DE LIMA v.

REYES

G.R. No. 209330; 11 January 2016

Leonen, J.

FACTS: Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega) or "Doc Gerry," was a veterinarian and anchor of several radio shows in
Palawan. He was shot dead around 10:30am inside the Baguio Wagwagan Ukay-ukay in San Pedro, Puerto Princesa
City, Palawan. After a brief chase with police officers, Marlon Recamata was arrested. On the same day, he made an
extrajudicial confession admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also implicated Rodolfo "Bumar" Edrad (Edrad), Dennis
Aranas, and Armando "Salbakotah" R. Noel, Jr. Subsequently, Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the
Counter-Terrorism Division of the NBI where he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel Reyes (former
Governor Reyes) who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega. And the following day, DOJ Sec. Leila De Lima issued
Department Order No. 091 creating a special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation.

Dr. Patria Gloria Inocencio-Ortega (Dr. Inocencio-Ortega), Dr. Ortega's wife, subsequently filed a Supplemental
Affidavit-Complaint implicating former Governor Reyes as the mastermind of her husband's murder. Former Governor
Reyes' brother, Coron Mayor Mario Reyes, Jr., former Marinduque Governor Jose Carreon, former Provincial
Administrator Atty. Romeo Seratubias, Marlon Recamata, Dennis Aranas, Valentin Lesias, Arturo D. Regalado, Armando
Noel, Rodolfo Edrad, and several John and Jane Does were also implicated.

Upon conclusion of the First Panel preliminary investigation, the Resolution was issued dismissing the Affidavit-Complain.
Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation, which, among others, sought the admission of
mobile phone communications between former Governor Reyes and Edrad. While the Motion to Re-Open was still
pending, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the Resolution. Both Motions
were denied by the First Panel in the Resolution.

De Lima issued DO No. 710 creating a new panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case, "in the interest of service and due process" as well as to address the offer of additional evidence denied by the
Forst Panel in its Resolution. This revoked the previous DO. To the dismay of Governor Reyes, he argued that the parties
were already afforded due process and that the evidence to be addressed by the reinvestigation was neither new nor
material to the case. It did not prevent the Second Panel from issuing a Resolution, finding probable cause and
recommending the filing of informations for all of the accused including Reyes. In his Supplemental Petition, Reyes
averred that the RTC could not proceed with the prosecution of his case because the Resolution was void. Contrary to
RTC, CA ruled that DO No. 710 was null and void and reinstated the First Panels Resolution.
Petitioners contend that De Lima acted within her authority when she issued DO No. 710. According to them, her
issuance was a purely executive function and not a quasi-judicial function that could be the subject of a petition for
certiorari or prohibition. In their submissions, they point out that under RA 10071 and the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, the
Secretary of Justice has the power to create a new panel of prosecutors to reinvestigate a case to prevent a
miscarriage of justice. First Panel "appeared to have ignored the rules of preliminary investigation" when it refused to
receive additional evidence that would have been crucial for the determination of the existence of probable cause.
They assert that respondent was not deprived of due process when the reinvestigation was ordered since he was not
prevented from presenting controverting evidence to Dr. Inocencio-Ortega's additional evidence. Petitioners, as well,
contend that since the Information had been filed, the disposition of the case was already within the discretion of the
trial court.

On the other hand, Reyes argues that De Lima had no authority to order motu proprio the reinvestigation of the case
since Dr. Inocencio-Ortega was able to submit her alleged new evidence to the First Panel when she filed her Motion for
Partial Reconsideration. He argues that all parties had already been given the opportunity to present their evidence
before the First Panel so it was not necessary to conduct a reinvestigation. Further, opportunity to present their evidence
before the First Panel so it was not necessary to conduct a reinvestigation. While De Limas discretion to create a new
panel of prosecutors was not "unbridled," however, the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires that there be compelling
circumstances for her to be able to designate another prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation. Also, the Second
Panel's Resolution was void since the Panel was created by a department order that was beyond De Limas authority to
issue. He further argues that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the Information filed by the
Second Panel was void.

ISSUES:

(1) Is the issuance of DO No. 710 an executive function beyond the scope of a petition for certiorari or prohibition?
(2) Is the Secretary of Justice authorized to create motu proprio another panel of prosecutors in order to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case?
(3) Is the Petition for Certiorari already been rendered moot by the filing of the information in court?

HELD:

(1) The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable cause is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors
may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. In a preliminary investigation,
the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. The prosecutor only determines
 "whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." Considering that "full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation," the functions of the prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice are not ministerial, thus,
prosecutors may be subject of a petition for certiorari or prohibition under Rule 65.
(2) Yes. Under existing laws, rules of procedure, and jurisprudence, the Secretary of Justice is authorized to issue DO
No. 710. Section 4 of RA 10071 also gives the Secretary of Justice the authority to directly act on any "probable
miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution staff, regional prosecution office, and the
provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor." Accordingly, the Secretary of Justice may step in and order a
reinvestigation even without a prior motion or petition from a party in order to prevent any probable
miscarriage of justice. It is clear that the Secretary of Justice issued DO No. 710 because she had reason to
believe that the First Panel's refusal to admit the additional evidence may cause a probable miscarriage of
justice to the parties. The Second Panel was created not to overturn the findings and recommendations of the
First Panel but to make sure that all the evidence, including the evidence that the First Panel refused to admit,
was investigated. Therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not act in an "arbitrary and despotic manner,'by
reason of passion or personal hostility.
(3) Yes. The filing of the information and the issuance by the trial court of the respondent's warrant of arrest has
already rendered this Petition moot. Once information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction of the case
and any motion to dismiss the case or to determine the accused's guilt or innocence rests within the sound
discretion of the court. trial court has already determined, independently of any finding or recommendation by
the First Panel or the Second Panel, that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against
respondent. Probable cause has been judicially determined. Jurisdiction over the case, therefore, has
transferred to the trial court. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary investigation in
any other venue has been rendered moot by the issuance of the warrant of arrest and the conduct of
arraignment. CA should have dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed before them when the trial court issued its
warrant of arrest. Since the trial court has already acquired jurisdiction over the case and the existence of
probable cause has been judicially determined, a petition for certiorari questioning the conduct of the
preliminary investigation ceases to be the "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy" provided by law. Inasmuch
as this Petition for Review is an appeal from a moot Petition for Certiorari, it must also be rendered moot.

CRIMPRO RULE 112

Title G.R. No. 197293
MENDOZA VS PEOPLE Date: April 21, 2014
Ponente: LEONEN, J.
ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, Petitioner PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC.,
Respondents
Nature of the case: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals' decision dated January 14,
2011, which reversed the Regional Trial Court's dismissal of the complaint against petitioner Alfredo C. Mendoza for
qualified theft and estafa.
FACTS
Case
1. Juno Cars alleged that on June 2, 2007, it hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor. On November 19,
2007, its Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia, conducted a partial audit of the used cars and discovered that
five (5) cars had been sold and released by Alfredo without Rolandos or the finance managers permission.
2. The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made payments, but Alfredo failed to remit the
payments totalling P886,000.00. It was further alleged that while there were 20 cars under Alfredos custody,
only 18 were accounted for. Further investigation revealed that Alfredo failed to turn over the files of a 2001
Hyundai Starex and a Honda City 1.5 LXI. Juno Cars alleged that taking into account the unremitted
amounts and the acquisition cost of the Honda City, Alfredo pilfered a total amount of P1,046,000.00 to its
prejudice and damage.
3. On March 4, 2008, Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a Resolution finding probable cause and
recommending the filing of an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa.
4. While Alfredos motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft and estafa were filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 212, Mandaluyong City. On March 31, 2008, Alfredo filed a motion for determination of probable
cause before the trial court. On April 28, 2008, he also filed a motion to defer arraignment.
5. On March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali, issued an order dismissing
the complaint

JUNO CARS S CONTENTION

Arguing that the trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed the complaint. It argued that "the determination of probable cause and the decision
whether or not to file a criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor.

MENDOZA S CONTENTION
In essence, he argued that the trial court was correct in finding that there was no probable cause as shown
by the evidence on record. He argued that "judicial determination of probable cause is broader than [the]
executive determination of probable cause"and that "[i]t is not correct to say that the determination of
 probable cause is exclusively vested on the prosecutor
ISSUE/S
I. The primordial issue is whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the
basis of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause. - YES
HELD
The court citing People v. Castillo and Mejia provides for the two kinds of determination of probable cause :
Exectutive and Judicial.
The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. The conduct
of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent determination of the existence of probable cause lie
solely within the discretion of the public prosecutor. If upon evaluation of the evidence, the prosecutor finds
sufficient basis to find probable cause, he or she shall then cause the filing of the information with the court.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. Once the information has been filed, the
judge shall then "personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence" to
determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest.
The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is
enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on
the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid, Judge Capco-Umali still had the discretion to
make her own finding of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of the accused and proceed
with trial.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated January 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No.
110774 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. MC08-11604-05 against Alfredo C. Mendoza are DISMISSED.
Notes
Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always proceed with caution in dismissing cases
due to lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only when he or she
finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of probable cause that he or she can dismiss the
case.

CRIMPRO Rule 112

Title : G.R. No. 114266
People vs Villanueva and Durana Date: December 4, 1996
Ponente: BELLOSILLO, J.
People of the Philippines plaintiff ROGELIO VILLANUEVA and MAMERTO DURANA, accused.
MAMERTO DURANA, accused-appellant
Nature of the case:
This is an appeal on the conviction of the accused in the crime of murder.
FACTS

On 12 November 1992, around ten-thirty in the evening, at Barangay Tagpuro, Tacloban City, Diosdado Meniano
and his wife Gloria were awakened by a loud voice from outside their house challenging Diosdado to a fight. Gloria
Meniano readily recognized the voice as that of accused Mamerto Durana. The challenge was hurled a number of
times by Durana. It was not heeded initially by Diosdado until after Durana threatened to go up the house if the
former would not go down. Diosdado decided finally to go down but not without arming himself with a short bolo.
Gloria remained inside the house. She peeped through the bamboo slats which served as external walls of their
house. Since the moon was bright she was able to see Durana clearly as the intruder. She also saw the accused
Rogelio Villanueva hiding near the San Francisco plants. As soon as Diosdado went out of his house he was
immediately hacked by Villanueva. Despite the hacking, Durana continued challenging Diosdado to a fight. He
even taunted the victim, You cannot bear a wound. Villanueva and Durana then ran away.

Elenita Meniano, sister-in-law and neighbor of Diosdado, also witnessed the hacking incident. She testified that on 12
November 1992 she and her husband were awakened by the shouts of Mamerto Durana challenging Diosdado to a
fight;that they watched the incident through the window and saw Diosdado hacked by Villanueva after the former
went down from his house; that after Diosdado was slain, she saw Durana brandishing a bolo near the crime scene.

The body of Diosdado Meniano was examined by Dr. Angel A. Cordero, Medico-Legal Officer, Camp Kangleion,
Palo, Leyte, who ascribed the cause of death to shock and hemorrhage due to hacking wounds of the right basal
portion of the skull, lacerating the spinal column.

The defense is alibi. Mamerto Durana claims that in the evening of 12 November 1992 he was in the store of a certain
Rogelio Baganio some 30 meters from the house of the deceased to buy cigarettes and to fetch his children who
were watching television in the store. Baganios store was about half a kilometer away from his residence.
The defense of appellant was not sustained by the trial court.

ISSUE/S
WON the court erred (a) in failing to consider the fact that appellant was not a party respondent during the
preliminary investigation of the case and (b) in giving credence to the testimony of Gloria Meniano. NO
RATIO
a) The argument is without merit. It is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective; neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court
over the case, nor does it constitute a ground for quashing the information. If no preliminary investigation has been
held, or if it is flawed, the trial court may, on motion of the accused, order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold
the proceedings on the criminal case in abeyance. In this case, accused-appellant failed to invoke such right to
preliminary investigation before or at the time he entered his plea at arraignment. He can no longer invoke that right
at this late stage of the proceedings.

b) Discrepancies on minor matters do not impair the essential integrity of the evidence for the prosecution as a whole
nor reflect on the honesty of the witness. The alleged inconsistencies on the testimony of Gloria Meniano dwell on
minor and trivial matters which only serve to strengthen than weaken her credibility. Human memory may be
temporarily paralyzed by a startling event especially if the same involves a person close to the witness.

Contrary to the allegations of the accused-appellant, there was no such inconsistency in the testimony of Gloria
Meniano concerning the formers participation in the killing of her husband. The inconsistency alleged by accused-
appellant referred merely to a police investigation report stating that Meniano allegedly told the police authorities
that appellant asked for a cigarette stick from the deceased prompting the latter to go out of his house. This cannot
prevail over the positive identification in court by the witnesses for the prosecution that appellant was one of two
culprits criminally responsible for the death of Diosdado Meniano.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the decision finding accused-appellant MAMERTO DURANA guilty of murder and imposing upon him a
prison term of reclusion perpetua, as well as ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Diosdado Meniano in the amount
of P50,000.00 is AFFIRMED, with costs against accused-appellant.

BIRAOGO VS PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION

FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft
and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is
gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena
powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They
argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial
powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and
the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and
personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power and power of control
necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in
any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and
settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere
allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a
fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters
jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;

2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to
appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING: The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members.
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in
their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury
attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed by
the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to
seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing
of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the
petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not
limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant
to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly
advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no
usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the
amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for
the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated
to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function
of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of
the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to
investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of
the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the states duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not
to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness
and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to
the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution

G.R. No. 196842 October 9, 2013

ALFREDO ROMULO A. BUSUEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN MINDANAO and ROSA S. BUSUEGO, Respondents.

TOPIC: Rule 112 Sec. 2

FACTS:
1. Private respondent filed complaint for concubinage, violation of VAWC, and Grave threats before the
ombudsman against her husband petitioner who is designated as Chief of Hospital, Davao Regional Hospital,
Tagum City.
2. In the complaint it was alleged that petitioner pointed a gun in her temple and he had an extra-marital
relationship with Emy Sia.
3. Petitioner filed a motion to have the case referred to the Office of the City Prosecutor by virtue of OMB-DOJ
Circular No. 95-001, since the offenses were not committed in relation to his office.
4. The ombudsman denied the motion on the grounds that it was belatedly filed and referral to the prosecutor is
not mandated under the OMB-DOJ circular.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint should be referred to the prosecutors office.

HELD:
1. THERE IS NO NEED TO REFER COMPLAINT TO PROSECUTORS OFFICE. OMBUDSMAN AND DOJ HAVE
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF CRIMES INVOLVING PUBLIC
OFFICERS.
2. The Ombudsmans primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct preliminary investigation of
crimes involving public officers, without regard to its commission in relation to office, had long been settled in
Sen. Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ.
3. The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as
amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public
officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state
prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases.
 4. In Honasan II, although Senator Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan was a public officer who was charged with coup
detat for the occupation of Oakwood on 27 July 2003, the preliminary investigation therefor was conducted by
the DOJ. Honasan questioned the jurisdiction of the DOJ to do so, proferring that it was the Ombudsman which
had jurisdiction since the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public office. We clarified that the DOJ
and the Ombudsman have concurrent jurisdiction to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees.
Nonetheless, we pointed out that the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases. Plainly, applying that ruling in this case, the Ombudsman has
primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, over Rosas complaint, and after choosing to exercise such
jurisdiction, need not defer to the dictates of a respondent in a complaint, such as Alfredo. In other words, the
Ombudsman may exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the DOJ.

CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Title
QUARTO v. MARCELO

Erdito Quarto, petitioner

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and mandamusfiled by Erdito Quarto (petitioner) assailing the
Ombudsmans January 7, 2004 and November 4, 2004 resolutions which granted Luisito M. Tablan, Raul B. Borillo,
and Luis A. Gayya (collectively, respondents) immunity from prosecution, resulting in the respondents exclusion from
the criminal informations filed before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner seeks to nullify the immunity granted to the
respondents, and to compel the Ombudsman to include them as accused in the informations for estafa through
falsification of public documents and for violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act (RA) No. 3019.
FACTS
Case timeline:
1. The petitioner is the Chief of the Central Equipment and Spare Parts Division (CESPD), Bureau of Equipment
(BOE), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Port Area, Manila.
2. On January 9, 2002, DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong created a committee to investigate alleged
anomalous transactions involving the repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles in
2001.
3. Based on this procedure, the DPWH-IAS discovered that from March to December 2001, several emergency
repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of hundreds of DPWH service vehicles, which were approved and
paid by the government, did not actually take place, resulting in government losses of approximately P143
million for this ten-month period alone.
4. Thus, Atty. Irene D. Ofilada of the DPWH-IAS filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a Complaint-
Affidavit and a Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit charging several high-ranking DPWH officials and
employees including the petitioner, the respondents, and other private individuals who purportedly
benefited from the anomalous transactions with Plunder, Money Laundering, Malversation, and violations
of RA No. 3019 and the Administrative Code.
5. The petitioner denied the allegations against him, claiming that he merely relied on his subordinates when
he signed the job orders and the inspection reports. The Ombudsman granted the respondents request for
immunity in exchange for their testimonies and cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed. The
petitioner initially filed a certiorari petition with the Sandiganbayan, questioning the Ombudsmans grant of
immunity in the respondents favor. The Sandiganbayan, however, dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction and advised the petitioner to instead question the Ombudsmans actions before this
Court. Hence, this present petition.
Petitioners contentions:
The petitioner argues that the Ombudsman should have included the respondents in the information since it was
their inspection reports that actually paved the way for the commission of the alleged irregularities. By excluding the
respondents in the information, the Ombudsman is engaged in "selective prosecution" which is a clear case of
grave abuse of discretion.
The petitioner claims that before the Ombudsman may avail of the respondents as state witnesses, they must be
included first in the information filed with the court. Thereafter, the Ombudsman can ask the court for their discharge
so that they can be utilized as state witnesses under the conditions laid down in Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court since the court has the "sole province" to determine whether these conditions exist.
These conditions require, inter alia, that there should be "absolute necessity" for the testimony of the proposed
witness and that he/she should not appear to be the "most guilty." The petitioner claims that the respondents failed
to comply with these conditions as the Ombudsmans "evidence," which became the basis of the information
subsequently filed, shows that the respondents testimony is not absolutely necessary; in fact, the manner of the
respondents participation proves that they are the "most guilty" in the premises.
Contention of the Ombudsman:
The Ombudsman asserts that Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which presupposes that the witness is
originally included in the information, is inapplicable to the present case since the decision on whom to prosecute is
an executive, not a judicial, prerogative.
On the other hand, the respondents submit that the Ombudsman has ample discretion in determining who should
be included in the information on the basis of his finding of probable cause.
ISSUE/S
Whether the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in granting immunity to the respondents
RATIO
We dismiss the petition on two grounds: first, the petitioner did not avail of the remedies available to him before filing
this present petition; and, second, within the context of the Courts policy of non-interference with the
Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers, the petitioner failed to establish that the grant
of immunity to the respondents was attended by grave abuse of discretion.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that he moved for a reconsideration of the assailed resolutions
based substantially on the same grounds stated in this present petition. Neither did the petitioner file a motion for the
inclusion of the respondents in the information before filing the present petition. These are adequate remedies that
the petitioner chose to forego; he bypassed these remedies and proceeded to seek recourse through the present
petition.
In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, the Ombudsman is generally no different from an
ordinary prosecutor in determining who must be charged. He also enjoys the same latitude of discretion in
determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause (that must be established
for the filing of an information in court) and the degree of participation of those involved or the lack thereof.
Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession and production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in any
hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in
the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives.
To secure the testimony without exposing him to the risk of prosecution, the law recognizes that the witness can be
given immunity from prosecution. In this manner, the state interest is satisfied while respecting the individuals
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The power to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide
whom not to prosecute.
We find that the petitioner miserably failed to clearly and convincingly establish that the Ombudsman gravely
abused his discretion in granting immunity to the respondents.
The respondents do not appear to be the "most guilty"
Similarly, far from concluding that the respondents are the "most guilty," we find that the circumstances surrounding
the preparation of the inspection reports can significantly lessen the degree of the respondents criminal complicity
in defrauding the government.
The Ombudsman simply saw the higher value of utilizing the respondents themselves as witnesses instead of
prosecuting them in order to fully establish and strengthen its case against those mainly responsible for the criminal
act, as indicated by the available evidence.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.
Notes
Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the performance of a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the
respondent. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to, to
compel the respondent to take action; it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to
be exercised.

Title: Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG, G.R. Nos. 92319-20, October 2, 1990, 190 SCRA 226, 243.

Guide : Coco Levy Fund Scam / PCGG / E.O. 1

Action: Petition to review decision of PCGG

Facts: President Corazon C. Aquino directed the OSG to prosecute all persons involved in the misuse of coconut levy
funds. Pursuant to the above directive the OSG created a task force to conduct a thorough study of the possible
involvement of all persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy funds. Upon the creation of the PCGG under EO. 1
issued by President Aquino, the PCGG was charged with the task of assisting the President not only in the recovery of ill
gotten wealth or unexplained wealth accumulated by the former President, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates but also in the investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President
may assign to the Commission from time to time and to prevent a repetition of the same in the future. Petitioner alleges
that the PCGG may not conduct a preliminary investigation of the complaints filed by the Solicitor General without
violating petitioner's rights to due process and equal protection of the law, and that the PCGG has no right to conduct
such preliminary investigation.

Issue : WON the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has the power to conduct a preliminary
investigation of the anti-graft and corruption cases filed by the Solicitor General against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and
other respondents for the alleged misuse of coconut levy funds.

Held : the court ruled in the negative. Considering that the PCGG, like the courts, is vested with the authority to grant
provisional remedies of (1) sequestration, (2) freezing assets, and (3) provisional takeover, it is indispensable that, as in
the case of attachment and receivership, there exists a prima facie factual foundation, at least, for the sequestration
order, freeze order or takeover order, an adequate and fair opportunity to contest it and endeavor to cause its
negation or nullification. Both are assured under the foregoing executive orders and the rules and regulations
promulgated by the PCGG. The general power of investigation vested in the PCGG may be divided into two stages.
The first stage of investigation which is called the criminal investigation stage is the fact finding inquiring which is usually
conducted by the law enforcement agents whereby they gather evidence and interview witnesses after which they
assess the evidence and if they find sufficient basis, file the complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation. The
second stage is the preliminary investigation stage of the said complaint. It is at this stage, as above discussed, where it
is ascertained if there is sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial. It is in such instances that we say one cannot be "a
prosecutor and judge at the same time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a law enforcer, he
cannot be expected to handle with impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own complaint, this time as a public
prosecutor. The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if the PCGG would be
prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation of the complaints subject of this petition and the petition for
intervention and that the records of the same should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independent
constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and
take appropriate action.

CRIM PRO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

Title G.R. No. 199082, G.R. No. 199085, G.R. No.199118
ARROYO VS DOJ Date: September 18, 2012
Ponente: PERALTA, J.
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO; BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR.; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO Petitioners HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, .JR., in his
capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on Elections;
and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and FACT-FINDING TEAM;
HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of
Justice; HON. SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as
COMELEC Chairperson; RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N.
TAGLE, ARMANDO V. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM AND AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, in
their capacity as COMELEC COMMISSIONERS; CLARO A.
ARELLANO, GEOUGE C. DEE, JACINTO G. ANG, ROMEO
B. FORTES AND MICHAEL D. VILLARET, in their capacity as
CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE
JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
COMMITEE ON THE 2004 AND 2007 ELECTION FRAUD;
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by
Chairperson Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, represented by Secretary Leila M. De Lima,
JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
COMMITTEE, SENATOR AQUILINO M. PIMENTEL III, and
DOJ-COMELEC FACT FINDING TEAM Respondents
Nature of the case: Before the Court are three (3) consolidated petitions and supplemental petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Jose Miguel T. Arroyo (Mike Arroyo) in G.R. No. 199082,
Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. (Abalos) in G.R. No. 199085 and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) in G.R. No. 199118.
FACTS
ANTECEDENTS
Acting on the discovery of alleged new evidence and the surfacing of new witnesses indicating the occurrence of
massive electoral fraud and manipulation of election results in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections, on August 2,
2011, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a committee jointly with the Department of
Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies
committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.

On August 4, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 6406 naming three (3) of its prosecutors to
the Joint Committee.

On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases.
The Joint Committee and the Fact-Finding Team are composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. Section 2
of the Joint Order lays down the mandate of the Joint Committee, to wit:

Section 2. Mandate. The Committee shall conduct the necessary preliminary investigation on the basis of the
evidence gathered and the charges recommended by the Fact-Finding Team created and referred to in Section 4
hereof. Resolutions finding probable cause for election offenses, defined and penalized under the Omnibus Election
Code and other election laws shall be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. For other offenses, or those not covered by the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, the
corresponding criminal information may be filed directly with the appropriate courts.

The members of the Fact-Finding Team unanimously agreed that the subject of the Initial Report would be the
electoral fraud and manipulation of election results allegedly committed during the May 14, 2007 elections. Thus, in its
Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May
14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed
perpetrated.12 The Fact-Finding Team recommended that petitioner Abalos and ten (10) others13 be subjected to
preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results in North and South
Cotabato. Twenty-six (26)14 persons, including petitioners GMA and Abalos, were likewise recommended for
preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for manipulating the election results in Maguindanao. Several persons
were also recommended to be charged administratively, while others, including petitioner Mike Arroyo, were
recommended to be subjected to further investigation.17 The case resulting from the investigation of the Fact-Finding
Team was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 001-2011.

Meanwhile, on October 17, 2011, Senator Aquilino Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel) filed a Complaint-Affidavit for
Electoral Sabotage against petitioners and twelve others and several John Does and Jane Does. The case was
docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 002-2011.

CONTENTIONS:
1. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Joint Order No. 001-2011 for having no basis in law.

2. Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because its sole purpose is the investigation and prosecution of certain
persons and incidents. They argue that there is no substantial distinction between the allegations of massive
electoral fraud in 2004 and 2007, on the one hand, and previous and subsequent national elections, on the
other hand; and no substantial distinction between petitioners and the other persons or public officials who
might have been involved in previous election offenses. They insist that the Joint Panel was created to target
only the Arroyo Administration as well as public officials linked to the Arroyo Administration. To bolster their
claim, petitioners explain that Joint Order No. 001-2011 is similar to Executive Order No. 1 (creating the
Philippine Truth Commission) which this Court had already nullified for being violative of the equal protection
clause.

3. Petitioners claim that the Joint Panel does not possess the required cold neutrality of an impartial judge
because it is all at once the evidence-gatherer, prosecutor and judge. They explain that since the Fact-
Finding Team has found probable cause to subject them to preliminary investigation, it is impossible for the
Joint Committee to arrive at an opposite conclusion. Petitioners likewise express doubts of any possibility that
the Joint Committee will be fair and impartial to them as Secretary De Lima and Chairman Brillantes had
repeatedly expressed prejudgment against petitioners through their statements captured by the media. For
their part, respondents contend that petitioners failed to present proof that the President of the Philippines,
Secretary of Justice, and Chairman of the Comelec actually made the statements allegedly prejudging their
case and in the context in which they interpreted them. They likewise contend that assuming that said
statements were made, there was no showing that Secretary De Lima had tried to intervene in the
investigation to influence its outcome nor was it proven that the Joint Committee itself had prejudged the
case. Lastly, they point out that Joint Order No. 001-2011 created two bodies, the Fact-Finding Team and the
Joint Committee, with their respective mandates. Hence, they cannot be considered as one.

4. Petitioners claim that in creating the Joint Panel, the Comelec has effectively abdicated its constitutional
mandate to investigate and, where appropriate, to prosecute cases of violation of election laws including
acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices in favor of the Executive
Department acting through the DOJ Secretary. Under the set- up, the Comelec personnel is placed under
the supervision and control of the DOJ. The chairperson is a DOJ official. Thus, the Comelec has willingly
surrendered its independence to the DOJ and has acceded to share its exercise of judgment and discretion
with the Executive Branch.

5. In her Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to require Senator Pimentel to furnish her with documents referred to in
his complaint-affidavit and for production of election documents as basis for the charge of electoral
sabotage, GMA prayed that the Joint Committee issue an Order directing the Fact-Finding Team and
Senator Pimentel to furnish her with copies of the certain documents. GMA likewise requested the production
of election documents used in the Provinces of South and North Cotabato and Maguindanao. The Joint
Committee, however, denied GMAs motion which carried with it the denial to extend the filing of her
counter-affidavit. Consequently, the cases were submitted for resolution sans GMAs and the other
petitioners counter-affidavits. This, according to GMA, violates her right to due process of law.
ISSUE/S
II. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 has basis in law to allow COMELEC and DOJ to conduct P.I.s on
the alleged election offenses YES
III. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection clause. NO
 IV. Whether or not the right to due process of the petitioners are violated. NO
V. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates separation of powers and independence of
Constitutional Commissions. NO
VI. Whether or not the PI conducted by the COMELEC and DOJ was valid. -YES
RATIO
1. Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code was amended by Section 43 of R.A. No. 9369,71 which reads:

Section 43. Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby amended to read as follows:

SEC. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the power,
concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct preliminary investigation of all
election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same.

As clearly set forth above, instead of a mere delegated authority, the other prosecuting arms of the
government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Comelec to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same.

2. Unlike the matter addressed by the Courts ruling in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, Joint
Order No. 001-2011 cannot be nullified on the ground that it singles out the officials of the Arroyo
Administration and, therefore, it infringes the equal protection clause. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
was expressly created for the purpose of investigating alleged graft and corruption during the Arroyo
Administration since Executive Order No. 177 specifically referred to the "previous administration"; while the
Joint Committee was created for the purpose of conducting preliminary investigation of election offenses
during the 2004 and 2007 elections. While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary
investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who were
investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance of their official duties. Private individuals
were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee. Thus, as the constitutional body granted
with the broad power of enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, and tasked to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections, the Comelec has the authority to determine how best to perform such constitutional
mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the Comelec issues various resolutions prior to every local or national
elections setting forth the guidelines to be observed in the conduct of the elections. This shows that every
election is distinct and requires different guidelines in order to ensure that the rules are updated to respond to
existing circumstances. Pursuant to law and the Comelecs own Rules, investigations may be conducted
either by the Comelec itself through its law department or through the prosecutors of the DOJ. These varying
procedures and treatment do not, however, mean that respondents are not treated alike. Thus, petitioners
insistence of infringement of their constitutional right to equal protection of the law is misplaced.

3. It is settled that the conduct of preliminary investigation is, like court proceedings, subject to the requirements
of both substantive and procedural due process. Preliminary investigation is considered as a judicial
proceeding wherein the prosecutor or investigating officer, by the nature of his functions, acts as a quasi-
judicial officer. The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside over or to
conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than that of a municipal judge or even an RTC Judge. In this
case, as correctly pointed out by respondents, there was no showing that the statements claimed to have
prejudged the case against petitioners were made by Secretary De Lima and Chairman Brillantes or were in
the prejudicial context in which petitioners claimed the statements were made. A reading of the statements
allegedly made by them reveals that they were just responding to hypothetical questions in the event that
probable cause would eventually be found by the Joint Committee. More importantly, there was no proof or
even an allegation that the Joint Committee itself, tasked to conduct the requisite preliminary investigation
against petitioners, made biased statements that would convey to the public that the members were
favoring a particular party. Neither did the petitioners show that the President of the Philippines, the Secretary
of Justice or the Chairman of the Comelec intervened in the conduct of the preliminary investigation or
exerted undue pressure on their subordinates to tailor their decision with their public declarations and adhere
to a pre-determined result.88 Moreover, insofar as the Comelec is concerned, it must be emphasized that
the constitutional body is collegial. The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of
the entire body itself. In equating the alleged bias of the above-named officials with that of the Joint
Committee, there would be no arm of the government credible enough to conduct a preliminary
investigation.

4. Although DOJ belongs to the executive department, as the agency tasked to investigate crimes, prosecute
offenders, and administer the correctional system, the DOJ is likewise not barred from acting jointly with the
Comelec. It must be emphasized that the DOJ and the Comelec exercise concurrent jurisdiction in
conducting preliminary investigation of election offenses. The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal
jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no
prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the
situation where one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for
preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of substantially
the same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the
second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that
 first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. To allow the
same complaint to be filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity
of proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and
defend his position before every agency or body where the same complaint was filed. This would lead
hapless litigants at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause or defense. Finally, the second
investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure of public funds, and the use of valuable and limited
resources of Government, in a duplication of proceedings already started with the Ombudsman. None of
these problems would likely arise in the present case. The Comelec and the DOJ themselves agreed that
they would exercise their concurrent jurisdiction jointly. Although the preliminary investigation was conducted
on the basis of two complaints the initial report of the Fact-Finding Team and the complaint of Senator
Pimentel both complaints were filed with the Joint Committee. Consequently, the complaints were filed
with and the preliminary investigation was conducted by only one investigative body. Thus, we find no
reason to disallow the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction jointly by those given such authority. This is especially
true in this case given the magnitude of the crimes allegedly committed by petitioners. The joint preliminary
investigation also serves to maximize the resources and manpower of both the Comelec and the DOJ for the
prompt disposition of the cases.

5. We must, however, emphasize at this point that during the preliminary investigation, the complainants are
not obliged to prove their cause beyond reasonable doubt. It would be unfair to expect them to present the
entire evidence needed to secure the conviction of the accused prior to the filing of information. A
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties respective
evidence but the presentation only of such evidence as may engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
Precisely there is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for the prosecution in support of the charge. With
the denial of GMAs motion to be furnished with and examine the documents referred to in Senator
Pimentels complaint, GMAs motion to extend the filing of her counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence
was consequently denied. Indeed, considering the nature of the crime for which GMA was subjected to
preliminary investigation and the documents attached to the complaint, it is incumbent upon the Joint
Committee to afford her ample time to examine the documents submitted to the Joint Committee in order
that she would be able to prepare her counter-affidavit. She cannot, however, insist to examine documents
not in the possession and custody of the Joint Committee nor submitted by the complainants. Otherwise, it
might cause undue and unnecessary delay in the disposition of the cases.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the denial of GMAs motion to be furnished with and examine
the documents referred to in Senator Pimentels complaint carried with it the denial to extend the filing of her
counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence rendering the preliminary investigation irregular, such
irregularity would not divest the RTC of jurisdiction over the case and would not nullify the warrant of arrest
issued in connection therewith, considering that Informations had already been filed against petitioners,
except Mike Arroyo. This would only compel us to suspend the proceedings in the RTC and remand the case
to the Joint Committee so that GMA could submit her counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence if
she still opts to. However, to do so would hold back the progress of the case which is anathema to the
accuseds right to speedy disposition of cases.

It is well settled that the absence or irregularity of preliminary investigation does not affect the courts
jurisdiction over the case. Nor does it impair the validity of the criminal information or render it defective.
Dismissal is not the remedy. Neither is it a ground to quash the information or nullify the order of arrest issued
against the accused or justify the release of the accused from detention. The proper course of action that
should be taken is to hold in abeyance the proceedings upon such information and to remand the case for
the conduct of preliminary investigation.

RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions and supplemental petitions are DISMISSED. Comelec Resolution No.
9266 dated August 2, 2011, Joint Order No. 001-2011 dated August 15, 2011, and the Fact-Finding Teams Initial Report
dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID. However, the Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary
Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of
publication.

In view of the constitutionality of the Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in accordance with
Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the
preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.

Let the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 112, where the criminal cases for electoral
sabotage against petitioners GMA and Abalos are pending, proceed with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
Notes
In Uy v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court explained the nature of preliminary investigation, to wit:
A preliminary investigation is held before an accused is placed on trial to secure the innocent against hasty,
malicious, and oppressive prosecution; to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as
from the trouble, expenses, and anxiety of a public trial. It is also intended to protect the state from having to
conduct useless and expensive trials. While the right is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a component of due
process in administering criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound
for trial and before being exposed to the risk of incarceration and penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is
a substantive right. To deny the accused's claim to a preliminary investigation is to deprive him of the full measure of
his right to due process.

A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal justice system which spells for an individual the difference
between months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail term, on the one hand, and peace of mind and liberty,
on the other hand. Thus, we have characterized the right to a preliminary investigation as not a mere formal or
technical right but a substantive one, forming part of due process in criminal justice.

In a preliminary investigation, the Rules of Court guarantee the petitioners basic due process rights such as the right to
be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit
counter-affidavits, and other supporting documents in her defense.

CRIMPRO Rule 112

Title G.R. No. 108431.
RARO V. SB July 14, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Oscar G. Raro Petitioner The Honorable SB, (Second Division), The Honorable
Ombudsman And People Of The Philippines Respondent
FACTS
1. July 30, 1987, the PCSO, through Atty. Reynaldo E. Ilagan of the Special Projects Department, authorized Elmec
Trading and Management Corporation (ELMEC) to operate the STL in the province of Camarines Norte. ELMEC in
turn employed Luis (Bing) F. Abao, a resident of Daet, Camarines Norte, as Provincial Manager of the experimental
STL in said province.
2. May 20, 1988, Abao alleged in a complaint with the Tanodbayan that petitioner Oscar G. Raro, a lawyer, was the
Corporate Secretary of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO). As such, petitioner was the Acting
Manager of the Special Projects Department that was in charge of the experimental Small Town Lottery (STL), in his
capacity as PCSO Corporate Secretary, personally and directly intervened in the operation of said lottery to his
financial benefit and advantage in violation of Section 3 (d)(e)(h) of the AntiGraft Law
3. Abao maintained further that petitioner got mad at him when he gave petitioner a check instead of cash, which
petitioner later used to accuse Abao of issuing a bouncing check notwithstanding that the check was not
encashed. Abao added that petitioner was not only dishonest but displayed such dishonesty. The complaint filed
by Abaos counsel was verified and subscribed before a notary public, and docketed in the Office of the
Ombudsman which was endorsed to the NBI for investigation. September 19, 1990, the NBI recommended the
prosecution of petitioner based on Abaos complaint.
4. May 1991, Graft Investigating Officer (GIO) II Caraos, formally directed petitioner to file his counteraffidavit and
controverting evidence to the complaint of May 1988, with a warning that his failure to do so shall be construed as
a waiver of his right to be heard and the preliminary investigation shall proceed accordingly. Petitioner filed his
counteraffidavit on October 25, 1991 denying the allegations of Abao.
5. November 29, 1991, GIO II Caraos issued a Resolution finding prima facie case against Raro for Violation of R.A.
3019 based on a finding of probable cause has been established by the clear and positive testimonies of the
complainant and his witnesses and also upon recommendation of the NBI report which also recommended the
filing of proper criminal charge against the petitioner Raro.
6. June 11, 1992, Special Prosecution Officer I (SPO I) Wendell E. Barreras-Sulit, after reviewing the Resolution of GIO II
Caraos, issued a Memorandum finding that said Resolution did not fully discuss the evidence that would support
the particular charges recommended to be filed against petitioner. After analyzing each of the charges, SPO I
Barreras-Sulit concluded that petitioner should only be charged with violation of Section 3 (b) of R.A. 3019 as there
was prima facie case that petitioner received the total amount of P116,000.00 on four different occasions.
Attached to the Memorandum was the information charging petitioner with violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic
Act No. 3019.
7. July 2, 1992, an information dated May 19, 1992 prepared by SPO I Barreras-Sulit was filed with the SB, accusing
petitioner with violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019.
8. July 6, 1992, the SB issued an order for petitioners arrest and fixed bail in the amount of P12,000.00. On the same
day, petitioner applied for bail before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26, which forthwith
approved the application.
9. July 8, 1992, petitioner filed with the SB a manifestation and motion for the lifting of the order of arrest.
Accordingly, the SB recalled its order of arrest the following day.
10. Petitioner subsequently filed with the SB a motion for the reinvestigation of the Resolution of the Ombudsman
dated 11 June 1992 on the grounds that there was prejudicial and indecent delay in the preliminary investigation
violated his constitutional rights; he was not furnished a copy of the resolution on which the information was based;
that the resolution of June 11, 1992 was a picture of legal and factual infirmities as no evidence supported the
complaint; and that the complaint was based solely on the affidavit of Abao and mere hearsay witnesses. The SB
 granted the petitioners motion for reinvestigation in a Resolution dated July 28, 1992, and ordered the defense to
file a motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation with the Office of the Ombudsman, and the prosecution to
conduct such reinvestigation
11. August 14, 1992, SPO III Berbano issued an Order stating that the grounds and issues raised in petitioners motion for
reinvestigation were clearly matters of defense to be ventilated during the trial of the case on the merits. Hence,
he recommended the denial of the motion for reinvestigation, which recommendation was approved by the
Ombudsman.
12. The scheduled arraignment of petitioner on September 8, 1992 was cancelled considering that the reinvestigation
ordered by the SB had not yet been terminated. Arraignment was reset and the petitioner again failed to appear
as he was ill. The SB reset the arraignment for October 12, 1992.
13. On that date, petitioner filed with the SB a motion to quash the information,on the ground that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction in view of violations of accuseds constitutional rights during the preliminary investigation. To
which SPO III Berbano opposed the motion to quash, arguing that all the pleadings filed by petitioner were duly
considered. The SB denied the motion to quash for lack of merit. The SB stressed that its authority to determine
probable cause is limited only for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest, and not for the purpose of justifying the
filing or nonfiling of the Information.
14. Petitioner again filed for a motion for reconsideration to which the SB denied and set petitioners arraignment.
15. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to enjoin respondents from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 17800.
16. The SC gave due course to the instant petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.
Meanwhile, the SB suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 17800 on account of the pendency of the instant
petition.

17. Petitioner alleges in this petition for certiorari and prohibition that:
(a) the determination of probable cause in Criminal Case No. 17800 was constitutionally defective because the
Ombudsman, before filing the information, and the SB, before issuing the warrant of arrest, failed to examine the
complainant under oath
(b) the preliminary investigation was hasty, malicious, persecutory and based on inadmissible evidence thereby
violating his right to due process of law, and
(c) the unexplained 4year delay in resolving the preliminary investigation, coupled with the favorable
consideration of the complaint albeit manifestly false and politically motivated, violated his constitutional rights to
speedy trial and to due process of law
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the SB gravely abused its discretion in denying a motion to quash an information on the ground that the
preliminary investigation allegedly violated the right of the accused to due process of law. - NO
RATIO
At the outset, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the
denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that when such an adverse interlocutory order is
rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course
and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law. It is only where
there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal that the special civil action of
certiorari or prohibition may exceptionally be allowed.

In the case at bar, there is no showing of such special circumstances. The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over the
complaint is not even questioned by petitioner as his motion to quash the information is based on the allegedly highly
anomalous preliminary investigation that amounted to a denial of his rights to due process and to speedy disposition of
the charge against him. However, an incomplete preliminary investigation or the absence thereof may not warrant the
quashal of an information. In such cases, the proper procedure is for the SB to hold in abeyance any further
proceedings conducted and to remand the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation or completion
thereof. Hence, on the issue alone of the propriety of the remedy sought by petitioner, the instant petition for certiorari
and prohibition must fail. However, in the interest of justice, we shall resolve the issue of whether or not the Ombudsman
conducted the preliminary investigation erroneously and irregularly.

1. Determination of probable cause by the Ombudsman was not defective

The mandate to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees* of the
Government is restated in Section 13 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), approved into law on
November 17, 1989. The same authority to act on complaints in any form, either verbal or in writing, is also reiterated in
Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Clearly in consonance with the provision
that the complaint may be in any form, the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure does not require that the complaint be
subscribed only before the Ombudsman or his duly authorized representative. In any event, the issue of the sufficiency
in form of the complaint was rendered moot and academic by petitioners filing of a counter-affidavit wherein he
controverted the allegations in the complaint.

The referral of the complaint to the NBI does not mean that the Ombudsman abdicated its constitutional and statutory
duty to conduct preliminary investigations. Under the circumstances of this case, the Ombudsmans failure to personally
administer oath to the complainant does not mean that the Ombudsman did not personally determine the existence of
probable cause to warrant the filing of an information. Neither did the SB violate petitioners right to due process of law
by its failure to personally examine the complainant before it issued the warrant of arrest. In a preliminary examination
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, a court is not required to review in detail the evidence submitted during the
preliminary investigation. What is required is that the judge personally evaluates the report and supporting documents
submitted by the prosecution in determining probable cause. In the absence of evidence that the SB did not personally
evaluate the necessary records of the case, the presumption of regularity in the conduct of its official business shall
stand. Citing Cruz Jr v People, it must be stressed that a preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the
only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to
prepare his complaint or information. In determining probable cause, an inquiry into the sufficiency of evidence to
warrant conviction is not required. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged.

2. The preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was not hasty, malicious and persecutory
Petitioner emphasizes the fact that while the Resolution recommending the filing of the information was issued on June
11, 1992, the information was already prepared almost a month earlier on May 19, 1992. This may show oversight in the
handling of the documents pertinent to this case considering that the date of the information should have been
corrected to conform to the date of the resolution where its filing was approved by the prosecutors superiors. However,
such faux pas did not violate petitioners substantive rights. The error in the date of the information did not affect its
validity, especially since the recommendation to file it was with the imprimatur of the Ombudsman himself. Neither is
there factual support to petitioners claim that the 4year delay in the completion of the preliminary investigation is
unexplained. The record clearly shows that the Ombudsman exerted utmost effort to determine the veracity of Abaos
allegations against petitioner. That it took the NBI almost two years to complete its report on the matter does not mean
that petitioners right to speedy disposition of the charge was brushed aside. The length of time it took before the
conclusion of the preliminary investigation may only be attributed to the adherence of the Ombudsman and the NBI to
the rules of procedure and the rudiments of fair play.

RULING
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions of
the SB are hereby AFFIRMED. The SB is DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case
No. 17800.
*Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution: The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, and shall, in
appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/december2007/151785.htm 2S 2016-17
(MATIENZO)

CRIMPRO
Title GR No. 217126-27
CARPIO-Morales vs. CA Date: Nov 10, 2015
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR
OMBUDSMAN Petitioners ERWIN S. BINAY, JR. Respondents
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition2 filed on March 25, 2015 by petitioner Conchita Carpio
Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
assailing: (a) the Resolution3 dated March 16, 2015 of public respondent the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453, which granted private respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) against the implementation of the Joint Order 4 dated March 10, 20,15 of the
Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-0058 to 0063 (preventive suspension order) preventively suspending him and several
other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and (b) the
Resolution5 dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for
contempt6 in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.
FACTS
A complaint was filed by Atty. Renato Bondal and Nicolas Enciso VI before the Ombudsmans against Binay,
Jr and other public officers of City of Makati charging them of of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No.
(RA) 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5)
phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking
Building).
A Special Panel of Investigators created by the Ombudsman to conduct a fact-finding investigation charged
them with 6 administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of
Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases). <See Notes Letter A for their violation/s)
Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, the subject preventive suspension
order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay,
during the pendency of the OMB Cases.53 The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive
suspension of a public officer are present,54 finding that:
o (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that
 (1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had
attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project;
(2) the documents on record negated the publication of bids; and
(3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of funds;
and
o (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service;
o (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and
o (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access to public records and allow them to
influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation
relative to the OMB Cases filed against them.
o Binays Contentions;
-that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the
five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken
before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term
and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his
administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and
academic.
In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to show
that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining that he did not participate in
any of the purported irregularities.62 In support of his prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that
he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by landslide vote in the 2010
and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to
sustain the charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the
electorate of the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.
In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman
filed a supplemental petition99 before this Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders.
The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which
should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate,
there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-
election in 2013

ISSUE/S
1. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation
of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman; -YES
2. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP
No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the
condonation doctrine -NO

RATIO
1. OMB contends that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive writ against her office to
enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in
conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that "[i]n
order to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial
intervention,"157particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the courts,"158 claiming that
said writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would."
Gonzales III v. Office of the President is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's
independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other constitutional bodies. the concept of Ombudsman's
independence covers three (3) things:

First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally
specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself
allows, or an amendment thereto is made;cralawlawlibrary

Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or
dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its] functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically
decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to impair said functions; and

Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks of the office
can only be disciplined by an internal authority.

Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman frompolitical
harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics."

That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the
Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which
 are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that
it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a
preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from political
harassment or pressure.

2. As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive
writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution
directing the issuance of the subject TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015
Resolution directing the issuance of the subject WPI was based on the cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor
Garcia, and again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine,
which at that time, unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse
of discretion based on its legal attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive
suspension order was correctly issued.

With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve the main petition forcertiorari in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453 on the merits. However, considering that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already found
Binay, Jr. administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty
of perpetual disqualification from holding public office, for the present administrative charges against him, the said
CA petition appears to have been mooted.313 As initially intimated, the preventive suspension order is only an
ancillary issuance that, at its core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office of the Ombudsman in its investigation. It
therefore has no more purpose - and perforce, dissolves - upon the termination of the office's process of investigation
in the instant administrative case.

RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of this Decision, the Court resolves as follows:
(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy
against the issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under the first paragraph of the said provision is DECLARED ineffective
until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued
therefor;cralawlawlibrary

(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect;craly

(c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 in light of the Office of the Ombudsman's supervening issuance of its Joint
Decision dated October 9, 2015 finding Binay, Jr. administratively liable in the six (6) administrative complamts,
docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062, and
OMB-C-A-15-0063; and

(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's comment, the CA is DIRECTED to resolve
Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with utmost dispatch.
Notes
A. Binays First Term:
o Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21 for Phase III, IV and V of the Makati Parking Building project to
Hilmarc's Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the corresponding
contract without the required publication and the lack of architectural design, 24 and approved the
release of funds therefor.
Binays Second Term:
o Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of contract with Hilmarc's for
Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project; and
o Approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the contract48 with MANA Architecture
& Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the design and architectural services covering the Makati Parking
Building.
B. Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman:
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for
Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be
appointed.
C. The law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive
suspension pending an investigation, namely:

(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and

(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement:

(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance
 of duty;cralawlawlibrary

(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or

(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

D. CONDONATION DOCTRINE-
limited empowerment of the electorate over the accountabilities of their elective local officials. It is limited
because it does not cover criminal accountabilities. It is a legal fiction grounded upon a presumed knowledge of all
the activities and behavior of the elective local official. It is presumed that when the electorate exercised their right
to choose, they were all aware of all the misconducts of the public official.

Callo-Claridad vs Esteban
G.R. No. 191567 March 20, 2013

Facts: Around 5:30 p.m. of February 27, 2007, Chase returned home from visiting his girlfriend, Ramonna Liza Monnel
Hernandez. Around 7:00 p.m., Chases sister Ariane was sitting at the porch of their house when she noticed a white
Honda Civic car parked along the street. Recognizing the driver to be Philip, Ariane waved her hand at him. Philip
appeared nonchalant and did not acknowledge her gesture. Ariane decided to stay behind and leave with their
house helpers, Marivic Guray and Michelle Corpus, only after Chase had left on board the white Honda Civic car.
Marivic Rodriguez, a house helper of Shellane Yukoko, the resident of No. 9 Cedar Place, Ferndale Homes, was with her
co-employee nanny Jennylyn Buri and the latters ward, Joei Yukoko, when they heard somebody crying coming from
the crime scene: Help! Help! This was at about 7:30 p.m. Even so, neither of them bothered to check who had been
crying for help. It was noted, however, that No. 10 Cedar Place, which was owned by one Mrs. Howard, was
uninhabited at the time. Based on the initial investigation report of the Megaforce Security and Allied Services, Inc., the
Estebans were illegally parking their cars at Mrs. Howards carport. The initial investigation report stated that the SGs
would regularly remind the Estebans to use their own parking garage, which reminders had resulted in heated
discussions and altercations. The SGs kept records of all the illegal parking incidents, and maintained that only the
Estebans used the carport of No. 10 Cedar Place. Around 7:45 p.m., respondent Teodora Alyn Esteban (Teodora)
arrived at Ferndale Homes on board a vehicle bearing plate XPN 733, as recorded in the subdivision SGs logbook. At
that time, three cars were parked at the carport of No. 10 Cedar place, to wit: a Honda CRV with plate ZAE 135 parked
parallel to the Honda Civic with plate CRD 999, and another Honda Civic with plate JTG 333, the car frequently used by
Philip, then parked diagonally behind the two cars. Some witnesses alleged that prior to the discovery of the Chases
body, they had noticed a male and female inside the car bearing plate JTG 333 engaged in a discussion. At
around 7:50 p.m., SG Abelardo Sarmiento Jr., while patrolling around the village, noticed that the side of the Honda
Civic with plate JTG 333 had red streaks, which prompted him to move towards the parked cars. He inspected the then
empty vehicle and noticed that its radio was still turned on. He checked the cars and discovered that the rear and side
of the Honda Civic with plate CRD 999 were smeared with blood. He saw on the passenger seat a cellular phone
covered with blood. It was then that he found the bloodied and lifeless body of Chase lying between the parallel cars.
The body was naked from the waist up, with a crumpled bloodied shirt on the chest, and with only the socks on. SG
Sarmiento called for back-up. SG Rene Fabe immediately barricaded the crime scene. Around 7:55 p.m., SG Solis
received a phone call from an unidentified person who reported that a kid had met an accident at Cedar Place. SG
Solis later identified and confirmed the caller to be Mr. Esteban Larry when the latter entered the village gate and
inquired whether the kid who had met an accident had been attended to. Moreover, when SG Fabe and SG
Sarmiento were securing the scene of the crime, they overheard from the radio that somebody had reported about a
kid who had been involved in an accident at Cedar Place. SG Fabe thereafter searched the village premises but did
not find any such accident. When SG Fabe got back, there were already several onlookers at the crime scene.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence is sufficient to charge the respondents of murder.

Held: No. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent
with one another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that a crime
has been committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof. The pieces of evidence must be consistent
with the hypothesis that the respondents were probably guilty of the crime and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that they were innocent, and with every rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient, therefore, if: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
have been proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

The records show that the circumstantial evidence linking Philip to the killing of Chase derived from the bare
recollections of Ariane (sister of Chase), and of Guray and Corpus (respectively, the househelp and nanny in the
household of a resident of the subdivision) about seeing Chase board the white Honda Civic at around 7:00 p.m. of
February 27, 2007, and about Philip being the driver of the Honda Civic. But there was nothing else after that, because
the circumstances revealed by the other witnesses could not even be regarded as circumstantial evidence against
Philip. To be sure, some of the affidavits were unsworn. The statements subscribed and sworn to before the officers of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) having the authority to administer oaths upon matters connected with the performance
of their official duties undeniably lacked the requisite certifications to the effect that such administering officers had
personally examined the affiants, and that such administering officers were satisfied that the affiants had voluntarily
executed and understood their affidavits.

Thus, it is imperative that the circumstantial evidence that the victim was last seen in the company of respondent Philip
must be established by competent evidence required by the rules in preliminary investigation. Here, it was allegedly
Chases sister, Ariane, and their two household helpers, Marivic Guray and Michelle Corpus, who saw respondent Philip
pick up Chase at around 7:00 oclock in the evening of February 27, 2007. Yet, such fact from which the inference is
derived was not duly proven. The statements of Marivic and Michelle both executed on February 28, 2007 were not
sworn to before the proper officer.

Neither was the affidavit dated July 3, 2009 of Ariane Claridad duly notarized nor is there any explanation why the same
was belatedly executed.

CRIM PRO Preliminary Investigation

Title G.R. No. 147932
DE OCAMPO VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE Date: January 25, 2006
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
LAILA G. DE OCAMPO, petitioner. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, MAGDALENA B.
DACARRA and ERLINDA P. ORAYAN, respondents.
Nature of the case: A clarificatory hearing is not indispensable during preliminary investigation; What is determined in
preliminary investigation is only probable cause, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
FACTS
Magdalena B. Dacarra (Magdalena) executed sworn statement before the Womens Desk of the CPD Police Station in
Batasan Hills, Quezon City and stated that on 4 December 1999, her nine-year-old son Ronald complained of dizziness
upon arriving home at about six in the evening. Ronald then vomited, prompting Magdalena to ask what happened.
Ronald replied that petitioner, who was Ronalds teacher, banged his head against that of his classmate Lorendo
Orayan (Lorendo). Magdalena inspected Ronalds head and saw a woundless contusion. Due to Ronalds continued
vomiting, Magdalena brought him to a quack doctor (arbularyo) on 5 December 1999. The following morning,
Magdalena brought Ronald to the East Avenue Medical Center where he underwent an x-ray. The attending physician
informed Magdalena that Ronalds head had a fracture. Blood oozed out of Ronalds nose before he died on 9
December 1999. Lorendo also executed a sworn statement narrating how petitioner banged his head against Ronalds.

According to Prosecutor, evidence warrants the release of the respondent for further investigation of the charges
against her. The case is not proper for inquest as the incident complained of happened on December 4, 1999.
Evidence insufficient to support the charge for homicide against the respondent as there is no concrete evidence to
show proof that the alleged banging of the heads of the two minor victims could be the actual and proximate cause
of the death of minor Ronald Dacarra y Baluton. Besides, the police report submitted by the respondent in this case
states that said victim bears stitches or sutures on the head due to a vehicular accident. There is no certainty, therefore,
that respondents alleged wrongdoing contributed or caused the death of said victim.

Case referred to investigating prosecutor Chua-Cheng for preliminary investigation and scheduled first hearing.
Respondent Erlinda P. Orayan, Lorendos mother, attended the hearing of 6 January 2000 and alleged that petitioner
offered her P100,000, which she initially accepted, for her and her sons non-appearance at the preliminary
investigation. Erlinda presented the money to the prosecutor. Jennilyn Quirong, who witnessed the head-banging
incident, and Melanie Lugales, who claimed to be another victim of petitioners alleged cruel deeds, filed their sworn
statements with the OQCP.

Petitioners Contentions:
Must invoke the disposition of the inquest prosecutor finding insufficient evidence to support the charges
against her. .
Pointed out the absence of damage or injury on Lorendo as borne out by his medical certificate and
contended that the head-banging incident was not the proximate cause of Ronalds death, but the failed
medical attention or medical negligence; Erred in concluding that her alleged act of banging Ronald and
Lorendos heads was the cause of Ronalds injury and that such was an act of child abuse.
Alleged that Jennilyn Quirong and Melanie Lugales have immature perception.
Causes of death stated in Ronalds Death Certificate are hearsay and inadmissible in the preliminary
investigation.
Investigating prosecutor showed bias in favor of complainants Magdalena and Erlinda (complainants) for not
conducting a clarificatory hearing and unilaterally procuring the autopsy report.
Alleged that it is the Office of the Ombudsman which has jurisdiction over the case, and not the Quezon City
Prosecutors Office.

Death Certificate: immediate cause of his death as Cardio Pulmonary Arrest, the underlying cause as Cerebral Edema,
and other significant conditions contributing to death as Electrolyte imbalance and vomiting. And from the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame, report states the cause as Intracranial hemorrhage secondary to traumatic injury of the
head.
The investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution found probable cause against petitioner for the offenses charged of
homicide. Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ but was denied. Filed motion for
reconsideration but was also denied.
ISSUE/S
1. Whether petitioner was denied due process during the preliminary investigation. NO
2. Whether there is probable cause against petitioner for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 and for violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610. - YES
RATIO
No Deprivation of Due Process despite Absence of Clarificatory Hearing

A clarificatory hearing is not indispensable during preliminary investigation, it is optional on the part of the investigating
officer as evidenced by the use of the term may in Section 3(e) of Rule 112. This provision states:

(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to propound
clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity
to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. xxx (emphasis supplied)

The use of the word may in a statute commonly denotes that it is directory in nature - generally permissive only and
operates to confer discretion. It is within the discretion of the investigation officer whether to set the case for further
hearings to clarify some matters. In this case, the investigating prosecutor no longer conducted hearings after petitioner
submitted her counter-affidavit. This simply means that at that point the investigating prosecutor believed that there
were no more matters for clarification. In any event, petitioner can raise these important matters during the trial proper.
Petitioner was not deprived of due process since both parties were accorded equal rights in arguing their case and
presenting their respective evidence during the preliminary investigation. Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial. Hence, if the investigating prosecutor is already satisfied that he can reasonably determine the existence of
probable cause based on the parties evidence thus presented, he may terminate the proceedings and resolve the
case. In the issue of obtaining copy of autopsy report, though it is not part of the parties evidence, the Rules on
preliminary investigation do not forbid the investigating prosecutor from obtaining it. Neither is there a law requiring the
investigating prosecutor to notify the parties before securing a copy of the autopsy report. The autopsy report, which
states the causes of Ronalds death, can either absolve or condemn the petitioner. Unfortunately for petitioner, the
investigating prosecutor found that the autopsy report bolstered complainants allegations.

Petitioner mistakenly cites Section 3(d) of Rule 112 in arguing that the investigating prosecutor should not go beyond
the evidence presented by complainants in resolving the case. This provision applies if the respondent cannot be
subpoenaed or if subpoenaed fails to submit her counter-affidavit within the prescribed period. Such is not the case
here where petitioner filed her counter-affidavit and both parties presented their respective evidence.

There is probable cause for the offenses charged against petitioner.

In the present case, Ronald, a nine-year-old student, died five days after his teacher, petitioner in this case, allegedly
banged his head against that of his classmate Lorendo. There is nothing in the records showing petitioners specific
denial of the occurrence of such act. Petitioner admits the occurrence of the head-banging incident but denies
committing it.
The alleged intervening events before Ronald died, namely: (a) the consultation with a quack doctor, and (b) the
three-day confinement in the East Avenue Medical Center, are not sufficient to break the relation of the felony
committed and the resulting injury. Were it not for the head-banging incident, Ronald might not have needed medical
assistance in the first place.

What is determined during preliminary investigation is only probable cause, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. As
implied by the words themselves, probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or moral certainty. As
correctly ruled by the DOJ Secretary, the inquest prosecutor did not dismiss the case but merely recommended it for
further investigation since it was not proper for inquest and the evidence was then insufficient. Moreover, petitioners
active participation in the preliminary investigation without questioning the propriety of such proceedings indicates
petitioners agreement with the recommendation of the inquest prosecutor for the further investigation of the case.

No Grave Abuse of Discretion

The Court rules that the DOJ Secretary did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that there is probable cause
to charge petitioner of the crimes of homicide and child abuse. The Court further rules that the investigating prosecutor
did not act with grave abuse of discretion in securing motu proprio the autopsy report and in not calling for a
clarificatory hearing. This ruling does not diminish in any way the constitutional right of petitioner to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proven.

RULING
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice dated 15 September
2000 and 19 April 2001 in I.C. No. 99-6254. No pronouncement as to costs.
CRIMPRO Sec. 4, Rule 112- Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review
Title GR No. 216920
QUISAY v. PEOPLE Date: January 13, 2016
Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
GIRLIE M. QUISAY Petitioner PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent
Nature of the case: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated October 10, 2014 and the
Resolution dated January 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 131968, which affirmed the denial
of petitioner Girlie M. Quisay's (petitioner) Motion to Quash before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 144
(RTC).chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
FACTS
1. On December 28, 2012, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City (OCP-Makati) issued a Pasiya or
Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610,
otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Consequently, a Pabatid Sakdal or Information was filed before the RTC on January 11, 2013 charging
petitioner of such crime.
2. On April 12, 2013, petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground of lack of
authority of the person who filed the same before the RTC, pointing out that the Resolution issued was
penned by ACP Estefano De La Cruz and approved by SACP Edgardo Hirang, while the Information was
penned by ACP De La Cruz without any approval from higher authority, albeit with a Certification claiming
that ACP De La Cruz has prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor in filing the said
Information. Petitioner claimed that nothing in the aforesaid Resolution and Information would show that
ACP De La Cruz and/or SACP Hirang had prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor to file or
approve the filing of the Information against her.
3. The OCP-Makati countered that the review prosecutor, SACP Hirang, was authorized to approve the
Resolution pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32. Further, it maintained that the Information was filed
with the prior approval of the City Prosecutor as shown in the Certification in the Information itself.
4. The RTC denied petitioner's motion to quash for lack of merit. It found the Certification attached to the
Pabatid Sakdal to have sufficiently complied with Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, the
RTC ruling was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE/S
VII. Whether or not the CA correctly held that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing
petitioner's motion to quash? NO
RATIO
Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a complaint or
information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein before a complaint or
information may be filed before the courts, viz.:
SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the investigating prosecutor finds cause
to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in
the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the
complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the
evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10)
days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman
or his deputy.
Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written authority or
approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and, therefore, subject to quashal pursuant
to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of the same Rules, to wit:
SECTION 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following
grounds:
xxxx
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
People v. Garfin firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the
same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by
express consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
The Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner of the crime charged, was validly made as it
bore the approval of one of the designated review prosecutors for OCP-Makati, SACP Hirang, as evidenced by his
signature therein. Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or Information filed before the
RTC, as there was no showing that it was approved by either the City Prosecutor of Makati or any of the OCP-
Makati's division chiefs or review prosecutors. All it contained was a Certification from ACP De La Cruz which stated,
among others, that "DAGDAG KO PANG PINATUTUNAYAN na angpaghahain ng sakdal na ito ay may nakasulat na
naunang pahintulot o pagpapatibay ng Panlunsod na Taga-Usig" - which translates to "and that the filing of the
Information is with the prior authority and approval of the City Prosecutor."
Aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that ACP De La Cruz was authorized to file
the Pabatid Sakdal or Information before the RTC by himself. Records are bereft of any showing that the City
Prosecutor of Makati had authorized ACP De La Cruz to do so by giving him prior written authority or by designating
him as a division chief or review prosecutor of OCP-Makati. There is likewise nothing that would indicate that ACP De
La Cruz sought the approval of either the City Prosecutor or any of those authorized pursuant to OCP-Makati Office
Order No. 32 in filing the Pabatid Sakdal.
In conclusion, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to quash as the Pabatid Sakdal or
Information suffers from an incurable infirmity - that the officer who filed the same before the RTC had no authority to
do so. Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 10, 2014 and the Resolution dated January 30,
2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131968 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
Information against petitioner Girlie M. Quisay is QUASHED and the criminal case against her is DISMISSED.
Notes
"The Rules of Court governs the pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts of the Philippines. For the orderly
administration of justice, the provisions contained therein should be followed by all litigants, but especially by the
prosecution arm of the Government."

CRIMPRO Sec. 8, RULE 112; Determination of Probable Cause by the Judge

Title GR No. 150185
OKABE v. GUTIERREZ Date: 27 May 2004
Ponente: Callejo. Sr., J.
TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE, petitioner HON. PEDRO DE LEON GUTIERREZ, in his capacity as
Prersiding Judge of RTC pasay City, Branch 119; PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES; and CECILIA MARUYAMA,
respondents
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of Rules of Court.
FACTS
Case timeline:
1. Private Respondent MARUYAMA executed a 15 page affidavit-complaint and filed the same with the Office of
the Prosecutor charging TANGHAL and OKABE (Petitioner) with estafa involving the alleged non delivery of
money agreed upon between the two parties.
2. In the preliminary investigation, the complainant submitted the affidavit of her witnesses and other documentary
evidence. Petitioner filed her counter-affidavit. Respondent filed her reply.
3. After the requisite preliminary investigation the assistant prosecutor came out with a RESOLUTION finding
probable cause. The resolution and information was submitted to the City Prosecutor for approval. The
information was APPROVED.
4. The information was filed in the RTC. Appended in the Information were the (1) affidavit-complaint of respondent
and (2) the resolution of the investigating prosecutor.
5. The trial court issued a warrant of arrest. The petitioner posted a personal bail bond. The court set the date for
arraignment. Thereafter the petitioner filed a MOTION FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE and to
defer arraignment alleging the only documents appended to the information were respondents complaint and
the resolution of the investigating prosecutor.
6. The court denied the motion. It justified that there was a personal examination of the information and that the
act of petitioner in posting bail and praying for other reliefs amounted to waiver of assailing the finding of
existence of probable cause.
7. The petitioner filed a petition to CA under Rule 65. It was partially granted but not with respect to the motion to
determine probable cause. Hence this appeal.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
1. The respondent judge could not have determined the existence of probable cause for her arrest solely on
the resolution of the investigating prosecutor and the undated affidavit-complaint of respondent Maruyama.
2. That it is wrong to say that by posting a personal bail bond for her provisional liability and by filing several
motions for relief, she thereby voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived her
right to assail the infirmities that infected the trial courts issuance of the warrant for her arrest.

ISSUE/S
VIII. WON there is a waiver of the right to assail probable cause by posting bail. (Ancillary issue)- NO.
IX. WON there was a proper determination of probable cause on the part of the judge. NO.
RATIO
1. ON WAIVER OF RIGHT TO ASSAIL PROBABLE CAUSE. There must be clear and convincing proof that the
petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause. When
 the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and
indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other
explanation of his conduct is possible. IN THIS CASE: the posting of bail bond should not be seen as a waiver
but only a way to avert incarceration.

2. ON LEGALITY OF THE DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE BY THE JUDGE. We agree with the petitioner that
before the RTC judge issues a warrant of arrest under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court in relation to
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the judge must make a personal determination of the existence
or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. The duty to make such determination
is personal and exclusive to the issuing judge. He cannot abdicate his duty and rely on the certification of
the investigating prosecutor that he had conducted a preliminary investigation in accordance with law and
the Rules of Court, as amended, and found probable cause for the filing of the Information.

The task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine
the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Probable cause is meant
such set of facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical
knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion, it requires less than evidence which would justify
conviction.

The PURPOSE of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is
to insulate from the very start those falsely charged of crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a
public trial.

In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused, the judge
should not rely solely on the said report. The judge should consider not only the report of the investigating
prosecutor but also the affidavit/affidavits and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-
affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the
preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the
Information.

The rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides that an Information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits
and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence of the
resolution:

SEC. 8. Records. (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An information or complaint
filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their
witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the resolution on the case.

IN THIS CASE: The information only had the affidavit complaint AND resolution of the prosecutor. The counter-
affidavits and other pertinent documents necessary to aid the judge in determining probable cause were
absent.

RULING
GRANTED and REMANDED to redetermine existence of probable cause.
CRIM PRO
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v HON. MA. THERESA L. DELA TORREYADAO, in her GR No.162144-54
capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 81, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, et Date: November 13, 2012
al.
Ponente: Abad, J.:
People of the Philippines, Petitioner HON. MA. THERESA L. DELA TORRE
YADAO et al, Respondents
Petition for Certiorari
FACTS
Case timeline for better appreciation:
1. May 18, 1995 - the combined forces of the Philippine National Police's Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat (then headed by Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo M.
Lacson), Traffic Management Command ([TMC] led by then Police Senior Superintendent Francisco G. Zubia,
Jr.), Criminal Investigation Command (led by then Police Chief Superintendent Romeo M. Acop ), and National
Capital Region Command (headed by then Police Chief Superintendent Jewel F. Canson) killed 11 suspected
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang2 along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City
2. March 29, 1999 - the RTC of Quezon City ordered the provisional dismissal of the cases for lack of probable
cause to hold the accused for trial following the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the
desistance of the private complainants.
3. March 27, 2001 - the case was reopened and CA granted the petition of Lacson on the ground of double
jeopardy. And on appeal, the SC directed the RTC to try the case.
4. The case was re-raffled to Branch 81 under presiding Judge Yadao.
5. November 12, 2003 - dismissed the cases against the respondents since the affidavits of the prosecution
witnesses were inconsistent with those they submitted in the preliminary investigations before the Ombudsman
for the crime of robbery.

ISSUE/S
1. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she dismissed the criminal actions on the
ground of lack of probable cause and barred the presentation of additional evidence in support of the
prosecutions motion for reconsideration. - NO

RATIO
1. Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of
the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the
accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt
on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within
five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint of information.
2. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal
information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a
warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within
five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.24
3. But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory. The courts first option
under the above is for it to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause." That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause
against the respondents.
4. It is only "in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause" that the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five days from notice. But that is not the case here.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES this petition
CRIMPRO RULE 112
Title G.R. No. 106087
Go vs CA Date: April 7, 1993
Ponente: ROMERO, J p:
ROLITO GO Y TAMBUNTING, petitioner THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 168, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
NCJR, PASIG, METRO MANILA and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Resolution dated September 23, 1992 denying petitioner's Petition
and affirming the Decision and Resolution promulgated on March 9, 1992 and June 26, 1992, respectively, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 26305.
FACTS

Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with another
vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off. An
eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioners plate number and reported the same to the
police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner.

An information was filed charging herein petitioner Rolito Go for murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Metro Manila. 6 days after the shooting petitioner voluntarily presented himself together with his two lawyers
to the police upon obtaining knowledge of being hunted by the latter. However, he was immediately
detained and denied his right of a preliminary investigation unless he executes and sings a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without
preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary
investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a
warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests.
Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary
investigation.

Petitioners contention:
Upon omnibus motion for immediate release on recognizance or on bail and proper preliminary investigation
on the ground that his warrantless arrest was unlawful and no preliminary investigation was conducted
before the information was filed, which is violative of his rights.

The same was granted but later on reversed by the lower court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court in sustaining the decision of the lower court held that petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid
in view of the fact that the offense was committed, the petitioner was clearly identified and there exists valid
information for murder filed against petitioner

Hence, the petitioner filed this present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S
(1) Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.
(2) Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.
RATIO

The general rule on arrest provides that the same is legitimate if effected with a valid warrant. However, there are
instances specifically enumerated under the law when a warrantless arrest may be considered lawful. However, the
warrantless arrest of herein petitioner Rolito Go does not fall within the terms of said rule.

The police were not present at the time of the commission of the offense, neither do they have personal knowledge
on the crime to be committed or has been committed not to mention the fact that petitioner was not a prisoner who
has escaped from the penal institution. In view of the above, the allegation of the prosecution that petitioner needs
to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before a preliminary investigation may be
conducted is baseless. In this connection, petitioner has all the right to ask for a preliminary investigation to determine
whether is probable cause that a crime has been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well
asto prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation brought by a criminal proceeding.This reason of the
accused is substantial, which he should not be deprived of.

On the other hand, petitioner did not waive his right to have a preliminary investigation contrary to the prosecutor's
claim. The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the
time of entering a pleas at arraignment. The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary
investigation before his arraignment and he, through his counsel denied answering questions before the court unless
they were afforded the proper preliminary investigation.
For the above reasons, the petition was granted and the ruling of the appellate court was set aside and nullified. The
Supreme Court however, contrary to petitioner's allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to preliminary
investigation did not impair the validity of the information charging the latter of the crime of murder.

RULING
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY. Attys. Raymundo A.
Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit are hereby ordered to pay a FINE of P500.00 each with a stern
WARNING that a repetition of this or similar act and language will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this
Resolution be attached to their records.

SO ORDERED

DOROMA VS.SANDIGANBAYAN

G. R. No. 85468, September 07, 1989

FACTS: An information was filed by the Tanodbayan against Quintin S. Doromal for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of
the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic,
electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC). A preliminary investigation was conducted.

The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan to file
the information without the approval of the Ombudsman. The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan
(called Special Prosecutor under the 1987) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct
the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the
information filed by the Tanodbayan. A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the
Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the PCGG, did then and
there willfully and unlawfully, participate in a business through the DITC, a family corporation of which he is the President,
and which company participated in the biddings conducted by the DECS and the NMYC which act or participation is
prohibited by law and the constitution. The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was
invalid since there had been no preliminary investigation for the new information that was filed against him.
Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary investigation is unnecessary because both old and new information
involve the same subject matter denied the motion.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both information involve the same subject matter.

2. Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the absence of preliminary investigation.

HELD: Yes, as to the first issue. No, as to the second issue. The Supreme Court granted petition.

RATIO:

1. The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its denial over his opposition is a
"prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of law"
provided by the Constitution. Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that
time shall also be considered as void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted.

2. The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the
defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing
the information should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court
so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.
CRIMPRO Rule 112

Villarin v People G.R. No. G.R. No. 175289

August 31, 2011
DEL CASTILLO, J.
Crisostomo Villarin People of the Philippines
Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 29, 20002 and the
March 27, 20013 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390. Petitioners appeal from the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed
FACTS
In a Criminal Complaint[6] filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City by
Marcelino B. Pioquinto (Pioquinto), Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit under the TL Strike Force
Team of Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and
three others namely, Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria (Sudaria) of Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City, Marlon Baillo
(Baillo) and Cipriano Boyatac (Boyatac), were charged with violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as amended by
Executive Order No. 277.
2. Subsequently, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Resolution[8] dated
March 13, 1996 recommending the filing of an Information for the aforesaid charge not only against Latayada, Baillo
and Boyatac but also against petitioner Crisostomo Villarin (Villarin), then Barangay Captain of Pagalungan,
Cagayan de Oro City.
3. Thus, on October 29, 1996, an Information[10] was filed against petitioners Villarin and Latayada and their co-
accused Baillo and Boyatac, for violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705
4. On January 14, 1997, Villarin, Boyatac and Baillo, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.[12] They alleged that the Joint
Affidavit[13]of the personnel of the DENR which became one of the bases in filing the Information never mentioned
Villarin as one of the perpetrators of the crime while the accusations against Baillo and Boyatac were not based on
the personal knowledge of the affiants. They also asserted that their indictment was based on polluted sources,
consisting of the sworn statements of witnesses like Latayada and Sudaria, who both appeared to have participated
in the commission of the crime charged.
5. RTC - Thus, in its Judgment, the trial court found herein petitioners and the deceased Boyatac guilty as charged.
On the other hand, it found the evidence against Baillo insufficient.
6. CA- Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[34] which the appellate court denied for lack of merit in its
Resolution[35] promulgated on September 22, 200
ISSUE/S

WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] ON [THE] MATTER OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION[,] DECIDED NOT IN
ACCORD WITH JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT -NO
RATIO
Records show that the investigating prosecutor received a criminal complaint charging Sudaria, Latayada, Baillo and
Boyatac with violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.[38] The said complaint did not state the known
addresses of the accused. Neither was the notarized joint-affidavit of the complainants attached thereto. The
subpoena issued to the accused and the copy of their counter-affidavits were also not part of the record. Moreover,
the complaint did not include Villarin as a respondent. However, said infirmities do not constitute denial of due
process particularly on the part of Villarin.

It is evidently clear from the Resolution dated March 13, 1996 of the Office of the City Prosecutor that Villarin and all
the accused participated in the scheduled preliminary investigation that was conducted prior to the filing of the
criminal case.[39] They knew about the filing of the complaint and even denied any involvement in the illegal cutting
of timber. They were also given the opportunity to submit countervailing evidence to convince the investigating
prosecutor of their innocence.

Foregoing findings considered, there is no factual basis to the assertion that Villarin was not afforded a preliminary
investigation. Accordingly, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao in denying Villarins motion for reconsideration.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 28, 2005 and the Resolution dated September
22, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that petitioners Crisostomo Villarin and
Aniano Latayada are each sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
CRIMPRO RULE 112
Title G.R. No. 130644.
THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, Represented March 13, 1998
in this Suit by his mother, MARGARITA G. Present: Ponente: PUNO, J.
LARRANAGA, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPPINES. respondents.
THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, Petitioners PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPPINES. respondents

Nature of the case: administrative complaint filed by P/Supt. Severino Cruz and Francisco Monedero against Judge
Pedro M. Areola of Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and his Branch Clerk of Court for Ignorance of the
Law relative to Criminal Case No. Q-99-80446 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Marilyn A. Carreon for Estafa
pending before the sala of the respondent Judge

FACTS

Petitioner Francisco Juan Larranaga is charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention pending
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Cebu City. He is presently detained at the Bagong Buhay
Rehabilitation Center.

Petitioner alleged that he was denied the right to preliminary investigation and sought to annul the informations as
well as the warrant of arrest issued in consequence thereof. In the alternative, petitioner prayed that a preliminary
investigation be conducted and that he be released from detention pending the investigation. Petitioner filed a
supplemental petition for habeas corpus or bail on October 6, 1997.

On October 20, 1997, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion in lieu of comment submitting that
petitioner should have been given a regular preliminary investigation before the filing of the informations and the
issuance of the warrant of arrest. The Solicitor General recommended that petitioner be accorded his right to
preliminary investigation and that he be released from detention during the pendency thereof.

On October 31, 1997, Judge Martin A. Ocampo, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 7, Cebu City, issued an order
deferring the resolution of petitioners motion. It stated that it would be premature to act on the motion since the trial
court has not yet received an official copy of our October 27 resolution and that said resolution has not yet attained
finality. Furthermore, Judge Ocampo called the Courts attention to the fact that petitioner has been arraigned on
October 14, 1997 and waived his right to preliminary investigation.
ISSUE/S
(1)Whether or not whether petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation?
(2) whether petitioner should be released from detention pending the investigation?
RATIO

(1) Yes. He is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation. Petitioner in this case was, in the first place, not arrested
either by a peace officer or a private person. The facts show that on September 15, 1997, some members of the
Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation Group (PNP CIG) went to the Center for Culinary Arts in Quezon
City to arrest petitioner, albeit without warrant. Petitioner resisted the arrest and immediately phoned his sister
and brother-in-law. Petitioners sister sought the aid of Atty. Raymundo A. Armovit. Atty. Armovit, over the phone,
dissuaded the police officers from carrying out the warrantless arrest and proposed to meet with them at the CIG
headquarters in Camp Crame, Quezon City. The police officers yielded and returned to the CIG
headquarters. Petitioner, together with his sister and brother-in-law also went to the CIG headquarters aboard
their own vehicle. Atty. Armovit questioned the legality of the warrantless arrest before CIG Legal Officer Ruben
Zacarias. After consulting with his superiors, Legal Officer Zacarias ordered to stop the arrest and allowed
petitioner to go home. Atty. Armovit made an undertaking in writing that he and petitioner would appear before
the Cebu City Prosecutor on September 17, 1997 for preliminary investigation.

The foregoing facts show no restraint upon the person of petitioner. Neither do they show that petitioner was
deprived of his own will and liberty. Hence, Section 7 of Rule 112 does not apply to petitioner.

Neither It appear in the case at bar that petitioner has just committed, is actually committing or is attempting to
commit an offense when the police officers tried to arrest him on September 15, 1997. In fact, petitioner was
attending classes at the Center for Culinary Arts at that time.

Judge Martin Ocampo of RTC Branch 7, Cebu City, and the state prosecutors assert that petitioner is no longer
entitled to a preliminary investigation because he had previously waived his right to such investigation. We
disagree. A waiver, whether express or implied, must be made in clear and unequivocal manner. Mere failure of
petitioner and his counsel to appear before the City Prosecutor in the afternoon of September 17, 1997 cannot
be construed as a waiver of his right to preliminary investigation, considering that petitioner has been vigorously
invoking his right to a regular preliminary investigation since the start of the proceedings before the City
Prosecutor.

Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been arraigned on October 14, 1997. The rule is that the
right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a
plea at arraignment. Petitioner, in this case, has been actively and consistently demanding a regular preliminary
 investigation even before he was charged in court. Also, petitioner refused to enter a plea during the
arraignment because there was a pending case in this Court regarding his right to avail of a regular preliminary
investigation. Clearly, the acts of petitioner and his counsel are inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminary
investigation is part of procedural due process. It cannot be waived unless the waiver appears to be clear and
informed.

(2) No. Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that the trial court still lawfully acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, he may move to quash the information, but only on that ground. If, as in this case, the accused
raises other grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and to have submitted
his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

The absence of preliminary investigations does not affect the courts jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair
the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations and
the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of
dismissing the information, should conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary
investigation may be conducted.

RULING

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we resolve to: (1) REITERATE our order to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu to conduct a
regular preliminary investigation of petitioner and to the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 7, Cebu City to cease and
desist from proceeding with the trial of petitioner until a preliminary investigation shall have been conducted; (2) SET
ASIDE our order to immediately release petitioner pending the preliminary investigation and thus DENY petitioners
urgent motion to implement petitioners release; (3) DISMISS Judge Ocampos complaint against Attorneys Raymundo
A. Armovit, Ramon R. Teleron and Bernardito Florido; and (4) DENY petitioners motion to change the venue and the
authority to conduct the preliminary investigation.

CRIMPRO Habeas Corpus

Title Mangila vs. Pangilinan G.R. No. 160739
Date: July 17, 2013
Ponente: BERSAMIN, J.:
ANITA MANGILA, Petitioner, JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, ASST. CITY
PROSECUTOR II LUCIA JUDY SOLINAP, and NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (DIRECTOR REYNALDO
WYCOCO), Respondents

Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process cannot be inquired into through habeas corpus.
FACTS
Case timeline:
1. June 16, 2003, seven criminal complaints charging petitiOner Anita Mangila and four others with syndicated
estafa in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code were filed in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities in
Puerto Princesa City (MTCC). The complaints arose from the recruiting and promising of employment by
Mangila and the others to the private complainants as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and
from the collection of visa processing fees, membership fees and on-line applicationthe private
complainants without lawful authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
2. June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of the MTCC, conducted a preliminary
investigation on the complaints. After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge
Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail
3. On the next day, the entire records of the cases, including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City
Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings and appropriate action in accordance with the
prevailing rules.3 As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and detained at the
headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
4. Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation; that the
preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant of arrest; and
that the issuance of the warrantof arrest was without sufficient justification or without a prior finding of
probable cause, Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals (CA)a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her
release from detention
5. CA denied the petition for habeas corpus for its lack of merit, the proper remedy available to petitioner is for
her to file with the Provincial Prosecutor a motion to be released from detention on the grounds alleged in
the instant petition, based on Sec. 5, Rule 112.
ISSUE/S
X. Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpuswas not the proper remedy to obtain the release of Mangila
from detention? - NO
RATIO
The objectof the writ of habeas corpusis to inquire into the legality of thedetention, and, if the detention isfound to
be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not issue where the
person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. 12 There is no question that
when the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila and her cohorts on June 16, 2003,Judge Pangilinan, as
the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to conduct preliminary investigations involving all crimes
cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions. His authority was expressly provided in
Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Section 2.Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. The following may conduct preliminary
investigations:
xx

(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

With Mangilas arrestand ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ
of habeas corpuswas not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. This is because the
restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be inquired into through habeas corpus. Under
Section 5,16 Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the resolution of the investigating judge was not
final but was still subject to the review by the public prosecutor who had the power to order the release of the
detainee if no probable cause should beultimately found against her. Her proper recourse was to bring the supposed
irregularities attending the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to
the attention of the City Prosecutor
RULING
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on October 14, 2003 and November 19, 2003 in C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 79745; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

CRIM PRO
GR No. 182497
AMPATUAN V MACARAIG Date: June 29, 2010
Perez, J:
NURHIDA AMPATUAN JUDGE VIRGILIO MACARAIG
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Order of the RTC of Manila denying the petition by Nurhida Ampatuan
on behalf of her husband PO1 Basser Ampatuan
FACTS
1. Husband was assigned in Sultan Kudarat Police Station and was asked by the Chief to report to the Director of
Shariff Kabunsuan, Superintendent Esmael Ali. Ali brought PO1 Ampatuan to the Provincial Director of PNP-
Maguindanao. He was restrained inside the Provincial Office without being informed of the cause (April 14,
2008)
2. April 15, 2008- He was brought on a plane bound to Manila and was brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim. He
was subjected to a press briefing where it was said that he was arrested for killing 2 COMELEC Officials. He was
detained in a police jail in UN Avenue, Manila before being transferred in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig.
3. While under inquest, Prosecutor Nelson Salva ordered his release. But, Police Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co
and Chief Inspector Quimson refused to do so. A petition for habeas corpus was then filed by petitioner in the
RTC of manila on April 23, 2008.
4. April 24- RTC Judge ordered his body to be produced and ordered the Co and Quimson to show cause why
they were restraining PO1 Ampatuan. The latter said that they withheld PO1 Ampatuan because he was facing
an administrative case of grave misconduct. They cited Manalo v Calderon, which states that habeas corpus
cannot lie for a PNP personnel under restrictive custody. But, petitioner argues that the administrative case was
merely ante-dated before the date of filing of the habeas corpus petition.
5. Judge Macaraig dismissed the petition for habeas corpus, arguing that the PNP had a right to detain him
because of its administrative case against him.
ISSUE/S
WHETHER OR NOT THE PO1 CAN BE DETAINED DESPTE THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS, BY VIRTUE OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE FILED AGAINST HIM- Yes.
RATIO
The Objective of the Writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. Even if a detention was
illegal, it may be possible that because of some supervening event, it be no longer such and the habeas corpus may
be granted anymore. To issue the writ, the individual seeking relief must be deprived of his freedom of movement or
placed under some form of illegal restraint.

The respondents were correct in saying that the release ordered by the inquest prosecutor was only pertaining to his
being restrained on the criminal charge of murder. But, He was under Restrictive Custody as allowed by RA 6975, where
members of the police force who are subject to administrative cases may be restrained.

Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor
effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to
assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for. This can be in the form of
continued detention or monitoring of their movements.

The remedy, therefore, is administrative, and not a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
RULING
Petition is denied.
Notes
In a petition for habeas corpus the judge must inquire whether the person is being restrained of his liberty first. If this is
absent, the writ cannot be issued. If the reason is unlawful, then the court will grant the petition.
2-S 2015-16 (CHAN)