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Badros, Notes On Philosophy of Mathematics
Badros, Notes On Philosophy of Mathematics
Class Notes
PHL-113
Dr. Carl Posy
Duke University
Fall 1992
Prepared by
Greg J. Badros
Table of Contents
5.2 Cantor 29
5.3.1 Peano 33
5.3.2 Frege 34
3) infinity - peculiar notion specific to pure math, yet a central concept to applied
calculations
Overview of Part I
1. Prehistory of numbers
2. Crisis in Greek Mathematics, the Calculus Crisis, and the 20th Century Crisis
Crises result from problems between numerical and geometrical mathematical models
A farmer wanted to shoot a crow who was eating his crop. He went out by himself and
hid behind a tree waiting for the crow to come out. Unfortunately, the crow saw him
hide behind the tree, and wouldn't return until he'd seen the farmer (and his rifle)
leave. The farmer then figured he would trick the crow; he and his wife went out and
both hid behind the tree. The farmer then sent his wife back inside, in clear view of
the crow. Again, the crow wouldn't come out until the farmer left as well-- the crow
could apparently tell the difference between one and two people. The farmer then
repeated his attempts with three, four, five, six, and seven of his friends. Not until he
brought a seventh friend, and sent all seven friends away from the tree did the crow
come out of hiding, at which point the farmer promptly shot the crow.
Although the crow could distinguish between one through seven, it seemed as though
it couldn't tell the difference between seven and eight individuals. It could "count" as
high as seven, since it has six talons. It could remember the number of people by
equating each person to a talon, and thinking one, two, three, four, five, six, more.
Since both seven and eight people equate to "more" they were indistinguishable to the
crow.
Counting
Counting rests on a 1-1 correspondence; a mapping between the elements of two sets;
for example, stones(1) used to count sheep. the set of talons, however, was exhausted
with the seventh person, since there were no more talons to correspond to the last
person.
Usually the correspondence is set up because we are concerned about the size of one
set against the index set.
English numbers are infinite, based on the number 10 (decimal), while French
numbers are based on 20.(2)
Babylonians used base 60,(3) which is why time and the circle are divided into
multiples of 60. They also altered their number system to simplify calculations within
different applications.
For counting, the order is significant, while cardinal numbers' order is irrelevant.
In English, we make a semantic distinction between the two types of numbers: fifth is
an ordinal number, expressing an ordered position, while five is a cardinal number
expressing a magnitude.
I.2 Greek Development of Math
Thales is credited with the beginning of Greek mathematics; he gave math the
position of a separate science-- it's own area of discourse.
believed "number rules the universe" - made no distinction between math, physics, or
different areas of mathematics
developed number theory(5) (primes, relative primes, amicable numbers, etc.) with
applications (eg. harmonics)
If commensurability were true, (1+1)=2 must equal p/q where p and q are natural
numbers.
3) p=q2 p2=2q2
9) Both q and p are even, thus they share the common factor of 2; this however,
contradicts step #2, that p/q is reduced to lowest terms, thus our assumption that
2=p/q is false.
at any instant of time, the arrow travels over no space, thus it is stationary
if an interval of time is a continuum of instants, the arrow doesn't move during any of
the instants, thus it doesn't move during the entire interval either.
b) Aristotle
Things are together in place when they're in one primary place; they are apart when
they are in different places. Things are in contact when their edges are in the same
place. A thing is in succession when it is after something with nothing similar (of the
same kind) in between.
Continuous is what is contiguous when the extremities are one and the same,
contained in one another. Continuous implies shared, merging edges.
Isomorphisms-- all basic continuous manifolds (i.e. space, time, motion) are
isomorphic.
Flowing motion is the basic idea of Aristotle's continuity-- very different from the
Pythagoreans' view.
Aristotle pointed out that the problem in Zeno's paradox is due to infinity.
2) Aristotle's analysis of infinity
To get a point requires infinite divisions of a line; anything short of infinite divisions
is a continuous magnitude. Infinite divisions is not possible, thus we can't get to a
point from a line.
Aristotle invented logic. In fact, his basic categorization for logic defined its study
until the late 19th century.
His basic idea was that reasoning always requires a starting point. Aristotle believed
science is made up of statements, and science is basically about inferring conclusions
from propositions. Aristotle showed what inferences were valid and what were
fallacious. He analyzed the structure of statements(8), the components of inferences.
Aristotle also introduced the idea of deduction-- that one can infer new statements by
building upon accepted past truths. This technique has the problem of infinite regress,
(9)
hence he developed postulates or axioms to serve as a foundation. Postulates (and
axioms(10)) are accepted as true, without requiring proof. All other statements about a
science must then be proven to be true using only the postulates, axioms, and
previously-proven-true statements.
Aristotle thought that concepts required definition. Again, a hierarchy existed where
there were concepts defined as specializations of more broad concepts. For example a
square could be defined as a rectangle with four equilateral sides; in this example, the
square is the species of the more broad genus, rectangle. Again, infinite regress is a
problem, necessitating fundamental concepts which aren't defined (eg. a geometric
point). Other concepts are then constructions (combinations, specializations, etc.) of
the fundamental concepts.
However, just defining a concept wasn't enough for Aristotle. He required that one
must also show an instantiation of the new concept exists. Thus each fundamental
(undefined) concept requires an existence postulate (since their existence can't be
proven).
Eudoxes
Theory of proportion:
Four magnitudes are said to be in the same ratio, the first to the second and the third
to the fourth, when, if any equimultiples whatever be taken of the first and third and
any equimultiples whatever be taken of the second and fourth, the former
equimultiples alike exceed, are alike equal to, or are alike less than the latter
equimultiples.(11)
So, if x and y are the same kind of magnitude, and z and w are also the same kind of
magnitude (not necessarily the same kind as x and y, though), then:
mx = ny implies mz = nw,
We can prove that the areas of triangles of equal heights is proportional to the lengths
of their bases. In other words, given ABC and ADE, we can show that Area of ABC :
Area of ADE = BC : DE(12).
Proof:
m AABC = n AADE
m BC = n DE.
1) Replicate segment BC to the left of B n-1 times; replicate segment DE to the right
of E m-1 times, see figure 2.
AADEm = n(AADE).(13)
4) There is a theorem that says if two triangle's share the same altitude, whichever has
the larger base has the larger area (likewise for smaller, and equal). Thus:
if m BC = n DE, then
m AABC = n AADE.
INCORRECT Proof:
1) Choose T such that BC = TP, and DE = TQ, see figure 3.
2) Divide ABC into P triangles each of base T, ADE into Q triangles each of base T.
3) Each smaller triangle has equal area, so total areas are in proportion.
ERROR: This proof assumes the existence of T, which is false. Thus the proof is
unsound-- it is based on a false assumption.
If from any magnitude there be subtracted a part not less than its half, from the
remainder another part not less that its half, and so on, there will at length remain a
magnitude less than any preassigned magnitude of the same kind.
Proof:
1) Given two circles, A1 and A2 (denoting area), with diameters d1 and d2, respectively,
we know A1 : A2 = d12 : d22 (area is proportional to square of diameter), see figure 4.
2) Take circle A1 and inscribe a regular polygon and repeatedly double the number of
sides in the inscribed polygon. See figure 5.
3) Given any small , we can eventually get an inscribed polygon, P1 with enough sides
such that:
4) Suppose:
P1 : P2 = d12 : d22
7) Thus, we have:
P1 : A2 = P1 : P2
which implies P2 > A2. However, P2 is inscribed in A2 and thus cannot have a greater
area. Therefore, our supposition in #4, above, is false.
9) If both inequalities are false, then the only other possible relationship is equality,
so:
A1 : A2 = d12 : d22
must be true.
Very sterile method; the relationship to be proved must be discovered in another way,
mathematics is simply used to prove the other possibilities to be false.
Archimedes objected to the method of exhaustion and replaced it with the method of
equilibrium.
Idea of infinite was very little strips that could be measured on a scale
Archimedes used the method of equilibria for discoveries, but used method of
exhaustion for rigorous proofs.
Euclid
Axiomatized geometry into a perfect Aristotelian science (in The Elements). Few
proofs are attributed to Euclid, his achievement was the organization: what needs to
be a postulate? etc.
Gaps were often due to the dependence on pictorial diagrams. Assumptions seemed
obvious, but needed to be explicitly stated. For example, Euclid forgot:
Given a line, there exists at least one point not on the line
If a straight line falling on two straight lines makes the interior angles on the same
side less than two right angles, then the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely,
will meet on that side on which are the angles less than two right angles. (see figure
7).
Mathematicians objected-- the postulate was too complex, and seemed derivable from
the other postulates. However, Euclid was right!
a) Incidence (intersection)
b) Betweenness
c) Congruence
d) Continuity
e) Parallelism
Hilbert points out that the interpretation of terms is irrelevant, only deductive logic is
used to generate theorems.
Dedekind's Postulate
Given line l1, split it into c1 and c2 such that l = c1 c2, and c1 and c2 are not empty nor
do they equal l. No point of c1 is between two points of c2, and no point of c2 is
between two points of c1. Then there is a unique point O such that O is between x and
y if and only if x c1, y c2
How did Hilbert realize the necessity of the parallel postulate? Many attempts were
made to prove the parallel postulate as a theorem, using only the other four postulates.
John Wallis (1616-1703) - looked for simpler postulates to assume, and tried proving
the parallel postulate from those.
Simpler Postulate: Given a ABC and any line segment DE, there exists a triangle with
DE as a side which is similar to ABC
In other words, similarity preserves shape-- size, shape, and location, are independent
of each other.
Saccheri and Lambert independently tried proving the parallel postulate by the
reductio ad absurdum method. Their proof started with "neutral geometry"--
Euclidean geometry excluding the parallel postulate.
1) B = C = 90
In the late 18th and early 19th century, three men became interested in the acute angle
hypothesis. Bolyai (Polish), Gauss (German), and Zobachevsky (Russian) all took the
negation of the parallel postulate as a postulate and added it to neutral geometry.
Nothing contradictory followed!
There is at least one line l and one point p outside of l such that through p there are at
least two lines which do not intersect l.
As it turns out, this implies through any point outside of l, there are infinitely many
lines parallel to l.
If two triangles are similar, then they are congruent-- size and
shape are not independent.(16)
Riemann developed "elliptical geometry" where there are no parallel lines; all lines
intersect.
Euclid Hyperbolic
These facts inspired Hilbert's remark that a study of geometry is just a consequence of
certain axioms and their interpretations are unimportant.
Klein said geometry is really the study of Algebra: a collection of transformations and
what remains the same. In fact, geometries can be classified by which properties of
figures remain invariant under which transformations; Euclidean geometry is
characterized by a certain set of invariants.
Bottom line:
There are several ways to consistently extend Euclid's first four postulates (neutral
geometry) in incompatible directions.
Philosophical Questions:
Hilbert believed geometry was just a formal system and the consequences of
postulates and axioms studied independently of their interpretations (an uninterpreted
formal system). A consistent interpretation of a system (called a model could be given
to show consistency.
What makes a sentence true?
The one physics verifies? Why does one work for physics? Why should any work for
physics?
An empirical question?
Meaningless game?
Respect for Aristotelian idea that a completed infinity does not belong in
mathematics.
Pressure not to admit irrationals as numbers due to their lack of a decimal expansion.
Nicholas of Cusa - cleric, write, philosopher, and theologian of the 15th century
Thought triangle was the polygon with the fewest sides; circle was the polygon with
the most sides (infinitely many sides)
"the infinite is that which cannot be made bigger. . . .the infinitesimal is that which
cannot be made smaller."
Stevin was interested in the problem of calculating the fluid pressure on a vertical
damn. He assumed the damn is made up of thin rectangles and used known formulas
for the relationship between the area and volume of the polygons, then rotated the thin
strips through the area of the damn.
After formulas were derived, they were treated as if they were delivered
independently of mathematics
Cavalieri - introduced a thin strip, or "indivisible" into mathematics. Plane strip can
be thought of as infinitely many parallel indivisibles, etc.
Cavalieri's principle:
One can move indivisibles composing a figure independently of each other and thus
recreate the figure. Then we have two figures inside two parallel lines. If all lines
parallel to two containing lines intersecting the two figures cut chords of equal
lengths, then the areas of the two figures are the same.
Cavalieri admitted that his methods clearly couldn't be rigorous; "Rigor is for
philosophers, mathematics is for scientists."
Cavalieri's chief critic was Galileo.(18) Galileo launched another attack against the
notion of infinity:
Let's think about a set of all natural numbers. It is infinite. This set is clearly larger
than the set of all perfect squares. However, there is a one to one correspondence
between the set of all natural numbers and the set of all perfect squares. Thus the sets
have the same size. A paradox is apparent.
Thus, mathematical notions don't apply to infinity; we can't speak of larger or smaller
than infinity. Infinity is not a magnitude, it is a collection of aggregates. Thus Galileo
didn't permit Cavalieri's method in mathematics, but did teach his method to students,
and advised them to use it to solve problems.
Pressure moving towards the notion of integration, yet still viewed as non-rigorous.
Theorem
If two solids have equal altitudes and if sections made by planes parallel to the bases
and of equal distance are always in a given ratio, then the solids' volumes are also in
that ratio.
Now build three dimensional figure out into space from whole rectangle and for
triangle (forming a half-pyramid)
and
Heterogenia is the notion that geometric figures are made of lots of figures in lower
dimensions. The above methods use the idea of summing these figures of lower
dimensions to make calculations about the figures of the higher dimensions
Cavalieri didn't mind because his idea of mathematics didn't require rigor.
Galileo didn't accept the methods into math, but used for calculations
Infinitesimals are objects which make up a figure; their size decreases as their number
increases.
Keppler gave a proof for the area of the circle by summing the areas of infinitely
many small triangles with heights equal to the circle's radius:(20)
John Wallis, a mathematician in favor of the idea of the indivisible, and in favor of
numerical methods attacked the same parallelogram problem as previously
mentioned. He introduced to represent the largest number. Thus, according to Wallis:
Isaac Barrow(21) also rejected analytic geometry. He favored geometrical methods and
the concept of the infinitesimal. Barrow was concerned with determining tangents to
curves, but wouldn't view curves as equations.
Take an indefinitely small arc MN, and construct MNR, and compare NR:MR to
NP:TP. There are several rules Barrow followed when considering the idea of M
moving closer and closer to coincidence:
2) Balance
rivalry developed
colorful personalities
Newton, born in 1642, had written ideas about the Calculus in the 1660s, but Leibniz,
born in 1646, had already published similar ideas. What makes things more
complicated is that there was a good deal of correspondence between the two of them.
Newton dealt with the analysis of motion; he viewed curves as the locus of motion of
a point and believed that notions of motion and flow must be used when analyzing
continua. He called his discovery the method of fluxions. Curve was a mapping
between abscissa and ordinates. Variables were called "fluents"; rates of change were
called "fluxions." The moment of a fluent was the delta of a variable. Newton's
notation was as follows:
Notation of lowercase "o" was misleading-- it looks like zero, and people accused him
of letting the t equate to zero.
Important contribution was recognizing the existence of an abstract technique which
was applicable to all problems involving rates of change.
Leibniz's notation: . dy and dx are both very small that they are insignificant,
however, their ratio is a number; thus ratios were stressed, not the individual
components.
Impact of Newton and Leibniz was due to systematicity and applicability-- not at all a
conceptual improvement. There was no longer confusion, math had a new science:
infinitesimal analysis; it was so powerful that the face of mathematics was changed
forever. It was called the Second Great Crisis because math is proceeding on the basis
of conceptually unclear notions; Physics was being based on these questionable ideas.
These problems brought serious attacks against mathematics.
George Berkeley criticized the whole process of the Calculus (in The Analyst, 1734)
saw math as the science of extended things; infinitesimals don't have extensions.
Keep mathematics, keep the Calculus; dig in and discover a clear conceptual
foundation!
I.5 Conceptual Foundations of Mathematics
Infinite quantities are not picturable-- maybe that's okay. So then what is mathematics
about?
1) Math is just an abstract science with strict definitions; it is simply a matter of proof
and rigor.
2) Math is about the physical world but we have to learn how to use the appropriate
theory about what we perceive-- we need a theory of intuition to allow us to keep the
infinitary parts of mathematics.
Within math, it was recognized that the problems arise because of the unclarity that
the mathematicians had about the relationship between geometric methods and
numerical methods. Geometric methods which allowed the infinitesimally small are
too imprecise. This led to the introduction of arithmetic techniques to the study of
infinitesimal analysis(24) to give it rigor-- a return to Pythagorean ideas.
2) Problems in math are not consistent with perceptual abilities, but do not limit math
to what is intuitable; math isn't necessarily about perceivable things, it should be
governed only by abstract considerations of rigor and reasoning.
The first reaction within the philosophical community was the first idea above.
Imanual Kant(25) and John Stuart Mill(26) took this view.
On the other hand, the mathematics world supported the second philosophical line.
This was called the anti-Kantian direction, as it opposed Kant's views. The reason for
this direction was related to two developments in pure math:
Consistent alternative theories of Geometry showed that mathematics can be
presented as an abstract system without any particular interpretation.
There was still resistance to leaving intuition behind. Kronecker,(27) for example,
advocated a return to an intuitive basis of mathematics.
First Thesis:
Mathematics is about the empirical world, but it is special in one important way:
necessary(28) properties of the world are found through mathematical proofs; to prove
something is wrong, one must show only that the world could be different.
Epistemological Problem:
Sciences are basically generalizations from experience, but this can provide only
contingent, possible properties of the world (it could have been otherwise). Science
simply predicts that the future will mirror the past.
Mathematics is about the empirical world, but usually methods for deriving
knowledge give contingent knowledge, not the necessity that pure mathematics(29)
gives us. Kant wants necessary knowledge with empirical knowledge.
1) Objects in the empirical world are appearances (or phenomenon). By their nature,
they have only the properties that we come to know of them from experiences. They
are not things in themselves. Therefore Kant said we must:
Become an idealist-- object's properties are only what is perceivable; there are no non-
experienceable properties of objects.
2) Built into our minds are two forms of intuition and perception such that every
perception we have is shaped by these forms: Space and Time. These are, in fact,
parts of the mind, and not something the mind picks up from experience. Thus,
empirical objects are necessarily spaciotemporal objects.
3) We then come to know spaciotemporal properties in an a priori fashion; in
studying spaciotemporal properties, we are merely studying ourselves, and our
perceptual abilities.
Empirical intuition, the intuition from the senses which is always finite (mathematics
doesn't deal with this), and
Pure intuition, the study of possibilities for empirical intuition where finite limits are
not introduced in either direction.
Thus mathematics can allow the division of small intervals and the expansion of large
intervals. This means we can discuss smaller and smaller quantities without
introducing the smallest quantities.
1) Pick an interval
2) Show it is divisible
3) Abstract from its actual size, and let it represent the notion of a perceivable
interval.
No such thing as unapplied mathematics-- math is, by nature, about the world (if it's
not, it's just an abstract game).
There is exactly one right mathematical theory of time, space, and motion.(31)
When F1(x), F2(x), ..., Fn(x), ... is such that for any given small quantity the difference
between Fn(x) and Fn+r(x) gets and stays smaller than that quantity as n gets larger,
then there is one and only one magnitude to which the sequence gets as close as you
please.
When the successive values attributed to a variable approach indefinitely a fixed value
so as to end by differing from it as little as one wishes, this last is called the limit of
all the others.
First step was the precise notion of what a limit is; Bolzano and Cauchy took care of
that.
Cauchy used limits in describing the notion of a derivative. He also introduced the
notion f(x):
Thus, the notion of continuity was made into an arithmetic notion (from a geometric
notion).
Cauchy tried using the limit notion for defining, and actually building, irrational
numbers out of limits and series. He said that irrational numbers are the limit of a
sequence of rational numbers. For example:
Cauchy was right that should be viewed as a number, but his attempt to show the
convergence failed because of his definition of a limit. He defined an irrational
number as the convergence of a sequence, but his definition of a limit required
knowing the limit in advance (in order to get closer and closer).
The problem with Cauchy's definition is there is no entity for the limit of the sequence
to be. Let the limit of a convergent series of rational numbers be the set of numbers in
the series. Therefore a set is a number. Hence, the limit of:
is the set:
and:
Weierstrass also introduced the - definition of a limit:
if for all > 0, there exists a > 0 such that for all t:
implies
We are now back to the Pythagorean idea of a single theory based on numerical
concepts.
Richard Dedekind took it one step more abstract. He showed the definition of
irrational number can be made only with the notion of sets of rational numbers
(eliminating the need for notions of series or convergence). Suppose we have a set of
rational numbers and cut the set into parts A and B, exhausting the set. All rational
numbers are in either set A or set B, none are in both, and all elements of A are less
than all elements of B. We can then define the abstract notion of a real number as a
pair, {A,B} of sets. For example:
Dedekind's view is more abstract, but requires less conceptual machinery-- irrationals
are defined in terms of only rationals and sets.
This view signifies a retreat on one crucial issue: Actually infinite sets must be
legitimate objects.
George Cantor showed a consistent theory of infinite magnitudes exists. He defined
natural numbers in terms of sets.
Frege showed nothing else but an infinite set is required; he thought of math as a
branch of pure abstract logic.
Mathematics is built from classification of numbers shown in figure 14. Each level
has its own set of defined operations: N, the natural numbers, have operations defined.
Q, the rational numbers, are defined as ratios of N and their operations are defined in
terms of operations on N. R, the real numbers, are defined as sets of convergent
sequences of rational numbers or as Dedekind cuts
It is important that:
The number one viewed as an element of N is a different entity from the number one
viewed as an element of Q is a different entity from the number one viewed as an
element of R.
So, ontologically, basic objects of mathematics are N (the natural numbers) and sets!
Two developments that this leads to are:
1) Investigation of the notion of infinite sets as numbers and that an infinite set can be
a number.
5.2 Cantor
Cantor, therefore, defined the notion of similarity of size (i.e. equality of cardinal):
Two sets have the same cardinality if there exists a one to one mapping between them
(34)
which exhausts them both.
Dedekind said an infinite set is a set which can be put into a one-one correspondence
with a proper subset of itself.
Proof: Write out rational numbers as shown in figure 15. All rational numbers
appear on the grid. Now give them the order shown by arrows. This orders the
rational numbers, thus creating a one to one correspondence with N. The first rational
number in the ordering corresponds to one, the second corresponds to two, etc.
A denumerable set (sometimes called enumerable) is one that can be put into a one to
one correspondence with the set of natural numbers.
Cantor conjectured that there are only two types of cardinal numbers: finite or
infinite; thus all infinite sets would be of the same size. However, he proved this
conjecture false! The set of R is larger than N; in fact there are more real numbers
between zero and one than there are total natural numbers.
Diagonal Proof:(36)
Assume that . List all natural numbers down left side, and give
corresponding real number to each's right:
1 0.a11 a21 a31 a41 a51 a61 .....
etc.
In other words, let r differ by at least one digit (the diagonal digit) from all the real
numbers listed. Thus r is different from each rational at least one digit, so:
Given any set K, the power set of K, P(K) = { S | S \&} K }. The following is then
true:
Recursively, a set of subsets of a set of subsets is an even larger infinity, and so on.
This implies that there exists an infinite hierarchy of larger cardinal numbers. In
general:
=0
P{1,2,3} = 8 = 2# of elements
Another reason for this notation is that we haven't yet proved that there is no set A
such that:(38)
In general, don't operate with the cardinal number itself; instead, do a set-theoretic
operation on sets with cardinalities of the given numbers.
Question remains: What type entity is a cardinal number? The distinction between
cardinal and ordinal numbers is unimportant with finite numbers because their
makeup coincides; however with infinite numbers, a distinction is necessary.
= , and
However:
+ 1 because {1,2,3,...} {a} = a set with an end having no unique predecessor (different
from which has no end).
*
is the order type of negative natural numbers, so:
*
+1=*
A conceptual foundation for the calculus was provided-- all notions of mathematics
was reduced to the ideas of natural numbers and the (possibly infinite) set.
Kronecker engaged in criticism of Cantor. He thought all Cantor did was nonsense--
just the artificial work of man.(40)
Now mathematics has been reduced to natural numbers and sets. However, the
questions remain: Where is the rigor behind natural numbers? What are natural
numbers? Why does the reduction stop there? Thus, there is a general move towards
creating a non-intuitive conceptual framework for natural numbers.
5.3.1 Peano
First attempt was by Peano.(41) He goes back to Euclid's idea to give a complete
axiomatization of the framework. Peano gave five axioms about the notion of a
natural number:
1) 0 is a natural number
3) If k = m then k = m.
If 0 has some property, P, and if n having property P implies that n also has property
P, then every number has property P.(42)
Doesn't tell what a number is; the basic notions (i.e. number, successor, and 0) are left
undefined.(43)
Doesn't uniquely characterize the set, N, of natural numbers. Lots of sets fit into the
pattern, for example, E, the set of even numbers fits into the pattern as well.(44)
5.3.2 Frege
To every property there corresponds a specific object (called the extension of that
property) that is the set of all things that have that property.
Notation:
By this, the number 3 is a set with cardinality 0. The number 0, however, has
cardinality of 1.
Only expresses the cardinal aspect of what a number is-- does nothing for ordinality.
Frege, therefore, took one final step. He recognized that what we needed were related
canonical sets. Thus he defined the natural numbers as follows:
and so on. Note that this is a recursive definition in which the number n is defined in
terms of smaller numbers. This fact gives the natural numbers a sense of ordering
(how closely are they related to zero).
Thus, Frege's account of natural numbers is that sets are the fundamental notions out
of which numbers are build. Natural numbers depend only on the notions of a
property, the extension of a property, equality, and negation-- all of these are notions
from logic, not mathematics. Hence, Frege ultimately concluded that mathematics is
simply a branch of pure logic. Note Frege's definition is ontological. It is also anti-
Kantian in that math is clearly freed from any appeal to intuition. Rigor was achieved
through definition and the use of artificial language. Frege supported Platonism: the
idea that mathematical objects are abstract to the extreme-- there can be no interaction
with mathematical objects through the senses.
Frege's definitions of mathematical objects makes use only of logical ideas: or, not,
equals, set, property, and extensions. Thus any being capable of clear thought and
understanding the simple concepts has the complete foundation necessary for
mathematics.
Bertrand Russell's work brought Frege's work into the public eye.
Problem:
Russell noticed that there existed a difficulty in the basic notion that every property
has an extension.
Some properties are self-referential (they apply to themselves). For example, the
property of being abstract is self-referential: the set of all things that are abstract
includes the set of all abstract things. Thus the set is a member of itself. Conversely, a
non-self-referential property has an extension which does not include itself. For
example, the property of being a building: the set of all things that are buildings (the
set of all buildings) does not include itself.
Frege's assumption was that every abstract notion has an extension. Consider the
properties of being a member of oneself and not being a member of oneself. We have:
, and
More importantly, r is not an element of itself (by definition). We will try to prove this
by a reductio ad absurdum method:
There were three main reactions to the crisis in the foundation of mathematics:
1) Bertrand Russell's Platonism-- maintain Frege's work, just patch up its problems.
Both reactions two and three were anti-platonic; they favored recoiling from the
abstractness of mathematics, and refounding it on intuition.
Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell collaborated on a work called Principia
Mathematica for over a decade. This work:
Went into detail of the theorems of Number Theory and The Calculus, all from Frege's
basic definitions.
Was carried out entirely in an abstract formal language-- a forerunner of modern logic
notation.
To remove Russell's paradox from Frege's theory, Russell and Whitehead refined the
notion of a set by introducing Type Theory. In type theory, no set can be an element of
itself; the thought of a set being an element of itself makes no sense. In type theory,
there are different levels of objects:
Thus, everything that exists gets typed at a certain level. It then becomes obvious that
nothing could be an element of something of its own level or lower. This, in fact
restricts the ability to form sets since each set must be capable of being typed at a
certain level. This system results in there being no such thing as a universal set,
because it must come in at a certain level, but the level one high up would be larger.
GVB Set theory was based on the idea of classes. Every property had a corresponding
class, and there were two types of classes: sets, and proper classes. The notion of a set
was basically the same as with Russell and Whitehead. Proper classes were very large
classes that never came into being at a level; they were never elements of anything
(the universal class, for example, is a proper class).
Gdel proved in 1940 that the continuum hypothesis is consistent with the axioms of
set theory; he used the same method as used for Euclid's fifth postulate-- give a
nonstandard model and show that all axioms hold, as well as the axiom whose
consistency we want to test holds. Gdel constructed an inner model of set theory
reinterpreting through a set, L, and showed that all axioms of set theory held, and
additionally proved the continuum hypothesis. Gdel also showed that the axiom of
choice is true within L.
Axiom of choice gives a new method of making sets. It lets one arbitrarily put objects
into a set, thus implying that sets whose elements we can never describe exist. For
example, we can construct a countably infinite set of rational numbers, one element
from the interval [0,1], one from [1,2], etc.; this set, since it's infinite, can not be
listed, and since it's random, cannot be described.
Cohen, in 1962, used an inner model and forcing techniques to show that the negation
of the continuum hypothesis was also true. Thus, the continuum hypothesis becomes
an undecidable question, like the parallel postulate.
Set theory is too rich; there are too many different ways to build up the rest of
mathematics.
The basic element shouldn't be arbitrarily picked, yet nothing dictates its choice. The
modern view is structuralism: the basic units are structures, not actually objects
In the late 1960's, Paul Bernaceraf wrote paper called What the Numbers Could Not
Be.(47) Benacerraf claimed that numbers couldn't be a specific thing, because there is
nothing forcing them to be anything specific. This leads to structuralism. In
structuralism, to be a natural number, is to be a place in the sequence.
Gdel, in 1964, wrote What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? He said that we do have
intuition; not sensory intuition, though. Instead, Gdel believed intellectual
mathematical intuition exists and is developed through sufficient practice of
mathematics.
Hilbert had an anti-Kantian reaction now called formalism. Hilbert had two
conflicting goals while developing formalism:(49)
But,
Hilbert did not want to lose any part of mathematics. He refused to give up the
infinitary methods which worked so well: "No one will expel us from the paradise
where Cantor has led us."
The result of these conflicting goals is called Hilbert's Program. The program is
implemented in two steps:
1) Divide all of the mathematical sciences into two broad classes: The real part (or
conceptual part) of mathematics and the ideal part of mathematics. The real part
included only the parts of mathematics which don't take us into the infinitary realm. It
involved no ontological or epistemological questions. Logic, and number theory are
part of real mathematics.
The ideal part of mathematics included everything else-- all the parts of mathematics
that would have been discarded without Hilbert's second motive. This includes
geometry, set theory, and analysis.
Hilbert had the basic idea that any branch of mathematics can be formalized (meaning
it can be expressed in a formal language(50)) and can be axiomatized to give a formal
system.
2) Hilbert observed that a formal system by itself is nothing other than a set of
symbols and rules for dealing with them. Symbols and rules belong to the real part of
mathematics. Thus, the science of dealing with formal systems (proving properties,
etc.) belongs to the real realm of mathematics. Among the properties we should be
able to prove is that of consistency. Consistency implies that no contradictions will
arise when dealing with the system. The method of proving consistency belongs to the
real part of mathematics.
The science of dealing with formal systems is called metamathematics. The usual way
to prove consistency is to model the formal system in concrete mathematics and then
show that the model was consistent.
2) Show that the formal system, S, is adequate. In other words, the axioms must really
give a formal system for the desired branch of mathematics. There are two things that
must be proven to imply adequacy.
a) Soundness. Every theorem derivable from the formal system must be true in the
branch of mathematics the formal system implements. No false consequences may
follow from the axioms.
Hilbert and his student Ackerman produced a formal system for logic.
Two of Hilbert's students, Earnst Zermelo and Abraham Fraenkel, formalized set
theory.(51)
Kurt Gdel was a major player in Hilbert's Program. Gdel's dissertation proved the
completeness of (first-order) logic. This proof became known as Gdel's
Completeness Theorem.
Gdel also proved that Hilbert was right about his assumption that metamathematics
was part of the real part of mathematics. Gdel used number theory as a completely
concrete example. He then showed how to translate talking about symbols into talking
about numbers. He assigned a code to each symbol in such a way that these so-called
Gdel-numbers multiplied together represent a formula, sets of formulas, and other
things. Then one can talk about the Gdel-numbers using number theory.
Constructing Gdel-numbers:
To make a Gdel-number for a statement in a formal system, you must first assign
each symbol a distinct integer starting from one. Then assign each position in the
statement consecutive prime numbers (starting with 3). The Gdel-number for the
statement is the product of primes taken to the power of number assigned to the
symbol in that position of the statement. Since the number two is not a factor of the
Gdel-number for a statement, all statements' Gdel-numbers will be odd.
Gdel-numbers for sequences of statements (such as in a proof) are constructed by
multiplying out consecutive primes (starting with the number two) taken to the power
of the Gdel-number of the statement appearing at that position in the list. For
example, if Ai is a statement in a proof and A1 is the first line of the proof and An is the
last line, the Gdel-number for the list of statements is:
To say something is a theorem means we can write down a list of sentences which is a
proof of it. Thus a theorem's Gdel-number is the last sentence in an even Gdel
number. This reduces proofs of theorems to a number-theoretic property involving
Gdel-numbers. Thus consistency can be shown through number theory. Gdel
showed anything that we can represent in a formal system of number theory is
finitary.
Problem
Gdel showed Hilbert's Program can not succeed. This was proven in what is now
called Gdel's Incompleteness Theorem. This theorem states:
If S is consistent, then there is a sentence, G, such that neither G nor the negation of G
(written G) is a theorem of S.
Thus, any formal system sufficient to express the theorems of number theory has to be
incomplete.
Proof:
S can prove P(n) just in case n is the Gdel-number of a theorem of S. There exists k,
such that k is a Gdel-number of the formula P(k)=G. This statement says of itself, it
is not provable.
The reasoning Gdel used for his incompleteness theorem is finitary, so it could be
formalized inside S. Thus, S can prove that if S is consistent, then G is not provable.
Note that the underlined phrase is what G says, so S proves Cst(S)(53) implies G is true,
but G says G is not provable.
Suppose S can prove Cst(S), then S can prove G, but if S is consistent, it can't prove
G, thus it can't prove its consistency. Thus, Hilbert's Program does not work; one
cannot prove the consistency of a mathematical theory.
Gentzen looked at Gdel's incompleteness theorem and asked why is the formal
system for arithmetic so weak that it's unable to prove its own consistency. A natural
constriction on proofs is that they are finite lists of statements. Gentzen offered a
theory of arithmetic which then allowed the proof of the consistency of the formal
system of arithmetic in Principia Mathematica. His principle strengthened the axiom
of mathematical induction, allowing a strong induction axiom. Traditional induction
assumes the domain has order type . Gentzen, however, assumed the domain had a
more complicated, higher order type, 0. This order type was defined as:
Now we are qualifying over the set of proofs instead of the set of natural numbers.
The set of proofs viewed as a finite branching tree has order type 0.
Philosophical Questions
Suppose we admit the provability of the consistency of the formal system for
arithmetic. Is that proof epistemologically satisfactory? Is induction through 0 finitary
reasoning?
Alonzo Church has a thesis now simply called Church's Thesis. It states that any
epistemological proposal put forth as concrete finitary reasoning can be shown to be
equivalent to the theory of recursive functions.(54) Gentzen's theory goes beyond the
theory of recursive functions. This raises the question: Is Gentzen's proof a part of real
mathematics?
Ontological Problem
Hilbert's program still has a division between real and ideal parts of mathematics.
What ontological status do objects in the ideal part of mathematics have? They have
no reality. They were simply created to give the ideal parts, to give us shortcuts, but
never believed to be a part of reality. This gives us a realm of virtual objects,
completing the dualism of objects: there are objects that exist, and objects that don't
exist.
Paul Bernaceraf raises this dilemma: What is our standard theory of knowledge? Of
truth? There is sort of a correspondence theory; knowledge comes to be known
because objects impinge upon our cognitive faculties through our senses, and we form
beliefs through causal interaction between the object we are thinking about and our
thoughts. The formalists and the Platonists have complementary difficulties
concerning these matters.
Formalists
However, truths can only be for the real part of mathematics; there are no things
corresponding to our beliefs in the ideal part. This results in a dualistic theory of
truths-- some thoughts are true through a hybrid, artificial theory, while others are true
through normal means.
Platonists
Platonists believed that abstract reality is a reality. Thus, they don't have the problem
with truths because objects in the ideal part of mathematics have properties. Instead
the Platonists have an epistemological problem-- one can have no knowledge of
objects in the ideal part of mathematics; they can't impinge on our senses in any
causal way.
This fact, that the formalists have no satisfactory theory of truth while the Platonists
have no satisfactory theory of knowledge, is called Bernaceraf's problem. The effect
of Benaceraf's paper was to make public the idea that neither the formalists' nor the
Platonists' theories were totally acceptable.
Brouwer was a solipsist. He believed the only mind was his own, and was less
concerned with intersubjectivity than was Kant.
Brouwer must reconstruct certain parts of mathematics given his own constraints. The
positive program of intuitionism is a construction of mathematics as limited by
Brouwer's Theory of Consciousness. The negative program of intuitionism argues that
standard mathematics is actually wrong (or at least inconsistent).
Brouwer does argue that standard mathematics is inconsistent; his argument is based
on his epistemological idealism. Brouwer makes little distinction between Hilbert and
the Platonists.
In constructing the natural numbers, there is one fundamental idea: We have the
ability to distinguish one thing from another. Then, we must abstract from the
difference between the two things, and get the concept of forming an entity with one
part and another part. Through this activity, the natural numbers are constructed; the
natural number one corresponds to the intuition before performing this mental
activity, while two corresponds to the intuition after the activity. Repeating the mental
abstraction gives the subsequent natural numbers. It is important to concentrate only
on the act itself-- abstracted from the content; one must look at the empty form.
Through this method, the intuitionists also derive the basic numerical operators. An
equation:
is the report of four activities: generating the numbers, looking at two of them
together, and recognizing they're the same as a third. Arend Heyting(55) said the role of
a math teacher is to make the student carry out the same mental activities as he did.
Problem: The previous processes have finite limitations on the number of steps. The
set of real numbers requires infinity in some way or another.
A choice sequence is given by a deterministic rule to give the first few elements, and a
not-necessarily-deterministic rule for picking subsequent elements. Brouwer pointed
out that this corresponds to an a priori intuition of time: the past is fixed, while the
future depends on the past, but many possibilities remain.
Example
is a sequence of rationals.
The canonical choice sequence is the sequence used to generate decimal fractions.
is a sequence of rationals.
Are and the same? Do they converge to the same real number? We don't and cannot
know! Some important questions about choice sequences are not answerable in a
finite amount of time. Thus, there is no truth concerning questions about the equality
of and . We don't even know if we'll know the answer in a finite amount of time.
Brouwer had to rework set theory to coincide with his other constructions. Under his
version of set theory, the distinction between an element of a set and the set itself is
less well-defined.
Brouwer proved a theorem stating that every real-valued function defined on a closed
interval is uniformly continuous on that interval. Consider f(x) = 1 for x < , f(x) = 3
for x > . This function is clearly discontinuous at x = . It also appears to be defined
over the interval [0,1]. However, in order for Brouwer's theorem to hold, he must
show that the function is not defined at some point on the interval. One such point is .
We can't tell what f() is equal to. Thus, this is not a counterexample to Brouwer's
theorem.
From this, we can see that a function is defined if its value depends on only a finite
amount of information about the input. This corresponds identically to continuity.
Brouwer can easily prove the uncountability of the real numbers. Consider a function,
f, mapping the reals into the natural numbers. If this is truly a continuous function, its
value must be calculable based on a finite amount of information. However, since the
natural numbers are discrete, such a function would have to be discontinuous. Let's
say f() = n. Then, f() = n if = , or f() = k, if (where k n). Thus, the function, f,
must be undefined at x = . Therefore the function cannot be continuous (it isn't
defined everywhere), and the real numbers must be uncountable.(57)
Suppose we want to divide the continuum into two sets, A and B (B = R - A). This
activity of forming a subset of the continuum is perfectly natural. Using the method of
characteristic functions, we can translate talking about sets into talking about
functions. We define fA(x) = 1 if x A, fA(x) = 0 if x A. This method results in
undetachable sets-- sets such that they cannot cleanly be picked out of the continuum.
The real number may, or may not, be in the set, and the characteristic function for that
set is discontinuous. In fact, for any subset of R, the characteristic function for R is
discontinuous. In other words, there are no detachable subsets of the continuum. This
view of the real number line is the same as Aristotle's. In a sense, we've come full
circle, as the problems with the Aristotelian continuum re-appear.
Brouwer noticed that the properties of space thought to be purely geometric can be
expressed temporally once we admit that what characterizes the structure of time is
that the future is undecided.
The intuitionists and the Platonists agree on one important point: They both believe
that the ideal parts of mathematics consist of actual objects created in the mind.
Brouwer, later in his career, admitted that there was a problem with choice sequences.
The basic tenet that a real number is created by acts of choice seemed improper-- it
required acts of humans, which Brouwer didn't feel should be introduced into
mathematics. In the late 1940's, Brouwer introduced the method of the creating
subject to generate real numbers. He said we should focus on an idealized
mathematician, B, and divide his research into stages. At each stage we ask him the
status of an unsolved mathematical problem. We then define the sequence :
(n) = if at the nth stage, B hasn't yet proved or refuted the unsolved problem.
This process forms a sequence which is a real number; there is no act of choice.
Instead, there is an automatic procedure, capturing the same effect as choice
sequences, without appealing to the non-mathematical act of choice.
Clearly, this method will not work if the unsolved problem is solved, so, in order for
the method of the creating subjects to be an acceptable method, there must be an
inexhaustible supply of unsolvable mathematical problems. Brouwer, as a matter of
faith, believed this to be true. Hilbert, however, in a famous address to the congress of
mathematicians in the late nineteenth century, remarked that there could be no
problem which is unsolvable in principle. Brouwer obviously opposed this view.
Both Hilbert and Brouwer were constructivists. Hilbert's Kantianism was very
different from Brouwer's, though. Hilbert actually put a structure on the intuitive part
of mathematics-- essentially that of finitary thought and formal systems. With Gdel's
work, we can see that Hilbert's formal system fits the theory of recursive functions.
Brouwer was very much opposed to these ideas, especially that of formalizing
systems. He even opposed the formalization of logic. Brouwer had a very radical view
of mathematics and language's relationship. In language, we can communicate the
output of mathematical construction, thus helping others recreate the mathematical
experience. But, the proof itself--mathematical thought itself--construction itself--is a
pre-linguistic, purely conscious activity which is much more flexible than language.
Brouwer thought formal systems could never be adequate to cover all the flexible
options available to the creative mathematician. Brouwer, in fact, thought formalism
was absurd! In particular, Brouwer thought that it was crazy to think that codified
logic could capture the rules for correct mathematical thought. He showed particular
rules of logic are inadequate. The most famous of these was the law of the excluded
middle: fails for . Another such rule, the rule of double
negation ( ) does not hold either. The inadequacy of the rule of double
negation is another good reason for rejecting reductio ad absurdum proofs for positive
results.
A second major distinction between Brouwer and Hilbert was that they disagreed on
the position of logic. While Hilbert thought logic was an autonomous, finished
science that could be freely applied to other mathematics, Brouwer argued logic
should only come after the mathematics is developed.
Gdel, in the middle 1930s, proved the consistency of classical number theory relative
to the consistency of intuitionistic number theory. Gdel, in 1958, gave an even more
interesting proof to the effect that one can't proof the consistency of a formal system
within a formal system with equivalent finitary limitations. Instead, one must use a
less finitary formal system. Intuitionistic number theory is, in fact, less finitary than
the formalist's number theory.
Intuitionism's drawbacks
Intuitionistic mathematics is much less familiar, and arguably more complicated than
classical mathematical theory.
a priori 24
Abscissa 21
Abstractness 1
Adequate 41
Analyst, The 22
Anti-Kantian view 23
Applicability 1
Archimidean Postulate 11
Archimides 10
Area of circle 19
Aristotle 5, 50
analysis of infinity 5
logic 5
proof methods 5
Atomic parts 3
Atomism 19
Axiom of choice 38
Axiomatization of Geometry 12
Axioms 6
Babylonians 3, 11
Barrow, Isaac 20
Belttrami 15
Berkeley, George 22
Bernaceraf's Problem 45
Bolyai 14
Bolzano 25
Definition of a limit 25
Brouwer, L. E. J. 46-52
Brouwer's 37
Brouwer's Doctrine 46
Calculus, Invention of 21
Cardinal numbers 2
Category theory 39
Cauchy 25
Definition of a Limit 26
Cavalieri 17, 19
Cavalieri's principle 17
Church, Alonzo 44
Church's Thesis 44
Circle, area of 19
Classes 38
Cohen 38
Commensurability 3
Completed infinity 5, 16
Contiguous succession 5
Continuity 3, 28
Aristotle's definition 5
Continuous magnitude 26
Continuum
Intuitionist's theory of 47
Continuum hypothesis 38
Counting 2
Crisis
Second 22
Third 37
Crisis, First 3
external 26
internal 25
Decimal 2
Dedekind 39
Dedekind Cuts 28
Dedekind's Postulate 13
Deduction 6
Definition of concepts 6
Denumerable set 30
Diagonal Proof 30
Discrete 3
Discrete mathematics 11
Discreteness 4
Doctrine of Logicism 36
Egyptians 11
Elements 11
Elements, The 11
Elliptical geometry 15
Empirical intuition 25
Enumerable set 30
Epistemology 1
Elements, The 11
Eudoxes 6
Method of Exhaustion 9
Theory of proportion 6
Exhausted 2
Existence postulate 6
Extension 35
Fallacious 6
Figurate numbers 3
Finitary reasoning 40
First-order property 36
fluents 21
fluxions 21
Formal system 16
Formalism 40, 51
Fraenkel, Abraham 41
Frege 28, 34
Function, continuous 26
Galileo
Attack on infinity 17
Criticizing Cavalieri 17
Gauss 14
General Survey 1
Gentzen 43, 44
Genus 6
Geometry
Euclidean 25
Gdel, Curt 44
Completeness Theorem 42
Gdel-number 43
Gdel-numbers 42
Gdel-numbers 42
Group theory 39
Heterogenia 19
Heterogenous indivisible 19
Axiomatization of Geometry 12
Hilbert's Postulates
Betweenness 12
Congruence 12
Continuity 12
Incidence 12
Parallelism 12
Hilbert's Program 40
Hilbert's Program 43
Homegenous indivisible 19
Hyperbolic geometry 15
Inconsistencies 1
Index set 2
Indirect proof 4
indivisible 17
heterogenous 19
homegenous 19
Indivisibles
vs. infinitesimals 19
Infinite divisibility 3, 4
Infinite divisions 5
Infinite regress 6
Infinitesimal 20
Infinitesimals
vs. indivisibles 19
Infinity 1
Artistotle's analysis 5
attack against 17
Instantiation 6
Integration 18
Internal convergence 27
Internally inconsistent 4
Intuition 25
Empirical 25
Intuition, pure 25
Irrational numbers 3
Isomorphism 5
Kant 46
Epistemological Problem 24
First Thesis 24
Klein 15
Lambert 14
Leibniz 21
Levels of objects 37
Limit 25
Bolzano's Definition 25
Cauchy's Definition 26
Epsilon-delta definition 27
Weierstrass' definition 27
Linguistics 39
Logic 5, 35, 52
Logicism 36
Magnitudes 11
Metamathematics 41, 42
Method of equilibrium 10
Method of fluxions 21
Methodology 1
Model 16
Moment of a fluent 21
names 34
Natural Numbers
Intuitionist's construction of 47
Neutral geometry 14
Newton 21
Newton and Leibniz, Impact of 22
Newton, Isaac 21
Nicholas of Cusa 16
Non-Euclidean geometry 46
discovery 14
evaluation of 13
Number theory 3
Ontology 1
order-type 32
Ordinal numbers 2
Ordinality
Cantor's notion 32
Ordinates 21
Paradoxes 1
Negation of 14
Pascal 20
Peano 33
Pictorial diagrams 11
Plato 4
Postulates 6
Potential infinity 5
Power set 31
predicates 34
prick of x 21
Principle of Comprehension 35
Proclus 13
Proof by contradiction 4
Proof methods
Aristotle's view 5
Proofs 3
Proper classes 38
Properties
self-referential 36
Property
first-order 36
second-order 36
Pythagoreans 3, 5
Rational 3
Reactions to Berkeley 23
Real Numbers
Intuitionist's Construction of 47
Recursive 35
Reductio ad absurdum 47
Riemann 15
Rigor 17
Rigorous 17
Saccheri 14
Second-order property 36
Self-evident assumptions
11
Self-referential 36
Set 27
Space 24
Spaciotemporal 24
Species 6
spirit of finesse 20
Stevin 17
Straight arrows 50
Structuralism 39
Thales 3
Theory of proportion 6
magnitudes 11
numbers 11
Third Crisis 37
Reactions to 37
Thomas Heath 11
Time 24
Total order 49
True geometry 16
Turing, Alan 42
Type theory 37
Ultraintuitionism 47
Unapplied mathematics 25
Undetachable sets 50
Unsound proof 9
Ur intuition 48
Valerio 17
Valid 6
Vieta 19
VonNeuman, John 38
Wallis
axiom, his 15
Weierstrass 27
Zeno 4
paradoxes of motion 4
Zeno's paradox 5, 11
Zermelo, Earnst 41
Zobachevsky 14
3. The number 60 has three prime components (2, 3, and 5), one more than either 10
or 20. That additional prime component was useful in calculations.
4. The Pythagoreans were a nearly religious cult who followed Pythagoras and his
ideas.
5. One number theoretical discovery the Pythagoreans made is that squares are sums
of two successive triangular numbers.
7. Note the way the potential infinity's definition is stated negatively, without
mentioning the ultimate existence of a point.
10. Axioms are self-evident universal truths, while postulates are specific to a
particular science, and may be irrelevant to other sciences.
12. Note that here, plugging into the symbolic interpretation of the theory of
proportion, x and y are areas of triangles (the same kind of magnitude) and z and w
are line segments (again, same kinds of magnitudes). We couldn't say the area of one
triangle relative to its base is equal to the area of the other, relative to its base.
13. The fact that triangles of equal height have areas in proportion to their base had
already been proven by the Pythagoras.
14. This Greek idea seems less advanced-- a step backward. The Egyptians and the
Babylonians had an integrated view to mathematics.
15. Conversely, given Euclid's fifth postulate, this postulate can be proven.
16. Note that from this it follows that Wallis' axiom is false.
17. This need derives from applications of mathematics to the physical world.
Decimal expansion of numbers is one example.
19. Along with this is the idea of atomism, that all spatial figures are made of atomic
parts.
20. This proof uses the homogenous indivisible-- an indivisible with the same number
of dimensions as the figure it makes up. This contrasts with the heterogenous
indivisible-- one which has fewer dimensions than the whole it sums to.
22. There is no justification for this; it is based on the mathematician Pascal who also
took the infinitesimal approach. He called it the "spirit of finesse."
29. Pure mathematics is, after all, an a priori science; it involves the study of things
known prior to having experience.
30. Mathematics involving the study of space is geometry. That which involves the
study of time is arithmetic (the concept of succession). The Calculus, specifically
mechanics, studies motion, which is the study of the interaction between space and
time.
35. The symbol means "is a proper subset of." A proper subset is a subset which isn't
the whole set.
36. This proof again utilizes the popular method, reductio ad absurdum.
37. The character representing the cardinal number of the natural numbers, 0, is the
Hebrew letter alaf subscripted with the Egyptian numeral zero.
38. This remains a question until 1962, at which point the answer is that there is no
answer; it is undecidable. Gdel showed the existence of A to be consistent, and
Cohen later showed its non-existence to be consistent as well. See Gdel, Escher, and
Bach by Douglas Hofstadter for more on undecidable axioms. The hypotheses that 2 0
40. Interestingly, Cantor had a general nervous breakdown as a result of conflicts with
Kronecker. Mathematics today does accept Cantor's work as the foundation of basic
mathematical analysis.
43. Bertrand Russell commented that "all of mathematics is hostage to these three
concepts" pointing to the need for an ontological basis of the three primitive ideas.
44. Russell thought the axioms did, at least, characterize the notion of a progression--
a set of order type . However, sets of order types + * + also fit Peano's axiomatization.
46. Peano actually wrote papers in the artificial language Frege invented.
47. This title was a pun on Dedekind's book, What Are and What Ought to Be the
Numbers.
48. David Hilbert was one of the top mathematicians in the twentieth century. No
branch of mathematics is without Hilbert's influence, and he was indeed a pioneer of
many modern areas of investigation.
49. Hilbert's basic inspiration towards creating formal systems was founded in the
consistency proofs for non-Euclidean geometry. Hilbert observed that one can
concentrate separately on the language, forgetting about a specific interpretation, thus
dealing only with a concrete thing.
52. Turing was one of the early founders of computer science. He is especially famous
for his Turing machine.
53. Here, we're using Cst(S) to mean that the formal system, S, is consistent.
54. Referring to the theory of constructive functions and recursive functions initiated
by Curt Gdel.
56. Remember a negative result means showing that something does not exist.
57. Interestingly, Brouwer had a special name for real numbers which were sequences
of the same number. They were called straight arrows. Note that the set of all straight
arrows is countable.
58. Ironically, Brouwer's epistemological idealism has become quite popular and
widespread.