreign property as
determined by the standards of the country where it is located.
As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure avoids
unreasonableness, as it recognizes that the subject matter of an action for
enforcement of a foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and not the
right-duty correlatives that resulted in the foreign judgment. In this particular
circumstance, given that the complaint is lodged against an estate and is
based on the US District Courts Final Judgment, this foreign judgment may,
for purposes of classification under the governing procedural rule, be deemed
as subsumed under Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141, i.e., within the class of all
other actions not involving property. Thus, only the blanket filing fee of minimal
amount is required.
 Finally, petitioners also invoke Section 11, Article III of the Constitution,
which states that [F]ree access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty. Since the provision is among the guarantees ensured by the Bill of
Rights, it certainly gives rise to a demandable right. However, now is not the
occasion to elaborate on the parameters of this constitutional right. Given our
preceding discussion, it is not necessary to utilize this provision in order to
grant the relief sought by the petitioners. It is axiomatic that the
constitutionality of an act will not be resolved by the courts if the controversy
can be settled on other grounds or unless the resolution thereof is
[73]

indispensable for the determination of the case. [74]

One more word. It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges
that the Final Judgment is not conclusive yet, but presumptive evidence of a
right of the petitioners against the Marcos Estate. Moreover, the Marcos
Estate is not precluded to present evidence, if any, of want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. This
ruling, decisive as it is on the question of filing fees and no other, does not
render verdict on the enforceability of the Final Judgment before the courts
under the jurisdiction of the Philippines, or for that matter any other issue
which may legitimately be presented before the trial court. Such issues are to
be litigated before the trial court, but within the confines of the matters for
proof as laid down in Section 48, Rule 39. On the other hand, the speedy
resolution of this claim by the trial court is encouraged, and contumacious
delay of the decision on the merits will not be brooked by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders are
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and a new order REINSTATING Civil Case No.
97-1052 is hereby issued. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.

10. Agustin vs. Edu

177 Phil 160 (1979)
G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979

FERNANDO, J.:

The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor
vehicles is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional
guarantee of due process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its
implementation are concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of non-
delegation of legislative power. The Letter of Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who
is possessed of the requisite standing, as being arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary
restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land Transportation
Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio,
Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino,
Minister of Public Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it
makes devoid clear that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of
justification The Letter of Instruction on is a valid police power measure. Nor could the
implementing rules and regulations issued by respondent Edu be considered as
amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the petition must be
dismissed.

The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President
Marcos, issued on December 2, 1974, reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one
of the major causes of fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of
disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without any
appropriate early warning device to signal approaching motorists of their presence;
[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said
Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207,
recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs
and devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the Philippines, in
the interest of safety on all streets and highways, including expressways or limited
access roads, do hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles
shall have at all times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device
consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least
15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled
or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any street or highway,
including expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof shall
cause the warning device mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters away to
the front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked. 3. The Land
Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning
Devices, as herein described, to be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor
vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more than 15 %
of the acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are
appropriate to effectively implement this order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely
coordinate and take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry into effect
then instruction. 3 Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of
Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instruction No. 229 is hereby
amended to read as follows: 3. The Land transportation Commissioner shall require
every motor vehicle owner to procure from any and present at the registration of his
vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early warning device, as d bed of any brand or make
chosen by mid motor vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner shall also
promulgate such rule and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this
order.'" 4 There was issued accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and
regulations on December 10, 1976. 5 They were not enforced as President Marcos on
January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar as the installation
of early warning device as a pre-registration requirement for motor vehicle was
concerned. 6 Then on June 30, 1978, another Letter of Instruction 7 the lifting of such
suspension and directed the immediate implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229
as amended. 8 It was not until August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu issued
Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of Letter of Instruction No.
716, dated June 30, 1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229, as
amended by Letter of Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices
(EWD) on motor vehicle, the following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC
Administrative Order No. 1, dated December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented
provided that the device may come from whatever source and that it shall have
substantially complied with the EWD specifications contained in Section 2 of said
administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every motor vehicle , except motorcycles,
is equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered stickers, to be issued free of
charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The EWD. serial number
shall be indicated on the registration certificate and official receipt of payment of current
registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda
in conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect immediately. 9 It
was for immediate implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public
Works, transportation, and Communications. 10

Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model
13035, already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with
blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in
case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as
well as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by
the land transportation Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229,
as amended, "clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: "
For him they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional
and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society." 12 He contended that
they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the
motoring public;" 13 are "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because
[they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car
owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate
of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the
precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on
the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety
device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed for
a judgment both the assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and
unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the meanwhile.

A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-
49112 (Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) Considering the
allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for
prohibition with writ of p prohibitory and/or mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to
(require) the respondents to file an answer thereto within ton (10) days from notice and
not to move to dismiss the petition. The Court further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary
restraining order] effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this
Court. 16

Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted.
Then on November 15, 1978, he Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting
the factual allegations and stating that they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny
the allegations and stating they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle Car, 17 they specifically deny the
allegations in paragraphs X and XI (including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to
the effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended by Letters of Instructions Nos.
479 and 716 as well as Land transportation Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and
its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions on due process of
law, equal protection of law and undue delegation of police power, and that the same
are likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided, onerous, immoral
unreasonable and illegal the truth being that said allegations are without legal and
factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this
Answer." 18 Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany
of grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional litigation,
the Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise
of the police power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not
susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there
was in the portion captioned Special and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what
respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for
application. They are Calalang v. Williams, 19 Morfe v. Mutuc, 20 and Edu v. Ericta. 21
Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on
road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory and which
was duly ratified. 22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail, in
language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of
petitioner that the assailed Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and
regulations cannot survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive
quality cannot be denied.

This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly
joined. As noted at the outset, it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed.

1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police
power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the
submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has
offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution,
although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive
scope of the police power which was originally Identified by Chief Justice Taney of the
American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as "nothing more or less than the powers
of government inherent in every sovereignty" 23 was stressed in the aforementioned
case of Edu v. Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the
Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens in order to we the general comfort, health and prosperity
of the state.' Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the
doctrine, such a competence being referred to as 'the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare
of the people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-
Commonwealth decision as 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables
it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense
it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the
totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful at.
tribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, 'the most essential,
insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out 'to
all the great public needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the
times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the
greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or
parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation.
What is critical or urgent changes with the time.' The police power is thus a dynamic
agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men
in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated
to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 24

2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the

fact that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to
promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a
legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an
indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained
the validity of the Reflector Law, 25 an enactment conceived with the same end in view.
Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was:
"To promote safe transit upon, and. avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated
as national roads * * *. 26 As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, 27 with petitioner failing in
his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.

3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the
implementing rules and regulations becomes even more apparent considering his
failure to lay the necessary factual foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it
was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of
Manila. 28 The rationale was clearly set forth in an excerpt from a decision of Justice
Branders of the American Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion: "The statute here
questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are
asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed
is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation
of record in overthrowing the statute. 29

4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted
presumption of validity. As was pointed out in his Answer "The President certainly had in
his possession the necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued said
letter of instructions, and such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's
naked assertion that early warning devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of
nighttime vehicular accidents' because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the
supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved rear-end collisions (p.
12 of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on record.
As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore that
there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is
unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case
here"' * * *. But even as g the verity of petitioner's statistics, is that not reason enough to
require the installation of early warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end
collisions that could mean the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could
likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?" 30 It is quite
manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of
prior, careful study by the Executive Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy
to the due process clause is to give sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded even
the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well known penchant for exaggeration.

5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter
of Instruction was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early
warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car
owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of
said motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-
in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4) "well-lighted
two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being universal among the signatory
countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse
conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from
any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device
installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that
somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a
motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers
passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other
built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate
advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an
emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or
uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the
danger of collision. 31

6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted

in the Answer of the Solicitor General "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of
Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or
compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby.
All that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their
motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining
the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity,
motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this early warning device so
long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter
of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly the early warning device requirement
can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make
manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of car
owners' as petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early
warning device requirement 'a more subtle racket may be committed by those called
upon to enforce it * * * is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous officials
may try to enforce said requirement in an unreasonable manner or to an unreasonable
degree, does not render the same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the
challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229 and implementing order disclose none of the
constitutional defects alleged against it. 32

7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not
premised on lack of power, the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the
pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it
put it at its mildest, is distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It
bears repeating "that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon
questions of wisdom justice or expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice
Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the
bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative
concern.' There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice
Montemayor. 'As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts
merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary.
For they, according to Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy
and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief
Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional
power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for
declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of
powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department
and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not
allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate
branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law,
as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly
litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of
legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision
likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on is wisdom
cannot be sustained. 33

8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of

legislative power is equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had
petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements from
this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt
from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint
of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public
agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command
is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the
above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be
either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The
standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from
the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly,
the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v.
Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to the recognition given
expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the Constitution
came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt
itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States
and England but in practically all modern governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with
the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward
the approval of the practice by the courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach
requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the
completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed." 34

9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is
reinforced by this consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of
the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to
traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the
1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations
Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vionna Convention, which was ratified by the
Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * " 35 It cannot be
disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land * * *." 36 The 1968 Vienna Convention on
Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to
repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt
servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the
principle of international morality.

10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal
protection did not even elicit any attempt on the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a
manner clear, positive, and categorical why such a casual observation should be taken
seriously. In no case is there a more appropriate occasion for insistence on what was
referred to as "the general rule" in Santiago v. Far Eastern Broadcasting Co., 37 namely,
"that the constitutionality of a law wig not be considered unless the point is specially
pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued." 38 "Equal protection" is not a
talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully
expect that success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is
immediately executory. No costs.

Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro
and Melencio-Herrera, concur.

Makasiar, J, reserves the right to file a separate opinion.

Aquino J., took no part.

Concepcion J., is on leave.

Castro, C.J., certifies that Justice Concepcion concurs in their decision.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the
restraining order issued on October 19, 1978 against the blanket enforcement of the
requirement that all motor vehicles be equipped with the so-called early warning device,
without even hearing the parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court in
original cases of far-reaching consequence such as the case at bar.

Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that the petition
advances grave and serious grounds of assailing "the rules and regulations issued by
the Land Transportation Commission under Administrative Order No. 1 and
Memorandum Circular No. 32 [which] do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives and
spirit of Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended by Letter of Instructions Nos. 479
and 716, because it is oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay
unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society,"
because of the following considerations, inter alia:

1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles

with built-in and more effective and efficient E.W.D.'S such as "a) blinking lights in the
fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 1)) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor
vehicles, c) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles.......
to purchase the E.W.D. specified in the challenged administrative order, whose
effectivity and utility have yet to be demonstrated.

2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid
refutation has been made of petitioner's assertion that the "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to
the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the 26,000
motor vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-
end collisions," as to require the purchase and installation of the questioned E.W.D. for
almost 900,000 vehicles throughout the country;

3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and

petitioner's assertion that "as of 1975, there were at least 865,037 motor vehicles all
over the country requiring E.W.D.'S and at the minimum price of 1156.00 per set, this
would mean a consumer outlay of P 48,451,872.00, or close to P 50 million for the
questioned E.W.D.'S "stands unchallenged;

4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less
burdensome alternative road safety devices for stalled vehicles than the prescribed
E.W.D., such as the common petroleum lamps "kinke" which can be placed just as
effectively in front of stalled vehicles on the highways; and

5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles.
The respondents have not shown that they have availed of the powers and prerogatives
vested in their offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and vehicles
which are the main cause of the deplorable -highway accidents due to stoned vehicles,
establishing an honest and foolproof system of examination and licensing of motor
vehicle drivers so as to ban the reckless and irresponsible and a sustained education
campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes that can be carried out for much less
than the P 50 million burden that would be imposed by the challenged order.

I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the
petitioner for his civic mindedness in having filed the present petition g as capricious
and unreasonable the "all pervading police power" of the State instead of throwing the
case out of court and leaving the wrong impression that the exercise of police power
insofar as it may affect the life, liberty and property of any person is no longer subject to
judicial inquiry.

# Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the
restraining order issued on October 19, 1978 against the blanket enforcement of the
requirement that all motor vehicles be equipped with the so-called early warning device,
without even hearing the parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court in
original cases of far-reaching consequence such as the case at bar.

Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that the petition
advances grave and serious grounds of assailing "the rules and regulations issued by
the Land Transportation Commission under Administrative Order No. 1 and
Memorandum Circular No. 32 [which] do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives and
spirit of Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended by Letter of Instructions Nos. 479
and 716, because it is oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay
unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society,"
because of the following considerations, inter alia:

1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles

with built-in and more effective and efficient E.W.D.'S such as "a) blinking lights in the
fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 1)) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor
vehicles, c) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles.......
to purchase the E.W.D. specified in the challenged administrative order, whose
effectivity and utility have yet to be demonstrated.
2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid
refutation has been made of petitioner's assertion that the "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to
the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the 26,000
motor vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-
end collisions," as to require the purchase and installation of the questioned E.W.D. for
almost 900,000 vehicles throughout the country;

3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and

petitioner's assertion that "as of 1975, there were at least 865,037 motor vehicles all
over the country requiring E.W.D.'S and at the minimum price of 1156.00 per set, this
would mean a consumer outlay of P 48,451,872.00, or close to P 50 million for the
questioned E.W.D.'S "stands unchallenged;

4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less
burdensome alternative road safety devices for stalled vehicles than the prescribed
E.W.D., such as the common petroleum lamps "kinke" which can be placed just as
effectively in front of stalled vehicles on the highways; and

5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles.
The respondents have not shown that they have availed of the powers and prerogatives
vested in their offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and vehicles
which are the main cause of the deplorable -highway accidents due to stoned vehicles,
establishing an honest and foolproof system of examination and licensing of motor
vehicle drivers so as to ban the reckless and irresponsible and a sustained education
campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes that can be carried out for much less
than the P 50 million burden that would be imposed by the challenged order.

I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the
petitioner for his civic mindedness in having filed the present petition g as capricious
and unreasonable the "all pervading police power" of the State instead of throwing the
case out of court and leaving the wrong impression that the exercise of police power
insofar as it may affect the life, liberty and property of any person is no longer subject to
judicial inquiry.
 11. Pharmaceutical and Health Care vs. Health Secretary
535 SCRA 265 (2007)
G.R. No. 173034

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

The Court and all parties involved are in agreement that the best nourishment for an
infant is mother's milk. There is nothing greater than for a mother to nurture her beloved
child straight from her bosom. The ideal is, of course, for each and every Filipino child to
enjoy the unequaled benefits of breastmilk. But how should this end be attained?

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to nullify Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise Known as The "Milk
Code," Relevant International Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other
Purposes (RIRR). Petitioner posits that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions
that are not constitutional and go beyond the law it is supposed to implement.

Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant

Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the
DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the
questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1

Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on
October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the
Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the
law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA)
in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.

In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society,
specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.

On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on
July 7, 2006.

However, on June 28, 2006, petitioner, representing its members that are manufacturers
of breastmilk substitutes, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.

The main issue raised in the petition is whether respondents officers of the DOH acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions of the Constitution in
promulgating the RIRR.3

On August 15, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution granting a TRO enjoining
respondents from implementing the questioned RIRR.

After the Comment and Reply had been filed, the Court set the case for oral arguments
on June 19, 2007. The Court issued an Advisory (Guidance for Oral Arguments) dated
June 5, 2007, to wit:
The Court hereby sets the following issues:

1. Whether or not petitioner is a real party-in-interest;

2. Whether Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 or the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;

2.1 Whether the RIRR is in accord with the provisions of Executive Order No. 51 (Milk
Code);

2.2 Whether pertinent international agreements1 entered into by the Philippines are part
of the law of the land and may be implemented by the DOH through the RIRR; If in the
affirmative, whether the RIRR is in accord with the international agreements;

2.3 Whether Sections 4, 5(w), 22, 32, 47, and 52 of the RIRR violate the due process
clause and are in restraint of trade; and

2.4 Whether Section 13 of the RIRR on Total Effect provides sufficient standards.

_____________

1 (1) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) the WHO and Unicef
"2002 Global Strategy on Infant and Young Child Feeding;" and (3) various World Health
Assembly (WHA) Resolutions.

The parties filed their respective memoranda.

The petition is partly imbued with merit.

On the issue of petitioner's standing

With regard to the issue of whether petitioner may prosecute this case as the real party-
in-interest, the Court adopts the view enunciated in Executive Secretary v. Court of
Appeals,4 to wit:

The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its
members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members.
An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if
its members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the
concerns of its constituents.
xxxx

x x x We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized x x
x to act as the representative of any individual, company, entity or association on
matters related to the manpower recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and
activities necessary to accomplish the purposes embodied therein. The respondent is,
thus, the appropriate party to assert the rights of its members, because it and its
members are in every practical sense identical. x x x The respondent [association] is but
the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the
expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances. 5 (Emphasis supplied)

which was reasserted in Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc. v. Yuipco,6 where the
Court ruled that an association has the legal personality to represent its members
because the results of the case will affect their vital interests.7

Herein petitioner's Amended Articles of Incorporation contains a similar provision just

like in Executive Secretary, that the association is formed "to represent directly or
through approved representatives the pharmaceutical and health care industry before
the Philippine Government and any of its agencies, the medical professions and the
general public."8 Thus, as an organization, petitioner definitely has an interest in
fulfilling its avowed purpose of representing members who are part of the
pharmaceutical and health care industry. Petitioner is duly authorized9 to take the
appropriate course of action to bring to the attention of government agencies and the
courts any grievance suffered by its members which are directly affected by the RIRR.
Petitioner, which is mandated by its Amended Articles of Incorporation to represent the
entire industry, would be remiss in its duties if it fails to act on governmental action that
would affect any of its industry members, no matter how few or numerous they are.
Hence, petitioner, whose legal identity is deemed fused with its members, should be
considered as a real party-in-interest which stands to be benefited or injured by any
judgment in the present action.

On the constitutionality of the provisions of the RIRR

First, the Court will determine if pertinent international instruments adverted to by

respondents are part of the law of the land.

Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code,
thereby amending and expanding the coverage of said law. The defense of the DOH is
that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code but also various international
instruments10 regarding infant and young child nutrition. It is respondents' position that
said international instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the
DOH may implement them through the RIRR.

The Court notes that the following international instruments invoked by respondents,
namely: (1) The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) The
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and (3) the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, only provide in
general terms that steps must be taken by State Parties to diminish infant and child
mortality and inform society of the advantages of breastfeeding, ensure the health and
well-being of families, and ensure that women are provided with services and nutrition in
connection with pregnancy and lactation. Said instruments do not contain specific
provisions regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes.

The international instruments that do have specific provisions regarding breastmilk

substitutes are the ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions.

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.11 The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies
when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force
of domestic law.12

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article
VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go
through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal
law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.13

The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been concurred in
by at least two-thirds of all members of the Senate as required under Section 21, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution.

However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed
into domestic law through local legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk
Code that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se.

The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but it is well to
emphasize at this point that the Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS
absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of
products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that
advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials
are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).

On the other hand, Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts

the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations. (Emphasis supplied)

embodies the incorporation method.14

In Mijares v. Ranada,15 the Court held thus:

[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause

of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from
treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary
rules accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the
established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.16 (Emphasis supplied)

"Generally accepted principles of international law" refers to norms of general or

customary international law which are binding on all states,17 i.e., renunciation of war
as an instrument of national policy, the principle of sovereign immunity,18 a person's
right to life, liberty and due process,19 and pacta sunt servanda,20 among others. The
concept of "generally accepted principles of law" has also been depicted in this wise:

Some legal scholars and judges look upon certain "general principles of law" as a
primary source of international law because they have the "character of jus rationale"
and are "valid through all kinds of human societies." (Judge Tanaka in his dissenting
opinion in the 1966 South West Africa Case, 1966 I.C.J. 296). O'Connell holds that
certain priniciples are part of international law because they are "basic to legal systems
generally" and hence part of the jus gentium. These principles, he believes, are
established by a process of reasoning based on the common identity of all legal
systems. If there should be doubt or disagreement, one must look to state practice and
determine whether the municipal law principle provides a just and acceptable solution. x
x x 21 (Emphasis supplied)
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas defines customary international law as follows:

Custom or customary international law means "a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation [opinio juris]." (Restatement)
This statement contains the two basic elements of custom: the material factor, that is,
how states behave, and the psychological or subjective factor, that is, why they behave
the way they do.

xxxx

The initial factor for determining the existence of custom is the actual behavior of states.
This includes several elements: duration, consistency, and generality of the practice of
states.

The required duration can be either short or long. x x x

xxxx

Duration therefore is not the most important element. More important is the consistency
and the generality of the practice. x x x

xxxx

Once the existence of state practice has been established, it becomes necessary to
determine why states behave the way they do. Do states behave the way they do
because they consider it obligatory to behave thus or do they do it only as a matter of
courtesy? Opinio juris, or the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory, is what
makes practice an international rule. Without it, practice is not law.22 (Underscoring and
Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic

system.23

WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local legislation. Have they attained
the status of customary law and should they then be deemed incorporated as part of the
law of the land?

The World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the international specialized agencies
allied with the United Nations (UN) by virtue of Article 57,24 in relation to Article 6325 of
the UN Charter. Under the 1946 WHO Constitution, it is the WHA which determines the
policies of the WHO,26 and has the power to adopt regulations concerning "advertising
and labeling of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international
commerce,"27 and to "make recommendations to members with respect to any matter
within the competence of the Organization."28 The legal effect of its regulations, as
opposed to recommendations, is quite different.

Regulations, along with conventions and agreements, duly adopted by the WHA bind
member states thus:

Article 19. The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt conventions or
agreements with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization. A
two-thirds vote of the Health Assembly shall be required for the adoption of such
conventions or agreements, which shall come into force for each Member when
accepted by it in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Article 20. Each Member undertakes that it will, within eighteen months after the
adoption by the Health Assembly of a convention or agreement, take action relative to
the acceptance of such convention or agreement. Each Member shall notify the
Director-General of the action taken, and if it does not accept such convention or
agreement within the time limit, it will furnish a statement of the reasons for non-
acceptance. In case of acceptance, each Member agrees to make an annual report to
the Director-General in accordance with Chapter XIV.

Article 21. The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt regulations concerning:
(a) sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the
international spread of disease; (b) nomenclatures with respect to diseases, causes of
death and public health practices; (c) standards with respect to diagnostic procedures
for international use; (d) standards with respect to the safety, purity and potency of
biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international commerce; (e)
advertising and labeling of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in
international commerce.

Article 22. Regulations adopted pursuant to Article 21 shall come into force for all
Members after due notice has been given of their adoption by the Health Assembly
except for such Members as may notify the Director-General of rejection or reservations
within the period stated in the notice. (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into
force for members, in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19
and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution
reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to
Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization.
(Emphasis supplied)

The absence of a provision in Article 23 of any mechanism by which the

recommendation would come into force for member states is conspicuous.

The former Senior Legal Officer of WHO, Sami Shubber, stated that WHA
recommendations are generally not binding, but they "carry moral and political weight,
as they constitute the judgment on a health issue of the collective membership of the
highest international body in the field of health."29 Even the ICMBS itself was adopted
as a mere recommendation, as WHA Resolution No. 34.22 states:

"The Thirty-Fourth World Health Assembly x x x adopts, in the sense of Article 23 of the
Constitution, the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes annexed to
the present resolution." (Emphasis supplied)

The Introduction to the ICMBS also reads as follows:

In January 1981, the Executive Board of the World Health Organization at its sixty-
seventh session, considered the fourth draft of the code, endorsed it, and unanimously
recommended to the Thirty-fourth World Health Assembly the text of a resolution by
which it would adopt the code in the form of a recommendation rather than a regulation.
x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The legal value of WHA Resolutions as recommendations is summarized in Article 62 of

the WHO Constitution, to wit:

Art. 62. Each member shall report annually on the action taken with respect to
recommendations made to it by the Organization, and with respect to conventions,
agreements and regulations.

Apparently, the WHA Resolution adopting the ICMBS and subsequent WHA Resolutions
urging member states to implement the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally
non-binding. Thus, unlike what has been done with the ICMBS whereby the legislature
enacted most of the provisions into law which is the Milk Code, the subsequent WHA
Resolutions,30 specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months,
continued breastfeeding up to 24 months, and absolutely prohibiting advertisements
and promotions of breastmilk substitutes, have not been adopted as a domestic law.
It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute "soft law" or non-binding norms,
principles and practices that influence state behavior.31

"Soft law" does not fall into any of the categories of international law set forth in Article
38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice.32 It is, however,
an expression of non-binding norms, principles, and practices that influence state
behavior.33 Certain declarations and resolutions of the UN General Assembly fall under
this category.34 The most notable is the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which this
Court has enforced in various cases, specifically, Government of Hongkong Special
Administrative Region v. Olalia,35 Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,36 Mijares v. Raada37
and Shangri-la International Hotel Management, Ltd. v. Developers Group of
Companies, Inc..38

The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized agency attached to

the UN with the mandate to promote and protect intellectual property worldwide, has
resorted to soft law as a rapid means of norm creation, in order "to reflect and respond
to the changing needs and demands of its constituents."39 Other international
organizations which have resorted to soft law include the International Labor
Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization (in the form of the Codex
Alimentarius).40

WHO has resorted to soft law. This was most evident at the time of the Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Avian flu outbreaks.

Although the IHR Resolution does not create new international law binding on WHO
member states, it provides an excellent example of the power of "soft law" in
international relations. International lawyers typically distinguish binding rules of
international law-"hard law"-from non-binding norms, principles, and practices that
influence state behavior-"soft law." WHO has during its existence generated many soft
law norms, creating a "soft law regime" in international governance for public health.

The "soft law" SARS and IHR Resolutions represent significant steps in laying the
political groundwork for improved international cooperation on infectious diseases.
These resolutions clearly define WHO member states' normative duty to cooperate fully
with other countries and with WHO in connection with infectious disease surveillance
and response to outbreaks.

This duty is neither binding nor enforceable, but, in the wake of the SARS epidemic, the
duty is powerful politically for two reasons. First, the SARS outbreak has taught the
lesson that participating in, and enhancing, international cooperation on infectious
disease controls is in a country's self-interest x x x if this warning is heeded, the "soft
law" in the SARS and IHR Resolution could inform the development of general and
consistent state practice on infectious disease surveillance and outbreak response,
perhaps crystallizing eventually into customary international law on infectious disease
prevention and control.41

In the Philippines, the executive department implemented certain measures

recommended by WHO to address the outbreaks of SARS and Avian flu by issuing
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 201 on April 26, 2003 and E.O. No. 280 on February 2,
2004, delegating to various departments broad powers to close down
schools/establishments, conduct health surveillance and monitoring, and ban
importation of poultry and agricultural products.

It must be emphasized that even under such an international emergency, the duty of a
state to implement the IHR Resolution was still considered not binding or enforceable,
although said resolutions had great political influence.

As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it

must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it
obligatory to comply with such rules (opinio juris). Respondents have not presented any
evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the member
states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states;
neither have respondents proven that any compliance by member states with said WHA
Resolutions was obligatory in nature.

Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are
customary international law that may be deemed part of the law of the land.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA

Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.

Second, the Court will determine whether the DOH may implement the provisions of the
WHA Resolutions by virtue of its powers and functions under the Revised Administrative
Code even in the absence of a domestic law.

Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 provides that
the DOH shall define the national health policy and implement a national health plan
within the framework of the government's general policies and plans, and issue orders
and regulations concerning the implementation of established health policies.
It is crucial to ascertain whether the absolute prohibition on advertising and other forms
of promotion of breastmilk substitutes provided in some WHA Resolutions has been
adopted as part of the national health policy.

Respondents submit that the national policy on infant and young child feeding is
embodied in A.O. No. 2005-0014, dated May 23, 2005. Basically, the Administrative
Order declared the following policy guidelines: (1) ideal breastfeeding practices, such as
early initiation of breastfeeding, exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months,
extended breastfeeding up to two years and beyond; (2) appropriate complementary
feeding, which is to start at age six months; (3) micronutrient supplementation; (4)
universal salt iodization; (5) the exercise of other feeding options; and (6) feeding in
exceptionally difficult circumstances. Indeed, the primacy of breastfeeding for children is
emphasized as a national health policy. However, nowhere in A.O. No. 2005-0014 is it
declared that as part of such health policy, the advertisement or promotion of breastmilk
substitutes should be absolutely prohibited.

The national policy of protection, promotion and support of breastfeeding cannot

automatically be equated with a total ban on advertising for breastmilk substitutes.

In view of the enactment of the Milk Code which does not contain a total ban on the
advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes, but instead, specifically creates an
IAC which will regulate said advertising and promotion, it follows that a total ban policy
could be implemented only pursuant to a law amending the Milk Code passed by the
constitutionally authorized branch of government, the legislature.

Thus, only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent WHA
Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the DOH through the subject RIRR.

Third, the Court will now determine whether the provisions of the RIRR are in
accordance with those of the Milk Code.

In support of its claim that the RIRR is inconsistent with the Milk Code, petitioner alleges
the following:

1. The Milk Code limits its coverage to children 0-12 months old, but the RIRR extended
its coverage to "young children" or those from ages two years old and beyond:

MILK CODE

RIRR
WHEREAS, in order to ensure that safe and adequate nutrition for infants is provided,
there is a need to protect and promote breastfeeding and to inform the public about the
proper use of breastmilk substitutes and supplements and related products through
adequate, consistent and objective information and appropriate regulation of the
marketing and distribution of the said substitutes, supplements and related products;

SECTION 4(e). "Infant" means a person falling within the age bracket of 0-12 months.

Section 2. Purpose These Revised Rules and Regulations are hereby promulgated to
ensure the provision of safe and adequate nutrition for infants and young children by the
promotion, protection and support of breastfeeding and by ensuring the proper use of
breastmilk substitutes, breastmilk supplements and related products when these are
medically indicated and only when necessary, on the basis of adequate information and
through appropriate marketing and distribution.

Section 5(ff). "Young Child" means a person from the age of more than twelve (12)
months up to the age of three (3) years (36 months).

2. The Milk Code recognizes that infant formula may be a proper and possible substitute
for breastmilk in certain instances; but the RIRR provides "exclusive breastfeeding for
infants from 0-6 months" and declares that "there is no substitute nor replacement for
breastmilk":

MILK CODE

RIRR

WHEREAS, in order to ensure that safe and adequate nutrition for infants is provided,
there is a need to protect and promote breastfeeding and to inform the public about the
proper use of breastmilk substitutes and supplements and related products through
adequate, consistent and objective information and appropriate regulation of the
marketing and distribution of the said substitutes, supplements and related products;

Section 4. Declaration of Principles The following are the underlying principles from
which the revised rules and regulations are premised upon:

a. Exclusive breastfeeding is for infants from 0 to six (6) months.

b. There is no substitute or replacement for breastmilk.

3. The Milk Code only regulates and does not impose unreasonable requirements for
advertising and promotion; RIRR imposes an absolute ban on such activities for
breastmilk substitutes intended for infants from 0-24 months old or beyond, and forbids
the use of health and nutritional claims. Section 13 of the RIRR, which provides for a
"total effect" in the promotion of products within the scope of the Code, is vague:

MILK CODE

RIRR

SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers.

(a) No advertising, promotion or other marketing materials, whether written, audio or

visual, for products within the scope of this Code shall be printed, published, distributed,
exhibited and broadcast unless such materials are duly authorized and approved by an
inter-agency committee created herein pursuant to the applicable standards provided
for in this Code.

Section 4. Declaration of Principles The following are the underlying principles from
which the revised rules and regulations are premised upon:

xxxx

f. Advertising, promotions, or sponsor-ships of infant formula, breastmilk substitutes and

other related products are prohibited.

Section 11. Prohibition No advertising, promotions, sponsorships, or marketing

materials and activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young children
up to twenty-four (24) months, shall be allowed, because they tend to convey or give
subliminal messages or impressions that undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding or
otherwise exaggerate breastmilk substitutes and/or replacements, as well as related
products covered within the scope of this Code.

Section 13. "Total Effect" - Promotion of products within the scope of this Code must be
objective and should not equate or make the product appear to be as good or equal to
breastmilk or breastfeeding in the advertising concept. It must not in any case
undermine breastmilk or breastfeeding. The "total effect" should not directly or indirectly
suggest that buying their product would produce better individuals, or resulting in
greater love, intelligence, ability, harmony or in any manner bring better health to the
baby or other such exaggerated and unsubstantiated claim.
Section 15. Content of Materials. - The following shall not be included in advertising,
promotional and marketing materials:

a. Texts, pictures, illustrations or information which discourage or tend to undermine the

benefits or superiority of breastfeeding or which idealize the use of breastmilk
substitutes and milk supplements. In this connection, no pictures of babies and children
together with their mothers, fathers, siblings, grandparents, other relatives or caregivers
(or yayas) shall be used in any advertisements for infant formula and breastmilk
supplements;

b. The term "humanized," "maternalized," "close to mother's milk" or similar words in

describing breastmilk substitutes or milk supplements;

c. Pictures or texts that idealize the use of infant and milk formula.

Section 16. All health and nutrition claims for products within the scope of the Code are
absolutely prohibited. For this purpose, any phrase or words that connotes to increase
emotional, intellectual abilities of the infant and young child and other like phrases shall
not be allowed.

4. The RIRR imposes additional labeling requirements not found in the Milk Code:

MILK CODE

RIRR

SECTION 10. Containers/Label.

(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to provide the necessary information
about the appropriate use of the products, and in such a way as not to discourage
breastfeeding.

(b) Each container shall have a clear, conspicuous and easily readable and
understandable message in Pilipino or English printed on it, or on a label, which
message can not readily become separated from it, and which shall include the
following points:

(i) the words "Important Notice" or their equivalent;

(ii) a statement of the superiority of breastfeeding;

(iii) a statement that the product shall be used only on the advice of a health worker as
to the need for its use and the proper methods of use; and

(iv) instructions for appropriate preparation, and a warning against the health hazards of
inappropriate preparation.

Section 26. Content Each container/label shall contain such message, in both Filipino
and English languages, and which message cannot be readily separated therefrom,
relative the following points:

(a) The words or phrase "Important Notice" or "Government Warning" or their

equivalent;

(b) A statement of the superiority of breastfeeding;

(c) A statement that there is no substitute for breastmilk;

(d) A statement that the product shall be used only on the advice of a health worker as
to the need for its use and the proper methods of use;

(e) Instructions for appropriate prepara-tion, and a warning against the health hazards
of inappropriate preparation; and

(f) The health hazards of unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other
related products including information that powdered infant formula may contain
pathogenic microorganisms and must be prepared and used appropriately.

5. The Milk Code allows dissemination of information on infant formula to health

professionals; the RIRR totally prohibits such activity:

MILK CODE

RIRR

SECTION 7. Health Care System.

(b) No facility of the health care system shall be used for the purpose of promoting
infant formula or other products within the scope of this Code. This Code does not,
however, preclude the dissemination of information to health professionals as provided
in Section 8(b).
SECTION 8. Health Workers. -

(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to health professionals

regarding products within the scope of this Code shall be restricted to scientific and
factual matters and such information shall not imply or create a belief that bottle-feeding
is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It shall also include the information specified
in Section 5(b).

Section 22. No manufacturer, distributor, or representatives of products covered by the

Code shall be allowed to conduct or be involved in any activity on breastfeeding
promotion, education and production of Information, Education and Communication
(IEC) materials on breastfeeding, holding of or participating as speakers in classes or
seminars for women and children activities and to avoid the use of these venues to
market their brands or company names.

SECTION 16. All health and nutrition claims for products within the scope of the Code
are absolutely prohibited. For this purpose, any phrase or words that connotes to
increase emotional, intellectual abilities of the infant and young child and other like
phrases shall not be allowed.

6. The Milk Code permits milk manufacturers and distributors to extend assistance in
research and continuing education of health professionals; RIRR absolutely forbids the
same.

MILK CODE

RIRR

SECTION 8. Health Workers

(e) Manufacturers and distributors of products within the scope of this Code may assist
in the research, scholarships and continuing education, of health professionals, in
accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Health.

Section 4. Declaration of Principles

The following are the underlying principles from which the revised rules and regulations
are premised upon:

i. Milk companies, and their representatives, should not form part of any policymaking
body or entity in relation to the advancement of breasfeeding.
SECTION 22. No manufacturer, distributor, or representatives of products covered by
the Code shall be allowed to conduct or be involved in any activity on breastfeeding
promotion, education and production of Information, Education and Communication
(IEC) materials on breastfeeding, holding of or participating as speakers in classes or
seminars for women and children activities and to avoid the use of these venues to
market their brands or company names.

SECTION 32. Primary Responsibility of Health Workers - It is the primary responsibility

of the health workers to promote, protect and support breastfeeding and appropriate
infant and young child feeding. Part of this responsibility is to continuously update their
knowledge and skills on breastfeeding. No assistance, support, logistics or training from
milk companies shall be permitted.

7. The Milk Code regulates the giving of donations; RIRR absolutely prohibits it.

MILK CODE

RIRR

SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers.

(f) Nothing herein contained shall prevent donations from manufacturers and distributors
of products within the scope of this Code upon request by or with the approval of the
Ministry of Health.

Section 51. Donations Within the Scope of This Code - Donations of products,
materials, defined and covered under the Milk Code and these implementing rules and
regulations, shall be strictly prohibited.

Section 52. Other Donations By Milk Companies Not Covered by this Code. - Donations
of products, equipments, and the like, not otherwise falling within the scope of this Code
or these Rules, given by milk companies and their agents, representatives, whether in
kind or in cash, may only be coursed through the Inter Agency Committee (IAC), which
shall determine whether such donation be accepted or otherwise.

8. The RIRR provides for administrative sanctions not imposed by the Milk Code.

MILK CODE

RIRR
Section 46. Administrative Sanctions. The following administrative sanctions shall be
imposed upon any person, juridical or natural, found to have violated the provisions of
the Code and its implementing Rules and Regulations:

a) 1st violation Warning;

b) 2nd violation Administrative fine of a minimum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) to

Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, depending on the gravity and extent of the
violation, including the recall of the offending product;

c) 3rd violation Administrative Fine of a minimum of Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) to

One Hundred Fifty Thousand (P150,000.00) Pesos, depending on the gravity and
extent of the violation, and in addition thereto, the recall of the offending product, and
suspension of the Certificate of Product Registration (CPR);

d) 4th violation Administrative Fine of a minimum of Two Hundred Thousand

(P200,000.00) to Five Hundred (P500,000.00) Thousand Pesos, depending on the
gravity and extent of the violation; and in addition thereto, the recall of the product,
revocation of the CPR, suspension of the License to Operate (LTO) for one year;

e) 5th and succeeding repeated violations Administrative Fine of One Million

(P1,000,000.00) Pesos, the recall of the offending product, cancellation of the CPR,
revocation of the License to Operate (LTO) of the company concerned, including the
blacklisting of the company to be furnished the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI);

f) An additional penalty of Two Thou-sand Five Hundred (P2,500.00) Pesos per day
shall be made for every day the violation continues after having received the order from
the IAC or other such appropriate body, notifying and penalizing the company for the
infraction.

For purposes of determining whether or not there is "repeated" violation, each product
violation belonging or owned by a company, including those of their subsidiaries, are
deemed to be violations of the concerned milk company and shall not be based on the
specific violating product alone.

9. The RIRR provides for repeal of existing laws to the contrary.

The Court shall resolve the merits of the allegations of petitioner seriatim.

1. Petitioner is mistaken in its claim that the Milk Code's coverage is limited only to
children 0-12 months old. Section 3 of the Milk Code states:

SECTION 3. Scope of the Code The Code applies to the marketing, and practices
related thereto, of the following products: breastmilk substitutes, including infant
formula; other milk products, foods and beverages, including bottle-fed complementary
foods, when marketed or otherwise represented to be suitable, with or without
modification, for use as a partial or total replacement of breastmilk; feeding bottles and
teats. It also applies to their quality and availability, and to information concerning their
use.

Clearly, the coverage of the Milk Code is not dependent on the age of the child but on
the kind of product being marketed to the public. The law treats infant formula, bottle-fed
complementary food, and breastmilk substitute as separate and distinct product
categories.

Section 4(h) of the Milk Code defines infant formula as "a breastmilk substitute x x x to
satisfy the normal nutritional requirements of infants up to between four to six months of
age, and adapted to their physiological characteristics"; while under Section 4(b), bottle-
fed complementary food refers to "any food, whether manufactured or locally prepared,
suitable as a complement to breastmilk or infant formula, when either becomes
insufficient to satisfy the nutritional requirements of the infant." An infant under Section
4(e) is a person falling within the age bracket 0-12 months. It is the nourishment of this
group of infants or children aged 0-12 months that is sought to be promoted and
protected by the Milk Code.

But there is another target group. Breastmilk substitute is defined under Section 4(a) as
"any food being marketed or otherwise presented as a partial or total replacement for
breastmilk, whether or not suitable for that purpose." This section conspicuously lacks
reference to any particular age-group of children. Hence, the provision of the Milk Code
cannot be considered exclusive for children aged 0-12 months. In other words,
breastmilk substitutes may also be intended for young children more than 12 months of
age. Therefore, by regulating breastmilk substitutes, the Milk Code also intends to
protect and promote the nourishment of children more than 12 months old.

Evidently, as long as what is being marketed falls within the scope of the Milk Code as
provided in Section 3, then it can be subject to regulation pursuant to said law, even if
the product is to be used by children aged over 12 months.
There is, therefore, nothing objectionable with Sections 242 and 5(ff)43 of the RIRR.

2. It is also incorrect for petitioner to say that the RIRR, unlike the Milk Code, does not
recognize that breastmilk substitutes may be a proper and possible substitute for
breastmilk.

The entirety of the RIRR, not merely truncated portions thereof, must be considered and
construed together. As held in De Luna v. Pascual,44 "[t]he particular words, clauses
and phrases in the Rule should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of
its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole."

Section 7 of the RIRR provides that "when medically indicated and only when
necessary, the use of breastmilk substitutes is proper if based on complete and updated
information." Section 8 of the RIRR also states that information and educational
materials should include information on the proper use of infant formula when the use
thereof is needed.

Hence, the RIRR, just like the Milk Code, also recognizes that in certain cases, the use
of breastmilk substitutes may be proper.

3. The Court shall ascertain the merits of allegations 345 and 446 together as they are
interlinked with each other.

To resolve the question of whether the labeling requirements and advertising regulations
under the RIRR are valid, it is important to deal first with the nature, purpose, and depth
of the regulatory powers of the DOH, as defined in general under the 1987
Administrative Code,47 and as delegated in particular under the Milk Code.

Health is a legitimate subject matter for regulation by the DOH (and certain other
administrative agencies) in exercise of police powers delegated to it. The sheer span of
jurisprudence on that matter precludes the need to further discuss it..48 However,
health information, particularly advertising materials on apparently non-toxic products
like breastmilk substitutes and supplements, is a relatively new area for regulation by
the DOH.49

As early as the 1917 Revised Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands,50 health
information was already within the ambit of the regulatory powers of the predecessor of
DOH.51 Section 938 thereof charged it with the duty to protect the health of the people,
and vested it with such powers as "(g) the dissemination of hygienic information among
the people and especially the inculcation of knowledge as to the proper care of infants
and the methods of preventing and combating dangerous communicable diseases."

Seventy years later, the 1987 Administrative Code tasked respondent DOH to carry out
the state policy pronounced under Section 15, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which
is "to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them."52 To that end, it was granted under Section 3 of the
Administrative Code the power to "(6) propagate health information and educate the
population on important health, medical and environmental matters which have health
implications."53

When it comes to information regarding nutrition of infants and young children, however,
the Milk Code specifically delegated to the Ministry of Health (hereinafter referred to as
DOH) the power to ensure that there is adequate, consistent and objective information
on breastfeeding and use of breastmilk substitutes, supplements and related products;
and the power to control such information. These are expressly provided for in Sections
12 and 5(a), to wit:

SECTION 12. Implementation and Monitoring

xxxx

(b) The Ministry of Health shall be principally responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of the provisions of this Code. For this purpose, the Ministry of Health shall
have the following powers and functions:

(1) To promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or proper for the
implementation of this Code and the accomplishment of its purposes and objectives.

xxxx

(4) To exercise such other powers and functions as may be necessary for or incidental
to the attainment of the purposes and objectives of this Code.

SECTION 5. Information and Education

(a) The government shall ensure that objective and consistent information is provided
on infant feeding, for use by families and those involved in the field of infant nutrition.
This responsibility shall cover the planning, provision, design and dissemination of
information, and the control thereof, on infant nutrition. (Emphasis supplied)
Further, DOH is authorized by the Milk Code to control the content of any information on
breastmilk vis--vis breastmilk substitutes, supplement and related products, in the
following manner:

SECTION 5. x x x

(b) Informational and educational materials, whether written, audio, or visual, dealing
with the feeding of infants and intended to reach pregnant women and mothers of
infants, shall include clear information on all the following points: (1) the benefits and
superiority of breastfeeding; (2) maternal nutrition, and the preparation for and
maintenance of breastfeeding; (3) the negative effect on breastfeeding of introducing
partial bottlefeeding; (4) the difficulty of reversing the decision not to breastfeed; and (5)
where needed, the proper use of infant formula, whether manufactured industrially or
home-prepared. When such materials contain information about the use of infant
formula, they shall include the social and financial implications of its use; the health
hazards of inappropriate foods or feeding methods; and, in particular, the health
hazards of unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other breastmilk
substitutes. Such materials shall not use any picture or text which may idealize the use
of breastmilk substitutes.

SECTION 8. Health Workers

xxxx

(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to health professionals

regarding products within the scope of this Code shall be restricted to scientific and
factual matters, and such information shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding
is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It shall also include the information specified
in Section 5(b).

SECTION 10. Containers/Label

(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to provide the necessary information
about the appropriate use of the products, and in such a way as not to discourage
breastfeeding.

xxxx

(d) The term "humanized," "maternalized" or similar terms shall not be used. (Emphasis
supplied)
The DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the information and to whom such
information may be disseminated under Sections 6 through 9 of the Milk Code54 to
ensure that the information that would reach pregnant women, mothers of infants, and
health professionals and workers in the health care system is restricted to scientific and
factual matters and shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or
superior to breastfeeding.

It bears emphasis, however, that the DOH's power under the Milk Code to control
information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes is not absolute as the
power to control does not encompass the power to absolutely prohibit the advertising,
marketing, and promotion of breastmilk substitutes.

The following are the provisions of the Milk Code that unequivocally indicate that the
control over information given to the DOH is not absolute and that absolute prohibition is
not contemplated by the Code:

a) Section 2 which requires adequate information and appropriate marketing and

distribution of breastmilk substitutes, to wit:

SECTION 2. Aim of the Code The aim of the Code is to contribute to the provision of
safe and adequate nutrition for infants by the protection and promotion of breastfeeding
and by ensuring the proper use of breastmilk substitutes and breastmilk supplements
when these are necessary, on the basis of adequate information and through
appropriate marketing and distribution.

b) Section 3 which specifically states that the Code applies to the marketing of and
practices related to breastmilk substitutes, including infant formula, and to information
concerning their use;

c) Section 5(a) which provides that the government shall ensure that objective and
consistent information is provided on infant feeding;

d) Section 5(b) which provides that written, audio or visual informational and educational
materials shall not use any picture or text which may idealize the use of breastmilk
substitutes and should include information on the health hazards of unnecessary or
improper use of said product;

e) Section 6(a) in relation to Section 12(a) which creates and empowers the IAC to
review and examine advertising, promotion, and other marketing materials;
f) Section 8(b) which states that milk companies may provide information to health
professionals but such information should be restricted to factual and scientific matters
and shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to
breastfeeding; and

g) Section 10 which provides that containers or labels should not contain information
that would discourage breastfeeding and idealize the use of infant formula.

It is in this context that the Court now examines the assailed provisions of the RIRR
regarding labeling and advertising.

Sections 1355 on "total effect" and 2656 of Rule VII of the RIRR contain some labeling
requirements, specifically: a) that there be a statement that there is no substitute to
breastmilk; and b) that there be a statement that powdered infant formula may contain
pathogenic microorganisms and must be prepared and used appropriately. Section
1657 of the RIRR prohibits all health and nutrition claims for products within the scope
of the Milk Code, such as claims of increased emotional and intellectual abilities of the
infant and young child.

These requirements and limitations are consistent with the provisions of Section 8 of the
Milk Code, to wit:

SECTION 8. Health workers -

xxxx

(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to health professionals

regarding products within the scope of this Code shall be restricted to scientific and
factual matters, and such information shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding
is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It shall also include the information specified
in Section 5.58 (Emphasis supplied)

and Section 10(d)59 which bars the use on containers and labels of the terms
"humanized," "maternalized," or similar terms.

These provisions of the Milk Code expressly forbid information that would imply or
create a belief that there is any milk product equivalent to breastmilk or which is
humanized or maternalized, as such information would be inconsistent with the
superiority of breastfeeding.
It may be argued that Section 8 of the Milk Code refers only to information given to
health workers regarding breastmilk substitutes, not to containers and labels thereof.
However, such restrictive application of Section 8(b) will result in the absurd situation in
which milk companies and distributors are forbidden to claim to health workers that their
products are substitutes or equivalents of breastmilk, and yet be allowed to display on
the containers and labels of their products the exact opposite message. That askewed
interpretation of the Milk Code is precisely what Section 5(a) thereof seeks to avoid by
mandating that all information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes be
consistent, at the same time giving the government control over planning, provision,
design, and dissemination of information on infant feeding.

Thus, Section 26(c) of the RIRR which requires containers and labels to state that the
product offered is not a substitute for breastmilk, is a reasonable means of enforcing
Section 8(b) of the Milk Code and deterring circumvention of the protection and
promotion of breastfeeding as embodied in Section 260 of the Milk Code.

Section 26(f)61 of the RIRR is an equally reasonable labeling requirement. It

implements Section 5(b) of the Milk Code which reads:

SECTION 5. x x x

xxxx

(b) Informational and educational materials, whether written, audio, or visual, dealing
with the feeding of infants and intended to reach pregnant women and mothers of
infants, shall include clear information on all the following points: x x x (5) where
needed, the proper use of infant formula, whether manufactured industrially or home-
prepared. When such materials contain information about the use of infant formula, they
shall include the social and financial implications of its use; the health hazards of
inappropriate foods or feeding methods; and, in particular, the health hazards of
unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other breastmilk substitutes. Such
materials shall not use any picture or text which may idealize the use of breastmilk
substitutes. (Emphasis supplied)

The label of a product contains information about said product intended for the buyers
thereof. The buyers of breastmilk substitutes are mothers of infants, and Section 26 of
the RIRR merely adds a fair warning about the likelihood of pathogenic microorganisms
being present in infant formula and other related products when these are prepared and
used inappropriately.
Petitioners counsel has admitted during the hearing on June 19, 2007 that formula milk
is prone to contaminations and there is as yet no technology that allows production of
powdered infant formula that eliminates all forms of contamination.62

Ineluctably, the requirement under Section 26(f) of the RIRR for the label to contain the
message regarding health hazards including the possibility of contamination with
pathogenic microorganisms is in accordance with Section 5(b) of the Milk Code.

The authority of DOH to control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk

substitutes and supplements and related products cannot be questioned. It is its
intervention into the area of advertising, promotion, and marketing that is being assailed
by petitioner.

In furtherance of Section 6(a) of the Milk Code, to wit:

SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers.

(a) No advertising, promotion or other marketing materials, whether written, audio or

visual, for products within the scope of this Code shall be printed, published, distributed,
exhibited and broadcast unless such materials are duly authorized and approved by an
inter-agency committee created herein pursuant to the applicable standards provided
for in this Code.

the Milk Code invested regulatory authority over advertising, promotional and marketing
materials to an IAC, thus:

SECTION 12. Implementation and Monitoring -

(a) For purposes of Section 6(a) of this Code, an inter-agency committee composed of
the following members is hereby created:

Minister of Health

-------------------

Chairman

Minister of Trade and Industry

-------------------
Member

Minister of Justice

-------------------

Member

Minister of Social Services and Development

-------------------

Member

The members may designate their duly authorized representative to every meeting of
the Committee.

The Committee shall have the following powers and functions:

(1) To review and examine all advertising. promotion or other marketing materials,
whether written, audio or visual, on products within the scope of this Code;

(2) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and prohibit the
printing, publication, distribution, exhibition and broadcast of, all advertising promotion
or other marketing materials, whether written, audio or visual, on products within the
scope of this Code;

(3) To prescribe the internal and operational procedure for the exercise of its powers
and functions as well as the performance of its duties and responsibilities; and

(4) To promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or proper for the
implementation of Section 6(a) of this Code. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

However, Section 11 of the RIRR, to wit:

SECTION 11. Prohibition No advertising, promotions, sponsorships, or marketing

materials and activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young children
up to twenty-four (24) months, shall be allowed, because they tend to convey or give
subliminal messages or impressions that undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding or
otherwise exaggerate breastmilk substitutes and/or replacements, as well as related
products covered within the scope of this Code.
prohibits advertising, promotions, sponsorships or marketing materials and activities for
breastmilk substitutes in line with the RIRRs declaration of principle under Section 4(f),
to wit:

SECTION 4. Declaration of Principles

xxxx

(f) Advertising, promotions, or sponsorships of infant formula, breastmilk substitutes and

other related products are prohibited.

The DOH, through its co-respondents, evidently arrogated to itself not only the
regulatory authority given to the IAC but also imposed absolute prohibition on
advertising, promotion, and marketing.

Yet, oddly enough, Section 12 of the RIRR reiterated the requirement of the Milk Code
in Section 6 thereof for prior approval by IAC of all advertising, marketing and
promotional materials prior to dissemination.

Even respondents, through the OSG, acknowledged the authority of IAC, and
repeatedly insisted, during the oral arguments on June 19, 2007, that the prohibition
under Section 11 is not actually operational, viz:

SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:

xxxx

x x x Now, the crux of the matter that is being questioned by Petitioner is whether or not
there is an absolute prohibition on advertising making AO 2006-12 unconstitutional. We
maintained that what AO 2006-12 provides is not an absolute prohibition because
Section 11 while it states and it is entitled prohibition it states that no advertising,
promotion, sponsorship or marketing materials and activities for breast milk substitutes
intended for infants and young children up to 24 months shall be allowed because this is
the standard they tend to convey or give subliminal messages or impression undermine
that breastmilk or breastfeeding x x x.

We have to read Section 11 together with the other Sections because the other Section,
Section 12, provides for the inter agency committee that is empowered to process and
evaluate all the advertising and promotion materials.
xxxx

What AO 2006-12, what it does, it does not prohibit the sale and manufacture, it simply
regulates the advertisement and the promotions of breastfeeding milk substitutes.

xxxx

Now, the prohibition on advertising, Your Honor, must be taken together with the
provision on the Inter-Agency Committee that processes and evaluates because there
may be some information dissemination that are straight forward information
dissemination. What the AO 2006 is trying to prevent is any material that will undermine
the practice of breastfeeding, Your Honor.

xxxx

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SANTIAGO:

Madam Solicitor General, under the Milk Code, which body has authority or power to
promulgate Rules and Regulations regarding the Advertising, Promotion and Marketing
of Breastmilk Substitutes?

SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:

Your Honor, please, it is provided that the Inter-Agency Committee, Your Honor.

xxxx

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SANTIAGO:

x x x Don't you think that the Department of Health overstepped its rule making authority
when it totally banned advertising and promotion under Section 11 prescribed the total
effect rule as well as the content of materials under Section 13 and 15 of the rules and
regulations?

SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:

Your Honor, please, first we would like to stress that there is no total absolute ban.
Second, the Inter-Agency Committee is under the Department of Health, Your Honor.

xxxx
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NAZARIO:

x x x Did I hear you correctly, Madam Solicitor, that there is no absolute ban on
advertising of breastmilk substitutes in the Revised Rules?

SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:

Yes, your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NAZARIO:

But, would you nevertheless agree that there is an absolute ban on advertising of
breastmilk substitutes intended for children two (2) years old and younger?

SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:

It's not an absolute ban, Your Honor, because we have the Inter-Agency Committee that
can evaluate some advertising and promotional materials, subject to the standards that
we have stated earlier, which are- they should not undermine breastfeeding, Your
Honor.

xxxx

x x x Section 11, while it is titled Prohibition, it must be taken in relation with the other
Sections, particularly 12 and 13 and 15, Your Honor, because it is recognized that the
Inter-Agency Committee has that power to evaluate promotional materials, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NAZARIO:

So in short, will you please clarify there's no absolute ban on advertisement regarding
milk substitute regarding infants two (2) years below?

SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:

We can proudly say that the general rule is that there is a prohibition, however, we take
exceptions and standards have been set. One of which is that, the Inter-Agency
Committee can allow if the advertising and promotions will not undermine breastmilk
and breastfeeding, Your Honor.63

Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the Milk Code.
However, although it is the IAC which is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations
for the approval or rejection of advertising, promotional, or other marketing materials
under Section 12(a) of the Milk Code, said provision must be related to Section 6
thereof which in turn provides that the rules and regulations must be "pursuant to the
applicable standards provided for in this Code." Said standards are set forth in Sections
5(b), 8(b), and 10 of the Code, which, at the risk of being repetitious, and for easy
reference, are quoted hereunder:

SECTION 5. Information and Education

xxxx

(b) Informational and educational materials, whether written, audio, or visual, dealing
with the feeding of infants and intended to reach pregnant women and mothers of
infants, shall include clear information on all the following points: (1) the benefits and
superiority of breastfeeding; (2) maternal nutrition, and the preparation for and
maintenance of breastfeeding; (3) the negative effect on breastfeeding of introducing
partial bottlefeeding; (4) the difficulty of reversing the decision not to breastfeed; and (5)
where needed, the proper use of infant formula, whether manufactured industrially or
home-prepared. When such materials contain information about the use of infant
formula, they shall include the social and financial implications of its use; the health
hazards of inappropriate foods of feeding methods; and, in particular, the health hazards
of unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other breastmilk substitutes. Such
materials shall not use any picture or text which may idealize the use of breastmilk
substitutes.

xxxx

SECTION 8. Health Workers.

xxxx

(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to health professionals

regarding products within the scope of this Code shall be restricted to scientific and
factual matters and such information shall not imply or create a belief that bottle feeding
is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It shall also include the information specified
in Section 5(b).

xxxx

SECTION 10. Containers/Label

(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to provide the necessary information
about the appropriate use of the products, and in such a way as not to discourage
breastfeeding.

(b) Each container shall have a clear, conspicuous and easily readable and
understandable message in Pilipino or English printed on it, or on a label, which
message can not readily become separated from it, and which shall include the
following points:

(i) the words "Important Notice" or their equivalent;

(ii) a statement of the superiority of breastfeeding;

(iii) a statement that the product shall be used only on the advice of a health worker as
to the need for its use and the proper methods of use; and

(iv) instructions for appropriate preparation, and a warning against the health hazards of
inappropriate preparation.

Section 12(b) of the Milk Code designates the DOH as the principal implementing
agency for the enforcement of the provisions of the Code. In relation to such
responsibility of the DOH, Section 5(a) of the Milk Code states that:

SECTION 5. Information and Education

(a) The government shall ensure that objective and consistent information is provided
on infant feeding, for use by families and those involved in the field of infant nutrition.
This responsibility shall cover the planning, provision, design and dissemination of
information, and the control thereof, on infant nutrition. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the DOH has the significant responsibility to translate into operational terms the
standards set forth in Sections 5, 8, and 10 of the Milk Code, by which the IAC shall
screen advertising, promotional, or other marketing materials.

It is pursuant to such responsibility that the DOH correctly provided for Section 13 in the
RIRR which reads as follows:

SECTION 13. "Total Effect" - Promotion of products within the scope of this Code must
be objective and should not equate or make the product appear to be as good or equal
to breastmilk or breastfeeding in the advertising concept. It must not in any case
undermine breastmilk or breastfeeding. The "total effect" should not directly or indirectly
suggest that buying their product would produce better individuals, or resulting in
greater love, intelligence, ability, harmony or in any manner bring better health to the
baby or other such exaggerated and unsubstantiated claim.

Such standards bind the IAC in formulating its rules and regulations on advertising,
promotion, and marketing. Through that single provision, the DOH exercises control
over the information content of advertising, promotional and marketing materials on
breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes, supplements and other related products. It
also sets a viable standard against which the IAC may screen such materials before
they are made public.

In Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. vs. Department of Foreign Affairs,64 the Court held:

x x x [T]his Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "public
interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare," and "simplicity,
economy and welfare."65

In this case, correct information as to infant feeding and nutrition is infused with public
interest and welfare.

4. With regard to activities for dissemination of information to health professionals, the

Court also finds that there is no inconsistency between the provisions of the Milk Code
and the RIRR. Section 7(b)66 of the Milk Code, in relation to Section 8(b)67 of the same
Code, allows dissemination of information to health professionals but such information
is restricted to scientific and factual matters.

Contrary to petitioner's claim, Section 22 of the RIRR does not prohibit the giving of
information to health professionals on scientific and factual matters. What it prohibits is
the involvement of the manufacturer and distributor of the products covered by the Code
in activities for the promotion, education and production of Information, Education and
Communication (IEC) materials regarding breastfeeding that are intended for women
and children. Said provision cannot be construed to encompass even the dissemination
of information to health professionals, as restricted by the Milk Code.

5. Next, petitioner alleges that Section 8(e)68 of the Milk Code permits milk
manufacturers and distributors to extend assistance in research and in the continuing
education of health professionals, while Sections 22 and 32 of the RIRR absolutely
forbid the same. Petitioner also assails Section 4(i)69 of the RIRR prohibiting milk
manufacturers' and distributors' participation in any policymaking body in relation to the
advancement of breastfeeding.
Section 4(i) of the RIRR provides that milk companies and their representatives should
not form part of any policymaking body or entity in relation to the advancement of
breastfeeding. The Court finds nothing in said provisions which contravenes the Milk
Code. Note that under Section 12(b) of the Milk Code, it is the DOH which shall be
principally responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of said
Code. It is entirely up to the DOH to decide which entities to call upon or allow to be part
of policymaking bodies on breastfeeding. Therefore, the RIRR's prohibition on milk
companies participation in any policymaking body in relation to the advancement of
breastfeeding is in accord with the Milk Code.

Petitioner is also mistaken in arguing that Section 22 of the RIRR prohibits milk
companies from giving reasearch assistance and continuing education to health
professionals. Section 2270 of the RIRR does not pertain to research assistance to or
the continuing education of health professionals; rather, it deals with breastfeeding
promotion and education for women and children. Nothing in Section 22 of the RIRR
prohibits milk companies from giving assistance for research or continuing education to
health professionals; hence, petitioner's argument against this particular provision must
be struck down.

It is Sections 971 and 1072 of the RIRR which govern research assistance. Said
sections of the RIRR provide that research assistance for health workers and
researchers may be allowed upon approval of an ethics committee, and with certain
disclosure requirements imposed on the milk company and on the recipient of the
research award.

The Milk Code endows the DOH with the power to determine how such research or
educational assistance may be given by milk companies or under what conditions
health workers may accept the assistance. Thus, Sections 9 and 10 of the RIRR
imposing limitations on the kind of research done or extent of assistance given by milk
companies are completely in accord with the Milk Code.

Petitioner complains that Section 3273 of the RIRR prohibits milk companies from giving
assistance, support, logistics or training to health workers. This provision is within the
prerogative given to the DOH under Section 8(e)74 of the Milk Code, which provides
that manufacturers and distributors of breastmilk substitutes may assist in researches,
scholarships and the continuing education, of health professionals in accordance with
the rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Health, now DOH.

6. As to the RIRR's prohibition on donations, said provisions are also consistent with the
Milk Code. Section 6(f) of the Milk Code provides that donations may be made by
manufacturers and distributors of breastmilk substitutes upon the request or with the
approval of the DOH. The law does not proscribe the refusal of donations. The Milk
Code leaves it purely to the discretion of the DOH whether to request or accept such
donations. The DOH then appropriately exercised its discretion through Section 5175 of
the RIRR which sets forth its policy not to request or approve donations from
manufacturers and distributors of breastmilk substitutes.

It was within the discretion of the DOH when it provided in Section 52 of the RIRR that
any donation from milk companies not covered by the Code should be coursed through
the IAC which shall determine whether such donation should be accepted or refused. As
reasoned out by respondents, the DOH is not mandated by the Milk Code to accept
donations. For that matter, no person or entity can be forced to accept a donation.
There is, therefore, no real inconsistency between the RIRR and the law because the
Milk Code does not prohibit the DOH from refusing donations.

7. With regard to Section 46 of the RIRR providing for administrative sanctions that are
not found in the Milk Code, the Court upholds petitioner's objection thereto.

Respondent's reliance on Civil Aeronautics Board v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc.76 is

misplaced. The glaring difference in said case and the present case before the Court is
that, in the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) was
expressly granted by the law (R.A. No. 776) the power to impose fines and civil
penalties, while the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was granted by the same law the
power to review on appeal the order or decision of the CAA and to determine whether to
impose, remit, mitigate, increase or compromise such fine and civil penalties. Thus, the
Court upheld the CAB's Resolution imposing administrative fines.

In a more recent case, Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc.,77 the
Court upheld the Department of Energy (DOE) Circular No. 2000-06-10 implementing
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 33. The circular provided for fines for the commission of
prohibited acts. The Court found that nothing in the circular contravened the law
because the DOE was expressly authorized by B.P. Blg. 33 and R.A. No. 7638 to
impose fines or penalties.

In the present case, neither the Milk Code nor the Revised Administrative Code grants
the DOH the authority to fix or impose administrative fines. Thus, without any express
grant of power to fix or impose such fines, the DOH cannot provide for those fines in the
RIRR. In this regard, the DOH again exceeded its authority by providing for such fines
or sanctions in Section 46 of the RIRR. Said provision is, therefore, null and void.
The DOH is not left without any means to enforce its rules and regulations. Section
12(b) (3) of the Milk Code authorizes the DOH to "cause the prosecution of the violators
of this Code and other pertinent laws on products covered by this Code." Section 13 of
the Milk Code provides for the penalties to be imposed on violators of the provision of
the Milk Code or the rules and regulations issued pursuant to it, to wit:

SECTION 13. Sanctions

(a) Any person who violates the provisions of this Code or the rules and regulations
issued pursuant to this Code shall, upon conviction, be punished by a penalty of two (2)
months to one (1) year imprisonment or a fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) nor more than Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) or both. Should the
offense be committed by a juridical person, the chairman of the Board of Directors, the
president, general manager, or the partners and/or the persons directly responsible
therefor, shall be penalized.

(b) Any license, permit or authority issued by any government agency to any health
worker, distributor, manufacturer, or marketing firm or personnel for the practice of their
profession or occupation, or for the pursuit of their business, may, upon
recommendation of the Ministry of Health, be suspended or revoked in the event of
repeated violations of this Code, or of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to this
Code. (Emphasis supplied)

8. Petitioners claim that Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws that are contrary
to the RIRR is frivolous.

Section 57 reads:

SECTION 57. Repealing Clause - All orders, issuances, and rules and regulations or
parts thereof inconsistent with these revised rules and implementing regulations are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 57 of the RIRR does not provide for the repeal of laws but only orders,
issuances and rules and regulations. Thus, said provision is valid as it is within the
DOH's rule-making power.

An administrative agency like respondent possesses quasi-legislative or rule-making

power or the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation
that is within the confines of the granting statute and the Constitution, and subject to the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.78 Such express grant of rule-
making power necessarily includes the power to amend, revise, alter, or repeal the
same.79 This is to allow administrative agencies flexibility in formulating and adjusting
the details and manner by which they are to implement the provisions of a law,80 in
order to make it more responsive to the times. Hence, it is a standard provision in
administrative rules that prior issuances of administrative agencies that are inconsistent
therewith are declared repealed or modified.

In fine, only Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 are ultra vires, beyond the authority of the DOH to
promulgate and in contravention of the Milk Code and, therefore, null and void. The rest
of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the Milk Code.

Lastly, petitioner makes a "catch-all" allegation that:

x x x [T]he questioned RIRR sought to be implemented by the Respondents is

unnecessary and oppressive, and is offensive to the due process clause of the
Constitution, insofar as the same is in restraint of trade and because a provision therein
is inadequate to provide the public with a comprehensible basis to determine whether or
not they have committed a violation.81 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner refers to Sections 4(f),82 4(i),83 5(w),84 11,85 22,86 32,87 46,88 and 5289
as the provisions that suppress the trade of milk and, thus, violate the due process
clause of the Constitution.

The framers of the constitution were well aware that trade must be subjected to some
form of regulation for the public good. Public interest must be upheld over business
interests.90 In Pest Management Association of the Philippines v. Fertilizer and
Pesticide Authority,91 it was held thus:

x x x Furthermore, as held in Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine

Coconut Authority, despite the fact that "our present Constitution enshrines free
enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene
whenever necessary to promote the general welfare." There can be no question that the
unregulated use or proliferation of pesticides would be hazardous to our environment.
Thus, in the aforecited case, the Court declared that "free enterprise does not call for
removal of protective regulations." x x x It must be clearly explained and proven by
competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the
restraint of trade. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

In this case, petitioner failed to show that the proscription of milk manufacturers
participation in any policymaking body (Section 4(i)), classes and seminars for women
and children (Section 22); the giving of assistance, support and logistics or training
(Section 32); and the giving of donations (Section 52) would unreasonably hamper the
trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner has not established that the proscribed
activities are indispensable to the trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner failed to
demonstrate that the aforementioned provisions of the RIRR are unreasonable and
oppressive for being in restraint of trade.

Petitioner also failed to convince the Court that Section 5(w) of the RIRR is
unreasonable and oppressive. Said section provides for the definition of the term "milk
company," to wit:

SECTION 5 x x x. (w) "Milk Company" shall refer to the owner, manufacturer, distributor
of infant formula, follow-up milk, milk formula, milk supplement, breastmilk substitute or
replacement, or by any other description of such nature, including their representatives
who promote or otherwise advance their commercial interests in marketing those
products;

On the other hand, Section 4 of the Milk Code provides:

(d) "Distributor" means a person, corporation or any other entity in the public or private
sector engaged in the business (whether directly or indirectly) of marketing at the
wholesale or retail level a product within the scope of this Code. A "primary distributor"
is a manufacturer's sales agent, representative, national distributor or broker.

xxxx

(j) "Manufacturer" means a corporation or other entity in the public or private sector
engaged in the business or function (whether directly or indirectly or through an agent or
and entity controlled by or under contract with it) of manufacturing a products within the
scope of this Code.

Notably, the definition in the RIRR merely merged together under the term "milk
company" the entities defined separately under the Milk Code as "distributor" and
"manufacturer." The RIRR also enumerated in Section 5(w) the products manufactured
or distributed by an entity that would qualify it as a "milk company," whereas in the Milk
Code, what is used is the phrase "products within the scope of this Code." Those are
the only differences between the definitions given in the Milk Code and the definition as
re-stated in the RIRR.

Since all the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both
manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no harm in the RIRR providing for just
one term to encompass both entities. The definition of "milk company" in the RIRR and
the definitions of "distributor" and "manufacturer" provided for under the Milk Code are
practically the same.

The Court is not convinced that the definition of "milk company" provided in the RIRR
would bring about any change in the treatment or regulation of "distributors" and
"manufacturers" of breastmilk substitutes, as defined under the Milk Code.

Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in
consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code, constituting
reasonable regulation of an industry which affects public health and welfare and, as
such, the rest of the RIRR do not constitute illegal restraint of trade nor are they
violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of

Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID
for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from
implementing said provisions.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on August 15, 2006 is LIFTED insofar as the
rest of the provisions of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chief Justice), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,

Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., Nachura,
Reyes, JJ., concur.

12.BAYAN MUNA VS ROMULO

G. R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011

Facts:

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent

the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent
Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to
cover those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.

On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed
the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of
the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and
concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No.
0470 to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-
surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03,
hereinafter), the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and
accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put
in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the Agreement aims to
protect what it refers to and defines as persons of the RP and US from frivolous and
harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.8 It is
reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and defense partnership
between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have been
effected by and between the US and 33 other countries.

The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:

1. For purposes of this Agreement, persons are current or former Government

officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one
Party.

2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the
express consent of the first Party,

(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any
purpose, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, or

(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or
expelled to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any
international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security
Council.

3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the

Philippines to a third country, the [US] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of
that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal
has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP].

4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the [USA]
to a third country, the [GRP] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person
by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been
established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government
of the [US].

5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one
party notifies the other of its intent to terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this
Agreement shall continue to apply with respect to any act occurring, or any allegation
arising, before the effective date of termination.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of

the non-surrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October
28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding
agreement under international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did
not require the advice and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in
concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as
unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.

Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for
contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with
universally recognized principles of international law.

Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.

Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold
posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the
Agreement.

Petitioners contentionperhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized

international doctrines, practices, and jargonsis untenable. One of these is the
doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution,
wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An exchange of notes falls
into the category of inter-governmental agreements, which is an internationally
accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections
(Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:

An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities

with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two
documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the
representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the
text of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be
government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of exchange of
notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes,
to avoid the process of legislative approval.

In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and executive agreements have
been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive
agreement that becomes binding through executive action. On the other hand,
executive agreements concluded by the President sometimes take the form of
exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated
agreements or protocols. As former US High Commissioner to the Philippines
Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends
and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or
otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. x x x
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03be it viewed as
the Non-Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof
or as consent to be boundis a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding
international written contract among nations.

Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance

with Principles of International Law

Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing
immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized
principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the
Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility
for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it
precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the [ICC] x x x.63

The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which, as

already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually
abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under
the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.

The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender
agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the
Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x The
agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys judiciary to
try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and
judiciously.

Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement
would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern
to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who
may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and
punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US,
before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind both
countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement
contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international
tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to
prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of things, there is
nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines
of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an
offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute

13. GUDANI VS. SENGA

Posted by kaye lee on 10:51 PM

GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry;
Legislative Investigation]

FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004
election fraud and the surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464
enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment
from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen.
Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from
appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the
two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to
them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the
Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the Chain of Command. Gen.
Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for
willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of
the AFP preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her
power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies
such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of
Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent
of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any
military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do
so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final
judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty
to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement
of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a
congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations
on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on
specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers
from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief
Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of
members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are
not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to
appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself
recognizes as one of the legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents
power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly
interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not
come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential
prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the
President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the
clash may soon loom or actualize.

The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize

the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has
earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify,
the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the
courts.

14. UCCP VS BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST

 UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE G.R. No. 171905
PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIO, J.,
-versus- Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH OF
CHRIST, INC., PATRIZIO EZRA,
GERONIMO V. NAZARETH, RUPERTO
MAYUGA, SR., ROBERT SCHAARE,
HENRY CARIAT, REYNALDO
FERRENAL AND JOHN DOES,
Respondents. Promulgated:

June 20, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 83159 which affirmed the Securities and Exchange Commission [2] (SEC)
Decision[3] in SEC Case No. C-00194.

Petitioner United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCP) is a religious

corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It is a
national confederation of incorporated and unincorporated self-governing Evangelical
churches of different denominations, devised for fellowship, mutual counsel and
cooperation. It is the ecclesiastical successor of the Evangelical Church of the
Philippines, the Philippine Methodist Church and the United Evangelical Church of
the Philippines.[4]

Respondent Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI), formerly known as

Bradford Memorial Church, is likewise a religious corporation with a personality
separate and distinct from UCCP. It was organized at the turn of the 20th century but
it was incorporated only on 14 December 1979.

Respondents Patrizio Ezra, Geronimo Nazareth, Ruperto Mayuga, Sr., Robert

Schaare, Henry Cariat, Reynaldo Ferrenal and other John Does are members of
BUCCI.
 The following historical background briefly summarizes the relationship
between UCCP and BUCCI, viz:

On May 25, 1948, The United Church of Christ in the Philippines,

Inc. was formally organized. The five ancestor churches were the
Methodist Episcopal Church, the Presbyterian Church, the Church of
Christ (Disciples) and the Congregational Churches. These churches
traced their lineage back to the early Christian Church.
Early on, at the turn of the century, the proponents of these
churches came as missionaries, spreading the faith as ardent offsprings
of the Reformation. Aimed at converting Roman Catholics, Buddhists,
Hindus and spirit worshippers to the Protestant faith, these missionaries
had organized the Evangelical Union by 1901, until it was superseded by
a forerunner of the National Council of Churches in the Philippines.

During th[o]se times, the precursor of Bradford Memorial Church,

the Presbyterian mission came to the Philippines. It was organized by the
early missionaries of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. through its
Board of Foreign Missions. In 1909, it was alleged to have acquired real
properties in the Philippines funded by one Matilda R. L. Bradford from
whom the congregation attributed its name, in recognition of her efforts
for the church.

While not all churches in the Evangelical Union were equally

strong in their desire for organic church union, such remained as a goal
of the organization. In 1921, it seemed that the plans for the union of the
five churches were not to materialize, so the movement widened its
activities to include all the Presbyterian churches and the Congregational
bodies in the Philippines.

After considerable negotiations, four churches- the Presbyterian,

the Congregational, the United Brethren and the United Church of
Manila were invited and an assembly was held in Manila. On March 15,
1929, the basis of Union was formally adopted and the United
Evangelical Church came into being.

The new church grew in strength from year to year until the
Second World War when a division was created in the newly formed
Evangelical Church in the Philippines.

In 1946, immediately following the close of World War II, the

Presbyterians and Congregationalist Churches in the Visayas and
Mindanao region under the Rev. Leonardo Dia reconstituted the United
Evangelical Church in the Philippines in those areas. In view of this
development, the Bradford Memorial Church transferred its synodical
connection to the newly reorganized United Evangelical Church in the
Philippines, and thereafter, carried the name BRADFORD Evangelical
Church.
 A few years after the war, it was thought wise not to push through
with the church union. However, on May 25, 1948, a total of 167
delegates from three church bodies met at Ellinwood-Malate
Church. They were the Evangelical Church, a federation of evangelical
churches operating in the Luzon area; the Philippine Methodist Church
(a split from the United Methodist-Episcopal Church) and the United
Evangelical Church in the Philipines, a federation of Presbyterian and
Congregationalist churches operating in the Visayas and Mindanao
area. Each body reported that its constituted divisions had voted to
accept the basis of Union and to join the new church. So on May 23-25,
1945, these three major churches convened, organized and declared the
new federation of evangelical churches.

Thus, the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. or

UCCP was born from the union of these three major churches. Finally,
on April 12, 1949, the UCCP was registered with the Commission.

Thus, by circumstance, the Bradford Evangelical Church

transferred its synodical connection to and became a constituent Church
of the UCCP.

Through the years the UCCP underwent major changes. Per its
Constitution published in April of 1980, it was apportioned into several
Conferences, delineated according to geographical areas as determined
by the General Assembly. Most of its local congregations and conferences
were also registered as separate entities for greater autonomy such as
the Cebu Conference Inc. and Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc.

On December 14, 1979, Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc.

(BUCCI) was incorporated as a personality separate and distinct from
UCCP. Registered under SEC. Reg. No. 90225, its Articles of
Incorporation declare Bradford United Church of Christ as a Protestant
Congregation. Among its original incorporators are herein Respondents
Patricio Ezra, Robert Schaare and Geronimo V. Nazareth. Furthermore,
Article 3 of its original articles of incorporation provides:

That its incorporation is not forbidden by competent

authorities or by the Constitution, rules, regulations or discipline
of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and that of the
Bradford United Church of Christ.[5]

UCCP has three (3) governing bodies namely: the General Assembly, the
Conference and the Local Church, each having distinct and separate duties and
powers. As a UCCP local church located in Cebu, BUCCI belonged to the Cebu
Conference Inc. (CCI) with whom it enjoyed peaceful co-existence until late 1989 when
BUCCI started construction of a fence that encroached upon the right-of way allocated
by UCCP for CCI and Visayas jurisdiction.[6]
 UCCP General Assembly attempted to settle the dispute. On 7 April 1990, the
Cebu Conference Judicial Commission rendered a decision in favor of CCI. [7] This
unfavorable decision triggered a series of events[8] which further increased the enmity
between the parties and led to the formal break-up of BUCCI from UCCP. [9]

In a Church Council Resolution dated 21 June 1992, BUCCI disaffiliated from

UCCP. The effectivity of the disaffiliation was made to retroact to 16 September 1990
when BUCCI severed its ties from CCI. This disaffiliation was duly ratified by BUCCIs
members in a referendum held on 19 July 1992.[10]

Consequently, BUCCI filed its Amended Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws

which provided for and effected its disaffiliation from UCCP. SEC approved the same
on 2 July 1993.[11]

Thereafter, UCCP filed before SEC a complaint/protest for rejection/annulment

of Amended Articles and Incorporation and Injunction, docketed as SEC Case No. C-
00194. UCCP also prayed for the disallowance of the continued use of BUCCI as
corporate name.[12]

UCCP later on filed an Amended Complaint/Protest dated 8 March 1994,

abandoning the original Complaint/Protest. The Amended Complaint/Protest added
BUCCI as one of the respondents; alleged that the separate incorporation and
registration of BUCCI is not allowed under the UCCP Constitution and By-laws; and
sought to enjoin BUCCI and the respondents from using the name BUCCI, both in its
Amended Articles of Incorporation and its dealings with the public, and from using its
properties.[13]
On 27 January 2004, the SEC en banc dismissed UCCPs petition to declare as
null and void the amendments made to the Articles of Incorporation of BUCCI. SEC
summarized UCCPs arguments into three main issues, as follow:

1. Whether or not the separation of [BUCCI] from [UCCP] is valid;

2. Whether or not the amendments to the Articles of Incorporation

and By-Laws of BUCCI made after it separated from UCCP are valid;
[and]

3. Whether or not private respondents are entitled to the use of the

name Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc.(BUCCI). [14]

SEC defended the right of BUCCI to disassociate itself from UCCP in recognition
of its constitutional freedom to associate and disassociate. SEC also pointed out that
since UCCP had used the fact of BUCCIs disaffiliation to consolidate its claim over the
property subject of the unlawful detainer case against BUCCI before the RTC, UCCP
cannot now deny the validity of said disaffiliation. Moreover, SEC found that UCCP is
not the real party in interest to question the amendments made by BUCCI to its
Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. Finally, SEC upheld the right of BUCCI to
continue using its corporate name.
 UCCP filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On 17 June 2005,
the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the SEC.

On 16 September 2005, UCCP filed a motion to drop BUCCI as respondent. [15]

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied on 21 February 2006,

[16]
UCCP filed the present appeal.

UCCP maintains that the issue on whether the disaffiliation of respondents is

valid is purely an ecclesiastical affair. It asserts that it has the sole power and
authority to declare and/or decide whether BUCCI or any of its local churches could
disaffiliate from it.[17] UCCP likewise restates that individual respondents cannot
validly effect amendments to BUCCIs Articles and By-Laws nor to continue the use of
BUCCIs name after they have disaffiliated from UCCP. Moreover, UCCP asseverates
that the stringent requirements of the Corporation Code to effect amendments have
not been satisfied.[18] UCCP also refutes the holding that BUCCI no longer forms part of
UCCP because the latter had filed several cases against the former. UCCP explains
that the above-mentioned cases had been filed against individual respondents, and
not against BUCCI; and the inclusion of BUCCIs name in said cases were merely
circumstantial because at the time those cases were filed, individual respondents were
still acting and sabotaging the operation of BUCCI.[19] Lastly, UCCP criticizes SEC for
its finding that UCCP has no legal personality to prosecute the case before it. UCCP
asserts that individual respondents were its former members and BUCCI, the entity
involved, is its member-local church.[20]

Respondents,[21] on the other hand, counter that UCCPs new theorythat the
determination of membership to UCCP is a purely ecclesiastical affairis not and cannot
be allowed at this late stage of the proceedings.[22] They maintain that the Court of
Appeals and SEC are correct in ruling that BUCCI had validly disaffiliated from UCCP
and is entitled to continue in the use of its name. [23] As their third point, respondents
assert that the Court of Appeals and SECs finding that UCCP had no legal personality
to question the validity of the amendments to BUCCIs Articles and By-laws, is in
accord with law and settled jurisprudence.[24] Finally, they point out that the petition
should be dismissed outright for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[25]

The Court denies the Petition.

The issue is not a purely ecclesiastical affair

Notably, UCCP invoked the jurisdiction of SEC when it submitted for resolution
the following issues:

1. Whether or not BUCCI is an organic component of UCCP

subject to the latters Constitution and By-laws;

2. Whether or not the referendum conducted by respondents

on July and November 1992 were valid;
 3. Whether or not the supposed separation of BUCCI from
UCCP is valid;

4. Whether or not the amendment of the Articles of

Incorporation and By-laws of BUCCI is valid;

5. Whether or not private respondents are entitled to the use

of the name BUCCI; and

6. Whether or not the use of the name BUCCI is confusingly

similar with UCCP.[26]

Before the Court of Appeals, UCCP cited the following as grounds for review:

I. The SEC committed serious reversible error in upholding as

valid the amendments to the constitution and by-laws of BUCCI
when there was absolutely no evidence proving that the strict
requirements for amendments provided (sic) for under the new
Corporation Code were complied with;

II. The SEC committed serious reversible error in disregarding

both testimonial and documentary evidence of the petitioner
proving that respondent did not comply with the proper notice,
deliberation of the issues and the 2/3 vote requirement for validity
of the amendments of its articles of incorporation;

III. The SEC committed serious reversible error in holding that

petitioner UCCP does not have the legal standing to question the
amendments made to BUCCIs articles of incorporation and by-
laws after the latters separation from the petitioner. Petitioners
legal standing to file the case had never been the issue of the case
from the time of its filing, during the pre-trial conference, during
the trial on the merits, and in the respective memorandum filed by
the parties in this case; and

IV. The SEC committed serious reversible error in upholding

respondents continued use of the name BUCCI when in fact
individual respondents by their very own acts have expelled
themselves from membership of the UCCP and its local church the
BUCCI.[27]

Failing to obtain favorable judgment from the SEC and the Court of Appeals,
UCCP now comes before the Court posing ostensibly a question of law, that the
determination of membership in UCCP is a purely ecclesiastical affair, which theory
strips SEC and the Court of Appeals of any authority to rule on the issues voluntarily
submitted to them by UCCP itself for resolution.
 Basic is the rule that a party cannot be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief and later on renounce or repudiate the same after it
fails to obtain such relief.[28]After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or
power of the court. The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.[29]

The Court has likewise consistently rejected the pernicious practice of shifting
to a new theory on appeal in the hope of a favorable result. Fair play, justice and due
process require that as a rule new matters cannot be raised for the first time before an
appellate tribunal.[30] Failure to assert issues and arguments within a reasonable time
warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or
declined to assert it.[31]

In any event, the Court believes that the matter at hand is not purely an
ecclesiastical affair.

An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed or form of worship of

the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful
laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of
excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership. [32] Based on
this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church
and its members and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and
governance of the congregation. To be concrete, examples of this so-called
ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle are proceedings for
excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments
and other activities attached with religious significance. [33]

In the first place, relief from civil courts was sought when the incident of
disaffiliation occurred, in the face of UCCPs assertions that it continues to recognize
BUCCI as one of its local churches and that it has the sole authority to determine the
validity of the disaffiliation.

Secondly, intertwined with the issue of the validity of the disaffiliation is the
question of whether BUCCI had the power under the law to effect disaffiliation such
that it should be given legal consequence and granted recognition.

UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate entities and grantees of primary franchises,
are subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A
provides that SEC shall have absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all
corporations. Even with their religious nature, SEC may exercise jurisdiction over
them in matters that are legal and corporate.[34]

BUCCI, as a juridical entity separate and distinct from UCCP, possesses the
freedom to determine its steps.

UCCPs statement in its memorandum- [w]here else can petitioner seek

protection and relief x x x?[35] is particularly telling. That UCCP sees the need to turn to
a body for relief is an admission that its authority over BUCCI is not absolute and is
actually more tenuous than alleged.

Thus, UCCP cannot rely on the Courts ruling as restated in Long v. Basa,
[36]
that in matters purely ecclesiastical, the decisions of the proper church tribunals
are conclusive upon the civil tribunals.[37] If in the case at bar, even with its highest
executive officials pronouncement that BUCCI is still recognized as its member-
church,[38] UCCP could not compel BUCCI to go back to its fold, then the alleged
absolute ecclesiastical authority must not be there to begin with.
In fact, Long may be viewed as supportive of respondents case. Said case
involved a churchs sole prerogative and power to expel its individual
members. Similarly, the case at bar concerns BUCCIs sole prerogative and power as a
church to disconnect ties with another entity. Such are decisions, that may have
religious color and are therefore ecclesiastical affairs, the Court must respect and
cannot review. It is worth mentioning that in Fonacier v. Court of Appeals,[39] the Court
held that the amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and
abandonment of faith or abjuration, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of
worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the
power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil
courts.

Conversely, the Court owes but recognition to BUCCIs decision as it concerns

its legal right as a religious corporation to disaffiliate from another religious
corporation via legitimate meansa secular matter well within the civil courts purview.

Respondents Validly Effected the Amendments

UCCP contends that respondents have severed their UCCP membership and
consequently, have lost their BUCCI membership. As such, they have neither the
power to bring about the amendments to BUCCIs Articles of Incorporation nor right to
continue the usage of BUCCIs name.

The Church Council Resolution dated 21 June 1992, duly ratified by BUCCIs
members in a referendum, carried out BUCCIs corporate act of disaffiliating from
UCCP. By virtue of this disaffiliation, BUCCI members, including respondents, severed
their ties from UCCP but maintained their membership with BUCCI. UCCPs
contention that the severance of UCCP ties amounts to severance of ties to the local
church does not hold water.

Local church autonomy takes precedence in the UCCP polity. Section 4 of the
1974 UCCP Constitution provides:

SECTION 4. The autonomy of the local church or congregation in

matters pertaining to its life in its own particular community shall be
respected, consistent with its relation to the Conference, Jurisdiction,
and General Assembly.
According to respondent, UCCP adopted a congregationalist system where a local
church has the right to govern itself by its own laws, rules and regulations for the
furtherance of its own general welfare and the freedom to practice its own faith and
polity of denominational origin.[40] This congregationalist system was shown in the
Basis of Union, the Declaration of Union and UCCPs Constitution and By-laws.

Article IV of the Basis of Union reads:

ARTICLE IV -- Church Practices and Worship: Congregations may

follow their customary practices and worship.[41]

Section 4, Article VI specifically outlines the duties and powers of the local church:

(a) Subject only to the general laws and regulations of the

Church, every local church or congregation, shall, with its pastor,
be responsible for watching over its members, keeping its life pure,
ordering its worship, providing Christian education and
proclaiming the Gospel[;] (b) Call a Pastor[;] (c) Recommend
candidates for the ministry[;] (d) Elect delegates to the Annual
Conference.[42]

Statement IV of Declaration of Union provides:

That by adoption of the name UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN

THE PHILIPPINES for this Church Union, no right, interest, or title in
and to their respective names by which the uniting Churches have been
identified and known, has been nor is surrendered, but all such rights
are specifically reserved against the claims of all persons, associations
and organizations whatsoever.[43]

As a matter of fact, the present UCCP Constitution[44] and By-laws continue to uphold
this tradition of respecting local church autonomy. The 2005 UCCP Amended
Constitution provides in Article II, Section 14:

Consistent with the heritage and commitment of the United

Church of Christ in the Philippines, the autonomy of the Local Church
shall be respected. The scope of such autonomy shall be defined in the
By-Laws.

Section 28, Article III of the UCCP By-laws provides:

Section 28. Scope of Local Autonomy: The primary locus of

mission is the Local Church. Hence, the UCCP upholds the autonomy of
the Local Church particularly as to its right and power to conduct its
ministry free from outside control, provided the same is in line with the
Constitution, By-Laws and statues of the Church, thereby enabling the
Local Church to become effective instrument in the ministry and mission
of the Church and ensuring its positive contribution to the unity and
strengthening of the whole Church. Specifically, autonomy of the Local
Church includes the authority to do the following:

a. To call and support its Pastor and other Church workers,

keeping in mind the basic policy of the Church to call to its
ministry pastors and Church workers belonging to the UCCP,
subscribing to the UCCP Statement of Faith and paying
allegiance to the Constitution, By-Laws and statutes of the
Church. Pastors, ministers and workers of other churches
affiliated with the National Council of Churches in the
Philippines (NCCP) may be requested to serve in the Local
Church with the prior written permission of the General
Assembly or the National Council, through the General
Secretary;

b. To administer, maintain, encumber or dispose of its personal

or real properties pursuant to a resolution of its Board of
Trustees and approved by its Church Council and, where real
properties are involved, with the written consent of the General
Assembly or the National Council, through the General
Secretary;

c. To invite pastors, ministers, workers and lay leaders of other

churches to speak, preach or otherwise enter into fellowship
with the Local Church, from time to time, in consonance with
Article II, Section 6, of the Constitution, provided that the
authority and integrity of the UCCP, as well as the unity of the
Local Church, shall never be impaired or compromised;

d. To nominate and elect its officers, in accordance with the

Constitution and By-Laws, and hold annual and such special
meetings as it may deem necessary and proper;

e. To admit qualified persons into the membership of the Local

Church, help ensure their nurture and spiritual development,
and promote and develop among them the idea of loving service,
stewardship and missionary outreach;

f. To celebrate its worship services that are orderly and solemn,

yet joyful and meaningful, reflective of the faith and life of the
Church and responsive to the needs of the community in terms
of witness, service and prophetic ministry;

g. To support the ministerial and lay formation program of the

Church and recruit, recommend and support candidates for the
ministry;
 h. To adopt its own budget and financial program and fulfill its
obligations to the wider bodies; and

i. To do all things as it may deem wise, necessary and proper,

without encroaching on the prerogatives of, and interfering
with, the wider Church bodies, ensuring at all times that its
action contribute to the unity and strengthening of the whole
UCCP.

From the foregoing it can be gleaned that: UCCPs control and authority over its local
churches is not full and supreme; membership of the local churches in the UCCP is
voluntary and not perpetual; local churches enjoy independence and autonomy and
may maintain or continue church-life with or without UCCP.

Thus, under the law and UCCP polity, BUCCI may validly bring about its disaffiliation
from UCCP through the amendment of its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws.

Significantly, SEC approved the amendments on 2 July 1993, which approval has in
its favor the presumption of regularity.[45] Government officials are presumed to have
regularly performed their functions and strong evidence is necessary to rebut this
presumption.[46] In the absence of convincing proof to the contrary, the presumption
must be upheld.[47]

More importantly, well-settled is the judicial dictum that factual findings of quasi-
judicial agencies, such as SEC, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but
even finality. They are binding upon this Court which is not a trier of facts. Only upon
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, or that such factual findings were arrived
at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record will this Court step in and
proceed to make its own independent evaluation of the facts. No cogent reason exists
in the instant cases to deviate from this settled rule. [48]

Anent the continued use by respondents of BUCCI, the Court likewise sustains the
rulings of SEC and Court of Appeals. Pertinently, the Court of Appeals ruled as
follows:

As held in Philips Export B.V. vs. Court of Appeals [206 SCRA 457, 463],
to fall within the prohibition of the law, two requisites must be proven, to
wit: (1) that the complainant corporation acquired a prior right over the
use of such corporate name; and (2) the proposed name is either: (a)
identical, or (b) deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing
corporation or to any other name already protected by law; or (c) patently
deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing law.

The respondent BUCCIs church history would show that it has a better
right to use its corporate name on the ground of priority of adoption. As
thoroughly discussed by the SEC in its assailed decision, the evolution of
respondent BUCCI to what it is today undoubtedly establishes that it
had acquired the right to make use of its corporate name.
 As to whether or not BUCCI is confusingly or deceptively similar to
UCCP, We find in the negative. In determining the existence of confusing
similarity in corporate names, the test is whether the similarity is such
as to mislead a person using ordinary care and discrimination. [49]

Furthermore, Section 2, Article I of the UCCP Constitution [50] states that, All local
churches and church-owned entities shall bear prominently the name: United Church
of Christ in the Philippines. For this reason, BUCCI is evidently distinct from UCCP
and from all other UCCP local churches and church-owned entities.

SEC and Court of Appeals correctly ruled that UCCP has no locus standi to question the
amendments to BUCCIs Articles of Incorporation and By-laws.
The doctrine of locus standi or the right of appearance in a court of justice has
been adequately discussed by this Court in a number of cases. The doctrine requires a
litigant to have a material interest in the outcome of a case. In private suits, locus
standi requires a litigant to be a real party in interest, which is defined as the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit.[51]

A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by real interest
is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a
future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. [52]

A suit may be dismissed if the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in
interest.[53]

After a review of the evidence on record, the SEC, which the Court of Appeals
affirmed, correctly ruled that UCCP, not being a member of BUCCI, is not the proper
party to question the validity of the amendments of the latters Articles of Incorporation
and By-laws. While UCCP stands to be affected by the disaffiliation, the same is
admitted and accepted by UCCPs polity by the very establishment of its liberal
structure.
Petition failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure

We highlight the fact that when UCCP filed the original complaint before the
SEC, only individual respondents were impleaded. UCCP then amended the complaint
to include BUCCI, only to drop it as respondent after the Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision, purportedly to show that it was merely going after individual
respondents. We agree with respondents that failure to implead BUCCI as respondent
in the instant case constitutes a blatant disregard of Section 4(a), Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court,[54] but also renders the assailed decision final and executory and all
subsequent actions on the petition are void considering that BUCCI is an
indispensable party.[55] We cannot countenance this disingenuous practice of shifting
to a new theory on appeal in the hope of obtaining a favorable result. [56]
 Essentially, the three main issues raised by UCCP before the SEC and the
Court of Appeals[57] are the very same issues presented for our resolution. Finding no
serious errors to warrant a reversal of the assailed Decision, We affirm.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 17 June 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

15. PAL VS SANTOS

G.R. No. 77875 February 4, 1993

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
ALBERTO SANTOS, JR., HOUDIEL MAGADIA, GILBERT ANTONIO, REGINO DURAN,
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, and THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

Fortunato Gupit, Jr., Solon R. Garcia, Rene B. Gorospe, Bienvinodo T. Jamoralin, jr. and
Paulino D. Ungos, Jr. for petitioner.

Adolpho M. Guerzon for private respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

The instant petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the decision of The National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. 4-1206-85, promulgated on
December 11, 1986, 1 containing the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Decision appealed from is set
aside and another one entered, declaring the suspension of complainants to be illegal
and consequently, respondent PAL is directed to pay complainants their salaries
corresponding to the respective period(s) of their suspension, and to delete the
disciplinary action from complainants' service records. 2

These material facts recited in the basic petition are virtually undisputed and we
reproduce the same hereunder:

1. Individual respondents are all Port Stewards of Catering Sub-Department,

Passenger Services Department of petitioner. Their duties and responsibilities, among
others, are:
Prepares meal orders and checklists, setting up standard equipment in accordance
with the requirements of the type of service for each flight; skiing, binning, and
inventorying of Commissary supplies and equipment.

2. On various occasions, several deductions were made from their salary. The
deductions represented losses of inventoried items charged to them for mishandling of
company properties . . . which respondents resented. Such that on August 21, 1984,
individual respondents, represented by the union, made a formal notice regarding the
deductions to petitioner thru Mr. Reynaldo Abad, Manager for Catering. . . .

3. As there was no action taken on said representation, private respondents filed a

formal grievance on November 4, 1984 pursuant to the grievance machinery Step 1 of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and the union. . . . The topics
which the union wanted to be discussed in the said grievance were the
illegal/questionable salary deductions and inventory of bonded goods and
merchandise being done by catering service personnel which they believed should not
be their duty.

4. The said grievance was submitted on November 21, 1984 to the office of Mr.
Reynaldo Abad, Manager for Catering, who at the time was on vacation leave. . . .

5. Subsequently, the grievants (individual respondents) thru the shop steward wrote a
letter on December 5, 1984 addressed to the office of Mr. Abad, who was still on leave
at the time, that inasmuch as no reply was made to their grievance which "was duly
received by your secretary" and considering that petitioner had only five days to
resolve the grievance as provided for in the CBA, said grievance as believed by them
(private respondents) was deemed resolved in their favor. . . .

6. Upon Mr. Abad's return on December 7, 1984, he immediately informed the

grievants and scheduled a meeting on December 12, 1984. . . .

7. Thereafter, the individual respondents refused to conduct inventory works. Alberto

Santos, Jr. did not conduct ramp inventory on December 7, 10 and 12. Gilbert
Antonio did not conduct ramp inventory on December 10. In like manner, Regino
Duran and Houdiel Magadia did not conduct the same on December 10 and 12.

8. At the grievance meeting which was attended by some union representatives, Mr.
Abad resolved the grievance by denying the petition of individual respondents and
adopted the position that inventory of bonded goods is part of their duty as catering
service personnel, and as for the salary deductions for losses, he rationalized:

1. It was only proper that employees are charged for the amount due to mishandling of
company property which resulted to losses. However, loss may be cost price 1/10
selling price.

9. As there was no ramp inventory conducted on the mentioned dates, Mr. Abad, on
January 3, 1985 wrote by an inter-office memorandum addressed to the grievants,
individual respondents herein, for them to explain on (sic) why no disciplinary action
should be taken against them for not conducting ramp inventory. . . .
10. The directive was complied with . . . . The reason for not conducting ramp
inventory was put forth as:

4. Since the grievance step 1 was not decided and no action was done by your office
within 5 days from November 21, 1984, per provision of the PAL-PALEA CBA, Art. IV,
Sec. 2, the grievance is deemed resolved in PALEA's favor.

11. Going over the explanation, Mr. Abad found the same unsatisfactory. Thus, a
penalty of suspension ranging from 7 days to 30 days were (sic) imposed depending on
the number of infractions committed. *

12. After the penalty of suspension was meted down, PALEA filed another grievance
asking for lifting of, or at least, holding in abeyance the execution of said penalty. The
said grievance was forthwith denied but the penalty of suspension with respect to
respondent Ramos was modified, such that his suspension which was originally from
January 15, 1985 to April 5, 1985 was shortened by one month and was lifted on
March 5, 1985. The union, however, made a demand for the reimbursement of the
salaries of individual respondents during the period of their suspension.

13. Petitioner stood pat (o)n the validity of the suspensions. Hence, a complaint for
illegal suspension was filed before the
Arbitration Branch of the Commission, . . . Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana, on
March 17, 1986, ruled in favor of petitioner by dismissing the complaint. . . . 3

Private respondents appealed the decision of the labor arbiter to respondent

commission which rendered the aforequoted decision setting aside the labor arbiter's
order of dismissal. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, it
interposed the present petition.

The Court is accordingly called upon to resolve the issue of whether or not public
respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in rendering the aforementioned decision.

Evidently basic and firmly settled is the rule that judicial review by this Court in labor
cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the
labor officer or office based his or its determination, but is limited to issues of
jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. 4 It has not been shown that respondent
NLRC has unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins it to perform as a duty or has otherwise unlawfully excluded petitioner from
the exercise of a right to which it is entitled.

The instant case hinges on the interpretation of Section 2, Article IV of the PAL-PALEA
Collective Bargaining Agreement, (hereinafter, CBA), to wit:

Sec. 2 Processing of Grievances

xxx xxx xxx

STEP 1 Any employee who believes that he has a justifiable grievance shall take the
matter up with his shop steward. If the shop steward feels there is justification for
taking the matter up with the Company, he shall record the grievance on the grievance
form heretofore agreed upon by the parties. Two (2) copies of the grievance form
properly filled, accepted, and signed shall then be presented to and discussed by the
shop steward with the division head. The division head shall answer the grievance
within five (5) days from the date of presentation by inserting his decision on the
grievance form, signing and dating same, and returning one copy to the shop
steward. If the division head fails to act within the five (5)-day regl(e)mentary period, the
grievance must be resolved in favor of the aggrieved party. If the division head's
decision is not appealed to Step II, the grievance shall be considered settled on the
basis of the decision made, and shall not be eligible for further appeal. 5(Emphasis
ours.)

Petitioner submits that since the grievance machinery was established for both labor
and management as a vehicle to thresh out whatever problems may arise in the course
of their relationship, every employee is duty bound to present the matter before
management and give the latter an opportunity to impose whatever corrective measure
is possible. Under normal circumstances, an employee should not preempt the
resolution of his grievance; rather, he has the duty to observe the status quo. 6

Citing Section 1, Article IV of the CBA, petitioner further argues that respondent
employees have the obligation, just as management has, to settle all labor disputes
through friendly negotiations. Thus, Section 2 of the CBA should not be narrowly
interpreted. 7 Before the prescriptive period of five days begins to run, two concurrent
requirements must be met, i.e., presentment of the grievance and
its discussion between the shop steward and the division head who in this case is Mr.
Abad. Section 2 is not self-executing; the mere filing of the grievance does not trigger
the tolling of the prescriptive period.8

Petitioner has sorely missed the point.

It is a fact that the sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes, not
only because the Constitution imposes such sympathy, but because of the one-sided
relation between labor and capital. 9 The constitutional mandate for the promotion of
labor is as explicit as it is demanding. The purpose is to place the workingman on an
equal plane with management with all its power and influence in negotiating for
the advancement of his interests and the defense of his rights. 10 Under the policy of
social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the
working class on the humane justification that those with less privileges in life should
have more privileges in law. 11

It is clear that the grievance was filed with Mr. Abad's secretary during his
absence. 12 Under Section 2 of the CBA aforequoted, the division head shall act on the
grievance within five (5) days from the date of presentation thereof, otherwise "the
grievance must be resolved in favor of the aggrieved party." It is not disputed that the
grievants knew that division head Reynaldo Abad was then "on leave" when they filed
their grievance which was received by Abad's secretary. 13 This knowledge, however,
should not prevent the application of the CBA.
On this score, respondent NLRC aptly ruled:

. . . Based on the facts heretofore narrated, division head Reynaldo Abad had to act on
the grievance of complainants within five days from 21 November 1984. Therefore,
when Reynaldo Abad, failed to act within the reglementary period, complainants,
believing in good faith that the effect of the CBA had already set in, cannot be blamed
if they did not conduct ramp inventory for the days thereafter. In this regard,
respondent PAL argued that Reynaldo Abad was on leave at the time the grievance was
presented. This, however, is of no moment, for it is hard to believe that everything
under Abad's authority would have to stand still during his absence from office. To be
sure, it is to be expected that someone has to be left to attend to Abad's duties. Of
course, this may be a product of inadvertence on the part of PAL management, but
certainly, complainants should not be made to suffer the consequences. 14

Contrary to petitioner's submission, 15 the grievance of employees is not a matter

which requires the personal act of Mr. Abad and thus could not be delegated.
Petitioner could at least have assigned an officer-in-charge to look into the grievance
and possibly make his recommendation to Mr. Abad. It is of no moment that Mr. Abad
immediately looked into the grievance upon returning to work, for it must be
remembered that the grievants are workingmen who suffered salary deductions and
who rely so much on their meager income for their daily subsistence and survival.
Besides, it is noteworthy that when these employees first presented their complaint on
August 21, 1984, petitioner failed to act on it. It was only after a formal grievance was
filed and after Mr. Abad returned to work on December 7, 1984 that petitioner decided
to turn an ear to their plaints.

As respondent NLRC has pointed out, Abad's failure to act on the matter may have
been due to petitioner's inadvertence, 16 but it is clearly too much of an injustice if the
employees be made to bear the dire effects thereof. Much as the latter were willing to
discuss their grievance with their employer, the latter closed the door to this
possibility by not assigning someone else to look into the matter during Abad's
absence. Thus, private respondents should not be faulted for believing that the effects
of the CBA in their favor had already stepped into the controversy.

If the Court were to follow petitioner's line of reasoning, it would be easy for
management to delay the resolution of labor problems, the complaints of the workers
in particular, and hide under the cloak of its officers being "on leave" to avoid being
caught by the 5-day deadline under the CBA. If this should be allowed, the
workingmen will suffer great injustice for they will necessarily be at the mercy of their
employer. That could not have been the intendment of the pertinent provision of the
CBA, much less the benevolent policy underlying our labor laws.

ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and
the assailed decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
AFFIRMED. This judgment is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
16. EDGEWATER VS MWSS

G.R. No. 170446, March 23, 2011 ]

EDGEWATER REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., PETITIONER, VS. METROPOLITAN

WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM AND MANILA WATER COMPANY, INC.,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:
This case is about the demand of a landowner, on whose land a large number of
informal settlers have lived, to compel the water utility company to discontinue
providing water to such settlers.

The Facts and the Case

Edgewater Realty Development, Inc., (ERDI) a realty company, owned several parcels
of land in Tumana, Concepcion, Marikina City.[1] ERDI filed a complaint for
ejectment against about 200 informal settlers that then occupied portions of its land
but, despite a final court decision evicting them, the settlers refused to leave.

To resolve the problem, on April 14, 1994 ERDI and the Municipality of Marikina
executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), identifying one of ERDI's own
properties[2] as an emergency relocation site.[3] The agreement resulted in the taking
of additional settlers (estimated around 3,500) at the site and the placing of
improvements in it. In turn, the settlers were to buy the land from ERDI. But
because of the inability of the Municipality to control the influx of settlers and its
breach of several other provisions of the MOA, ERDI rescinded the same and filed an
action before the Marikina Regional Trial Court (RTC) for confirmation of the rescission
of the MOA and for injunction against the Municipality, its Mayor Bayani M.
Fernando, the Marikina Settlement Office, and Harry Singh.[4]

On August 5, 1997 the RTC rendered a decision, confirming the rescission of the MOA
and ordering the Municipality to remove all structures, constructions, and projects
that it introduced on ERDI's property and to pay damages. Subsequently, the RTC
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA)[5] and later by the Supreme Court.
[6]

On May 7, 1998 the MTC which tried the ejectment case[7] issued a break-open and
demolition order in the case and appointed a Special Sheriff to implement the order.
The ERDI also applied for a writ of execution of the August 5, 1997 RTC decision.

Meantime, ERDI noticed that the settlers had maintained several facilities on its
property, including a water system, without its consent. On September 13, 1995 it
wrote the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) a letter to formalize
a water distribution system in the area but asked that it hold actual implementation of
such system until an agreement was signed. To ERDI's dismay, however, it received
information that some of the settlers already have water connections while the others
had pending application for theirs.

Consequently, ERDI filed a complaint for injunction with prayer for temporary
retraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against MWSS before the RTC of
Quezon City,[8] praying that it order MWSS to disconnect all water connections in
ERDI's properties and to refrain from putting in place any further connections without
its prior consent. The RTC issued a TRO against MWSS and, after due hearing, issued
a writ of preliminary injunction restraining it from installing water connections on
ERDI's properties.

In its Answer with counterclaims, MWSS averred that ERDI had no cause of action
against it since it provided connections to some of the occupants only after the
Municipality issued clearances to them through the Marikina Settlement Office. But,
from the time it received ERDI's letter in September 1995, MWSS stopped processing
applications for service connection in the area.

On January 15, 1998 the Quezon City RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order, detailing the
issues it needed to resolve as follows: (1) whether or not the existing water connections
within the properties of ERDI were illegal, and if so, whether MWSS has an obligation
to remove or disconnect them; (2) whether or not MWSS may be enjoined from
supplying water into the properties without ERDI's consent; (3) whether or not ERDI is
entitled to the reliefs it asked in its complaint; and (4) whether or not MWSS is entitled
to the reliefs it asked in its counterclaim.

Subsequently, ERDI amended its complaint to join Manila Water Company, Inc.
(MWCI) as additional party defendant based on the concession agreement between the
latter company and MWSS, which gave MWCI the sole right to manage and operate the
MWSS water facilities in Marikina, including those in ERDI properties. The RTC
allowed the amendment and the inclusion of MWCI in the coverage of the preliminary
injunction.

Answering the amended complaint, MWCI denied that it installed a water system in
the area. After it assumed operations, the settlers got clearances from the Marikina
City Government and so MWCI allowed them to apply for the registration of their
illegal connections. But, on receipt of ERDI's letter of July 9, 1998, MWCI stopped
accepting applications for such registration and placed on hold those that it had
already accepted.
On January 15, 2001 the Quezon City RTC rendered judgment, declaring the water
connections on ERDI's land illegal and permanently enjoined MWSS and MWCI from
installing water connections on it. The RTC did not, however, order the removal of
existing water connections, pointing out that ERDI's remedy was to await the eviction
of the settlers pursuant to the decision in the ejectment case. While the RTC
dismissed MWSS's counterclaim, it allowed MWCI to collect payment of water bills by
settlers who had existing water connections prior to the court's issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction in the case.

Dissatisfied with the decision, ERDI appealed from it to the CA.[9] ERDI additionally
argued that both MWSS and MWCI have the authority under Republic Act (R.A.)
8041[10] to remove illegal connections. On June 27, 2005 the CA rendered judgment,
affirming the decision of the RTC, hence the present petition for review.

The Issues Presented

The case presents the following issues:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule that MWSS and MWCI can be
compelled to dismantle existing water connections on ERDI's land that was occupied
by informal settlers; and

2. Whether or not MWCI can collect payment of bills for water connections on that
land.

The Court's Rulings

One. ERDI invokes the provisions of R.A. 8041 as cause for rendering a decision in its
favor which would require MWSS and MWCI to disconnect all existing water service on
ERDI's property. But fair play dictates that matters, which ERDI did not raise in its
complaint, are not allowed to be raised for the first time on appeal.[11] Here, the
Court cannot entertain ERDI's new cause of action based on its alleged right under the
provisions of R.A. 8041 since it is only in the course of its appeal to the CA that ERDI
brought up the matter.

Besides, assuming that ERDI could still invoke in its favor the provisions of R.A. 8041,
its claim must still fail. The water connections ERDI complained of are not the "illegal
connections" subject of R.A. 8041.[12] In ERDI's case, those water connections were
either a) installed by MWSS or MWCI and, therefore, cannot be regarded as illegal or b)
illegally installed by the settlers themselves but were subsequently ratified by the
water utility company. To be considered illegal under the purview of R.A. 8041, the
water connections must be unauthorized by the water utility company, not by any
other entity.

Nor can ERDI invoke the charter of MWSS[13] as source of its right to compel MWSS
or MWCI to remove the existing connections. The rights and the remedies for removal
of illegal connections under that charter belong to the water utilities, not to ERDI.

The Court is not unmindful of its December 2, 1998 resolution in G.R. 135727 that
affirmed the rescission of the MOA between ERDI and the Marikina government.
Before its rescission, the MOA authorized the Marikina government to lay ground
works for infrastructures such as lights and other amenities of community life.[14]
Undoubtedly, it was this provision of the MOA that opened the way for settlers to
apply with the MWSS for water connections. While the witness for ERDI testified that
he did not know when the construction of the water lines began, it may be assumed
that the same took place during the time the MOA was still in force.[15] No evidence
has been presented to show that the water system on ERDI's land was put in place
during the pendency of the earlier ejectment case. Consequently, it cannot be said
that the water connections were illegal from the beginning.

True, the MOA has been rescinded by final judgment but the obligation to remove the
water connections fell upon the Marikina government, not upon respondent water
utilities who were not parties to the earlier case. For this reason, ERDI's remedy is to
have the final judgments of the Marikina MTC in Civil Case 92-5592 and the Quezon
City RTC in Civil Case Q-96-28338 executed, not only for the eviction of the settlers
but also for the eventual removal of all structures, constructions, and projects that the
Marikina government introduced or allowed to be introduced in the place.

ERDI claims that the RTC and the CA's rulings, which allowed water service to illegal
settlers to continue, are acts of cowardice in the face of the need to enforce its right as
owner of the land to disallow such service. But as ERDI knows, the problem is not
that easy. Its land has become a colony of thousands of informal settlers who have
nowhere to go, posing a serious social problem. ERDI is not exactly blameless for this
result. It ought to know that empty lands in places like Marikina are susceptible to
the entry of such settlers and that both the national and local governments have
difficulty in preventing squatting. Consequently, ERDI has itself to blame for letting
the problem deteriorate. It was of course generous of ERDI to enter into the MOA with
the Marikina government but it failed to exercise adequate prudence and care to
prevent the agreement from being overwhelmed by the uncontrolled surge of settlers.

The task of evicting the large number of settlers from its land belongs to ERDI with the
assistance of the authorities. It had obtained final judgment in its favor against the
initial group of settlers that occupied the same. Still, ERDI had been unable to use
these judgments, no doubt because it frowned on the terrible violence and human
sufferings that such would cause. Surely, ERDI would not be justified in using MWSS
and MWCI as tool for depriving the people on its land of the water they need for
drinking, washing, and sanitation, subjecting them to the diseases that absence or
shortage of water would cause, considering that the water connections were installed
lawfully when the MOA was still in effect.

Two. ERDI contends that MWCI should not be allowed to collect payments for the
water bills of its customers on ERDI's land. But, having ruled that MWSS and MWCI
put the water service in place on that land for certain customers there when this was
still permitted, there is no valid reason for such water service to be severed before the
informal settlers concerned are properly evicted. And if it is not severed, it would be
unreasonable to prevent MWCI from collecting from its customers the cost of its
service.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 69925 dated June 27, 2005.

SO ORDERED.

17. OXALES VS UNITED LABORATORIES

G.R. No. 152991, July 21, 2008] ALBERTO P. OXALES, VS. UNITED LABORATORIES,
INC.,REYES, R.T., J.: appeal by certiorari

RETIREMENT PAY LAW vs PRIVATE RETIREMENT PLAN

A company retirement plan partakes the nature of a contract between the employer
and employee. There arises a contractual obligation where the payment of retirement
benefits is in consideration of continued faithful service tot eh employer for a required
time. The parties may establish applicable terms and conditions which have the force
of law between them, to be complied with in good faith. But this right is not absolute.
The limiation of law is that such terms and conditions should not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Existing laws are deemed written
in every contract, and when the provision of the party is lacking, the provision of the
law supplies it.
Law and jurisprudence state that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, its literal meaning shall
control.There is no basis for nullifying the URP, since it is not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy. The benefits received by Oxales are way
above the entitlement he could have received under the New Retirement Law.

The company URP states that "basic monthly salary" for purposes of computing the
retirement pay refers to the basic rate of pay converted to basic monthly salary of the
employee excluding commissions, overtime, bonuses, or extra compensations."
R.A. No. 7641 does not apply a the URP gives the retiring employee more than what
the law requires. R.A. No. 7641, The Retirement Pay Law," only applies when:

(1) there is no collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment

contract providing for retirement benefits for an employee. This is to prevent the
situation where a deserving employeeis denied retirement benefits becauser the
employers in not providing for retirement benefits for their employees; or
(2) there is a collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract
but the retirement benefits are below the requirements by law. This is because Private
contracts cannot derogate from the public law. Five (5) reasons support this
conclusion.

1.The Retirement Pay Law says so.

2.legislative history of the Retirement Pay Law. It may be recalled that R.A. No. 7641
traces back to Llora Motors, Inc. v. Drilon, where the Court held that then Article 287
of the Labor Code and its IRR may not be the source of an employee's entitlement to
retirement pay absent the presence of a collective bargaining agreement or voluntary
company policy that provides for retirement benefits for the employee.
3. legislative intent of the Retirement Pay Law to compel employers
4. the title of the Retirement Pay Law says it is "An Act Amending Article 287 of
Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines, By Providing for Retirement Pay to Qualified Private Sector in the Absence
of Any Retirement Plan in the Establishment."
5. jurisprudence.
Oro Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC: R.A. No. 7641 "is undoubtedly a social legislation
enacted as a labor protection measure and as a curative statute that - absent a
retirement plan devised by, an agreement with, or a voluntary grant from, an employer
- can respond, in part at least, to the financial well-being of workers during their
twilight years soon following their life of labor."

Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission: Article 287
"makes clear the intention and spirit of the law to give employers and employees a free
hand to determine and agree upon the terms and conditions of retirement," and that
the law "presumes that employees know what they want and what is good for them
absent any showing that fraud or intimidation was employed to secure their consent
thereto."

Brion v. South Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventist Church: a
reading of Article 287 of the Labor Code would reveal that the "employer and employee
are free to stipulate on retirement benefits, as long as these do not fall below floor
limits provided by law."

Villena v. National Labor Relations Commission: the "compulsory retirement" of Villena

was an illegal dismissal in disguise and the Court ordered BLTB to pay Villena "his full
backwages, allowances, and other benefits for a period of three (3) years after his
illegal dismissal, until he reached the compulsory retirement age plus his retirement
benefits equivalent to his gross monthly pay, allowances and other benefits for every
year of service up to age sixty (60), which is the normal retirement age for him."

In Villena the Court used the regular compensation of Villena in computing his
retirement benefits because the CBA provision CBA for rank-and-file employees is
inapplicable to a managerial employee, and was also decided before the passage of
R.A. No. 7641.

Planters Products, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission: petitioning employees

were given termination benefits based on their basic salary. However, Planters
Products, Inc. had integrated the allowances of its remaining employees into their
basic salary, increasing the basic salary . The basic salary as increased still formed
the basis for the computation of the termination benefits of the remaining employees
of the company. The Court held that fairness demanded that the terminated
employees receive the same treatment.

Manuel L. Quezon University v. National Labor Relations Commission: The Court held
that the coverage of the law "applies to establishments with existing collective
bargaining or other agreements or voluntary retirement plans whose benefits are less
than those prescribed under the proviso in question."

Songco v. National Labor Relations Commission: decided before the passage of

RA7641, basic salary plus "allowances" (like transportation and emergency living
allowances) and "earned sales commissions" should be taken into consideration in
computing the backwages and separation pay of the employee. The CBA between
Zuellig and F.E. Zuellig Employees Association, in which Songco was a member, had
no explicit definition of what salary is. Neither was there any inclusions or exclusions
in the determination of the salary of the employee. The present case has an explicit
provision excluding any commissions, overtime, bonuses, or extra compensations for
purposes of computing the basic salary of a retiring employee.

R.A. No. 7641 does not apply because the URP grants to the retiring employee more
than what the law gives. compared to the minimum month salary for every year of
service set forth by R.A. No. 7641.

Oxales is not entitled to the reinstatement of his medical benefits, which are not part
of the URP. After he retired from UNILAB, he chose to join a rival company. As a
retired employee, Oxales may not claim a vested right on these medical benefits. While
there is nothing wrong in joining a rival company after his retirement, justice and fair
play dictate that by doing so, he cannot now legally demand the continuance of his
medical benefits from UNILAB, else there would be an absurd situation where Oxales
would continue to receive medical benefits from UNILAB while working in a rival
company.

The claim of Oxales to moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees was
denied for want of basis in law or jurisprudence. The person claiming moral damages
must prove bad faith by clear and convincing evidence . It is not enough that one
merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as the result of the
actuations of the other party. It must be shown to have been willfully done in bad faith
or with ill motive, which must be established with clear and convincing evidence.

Not being entitled moral damages, an award of exemplary damages is baseless, and
the award for attorney's fees must be deleted.

18. CALEON V. AGUS DEVELOPMENT CORP. (G.R. NO. 77365. APRIL 7, 1992)

18AUG

FACTS:

Agus Development Corporation leased to Rita Caleon its lot for P180.00/month.
Caleon built a 4-door apartment and sub-leased it at P350.00/door/month without
Agus consent. Agus filed an ejectment suit under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 25 after
Caleon refused to vacate the lot. Caleon argued that B.P. Blg. 25 cannot be applied
because there is a perfected contract of lease without any express prohibition on
subleasing. The MTC ruled in favor of Agus. It was appealed to the RTC but was
dismissed outright. Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not B.P. Blg. 25 is unconstitutional for being violative of non-impairment

clause on the ground that it impaired the lease contract.

HELD:

No. B.P. Blg. 25 is valid and constitutional. The lease contract is subordinate to the
police power of the state. Petition is denied.

RATIO:

B.P. Blg. 25 is derived from P.D. No. 20 which has been declared by the Supreme
Court as police power legislation so that the applicability thereof to existing contracts
cannot be denied. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of police power of the state in the
interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. In spite of the
constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the
vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interest may
modify or abrogate contracts already in effect.

19. MAGKALAS VS NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

CARIDAD MAGKALAS, G.R. No. 138823

Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CORONA,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES*,

AZCUNA, and

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

Promulgated:

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,

Respondent. September 17, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitioner seeks to set aside and annul the Decision [1] dated March 10,
1999 as well as the Order[2] dated May 14, 1999 rendered by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 124, in Civil Case No. C-16464.

The RTC decision dismissed the complaint for damages with prayer for temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction filed by herein petitioner against the
National Housing Authority (NHA). The RTC also ordered the NHA to proceed with the
demolition of petitioners structure.

The undisputed facts, as found by the RTC, are quoted hereunder:

x x x plaintiff and her predecessors-in-interest have been occupying a lot designated

as TAG-77-0063, Block 1, Barangay 132, located at the corner of 109 Gen.
Concepcion and Adelfa Streets, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for the past 39 years.

On March 26, 1978, P.D. No. 1315 was issued expropriating certain lots at Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City. In the same Decree, the National Housing Authority (NHA) was
named Administrator of the Bagong Barrio Uban Bliss Project with the former to take
possession, contol (sic) and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power
of demolition. During the Census survey of the area, the structure built by the plaintiff
was assigned TAG No. 0063. After conducting studies of the area, the NHA determined
that the area where plaintiffs structure is located should be classified as an area
center (open space). The Area Center was determined in compliance with the
requirement to reserve 30% open space in all types of residential development.

Plaintiff, together with Mr. & Mrs. Josefino Valenton and Mr. & Mrs. Rey Pangilinan,
through counsel, filed an appeal from the decision to designate the area where the
plaintiff and the two other spouses have erected structures, as
an Area Center. On January 25, 1985, the NHA, through its General Manager, sent a
letter to the counsel of the plaintiff and the two other previously named spouses
explaining why the area where their structures were erected was designated as the
area center (open space). The said appeal was denied by the NHA. In a letter,
dated August 6, 1985, the NHA sent a Notice of Lot Assignment to plaintiff recognizing
the latter as a Censused Owner of a structure with TAG No. 0063-04 which was
identified for relocation.
In the same Notice, the NHA informed plaintiff that per Development Program of
Bagong Barrio, she was being assigned to Lot 77, Block 2, Barangay 132.

On August 23, 1985, plaintiff filed a Complaint for Damages with prayer for the
issuance of a restraining order and writ of Preliminary Injunction against the NHA
with the RegionalTrial Court of Caloocan City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. C-
12102. The civil case was filed after the NHA, through Henry Camayo, sent a letter to
the plaintiff earlier in the month of August, 1985 directing said plaintiff to vacate the
premises and dismantle her structure. In an Order, dated July 23, 1981, this civil
case docketed as C-12102 was dismissed with the instruction that the parties exhaust
the administrative remedies available to the plaintiff.

Sometime in March, 1994, plaintiff received a letter, dated March 8, 1994 from Ines
Gonzales, the Office-in-charge of District II-NCR. In said letter, plaintiff was advised
that her previous request to stay put in her house which is located within the area
designated as Area Center, was previously denied per resolution of the NHA which was
signed as early as February 21, 1990 by the former manager of the NHA, Monico
Jacob. The plaintiff was told to remove the structure she erected on the area within 30
days and to transfer her residence to Lot 77, Block 2. It was stressed in said letter that
no Judicial Order was required to remove the plaintiffs structure pursuant to P.D. No.
1472.

Plaintiff prays that, aside from the issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of
preliminary injunction, defendants be enjoined from transferring plaintiffs residential
house from its present location to another lot and/or demolishing the same without
judicial order; payment of moral damages, in the amount of P50,000.00, for the
malicious and illegal acts of defendants; and payment of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees.

At this juncture, it may not be remiss to state that the two other homeowners, Mr. &
Mrs. Josefino Valenton, and Mr. & Mrs. Rey Pangilinan had already transferred to
their allocated lots at Lot 2, Block 1, and Lot 78, Block 2, respectively.

On March 25, 1994, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against
defendants. After hearing and submission of memoranda, plaintiffs prayer for issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction was denied in an Order dated April 14, 1994.

The Order denying plaintiffs prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was
appealed, by way of Petition for Certiorari, to the Court of Appeals (docketed therein as
CA-G.R. No. 33833). On May 31, 1994, the Court of Appeals, Seventeenth Division,
promulgated a Decision denying the Petition. Plaintiffs (petitioner herein) motion for
reconsideration having been denied in a Resolution dated July 29, 1994, she appealed
to the Supreme Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Supreme Court,
through the First Division, issued a Resolution dated October 5, 1994, denying the
Petition. An Entry of Judgment on the aforesaid Resolution was made on December
22, 1994.
Thereafter, pre-trial conference was scheduled on January 9, January 23, February
16, March 22 and finally on April 25, all in 1996 (an Order dated May 16, 1996 was
issued declaring the pre-trial terminated). During the pre-trial, counsel for plaintiff
proposed that the case be decided based on the memoranda to be submitted by the
parties, to which counsel for defendants agreed. Hence, a Motion for Leave of Court to
allow parties to submit memoranda in lieu of trial was filed by the defendants. Plaintiff
filed her comment thereto. After submission of NHAs Reply and plaintiffs rejoinder,
reiterating their respective stands, the Court resolved to grant the Motion for Leave. In
the same Order, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda
within thirty (30) days from receipt, on the sole issue of whether or not the NHA can
lawfully relocate the plaintiff and demolish plaintiffs structure. [3]

On March 10, 1999, the trial court promulgated its assailed decision dismissing
petitioners complaint. Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied by the trial court in its Order dated May 14, 1999. Hence, this petition for
review of the said decision and order of the RTC.

In the instant petition for review, petitioner raises the following issues:

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEMOLITION OR RELOCATION OF THE

PETITIONERS STRUCTURE WILL VIOLATE THE VESTED RIGHTS OF THE
PETITIONER OVER THE ACQUIRED PROPERTY UNDER THE SOCIAL JUSTICE
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

B. WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7279 IMPLIEDLY REPEALED P.D. 1472 AND

[4]
P.D. 1315.

As to the first issue, petitioner maintains that she had acquired a vested right over the
property subject of this case on the ground that she had been in possession of it for
forty (40) years already. Thus, to order her relocation and the demolition of her house
will infringe the social justice clause guaranteed under the Constitution.

Petitioners contentions must necessarily fail. The NHAs authority to order the
relocation of petitioner and the demolition of her property is mandated by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1315.[5] Under this Decree, the entire Bagong Barrio
in Caloocan City was identified as a blighted area and was thereby declared
expropriated. The properties covered under P.D. No. 1315 included petitioners
property. The NHA, as the decrees designated administrator for the national
government, was empowered to take possession, control and disposition of the
expropriated properties with the power of demolition of their improvements. [6] Section
2 of P.D. No. 1315 further states:
Section 2. The comprehensive development plan shall consider the upgrading of
existing dwelling units, the relocation of qualified squatter families to a resettlement
area nearby; and the re-blocking, re-arrangement and re-alignment of existing
dwelling and other structures to allow for the introduction of basic facilities and
services, all in accordance with the provision of national SIR [Slum Improvement
Resettlement] and Metro Manila ZIP [Zonal Improvement Program] Programs. The
Authority [NHA] shall maximize the land use of the area and shall provide for a
controlled, orderly and structured growth of dwellings in an environment provided
with adequate sanitary and other physical facilities. (Words in bracket ours)

Pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. No. 1315, the NHA identified Area 1 where petitioners
property was located as part of the Area Center reserved for open space, after studies
have shown that the development of the area will affect only three (3) structures
compared to six (6) or more structures in the other areas. A stage and recreation
center was expected to be constructed at the Area Center. As a result, petitioner was
informed by the NHA that she would be relocated to Lot 77, Block 2, Barangay
132. However, petitioner adamantly refused to vacate the property claiming she had
acquired a vested right over the same. Her refusal to vacate and relocate to her
assigned lot had hampered the development of the entire area. It should be noted that
to date, only petitioner had refused to comply with the NHA directive as the other
occupants in Area 1 had already vacated the premises.

To stress, P.D. No. 1315 explicitly vests the NHA the power to immediately take
possession, control and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of
demolition. Clearly, the NHA, by force of law, has the authority to order the relocation
of petitioner, and the demolition of her structure in case of her refusal as this is the
only way through which the NHA can effectively carry out the implementation of P.D.
No. 1315.

The NHAs authority to demolish squatters and illegal occupants was further reinforced
by P.D. No. 1472[7] which specifically provides as follows:

SEC. 2. The National Housing Authority shall have the power to summarily eject,
without the necessity of judicial order, any and all squatters colonies on government
resettlement projects, as well as any illegal occupants in any homelot, apartment or
dwelling unit owned or administered by it. In the exercise of such power, the National
Housing Authority shall have the right and authority to request the help of the
Barangay Chairman and any peace officer in the locality. xxx.(Emphasis ours)

Inasmuch as petitioners property was located in the area identified as an open space
by the NHA, her continued refusal to vacate has rendered illegal her occupancy
thereat. Thus, in accordance with P.D. No. 1472, petitioner could lawfully be ejected
even without a judicial order.
Neither can it be successfully argued that petitioner had already acquired a vested
right over the subject property when the NHA recognized her as the censused owner
by assigning to her a tag number (TAG No. 77-0063). We quote with approval the trial
courts pertinent findings on the matter:

Plaintiffs structure was one of those found existing during the census/survey of the
area, and her structure was assigned TAG No. 77-0063. While it is true that NHA
recognizes plaintiff as the censused owner of the structure built on the lot, the
issuance of the tag number is not a guarantee for lot allocation. Plaintiff had
petitioned the NHA for the award to her of the lot she is occupying. However, the
census, tagging, and plaintiffs petition, did not vest upon her a legal title to the lot she
was occupying, but a mere expectancy that the lot will be awarded to her. The
expectancy did not ripen into a legal title when the NHA, through Ms. Ines Gonzales,
sent a letter dated March 8, 1994 informing her that her petition for the award of the
lot was denied. Moreover, the NHA, after the conduct of studies and consultation with
residents, had designated Area 1, where the lot petitioned by plaintiff is located, as
an Area Center.[8]

A vested right is one that is absolute, complete and unconditional and no obstacle
exists to its exercise. It is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon any
contingency. To be vested, a right must have become a title -- legal or equitable -- to
the present or future enjoyment of property.[9]

Contrary to petitioners position, the issuance of a tag number in her favor did not
grant her irrefutable rights to the subject property. The tagging of structures in the
Bagong Barrio area was conducted merely to determine the qualified beneficiaries
and bona fide residents within the area. It did not necessarily signify an assurance
that the tagged structure would be awarded to its occupant as there were locational
and physical considerations that must be taken into account, as in fact, the area
where petitioners property was located had been classified as Area Center (open
space). The assignment of a tag number was a mere expectant or contingent right and
could not have ripened into a vested right in favor of petitioner. Her possession and
occupancy of the said property could not be characterized as fixed and absolute. As
such, petitioner cannot claim that she was deprived of her vested right when the NHA
ordered her relocation to another area.

Petitioner invokes the Social Justice Clause of the Constitution, asserting that a poor
and unlettered urban dweller like her has a right to her property and to a decent
living. Thus, her relocation and the demolition of her house would be violative of her
right embodied under Article XIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation
with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which
will make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It
shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the
implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small property
owners. (Underscoring supplied)

Sec. 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings
demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.
(Underscoring supplied)

No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate

consultation with them and the communities where they are to be relocated.

Petitioner cannot find solace in the aforequoted Constitutional provisions. Social

Justice, as the term suggests, should be used only to correct an injustice. As the
eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel observed, social justice must be founded on
the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among diverse units of a society
and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the State of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number. [10]

Moreover, jurisprudence stresses the need to dispense justice with an even hand in
every case:

This Court has stressed more than once that social justice or any justice for
that matter is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a
pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to
tilt the balance in favor of the poor to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its
sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to give preference to the poor
simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for
justice must always be served for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the
law.[11] (Underscoring supplied)
 Hence, there is a need to weigh and balance the rights and welfare of both
contending parties in every case in accordance with the applicable law, regardless of
their situation in life.

In the instant case, the relocation of petitioner and the demolition of her structure
were in accordance with the mandate of P.D. No. 1315 which was enacted primarily
to address the housing problems of the country and to adopt an effective strategy for
dealing with slums, squatter areas and other blighted communities in urban
areas. Significantly, the whereas clause of P.D. No. 1315 states:

WHEREAS, the Constitution of the Philippines mandates that the State shall
establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services in the field of housing, to
guarantee the enjoyment of the people of a decent standard of living and directs that
The State shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare and security of all
the people xxx.

For sure, the NHAs order of relocating petitioner to her assigned lot and demolishing
her property on account of her refusal to vacate was consistent with the laws
fundamental objective of promoting social justice in the manner the will inure to the
common good. The petitioner cannot disregard the lawful action of the NHA which was
merely implementing P.D. No. 1315. It is also worth noting that petitioners continued
refusal to leave the subject property has hindered the development of the entire area.
Indeed, petitioner cannot invoke the social justice clause at the expense of the
common welfare.

Anent the second issue, petitioner avers that P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472 were
impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and
Housing Act of 1992.[12] She contends that while P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472
authorized the NHA to eject without the necessity of a judicial order all squatter
colonies in government resettlement projects, R.A. No. 7279 discouraged such eviction
and demolition without a court order. According to petitioner, R.A. No. 7279, being the
later law, impliedly repealed the former laws, i.e. P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472,
following the legal axiom that when a later law is passed with provisions contrary to
the former law, an implied repeal of the former law takes effect. In particular,
petitioner cites Section 28 of R.A. No. 7279 which provides:

Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be

discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following
situations:
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways and other public places such as
sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds;

(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented; or

(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.

Petitioner asserts that the afore-quoted provision of R.A. No. 7279 is inconsistent with
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1315 and Section 2 of P.D. No. 1472, which state as follows:

Sec. 1 (P.D. No. 1315) xxx. The National Housing Authority hereinafter referred to as
the Authority is designated administrator for the national government and is
authorized to immediately take possession, control and disposition of the expropriated
properties with the power of demolition of their improvements. xxx.

Sec. 2 (P.D. No. 1472) - The National Housing Authority shall have the power to
summarily eject, without the necessity of judicial order, any and all squatters colonies
on government resettlement projects, as well as any illegal occupants in any homelot,
apartment or dwelling unit owned or administered by it. xxx.

From a careful reading of the foregoing provisions, we hold that R.A. No. 7279 does
not necessarily repeal P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472 as it does not contain any
provision which categorically and expressly repeals the provisions of P.D. No. 1315
and P.D. No. 1472. Neither could there be an implied repeal. It is a well-settled rule of
statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. The rationale
behind the rule is explained as follows:

Repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. Repeals by implication are not
favored as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all
laws existing on the subject. Such repeals are not favored for a law cannot be deemed
repealed unless it is clearly manifest that the legislature so intended it. The failure to
add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing
law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the
new and old laws.[13]
Likewise, in another case, it was held:

Well-settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and that
courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be
absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference
of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et
concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted
and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have
known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting
statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts
should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.[14]

We find, as the trial court has found, no irreconcilable conflict or repugnancy between
Section 28 of R.A. No. 7279 and P.D. No. 1315 and No. 1472, rather, they can be read
together and harmonized to give effect to their provisions. It should be stressed that
Section 28 of R.A. No. 7279 does not totally and absolutely prohibit eviction and
demolition without a judicial order as in fact it provides for exceptions. Pursuant to
established doctrine, the three (3) statutes should be construed in light of the objective
to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed by the said laws, and they
should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief,
and secure the benefits intended.[15] It is worthy to note that the three laws (P.D. No.
1315, P.D. No. 1472 and R.A. No. 7279) have a common objective to address the
housing problems of the country by establishing a comprehensive urban development
and housing program for the homeless. For this reason, the need to harmonize these
laws all the more becomes imperative. Hence, in construing the three laws together,
we arrive at a conclusion that demolition and eviction may be validly carried out even
without a judicial order in certain instances, to wit:

(1) when the property involved is an expropriated property in Bagong

Barrio, Caloocan City pursuant to Section 1 of P.D. No. 1315,

(2) when there are squatters on government resettlement projects and

illegal occupants in any homelot, apartment or dwelling unit owned or administered by
the NHA pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. No. 1472,

(3) when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros,

railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways and other public
places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds, pursuant to Section 28(a) of
R.A. No. 7279;

(4) when government infrastructure projects with available funding are

about to be implemented pursuant to Section 28(b) of R.A. No. 7279.
It readily appears that R.A. No. 7279 does not foreclose the NHAs authority to
dismantle the house of petitioner. Besides, under Section 28(b) of R.A. No. 7279,
demolition may be carried out when government infrastructure projects with available
funding are about to be implemented. Under P.D. No. 1315, the government has set
aside the amount of P40 million for the establishment and upgrading of housing
facilities and services in Bagong Barrio.[16] Thus, on the ground of a much-delayed
government infrastructure project about to be implemented, the NHA has the
authority to carry out the summary eviction and demolition of petitioners structure on
the subject lot.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. C-16464 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

20. IMBONG VS OCHOA

Digested Case: Imbong v Ochoa, et al. (G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 205003,
205138, 204988, 205043, 205478, 205491, 205720, 206355, 207111,
207172, 207563)

FACTS:
Concerned citizens and the Catholic Church had petitioned for the constitutionality of
the Reproductive Health Bill.

ISSUES:

A. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional

for violating the:

1. Right to life

2. Right to health

3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech

a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it mandates the
State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs
of e.g. the petitioners
b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling medical
health practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to
refer patients to other institutions despite their conscientious objections

c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be
spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition

4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom

6. Due process clause

7. Equal protection clause

8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
determine WON a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is
valid

C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local Governments and the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

* HELD:

A.

1. NO.

2. NO.

3.

a.) NO.

b.) YES.

c.) NO.

4. YES.

5. NO.

6. NO.
7. NO.

8. NO.

B. NO.

C. NO.

* RATIO:

1.) Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is
a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper
hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express
their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception.

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional
meaning of conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is
that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception
begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the
moment of fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization.
In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional;
only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives
that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that
similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus
constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child
was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court
cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually
prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the
RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those
that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb.
The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has
a bounded duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients
only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the
same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also
uses the term primarily, must be struck down.

2.) Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it
requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables
and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and
supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite
risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.

Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather,
they pray that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws
prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-
licensed physician.

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place,
the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives
are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law,
the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that
the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following
a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered

mandatory only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and
approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe, legal,
non-abortificient and effective.

3.) The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or
participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious
standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to ones dogma or belief. However, the
Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

3a.) The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated
upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or
restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the
Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion,
and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population
control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
3b.) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical practitioner to
immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another
accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on
religious or ethical beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and conviction
of a conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI of the
Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.

The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and

hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service providers to
refer patients to other providers and penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7
and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling them to disseminate information and perform
RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation to Section
24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion. While penalties may be
imposed by law to ensure compliance to it, a constitutionally-protected right must
prevail over the effective implementation of the law.

Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of
the IRR) also violates the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction
between public health officers and their private counterparts. In addition, the freedom
to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protection of this freedom remains
even if he/she is employed in the government.

Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit
the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or
health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In
addition, the limits do not pertain to life-threatening cases.

The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive means to
achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature has already taken other secular
steps to ensure that the right to health is protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The
Population Act of the Philippines) andRA 9710 (TheMagna Cartaof Women).

3c.) Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar
on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for
the issuance of a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police power by the
government. The law does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be
included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or reject
information they receive and they retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life
without the intervention of the State.

4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal
content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the
constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly,
Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of
spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations
to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger
the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is

already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family
and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. In
addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of minors, the written
consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental
authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures is
invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is
non-surgical procedures.

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family
planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their
minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject
the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.

5.) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law,
which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive
Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation
in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case
be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education

has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents
in the development of their children with the use of the term primary. The right of
parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other

interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said
that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6.) The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the
definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to
Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a public health service provider. The
private health care institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous
to private health care service provider.

The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of
information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by
religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning
methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH
information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section
23 (a)(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill
motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs
and services on reproductive health.

7.) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program is
not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of
the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall
endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since
Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering
from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not
prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions
upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority
to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education

program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom
of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and
to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

8.) The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government
health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not
amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the
State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers
to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed
should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious
beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of
this digest.)

B. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not
only has the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health
services and methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of
2009).

C. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Paragraph
(c) of Section 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded
projects, facilities, programs and services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program
for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual
general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services
within the jurisdiction of the LGU.

In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of these

services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue
encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.

Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely
delineates the powers that may be exercised by the regional government. These
provisions cannot be seen as an abdication by the State of its power to enact
legislation that would benefit the general welfare.

Digested Case: Imbong v Ochoa, et al. (G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 205003,
205138, 204988, 205043, 205478, 205491, 205720, 206355, 207111,
207172, 207563)
FACTS:
Concerned citizens and the Catholic Church had petitioned for the constitutionality of
the Reproductive Health Bill.

ISSUES:

A. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional

for violating the:

1. Right to life

2. Right to health

3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech

a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it mandates the
State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs
of e.g. the petitioners

b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling medical
health practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to
refer patients to other institutions despite their conscientious objections

c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be
spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition

4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom

6. Due process clause

7. Equal protection clause

8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
determine WON a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is
valid

C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local Governments and the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
* HELD:

A.

1. NO.

2. NO.

3.

a.) NO.

b.) YES.

c.) NO.

4. YES.

5. NO.

6. NO.

7. NO.

8. NO.

B. NO.

C. NO.

* RATIO:

1.) Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is
a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper
hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express
their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception.

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional
meaning of conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is
that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception
begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the
moment of fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization.
In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional;
only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives
that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that
similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus
constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child
was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court
cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually
prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the
RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those
that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb.
The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has
a bounded duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients
only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the
same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also
uses the term primarily, must be struck down.

2.) Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it
requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables
and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and
supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite
risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.

Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather,
they pray that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws
prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-
licensed physician.

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place,
the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives
are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law,
the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that
the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following
a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered

mandatory only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and
approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe, legal,
non-abortificient and effective.

3.) The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or
participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious
standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to ones dogma or belief. However, the
Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

3a.) The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated
upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or
restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the
Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion,
and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population
control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

3b.) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical practitioner to
immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another
accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on
religious or ethical beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and conviction
of a conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI of the
Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.

The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and

hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service providers to
refer patients to other providers and penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7
and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling them to disseminate information and perform
RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation to Section
24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion. While penalties may be
imposed by law to ensure compliance to it, a constitutionally-protected right must
prevail over the effective implementation of the law.

Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of
the IRR) also violates the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction
between public health officers and their private counterparts. In addition, the freedom
to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protection of this freedom remains
even if he/she is employed in the government.
Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit
the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or
health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In
addition, the limits do not pertain to life-threatening cases.

The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive means to
achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature has already taken other secular
steps to ensure that the right to health is protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The
Population Act of the Philippines) andRA 9710 (TheMagna Cartaof Women).

3c.) Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar
on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for
the issuance of a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police power by the
government. The law does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be
included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or reject
information they receive and they retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life
without the intervention of the State.

4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal
content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the
constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly,
Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of
spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations
to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger
the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is

already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family
and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. In
addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of minors, the written
consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental
authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures is
invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is
non-surgical procedures.

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family
planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their
minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject
the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.

5.) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law,
which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive
Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation
in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case
be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education

has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents
in the development of their children with the use of the term primary. The right of
parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other

interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said
that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

6.) The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the
definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to
Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a public health service provider. The
private health care institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous
to private health care service provider.

The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of
information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by
religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning
methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH
information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section
23 (a)(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill
motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs
and services on reproductive health.
7.) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program is
not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of
the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall
endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since
Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering
from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not
prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions
upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority
to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education

program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom
of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and
to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

8.) The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government
health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not
amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the
State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers
to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed
should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious
beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of
this digest.)

B. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not
only has the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health
services and methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of
2009).

C. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Paragraph
(c) of Section 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded
projects, facilities, programs and services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program
for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual
general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services
within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of these
services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue
encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.

Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely
delineates the powers that may be exercised by the regional government. These
provisions cannot be seen as an abdication by the State of its power to enact
legislation that would benefit the general welfare.

21. BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES VS NLRC

BSP VS NLRC

G.R. No. 80767 April 22, 1991

BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FORTUNATO ESGUERRA, ROBERTO

MALABORBOR, ESTANISLAO MISA, VICENTE EVANGELISTA, and MARCELINO GARCIA,
respondents.

Julio O. Lopez for petitioner.

FELICIANO, J.:

This Petition for Certiorari is directed at (1) the Decision,1 dated 27 February 1987, and (2) the
Resolution2 dated 16 October 1987, both issued by the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") in
Case No. 1637-84.

Private respondents Fortunato C. Esquerra, Roberto O. Malaborbor, Estanislao M. Misa, Vicente N.

Evangelista and Marcelino P. Garcia, had all been rank-and-file employees of petitioner Boy Scouts of the
Philippines ("BSP"). At the time of termination of their services in February 1985, private respondents
were stationed at the BSP Camp in Makiling, Los Baos, Laguna.

The events which led to such termination of services are as follows:

On 19 October 1984, the Secretary-General of petitioner BSP issued Special Orders Nos. 80, 81, 83, 84
and 85 addressed separately to the five (5) private respondents, informing them that on 20 November
1984, they were to be transferred from the BSP Camp in Makiling to the BSP Land Grant in Asuncion,
Davao del Norte. These Orders were opposed by private respondents who, on 4 November 1984,
appealed the matter to the BSP National President.

On 6 November 1984, petitioner BSP conducted a pre-transfer briefing at its National Headquarters in
Manila. Private respondents were in attendance during the briefing and they were there assured that
their transfer to Davao del Norte would not involve any diminution in salary, and that each of them
would receive a relocation allowance equivalent to one (1) month's basic pay. This assurance, however,
failed to persuade private respondents to abandon their opposition to the transfer orders issued by the
BSP Secretary-General.

On 13 November 1984, a complaint3

(docketed as NLRC Case No. 16-84J) for illegal transfer was filed with the then Ministry of Labor and
Employment, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch IV, San Pablo City, Laguna. Private respondents there
sought to enjoin implementation of Special Orders Nos. 80, 81, 83, 84 and 85, alleging, among other
things, that said orders were "indubitable and irrefutable action[s] prejudicial not only to [them] but to
[their] families and [would] seriously affect [their] economic stability and solvency considering the
present cost of living."

On 21 November 1984 (or the day immediately following the date of scheduled transfer), the BSP Camp
Manager in Makiling issued a Memorandum requiring the five (5) private respondents to explain why
they should not be charged administratively for insubordination. The Memorandum was a direct result
of the refusal by private respondents, two (2) days earlier, to accept from petitioner BSP their respective
boat tickets to Davao del Norte and their relocation allowances.

Meanwhile, in a letter of the same date, the BSP National President informed private respondents that
their refusal to comply with the Special Orders was not sufficiently justified and constituted rank
disobedience. Memoranda subsequently issued by the BSP Secretary-General stressed that such refusal
as well as the explanations proffered therefor, were unacceptable and could altogether result in
termination of employment with petitioner BSP. These warnings notwithstanding, private respondents
continued pertinaciously to disobey the disputed transfer orders.

Petitioner BSP consequently imposed a five-day suspension on the five (5) private respondents, in the
latter part of January 1985. Subsequently, by Special Order dated 12 February 1985 issued by the BSP
Secretary-General, private respondents' services were ordered terminated effective 15 February 1985.

On 22 February 1985, private respondents amended their original complaint to include charges of illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice against petitioner BSP.4

The Labor Arbiter thereafter proceeded to hear the complaint.

In a decision5 dated 31 July 1985, the Labor Arbiter ordered the dismissal of private respondents'
complaint for lack of merit.
On 27 February 1987, however, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter was reversed by public respondent, NLRC,
which held that private respondents had been illegally dismissed by petitioner BSP. The dispositive
portion of the NLRC decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the Decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one
entered ordering the respondent-appellee [petitioner BSP] to reinstate the complainants-appellants
[private respondents] to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and other benefits
appurtenant thereto and with full backwages from the time they were illegally dismissed from the
service up to the date of their actual reinstatement.

SO ORDERED.

The Court notes at the outset that in the Position Paper6 filed by petitioner BSP with the Labor Arbiter, it
was alleged in the second paragraph thereof, that petitioner is a "civic service, non-stock and non-profit
organization, relying mostly [on] government and public support, existing under and by virtue of
Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. 460 . . . " A similar allegation was
contained in the Brief for Appellee7 and in the Petition8 and Memorandum9 filed by petitioner BSP with
public respondent NLRC and this Court, respectively. The same allegation, moreover, appeared in the
Comment10 (also treated as the Memorandum) submitted to this Court by the Solicitor General on
behalf of public respondent NLRC; for their part, private respondents stated in their Appeal
Memorandum11 with the NLRC that petitioner BSP is "by mandate of law a Public Corporation," a
statement reiterated by them in their Memorandum12 before this Court.

In a Resolution dated 9 August 1989, this Court required the parties and the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel to file a comment on the question of whether or not petitioner BSP is in fact a
government-owned or controlled corporation.

Petitioner, private respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel filed their respective comments.

The central issue is whether or not the BSP is embraced within the Civil Service as that term is defined in
Article IX (B) (2) (1) of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:

The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentality mentalities and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

xxx xxx xxx

The answer to the central issue will determine whether or not private respondent NLRC had jurisdiction
to render the Decision and Resolution which are here sought to be nullified.

The responses of the parties, on the one hand, and of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of
the Government Corporate Counsel, upon the other hand, in compliance with the Resolution of this
Court of 9 August 1989, present a noteworthy uniformity. Petitioner BSP and private respondents submit
substantially the same view "that the BSP is a purely private organization". In contrast, the Solicitor
General and the Government Corporate Counsel take much the same position, that is, that the BSP is a
"public corporation' or a "quasi-public corporation" and, as well, a "government controlled corporation."
Petitioner BSP's compliance with our Resolution invokes the following provisions of its Constitution and
By-laws:

The Boy Scouts of the Philippines declares that it is an independent, voluntary, non-political, non-
sectarian and non-governmental organization, with obligations towards nation building and with
international orientation.

The BSP, petitioner stresses, does not receive any monetary or financial subsidy from the Government
whether on the national or local level.13 Petitioner declares that it is a "purely private organization"
directed and controlled by its National Executive Board the members of which are, it is said, all
"voluntary scouters," including seven (7) Cabinet Secretaries.14

Private respondents submitted a supplementary memorandum arguing that while petitioner BSP was
created as a public corporation, it had lost that status when Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 111 as
amended by P.D. No. 460 conferred upon it the powers which ordinary private corporations organized
under the Corporation Code have:

Sec. 2. The said corporation shall have perpetual succession with power to sue and be sued; to hold such
real and personal estate as shall be necessary for corporate purposes, and to receive real and personal
property by gift, devise, or bequest; to adopt a seal, and to alter or destroy the same at pleasure; to have
offices and conduct its business and affairs in the City of Manila and in the several provinces; to make
and adopt by-laws, rules and regulations not inconsistent with the laws of the Philippines, and generally
to do all such acts and things (including the establishment of regulations for the election of associates
and successors: as may be necessary to carry into effect the provisions of the Act and promote the
purposes of said corporation.

Private respondents also point out that the BSP is registered as a private employer with the Social
Security System and that all its staff members and employees are covered by the Social Security Act,
indicating that the BSP had lost its personality or standing as a public corporation. It is further alleged
that the BSP's assets and liabilities, official transactions and financial statements have never been
subjected to audit by the government auditing office, i.e., the Commission on Audit, being audited rather
by the private auditing firm of Sycip Gorres Velayo and Co. Private respondents finally state that the
appointments of BSP officers and staff were not approved or confirmed by the Civil Service Commission.

The views of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel on
the above issue appeared to be generally similar. The Solicitor General's Office, although it had appeared
for the NLRC and filed a Comment on the latter's behalf on the merits of the Petition for Certiorari,
submitted that the BSP is a government-owned or controlled corporation, having been created by virtue
of Commonwealth Act No. 111 entitled "An Act to Create a Public Corporation to be known as the Boy
Scouts of the Philippines and to Define its Powers and Purposes." The Solicitor General stressed that the
BSP was created in order to "promote, through organization, and cooperation with other agencies the
ability of boys to do things for themselves and others, to train them in scoutcraft, and to teach them
patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues, using the methods which are now in common use
by boy scouts."5 He further noted that the BSP's objectives and purposes are "solely of a benevolent
character and not for pecuniary profit by its members.16 The Solicitor General also underscored the
extent of government participation in the BSP under its charter as reflected in the composition of its
governing body:

The governing body of the said corporation shall consist of a National Executive Board composed of (a)
the President of the Philippines or his representative; (b) the charter and life members of the Boy Scouts
of the Philippines; (c) the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Philippine Scouting Foundation; (d)
the Regional Chairman of the Scout Regions of the Philippines; (e) the Secretary of Education and
Culture, the Secretary of Social Welfare, the Secretary of National Defense, the Secretary of Labor, the
Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Youth and Sports, and the Secretary of local Government and
Community Development; (f) an equal number of individuals from the private sector; (g) the National
President of the Girl Scouts of the Philippines; (h) one Scout of Senior age from each Scout Region to
represent the boy membership; and (i) three representatives of the cultural minorities. Except for the
Regional Chairman who shall be elected by the Regional Scout Councils during their annual meetings,
and the Scouts of their respective regions, all members of the National Executive Board shall be either by
appointment or cooption, subject to ratification and confirmation by the Chief Scout, who shall be the
Head of State. . . .17 (Emphasis supplied)

The Government Corporate Counsel, like the Solicitor General, describes the BSP as a "public
corporation" but, unlike the Solicitor General, suggests that the BSP is more of a "quasi corporation"
than a "public corporation." The BSP, unlike most public corporations which are created for a political
purpose, is not vested with political or governmental powers to be exercised for the public good or
public welfare in connection with the administration of civil government. The Government Corporate
Counsel submits, more specifically, that the BSP falls within the ambit of the term "government-owned
or controlled corporation" as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 2029 (approved on 4 February 1986) which
reads as follows:

A government-owned or controlled corporation is a stock or a non-stock corporation, whether

performing governmental or proprietary functions, which is directly chartered by special law or if
organized under the general corporation law is owned or controlled by the government directly, or
indirectly through a parent corporation or subsidiary corporation, to the extent of at least a majority of
its outstanding capital stock or its outstanding voting capital stock.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Examining the relevant statutory provisions and the arguments outlined above, the Court considers that
the following need to be considered in arriving at the appropriate legal characterization of the BSP for
purposes of determining whether its officials and staff members are embraced in the Civil Service. Firstly,
BSP's functions as set out in its statutory charter do have a public aspect. BSP's functions do relate to the
fostering of the public virtues of citizenship and patriotism and the general improvement of the moral
spirit and fiber of our youth. The social value of activities like those to which the BSP dedicates itself by
statutory mandate have in fact, been accorded constitutional recognition. Article II of the 1987
Constitution includes in the "Declaration of Principles and State Policies," the following:

Sec. 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism
and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

At the same time, BSP's sanctions do not relate to the governance of any part of territory of the
Philippines; BSP is not a public corporation in the same sense that municipal corporations or local
governments are public corporations. BSP's functions can not also be described as proprietary functions
in the same sense that the functions or activities of government-owned or controlled corporations like
the National Development Company or the National Steel Corporation can be described as proprietary or
"business-like" in character. Nevertheless, the public character of BSP's functions and activities must be
conceded, for they pertain to the educational, civic and social development of the youth which
constitutes a very substantial and important part of the nation.

The second aspect that the Court must take into account relates to the governance of the BSP. The
composition of the National Executive Board of the BSP includes, as noted from Section 5 of its charter
quoted earlier, includes seven (7) Secretaries of Executive Departments. The seven (7) Secretaries (now
six [6] in view of the abolition of the Department of Youth and Sports and merger thereof into the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports) by themselves do not constitute a majority of the
members of the National Executive Board. We must note at the same time that the appointments of
members of the National Executive Board, except only the appointments of the Regional Chairman and
Scouts of Senior age from the various Scout Regions, are subject to ratification and confirmation by the
Chief Scout, who is the President of the Philippines. Vacancies to the Board are filled by a majority vote
of the remaining members thereof, but again subject to ratification and confirmation by the Chief
Scout.18 We must assume that such confirmation or ratification involves the exercise of choice or
discretion on the part of ratifying or confirming power. It does appears therefore that there is substantial
governmental (i.e., Presidential) participation or intervention in the choice of the majority of the
members of the National Executive Board of the BSP.

The third aspect relates to the character of the assets and funds of the BSP. The original assets of the BSP
were acquired by purchase or gift or other equitable arrangement with the Boy Scouts of America, of
which the BSP was part before the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. The BSP
charter, however, does not indicate that such assets were public or statal in character or had originated
from the Government or the State. According to petitioner BSP, its operating funds used for carrying out
its purposes and programs, are derived principally from membership dues paid by the Boy Scouts
themselves and from property rentals. In this respect, the BSP appears similar to private non-stock, non-
profit corporations, although its charter expressly envisages donations and contributions to it from the
Government and any of its agencies and instrumentalities.19 We note only that BSP funds have not
apparently heretofore been regarded as public funds by the Commission on Audit, considering that such
funds have not been audited by the Commission.
While the BSP may be seen to be a mixed type of entity, combining aspects of both public and private
entities, we believe that considering the character of its purposes and its functions, the statutory
designation of the BSP as "a public corporation" and the substantial participation of the Government in
the selection of members of the National Executive Board of the BSP, the BSP, as presently constituted
under its charter, is a government-controlled corporation within the meaning of Article IX. (B) (2) (1) of
the Constitution.

We are fortified in this conclusion when we note that the Administrative Code of 1987 designates the
BSP as one of the attached agencies of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS").20 An
"agency of the Government" is defined as referring to any of the various units of the Government
including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, government-owned or-controlled corporation, or
local government or distinct unit therein.21"Government instrumentality" is in turn defined in the 1987
Administrative Code in the following manner:

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not
all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or
controlled corporations.22 (Emphasis supplied)

The same Code describes a "chartered institution" in the following terms:

Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested
by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state
universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the State.23 (Emphasis supplied)

We believe that the BSP is appropriately regarded as "a government instrumentality" under the 1987
Administrative Code.

It thus appears that the BSP may be regarded as both a "government controlled corporation with an
original charter" and as an "instrumentality" of the Government within the meaning of Article IX (B) (2)
(1) of the Constitution. It follows that the employees of petitioner BSP are embraced within the Civil
Service and are accordingly governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations.

It remains only to note that even before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution employees of the BSP
already fell within the scope of the Civil Service. In National Housing Corporation v. Juco,24 decided in
1985, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Gutierrez, held:

There should no longer be any question at this time that employees of government-owned or controlled
corporations are governed by the civil service law and civil service rules and regulations.

Section 1, Article XII-B of the [19731 Constitution specifically provides:

The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the Government,
including every government-owned or controlled corporation. . . .
The 1935 Constitution had a similar provision in its Section 1, Article XII which stated:

A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by
law.1wphi1

The inclusion of "government-owned or controlled corporations" within the embrace of the civil service
shows a deliberate effort of the framers to plug an earlier loophole which allowed government-owned or
controlled corporations to avoid the full consequences of the all encompassing coverage of the civil
service system. The same explicit intent is shown by the addition of "agency" and "instrumentality" to
branches and subdivisions of the Government. All offices and firms of the government are covered. The
amendments introduced in 1973 are not idle exercises or meaningless gestures. They carry the strong
message that civil service coverage is broad and all-embracing insofar as employment in the government
in any of its governmental or corporate arms is concerned.25

The complaint in NLRC Case No. 1637-84 having been filed on 13 November 1984, when the 1973
Constitution was still in force, our ruling in Juco applies in the case at bar.26

In view of the foregoing, we hold that both the Labor Arbiter and public respondent NLRC had no
jurisdiction over the complaint filed by private respondents in NLRC Case No. 1637-84; neither labor
agency had before it any matter which could validly have been passed upon by it in the exercise of
original or appellate jurisdiction. The appealed Decision and Resolution in this case, having been
rendered without jurisdiction, vested no rights and imposed no liabilities upon any of the parties here
involved. That neither party had expressly raised the issue of jurisdiction in the pleadings poses no
obstacle to this ruling of the Court, which may motu proprio take cognizance of the issue of existence or
absence of jurisdiction and pass upon the same.27

ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 31 July 1985, and the Decision dated 27 February
1987 and Resolution dated 16 October 1987, issued by public respondent NLRC, in NLRC Case No. 1637-
84, are hereby SET ASIDE. All other orders and resolutions rendered in this case by the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC are likewise SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide Jr., JJ., concur.

22. SORIANO VS. LA GUARDIA

G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009

Facts:

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang
Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after,
before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by
Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent
Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a
minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

Issue:

Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part of
the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
Held:

No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the
adverse effect of petitioners utterances on the viewers fundamental rights as well as
petitioners clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly
suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it
cannot be properly asserted that petitioners suspension was an undue curtailment of
his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment.
Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public
trusteeship character of a broadcasters role and the power of the State to regulate
broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary
effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if
any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

23. PEOPLE VS JACINTO

G.R. No. 162540

July 13, 2009

GEMMA T. JACINTO,

Petitionervs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RespondentPERALTA,

A petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appealsaffirming petitioner's conviction of the
crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

Facts:

Baby Aquino handed petitioner Gemma Jacinto a Banco De Oro (BDO) Check in the
amount of P10,000.00. The check waspayment for Baby Aquino's purchases from
Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of MegaFoam. Somehow,
the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband
of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing,
merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.Later, Rowena Ricablanca, another
employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank,who
was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that
the subject BDO checkdeposited in his account had been dishonored. Ricablanca then
called and relayed the message through accusedAnita Valencia, a former
employee/collector of Mega Foam, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but
theycould be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of
Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came
from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquinoto replace the check
with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it
equally intofour: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle.
Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam'saccountant, reported the matter to the
owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to
Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed handedpetitioner a BDO
check for P10,000.00 as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam. Baby
Aquino furthertestified that petitioner Jacinto also called her on the phone to tell her
that the BDO check bounced. Verificationfrom company records showed that
petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, BabyAquino said
that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash as replacement for the
dishonored check.Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapmentoperation with its agents. Ten pieces
of P1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted withfluorescent
powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to
pretend that shewas going along with Valencia's plan.Ricablanca, petitioner, her
husband, and Valencia then boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby
Aquino'sfactory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of
Baby Aquino, pretending that shewas getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the
cash she actually brought out from the premises was theP10,000.00 marked money
previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and
uponreturning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter,
petitioner and Valencia werearrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole
time.A case was filed against the three accused, Jacinto, Valencia and Capitle. RTC
rendered its Decisionfinding them

GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

QUALIFIED THEFT

and sentenced eachimprisonment of

FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS,

as minimum

, to SIX(6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS,

as maximum

.The three appealed to the CA and the decision of the trial court was

MODIFIED

in that:(a) thesentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands; (b) the sentence
against accused Anita Valencia isreduced to 4 months

arresto mayor

medium, and (c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted. Hence,the present
Petition for Review on

Certiorari

filed by petitioner alone,

Issue:

Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft.

Held:

As may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code,

the personal property subject of thetheft must have some value, as the intention of the
accused is to

gain

from the thing stolen

. This isfurther bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be
imposed on the accused isdependent on the value of the thing stolen.In this case,
petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same
was apparentlywithout value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question
arises on whether the crime of qualified theftwas actually produced. The Court must
resolve the issue in the negative.

Intod v. Court of Appeals

is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In

Intod (see doctrines laid out inIntod)

, the Court went on to give an example of

an offense that involved factual impossibility,

i.e.

, a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the
latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty

24. GARCIA VS DRILON

Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262

Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod
City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A.
9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing
for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and
economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions
set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance
of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when
petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given
time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as
it would be an axercise in futility.

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and
TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process
and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being an
unwanted product of an invalid law.

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition
for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court
and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court
constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition
constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is

discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the
due process clause of the Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to
protect the family as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional

because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and
jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts
have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not
raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial
court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply
equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence
of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence
one may have in support of ones defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be
impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners contention

that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In
a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any
issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power

includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the power to
enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the
prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the
issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is
consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

25. GO-TAN VS SPOUSES

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN G.R. No. 168852

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN
and JUANITA L. TAN, Promulgated:
*
Respondents. September 30, 2008
x----------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Resolution[1] dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC
[2]
Resolution dated July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for
Reconsideration.

The factual background of the case:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were
married.[3] Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle[4] and Kristen
Denise.[5] On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a
Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) [6] against
Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents)
before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing
verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs
(e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)[7] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,[8] otherwise known as the
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice[9] granting petitioner's prayer for a
TPO.

On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the

Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,
[10]
contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law
of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.

On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition[11] to respondents' Motion

to Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal
interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of violence.

On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution[12] dismissing the case as to respondents
on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not
included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of
law expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[13]

On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration[14] contending
that the doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in the broader interests of
substantial justice and due process.

On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration[15] arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the
provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the alleged
victim was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.

On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution[16] denying petitioner's

Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under
the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the
law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES

PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE
INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004.[17]

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of
Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on conspiracy under Article 8
of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had
community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial
support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in
repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents
should be included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the
case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since
Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only
by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the
conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by this
Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or
necessary parties, since their presence in the case is not only unnecessary but altogether
illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No.
9262.

The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as any
act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of
such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of
the RPC, thus:

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal
Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)

Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses
which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject
to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such
laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis
supplied)

Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary
capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the
special law is silent on a particular matter.

Thus, in People v. Moreno,[18] the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary
penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise
known as the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, noting that the special law did not contain any
provision that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,[19] the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of
sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found guilty
of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.

In People v. Chowdury,[20] the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the
RPC to define the words principal, accomplices and accessories under R.A. No. 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, because said
words were not defined therein, although the special law referred to the same terms in
enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v. People,[21] the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise
known as the Bouncing Checks Law, noting the absence of an express provision on
subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.

Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,[22] the Court applied suppletorily the principle of
conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary
provision therein.

With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be
applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that
the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which
by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.

Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or
action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.[23]

It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts
of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through
another, thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxx

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another,

that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her
child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or
her child;
 (3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or
her child against her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to

animals or pets of the woman or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of
preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child may include
individuals other than the offending husband, thus:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The protection orders that may be issued
under this Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing,

personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this
Act;

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning,

contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly
or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:

SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the

protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children.
(Emphasis supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law [24] and that this intent must be
effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262
reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment
of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and
safety of victims of violence against women and children.

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the

maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius finds no application here. It must be
remembered that this maxim is only an ancillary rule of statutory construction. It is not of
universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of
discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted
to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.[25]

The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of
circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause
verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is
an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and
cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts.[26] It is
thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered
only on the determination of whether respondents may be included in a petition under R.A.
No. 9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on
the merits.

Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be

applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether
respondents may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an
exercise in superfluity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions

dated March 7, 2005 and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED
and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition against respondents is
concerned.

26. DEL ROSARIO VS BENGZON

Del Rosario vs Bengzon GR L-88265 21December 1989

POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

LEAVE A COMMENT
Facts: RA 6675 requiring the use of generic names in all transactions related to
purchasing, prescribing, dispensing and administering of drugs and medicines.
Petitioners, officers of Philippine Medical Association assailed the constitutionality of
the said statute and petitioned for declaratory relief. Court treated it as petition for
prohibition. Petitioners argument of the RA favouring private sector and giving the act
of prescribing the correct medicine a duty of the salesgirl were all stricken down as
misinterpretation of the RA.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act 6675 (Generics Act of 1988), requiring the use of
generic names in all transactions relating to drugs and medicines constitutional?

Decision: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. Generics Act of 1988 constitutional. RA
6675 secures the patient the right to choose between the brand name and its generic
equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write both the generic and the brand name in
his prescription form. The respondent is implementing the constitutional mandate of
the State to protect and promote the right to health of the people and to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost.

27. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS PAGADIAN CITY TIMBER CO.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (DENR),
Petitioner,
- versus -

PAGADIAN CITY TIMBER CO., INC.,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 159308

Promulgated:

September 16, 2008

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to nullify and set aside the Decision[2] dated October 18, 2001 and the
Resolution[3] dated July 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59194
entitled Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc. v. Antonio Cerilles, as Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Antonio Mendoza, as
Regional Executive Director, DENR, Region IX.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On October 14, 1994, petitioner, through the DENR, and respondent Pagadian City
Timber Co., Inc. executed Industrial Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) No. R-9-
040[4] whereby petitioner, represented by then Regional Executive Director (RED) for
Region IX, Leonito C. Umali, authorized respondent, represented by its President
Filomena San Juan, to develop, utilize, and manage a specified forest area covering
1,999.14 hectares located in Barangays Langapod, Cogonan, and Datagan,
Municipality of Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur, for the production of timber and other
forest products subject to a production-sharing scheme.

Respondent later submitted the required Comprehensive Development and

Management Plan (CDMP) which the DENR approved on August 17, 1995.

On October 8, 1998, in response to the numerous complaints filed by members of the

Subanen tribe regarding respondents alleged failure to implement the CDMP,
disrespect of their rights as an indigenous people, and the constant threats and
harassment by armed men employed by respondent, RED Antonio Mendoza, DENR
Region IX, issued Regional Special Order No. 217 creating a regional team to evaluate
and assess IFMA No. R-9-040.

Thus, the DENR sent a letter dated October 22, 1998 to respondent, giving notice of
the evaluation and assessment to be conducted on the area from October 22-30,
1998 covering the years 1997 and 1998. In the notice, the DENR requested any
representative of the company to appear at the CENRO Office, Pagadian City, and
bring with him documents and maps concerning its IFMA operations.

On October 23, 1998, a DENR Evaluation Team composed of Aniceto Wenceslao

(Forester, DENR, Zamboanga del Sur), Isabelo Mangaya-ay (Intern Chief, RCBF/MCO),
Philidor Lluisma (Forester II, Regional Office), Chanito Paul Siton (C. Forester,
CENRO-Pagadian City), Adelberto Roullo (Forester, CENRO, Pagadian City), and
Francisco Martin (Carto LEP, CENRO, Pagadian City) went to the IFMA site. After a
briefing conference between the Evaluation Team and respondents Operations
Manager, Inocencio Santiago, actual field evaluation and assessment followed.
On October 29, 1998, an exit conference and dialogue on post evaluation and
assessment of IFMA R-9-04 was held between DENR officials, namely, CENR Officer
Maximo O. Dichoso, IFMA Regional Team Leader, Forester Isabelo C. Mangaya-ay, and
IFMA Regional Team Member, Forester Philidor O. Lluisma, and IFMA Representative
and Operations Manager Inocencio Santiago at the CENRO, Pagadian City.[5] The exit
conference was called to order at 1:30 p.m. and was concluded at 3:00 p.m. Forester
Mangaya-ay presented the representative results and findings of the Evaluation Team,
to wit:

The presiding officer started with the mango plantation in the Noran,
Langapod side. That out of the estimated number of seedlings planted of
about 2,008 hills, within an equivalent area of 20 hectares, the result or
finding of the inventory conducted at 100% intensity is only 98 hills of
seedlings survived including the doubtful and badly deformed. The
species planted along trails are Gmelina and Mahogany species. The said
foot trail planted with the aforementioned species starts from the
entrance of the IFMA are where the notice billboard is posted up to the
only existing look-out tower. The estimated average of percent survival
for Gmelina is more or less 30%. There are also portions where higher
percentage of survival is recorded at 56% and lower at 14%. There are
areas planted declared by Kagawad Cerning Becagas of Barangay
Cogonan now covered by CSC. The areas covered by CSC, a waiver is
needed to be issued by the IFMA holder.

CENR Officer Maximo O. Dichoso commented that during a meeting held

before, the IFMA holder was willing to give up the said areas.

The presiding officer continued that on the courtesy call made to the
Barangay Chairman of Barangay Cogonan, Mr. Roberto Palaran
recounted the assistance extended by the IFMA holder to his barangay as
Community Assistance/service which includes electric generator,
handheld radio and laborers for the repair of Noburan Cogonan road and
the repair of the hanging bridge at Sitio Tialaic to which the said
Barangay Chairman issued a duly signed certification to this effect.

With regards, the seedling stock within the nursery, there are
approximately a total number of about 44,460 seedlings of Gmelina
species. That the infrastructure implemented or constructed, there exist
only one look-out tower of the reported 4 look-out towers
constructed. Moreover, the team had also noted only 1 bunkhouse and 1
stockroom or shedhouse. There is also 1 Multi-purpose shed and 1
dilapidated or neglected notice billboard poster at the entrance trail
leading to the IFMA area. That with regards the concrete monument,
there are only 2 recorded. The other corners visible are those located at
 junctions of creeks and rivers. But the others cannot be visibly or never
planted for the same cannot be pinpointed or shown to the team
allegedly for lack of knowledge by the representative of the IFMA
holder. Finally, the presiding officer reminded the herein IFMA
representative Mr. Inocencio Santiago that per actual survey, inspection
and ground verification, the team believes that the other reported areas
planted are located outside the designated IFMA area particularly the
Noburan and Langapod sides.[6]

After the presentation, Mangaya-ay asked Santiago if he had comments, suggestions,

or questions regarding the matter and the manner of the conduct of the evaluation
and assessment by the Evaluation Team. Santiago said he had none, but requested a
copy of the report of the Evaluation Team. Mangaya-ay informed him that it was only
RED Mendoza who may furnish him a copy of the report.

Later, the Evaluation Team submitted a report through a

Memorandum[7] dated November 6, 1998 to the DENR-RED of Region
9, Zamboanga City, on the evaluation and assessment of respondent under IFMA No.
R-9-040. The said Memorandum stated

In compliance with Regional Special Order No. 217, Series of 1998,

please be informed that the herein information is the result or findings of
the team for the conduct of evaluation and assessment following the
guidelines setforth under Department Administrative Order (DAO) No.
11, Series of 1995 of Pagadian Timber Co., Inc. under IFMA No. R9-040
against their actual accomplishment as mandated under the terms and
conditions of the IFMA including other applicable laws, rules and
regulations of the department on the matter.

At the onset, the team conducted a briefing conference and dialogue with
the IFMA holder, the CENR Officer of Pagadian City and personnel
concerned for the proper and orderly implementation and conduct of the
evaluation and assessment (please see attached).

The team was composed of the Regional Evaluating Team, the CENRO
and PENRO representatives and the representatives of the IFMA
holder. The team proceeded to the western portion of the area of the
herein IFMA particularly Barangay Cogonan, Labangan, Zamboanga del
Sur. The evaluation and assessment was then conducted on the main
nursery, the established plantation, the look-out towers, the boundary of
ISF and claimed or occupied areas, natural or residual forest, the IFMA
boundary, monuments planted, foot trails, other improvements
introduced and the billboard and signboard posted. The inspection,
evaluation and assessment conducted were all undertaken in the
presence of the IFMA holder, representatives, laborers and other
personnel on the area. (please see attached report, tall sheets, pictorials
and map).

In the conduct of the same, the IFMA representatives or laborers that

assisted the team could only show the subject area under evaluation but
the other areas alluded to as accomplished or undertaken by the
company appeared upon actual verification and inspection to be negative
and non-existent thus dispelling their allegation.

With regard the information and dissemination conducted by the IFMA

holder including other services extended to the communities within the
IFMA area and vicinities, it is noteworthy for recognition the donations
made by the company. (Please see attached minutes of the dialogue with
the barangay officials of Barangay Cogonan and pictorials).

The evaluation conducted on the nursery operations show that the

facilities and other necessary implements were generally below par. An
inventory of the seedlings stock of pure Gmelina species have already
lapsed its plantability or have overgrown in the seedbed with an average
grand total of about 44,460 within the established 2-hectare main
nursery area. There was no other subsidiary nursery established in the
area. Also noted is the enrichment planting conducted along both sides
of the foot-trail which extends approximately 18 kms. From the entrance
of the IFMA area going to the lookout tower of the four (4) lookout towers
reported, only one (1) has been noted remaining in the area and the rest
were destroyed or burned (pls. see attached pictorials). The signboard
posted was unattended and in the state of disrepair. There were no
monument planted or any marking along the IFMA boundary and in
residual forest except the monuments found in the ISF boundaries
within the IFMA area (please see attached pictorials). The plantation
established is composed of Gmelina species with 4 x 4 spacing over a
total of about 10.18 hectares. Basing on 5% estimate inventory, the
result is 43% seedling survival.

Thereafter, the team also conducted evaluation and assessment at the

eastern portion particularly at Langapod, Labangan, Zamboanga del
Sur. The team inspected and verified on the ground the reported 20
hectares mango plantation with a spacing of 10 x 10 meters at 100%
intensity inventory. The accounted number of mango seedlings planted of
about 2,008 hills, only 98 seedlings survived. Wherefore, it generally
represents 5% seedling survival. (Please see attached)
 Finally, the team conducted an exit conference with the CENR Officer,
and the IFMA holder where the tentative and general findings of the
evaluation and assessment was laid-out and presented to the body.
(Please see attached)[8]

On the basis of such findings, the Evaluation Team made the following
recommendations

1. The lessee should be required to explain why they failed to

develop their IFMA area (Plantation Development) in accordance
with the approved Comprehensive Development and Management
Plan (CDMP);
2. The boundary and area coverage of IFMA No. R9-040
should be amended to exclude areas covered by Certificates of
Stewardship Contracts (CSC) under the ISF Program with an area
of 226.17 hectares, other areas previously identified
as occupied/claimed and other conflict areas;

3. The amended boundary should be delineated/surveyed on

the ground with a precise instrument and all corners
appropriately marked/monumented;

4. The company should hire a full time forester.[9]

Acting on the Memorandum dated November 6, 1998, RED Antonio M.

Mendoza, DENR-IX, Zamboanga City, submitted to the DENR Secretary a
Memorandum[10] dated April 7, 1999regarding the performance evaluation of IFMA No.
R-9-040. The RED Memorandum reads

This has reference with the instruction to validate the

performance/accomplishment of IFMAs of Region IX, Western
Mindanao. Validation of IFMAs is in accordance with the existing policy
of the DENR, to determine the capabilities of the holders to develop their
Lease areas in consonance with their submitted and approved
Comprehensive Development Management Plan.

xxxx

On 6 November 1998, Foresters Isabelo C. Mangaya-ay and

Philidor Lluisma, pursuant to Regional Special Order No. 217, Series of
1998, conducted the evaluation of the performance of IFMA No. R9-040
of Pagadian City Timber Company, Inc. located at Langapod and
Cogonan, Municipality of Labangan and
Datagan, Municipality of Sominot, all of Zamboanga del Sur. Result of
the evaluation reveals that the holder violated the following DENR
existing Rules and Regulations particularly Section 26 of DAO 97-04
GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION of IFMA which provides that, any of the
following violations shall be sufficient grounds for the cancellation of
IFMA.

1. Paragraph 26.5, Section 26, DAO 97-04, Series of 1997,

provides that failure to implement the approved Comprehensive
Development and Management Plan.

As of 1998, the 4th year of existence of IFMA No. R9-040, the

holder must have developed a total of 1,597.0 hectares as per
approved CDMP. However, based on the report submitted by the
Evaluation Team only 365.2 hectares was planted which are about
22.8%. During the evaluation, however, the IFMA representative
could not even pinpoint the planted areas.
Per report of the Pagadian CENRO Composite Monitoring
Team conducted on 21 August 1998 the plantation area was
burned resulting to the damage of about 300 hectares leaving only
about 20.0 hectares undamaged. No report had been
submitted/received since then.

In infrastructure, the holder managed to put up one (1) out of four

(4) programmed look-out towers; developed one (1) out of two (2)
forest nurseries and constructed only 6 km. foot trail which is only
about 27% accomplishment of the whole infrastructure.

2. Paragraph 26.8 of Section 26, DAO 97-04, specifically

provides that failure to implement or adopt agreements made with
communities and other relevant sectors.

Attached herewith, please find several petitions, sworn

statements, affidavits and resolutions from various sectors
particularly the Subanen Communities (IPs) within the area. The
existence and approval of IFMA No. R9-040 contract is being
protested and is demanding for its cancellation.

The primary complaint was a blatant disrespect to their rights as

an Indigenous People and the non-peaceful co-existence between
them and the holder of the IFMA R9-040. Accordingly, they were
 constantly threatened/harassed by armed men employed by the
holder.

In the same Memorandum, RED Mendoza recommended to the DENR Secretary the
cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040. [11]

It appears that RED Mendoza issued a subsequent but similar

Memorandum[12] dated April 21, 1999 to the DENR Secretary relative to IFMA No. R-9-
040. It stated

This has reference with the instruction to validate the

performance/accomplishment of IFMAs of Region IX, Western
Mindanao. Validation of IFMAs is in accordance with the existing policy
of the DENR to determine the capabilities of the holders to develop their
Lease areas in consonance with their approved Comprehensive
Development and Management Plan.

In furtherance thereto, Foresters Isabelo C. Mangaya-ay and Philidor

Lluisma, pursuant to Regional Special Order No. 217, Series of 1998,
conducted the evaluation of the performance of IFMA No. R9-040 of
Pagadian City Timber Company, Inc. located at the Municipalities of
Labangan, Datagan and Sominot, all of Zamboanga del Sur,
on November 6, 1998. Result of the evaluation revealed that the holder
violated Rules and Regulations which are sufficient ground for
cancellation as stipulated under Section 26 of DAO 97-04, they are as
follows

1. FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT THE APPROVED

COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT PLAN.

Under the approved comprehensive and development plan,

1,597.0 ha of plantation should have been established from the Approval
of the CDMP. However, only 365.2 ha were reportedly planted from CY
1995 to 1997. This represents only 28% of the targeted goal on
plantation establishment.

Field validation of the reported established plantation revealed

otherwise. The findings of the team are:

A. Portion of the area reported as established

plantation by the IFMA holder is an ISF project with
an area of 226.17 ha. These are covered with
Certificate of Stewardship;
 B. Locations and boundaries of reported
plantations established from 1995 to 1997 cannot be
located on the ground by the team neither by the
representative of the IFMA holder who accompanied
the validating team; and

C. No plantation was established during CY 1998.

On Infrastructure, the holder constructed only one (1) lookout

tower as against the goal of 4 towers; established one (1) nursery as
against the goal of two (2); and constructed only 6km foot trail. These
represent only 27% of the total infrastructure to be undertaken by the
holder over the area.

2. FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT OR ADOPT AGREEMENT WITH

COMMUNITIES AND OTHER RELEVANT SECTORS.

Attached herewith are copies of petitions, sworn statements,

affidavit and resolutions from Subanen Communities (IPs) and other
sectors in the area demanding the cancellation of IFMA R9-040.

The complaints and demand for cancellation by the people where

the IFMA is located is a manifestation and proof of non-social acceptance
of the project by the residents in the locality.

In view of the above findings, IFMA No. R9-040 is hereby

recommended for cancellation.[13]

Acting on the latter Memorandum from RED Mendoza, then DENR Secretary
Antonio H. Cerilles, on June 7, 1999, issued an Order[14] canceling IFMA No. R-9-040
for failure to implement the approved CDMP and for failure of the lessee to protect the
area from forest fires. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, IFMA No. R9-040 issued to

Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc. is hereby ordered cancelled. The IFMA
holder is hereby ordered to immediately vacate the area and to
surrender/return copy of the Agreement to the Regional Executive
Director, DENR Region 9, Zamboanga City.

The RED concerned or his duly authorized representative is

hereby directed to serve this Order; determine best end use of the land;
 take appropriate measures to protect the same and inform this Office
immediately of his compliance.

SO ORDERED.[15]

On July 2, 1999, respondents President, Filomena S. San Juan, wrote DENR

Secretary Cerilles that the company was surprised to receive the Order of the
cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040 on June 22, 1999. She claimed that

The DENR regional office is fully aware that the company is doing
its best to manage and develop the area by continually planting trees and
protecting the area from forest fires and illegalities. No company would
ever set fire on its own plantation for obvious reasons. The company
observed precautionary measures especially during the time of the El Nio
phenomenon. If there have been mistakes and miscommunications in the
reports of the DENR field officers, these could have been threshed out by
a conference between DENR and the Pagadian Timber Company Inc.

The company was not accorded due process before the order of
cancellation was issued. The company was not furnished copy of the
evaluation and recommendation of the DENR Regional Executive Director
of Region IX. Had the company been given the opportunity to contest the
findings, evaluation and recommendation of the said office, the result
would be otherwise.[16]

She appealed for the reconsideration of the Order asking that a re-investigation
be conducted to comply with due process.

Even as the said letter for reconsideration was not yet acted upon, respondent
appealed to the Office of the President (OP).

In the Resolution[17] dated January 12, 2000, the OP affirmed the cancellation
order based on the results of the actual evaluation and assessment of the DENR
team. It ruled that the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040 was primarily and specifically
governed by Section 26 of Department Administrative Order (DAO) 97-04. Relative to
respondents invocation of due process, the OP held that respondent was afforded the
right to be heard when it filed its motion for reconsideration and its subsequent appeal
to the OP.

The motion for reconsideration filed by respondent of the January 12, 2000
Resolution was denied by the OP in the Resolution[18] dated May 8, 2000.
 Respondent went up to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for review with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the implementation
of the assailed Order dated June 7, 1999.

In its Resolution dated January 17, 2001, the CA issued the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for, directing and ordering respondents (petitioner) and/or any other
person acting under their command, authority and/or for and in their behalf, to
DESIST from implementing the assailed Order of cancellation dated June 7, 1999,
and/or taking over the IFMA premises of [respondent], pending the termination of this
proceeding.

In its Decision[19] dated October 18, 2001, the CA ruled in favor of

respondents. In striking down the rulings of the OP and the Order dated June 7, 1999,
the CA declared that IFMA No. R-9-040 was a contract that could not be unilaterally
cancelled without infringing on the rights of respondent to due process and against
impairment of contracts. The appellate court agreed with respondent when the latter
argued that it was entitled to the benefits of Sections 35[20] and 36[21] of IFMA No. R-9-
040 such that respondent should have been given 30 days, after due notice, to remedy
any breach or default of the provisions of the IFMA and/or that the dispute regarding
the bases for the cancellation of the IFMA should have first been submitted to
arbitration.

Petitioner moved to reconsider the CA Decision. In the Resolution[22] dated July

24, 2003, the motion was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition based on the
following grounds:

I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that IFMA No. R9-
040 is a contract and not a mere privilege granted by the State to
respondent.

II. The Court of Appeals seriously erred in ordaining that

respondent can rightfully invoke prior resort to arbitration or the option
to mend its violations under IFMA No. R9-040.[23]

In essence, petitioner argues that an IFMA is not an ordinary contract which is

protected by the Constitution against impairment[24] but a mere privilege granted by
the State to qualified persons by means of a permit, license, franchise, agreement, or
other similar concessions, which in this case is the exploration, development and
utilization of the forest lands belonging to the State under its full control and
supervision. Thus, the cancellation of the IFMA does not amount to a rescission of a
contract but a mere withdrawal of this privilege. As such, the due process clause
under the Constitution[25] does not likewise apply since the IFMA area cannot be
considered as property of respondent. According to petitioner, IFMA No. R-9-040, with
the forest lands covered by it, is imbued with paramount considerations of public
interest and public welfare such that whatever rights respondent may have under it
must yield to the police power of the State. In this sense, respondent cannot take
refuge in Sections 35 and 36 of IFMA No. R-9-040 to prevent the IFMAs cancellation.

Inasmuch as the grounds cited by petitioner are interrelated, they shall be

jointly discussed hereunder.

The petition is impressed with merit.

IFMA No. R-9-040 is a license agreement under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
705 (Revised Forestry Code), the law which is the very basis for its existence. [26] Under
Section 3, paragraph (dd) thereof, a license agreement is defined as
a privilege[27] granted by the State to a person to utilize forest resources within any
forest land with the right of possession and occupation thereof to the exclusion of
others, except the government, but with the corresponding obligation to develop,
protect and rehabilitate the same in accordance with the terms and conditions set
forth in said agreement.This is evident in the following features, among others, of
IFMA No. R-9-040, to wit:

1. The State agreed to devolve to the holder of IFMA No. R-9-040

the responsibility to manage the specified IFMA area for a period of 25
years, specifically until October 14, 2019, which period is automatically
renewable for another 25 years thereafter;

2. The State imposed upon respondent, as holder of IFMA No. R-9-

040, the conditions, the means, and the manner by which the IFMA area
shall be managed, developed, and protected;

3. The State, through the DENR Secretary, shall not collect any
rental within the first five (5) years of the IFMA, after which it shall be
entitled to annual rental of fifty centavos (P0.50) per hectare from the
sixth to the tenth year thereof, and one peso (P1.00) per hectare
thereafter;

4. The IFMA area, except only the trees and other crops planted
and the permanent improvements constructed by the IFMA holder,
remains the property of the State; and

5. Upon cancellation of the IFMA through the fault of the holder,

all improvements including forest plantations existing within the IFMA
area shall revert to and become the property of the State.
An IFMA has for its precursor the Timber License Agreement (TLA), one of the tenurial
instruments issued by the State to its grantees for the efficient management of the
countrys dwindling forest resources. Jurisprudence has been consistent in holding
that license agreements are not contracts within the purview of the due process and
the non-impairment of contracts clauses enshrined in the Constitution. Our
pronouncement in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.[28] is enlightening

In unequivocal terms, we have consistently held that such licenses

concerning the harvesting of timber in the countrys forests cannot be
considered contracts that would bind the Government regardless of
changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare.
(citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA
792, 811) Such unswerving verdict is synthesized in Oposa v. Factoran,
Jr., (id., at pp. 811, 812) where we held:

In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for

obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the
non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have
acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing
undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have forever
bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and conditions regardless of
changes in policy and the demands of public interest and
welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by
petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section
20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which
provides:

x x x Provided, that when the national interest

so requires, the President may amend, modify,
replace or rescind any contract, concession,
permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein x x x.

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or

rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property
or a property right protected by the due process clause of
the constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, [125 SCRA
302, 325 (1983)] this Court held:

x x x A timber license is an instrument by

which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that
 public welfare is promoted. A timber license is
not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause; it is only a license or privilege,
which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as
in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do

what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not
a contract between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it and the person
to whom it is granted; neither is it property or
a property right, nor does it create a vested
right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus,
this Court held that the granting of license
does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights. (People vs. Ong
Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x x x

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. &

Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary [190 SCRA 673, 684
(1990):

x x x Timber licenses, permits and license

agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly
be gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest
products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by
the Chief Executive when national interests so
require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts
within the purview of the due process of law
clause. [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October
27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
 Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-
impairment clause, which reads:

SEC. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of

contracts shall be passed.

cannot be invoked.

Even assuming arguendo that an IFMA can be considered a contract or an agreement,

we agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that the alleged property rights that
may have arisen from it are not absolute.

All Filipino citizens are entitled, by right, to a balanced and healthful ecology as
declared under Section 16,[29] Article II of the Constitution. This right carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment, [30] particularly our
diminishing forest resources. To uphold and protect this right is an express policy of
the State.[31] The DENR is the instrumentality of the State mandated to actualize this
policy. It is the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the countrys environment and natural
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public
domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be
provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos. [32]

Thus, private rights must yield when they come in conflict with this public policy and
common interest. They must give way to the police or regulatory power of the State, in
this case through the DENR, to ensure that the terms and conditions of existing laws,
rules and regulations, and the IFMA itself are strictly and faithfully complied with.

Respondent was not able to overturn by sufficient evidence the presumption of

regularity in the performance of official functions of the Evaluation Team when the
latter inspected, assessed, and reported the violations respondent committed under
DAO No. 97-04 which eventually led to the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040.

It is worthy to note that petitioner followed regular procedure regarding the

assessment of IFMA No. R-9-040. It gave notice of the evaluation on October 22,
1998 to be held within the period October 22-30, 1998. Respondent admitted through
the affidavits of its President,[33] Operations Manager,[34] and workers[35] that an
Evaluation Team arrived at the IFMA area on October 23, 1998. On October 23, 1998,
prior to the actual assessment, a briefing was held on the conduct thereof in the
presence of the IFMA representatives. On October 29, 1998, an exit conference with
IFMA Operations Manager Inocencio Santiago was held at the CENRO
Office, Pagadian City, where the results of the assessment were presented. That day,
the DENR officials asked Santiago if he had any questions or comments on the
assessment results and on the manner the evaluation was conducted, but the latter
replied that he had none.

We do not understand why Santiago did not lift a finger or raise an objection to
the assessment results, and only much later in his Affidavit executed almost ten
months thereafter, or on August 12, 1999, to claim so belatedly that there was no
notice given on October 22, 1998, that the Evaluation Team did not actually
extensively inspect the IFMA area on October 23, 1998, and that there was no proper
exit conference held on October 29, 1998. The same observation applies to
respondents President herself, who instead claimed that she vehemently opposed the
appointment of then DENR Secretary Cerilles because he was bent on canceling the
IFMA at all costs, prior to the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040.

Besides, the detailed findings on the failure of respondent to implement its

CDMP under its IFMA, as shown by the November 6, 1998 Report of the Evaluation
Team and the Memoranda dated April 7, 1999 and April 21, 1999, together with all its
attachments, belie respondents claim that there was no actual evaluation and
assessment that took place on October 23, 1998. That the Evaluation Report was
dated November 6, 1998 does not conclusively show that the evaluation was actually
held on that date. Neither was this properly proven by the Memoranda of RED
Mendoza which stated that the evaluation was conducted on November 6, 1998, since
RED Mendoza could have been merely misled into such an assumption because of the
date of the Evaluation Report. The sweeping denials made by the IFMA representatives
and their self-serving accomplishment reports cannot prevail over the actual
inspection conducted, the results of which are shown by documentary proof.

Respondent, likewise, cannot insist that, pursuant to Section 35 of IFMA No. R-

9-040, it should have been given notice of its breach of the IFMA and should have
been given 30 days therefrom to remedy the breach. It is worthy to note that Section
35 uses the word may which must be interpreted as granting petitioner the discretion
whether or not to give such notice and allow the option to remedy the breach. In this
case, despite the lack of any specific recommendation from the Evaluation Team for
the cancellation of the IFMA, DENR Secretary Cerilles deemed it proper to cancel the
IFMA due to the extent and the gravity of respondents violations.

It is also futile for respondent to claim that it is entitled to an arbitration under

Section 36 of IFMA No. R-9-040 before the license agreement may be canceled. A
reading of the said Section shows that the dispute should be based on the provisions
of the IFMA to warrant a referral to arbitration of an irreconcilable conflict between the
IFMA holder and the DENR Secretary. In this case, the cancellation was grounded on
Section 26 of DAO No. 97-04, particularly respondents failure to implement the
approved CDMP and its failure to implement or adopt agreements made with
communities and other relevant sectors. The contrary notwithstanding, what remains
is that respondent never refuted the findings of the Evaluation Team when given the
opportunity to do so but waited until IFMA No. R-9-040 was already cancelled before it
made its vigorous objections as to the conduct of the evaluation, harping only on its
alleged right to due process.

Indeed, respondent was given the opportunity to contest the findings that
caused the cancellation of its IFMA when it moved to reconsider the Order of
cancellation and when it filed its appeal and motion for reconsideration before the OP.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as

applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. What the law prohibits is the absolute absence of the
opportunity to be heard; hence, a party cannot feign denial of due
process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side.
[36]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 18, 2001 and the Resolution dated
July 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59194
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Order dated June 7, 1999 of then DENR
Secretary Antonio Cerilles, and the Resolutions of the Office of the President dated
January 12, 2000 and May 8, 2000 affirming the said Order,
are REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

28. CMU VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY, G.R. No. 184869

Represented by Officer-In-Charge

Dr. Rodrigo L. Malunhao,

VERSUS

THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE CHAIRPERSON
AND COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, and THE LEAD CONVENOR OF THE NATIONAL ANTI-POVERTY
COMMISSION

Promulgated:
September 21, 2010

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case concerns the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation that

takes property from a state university, over its objections, for distribution to
indigenous peoples and cultural communities.

The Facts and the Case

Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered educational

institution owned and run by the State.[1] In 1958, the President issued Presidential
Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401 hectares of lands of the public domain in Musuan,
Bukidnon, as school site for CMU. Eventually, CMU obtained title in its name over
3,080 hectares of those lands under Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) 0-160, 0-161,
and 0-162. Meanwhile, the government distributed more than 300 hectares of the
remaining untitled lands to several tribes belonging to the areas cultural communities.

Forty-five years later or on January 7, 2003 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

issued Presidential Proclamation 310 that takes 670 hectares from CMUs registered
lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities in Barangay
Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon.
On April 3, 2003, however, CMU filed a petition for prohibition against
respondents Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Chairperson and Commissioner of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and Lead Convenor of the National Anti-Poverty
Commission (collectively, NCIP, et al) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malaybalay City (Branch 9), seeking to stop the implementation of Presidential
Proclamation 310 and have it declared unconstitutional.

The NCIP, et al moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
of the Malaybalay RTC over the action, pointing out that since the act sought to be
enjoined relates to an official act of the Executive Department done in Manila,
jurisdiction lies with the Manila RTC. The Malaybalay RTC denied the motion,
however, and proceeded to hear CMUs application for preliminary
injunction. Meanwhile, respondents NCIP, et al moved for partial reconsideration of
the RTCs order denying their motion to dismiss.
 On October 27, 2003, after hearing the preliminary injunction incident, the RTC
issued a resolution granting NCIP, et als motion for partial reconsideration and
dismissed CMUs action for lack of jurisdiction. Still, the RTC ruled that Presidential
Proclamation 310 was constitutional, being a valid State act. The RTC said that the
ultimate owner of the lands is the State and that CMU merely held the same in its
behalf. CMU filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but the RTC denied
the same on April 19, 2004. This prompted CMU to appeal the RTCs dismissal order to
the Court of Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station.[2]

CMU raised two issues in its appeal: 1) whether or not the RTC deprived it of its
right to due process when it dismissed the action; and 2) whether or not Presidential
Proclamation 310 was constitutional.[3]

In a March 14, 2008 decision,[4] the CA dismissed CMUs appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, ruling that CMUs recourse should have been a petition for review
on certiorari filed directly with this Court, because it raised pure questions lawbearing
mainly on the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310. The CA added that
whether the trial court can decide the merits of the case based solely on the hearings
of the motion to dismiss and the application for injunction is also a pure question of
law.

CMU filed a motion for reconsideration of the CAs order of dismissal but it
denied the same,[5] prompting CMU to file the present petition for review.

The Issues Presented

The case presents the following issues:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in not finding that the RTC erred in dismissing
its action for prohibition against NCIP, et al for lack of jurisdiction and at the same
time ruling that Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and constitutional;

2. Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed CMUs appeal on the ground that
it raised purely questions of law that are proper for a petition for review filed directly
with this Court; and

3. Whether or not Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and constitutional.

The Courts Rulings

One. The RTC invoked two reasons for dismissing CMUs action. The first is that
jurisdiction over the action to declare Presidential Proclamation 310 lies with the RTC
of Manila, not the RTC of Malaybalay City, given that such action relates to official
acts of the Executive done in Manila. The second reason, presumably made on the
assumption that the Malaybalay RTC had jurisdiction over the action, Presidential
Proclamation 310 was valid and constitutional since the State, as ultimate owner of
the subject lands, has the right to dispose of the same for some purpose other than
CMUs use.

There is nothing essentially wrong about a court holding on the one hand that it
has no jurisdiction over a case, and on the other, based on an assumption that it has
jurisdiction, deciding the case on its merits, both with the same results, which is the
dismissal of the action. At any rate, the issue of the propriety of the RTC using two
incompatible reasons for dismissing the action is academic. The CA from which the
present petition was brought dismissed CMUs appeal on some technical ground.

Two. Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980[6] vests in the CA
appellate jurisdiction over the final judgments or orders of the RTCs and quasi-judicial
bodies. But where an appeal from the RTC raises purely questions of law, recourse
should be by a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with this Court. The
question in this case is whether or not CMUs appeal from the RTCs order of dismissal
raises purely questions of law.

As already stated, CMU raised two grounds for its appeal: 1) the RTC deprived it
of its right to due process when it dismissed the action; and 2) Presidential
Proclamation 310 was constitutional.Did these grounds raise factual issues that are
proper for the CA to hear and adjudicate?

Regarding the first reason, CMUs action was one for injunction against the
implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 that authorized the taking of lands
from the university. The fact that the President issued this proclamation in Manila and
that it was being enforced in Malaybalay City where the lands were located were facts
that were not in issue. These were alleged in the complaint and presumed to be true
by the motion to dismiss. Consequently, the CMUs remedy for assailing the
correctness of the dismissal, involving as it did a pure question of law, indeed lies with
this Court.

As to the second reason, the CMU claimed that the Malaybalay RTC deprived it
of its right to due process when it dismissed the case based on the ground that
Presidential Proclamation 310, which it challenged, was constitutional. CMU points
out that the issue of the constitutionality of the proclamation had not yet been
properly raised and heard. NCIP, et al had not yet filed an answer to join issue with
CMU on that score. What NCIP, et al filed was merely a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over the injunction case. Whether
the RTC in fact prematurely decided the constitutionality of the proclamation,
resulting in the denial of CMUs right to be heard on the same, is a factual issue that
was proper for the CA Mindanao Station to hear and ascertain from the
parties. Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the action on the ground that it
raised pure questions of law.
 Three. Since the main issue of the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation
310 has been raised and amply argued before this Court, it would serve no useful
purpose to have the case remanded to the CA Mindanao Station or to the Malaybalay
RTC for further proceedings. Ultimately, the issue of constitutionality of the
Proclamation in question will come to this Court however the courts below decide
it. Consequently, the Court should, to avoid delay and multiplicity of suits, now
resolve the same.

The key question lies in the character of the lands taken from CMU. In CMU v.
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),[7] the DARAB, a national
government agency charged with taking both privately-owned and government-owned
agricultural lands for distribution to farmers-beneficiaries, ordered the segregation for
this purpose of 400 hectares of CMU lands. The Court nullified the DARAB action
considering the inalienable character of such lands, being part of the long term
functions of an autonomous agricultural educational institution. Said the Court:

The construction given by the DARAB to Section 10 restricts the

land area of the CMU to its present needs or to a land area presently,
actively exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out its
present educational program with its present student population and
academic facility overlooking the very significant factor of growth of the
university in the years to come. By the nature of the CMU, which is a
school established to promote agriculture and industry, the need for a
vast tract of agricultural land for future programs of expansion is
obvious. At the outset, the CMU was conceived in the same manner as
land grant colleges in America, a type of educational institution which
blazed the trail for the development of vast tracts of unexplored and
undeveloped agricultural lands in the Mid-West. What we now know
as Michigan State University, Penn State University and Illinois State Uni
versity, started as small land grant colleges, with meager funding to
support their ever increasing educational programs. They were given
extensive tracts of agricultural and forest lands to be developed to
support their numerous expanding activities in the fields of agricultural
technology and scientific research.Funds for the support of the
educational programs of land grant colleges came from government
appropriation, tuition and other student fees, private endowments and
gifts, and earnings from miscellaneous sources. It was in this same spirit
that President Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from
sale or settlement and reserving for
the Mindanao Agricultural College (forerunner of the CMU) a land
reservation of 3,080 hectares as its future campus. It was set up in
Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of Mindanao, in order that it can have
enough resources and wide open spaces to grow as an agricultural
 educational institution, to develop and train future farmers
of Mindanao and help attract settlers to that part of the country.

The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly

among the highest priorities in the government socio-economic
programs. In this case, neither need give way to the other. Certainly,
there must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside
the CMU land reservation which can be made available to landless
peasants, assuming the claimants here, or some of them, can qualify as
CARP beneficiaries. To our mind, the taking of the CMU land which had
been segregated for educational purposes for distribution to yet
uncertain beneficiaries is a gross misinterpretation of the authority and
jurisdiction granted by law to the DARAB.

The decision in this case is of far-reaching significance as far as it

concerns state colleges and universities whose resources and research
facilities may be gradually eroded by misconstruing the exemptions from
the CARP. These state colleges and universities are the main vehicles for
our scientific and technological advancement in the field of agriculture,
so vital to the existence, growth and development of this country.[8]

It did not matter that it was President Arroyo who, in this case, attempted by
proclamation to appropriate the lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and
cultural communities. As already stated, the lands by their character have become
inalienable from the moment President Garcia dedicated them for CMUs use in
scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture. They have ceased to be
alienable public lands.

Besides, when Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) or
Republic Act 8371[9] in 1997, it provided in Section 56 that property rights within the
ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon its effectivity shall be
recognized and respected. In this case, ownership over the subject lands had been
vested in CMU as early as 1958. Consequently, transferring the lands in 2003 to the
indigenous peoples around the area is not in accord with the IPRA.

Furthermore, the land registration court considered the claims of several tribes
belonging to the areas cultural communities in the course of the proceedings for the
titling of the lands in CMUs name. Indeed, eventually, only 3,080 hectares were titled
in CMUs name under OCTs 0-160, 0-161 and 0-162. More than 300 hectares were
acknowledged to be in the possession of and subject to the claims of those tribes.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the March 14,
2008 decision and September 22, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP 85456, and DECLARES Presidential Proclamation 310 as null and void for being
contrary to law and public policy.

SO ORDERED.

29. NORKIS UNION VS NORKIS TRADING

G.R. No. 157098

NORKIS FREE AND INDEPENDENT
WORKERS UNION
Petitioner
VS

NORKIS TRADING COMPANY,

INC. , Respondent.

Promulgated:JUNE 30, 2005

Decision

Panganiban, j.:

Age order no. Rovii-06, issued by the regional tripartite wages and productivity
W board (rtwpb), merely fixed a new minimum wage rate for private sector
employees in region vii; hence, respondent cannot be compelled to grant an
across-the-board increase to its employees who, at the time of the promulgation
of the wage order, were already being paid more than the existing minimum wage.
The case

Before us is a petition for review[1] under rule 45 of the rules of court, seeking to set
aside the july 30, 2002 decision[2] and the january 16, 2003 resolution[3] of the court
of appeals (ca) in ca-gr sp no. 54611. The disposition of the assailed decision reads as
follows:

Accordingly, we grant the instant petition for certiorari. The decision of public
respondent voluntary arbitrator in va case no. 374-vii-09-014-98e dated july 8, 1999,
and order dated august 13, 1999, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, are
hereby set aside. Petitioner is hereby declared to have lawfully complied with wage
order no. Rovii-06. No pronouncement as to costs.[4]

The decision[5] of voluntary arbitrator perfecto r. De los reyes iii,[6] reversed by the ca,
disposed as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, this office hereby decides in favor of complainant.

Respondent is hereby ordered to grant its employees the amount of increases granted
under rtwpb wage order rovii-06 in an across-the-board manner retroactive to the
dates provided for under the said wage order.[7]

The january 16, 2003 resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The facts
The ca summarized the undisputed factual antecedents as follows:

The instant case arose as a result of the issuance of wage order no. Rovii-06 by the
regional tripartite wages and productivity board (rtwpb) increasing the minimum daily
wage by p10.00, effective october 1, 1998.

Prior to said issuance, herein parties entered into a collective bargaining agreement
(cba) effective from august 1, 1994 to july 31, 1999.

Sec. 1. Salary increase. The company shall grant a fifteen (p15.00) pesos per day
increase to all its regular or permanent employees effective august 1, 1994.

Sec. 2. Minimum wage law amendment. In the event that a law is enacted increasing
minimum wage, an across-the-board increase shall be granted by the company
according to the provisions of the law.

On january 27, 1998, a re-negotiation of the cba was terminated and pursuant to
which a memorandum of agreement was forged between the parties. It was therein
stated that petitioner shall grant a salary increase to all regular and permanent
employees as follows:

Ten (10) pesos per day increase effective august 1, 1997; ten (10) pesos per day
increase effective august 1, 1998.

Pursuant to said memorandum of agreement, the employees received wage increases

of p10.00 per day effective august 1, 1997 and p10.00 per day effective august 1,
1998. As a result, the agreed p10.00 re-negotiated salary increase effectively raised
the daily wage of the employees to p165.00 retroactive august 1, 1997; and another
increase of p10.00, effective august 1, 1998, raising the employees[] daily wage
to p175.00.
On march 10, 1998, the regional tripartite wage productivity board (rtwpb) of region
vii issued wage order rovii-06 which established the minimum wage of p165.00, by
mandating a wage increase of five (p5.00) pesos per day beginning april 1, 1998,
thereby raising the daily minimum wage to p160.00 and another increase of five
(p5.00) pesos per day beginning october 1, 1998, thereby raising the daily minimum
wage to p165.00 per day.

In accordance with the wage order and section 2, article xii of the cba, [petitioner]
demanded an across-the-board increase. [respondent], however, refused to implement
the wage order, insisting that since it has been paying its workers the new minimum
wage of p165.00 even before the issuance of the wage order, it cannot be made to
comply with said wage order.

Thus, [respondent] argued that long before the passage of wage order rovii-06 on
march 10, 1998, and by virtue of the memorandum of agreement it entered with
herein [petitioner], [respondent] was already paying its employees a daily wage
of p165.00 per day retroactive on august 1, 1997, while the minimum wage at that
time was still p155.00 per day. On august 1, 1998, [respondent] again granted an
increase from p165.00 per day to p175.00, so that at the time of the effectivity of wage
order no. 06 on october 1, 1998 prescribing the new minimum wage of p165.00 per
day, [respondents] employees were already receiving p175.00 per day.

For failure of the parties to settle this controversy, a preventive mediation complaint
was filed by herein [petitioner] before the national conciliation and mediation board,
pursuant to which the parties selected public respondent voluntary arbitrator to
decide said controversy.

Submitted for arbitral resolution is the sole issue of whether or not [respondent] has
complied with wage order no. Rovii-06, in relation to the cba provision mandating an
across-the-board increase in case of the issuance of a wage order.

In his decision, public respondent arbitrator found herein [respondent] not to have
complied with the wage order, through the following dispositions:

The cba provision in question (providing for an across-the-board increase in case of a

wage order) is worded and couched in a vague and unclear manner.
X x x in order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous
and subsequent acts shall be principally considered (art. 1371, new civil code). Thus,
this office x x x required the parties to submit additional evidence in order to be able
to know and interpret the parties working intent and application of wage order no. 06
issued by the regional tripartite wages and productivity board, regional office vii in
relation to section 2, article xii provided for in the parties[] existing cba.

X x x viewed from the foregoing facts and evidence, the working intent and application
of rtwpb wage order rovii-06 in relation to section 2, article xii of the parties[] existing
cba is clearly established. The evidence submitted by the parties, all point to the fact
that their true intention on how to implement existing wage orders is to grant such
wage orders in an across-the-board manner in relation to the provisions of section 2,
article xii of their existing cba. Respondent in this case [has] failed to comply with its
contractual obligation of implementing the increase under rtwpb wage order rovii-06
in an across-the-board manner as provided in section 2, article xii of its cba with
[petitioner].

X x x x x x x x x[8]

Respondent elevated the case to the ca via a petition for certiorari and prohibition
under rule 65 of the rules of court.

Ruling of the court of appeals

The ca noted that the grant of an across-the-board increase, provided under section 2
of article xii of the cba, was qualified by the phrase according to the provisions of the
law. It thus stressed the necessity of determining the import of wage order no. Rovii-
06, the law involved in the present controversy. Taking into consideration the opinion
of the rtwpb, region vii, the appellate court held that respondent had sufficiently
complied with wage order no. Rovii-06. The board had opined that since adjustments
granted are only to raise the minimum wage or the floor wage as a matter of policy, x x
x wages granted over the above amount set by this board is deemed a compliance.
The ca added that the policy and intent of the wage order was to cushion the impact of
the regional economic crisis upon both the workers and the employers, not to enrich
the employees at the expense of the employers. Further, it held that to compel
respondent to grant an across-the-board wage increase, notwithstanding that it was
already paying salaries to its employees above the minimum wage, would be to
penalize generous employers and effectively make them wait for the passage of a new
wage order before granting any increase. This would be counter-productive [insofar] as
securing the interests of labor is concerned.[9]

The appellate court said that the wage order exempted from compliance those
enterprises already paying salaries equal to or more than the prescribed minimum
wage; thus, the order effectively made the previous voluntary increases given by
respondent to its employees creditable against the law-mandated increase.
Consequently, there was no need for the collective bargaining agreement (cba) to
provide expressly for such creditability.

Finally, the ca sustained respondents explanation that the across-the-board increases

provided in the cba was required only when a minimum wage law caused a distortion
in the wage structure.

Hence, this petition.[10]

Issues

In its memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

I. Whether or not the honorable court of appeals gravely abused its discretion in
setting aside the decision and resolution of the honorable voluntary arbitrator[.]
Ii. Whether or not the honorable court of appeals gravely abused its discretion in
considering the supplemental memorandum of respondent and giving merit to
evidence presented for the first time on appeal and filed after the lapse of the
non[-]extendible period of time to file memorandum and despite an extension granted
to respondent[.]

Iii. Whether or not the honorable court of appeals gravely abused its
discretion in disregarding established jurisprudence on statutory construction.[11]

The main issue is whether respondent violated the cba in its refusal to grant its
employees an across-the-board increase as a result of the passage of wage order no.
Rovii-06. Also raised is the procedural issue relating to the propriety of the admission
by the ca of rtwpbs letter-opinion, which was attached to respondents supplemental
memorandum submitted to that court on august 30, 2000, beyond the july 17, 2000
extended deadline.

The courts ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Main issue:

Effect of wage order no. Rovii-06

On the parties cba

Petitioner insists that respondent should have granted to the employees the increase
stated in wage order no. Rovii-06. In addition to the increases both parties had
mutually agreed upon, the cba supposedly imposed upon respondent the obligation to
implement the increases mandated by law without any condition or qualification. To
support its claim, petitioner repeatedly invokes section 2 of article xii of the cba, which
reads:

Section 2. Minimum wage law amendment. In the event that a law is enacted
increasing minimum wage, an across-the-board increase shall be granted by the
company according to the provisions of the law.

Interestingly, petitioner disregards altogether in its argument the qualifying phrase

according to the provisions of the law and merely focuses its attention on the across-
the-board increase clause. Given the entire sentence, it is clear that the above-quoted
cba provision does not support the unyielding view of petitioner that the issuance of
wage order no. Rovii-06 entitles its members to an across-the-board increase,
absolutely and without any condition.

Stipulations in a contract must be read together,[12] not in isolation from one

another. When the terms of its clauses are clear and leave no room for doubt as to the
intention of the contracting parties, it would not be necessary to interpret those terms,
whose literal meanings should prevail.[13]

The ca correctly observed that the import of wage order no. Rovii-06 should be
considered in the implementation of the government-decreed increase. The present
petition makes no denial or refutation of this finding, but merely an averment of the
silence of the cba on the creditability of increases provided under the agreement
against those in the minimum wage under a wage order. It insists that the parties
intended no such creditability; otherwise, they would have expressly stated such
intent in the cba.

We hold that the issue here is not about creditability, but the applicability of wage
order no. Rovii-06 to respondents employees. The wage order was intended to fix a
new minimum wage only, not to grant across-the-board wage increases to all
employees in region vii. The intent of the order is indicated in its title, establishing
new minimum wage rates, as well as in its preamble: The purpose, reason or
justification for its enactment was to adjust the minimum wage of workers to cushion
the impact brought about by the latest economic crisis not only in the philippines but
also in the asian region.

In cagayan sugar milling company v. Secretary of labor and

employment [14] and manila mandarin employees union v. Nlrc,[15] the wage orders
that were the subjects of those cases were substantially and similarly worded as wage
order no. Rovii-06. In those cases, this court construed the orders along the same line
that it follows now: As providing for an increase in the prevailing statutory minimum
wage rates of workers. No across-the-board increases were granted.

Parenthetically, there are two methods of adjusting the minimum wage. In employers
confederation of the phils. V. National wages and productivity commission,[16] these
were identified as the floor wage and the salary-ceiling methods. The floor wage
method involves the fixing of a determinate amount to be added to the prevailing
statutory minimum wage rates. On the other hand, in the salary-ceiling method, the
wage adjustment was to be applied to employees receiving a certain denominated
salary ceiling. In other words, workers already being paid more than the existing
minimum wage (up to a certain amount stated in the wage order) are also to be given
a
wage increase.

A cursory reading of the subject wage order convinces us that the intention of the
regional board of region vii was to prescribe a minimum or floor wage; not to
determine a salary ceiling. Had the latter been its intention, the board would have
expressly provided accordingly. The text of sections 2 and 3 of the order states:

Section 2. Amount and manner of increase. Upon the effectivity of this order, the daily
minimum wage rates for all the workers and employees in the private sector shall be
increased by ten pesos (p10.00) per day to be given in the following manner:

I. Five pesos (p5.00) per day effective april 1, 1998, and

Ii. Additional five pesos (p5.00) per day effective october 1, 1998.
Section 3. Uniform wage rate per area classification. To effect a uniform wage rate
pursuant to section 1 hereof, the prescribed minimum wage after full implementation
of this order for each area classification shall be as follows:

Area classification non-agriculture sector agriculture sector

Class a 165.00 150.00

Class b 155.00 140.00

Class c 145.00 130.00

Class d 135.00 120.00

These provisions show that the prescribed minimum wage after full implementation of
the p10 increase in the wage order is p165 for class a private non-agriculture sectors.
It would be reasonable and logical, therefore, to infer that those employers already
paying their employees more than p165 at the time of the issuance of the order are
sufficiently complying with the order.

Further supporting this construction of wage order no. Rovii-06 is the opinion of its
drafter, the rtwpb region vii. In its letter-opinion[17] answering respondents queries,
the board gave a similar interpretation of the essence of the wage order: To fix a new
floor wage or to upgrade the wages of the employees receiving lower than the
minimum wage set by the order.

Notably, the rtwpb was interpreting only its own issuance, not a statutory provision.
The best authority to construe a rule or an issuance is its very source,[18] in this case
the rtwpb. Without a doubt, the board, like any other executive agency, has the
authority to interpret its own rules and issuances; any phrase contained in its
interpretation becomes a part of those rules or issuances themselves.[19] therefore, it
was proper for the ca to consider the letter dated june 13, 2000, written by the rtwpb
to explain the
scope and import of the latters own order, as such interpretation is deemed a part of
the order itself. That the letter was belatedly submitted to that court is not fatal in the
determination of this particular case.

We cannot sustain petitioner, even if we assume that its contention is right and that
the implementation of any government-decreed increase under the cba is absolute.
The cba is no ordinary contract, but one impressed with public interest.[20] therefore,
it is subject to special orders on wages,[21] such as those issued by the rtwpb. Capitol
wireless v. Bate[22] is squarely in point. The union in that case claimed that all
government-mandated increases in salaries should be granted to all employees across-
the-board without any qualification whatsoever, pursuant to the cba provision that
any government-mandated wage increases should be over and above the benefits
granted in the cba. The court denied such claim and held that the provisions of the
agreement should be read in harmony with the wage orders. Applying that ruling to
the present case, we hold that the implementation of a wage increase for respondents
employees should be controlled by the stipulations of wage order no. Rovii-06.

At the risk of being repetitive, we stress that the employees are not entitled to the
claimed salary increase, simply because they are not within the coverage of the wage
order, as they were already receiving salaries greater than the minimum wage fixed by
the order. Concededly, there is an increase necessarily resulting from raising the
minimum wage level, but not across-the-board. Indeed, a double burden cannot be
imposed upon an employer except by clear provision of law.[23] it would be unjust,
therefore, to interpret wage order no. Rovii-06 to mean that respondent should grant
an across-the-board increase. Such interpretation of the order is not sustained by its
text.[24]

In the resolution of labor cases, this court has always been guided by the state policy
enshrined in the constitution: Social justice[25] and the protection of the working
class.[26] social justice does not, however, mandate that every dispute should be
automatically decided in favor of labor. In every case, justice is to be granted to the
deserving and dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law
and doctrine.[27]

Wherefore, the petition is denied, and the assailed decision and

resolution affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

So ordered.
30. LAWIN SECURITY SERVICES VS NLRC.

G.R. No. 118536. June 9, 1997]

LAWIN SECURITY SERVICES, INC., JUAN C. ABAGA, EDWIN V. ETCOBANEZ,

ARSENIO A. GODOY, ANTERO O. OALIN JR., RICARDO G. SANTOS, EMILIO J.
MAZO, JUANITO S. SOBREDILLA, ANTONIO BOLANIO, ANICETO B.
BELARMINO, FLORENCIO H. CIDRO, SALVADOR P. AGUILAR and ANTONIO B.
BRUTAS, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (First
Division) and ALLIED INTEGRATED STEEL CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

LAWIN SECURITY SERVICES, INC. (LAWIN) entered into a contract for security
services with Allied Integrated Steel Corporation (ALLIED). Petitioners Juan C. Abaga,
Edwin V. Etcobanez, Arsenio A. Godoy, Antero O. Oalin Jr., Ricardo G. Santos, Emilio
J. Mazo, Juanito S. Sobredilla, Antonio Bolanio, Aniceto B. Belarmino, Florencio H.
Cidro, Salvador P. Aguilar and Antonio B. Brutas were security guards posted by
petitioner LAWIN in the premises of ALLIED. During the pendency of the contract,
various wage increases were decreed under Wage Order Nos. 4, 5 and 6, E.O. Nos.
178-A and 178-B as well as under R.A. Nos. 6640 and 6727. Pursuant therewith,
requests for wage adjustments were made by petitioners on respondent company but
the same were not granted. Thus petitioners[1] were constrained to bring the matter
before the Labor Arbiter.
Respondent ALLIED assailed the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter on the ground of
absence of employer-employee relationship between it and the security guards as it
claimed that the latter were employees of petitioner LAWIN. It advanced the view that
what was involved in the instant case was a breach of contract properly cognizable by
the regular courts.
The Labor Arbiter on the other hand insisted on his authority and competence to
pass upon the controversy, invoking Sec. 5, par. B, of the Rules Implementing Wage
Order No. 6[2] and Arts. 107[3] and 109[4] of the Labor Code. He opined that wage
increases should be granted taking into account the contract between petitioner
LAWIN and respondent ALLIED and that the individual complainants were the ones
assigned to secure the premises of ALLIED. On 29 June 1992 ALLIED was thus
ordered to pay the individual complainants wage adjustments for services rendered
from 14 December 1987 to 28 February 1990 in the total amount of P195,560.56.[5]
 On appeal by ALLIED, respondent NLRC observed that the procedure adopted by
the complainants was not in accord with its rules since they should have instituted
the action against both petitioner LAWIN and respondent ALLIED as direct and
indirect employers, respectively, or against petitioner LAWIN only and for the latter to
file a third-party complaint against ALLIED. Nevertheless, respondent NLRC did not
find the infirmity fatal as to warrant its outright dismissal. After all, the complaint was
geared towards the objective of enforcing the rights of the individual complainants
under existing labor standard laws. Thus on 28 February 1994 respondent NLRC
affirmed the award of the Labor Arbiter.[6]
ALLIED moved for reconsideration anchored on its primary claim that not all the
individual complainants were assigned to it and those who were properly assigned
rendered work only on an intermittent basis.ALLIED attached to its motion the service
records of the individual complainants as Annexes "B" to "DD," inclusive.
Petitioners opposed the motion claiming that respondent NLRC's resolution was
already final and executory.
Respondent NLRC found the opposition untenable because a verification of the
records disclosed that copy of its subject resolution was served on the security guard
of the building where ALLIED's counsel had his office. Therefore, the service was
improper and the 10-day period within which the aggrieved party could avail of the
remedies provided for by its rules had not commenced to run. As for the merits of the
motion, respondent NLRC was swayed to change its prior stand -

There may have been some lapses on the part of the respondent in having failed to
present its documentary evidence below as it anchored its defense solely on the alleged
lack of jurisdiction of the Commission, nevertheless, in the interest of substantial
justice and equity, it behooves Us to relax the application of technicalities x x x x [7]

Thus on 26 September 1994 respondent NLRC set aside its 28 February 1994
resolution as well as the 29 June 1992 decision of the Labor Arbiter. It ordered that
the case be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. [8] Petitioners sought
reconsideration but was denied on 28 November 1994.[9]
Petitioners impute grave abuse of discretion on respondent NLRC in having acted
favorably on respondent company's motion for reconsideration. Petitioners argue that
prior to the filing of respondent company's motion for reconsideration there was
already an entry of judgment of the resolution subject thereof and, therefore,
respondent NLRC no longer had jurisdiction to take any further action except to cause
its execution. They argue next that the evidence to be presented by respondent
company in the second proceedings before the Labor Arbiter constitutes forgotten
evidence which cannot serve as justification for granting retrial or new trial.
We are not persuaded. Section 4, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, which is
suppletory to the rules of respondent NLRC, provides -

Sec. 4. Personal Service. - Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally
a copy to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a
person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not
known, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in
the evening, at the party's or attorney's residence, if known, with a person of sufficient
discretion to receive the same (underscoring supplied).

In Adamson Ozanam Educational Institution, Inc. v. Adamson University Faculty

and Employees Association,[10] which was correctly relied upon by respondent NLRC,
this Court applied the aforementioned rule and explained that -

Under the foregoing rule, service of papers should be delivered personally to the
attorney or by leaving it (sic) at his office with his clerk or with a person having charge
thereof. The service of the court's order upon any person other than the party's
counsel is not legally effective.[11] Where the copy of the decision is served on a person
who is neither a clerk or one in charge of the attorney's office, such service is invalid
and the decision does not therefore become executory.[12] The security guard of the
building where the attorney is holding office is neither the office clerk nor a person in
charge thereof as contemplated in the rules (underscoring supplied).

And so it was in the present case. The service of subject resolution on the security
guard of the building where the counsel for respondent company was holding office
was an invalid service. Consequently, the period after which the resolution would have
become final and executory[13] had not commenced to run. On this basis, the entry of
judgment was patently erroneous and respondent NLRC was still vested with
jurisdiction to entertain respondent companys motion for reconsideration. Article
221of the Labor Code provides -

Art. 221. Technical rules not binding and prior resort to amicable settlement. - In any
proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and
intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters
shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily
and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the
interest of due process x x x x

In Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [14] petitioner submitted

on appeal to respondent NLRC uncontradicted evidence showing payment to private
respondent of his holiday pay and rest day pay and his non-entitlement to incentive
leave pay due to his enjoyment of vacation leave privileges. Such evidence was
however rejected by respondent NLRC on the rationalization that it was not presented
at the first opportunity, presumably when the case was pending with the Labor
Arbiter. Respondent NLRC's action did not merit our approval -

The belated presentation of the evidence notwithstanding, respondent commission

should have considered them just the same. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General x x x x technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor
officials should use every and reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the
interest of due process.

Thus, even if the evidence was not submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact that it was
duly introduced on appeal to respondent commission is enough basis for the latter to
have been more judicious in admitting the same, instead of falling back on the mere
technicality that said evidence can no longer be considered on appeal. Certainly, the
first course of action would be more consistent with equity and the basic notions of
fairness.

Along the same line, we ruled in Bristol Laboratories Employees' Association-DFA v.

NLRC[15] that -

x x x x Procedural technicalities do not strictly apply to proceedings before labor

arbiters for they may avail themselves of all reasonable means to speedily ascertain
the facts of a controversy (Art. 221, Labor Code).

No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the NLRC for having considered
additional documentary evidence submitted by the respondent-employer on appeal, to
prove breach of trust and loss of confidence as bases for the dismissal of the
petitioner.

Even in the earlier cases of Firestone Filipinas Employees Association v. Firestone

Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines[16] and Philippine Maritime Industrial Union
v. Court of Industrial Relations[17] we reaffirmed the well-settled doctrine that in labor
cases before this Tribunal no undue sympathy is to be accorded to any claim of a
procedural misstep, the idea being that its powers should be exercised according to
justice and equity and the substantial merits of the controversy.
It is noteworthy that petitioners unyielding stance to respondent NLRCs order for
further proceedings is in fine anchored on respondent companys non-observance of
procedural rules. Yet it would be more in keeping with the directive of Art. 221 for us
to sustain the NLRC. Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of
equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties,
[18]
especially considering the primary claim of respondent company, supported by
evidence, that not all the individual complainants were assigned to it and those who
were actually assigned worked only on an intermittent basis. Respondent NLRC was
no less emphatic -

As in this case, the complainants appear to have been unduly awarded with wage
differentials. It would be the height of injustice as it would undoubtedly amount to
unjust enrichment if the Commission will opt to remain silent and refuse to correct
itself even after having been made aware of certain material facts which, if taken
cognizance of, would substantially change the original judgment. [19]

While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the
protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will
be automatically decided in favor of labor.Management has also its own rights which
are equally entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out
of its concern for those with less in life, this Court has inclined more often than not
toward the worker and has upheld his cause in his conflicts with his employer. Such
partiality for labor however has not in any way diminished our belief that justice is in
every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and
the applicable law and doctrine.[20] Hence, absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion, certiorari will not lie against respondent NLRC.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution of respondent National
Labor Relations Commission of 26 September 1994 ordering the remand of the case to
the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings as well as the Resolution of 28 November
1994 denying reconsideration is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Padilla, (Chairman), J., on leave.

31. ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City
Treasurer of Manila, respondents.
Facts:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress
enacted Act No. 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate the Retail Business. The main
provisions of the Act, among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against
associations, among others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the
retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business.

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a
judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all
other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending
that:

It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their
liberty and property without due process of law.

The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.

The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted
principles.

Discussions:
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good
faith. If a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld
because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not
be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Ruling/s:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the
Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and
with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute
equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

32. ESPINA VS ZAMORA

G.R. No. 143855

REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. ESPINA, ORLANDO FUA, JR., PROSPERO

AMATONG, ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, RAUL M. GONZALES, PROSPERO PICHAY,
JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI and FRANKLIN BAUTISTA,

Petitioners,

VERSUS

HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, JR. (Executive Secretary), HON. MAR ROXAS (Secretary of
Trade and Industry), HON. FELIPE MEDALLA (Secretary of National Economic and
Development Authority), GOV. RAFAEL BUENAVENTURA (Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas) and HON. LILIA BAUTISTA (Chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission),
Promulgated:
September 21, 2010

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case calls upon the Court to exercise its power of judicial review and
determine the constitutionality of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000, which
has been assailed as in breach of the constitutional mandate for the development of a
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

The Facts and the Case

On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act
(R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly
repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the
retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under four categories:

Category A Less than Exclusively for Filipino

US$2,500,000.00 citizens and
corporations wholly
owned by Filipino
citizens.
Category B US$2,500,000.00 up but For the first two years of
less than R.A. 8762s effectivity,
US$7,500,000.00 foreign ownership is
allowed up to 60%. After
the two-year period,
100% foreign equity
shall be allowed.
Category C US$7,500,000.00 or more May be wholly owned by
foreigners. Foreign
investments for
establishing a store in
Categories B and C
shall not be less than
the equivalent in
Philippine Pesos of
US$830,000.00.
 Category D US$250,000.00 per store May be wholly owned by
of foreign enterprises foreigners.
specializing in high-end
or luxury products

R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their
citizenship and now reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business
with the same rights as Filipino citizens.

On October 11, 2000 petitioners Magtanggol T. Gunigundo I, Michael T.

Defensor, Gerardo S. Espina, Benjamin S. Lim, Orlando Fua, Jr., Prospero Amatong,
Sergio Apostol, Robert Ace S. Barbers, Enrique Garcia, Jr., Raul M. Gonzales, Jaime
Jacob, Apolinario Lozada, Jr., Leonardo Montemayor, Ma. Elena Palma-Gil, Prospero
Pichay, Juan Miguel Zubiri and Franklin Bautista, all members of the House of
Representatives, filed the present petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762
on the following grounds:

First, the law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the
Constitution which enjoins the State to place the national economy under the control
of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization
and full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and
trade policies.

Second, the implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail
trade, which taken together with alien dominance of other areas of business, would
result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the economy.

Third, foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers
and sari-sari store vendors, destroy self-employment, and bring about more
unemployment.

Fourth, the World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed

the passage of R.A. 8762 on the government as a condition for the release of certain
loans.

Fifth, there is a clear and present danger that the law would promote
monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade.

Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and Industry Secretary
Mar Roxas, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) Secretary Felipe
Medalla, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Gov. Rafael Buenaventura, and Securities and
Exchange Commission Chairman Lilia Bautista countered that:

First, petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke
the fact that they are taxpayers since R.A. 8762 does not involve the disbursement of
public funds. Nor can they invoke the fact that they are members of Congress since
they made no claim that the law infringes on their right as legislators.
 Second, the petition does not involve any justiciable controversy. Petitioners of
course claim that, as members of Congress, they represent the small retail vendors in
their respective districts but the petition does not allege that the subject law violates
the rights of those vendors.

Third, petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of

R.A. 8762. Indeed, they could not specify how the new law violates the constitutional
provisions they cite. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution are not self-
executing provisions that are judicially demandable.

Fourth, the Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of
foreign investments. It directs Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of
investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest so
dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the Congress whether or not
to make such reservation. It does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws allowing
the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to
Filipino citizens.

The Issues Presented

Simplified, the case presents two issues:

1. Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the
constitutionality of R.A. 8762; and

2. Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.

The Courts Ruling

One. The long settled rule is that he who challenges the validity of a law must
have a standing to do so.[1] Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party
to come to a court of justice and make such a challenge. More particularly, standing
refers to his personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer
direct injury as a result of the passage of that law. [2] To put it another way, he must
show that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is
lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the law he complains of.[3]

Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade
Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or inflicts damages on them, either as
taxpayers[4] or as legislators.[5] Still the Court will resolve the question they raise since
the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when as in this case the public interest so requires or the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.[6]

Two. Petitioners mainly argue that R.A. 8762 violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution for the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos. They invoke the provisions of the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies under Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which read as
follows:

Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order
that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free
the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an
improved quality of life for all.

xxxx

Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent

national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the

private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to
needed investments.

Petitioners also invoke the provisions of the National Economy and Patrimony
under Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the

economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates,
reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such
higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by
Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the

national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign

investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its
national goals and priorities.

xxxx

Section 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt
measures that help make them competitive.
 Section 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the
general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on
the basis of equality and reciprocity.

But, as the Court explained in Taada v. Angara,[7] the provisions of Article II of the
1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-
executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of
action in the courts.

The Court further explained in Taada that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
lays down the ideals of economic nationalism: (1) by expressing preference in favor of
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials
and locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt measures that help
make them competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. [8]

In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the
development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled
by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the
economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests
from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given
preference in all areas of development.

Indeed, the 1987 Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside
world as it requires the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and
utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity; and speaks of industries which are competitive in both domestic and
foreign markets as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair
foreign competition and trade practices. Thus, while the Constitution mandates a bias
in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need
for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair. [9]

In other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign
investments, goods, and services. While it does not encourage their unlimited entry
into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
[10]
The key, as in all economies in the world, is to strike a balance between protecting
local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign investments and services.

More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives
Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the
recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus, Congress
can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic
exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not
reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has decided to
open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of
reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy.

The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the public welfare is of
course an exercise of the police power of the State. A persons right to property,
whether he is a Filipino citizen or foreign national, cannot be taken from him without
due process of law. In 1954, Congress enacted the Retail Trade Nationalization Act or
R.A. 1180 that restricts the retail business to Filipino citizens.In denying the petition
assailing the validity of such Act for violation of the foreigners right to substantive due
process of law, the Supreme Court held that the law constituted a valid exercise of
police power.[11] The State had an interest in preventing alien control of the retail trade
and R.A. 1180 was reasonably related to that purpose. That law is not arbitrary.

Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens
the restraint on the foreigners right to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful
business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos right to
property and to due process of law. Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in
the kinds of retail business to which the law in question has permitted the entry of
foreign investors.

Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of
R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said,
there is no showing that the law has contravened any constitutional mandate. The
Court is not convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to
alien control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete
and strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict
safeguards on foreign participation in that business. Thus

First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories
above-enumerated; Second, only nationals from, or juridical entities formed or
incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be allowed to
engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be
allowed to engage in certain retailing activities outside their accredited stores through
the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives, door-to-
door selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing activities.

In sum, petitioners have not shown how the retail trade liberalization has
prejudiced and can prejudice the local small and medium enterprises since its
implementation about a decade ago.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
33. GANZON VS CA

Rodolfo Ganzon vs Court of Appeals

FACT: Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed
against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of
Local Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the
merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of
suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension
order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize
the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is
because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same.
What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego,
can suspend and or remove local officials.

HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the
President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority.
It is a mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not incompatible with
disciplinary authority.

The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by
the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given
to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the
two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the
other in meaning and extent. In administration law supervision means overseeing or
the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.

Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this
pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the
President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation
when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.

The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending
Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day
suspension.

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him
on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local
Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of
the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of
suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension
order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize
the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is
because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same.
What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego,
can suspend and or remove local officials.
HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the
President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority.
It is a mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not incompatible with
disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by
the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given
to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the
two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the
other in meaning and extent. In administration law supervision means overseeing or
the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this
pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the
President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation
when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending
Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day
suspension.