Curative statutes

Curative remedial statutes are healing acts.

They are remedial by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations.
The rule to curative statutes is that if the thing omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes
the defect sought to be removed or made harmless, is something which the legislature might have
dispensed with by a previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one.
Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb
certain evils. They are designed and intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by
reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which,
before the enactment of the statute, was invalid.
Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws,
as if existing laws have been complied with.

Frivaldo v. COMELEC (rested the definition of curative statutes)

Tolentino
o those which undertake to cure errors& irregularities, thereby validating judicial judicial or
administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds or contracts which
otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory
disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement
Agpalo
o curative statutes are healing acts curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing
existing obligations o and are intended to supply defects abridge superfluities in existing
laws& curb certain evils o by their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive and reach
back to the past events to correct errors or irregularities & to render valid & effective
attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended
Curative statutes are forms of retroactive legislations which reach back on past events to correct
errors or irregularities & to render valid & effective attempted acts which would be otherwise
ineffective for the purpose the parties intended.
Erectors, Inc. v. NLRC
Statute: EO 111, amended Art 217 of the Labor Code to widen the workers, access to the
government for redress of grievances by giving the Regional Directors & the Labor Arbiters
concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving money claims
Issue: Amendment created a situation where the jurisdiction of the RDs and LAs overlapped.
Remedy: RA 6715further amended Art 217 by delineating their respective jurisdictions. Under
RA 6715, the RD has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving claims, provided:
o the claim is presented by an employer or person employed in domestic or household
services or household help under the Code.
 o the claimant no longer being employed does not seek reinstatement
o the aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper doesnt exceed P5,000. All
other cases are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
Held: EO 111 & RA 6715 are therefore curative statutes.
A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings,
instruments or acts of public authorities which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with
certain existing legal requirements
Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee
Statutes intended to validate what otherwise void or invalid marriages, being curative, will be
given retroactive effect.
Santos v. Duata
Statute which provides that a contract shall presumed an equitable mortgage in any of the cases
therein enumerated, and designed primarily to curtail evils brought about by contracts of sale with
right of repurchase, is remedial in nature & will be applied retroactively to cases arising prior to
the effectivity of the statute.
Abad v. Phil American General Inc.
Where at the time action is filed in court the latter has no jurisdiction over the subject matter but
a subsequent statute clothes it with jurisdiction before the matter is decided.
The statute is in the nature of a curative law with retroactive operation to pending proceedings
and cures the defect of lack of jurisdiction of the court at the commencement of the action.
Legarda v. Masaganda
Where a curative statute is enacted after the court has rendered judgment, which judgment is
naturally void as the court has at the time no jurisdiction over the subject of the action, the
enactment of the statute conferring jurisdiction to the court does not validate the void judgment
for the legislature has no power to make a judgment rendered without jurisdiction of a valid
judgment.
Frivaldo v. COMELEC
(an example considered curative & remedial as well as one which creates new rights & new
remedies, generally held to be retroactive in nature- PD 725, which liberalizes the procedure of
repatriation)
Held: PD 725 & the re-acquisition of the Filipino citizenship by administrative repatriation
pursuant to said decree is retroactive.
De Castro v. Tan
Held: what has been given retroactive effect in Frivaldo is not only the law itself but also Phil.
Citizenship re-acquired pursuant to said law to the date of application for repatriation, which meant
that his lack of Filipino citizenship at the time he registered as a voter, one of the qualification is
as a governor, or at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for governorship, one of the
qualification is as a governor, was cured by the retroactive application of his repatriation.
Republic v. Atencio
Curative statute: one which confirms, refines and validate the sale or transfer of a public land
awarded to a grantee, which a prior law prohibits its sale within a certain period & otherwise invalid
transaction under the old law.
Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez
Statute: Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991, provides that municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders & which have their respective
sets of elective municipal officials holding at the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth
be considered as a regular municipalities This is a curative statute as it validates the creation of
municipalities by EO which had been held to be an invalid usurpation of legislative power.
Tatad v. Garcia Jr.
Issue: Where there is doubt as to whether government agency under the then existing law, has
the authority to enter into a negotiated contract for the construction of a government project under
the build-lease-and transfer scheme
Held: The subsequent enactment of a statute which recognizes direct negotiation of contracts
under such arrangement is a curative statute.
As all doubts and procedural lapses that might have attended the negotiated contract have been
cured by the subsequent statute

Limitations of rule
Remedial statutes will not be given retroactive effect if to do so would impair the obligations of
contract or disturb vested rights
Only administrative or curative features of the statute as will not adversely affect existing rights
will be given retroactive operation
The exception to the foregoing limitations of the rule is a remedial or curative statute which is
enacted as a police power measure
Statutes of this type may be given retroactive effect even though they impair vested rights or the
obligations of contract, if the legislative intent is to give them retrospective operation
Rationale: The constitutional restriction against impairment against obligations of contract or
vested rights does not preclude the legislature from enacting statutes in the exercise of its police
power

Police power legislations

As a rule, statutes which are enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate certain activities,
are applicable not only to those activities or transactions coming into being after their passage,
but also to those already in existence.
Rationale: the non-impairment of the obligations of contract or of vested rights must yield to the
legitimate exercise of power, by the legislature, to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people
 Any right acquired under a statute or under a contract is subject to the condition that it may be
impaired by the state in the legitimate exercise of its police power, since the reservation of the
essential attributes of sovereign power is deemed read into every statute or contract as a
postulate of the legal order.

Statutes relating to prescription

General rule: a statute relating to prescription of action, being procedural in nature, applies to all
actions filed after its effectivity. In other words, such a statute is both:
o prospective in the sense that it applies to causes that accrued and will accrue after it took
effect
o retroactive in the sense that it applies to causes that accrued before its passage
However, a statute of limitations will not be given retroactive operation to causes of action that
accrued prior to its enactment if to do so will remove a bar of limitation which has become
complete or disturb existing claims without allowing a reasonable time to bring actions thereon
Nagrampa v. Nagrampa
Statute: Art. 1116 of the Civil Code: prescription already running before the effectivity of this
Code shall be governed by laws previously in force; but if since the time this Code took effect the
entire period herein required for prescription should elapse, the present Code shall be applicable
even though by the former laws a longer period might be required.
Held: The provision is retroactive since it applied to a cause that accrued prior to its effectivity
which when filed has prescribed under the new Civil Code even though the period of prescription
prescribed under the old law has not ended at the time the action is filed in court
The fact that the legislature has indicated that the statute relating to prescription should be given
retroactive effect will not warrant giving it if it will impair vested rights
Statute of limitations prescribing a longer period to file an action than that specified under the
law may not be construed as having retroactive application if it will revive the cause that already
prescribed under the old statute for it will impair vested rights against whom the cause is asserted.
Statute which shorten the period of prescription & requires that causes which accrued prior to
its effectivity be prosecuted or filed not later than a specific date may not be construed to apply to
existing causes which pursuant to the old law under which they accrued, will not prescribe until a
much longer period than that specified in the later enactment because the right to bring an action
is founded on law which has become vested before the passage of the new statute of limitations

Apparently conflicting decisions on prescription

Billones v. CIR
Issue: whether Sec. 7A of Common wealth Act 144, amended by RA 1993, to the effect that
any action to enforce an cause (i.e. non payment of wages or overtime compensation) under this
Act shall be commenced within 3 years after such cause of action accrued, otherwise it shall be
forever barred. Provided, however, that actions already commenced before the effective day of
this Act shall not be affected by the period herein prescribed.
 As statute shortened the period of prescription from 6 to 3 yrs. from the date the cause of action
accrued, it was contended that to give retroactive effect would impair vested rights since it would
operate to preclude the prosecution of claims that accrued more than 3 but less than 6 yrs.
Held: a statute of limitations is procedural in nature and no vested right can attach thereto or
arise therefrom.
When the legislature provided that actions already commenced before the effectivity of this Act
shall not be affected by the period herein prescribed, it intended to apply the statute to all existing
actions filed after the effectivity of the law.
Because the statute shortened the period within which to bring an action & in order to violate the
constitutional mandate, claimants are injuriously affected should have a reasonable period of 1
yr. from time new statute took effect within which to sue on such claims.
Corales v. Employees Compensation Commission
Same issue on Billones but Court arrived at a different conclusion.
Issue: Whether a claim for workmens compensation which accrued under the old Workmens
Compensation Act (WCA) but filed under after March 31, 1975 is barred by the provision of the
New Labor Code which repealed the WCA.
WCA requires that workmens compensation claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code
shall be filed with the appropriate regional offices of the Department of Labor not later than March
31, 1975, otherwise shall be barred forever.
Held: Provision doesnt apply to workmens compensation that accrued before Labor Code took
effect, even if claims were not filed not later than March 31, 1975.
Rationale: prescriptive period for claims which accrued under WCA as amended 10 yrs. which
is a right found on statute & hence a vested right, that cannot be impaired by the retroactive
application of the Labor Code.
Comparison of Billones and Corales
Billones
While Court said that such right to bring an action accrued under the old law is not vested right, it
did not say that the right is one protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
For BOTH cases: In solving how to safeguard the right to bring action whose prescriptive period
to institute it has been shortened by law? Gave the claimants whose rights have been affected,
one year from the date the law took effect within which to sue their claims.
Corales
Court considered the right to prosecute the action that accrued under the old law as one founded
on law & a vested right.
Court construed the statute of limitations as inapplicable to the action that accrued before the law
took effect. (It is generally held that the court has no power to read into the law something which
the law itself did not provide expressly or impliedly. Corales case seems to be on firmer grounds.
Prescription in criminal and civil cases
General rule: laws on prescription of actions apply as well to crimes committed before the
enactment as afterwards. There is, however, a distinction between a statute of limitations in
criminal actions and that of limitations in civil suits, as regards their construction.
In CIVIL SUIT- statute is enacted by the legislature as an impartial arbiter, between two
contending parties. In the construction of such statute, there is no intendment to be made in favor
of either party. Neither grants right to the other; there is therefore no grantor against whom no
ordinary presumptions of construction are to be made.
CRIMINAL CASES: the state is the grantor, surrendering by act of grace its right to prosecute
or declare that the offense is no longer subject of prosecution after the prescriptive period. Such
statutes are not only liberally construed but are applied retroactively if favorable to the accused.

Statutes relating to appeals

The right to appeal from an adverse judgment, other than that which the Constitution grants, is
statutory and may be restricted or taken away
A statute relating to appeals is remedial or procedural in nature and applies to pending actions
in which no judgment has yet been promulgated at the time the statute took effect.
Such statute, like other statutes, may not however be construed retroactively so as to impair
vested rights. Hence, a statute which eliminates the right to appeal and considers the judgment
rendered in a case final and unappealable, destroys the right to appeal a decision rendered after
the statute went into effect, but NOT the right to prosecute an appeal that has been perfected
before the passage of the law, for in the latter case, the right of the appellant to appeal has become
vested under the old law and may not therefore be impaired.
Stature shortening the period for taking appeals is to be given prospective effect and may not
be applies to pending proceedings in which judgment has already been rendered at the time of
its enactment except if theres clear legislative intent.
Berliner v. Roberts
Where a statute shortened the period for taking appeals form thirty days to fifteen days from
notice of judgment, an appeal taken within thirty days but beyond fifteen days from notice of
judgment promulgated before the statute took effect is deemed seasonably perfected.

CHAPTER TEN: Amendment, Revision, Codification and Repeal

AMENDMENT
Power to Amend
The legislature has the authority to amend, subject to constitutional requirements, any existing
law.
Authority to amend is part of the legislative power to enact, alter and repeal laws.
 The SC in the exercise of its rule-making power or of its power to interpret the law, has no
authority to amend or change the law, such authority being the exclusive to the legislature.

How amendment effected

Amendment the change or modification, by deletion, alteration, of a statute which survives in
its amended form.
The amendment of a statute is effected by the enactment of an amendatory act modifying or
altering some provisions of a statute either expressly or impliedly.
Express amendment done by providing in the amendatory act that specific sections or
provisions of a statute be amended as recited therein or as common indicated, to read as
follows.

Amendment by implication
Every statute should be harmonized with other laws on the same subject, in the absence of a
clear inconsistency.
Legislative intent to amend a prior law on the same subject is shown by a statement in the later
act that any provision of law that is inconsistent therewith is modified accordingly.
Implied Amendment- when a part of a prior statute embracing the same subject as the later may
not be enforced without nullifying the pertinent provision of the latter in which event, the prior act
is deemed amended or modified to the extent of repugnancy.
Quimpo v. Mendoza
Where a statute which requires that the annual realty tax on lands or buildings be paid on or
before the specified date, subject to penalty of a percentage of the whole amount of tax in case
of delayed payment, is amended by authorizing payment of the tax in four equal instalments to
become due on or before specified dates.
The penalty provision of the earlier statute is modified by implication that the penalty for late
payment of an instalment under the later law will be collected and computed only on the instalment
that became due and unpaid, and not on the whole amount of annual tax as provided in the old
statute.
Legislative intent to change the basis is clear when the later law allowed payment in four
instalments.
People v. Macatanda
A statute punishing an act which is also a crime under the RPC provides a penalty as prescribed
in the said Code, such statute is not a special law but an amendment by implication.