No.

578 July-August 2010

Lebanon: Ayatollah Fadlallah's Death and the Expansion of Iranian Hegemony

Shimon Shapira

Shiite religious leader Sayyed Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah played a leading role in the
increasing Islamic radicalization of Lebanese Shiites and laid the foundations for Hizbullah's
ideology of violent struggle against the West and Israel. He endowed the need to employ
violence with religious sanction.

When Islamic radicalism blew in from Khomeini's Tehran in the 1980s and swept up the Shiites
in Lebanon into jihad against Israel and the West, Fadlallah provided them with a guide. He
served as a leading ideologue and supplied an organized doctrine for the mujahid who is ready
to sacrifice his life for the Imam.

According to Fadlallah, “Death for those (Muslim fighters) is not a tragedy....Death has been
transformed into a carefully calculated step that is not predicated on emotion. Death does not
exist together with despair. The objectives and goals remain alive.” It came as no surprise that
Fadlallah praised the murder of eight innocent Jewish students at the Merkaz Harav Yeshiva in
Jerusalem in 2008.

Yet it is also true that Fadlallah displayed a measure of political courage in opposing the
aspirations of Iran to establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon. Fadlallah was not prepared to
recognize the status of Iran’s Khamenei as vilayat-i faqih (rule of jurisprudent) because he did
not view him as sufficiently learned, and also because he opposed this principle that had been
invented by Ayatollah Khomeini.

Fadlallah's death removes one of the major obstacles to Iran’s quest to establish an Islamic
republic in its own image in Lebanon. Indeed, Iran and Hizbullah are already acting to
incorporate Fadlallah’s memory under their auspices, as though they were always a part of his
flesh and blood.

The death of Shiite religious leader Sayyed Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah gave rise to a wave of
eulogies, publications, and manifestos that continued even after he was brought for burial at his mosque
in the Dahiya neighborhood in Beirut where he preached, rather than in Najaf, Iraq, where he was born
in 1935 and where his father and grandfather are buried.1

The general tone of the eulogists – devotees and critics alike – emphasized the moderate, scholarly,
moral, and progressive aspects of his activity since his arrival in Lebanon in 1966. At first he operated
in the shadow of Imam Musa Sadr, who led the Shiite community in Lebanon until his mysterious
disappearance in summer 1978 in Libya. Seven months later, immediately after the Islamic revolution
in Iran, Fadlallah became the most influential cleric in Lebanon.2

A Leader in the Radicalization of Lebanese Shiites

He played a leading role in the increasing Islamic radicalization of Lebanese Shiites and laid the
foundations for Hizbullah's ideology of violent struggle against the West and Israel that brought him to
the television screens and front pages of newspapers throughout the world. In the 1980s, an irate
Fadlallah poured fire and brimstone on the unbelievers, and endowed the need to employ violence with
religious sanction.

In death he was transformed into the “sweet” Fadlallah who concerned himself with the status of
women and gave women the right to stand up against wife-beating husbands. Yet Fadlallah knew full
well that a smiling and moderate face would not enable him to attain the exalted status of marja al-
taqlid (source of imitation) in the Lebanon of the 1980s. Islamic radicalism blew in from Khomeini's
Tehran and swept up the Shiites in Lebanon into jihad against Israel and the West.

Fadlallah provided them with a guide. He spoke their language and supplied them with an organized
doctrine and the perfect ideology for the mujahid who is ready to sacrifice his life for the Imam. The
Israeli entry into Lebanon in 1982 (and for a brief period that of an international force in Beirut)
greased the wheels of an Islamic revolution in Lebanon, one in which Fadlallah served as its leading
ideologue.

In his book Islam and the Logic of Force, which Fadlallah wrote “when shells are falling in the
background and by candlelight” during the Lebanese civil war in 1976, he laid out the basic
infrastructure. In his preface to the 3rd edition in 1984, Fadlallah explained the concept of terror which
his acolytes were accused of perpetrating:3

Civilization (hadara) does not mean that one contends against a rocket with a stick, against
a combat aircraft with a kite, and against a warship with a sailboat....Against the force of
oppression, one rises up with equal force or superior force; for the legitimate defense of
man, the soil, the nation or fate, all means are legitimate.

As his believers united around his charismatic image, his sermons and lectures riveted thousands who
drank in his words with an unquenchable thirst. Similar to Khomeini's technique, Fadlallah's speeches
were recorded on cassettes and disseminated throughout Lebanon, in this way reaching a broader
public that did not necessarily read his writings or hear him speak in Beirut. His speeches and lectures
were also disseminated as proclamations and pocket-sized books.4

A Theology of Resistance

One of Fadlallah's most important lectures published in this fashion was al-Mukawama al-Islamiya
(“The Islamic Resistance”) against Israel. It was delivered in summer 1984 in the midst of Hizbullah’s
armed struggle against Israeli forces in south Lebanon, and was intended to lay the theoretical base for
the Islamic struggle against Israel.5 With militant Shiite fervor, Fadlallah analyzed the change that had
come over the Muslims in Lebanon. Fadlallah complained that they had become accustomed to
acquiescence, spawning a generation that had no inkling of the term “resistance.” The result, said
Fadlallah, was that “when Israel entered south Lebanon [to eliminate PLO terrorist bases], it was
regarded as a savior...and it scattered sleeping pills that instilled upon the fatigued residents a sense of
tranquility. But...Israel began to disclose its true face.”

At a certain point a change occurred. “We did not have any experience in the struggle against Israel,”
wrote Fadlallah, “but after the initial attempts we began to sense that the Israeli could be killed, he runs
away, lives in fear. This surprised people...and provided them with strength.” “The legend of the
invincible soldier collapsed. Here he was killed by a bullet and there by a roadside bomb, and all the
people began to feel their power, a power that began to find new modes of expression. Since they did
not have the ability to operate using classical means, they developed small-scale, guerrilla warfare.
Against that, the enemy could not use tanks and planes. This is how our people in the south discovered
their strength.”6

Death and Martyrdom

Fadlallah discussed the current Islamic struggle at length, without ambiguity. “Death for those (Muslim
fighters) is not a tragedy and does not represent a psychological state choked with emotion. Death has
been transformed into a carefully calculated step that is not predicated on emotion. Death does not exist
together with despair. The objectives and goals remain alive.” Fadlallah voiced his opposition to “those
who take issue with suicide attacks in Beirut, in the south, and other places (and argued) that they (the
suicide bombers) lived in an atmosphere bereft of feeling and underwent brainwashing…when they
contemplate sweet dreams and detach themselves from thought, sensing themselves suspended in the
atmosphere of the Garden of Eden.”7

“The problem with psychology,” argued Fadlallah, “is that this science investigates concrete
phenomena in laboratory conditions, whereas there are things you cannot understand unless you
experience them….Someone who does not understand oppression cannot understand freedom.” The
psychologists “cannot understand how a person can work on behalf of a cause that fills his heart, belief
and essence.”8

Later, Fadlallah argued, “We do not see in this (self-sacrifice) the result of brainwashing or
unconscious activity, as the intelligence services attempt to hint to the world. They do not want to
present to the world the example of a person who wants to die by taking action on behalf of his
liberty….They do not want the world to honor such a person, because this would constitute a problem
for all imperialist governments.” For Fadlallah, “a person senses spiritual joy when he is going to die
and is not, as the media describes him, the laughing suicide bomber. Such a person does not laugh
facially and with his lips but in his heart, and not on the basis of the sweet dreams that he experiences,
but on behalf of the objective that he knows that he can advance one step forward.”9

Subsequently, Fadlallah argued that he never issued a fatwa (a religious ruling) permitting istishhad
(self-sacrifice).10 However, given his concepts, his followers did not require a fatwa to understand how
their guide was directing them. It came as no surprise, therefore, that Fadlallah praised the murder of
eight innocent Jewish students at the Merkaz Harav Yeshiva in Jerusalem in 2008.11

Standing Against Iran in Lebanon

Yet it is also true that Fadlallah displayed a measure of political courage in opposing the bruising
aspirations of Iran to establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon. As long as Khomeini was alive,
Fadlallah tiptoed around the issue. Both sides needed each other to build the new Shiite society in
Lebanon. Iran knew how to restrain its demands on Fadlallah and understood how to utilize his
influence on Shiite believers in Lebanon and channel them to broad support for Hizbullah. Iran's
emissaries in Hizbullah respected the rules of the game that were set in Iran.
When Ali Khamenei replaced Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, the rules were shattered. Ayatollah
Fadlallah was not prepared to recognize the status of Khamenei as vilayat-i faqih (rule of jurisprudent)
because he did not view him as sufficiently learned, and also because he opposed this principle that had
been invented by Khomeini. Fadlallah also did not recognize the religious authority of Iran's leader. He
built up his own religious authority and in 1995 he was recognized as the marja al-taqlid. His office
became a workshop for issuing religious decrees in the various spheres of life of the believers. His
superior scholarship now found practical expression. The masses turned to him with questions and
awaited his dicta. Hizbullah could not stand aside, and imposed organizational discipline on its
members. Whoever sought to join Hizbullah had to (and still has to) recognize the religious and
political authority of Iran’s Khamenei as the marja al-taqlid in Lebanon, as a religious obligation that
the believer must fulfill.

Fadlallah rebelled. He was not willing to play Khamenei's game, even when he was subjected to false
accusations, based on fraudulent documents, that he had espoused heretical opinions. Heading
Fadlallah’s opponents were Khamenei and his protégé in Lebanon, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah.
One of the senior security offices of Hizbullah was even suspected of trying to assassinate Fadallah. A
Shiite religious figure close to Fadlallah described the bad blood between Tehran and Fadlallah: “All of
the money Iran spent fighting Fadlallah was greater than the amount it spent on fighting Israel during
all the years of the occupation from 1982 until the victory in 2000.”12

The Second Lebanon War in summer 2006 led to a rapprochement between Hassan Nasrallah and
Fadlallah, whose house had been struck by an Israeli bomb. Iran, too, understood Fadlallah's value in
Hizbullah's difficult moments and his role in assisting the movement in regaining mass sympathy when
some blamed Hizbullah for the loss of their homes and assets during the war. Fadlallah was willing to
hug Hizbullah leader Nasrallah, his former student, but continued to reject the vilayat-i faqih – a
fundamental principle of the Islamic Republic. He persisted in his refusal to recognize the religious
authority of the Iranian leader and Iranian aspirations to establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon.

Khamenei never forgave Fadlallah for this. In a letter of sympathy after his death sent by the Iranian
leader, Fadlallah was called al-‘alam al-kabir and al-mujahid and by Nasrallah ab hakim and murshid
hakim, but both ignored his status as marja al-taqlid. In his condolence letter, Nasrallah noted that for
the entire resistance public, their marja was Iran’s Imam Khamenei.13 All this did not prevent Nasrallah
and senior Iranian representatives from standing before Fadlallah’s coffin and for Hizbullah to arrange
the funeral ceremonies as if for one of their own. If he had been present, Fadlallah would have been
amazed by the manifestations of sorrow, mourning, and grief displayed by the Hizbullah leaders.

Death Removes an Obstacle to Iran

Fadlallah's death removes one of the major obstacles to Iran’s quest to establish an Islamic republic in
its own image in Lebanon. As long as the erosion of the Lebanese state continues and the central
government fails to impose its authority in the regions under Hizbullah control (southwest Beirut,
southern Lebanon, and the Beqaa Valley), Iran's efforts to realize its strategic objectives in Lebanon
will intensify. This process may be expected to accelerate now that there is no longer any figure of
political or religious stature among the Shiite community in Lebanon that can challenge or obstruct Iran
and its emissaries in Lebanon. This also applies to Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who formally holds
the most important Shiite position in the Lebanese state.

During his life, Fadlallah prepared no disciple or heir who could fill his shoes. This is not the Shiite
custom. Iran as well will not seek to groom any Lebanese heir to Fadlallah who might later compete
with Khamenei. Interest in Sheikh Afif Nabulsi,14 a minor cleric from south Lebanon, as a possible
successor to Fadlallah does not appear serious. It would appear that Shiite believers will have to turn to
Ali al-Sistani of Iraq or Ali Khamenei in Iran.

Nevertheless, Fadlallah’s office continues to operation under direction of his son, Ali, to offer advice
and guidance to the believers. Fadlallah’s website announced immediately following his death: “To the
emulators of the late religious authority, His Eminence Sayyed Muhammed Hussein [Fadlallah]: it is
permissible to continue to emulate a deceased (marja) based on a fatwa of a living religious authority
who fulfills all the conditions of such a post and who deems it permissible to continue to emulate a
deceased (marja). Furthermore the office of His Eminence is considering issuing a detailed explanation
of the issue. Meanwhile, we will continue to answer your inquiries in accordance with the opinions of
His Eminence.”15

While Fadlallah’s many institutions will continue to operate in the coming months, as time passes, it
can be expected that his son, Ali, will find it difficult to raise money and to continue to operate his
father’s network at its current capacity. The main concern of Fadlallah’s successors will be the
unbridled efforts of Iran and Hizbullah to take control of the widespread Fadlallah network, which he
built up over many years. Iran and Hizbullah are already acting to incorporate Fadlallah’s memory
under their auspices, as though they were always a part of his flesh and blood.

* * *

Notes

Two unusual events were the tasteless words of Brtish Ambassador to Beirut Frances Guy
regarding Fadlallah's personality, followed by her apology, and the surprise firing of CNN
correspondent Octavia Nasr after her words in reaction to his death were publicized. Kim
Ghattas, “Ayatollah Fadlallah Tributes Divide Opinion,” BBC News, Washington, July 10,
2010.
On Fadlallah's initial path, see Shimon Shapira, Hizbullah, Between Iran and Lebanon (Tel
Aviv: HaKibbutz HaMeuhad, 2000), pp. 102-105, 120-123, 130-131 (hereafter, Shapira); Jamal
Sankari, Fadlallah, The Making of a Radical Shiite Leader (London: Saqi, 2005).
Shapira, p. 152.
Shapira, p. 156.
Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, al-Mukawama al-Islamiya, June 18, 1984.
Ibid., pp. 4-6.
Ibid., p. 16.
Ibid., pp. 17-18.
Ibid., pp. 18-19
Interview with Fadlallah, al-Mustaqbal, Paris, July 6, 1985.
Shimon Shapira, “Lebanon's Ayatollah Fadlallah and the Mercaz Ha-Rav Yeshiva Attack in
Jerusalem,” Jerusalem Issue Brief, vol. 7, no. 35, March 10, 2008.
“Facts About the Relationship between Fadlallah and Hizbullah,” www.alshiraa.com, July 7,
2010.
Al-Manar television, July 5, 2010.
David Schenker, “Passing of Shiite Cleric Fadlallah Spells Trouble for Lebanon,” Christian
Science Monitor, July 9, 2010.
The web site of the religious authority Sayyed Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah –
 english.www.bayynat.org.lb.

* * *

Brig.-Gen. (ret.) Dr. Shimon Shapira is a senior research associate at the HYPERLINK
"http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?
DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=112&FID=568&PID=0&IID=429" Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

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