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    of 13
    Delhi School of Economics er oes aq Entrance Examination for M. A. Beonomies Option A. (Series 02) June 26, 2004 ‘Lime. 3 hours ‘Maximum marks. 100 General instructions. Please read the following instructions carefully. ‘Cheek that you have a bubblesheet accompanying this examination booklet. Do not break the seal on this booklet until instructed to do so by the invigilator. ‘* Immediately on receipt of this booklet, fill in your Name and Roll Number’on the small slip attached to this booklet. Do not write this information anywhere else on this booklet, + Following the instructions on the bubble-sheet, fill in the required information in Boxes 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 on the bubblesheet. The invigilator wil gn in Be 3 + This examination has two parts, t and 2. Past. 1 isto be answered on the bubble- sheet, while Part 2 is to be answered in the blank space provided on this booklet itself. ‘* When you finish, hand in this booklet and the bubble-sheet to the invigilator. * Do not disturb your neighbours at any time. Anyone engaging in illegal ex- amination practices will be immediately evicted and that person’s candidature will be cancelled. Do mo write balow this ine “This apce i for oficial ie ny Write your Roll No. and Name on this slip and not on the answer book Marks tally Question | Marks 7 Roll No._ 2 . ae : [Name i Es : a) BEE 2004 A 08 1 Part 1 Instructions, «= Check that this booklet has pages 1 through 26. Also check that the bottom of each page is marked with BEB 2004 A 02. «This part of the examination consists of 30 multiple-choice questions. Bach question is followed by four possible answers, one of which is correct. Indicate the correct, answer ‘on the bubble-sheet, not on this booklet. «Bach correct choice will earn you 2 marks, However, you will lose 1 mark for each incorrect choice. If you shade none of the bubbles or more than one bubble, you will get 0 for that question. 1 Use pages 22 through 26 of this booklet, marked Rough work to do your caleula- tions, drawings, ete. Your “Rough work” will not be ead or checked. This pact of the examination will be checked by a machine. ‘Therefore, it is very important that you follow the instructions on the bubble-shest. You may begin wow. Good buck! ant the following propositions: (i) If (AUB) (AUC) = , then BC = 0. 1. Consider sets A, B and then BNC = 0. (ii) (ANB) U(ANC) = {a) Both propositions are true (b) Only proposition (i) is true (0) Only proposition (ii) is true (a) Both propositions are false 2, Suppose an ustrouomer asserts “Every solar system in the Milky Way galaxy contains f planet such that all the moons revolving around that planet have life forms.” If this assertion ig false, which of the following assertions must be true? (a) Every solar system in the Milky Way galaxy contains a planet such that none of the moons revolving around that planet have life forms. (b) ‘Phere exists a solar system in the Milky Way galaxy such that every planet in it has a moon revolving around it without any life forms. (c) There exists a solar system in the Milky Way galaxy with a planet such that all the moons revolving around it have no life forms. (a) There exists a solar system in the Milky Way galaxy such that every moon revoly- ing around every. planet in i has no life forsns. BBE 2004 A 02 2 : oh 4 Situation I. Answer 3 and 4 on the basis of the following information. Consider a competitive exchange economy with two agents (1 and 2) and two goods (X and Y). Agent 1's endowment of (X,Y) is (1000,0) and Agent 2's endowment of (X, ¥) is (0,100). An allocation for Agent i is denoted (x:,ys), where 2 is his allocation of X and yi is his allocation of Y. Agent i's objective is to choose allocations (xi, y) to maximise his utility min{s, 9} 3. The set of all Pareto efficient allocations for this economy consists of allocations of the form (x1,1) and (x2, y2), where (x2, y2) = (1000 — x1, 1000 — y1) and (a)a= 500 (b) (#141) = (1000, 0) and (11,41) = (0, 1000) « () 1 = m1 for ey € [0, 1009] (2) #1 € [0, 1000} and yy € (0, 1000), 4. The set of all competitive equilibrium allocations for this economy consists of allocations of the form (z1, ys) and (22, yp), where (1-2, y2) = (1000 ~ 211, 1000 ~ y,) and (a) a1 =m = 500 7 (b) (e1.m1) = (1000, 0) and (21, y1) = (0, 1000) (©) 21 = 41, for 21 € [0, 1000] (2) 21 € (0, 1000} and yr € (0, 1009] Situation Il. Answer 5, 6 and 7 on the basis of the following information. Consider the exchange economy of Situation I with one change only: Agent I's endowment of (X,Y) is (999,0) 5. Consider allocation a in which (21,y1) = (0,1) and (2,42) = (999,999), and allocation, B in which (21,21) = (500,500) and (72, yo) = (499, 500). (@) ais Pareto efficient but fis not (b) f is Pareto efficient but a is not () Neither a, nor is Pareto efficignt (@) Both a and f are Pareto efficient, 6. The set of all competitive equilibrium allocations for this economy consists of allocations of the form (x1, 91) and (z2,y2), where (a2, 2) = (999 — 21, 1000 ~ yx) and (a) and a € 0,1] (b) 21 = 999 and yr € 999, 1000} (©) 2 € [0,999] and ys € [0, 1000] (@) 21 = 499 and yy = 500 BEB 2004 A 02 3 Jo% 7. Assuming the sum of prices is 1, the competitive equilibrium prices (pi,p,) are (a) (1,0) (b) 1) (©) (4/2, 1/2) (4) (00/999, 499/999) Situation III. Answer 8, 9, 10, 11 1 12 on the basis of the following informa tion. Consider a Cournot duopoly with inverse market demand function p = 1 — 4, ~ qa,- where p is the market price and q; is tirm i's output. Suppose Firm 1’s cost function is Cilqu) = en, where c € [0,3/4], and Firm 2's cost function is C2(q2) = 92/2 8. In Coumnot equilibrium, if Firm i’s market-share is defined by s; = q:/{q1 + 49), then (2) 81 = (2~20)/(8 — de) and sy = (1 ~ 22)/(3 ~ 4c) (b) 51 = 20f/(8 2c) and s2 = (3— 4e)/(3 — 2¢) (©) 81 = (B= 40)/(3 — 20) and 5 = 2c/(3 — 20) (4) 51 = (1 20)/(8~ Ae) and 5 = (2 2)/(8 ~ Ae) 9. Ts the derived Cournot outcome Pareto efficient from the point-of-view of the two firms? (@) Yes (b) No (©) This is undecidable in the Arrow-Debreu model (@) Cannot be determined if prices are sticky 10. Suppose, prior to the choice of quantities by the two firms, Firm 1 ean choose & by investing (9c? — 13c), /18. Assuming that the firm chooses c anticipating Cournot quantity competition thereafter, the optimal choice of ¢ is (@) 172 (b) 2/3 (3/4 (@o 14. Suppose Firm 1 takes-over Firm 2 to become a monopolist and ¢ = 2/3. ‘The new monopolist firm will produce (=) 2/8 of the output in Plant 1 and 1/3 of the output in Plant 2 (b) 1/3 of the olttput in Plant 1 and 2/3 of the output in Plant 2 (¢) Divide the output equally betw (a) Produce nothing in Plant 1 the two plants BEE 2004 A 02 4 ice 12, Suppose ¢ = 1/2 and Firm 1 can credibly commit itself to producing any output level 44 that it publicly announces. What announcement g will it make? (a) 1/2 (b) 1/3 4 @ 5 Situation IV. Answer 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 on the basis of the following in- formation. Consider a person who consumes water and bread, deri ing utility 2y if 2 is the amount of water consumed and y'is the amount of bread consumed. Suppose this person's income is Rs. 10, the unit price of bread is Rs. 3 and the unit price of water facing this person is Re. 1. The price of water incorporates a per unit subsidy of Re. I, ie. for every unit of water consumed by this person, she pays Re. 1 to the water supplier and the government pays Re. 1 to the water supplier. Suppose this person's demand is (#0, 40) 13. Suppose the water st uubsidy is temoved and shy has tv pay Rs. 2 for each ust of water Tet (21,41) be the new demand. What is the resulting change in this person’s demand, i. what is (1 20,01 ~ yo)? (@) (-8/2,0) (b) (5/2, 10/9) () (10/3, 10/9) (@) (-10/3,0) 1M, If the government provides thi person a lump-sum income subsidy that exactly offsets her utility loss on account of reinoval of the water subsidy, then the required lump-sum subsidy is (a) 9/4 (b) 5/3 (0) V5B+4 (a) ¥206 - 10 15. The income effect of the removal of the water subsidy is (a) (sy, 11/8) 0) (2%, (©) (-1/2,-1/8) @) (= 2) JEG 7 BEB 2004 A 02 fos 16. The effect on the government's budget of the replacement of the water subsidy by the ‘compensating income subsidy is (a) Deficit decreases by 15 — Y200 _ (b) Deficit decreases by 1- V56 (©) Deficit detreases by 10/3 (d) Deficit decreases by 11/4 17. Assuming that government funds have a positive opportunity cost, the government can make a Pareto improvement by (a) removing the water subsidy (b) increasing the water subsidy (©) imposing a water tax and providing lump-sum subsidy (d) removing the water subsidy and providing a lump-sum subsidy: V. Answer 18 and 19 on the basis of the following information. Suppose ¥ is aggregate real income, r is the real rate of interest, IM is the exogenously given nominal money stock, P is the aggregate price level and G is real government expenditure. Con- sumption demand is cY +BM/P and investment demand is a/r. The transactions demand for money balances is NY and the speculative demand for money balances is u/r. Suppose Y and r are endogenously determined variables, while c € (0,1), 8 > 0, «> 0, A> O-and > 0 are exogenously given parameters. 18. The rate of change of aggregate demand with respect Lo expansionary monetary policy (®) (u9 + 0)/P(.—e) + aX (b) (uf + a) /Plu(1 — c) + ad} (©) G+ a)/Plu(1 ~e) + aX} (@) (WB-+0)/PIA 0) + ad 19. The rate of change of aggregate demand with respect to expansionary fisea! policy is @) f(a -9 +a} (©) H/l(d —e) + pad] (©) 1/lu(h ~ 6) + ad} (4) 1/[(1 — ¢) + ped} BEE 2004 A 02 6 eo s . VI. Answer 20 on the basis of the following information. Let w= W/P be the real wage rate, where W is the nominal wage rate and P is the aggregate price level. The demand for labour is given by D(w) = 1—w and the supply of labour is described by the equation S(w) = w. Suppose that, if N is the employment level, then (WV) is the aggregate output. 28°" If nominal wage is always such that the labour market clears, then the, aggregate supply curve is give by the equation A (o) ¥ = g(a) (a) ¥ = fifa) VIL. Answer 21, 22 and 23 on the basis of the following information. Consider the labour market of Situation VI with the following change. Suppose the nominal wagé rate W is always such that it minimizes |D(W/P) ~ S(W/P)| subject to the constraint W > Wo, where Wo > 0 is an exogenously given minimum nominal wage. 21. Given the price level P, the nominal wage W is (a) min(Wo, P/2) : (b) max{Wo, P/2} ou © L@) Wel? 22. Given the price level P, the employsuens level is (a) min{1/2,1— Wo/P} (b) max{1/2,1— Wo/P} (c) 1-Wo/2P (@ 1-12P 23. Given the price level P such that 1/2 1and Y? > 1? (@)%» () 4p Oar @ar BEE 2004 A 02 ° Part 2 Instructions. This part of the examination consists of 4 questions, Bach question is worth 10 marks; so budget approximately 18 minutes for each question. Ariswer each question in the space provided after that question. Do not use the space for Rough Worle to write your answers; the Rough Work will not be read. Marks for each sub-part of ‘question are indicated at the end of that sub-part Question 1. Answer either (A) or (B). Bach pact is worth 10 marks. (A) Consider a closed economy with aggregate output Y, rate of interest r, lump-sum tax T, government expenditure G, nominal money supply M and price level P. Por this economy, the consumption function is G(Y —T), the investment function is I(r) and the demand-for-money function is IXY,r) Suppose M and G are exogenously given, and the Iw requires the government to balance its budget. What is the effect of a marginal increase in Gon aggregate demand? Explain the expansionary effect of such an increment, (B) Ina model with flexible exchange rates and perfect capital mobility, examine the effects of an increase in the foreign price lev. Answer. 1B 200} A 02 10 Question 2. Answer either (A) or (B). Bach part is worth 10 marks. (A) Suppose m friends are trying to decide who will pay for everyone’s dinner. They decide to choose this person (the “loser") by playing “odd man out". Bach person is given fa coin that has probebility p of falling Heads. Each person tosses his coin. A person is said’to be the loser if hie toss outcome ig different from that of the other nm — 1 persons? tosses, (a) If this game is played exactly once, what is the probability of finding a loser? (b) Suppose the friends repeat this game until there is a loser. What is the probability that the game wil be repeated exactly k times? (B) A continuous random variable X takes values in the interval [2,8]. Suppose Prob (X < ¢) = f°, a(z-+3)dx, where ¢ € (00,0). (a) Calculate a (b) Calculate Prob (3 < X < 5). (¢) Calculate Prob (X > 4). Answer. EEE 2005 A 02 rr Question 8. Aziswer any two out of (A), (B) and (C). Bach part is worth 5 marks. (A) Consider a production function given by (x1,22) ++ f(e1,t2), where wy and a2 are the quantities of the two inputs and f(,:r2) is the resulting output. Suppose (a) f has the constant-returns-to-scale property, i., ftir, tar) = tf (1, 22) for every > 0, and (b) the marginal product of the first input is always decreasing, ic. 0°f/0x} <0. Show that the marginal product of either input increases with an increase in the use of the other input. (B) Suppose the monsoon can be Good, Average or Bad, which we label State 1, State 2 and State 3 respectively. Suppose three securities (1, 2 and 3) are traded on financial ‘ain, 22,043), where ais refers to the markets. Security i is described by a vector af value of Security in State j. Suppose the three traded securities are at = (2,1,—3), (0,3,-1) and a = (2, ~1, 498). Consider another security, described by b= (b1,b2,ba). For what values of as will it be the case that, for every b = (b1, b2,b3), there exists (21, 22,23) such that banal + xa? + xg0* (0) Given such a value of axa, provide an economic interpretation of equation (4) (©) A set X CR? is said to be convex if tz + (I~ t)y € X for every x € X, every y €X and every £€ (0,1). A function f : % + Wis said to be convex if f(te+(1—2y) 14(x) + (1 = f(y) for-every t € (0,1). Show that « function f : #1 — Bis convex if and only if the set {(z,r) ER | f(a) =r} Answer. 16 , i 2" Question:4. Answer either (A) or (B). Each part is worth 10 marks. (A) A profitmaximizing firm produces electricity to meet the electricity demand of a city. The regulator has fixed the price of electricity and requires the firm to meet the entire demand at that price. Given this price, the city daily demands 4 units of electricity in Period 1 (6 AM and 6 PM) and 3 units of electricity in Period 2 (6 PM and 6 AM). Let ‘a be the firm’s electricity output in Period é. Electricity is produced using a fixed input = (say, plant) and a variable input y (say, fuel). The plant is invariant across periods, but the firm can employ different amounts of fuel in the two periods, say yy and ya. In Period i, the relationship between the inputs and the output is 24 — YZ (a) Derive the firm's short-run cost function for a given period. (b) Derive the firm's long-run cost function for a. given period, (c) Given that the firm must obey the regulator, what plant size + will the firm choose? (a) Does the answer to (¢) change if the electricity demand changes to 3.5 units in each period? If s0, what is the new plant size? (B) There is a selection committee with three members (1, 2 and 3) who have to choose one of four candidates (a, b, © and d). ‘The preferences of the mesnbers among the candidates are as follows wa(d)

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