e] Executive Orders Nos.
: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471,
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT
OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ,
in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid
and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is
sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179,
184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355,
358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486,
491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661,
718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030,
1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278,
1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-
1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136,
141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204,
205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251,
253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299,
301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367,
370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488,
498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611,
612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881,
882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281,
1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-
1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649,
1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744,
1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800,
1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-
1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-
1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923,
1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044,
2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-
544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604,
609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-
857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50,
51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433,
436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this
case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said
petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute
this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation,
board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required
to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts
of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of
the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific
interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910
case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while
the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
private individual only in those cases where he has some private or
particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at
large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the
writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs.
Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one
of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High,
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a
private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings
brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for
the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros
Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority
supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to
proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be
enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think
that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that
it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case
without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under
the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist,
the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well
lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule
insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances
which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these
proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not
the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal
personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the
present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by
petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to
institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of
any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor
General, the government officer generally empowered to represent
the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette
is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where
the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication
in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The
point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's
construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court
has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in
those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day
following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the
date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as
it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication.
Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at
hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1
of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all
important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the,
Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law;
and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of
the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be
published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine
Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that
at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the
people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and
deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones,
ready access to the legislative recordsno such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of
informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such
decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los
reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales
ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en
uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads:
"There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word
"shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to
be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what
should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind,
leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must
be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or
"of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax
and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such as administrative and executive orders need not be published
on the assumption that they have been circularized to all
concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of
a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law,
he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As
Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions
which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due
process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the
official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of
all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may
know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no force and
effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in
reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to
P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their
publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the
past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth
in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law;
that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett,
228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality
must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and
official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted
upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of
the statute and of its previous application, demand examination.
These questions are among the most difficult of those which have
engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest
from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs.
Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law,
albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was
declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees
prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact
which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an
all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it
appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be
published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos.
1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not
been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of
these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available.
But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none
of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced
by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through
Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make
the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The
cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent
officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting
violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published
in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though
some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the
Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed
in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however,
to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement
of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential
issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due
process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party
who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that
such publication required need not be confined to the Official
Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be
gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not
follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all
circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other
executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force
and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question.
Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that
such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of
effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such
requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed
out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past
"presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my
mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is
required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with
binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate
opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is
the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions
elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the
Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am
likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in
the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before
laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in
the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the
command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if
it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the
level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is
unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential.
What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must
be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is
the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its
effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what
is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not
so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of
their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with
their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of
publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could
arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances"
could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is
contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or
executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases
though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process
aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover,
where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was
issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must
still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it
could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional
terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional
application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no
further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity
of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in
agreement with the view that such publication must be in the
Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly
recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette
is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided."
Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force
of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act
which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a
different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the
opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive
acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be
devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go
too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable
consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such
a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos,
Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the
concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law
connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and
of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court
has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play
and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they
can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based
on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is
bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by
Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code,
there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of
Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the
provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official
repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the
Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity
[date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity"
is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code
is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by
the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been
duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of
due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the
same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one
year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents'
misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their
effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is
not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render
nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of
prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of
providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in
the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its
publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for
its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree
provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I
would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when
a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree
becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the
Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have
retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree
itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run
counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws

as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions
elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can
be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,
in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. vs.
Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC
any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE
provide for their effectivity date. AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after REFORMS, respondents.
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be x----------------------x
said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law
with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008
clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different
period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D.
notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published AGCAOILI, petitioners,
elsewhere than in the Official Gazette. vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL
proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the VILLAR, respondents.
Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the
Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." x----------------------x
Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official
Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the
x----------------------x
Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and
"all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO,
such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA,
legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F.
but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors
law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is
essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all DECISION
statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially
an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. NACHURA, J.:
638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute
that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped
Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role. conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines
and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention
notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy
by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg of the present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-
to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred
in the Official Gazette. to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents
instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur. manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections.
These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative
hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of
Congress.1

In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then

Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege
speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional
investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public
Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security,
Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the
inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged.
But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director
Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI
Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House
Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the
supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and
impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility
and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played
in the chambers of the House.2
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to
suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to
prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the
testimonies of the resource persons.3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano
(Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and
Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction4docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed
that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using
these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped
conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose.
He further implored that the said recordings and any reference
thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the
respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using
the recordings in any of the House proceedings.5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates
on the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson
roused the slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The
Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson
promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth the
whats, whens, wheres, whos and whys" of the alleged wiretap,
and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of
telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious
wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacsons speech
was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously
filed two bills6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of
wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.7
In the Senates plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate
ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the
possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the body
were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28,
2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege
speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution
absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the
contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a
legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of
the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government
entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo
Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this
Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate
from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the
main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and
Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded
with its public hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September
7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.
Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.,
Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson,
Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes
filed their Comment16 on the petition on September 25, 2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the
ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to
appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner
in G.R. No. 179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos.
170338 and 179275.19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci"
recordings, they have different objectivesthe first is poised at
preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their
subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second
seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the
wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants
the second, G.R. No. 179275.
-I-
Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first
resolve the issue on the parties standing, argued at length in their
pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "[l]egal standing
or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because
of the challenged governmental act x x x," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can
show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2)
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural
technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent
direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a
"liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens,
members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions
involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and
rulings."24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a
non-member of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the
Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications
Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed the current
policy that "this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to
wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and
resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public
interest, in keeping with the Courts duty under the 1987
Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them."26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to
initiate the petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the
"Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the
members of the respondent committees as one of the voices in the
recordings.27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be
directly injured by the House committees actions and charges of
electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to institute the
petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their
standing by alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and
members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any
attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the
country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of public funds
that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They
are worried by the continuous violation of the laws and individual
rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes
through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of
legislation.28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process
considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings
without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the
publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which
underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer
bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the
execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his
constitutional right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being
citizens of the Republic.
Following the Courts ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners Ranadas and
Agcaoilis and intervenor Sagges allegation that the continuous
conduct by the Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will
necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.32 It should be
noted that in Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts
of the House of Representatives, yet the Court granted standing to
the petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably invoked
the vindication of their own rightsas taxpayers, members of
Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the
bar and of the legal professionwhich were also supposedly violated
by the therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the
petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of
transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public
but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the
guidance of all.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal
attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent
case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners
Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge.
- II -
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and
academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle
that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the
determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies. 35 By
actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for
judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise
the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The
power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions
because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a
case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes
moot when its purpose has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to
indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question
as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in
the nature of things, cannot be enforced.38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as
aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the
respondent House Committees from playing the tape recordings and
from including the same in their committee report. He likewise prays
that the said tapes be stricken off the records of the House
proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were already
played in the House and heard by its members.39 There is also the
widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello
Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in
plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been overtaken by
these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being
moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to
restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to
provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.41
- III -
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The
Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the
questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that
"[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite
of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for
it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. 43 What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides
that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion
of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and
even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.45 With
respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of
which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007,
no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when
they first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question.
In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent
Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the
"duly published rules of procedure." We quote the OSGs
explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate
of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing
inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from
the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every
three (3) years for one-half of the Senates membership, the
composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term.
Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem
fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject
hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are
therefore, procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion,
reinforces this ruling with the following rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a
continuing legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four
members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term
of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every
three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue
into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935
Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to "constitute a
quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning in Arnault v.
Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a
continuing body because less than majority of the Senators continue
into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of
Procedure must be republished by the Senate after every expiry of
the term of twelve Senators.47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in
our Resolution48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration) in the same
case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees
fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the
Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an
entity with each national election or change in the composition of its
members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the
Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the
Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself
confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be
taken up at the next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the
expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding
Congress as if present for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and
proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative investigations,
of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is
merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up
such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if
presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule
is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding
Congress (which will typically have a different composition as that of
the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and
deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate
is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business,
then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the
expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue
into the next Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and
of the opposite nature of the conduct of its business is reflected in
its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senates main rules of
procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected
in the preceding elections shall begin their term of office, the
President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for
amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should
be presented at least one day before its consideration, and the vote
of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be
required for its approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption
and shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the
new composition of the Senate after an election and the possibility
of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start
of each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin their
term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main
rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until
they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously
absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall
take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the
continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or
repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of
Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative
inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the
next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative
inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring
that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published
rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to
publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or
otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall
be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or
repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on
legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it
could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main
rules regarding effectivity.
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October
31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take
judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the
infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant
petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the
legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken
by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules
governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to
discuss the other issues raised in the consolidated petitions.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally
mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet
form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the
Senates internet web page.49
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the
petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be
issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or
any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of
legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.

The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the SO ORDERED.
rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in
accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not
make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the
said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by
the Senate.

Justice Carpios response to the same argument raised by the

respondents is illuminating:

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the

Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient
under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect
seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in
accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply with the due
process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a persons
liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be
arrested and detained by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.

8792,50 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000,
to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all
the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message
or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the law
merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the
original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents.52 It does not make the internet a medium for publishing
laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore,

could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules
in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be
deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure."
 G.R. SP No. 68163, which directed that SEC Memorandum Circular
No. 1, Series of 1986 should be the basis for computing the filing fee
relative to GMA Network, Inc.s (GMAs) application for the
amendment of its articles of incorporation for purposes of extending
its corporate term.

The undisputed facts as narrated by the appellate court are as

follows:

On August 19, 1995, the petitioner, GMA NETWORK, INC., (GMA, for
brevity), a domestic corporation, filed an application for collective
approval of various amendments to its Articles of Incorporation and
SECOND DIVISION By-Laws with the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission,
(SEC, for brevity). The amendments applied for include, among
others, the change in the corporate name of petitioner from
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE G.R. No. 164026
Republic Broadcasting System, Inc. to GMA Network, Inc. as well as
the extension of the corporate term for another fifty (50) years from
COMMISSION,
and after June 16, 2000.

Petitioner, Present:

Upon such filing, the petitioner had been assessed by the SECs
Corporate and Legal Department a separate filing fee for the
QUISUMBING, J., application for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1%
of its authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof or an amount
Chairperson, of P1,212,200.00.

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA, On September 26, 1995, the petitioner informed the SEC of its
intention to contest the legality and propriety of the said
*CHICO-NAZARIO, and assessment. However, the petitioner requested the SEC to approve
the other amendments being requested by the petitioner without
VELASCO, JR., JJ., being deemed to have withdrawn its application for extension of
corporate term.
GMA NETWORK, INC.,

Respondent. Promulgated:
On October 20, 1995, the petitioner formally protested the
December 23, 2008 assessment amounting to P1,212,200.00 for its application for
extension of corporate term.

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
On February 20, 1996, the SEC approved the other amendments to
the petitioners Articles of Incorporation, specifically Article 1 thereof
referring to the corporate name of the petitioner as well as Article 2
thereof referring to the principal purpose for which the petitioner
was formed.
DECISION
On March 19, 1996, the petitioner requested for an official
opinion/ruling from the SEC on the validity and propriety of the
assessment for application for extension of its corporate term.
TINGA, J.:

Petitioner Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) assails the

Decision[1] dated February 20, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-

Consequently, the respondent SEC, through Associate Commissioner
Fe Eloisa C. Gloria, on April 18, 1996, issued its ruling upholding the
validity of the questioned assessment, the dispositive portion of
which states:
In light of the foregoing, we believe that the questioned
assessment is in accordance with law. Accordingly, you are hereby
required to comply with the required filing fee.
An appeal from the aforequoted ruling of the respondent SEC was
subsequently taken by the petitioner on the ground that the
assessment of filing fees for the petitioners application for extension
of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital
stock plus 20% thereof is not in accordance with law.
On September 26, 2001, following three (3) motions for early
resolution filed by the petitioner, the respondent SEC En Banc issued
the assailed order dismissing the petitioners appeal,
the dispositive portion of which provides as follows:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant Appeal is hereby
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[2]
In its petition for review[3] with the Court of Appeals, GMA argued
that its application for the extension of its corporate term is akin to
an amendment and not to a filing of new articles of incorporation. It
further averred that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of
1994, which the SEC used as basis for assessing P1,212,200.00 as
filing fee for the extension of GMAs corporate term, is not valid.
The appellate court agreed with the SECs submission that an
extension of the corporate term is a grant of a fresh license for a
corporation to act as a juridical being endowed with the powers
expressly bestowed by the State. As such, it is not an ordinary
amendment but is analogous to the filing of new articles of
incorporation.
However, the Court of Appeals ruled that Memorandum Circular
No. 2, Series of 1994 is legally invalid and ineffective for not having
been published in accordance with law. The challenged
memorandum circular, according to the appellate court, is not
merely an internal or interpretative rule, but affects the public in
general. Hence, its publication is required for its effectivity.
The appellate court denied reconsideration in a Resolution [4] dated
June 9, 2004.
In its Memorandum[5] dated September 6, 2005, the SEC argues that
it issued the questioned memorandum circular in the exercise of its
delegated legislative power to fix fees and charges. The filing fees
required by it are allegedly uniformly imposed on the transacting
public and are essential to its supervisory and regulatory functions.
The fees are not a form of penalty or sanction and, therefore,
require no publication.
For its part, GMA points out in its Memorandum,[6] dated September
23, 2005, that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986
refers to the filing fees for amended articles of incorporation where
the amendment consists of extending the term of corporate
existence. The questioned circular, on the other hand, refers only to
filing fees for articles of incorporation. Thus, GMA argues that the
former circular, being the one that specifically treats of applications
for the extension of corporate term, should apply to its case.
Assuming that Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 is
applicable, GMA avers that the latter did not take effect and cannot
be the basis for the imposition of the fees stated therein for the
reasons that it was neither filed with the University of the
Philippines Law Center nor published either in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation as required under existing
laws.
It should be mentioned at the outset that the authority of the SEC to
collect and receive fees as authorized by law is not in question.[7] Its
power to collect fees for examining and filing articles of
incorporation and by-laws and amendments thereto, certificates of
increase or decrease of the capital stock, among others, is
recognized. Likewise established is its power under Sec. 7 of P.D. No.
902-A to recommend to the President the revision, alteration,
amendment or adjustment of the charges which it is authorized to
collect.
The subject of the present inquiry is not the authority of the SEC to
collect and receive fees and charges, but rather the validity of its
imposition on the basis of a memorandum circular which, the Court
of Appeals held, is ineffective.
Republic Act No. 3531 (R.A. No. 3531) provides that where the
amendment consists in extending the term of corporate existence,
the SEC shall be entitled to collect and receive for the filing of the
amended articles of incorporation the same fees collectible under
existing law as the filing of articles of incorporation.[8] As is clearly
the import of this law, the SEC shall be entitled to collect and receive
the same fees it assesses and collects both for the filing of articles of
incorporation and the filing of an amended articles of incorporation
for purposes of extending the term of corporate existence.
The SEC, effectuating its mandate under the aforequoted law and
other pertinent laws,[9] issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1,
Series of 1986, imposing the filing fee of 1/10 of 1% of the
authorized capital stock but not less than P300.00 nor more
than P100,000.00 for stock corporations, and 1/10 of 1% of the
authorized capital stock but not less than P200.00 nor more
than P100,000.00 for stock corporations without par value, for the
filing of amended articles of incorporation where the amendment
consists of extending the term of corporate existence.
Several years after, the SEC issued Memorandum Circular No. 2,
Series of 1994, imposing new fees and charges and deleting the
maximum filing fee set forth in SEC Circular No. 1, Series of 1986,
such that the fee for the filing of articles of incorporation became
1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof but not
less than P500.00.
A reading of the two circulars readily reveals that they indeed
pertain to different matters, as GMA points out. SEC Memorandum
Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 refers to the filing fee for the
amendment of articles of incorporation to extend corporate life,
while Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 pertains to the
filing fee for articles of incorporation. Thus, as GMA argues, the
former circular, being squarely applicable and, more importantly,
being more favorable to it, should be followed.
 What this proposition fails to consider, however, is the clear
directive of R.A. No. 3531 to impose the same fees for the filing of
articles of incorporation and the filing of amended articles of
incorporation to reflect an extension of corporate term. R.A. No.
3531 provides an unmistakable standard which should guide the SEC
in fixing and imposing its rates and fees. If such mandate were the
only consideration, the Court would have been inclined to rule that
the SEC was correct in imposing the filing fees as outlined in the
questioned memorandum circular, GMAs argument
notwithstanding.
A related factor which precludes consideration of the questioned
issuance as interpretative in nature merely is the fact the SECs
assessment amounting to P1,212,200.00 is exceedingly
unreasonable and amounts to an imposition. A filing fee, by legal
definition, is that charged by a public official to accept a document
for processing. The fee should be just, fair, and proportionate to the
service for which the fee is being collected, in this case, the
examination and verification of the documents submitted by GMA
to warrant an extension of its corporate term.

However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the questioned
memorandum circular is invalid as it does not appear from the
records that it has been published in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. Executive Order No. 200, which
repealed Art. 2 of the Civil Code, provides that laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
In Taada v. Tuvera,[10] the Court, expounding on the publication
requirement, held:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been
delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and other pertinent laws. The
due process clause, however, permits the courts to determine
whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within
the bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it
arbitrarily infringes on a persons right to property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68163, dated February 20, 2004, and its
Resolution, dated June 9, 2004, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders

promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature, or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce
or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that
is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.[11]

The questioned memorandum circular, furthermore, has not been

filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register of the
University of the Philippines Law Center as required in the
Administrative Code of 1987.[12]

In Philsa International Placement and Services Corp. v. Secretary of

Labor and Employment,[13] Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of
1983 of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, which
provided for the schedule of placement and documentation fees for
private employment agencies or authority holders, was struck down
as it was not published or filed with the National Administrative
Register.

The questioned memorandum circular, it should be emphasized,

cannot be construed as simply interpretative of R.A. No. 3531. This
administrative issuance is an implementation of the mandate of R.A.
No. 3531 and indubitably regulates and affects the public at large. It
cannot, therefore, be considered a mere internal rule or regulation,
nor an interpretation of the law, but a rule which must be declared
ineffective as it was neither published nor filed with the Office of the
National Administrative Register.
G.R. No. L-30771 May 28, 1984
LIAM LAW, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
OLYMPIC SAWMILL CO. and ELINO LEE CHI, defendants-appellants.
Felizardo S.M. de Guzman for plaintiff-appellee.
Mariano M. de Joya for defendants-appellants.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is an appeal by defendants from a Decision rendered by the
then Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The appeal was originally
taken to the then Court of Appeals, which endorsed it to this
instance stating that the issue involved was one of law.
It appears that on or about September 7, 1957, plaintiff loaned
P10,000.00, without interest, to defendant partnership and
defendant Elino Lee Chi, as the managing partner. The loan became
ultimately due on January 31, 1960, but was not paid on that date,
with the debtors asking for an extension of three months, or up to
April 30, 1960.
On March 17, 1960, the parties executed another loan document.
Payment of the P10,000.00 was extended to April 30, 1960, but the
obligation was increased by P6,000.00 as follows:
That the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00), Philippine
currency shall form part of the principal obligation to answer for
attorney's fees, legal interest, and other cost incident thereto to be
paid unto the creditor and his successors in interest upon the
termination of this agreement.
Defendants again failed to pay their obligation by April 30, 1960 and,
on September 23, 1960, plaintiff instituted this collection case.
Defendants admitted the P10,000.00 principal obligation, but
claimed that the additional P6,000.00 constituted usurious interest.
Upon application of plaintiff, the Trial Court issued, on the same
date of September 23, 1960, a writ of Attachment on real and
personal properties of defendants located at Karanglan, Nueva Ecija.
After the Writ of Attachment was implemented, proceedings before
the Trial Court versed principally in regards to the attachment.
On January 18, 1961, an Order was issued by the Trial Court stating
that "after considering the manifestation of both counsel in
Chambers, the Court hereby allows both parties to simultaneously
submit a Motion for Summary Judgment. 1 The plaintiff filed his
Motion for Summary Judgment on January 31, 1961, while
defendants filed theirs on February 2, 196l. 2
On June 26, 1961, the Trial Court rendered decision ordering
defendants to pay plaintiff "the amount of P10,000.00 plus the
further sum of P6,000.00 by way of liquidated damages . . . with
legal rate of interest on both amounts from April 30, 1960." It is
from this judgment that defendants have appealed.
We have decided to affirm.
Under Article 1354 of the Civil Code, in regards to the agreement of
the parties relative to the P6,000.00 obligation, "it is presumed that
it exists and is lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary". No
evidentiary hearing having been held, it has to be concluded that
defendants had not proven that the P6,000.00 obligation was illegal.
Confirming the Trial Court's finding, we view the P6,000.00
obligation as liquidated damages suffered by plaintiff, as of March
17, 1960, representing loss of interest income, attorney's fees and
incidentals.
The main thrust of defendants' appeal is the allegation in their
Answer that the P6,000.00 constituted usurious interest. They insist
the claim of usury should have been deemed admitted by plaintiff as
it was "not denied specifically and under oath". 3
Section 9 of the Usury Law (Act 2655) provided:
SEC. 9. The person or corporation sued shall file its answer in writing
under oath to any complaint brought or filed against said person or
corporation before a competent court to recover the money or
other personal or real property, seeds or agricultural products,
charged or received in violation of the provisions of this Act. The lack
of taking an oath to an answer to a complaint will mean the
admission of the facts contained in the latter.
The foregoing provision envisages a complaint filed against an entity
which has committed usury, for the recovery of the usurious interest
paid. In that case, if the entity sued shall not file its answer under
oath denying the allegation of usury, the defendant shall be deemed
to have admitted the usury. The provision does not apply to a case,
as in the present, where it is the defendant, not the plaintiff, who is
alleging usury.
Moreover, for sometime now, usury has been legally non-existent.
Interest can now be charged as lender and borrower may agree
upon. 4 The Rules of Court in regards to allegations of usury,
procedural in nature, should be considered repealed with
retroactive effect.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that
extent. 5
... Section 24(d), Republic Act No. 876, known as the Arbitration Law,
which took effect on 19 December 1953, and may be retroactively
applied to the case at bar because it is procedural in nature. ... 6
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la
Fuente, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO
RAMOS, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL,
LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA
DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N CORTES, J.: This special civil action for certiorari
seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First
Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al.
v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first
resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners'
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and
directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had
become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been filed
out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for
not being verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of
Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this
defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would
still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out
building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring
shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in
injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to
vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but
the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the
Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided
by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding
petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to
private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated
on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on
August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-
day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually
denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30,
1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on
September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of
October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave
abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of
judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly
applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon,
[G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day
period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot
be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this
Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the
rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan
or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in
cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort,
which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension
requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate
Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA
643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the
modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15,
1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the prospective application of said
rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the
promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the
clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which
the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February
27, 1986, it is still within the grace period, which expired on June 30,
1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate
Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of
time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the
expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no
longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the
length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the
promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25,
1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their
counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case
should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of
the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring
the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law
practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court
particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated,
and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.
R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision
holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible
for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should
be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private
respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only
they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and ,
therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since
the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to
vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY
the instant petition for lack of merit.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-51841
REMIGIO QUIQUI, EMILIANA Q. ARELLANO, TURCUATA Q.
DIPUTADO, APOLONIA Q. SALCEDOR, LORETO QUIQUI, SUPLICIA Q.
CHAN, ELDEGUNDA Q. MONASTERIO, ELSA Q. ARBON and ANTIPAS
Q. YANG, petitioners
vs.
The Honorable Judge ALEJANDRO R. BONCAROS of Branch V, Court
of First Instance of Negros Oriental, ESTEFANIA G. AMOLO, LOPE
AMOLO, SOFIA G. ALBON, PASTOR GADINGAN, ANGEL GADINGAN,
ANTERO GADINGAN, TEOFILO GADINGAN and FELICITAS
GADINGAN, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. It
concerns a parcel of agricultural land situated in Barangay
Cabangan, Siaton, Negros Oriental with an area of about 450 square
meters. The said parcel of land is a portion of Lot No. 3217, Pls-659-
D covered by Free Patent Title No. FV-13703. The improvements on
the parcel of land in question include several fruit trees and a
modest residential house.
The record of the case reveals that on May 22, 1973, the herein
private respondents Estefania G. Amolo, Lope Amolo, Sofia G. Albon,
Pastor Gadingan, Angel Gadingan, Antero Gadingan, Teofilo
Gadingan and Felicitas Gadingan were able to secure Free Patent
Title No. FV-13703 in their names. The 450-square meter lot in
question was included in the survey of the entire parcel of land
covered by the said Title.
On the other hand, it is the position of the herein petitioners
Remigio Quiqui, Emiliana Q. Arellano, Turcuata Q. Diputado,
Apolonia Q. Salcedor, Loreto Quiqui, Suplicia Q. Chan, Eldegunda Q.
Monasterio, Elsa Q. Arbon and Antipas Q. Yang that the 450-square
meter lot in question belongs to them and not to the private
respondents. They contend that the said lot was purchased by their
late father sometime in 1920 and that ever since then, they have
been in actual possession thereof, peacefully, openly continuously
and adversely, for a period of 56 years already. They also contend
that the private respondents succeeded in putting the said property
in their name by clandestinely including the said lot in the survey of
the premises undertaken by the Government sometime in the
1970s.
On November 9, 1976, the petitioners, assisted by the Citizens Legal
Assistance Office of the then Ministry of Justice, filed a Complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental for "reconveyance
and/or annulment of Title with damages" against the private
respondents. 1 The said Complaint was anchored on the theory that
the title to the lot in question obtained by the private respondents
in their name was secured through fraud. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 6606.
On December 5, 1976, the private respondents filed their Answer to
the Complaint, alleging, inter alia, that the petitioners have no cause
of action against them. By way of Counterclaim, the private
respondents sought the payment to them of moral damages and
attorney's fees. 2
Thereafter, a pre-trial conference was scheduled by the trial court.
Inasmuch as the parties could not reach an amicable settlement of
their case, the pre-trial conference was terminated and the case was
set for trial on the merits. In the course of the proceedings, more
particularly on May 10, 1979, the private respondents filed a Motion
to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the trial court. 3
On June 7, 1979, the petitioners submitted their Opposition to the
said Motion, stressing that the trial court has jurisdiction over cases
for reconveyance. 4 In its Order dated July 16, 1979, the trial court,
with respondent Judge Alejandro R. Boncaros presiding, dismissed
the Complaint for reconveyance on the ground that it had no
jurisdiction over the case. 5 Counsel for the petitioners received a
copy of the said Order on July 17, 1979. 6
On August 17, 1979, the petitioners filed a Motion for the
reconsideration of the Order of the trial court dismissing the
Complaint. 7 The said Motion for Reconsideration is dated August
16, 1979.
The private respondents opposed the Motion for Reconsideration,
stating that the same had been filed beyond the 30 day
reglementary period under the Rules. The private respondents
maintain that inasmuch as the petitioners received their copy of the
Order of dismissal on July 17, 1979, they had up to August 16, 1979
to file the Motion for reconsideration, computed on the basis of the
30-day reglementary period. They contend that since the said
Motion was filed beyond the 30-day period, the Order of dismissal
has become final and executory and could no longer be the subject
of a Motion for reconsideration. 8 In its Order dated August 21,
1979, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration on the
ground asserted by the private respondents.9
On August 23, 1979, the petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal, seeking
relief from the Court of Appeals. They sought the Appeal on the
ground that the Orders of the trial court dismissing their Complaint
and denying their Motion for Reconsideration are contrary to law
and the evidence submitted. 10 On August 24, 1979, the petitioners
filed their Appeal Bond, together with their Motion to approve the
same.
In its Order dated August 28, 1979, the trial court denied the Notice
of Appeal, including the Motion to approve the Appeal Bond. The
pertinent portion of the said Order are as follows
The order of dismissal of this Court which was dated July 16, 1979
was received by the plaintiffs (the herein petitioners) on July 17,
1979. Under Section 3, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
period to appeal is thirty (30) days, so with the motion for a
reconsideration so that (sic) under Art. 13 of the Civil Code that in
the computation of the period exclude the first (day), include the
last (sic), August 16, 1979 therefore was the last day to file the
motion for reconsideration but it was filed on August 17 or one day
late and this motion for reconsideration was denied by this Court on
August 21, 1979 (sic). The reason for the denial was the motion for
reconsideration was filed (sic) beyond the reglementary period, in
which case, the notice of appeal ... (was) likewise filed beyond the
reglementary period ....
xxx xxx xxx 11
Finding the action taken by the trial court unsatisfactory, the
petitioners brought their case directly to this Court by way of the
instant Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. They maintain that the Order of the trial
court dated July 16, 1979 is illegal and void for having been "issued
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion, for the so called "one day late" (ground) upon which it
is based does not actually exist. " 12 They pray, inter alia, that the
trial court be ordered to approve their Notice of Appeal. 13
Complying with the instructions of this Court, the private
respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition. 14
In the Resolution of this Court dated January 14, 1980, We gave due
course to the instant Petition. 15 The parties submitted their
respective Memoranda after which the case was deemed submitted
for decision on June 11, 1980.
After a careful examination of the entire record of the case, We find
the instant Petition devoid of merit.
At the time this litigation was instituted in the trial court, Section 3,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court was the provision governing the period
within which an Appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals, to wit
SEC. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal may be taken by serving upon
the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30)
days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal
bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set
aside the judgment or order or for a new trial has been pending shall
be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of
Rule 37.
But where such a motion has been filed during office hours of the
last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected
within the day following that in which the party appealing received
notice of the denial of said motion.
Under this cited provision, the Appeal may be taken within 30 days
from notice of the judgment or order of the trial court. 16 In the
event that the party aggrieved by the judgment or order of the trial
court files a Motion to set aside the judgment or order, i. e a Motion
for Reconsideration, the time during which such Motion is pending
resolution shall, as a rule, be deducted from the 30-day period. 17 In
relation thereto, the New Civil Code states that in computing a
period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day included. 18
The petitioners admit that they received their copy of the Order of
dismissal of their Complaint on July 17, 1979. Under Section 3, Rule
41, they had 30 days within which to appeal their case or to file a
Motion for Reconsideration of the judgment or order of the trial
court. In computing the 30-day period, July 17, 1979 (the first day) is
excluded, pursuant to Article 13 of the New Civil Code. Counting 30
days thereafter, beginning on July 18, 1979, the petitioners had up
to August 16, 1979 to file their Motion for Reconsideration. Their
Motion for Reconsideration, although dated August 16, 1979, was
filed with the trial court on August 17, 1979 or one day beyond the
30-day reglementary period prescribed by Section 3 of Rule 41.
Under these circumstances, the order of the trial court dismissing
the Complaint has become final and executory. As such, it is beyond
the reach of a Motion for consideration. 19 The Notice of Appeal,
therefore, was properly denied. Perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period laid down by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal as
required by the rules has the effect of rendering the judgment final
and executory. A strict observance of the reglementary period
within which to exercise the statutory right of appeal has been
considered as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays. 20
As a last recourse in support of their case, the petitioners invoke the
following observations made by this Court in De Las Alas v. Court of
Appeals, 21 to wit:
Regardless, however, of the above findings and even assuming that
respondents' position were correct, WE find that a one-day delay
does not justify the dismissal of the appeal under the circumstances
obtaining in this case. The real purpose behind the limitation of the
period of appeal is to forestall or avoid an unreasonable delay in the
administration of justice and to put an end to controversies ... 22
Unfortunately for the petitioners, the observation made by this
Court in De Las Alas does not apply to their case.
In De Las Alas, the view expressed by this Court to the effect that "a
one-day delay does not justify the dismissal of the appeal" is
qualified by the phrase "under the circumstances obtaining in this
case". Unlike the situation faced by the herein petitioners, there is
no showing that the petitioners in the De Las Alas case failed to file
their Motion for Reconsideration as well as their Record on Appeal
within the reglementary period. On the contrary, this Court noted
therein the lack of delay on the part of the petitioners in that
case, viz
Furthermore, WE note from the records the absence or lack of the
element of intent to delay the administration of justice on the part
of petitioners in this case. On the contrary, petitioners' counsel have
demonstrated cautiousness, concern and punctuality in the
prosecution of the appeal. They filed their motion for
reconsideration October 7, 1972, even if the respondent lower court
judge had given them an extension up to October 24, 1972, within
which to file the said motion. Petitioners had up to December 25,
1972, within which to submit their record on appeal, yet they filed
their record on appeal on December 8, 1972, or 17 days before the
deadline. 23
Moreover, a doubtful and controversial question of law confronted
the parties in the De Las Alas case, i.e., the matter of computing the
reglementary period for filing an Appeal. The respondent court
found petitioner had only two (2) days left to perfect the appeal
after the denial of the motion for reconsideration while this Court
held petitioners had three (3) days left deducting the period within
which the motion for reconsideration has been pending, excluding
the first day in the computation of the period, but since the last day
falls on a Sunday the period of appeal is ipso jure extended to the
first working day immediately following. 24 In the case at bar,
however, there is no such doubtful or controversial question of law
submitted for Our resolution.
For the petitioners to seek exception for their failure to comply
strictly with the requirements for perfecting their Appeal, strong
compelling reasons, like the prevention of a grave miscarriage of
justice, must be shown to exist in order to warrant this Court to
suspend the Rules. 25 No such reasons have been shown to exist in
this case. In fact, the petitioners did not even offer any reasonable
explanation for their delay.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, We find no jurisdictional
infirmity, sufficient to call for the issuance of the corrective writ of
certiorari in the action taken by the trial court. As stated earlier, the
instant Petition is devoid of merit.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition

for certiorari prohibition and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.