U.S.

Supreme Court

Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 8 Wheat. 543 543 (1823)

Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. McIntosh

21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT

COURT OF ILLINOIS

Syllabus

A title to lands under grants to private individuals made by Indian tribes or nations northwest of the River Ohio in 1773 and 1775 cannot
be recognized in the courts of the United States.

Discovery the original foundation of titles to land on the American continent as between the different European nations by whom
conquests and settlements were made here.

Recognition of the same principle in the wars, negotiations, and treaties between the different European powers.

Adoption of the same principle by the United States.

The exclusive right of the British government to the lands occupied by the Indians has passed to that of the United States.

Foundation and limitation of the right of conquest.

Application of the principle of the right of conquest to the case of the Indian savages. Nature of the Indian title, as subordinate to the
absolute ultimate title of the government.

Effect of the proclamation of 1763.

Titles in New England under Indian grants.

This was an action of ejectment for lands in the State and District of Illinois, claimed by the plaintiffs under a purchase and conveyance
from the Piankeshaw Indians and by the defendant under a grant from the United States. It came up on a case stated upon which there
was a judgment below for the defendant. The case stated set out the following facts:

1st. That on 23 May, 1609, James I, King of England, by his letters patent of that date, under the great seal of England, did erect, form,
and establish Robert, Earl of Salisbury, and others, his associates, in the letters patent named and their successors into a body
corporate and politic by the name and style of "The Treasurer and Company of Adventurers and Planters of the City of London for the
first Colony in Virginia," with perpetual succession and power to make, have, and use a common seal, and did give, grant, and confirm
unto this company, and their successors, under certain reservations and limitations in the letters patent expressed,

"All the lands, countries, and territories situate, lying, and being in that part of North America called Virginia, from the point of land
called Cape or Point Comfort all along the seacoast to the northward two hundred miles, and from the said Cape or Point Comfort all
along the seacoast to the southward two hundred miles, and all that space and circuit of land lying from the seacoast of the precinct
aforesaid up into the land throughout from the sea, west and northwest, and also all the islands lying within one hundred miles along
the coast of both seas of the precinct aforesaid, with all the soil, grounds, rights, privileges, and appurtenances to these territories
belonging and in the letters patent particularly enumerated,"

and did grant to this corporation and their successors various powers of government in the letters patent particularly expressed.
2d. That the place called in these letters patent Cape or Point Comfort is the place now called and known by the name of Old Point
Comfort, on the Chesapeake Bay and Hampton Roads, and that immediately after the granting of the letters patent, the corporation
proceeded under and by virtue of them to take possession of parts of the territory which they describe and to form settlements, plant a
colony, and exercise the powers of government therein, which colony was called and known by the name of the Colony of Virginia.

3d. That at the time of granting these letters patent and of the discovery of the continent of North America by the Europeans, and
during the whole intermediate time, the whole of the territory in the letters patent described, except a small district on James River,
where a settlement of Europeans had previously been made, was held, occupied, and possessed in full sovereignty by various
independent tribes or nations of Indians, who were the sovereigns of their respective portions of the territory and the absolute owners
and proprietors of the soil and who neither acknowledged nor owed any allegiance or obedience to any European sovereign or state
whatever, and that in making settlements within this territory and in all the other parts of North America where settlements were made
under the authority of the English government or by its subjects, the right of soil was previously obtained by purchase or conquest from
the particular Indian tribe or nation by which the soil was claimed and held, or the consent of such tribe or nation was secured.

4th. That in the year 1624, this corporation was dissolved by due course of law and all its powers, together with its rights of soil and
jurisdiction under the letters patent in question were revested in the Crown of England, whereupon the colony became a royal
government with the same territorial limits and extent which had been established by the letters patent, and so continued until it
became a free and independent state, except so far as its limits and extent were altered and curtailed by the Treaty of February 10,
1763, between Great Britain and France and by the letters patent granted by the King of England for establishing the Colonies of
Carolina, Maryland, and Pennsylvania.

5th. That sometime previous to the year 1756, the French government, laying a claim to the country west of the Alleghany or
Appalachian Mountains on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers and their branches, took possession of certain parts of it with the consent of
the several tribes or nations of Indians possessing and owning them, and with the like consent established several military posts and
settlements therein, particularly at Kaskaskias, on the River Kaskaskias, and at Vincennes, on the River Wabash, within the limits of
the Colony of Virginia, as described and established in and by the letters patent of May 23, 1609, and that the government of Great
Britain, after complaining of these establishments as encroachments and remonstrating against them, at length, in the year 1756, took
up arms to resist and repel them, which produced a war between those two nations wherein the Indian tribes inhabiting and holding the
countries northwest of the Ohio and on the Mississippi above the mouth of the Ohio were the allies of France, and the Indians known
by the name of the Six Nations or the Iroquois and their tributaries and allies were the allies of Great Britain, and that on 10 February,
1763, this war was terminated by a definitive treaty of peace between Great Britain and France and their allies by which it was
stipulated and agreed that the River Mississippi, from its source to the Iberville, should forever after form the boundary between the
dominions of Great Britain and those of France in that part of North America and between their respective allies there.

6th. That the government of Virginia, at and before the commencement of this war and at all times after it became a royal government,
claimed and exercised jurisdiction, with the knowledge and assent of the government of Great Britain, in and over the country
northwest of the River Ohio and east of the Mississippi as being included within the bounds and limits described and established for
that colony, by the letters patent of May 23, 1609, and that in the year 1749, a grant of six hundred thousand acres of land within the
country northwest of the Ohio and as part of Virginia was made by the government of Great Britain to some of its subjects by the name
and style of the Ohio Company.

7th. That at and before the commencement of the war in 1756 and during its whole continuance and at the time of the Treaty of
February 10, 1763, the Indian tribes or nations inhabiting the country north and northwest of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi as far
east as the river falling into the Ohio called the Great Miami were called and known by the name of the Western Confederacy of
Indians, and were the allies of France in the war, but not her subjects, never having been in any manner conquered by her, and held
the country in absolute sovereignty as independent nations, both as to the right of jurisdiction and sovereignty and the right of soil,
except a few military posts and a small territory around each, which they had ceded to France, and she held under them, and among
which were the aforesaid posts of Kaskaskias and Vincennes, and that these Indians, after the treaty, became the allies of Great
Britain, living under her protection as they had before lived under that of France, but were free and independent, owing no allegiance to
any foreign power whatever and holding their lands in absolute property, the territories of the respective tribes being separated from
each other and distinguished by certain natural marks and boundaries to the Indians well known, and each tribe claiming and
exercising separate and absolute ownership in and over its own territory, both as to the right of sovereignty and jurisdiction and the
right of soil.

8th. That among the tribes of Indians thus holding and inhabiting the territory north and northwest of the Ohio, east of the Mississippi,
and west of the Great Miami, within the limits of Virginia, as described in the letters patent of May 23, 1609, were certain independent
tribes or nations called the Illinois or Kaskaskias and the Piankeshaw or Wabash Indians, the first of which consisted of three several
tribes united into one and called the Kaskasias, the Pewarias, and the Cahoquias; that the Illinois owned, held, and inhabited, as their
absolute and separate property, a large tract of country within the last mentioned limits and situated on the Mississippi, Illinois, and
Kaskaskias Rivers and on the Ohio below the mouth of the Wabash, and the Piankeshaws another large tract of country within the
same limits, and as their absolute and separate property, on the Wabash and Ohio Rivers, and that these Indians remained in the sole
and absolute ownership and possession of the country in question until the sales made by them in the manner herein after set forth.

9th. That on the termination of the war between Great Britain and France, the Illinois Indians, by the name of the Kaskaskias tribes of
Indians, as fully representing all the Illinois tribes then remaining, made a treaty of peace with Great Britain and a treaty of peace,
limits, and amity, under her mediation, with the Six Nations, or Iroquois, and their allies, then known and distinguished by the name of
the Northern Confederacy of Indians, the Illinois being a part of the confederacy then known and distinguished by the name of the
Southern Confederacy, and sometimes by that of the Western Confederacy.

10th. That on 7 October, 1763, the King of Great Britain made and published a proclamation for the better regulation of the countries
ceded to Great Britain by that treaty, which proclamation is referred to and made part of the case.

11th. That from time immemorial and always up to the present time, all the Indian tribes or nations of North America, and especially the
Illinois and Piankeshaws and other tribes holding, possessing, and inhabiting the said countries north and northeast of the Ohio east of
the Mississippi and west of the Great Miami held their respective lands and territories each in common, the individuals of each tribe or
nation holding the lands and territories of such tribe in common with each other, and there being among them no separate property in
the soil, and that their sole method of selling, granting, and conveying their lands, whether to governments or individuals, always has
been from time immemorial and now is for certain chiefs of the tribe selling to represent the whole tribe in every part of the transaction,
to make the contract, and execute the deed, on behalf of the whole tribe, to receive for it the consideration, whether in money or
commodities, or both, and finally to divide such consideration among the individuals of the tribe, and that the authority of the chiefs so
acting for the whole tribe is attested by the presence and assent of the individuals composing the tribe, or some of them, and by the
receipt by the individuals composing the tribe of their respective shares of the price, and in no other manner.

12th. That on 5 July, 1773, certain chiefs of the Illinois Indians, then jointly representing, acting for, and being duly authorized by that
tribe in the manner explained above, did by their deed poll, duly executed and delivered and bearing date on that day, at the post of
Kaskaskias, then being a British military post, and at a public council there held by them for and on behalf of the said Illinois nation of
Indians with William Murray, of the Illinois country, merchant, acting for himself and for Moses Franks and Jacob Franks, of London, in
Great Britain, David Franks, John Inglis, Bernard Gratz, Michael Gratz, Alexander Ross, David Sproat, and James Milligan, all of
Philadelphia, in the p\Province of Pennsylvania; Moses Franks, Andrew Hamilton, William Hamilton, and Edmund Milne of the same
place; Joseph Simons otherwise called Joseph Simon and Levi Andrew Levi of the Town of Lancaster in Pennsylvania; Thomas
Minshall of York County in the same province; Robert Callender and William Thompson, of Cumberland County in the same province;
John Campbell of Pittsburgh in the same province; and George Castles and James Ramsay of the Illinois country, and for a good and
valuable consideration in the said deed stated grant, bargain, sell, alien, lease, enfeoff, and confirm to the said William Murray, Moses
Franks, Jacob Franks, David Franks, John Inglis, Bernard Gratz, Michael Gratz, Alexander Ross, David Sproat, James Milligan,
Andrew Hamilton, William Hamilton, Edmund Milne Joseph Simons, otherwise called Joseph Simon Levi Andrew Levi, Thomas
Minshall, Robert Callender, William Thompson, John Campbell, George Castles, and James Ramsay, their heirs and assigns forever,
in severalty, or to George the Third, then King of Great Britain and Ireland, his heirs and successors, for the use, benefit, and behoof of
the grantees, their heirs and assigns, in severalty, by whichever of those tenures they might most legally hold, all those two several
tracts or parcels of land situated, lying, and being within the limits of Virginia on the east of the Mississippi, northwest of the Ohio, and
west of the Great Miami, and thus butted and bounded:

Beginning for one of the said tracts on the east side of the Mississippi at the mouth of the Heron Creek, called by the French the River
of Mary, being about a league below the mouth of the Kaskaskias River, and running thence a northward of east course in a direct line
back to the Hilly Plains, about eight leagues more or less; thence the same course in a direct line to the Crab Tree Plains, about
seventeen leagues more or less; thence the same course in a direct line to a remarkable place known by the name of the Big Buffalo
Hoofs, about seventeen leagues more or less; thence the same course, in a direct line to the Salt Lick Creek, about seven leagues
more or less; then crossing the Salt Lick Creek, about one league below the ancient Shawanese town in an easterly or a little to the
north of east course in a direct line to the River Ohio, about four leagues more or less; then down the Ohio by its several courses until it
empties into the Mississippi, about thirty-five leagues more or less; and then up the Mississippi, by its several courses, to the place of
beginning, about thirty-three leagues more or less; and beginning for the other tract on the Mississippi at a point directly opposite to the
mouth of the Missouri and running up the Mississippi by its several courses to the mouth of the Illinois, about six leagues more or less;
and thence up the Illinois, by its several courses, to Chicagou or Garlic Creek, about ninety leagues, more or less; thence nearly a
northerly course, in a direct line, to a certain remarkable place, being the ground on which a battle was fought about forty or fifty years
before that time between the Pewaria and Renard Indians, about fifty leagues more or less; thence by the same course in a direct line
to two remarkable hills close together in the middle of a large prairie or plain, about fourteen leagues more or less; thence a north of
east course, in a direct line, to a remarkable spring known by the Indians by the name of "Foggy Spring," about fourteen leagues more
or less; thence the same course in a direct line to a great mountain, to the northwest of the White Buffalo Plain, about fifteen leagues
more or less; and thence nearly a southwest course to the place of beginning, about forty leagues more or less:

To have and to hold the said two tracts of land, with all and singular their appurtenances, to the grantees, their heirs and assigns,
forever in severalty or to the King, his heirs and successors, to and for the use, benefit, or behoof of the grantees, their heirs and
assigns, forever in severalty, as will more fully appear by the said deed poll, duly executed under the hands and seals of the grantors
and duly recorded at Kaskaskias on 2 September, 1773, in the office of Vicerault Lemerance, a notary public, duly appointed and
authorized. This deed, with the several certificates annexed to or endorsed on it, was set out at length in the case.

13th. That the consideration in this deed expressed, was of the value of $24,000 current money of the United States and upwards, and
was paid and delivered, at the time of the execution of the deed, by William Murray, one of the grantees, in behalf of himself and the
other grantees, to the Illinois Indians, who freely accepted it and divided it among themselves; that the conferences in which the sale of
these lands was agreed on and made and in which it was agreed that the deed should be executed were publicly held for the space of
a month at the post of Kaskaskias, and were attended by many individuals of all the tribes of Illinois Indians, besides the chiefs, named
as grantors in the deed; that the whole transaction was open, public, and fair, and the deed fully explained to the grantors and other
Indians by the sworn interpreters of the government and fully understood by the grantors and other Indians before it was executed; that
the several witnesses to the deed and the grantees named in it were such persons and of such quality and stations, respectively, as
they are described to be in the deed, the attestation, and the other endorsements on it; that the grantees did duly authorize William
Murray to act for and represent them in the purchase of the lands and the acceptance of the deed, and that the two tracts or parcels of
land which it describes and purports to grant were then part of the lands held, possessed, and inhabited by the Illinois Indians from time
immemorial in the manner already stated.

14th. That all the persons named as grantees in this deed were, at the time of its execution and long before, subjects of the Crown of
Great Britain and residents of the several places named in the deed as their places of residence, and that they entered into the land
under and by virtue of the deed and became seized as the law requires.

15th. That on 18 October, 1775, Tabac and certain other Indians, all being chiefs of the Piankeshaws and jointly representing, acting
for, and duly authorized by that nation in the manner stated above, did, by their deed poll, duly executed and bearing date on the day
last mentioned at the post of Vincennes, otherwise called post St. Vincent, then being a British military post, and at a public council
there held by them for and on behalf of the Piankeshaw Indians, with Louis Viviat, of the Illinois country, acting for himself and for the
Right Honorable John, Earl of Dunmore, then Governor of Virginia, the Honorable John Murray, son of the said Earl, Moses Franks and
Jacob Franks, of London, in Great Britain, Thomas Johnson, Jr., and John Davidson, both of Annapolis, in Maryland, William Russel,
Matthew Ridley, Robert Christie, Sr., and Robert Christie, Jr., of Baltimore Town, in the same province, Peter Compbell, of Piscataway
in the same province, William Geddes, of Newtown Chester in the same province, collector of his Majesty's customs, David Franks and
Moses Franks, both of Philadelphia in Pennsylvania, William Murray and Daniel Murray, of the Illinois country, Nicholas St. Martin and
Joseph Page, of the same place, Francis Perthuis, late of Quebec, in Canada, but then of post St. Vincent, and for good and valuable
consideration, in the deed poll mentioned and enumerated, grant, bargain, sell, alien, enfeoff, release, ratify, and confirm to the said
Louis Viviat and the other persons last mentioned, their heirs and assigns, equally to be divided, or to George III, then King of Great
Britain and Ireland, his heirs and successors, for the use, benefit, and behoof of all the above mentioned grantees, their heirs and
assigns, in severalty, by whichever of those tenures they might most legally hold, all those two several tracts of land in the deed
particularly described situate, lying, brk:

and being northwest of the Ohio, east of the Mississippi, and west of the Great Miami, within the limits of Virginia and on both sides of
the Ouabache, otherwise called the Wabash, which two tracts of land are contained respectively within the following metes and
bounds, courses and distances, that is to say, beginning for one of the said tracts at the mouth of a rivulet called Riviere du Chat, or
Cat River, where it empties itself into the Ouabache or Wabash, by its several courses, to a place called Point Coupee, about twelve
leagues above post St. Vincent, being forty leagues, or thereabouts, in length, on the said river Ouabache, from the place of beginning,
with forty leagues in width or breadth on the east side, and thirty leagues in breadth or width on the west side of that river, to be
continued along from the place of beginning to Point Coupee. And beginning for the other tract at the mouth of White River where it
empties into the Ouabache, about twelve leagues below post St. Vincent, and running thence down the Ouabache by its several
courses until it empties into the Ohio, being from White River to the Ohio, about fifty-three leagues in length, more or less, with forty
leagues in width or breadth on the east side and thirty in width or breadth on the west side of the Ouabache, to be continued along from
the White River to the Ohio, with all the rights, liberties, privileges, hereditaments, and appurtenances to the said tract belonging, to
have and to hold to the grantees, their heirs and assigns, forever in severalty or to the King, his heirs and successors, for the use,
benefit, and behoof of the grantees, their heirs and assigns, as will more fully appear by the deed itself, duly executed under the hands
and seals of the grantors, and duly recorded at Kaskaskias, on 5 December, 1775, in the office of Louis Bomer, a notary public, duly
appointed and authorized. This deed, with the several certificates annexed to or endorsed on it, was set out at length.

16th. That the consideration in this deed expressed was of the value of $31,000 current money of the United States and upwards, and
was paid and delivered at the time of the execution of the deed by the grantee, Lewis Viviat, in behalf of himself and the other grantees,
to the Piankeshaw Indians, who freely accepted it and divided it among themselves; that the conferences in which the sale of these two
tracts of land was agreed on and made, and in which it was agreed that the deed should be executed were publicly held for the space
of a month at the post of Vincennes or post St. Vincent, and were attended by many individuals of the Piankeshaw nation of Indians
besides the chiefs named as grantors in the deed; that the whole transaction was open, public, and fair, and the deed fully explained to
the grantors and other Indians by skillful interpreters, and fully understood by them before it was executed; that it was executed in the
presence of the several witnesses by whom it purports to have been attested, and was attested by them; that the grantees were all
subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, and were of such quality, station, and residence, respectively, as they are described in the deed
to be; that the grantees did duly authorize Lewis Viviat to act for and represent them in the purchase of these two tracts of land and in
the acceptance of the deed; that these tracts of land were then part of the lands held, possessed, and inhabited by the Piankeshaw
Indians from time immemorial, as is stated above; and that the several grantees under this deed entered into the land which it purports
to grant and became seized as the law requires.

17th. That on 6 May, 1776, the Colony of Virginia threw off its dependence on the Crown and government of Great Britain and declared
itself an independent state and government with the limits prescribed and established by the letters patent of May 23, 1609, as
curtailed and restricted by the letters patent establishing the Colonies of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Carolina and by the Treaty of
February 10, 1763, between Great Britain and France, which limits, so curtailed and restricted, the State of Virginia, by its Constitution
and form of government, declared should be and remain the limits of the state and should bound its western and northwestern extent.

18th. That on 5 October, 1778, the General Assembly of Virginia, having taken by arms the posts of Kaskaskias and Vincennes, or St.
Vincent, from the British forces, by whom they were then held, and driven those forces from the country northwest of the Ohio, east of
the Mississippi, and west of the Great Miami, did, by an act of assembly of that date, entitled "An act for establishing the County of
Illinois and for the more effectual protection and defense thereof," erect that country, with certain other portions of territory within the
limits of the state and northwest of the Ohio into a county, by the name of the County of Illinois.

19th. That on 29 December, 1783, the State of Virginia, by an act of assembly of that date, authorized their delegates in the Congress
of the United States, or such of them, to the number of three at least, as should be assembled in Congress on behalf of the state and
by proper deeds or instruments in writing under their hands and seals, to convey, transfer, assign, and make over to the United States,
in Congress assembled, for the benefit of the said states, all right, title, and claim, as well of soil as jurisdiction, which Virginia had to
the territory or tract of country within her limits, as defined and prescribed by the letters patent of May 23, 1609, and lying to the
northwest of the Ohio; subject to certain limitations and conditions in the act prescribed and specified, and that on 1 March, 1784,
Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Hardy, Arthur Lee, and James Monroe, then being four of the delegates of Virginia to the Congress of the
United States, did, by their deed poll, under their hands and seals, in pursuance and execution of the authority to them given by this act
of assembly, convey, transfer, assign, and make over to the United States, in Congress assembled, for the benefit of the said states, all
right, title, and claim, as well of soil as jurisdiction which that state had to the territory northwest of the Ohio, with the reservations,
limitations, and conditions in the act of assembly prescribed, which cession the United States accepted.

20th. That on 20 July, 1818, the United States, by their officers duly authorized for that purpose did sell, grant, and convey to the
defendant in this action, William McIntosh, all those several tracts or parcels of land, containing 11,560 acres, and butted, bounded,
and described, as will fully appear in and by the patent for the said lands, duly executed, which was set out at length.

21st. That the lands described and granted in and by this patent are situated within the State of Illinois and are contained within the
lines of the last or second of the two tracts described and purporting to be granted and conveyed to Louis Viviat and others by the deed
of October 18, 1775, and that William McIntosh, the defendant, entered upon these lands under and by virtue of his patent and became
possessed thereof before the institution of this suit.

22d. That Thomas Johnson, one of the grantees in and under the deed of October 18, 1775, departed this life on or about 1 October,
1819, seized of all his undivided part or share of and in the two several tracts of land described and purporting to be granted and
conveyed to him and others by that deed, having first duly made and published his last will and testament in writing, attested by three
credible witnesses, which he left in full force and by which he devised all his undivided share and part of those two tracts of land to his
son, Joshua Johnson and his heirs, and his grandson, Thomas J. Graham, and his heirs, the lessors of the plaintiff in this action, as
tenants in common.

23d. That Joshua Johnson and Thomas J. Graham, the devisees, entered into the two tracts of land last above mentioned under and
by virtue of the will, and became thereof seized as the law requires. That Thomas Johnson, the grantee and devisor, during his whole
life and at the time of his death, was an inhabitant and citizen of the State of Maryland; that Joshua Johnson and Thomas J. Graham,
the lessors of the plaintiff, now are and always have been citizens of the same state; that the defendant, William McIntosh, now is and
at and before the time of bringing this action was a citizen of the State of Illinois, and that the matter in dispute in this action is of the
value of $2,000 current money of the United States and upwards.

24th. And that neither William Murray nor any other of the grantees under the deed of July 5, 1773, nor Louis Viviat nor any other of the
grantees under the deed of October 8, 1775, nor any person for them or any of them ever obtained or had the actual possession under
and by virtue of those deeds or either of them of any part of the lands in them or either of them described and purporting to be granted,
but were prevented by the war of the American Revolution, which soon after commenced, and by the disputes and troubles which
preceded it, from obtaining such possession, and that since the termination of the war and before it, they have repeatedly and at
various times from the year 1781 till the year 1816 petitioned the Congress of the United States to acknowledge and confirm their title
to those lands under the purchases and deeds in question, but without success.

Judgment being given for the defendant on the case stated, the plaintiffs brought this writ of error. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL
delivered the opinion of the Court.

The plaintiffs in this cause claim the land in their declaration mentioned under two grants purporting to be made, the first in 1773 and
the last in 1775, by the chiefs of certain

Indian tribes constituting the Illinois and the Piankeshaw nations, and the question is whether this title can be recognized in the courts
of the United States?

The facts, as stated in the case agreed, show the authority of the chiefs who executed this conveyance so far as it could be given by
their own people, and likewise show that the particular tribes for whom these chiefs acted were in rightful possession of the land they
sold. The inquiry, therefore, is in a great measure confined to the power of Indians to give, and of private individuals to receive, a title
which can be sustained in the courts of this country.

As the right of society to prescribe those rules by which property may be acquired and preserved is not and cannot be drawn into
question, as the title to lands especially is and must be admitted to depend entirely on the law of the nation in which they lie, it will be
necessary in pursuing this inquiry to examine not singly those principles of abstract justice which the Creator of all things has
impressed on the mind of his creature man and which are admitted to regulate in a great degree the rights of civilized nations, whose
perfect independence is acknowledged, but those principles also which our own government has adopted in the particular case and
given us as the rule for our decision.

On the discovery of this immense continent, the great nations of Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves so much of it as they
could respectively acquire. Its vast extent offered an ample field to the ambition and enterprise of all, and the character and religion of
its inhabitants afforded an apology for considering them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe might claim an
ascendency. The potentates of the old world found no difficulty in convincing themselves that they made ample compensation to the
inhabitants of the new by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity in exchange for unlimited independence. But as they were all
in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war with each other, to
establish a principle which all should acknowledge as the law by which the right of acquisition, which they all asserted should be
regulated as between themselves. This principle was that discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects or by whose
authority it was made against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by possession.

The exclusion of all other Europeans necessarily gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the
natives and establishing settlements upon it. It was a right with which no Europeans could interfere. It was a right which all asserted for
themselves, and to the assertion of which by others all assented.
Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be regulated by themselves. The rights thus
acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.

In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were in no instance entirely disregarded, but were
necessarily to a considerable extent impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just
claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty as independent
nations were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will to whomsoever they pleased was denied by
the original fundamental principle that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.

While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in
themselves, and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil while yet in possession
of the natives. These grants have been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.

The history of America from its discovery to the present day proves, we think, the universal recognition of these principles.

Spain did not rest her title solely on the grant of the Pope. Her discussions respecting boundary, with France, with Great Britain, and
with the United States all show that she placed in on the rights given by discovery. Portugal sustained her claim to the Brazils by the
same title.

France also founded her title to the vast territories she claimed in America on discovery. However conciliatory her conduct to the
natives may have been, she still asserted her right of dominion over a great extent of country not actually settled by Frenchmen and
her exclusive right to acquire and dispose of the soil which remained in the occupation of Indians. Her monarch claimed all Canada and
Acadie as colonies of France at a time when the French population was very inconsiderable and the Indians occupied almost the whole
country. He also claimed Louisiana, comprehending the immense territories watered by the Mississippi and the rivers which empty into
it, by the title of discovery. The letters patent granted to the Sieur Demonts in 1603, constitute him Lieutenant General, and the
representative of the King in Acadie, which is described as stretching from the 40th to the 46th degree of north latitude, with authority to
extend the power of the French over that country and its inhabitants, to give laws to the people, to treat with the natives and enforce the
observance of treaties, and to parcel out and give title to lands according to his own judgment.

The states of Holland also made acquisitions in America and sustained their right on the common principle adopted by all Europe. They
allege, as we are told by Smith in his History of New York, that Henry Hudson, who sailed, as they say, under the orders of their East
India Company, discovered the country from the Delaware to the Hudson, up which he sailed to the 43d degree of north latitude, and
this country they claimed under the title acquired by this voyage.

Their first object was commercial, as appears by a grant made to a company of merchants in 1614, but in 1621 the States General
made, as we are told by Mr. Smith, a grant of the country to the West India Company by the name of New Netherlands.

The claim of the Dutch was always contested by the English -- not because they questioned the title given by discovery, but because
they insisted on being themselves the rightful claimants under that title. Their pretensions were finally decided by the sword.

No one of the powers of Europe gave its full assent to this principle more unequivocally than England. The documents upon this
subject are ample and complete. So early as the year 1496, her monarch granted a commission to the Cabots to discover countries
then unknown to Christian people and to take possession of them in the name of the King of England. Two years afterwards, Cabot
proceeded on this voyage and discovered the continent of North America, along which he sailed as far south as Virginia. To this
discovery the English trace their title.

In this first effort made by the English government to acquire territory on this continent we perceive a complete recognition of the
principle which has been mentioned. The right of discovery given by this commission is confined to countries "then unknown to all
Christian people," and of these countries Cabot was empowered to take possession in the name of the King of England. Thus asserting
a right to take possession notwithstanding the occupancy of the natives, who were heathens, and at the same time admitting the prior
title of any Christian people who may have made a previous discovery.

The same principle continued to be recognized. The charter granted to Sir Humphrey Gilbert in 1578 authorizes him to discover and
take possession of such remote, heathen, and barbarous lands as were not actually possessed by any Christian prince or people. This
charter was afterwards renewed to Sir Walter Raleigh in nearly the same terms.
By the charter of 1606, under which the first permanent English settlement on this continent was made, James I granted to Sir Thomas
Gates and others those territories in America lying on the seacoast between the 34th and 45th degrees of north latitude and which
either belonged to that monarch or were not then possessed by any other Christian prince or people. The grantees were divided into
two companies at their own request. The first or southern colony was directed to settle between the 34th and 41st degrees of north
latitude, and the second or northern colony between the 38th and 45th degrees.

In 1609, after some expensive and not very successful attempts at settlement had been made, a new and more enlarged charter was
given by the Crown to the first colony, in which the King granted to the "Treasurer and Company of Adventurers of the City of London
for the first colony in Virginia," in absolute property, the lands extending along the seacoast four hundred miles, and into the land
throughout from sea to sea. This charter, which is a part of the special verdict in this cause, was annulled, so far as respected the rights
of the company, by the judgment of the Court of King's Bench on a writ of quo warranto, but the whole effect allowed to this judgment
was to revest in the Crown the powers of government and the title to the lands within its limits.

At the solicitation of those who held under the grant to the second or northern colony, a new and more enlarged charter was granted to
the Duke of Lenox and others in 1620, who were denominated the Plymouth Company, conveying to them in absolute property all the
lands between the 40th and 48th degrees of north latitude.

Under this patent New England has been in a great measure settled. The company conveyed to Henry Rosewell and others, in 1627,
that territory which is now Massachusetts, and in 1628 a charter of incorporation comprehending the powers of government was
granted to the purchasers.

Great part of New England was granted by this company, which at length divided their remaining lands among themselves, and in 1635
surrendered their charter to the Crown. A patent was granted to Gorges for Maine, which was allotted to him in the division of property.

All the grants made by the Plymouth Company, so far as we can learn, have been respected. In pursuance of the same principle, the
King, in 1664, granted to the Duke of York the country of New England as far south as the Delaware Bay. His Royal Highness
transferred New Jersey to Lord Berkeley and Sir George Carteret.

In 1663, the Crown granted to Lord Clarendon and others the country lying between the 36th degree of north latitude and the River St.
Mathes, and in 1666 the proprietors obtained from the Crown a new charter granting to them that province in the King's dominions in
North America which lies from 36 degrees 30 minutes north latitude to the 29th degree, and from the Atlantic ocean to the South sea.

Thus has our whole country been granted by the Crown while in the occupation of the Indians. These grants purport to convey the soil
as well as the right of dominion to the grantees. In those governments which were denominated royal, where the right to the soil was
not vested in individuals, but remained in the Crown or was vested in the colonial government, the King claimed and exercised the right
of granting lands and of dismembering the government at his will. The grants made out of the two original colonies, after the
resumption of their charters by the Crown, are examples of this. The governments of New England, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and a part of Carolina were thus created. In all of them, the soil, at the time the grants were made, was
occupied by the Indians. Yet almost every title within those governments is dependent on these grants. In some instances, the soil was
conveyed by the Crown unaccompanied by the powers of government, as in the case of the northern neck of Virginia. It has never
been objected to this or to any other similar grant that the title as well as possession was in the Indians when it was made and that it
passed nothing on that account.

These various patents cannot be considered as nullities, nor can they be limited to a mere grant of the powers of government. A
charter intended to convey political power only would never contain words expressly granting the land, the soil, and the waters. Some
of them purport to convey the soil alone, and in those cases in which the powers of government as well as the soil are conveyed to
individuals, the Crown has always acknowledged itself to be bound by the grant. Though the power to dismember regal governments
was asserted and exercised, the power to dismember proprietary governments was not claimed, and in some instances, even after the
powers of government were revested in the Crown, the title of the proprietors to the soil was respected.

Charles II was extremely anxious to acquire the property of Maine, but the grantees sold it to Massachusetts, and he did not venture to
contest the right of that colony to the soil. The Carolinas were originally proprietary governments. In 1721, a revolution was effected by
the people, who shook off their obedience to the proprietors and declared their dependence immediately on the Crown. The King,
however, purchased the title of those who were disposed to sell. One of them, Lord Carteret, surrendered his interest in the
government but retained his title to the soil. That title was respected till the revolution, when it was forfeited by the laws of war.
Further proofs of the extent to which this principle has been recognized will be found in the history of the wars, negotiations, and
treaties which the different nations claiming territory in America have carried on and held with each other.

The contests between the cabinets of Versailles and Madrid respecting the territory on the northern coast of the Gulf of Mexico were
fierce and bloody, and continued until the establishment of a Bourbon on the throne of Spain produced such amicable dispositions in
the two Crowns as to suspend or terminate them.

Between France and Great Britain, whose discoveries as well as settlements were nearly contemporaneous, contests for the country
actually covered by the Indians began as soon as their settlements approached each other, and were continued until finally settled in
the year 1763 by the Treaty of Paris.

Each nation had granted and partially settled the country, denominated by the French Acadie, and by the English Nova Scotia. By the
12th article of the Treaty of Utrecht, made in 1703, his most Christian Majesty ceded to the Queen of Great Britain "all Nova Scotia or
Acadie, with its ancient boundaries." A great part of the ceded territory was in the possession of the Indians, and the extent of the
cession could not be adjusted by the commissioners to whom it was to be referred.

The Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, which was made on the principle of the status ante bellum, did not remove this subject of controversy.
Commissioners for its adjustment were appointed whose very able and elaborate, though unsuccessful, arguments in favor of the title
of their respective sovereigns show how entirely each relied on the title given by discovery to lands remaining in the possession of
Indians.

After the termination of this fruitless discussion, the subject was transferred to Europe and taken up by the cabinets of Versailles and
London. This controversy embraced not only the boundaries of New England, Nova Scotia, and that part of Canada which adjoined
those colonies, but embraced our whole western country also. France contended not only that the St. Lawrence was to be considered
as the center of Canada, but that the Ohio was within that colony. She founded this claim on discovery and on having used that river for
the transportation of troops in a war with some southern Indians.

This river was comprehended in the chartered limits of Virginia, but though the right of England to a reasonable extent of country in
virtue of her discovery of the seacoast and of the settlements she made on it, was not to be questioned, her claim of all the lands to the
Pacific Ocean because she had discovered the country washed by the Atlantic, might, without derogating from the principle recognized
by all, be deemed extravagant. It interfered, too, with the claims of France founded on the same principle. She therefore sought to
strengthen her original title to the lands in controversy by insisting that it had been acknowledged by France in the 15th article of the
Treaty of Utrecht. The dispute respecting the construction of that article has no tendency to impair the principle, that discovery gave a
title to lands still remaining in the possession of the Indians. Whichever title prevailed, it was still a title to lands occupied by the Indians,
whose right of occupancy neither controverted and neither had then extinguished.

These conflicting claims produced a long and bloody war which was terminated by the conquest of the whole country east of the
Mississippi. In the treaty of 1763, France ceded and guaranteed to Great Britain all Nova Scotia, or Acadie, and Canada, with their
dependencies, and it was agreed that the boundaries between the territories of the two nations in America should be irrevocably fixed
by a line drawn from the source of the Mississippi, through the middle of that river and the lakes Maurepas and Ponchartrain, to the
sea. This treaty expressly cedes, and has always been understood to cede, the whole country on the English side of the dividing line
between the two nations, although a great and valuable part of it was occupied by the Indians. Great Britain, on her part, surrendered
to France all her pretensions to the country west of the Mississippi. It has never been supposed that she surrendered nothing, although
she was not in actual possession of a foot of land. She surrendered all right to acquired the country, and any after attempt to purchase
it from the Indians would have been considered and treated as an invasion of the territories of France.

By the 20th article of the same treaty, Spain ceded Florida, with its dependencies and all the country she claimed east or southeast of
the Mississippi, to Great Britain. Great part of this territory also was in possession of the Indians.

By a secret treaty which was executed about the same time, France ceded Louisiana to Spain, and Spain has since retroceded the
same country to France. At the time both of its cession and retrocession, it was occupied chiefly by the Indians.

Thus all the nations of Europe who have acquired territory on this continent have asserted in themselves and have recognized in others
the exclusive right of the discoverer to appropriate the lands occupied by the Indians. Have the American states rejected or adopted
this principle?
By the treaty which concluded the war of our revolution, Great Britain relinquished all claim not only to the government, but to the
"propriety and territorial rights of the United States" whose boundaries were fixed in the second article. By this treaty the powers of
government and the right to soil which had previously been in Great Britain passed definitively to these states. We had before taken
possession of them by declaring independence, but neither the declaration of independence nor the treaty confirming it could give us
more than that which we before possessed or to which Great Britain was before entitled. It has never been doubted that either the
United States or the several states had a clear title to all the lands within the boundary lines described in the treaty, subject only to the
Indian right of occupancy, and that the exclusive power to extinguish that right was vested in that government which might
constitutionally exercise it.

Virginia, particularly, within whose chartered limits the land in controversy lay, passed an act in the year 1779 declaring her

"exclusive right of preemption from the Indians of all the lands within the limits of her own chartered territory, and that no person or
persons whatsoever have or ever had a right to purchase any lands within the same from any Indian nation except only persons duly
authorized to make such purchase, formerly for the use and benefit of the colony and lately for the Commonwealth."

The act then proceeds to annul all deeds made by Indians to individuals for the private use of the purchasers.

Without ascribing to this act the power of annulling vested rights or admitting it to countervail the testimony furnished by the marginal
note opposite to the title of the law forbidding purchases from the Indians in the revisals of the Virginia statutes stating that law to be
repealed, it may safely be considered as an unequivocal affirmance on the part of Virginia of the broad principle which had always
been maintained that the exclusive right to purchase from the Indians resided in the government.

In pursuance of the same idea, Virginia proceeded at the same session to open her land office for the sale of that country which now
constitutes Kentucky, a country every acre of which was then claimed and possessed by Indians, who maintained their title with as
much persevering courage as was ever manifested by any people.

The states, having within their chartered limits different portions of territory covered by Indians, ceded that territory generally to the
United States on conditions expressed in their deeds of cession, which demonstrate the opinion that they ceded the soil as well as
jurisdiction, and that in doing so they granted a productive fund to the government of the Union. The lands in controversy lay within the
chartered limits of Virginia, and were ceded with the whole country northwest of the River Ohio. This grant contained reservations and
stipulations which could only be made by the owners of the soil, and concluded with a stipulation that

"all the lands in the ceded territory not reserved should be considered as a common fund for the use and benefit of such of the United
States as have become or shall become members of the confederation, . . . according to their usual respective proportions in the
general charge and expenditure, and shall be faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose, and for no other use or purpose
whatsoever."

The ceded territory was occupied by numerous and warlike tribes of Indians, but the exclusive right of the United States to extinguish
their title and to grant the soil has never, we believe, been doubted.

After these states became independent, a controversy subsisted between them and Spain respecting boundary. By the treaty of 1795,
this controversy was adjusted and Spain ceded to the United States the territory in question. This territory, though claimed by both
nations, was chiefly in the actual occupation of Indians.

The magnificent purchase of Louisiana was the purchase from France of a country almost entirely occupied by numerous tribes of
Indians who are in fact independent. Yet any attempt of others to intrude into that country would be considered as an aggression which
would justify war.

Our late acquisitions from Spain are of the same character, and the negotiations which preceded those acquisitions recognize and
elucidate the principle which has been received as the foundation of all European title in America.

The United States, then, has unequivocally acceded to that great and broad rule by which its civilized inhabitants now hold this country.
They hold and assert in themselves the title by which it was acquired. They maintain, as all others have maintained, that discovery
gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy either by purchase or by conquest, and gave also a right to such a
degree of sovereignty as the circumstances of the people would allow them to exercise.
The power now possessed by the government of the United States to grant lands, resided, while we were colonies, in the Crown, or its
grantees. The validity of the titles given by either has never been questioned in our courts. It has been exercised uniformly over territory
in possession of the Indians. The existence of this power must negative the existence of any right which may conflict with and control it.
An absolute title to lands cannot exist at the same time in different persons or in different governments. An absolute must be an
exclusive title, or at least a title which excludes all others not compatible with it. All our institutions recognize the absolute title of the
Crown, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and recognize the absolute title of the Crown to extinguish that right. This is
incompatible with an absolute and complete title in the Indians.

We will not enter into the controversy whether agriculturists, merchants, and manufacturers have a right on abstract principles to expel
hunters from the territory they possess or to contract their limits. Conquest gives a title which the courts of the conqueror cannot deny,
whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the claim which has been
successfully asserted. The British government, which was then our government and whose rights have passed to the United States,
asserted title to all the lands occupied by Indians within the chartered limits of the British colonies. It asserted also a limited sovereignty
over them and the exclusive right of extinguishing the title which occupancy gave to them. These claims have been maintained and
established as far west as the River Mississippi by the sword. The title to a vast portion of the lands we now hold originates in them. It
is not for the courts of this country to question the validity of this title or to sustain one which is incompatible with it.

Although we do not mean to engage in the defense of those principles which Europeans have applied to Indian title, they may, we
think, find some excuse, if not justification, in the character and habits of the people whose rights have been wrested from them.

The title by conquest is acquired and maintained by force. The conqueror prescribes its limits. Humanity, however, acting on public
opinion, has established, as a general rule, that the conquered shall not be wantonly oppressed, and that their condition shall remain
as eligible as is compatible with the objects of the conquest. Most usually, they are incorporated with the victorious nation, and become
subjects or citizens of the government with which they are connected. The new and old members of the society mingle with each other;
the distinction between them is gradually lost, and they make one people. Where this incorporation is practicable, humanity demands
and a wise policy requires that the rights of the conquered to property should remain unimpaired; that the new subjects should be
governed as equitably as the old, and that confidence in their security should gradually banish the painful sense of being separated
from their ancient connections, and united by force to strangers.

When the conquest is complete and the conquered inhabitants can be blended with the conquerors or safely governed as a distinct
people, public opinion, which not even the conqueror can disregard, imposes these restraints upon him, and he cannot neglect them
without injury to his fame and hazard to his power.

But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages whose occupation was war and whose subsistence was drawn
chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct
people was impossible because they were as brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms every
attempt on their independence.

What was the inevitable consequence of this state of things? The Europeans were under the necessity either of abandoning the
country and relinquishing their pompous claims to it or of enforcing those claims by the sword, and by the adoption of principles
adapted to the condition of a people with whom it was impossible to mix and who could not be governed as a distinct society, or of
remaining in their neighborhood, and exposing themselves and their families to the perpetual hazard of being massacred.

Frequent and bloody wars, in which the whites were not always the aggressors, unavoidably ensued. European policy, numbers, and
skill prevailed. As the white population advanced, that of the Indians necessarily receded. The country in the immediate neighborhood
of agriculturists became unfit for them. The game fled into thicker and more unbroken forests, and the Indians followed. The soil to
which the Crown originally claimed title, being no longer occupied by its ancient inhabitants, was parceled out according to the will of
the sovereign power and taken possession of by persons who claimed immediately from the Crown or mediately through its grantees or
deputies.

That law which regulates and ought to regulate in general the relations between the conqueror and conquered was incapable of
application to a people under such circumstances. The resort to some new and different rule better adapted to the actual state of things
was unavoidable. Every rule which can be suggested will be found to be attended with great difficulty.

However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the principle has
been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the
great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land and cannot be questioned. So, too, with respect to the
concomitant principle that the Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to be protected, indeed, while in peace, in
the possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title to others. However this restriction may be
opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations, yet if it be indispensable to that system under which the country has
been settled, and be adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it may perhaps be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be
rejected by courts of justice.

This question is not entirely new in this Court. The case of Fletcher v. Peck grew out of a sale made by the State of Georgia of a large
tract of country within the limits of that state, the grant of which was afterwards resumed. The action was brought by a subpurchaser on
the contract of sale, and one of the covenants in the deed was that the State of Georgia was, at the time of sale, seized in fee of the
premises. The real question presented by the issue was whether the seizin in fee was in the State of Georgia or in the United States.
After stating that this controversy between the several states and the United States had been compromised, the court thought in
necessary to notice the Indian title, which, although entitled to the respect of all courts until it should be legitimately extinguished, was
declared not to be such as to be absolutely repugnant to a seizin in fee on the part of the state.

This opinion conforms precisely to the principle which has been supposed to be recognized by all European governments from the first
settlement of America. The absolute ultimate title has been considered as acquired by discovery, subject only to the Indian title of
occupancy, which title the discoverers possessed the exclusive right of acquiring. Such a right is no more incompatible with a seizin in
fee than a lease for years, and might as effectually bar an ejectment.

Another view has been taken of this question which deserves to be considered. The title of the Crown, whatever it might be, could be
acquired only by a conveyance from the Crown. If an individual might extinguish the Indian title for his own benefit, or in other words
might purchase it, still he could acquire only that title. Admitting their power to change their laws or usages so far as to allow an
individual to separate a portion of their lands from the common stock and hold it in severalty, still it is a part of their territory and is held
under them by a title dependent on their laws. The grant derives its efficacy from their will, and if they choose to resume it and make a
different disposition of the land, the courts of the United States cannot interpose for the protection of the title. The person who
purchases lands from the Indians within their territory incorporates himself with them so far as respects the property purchased; holds
their title under their protection and subject to their laws. If they annul the grant, we know of no tribunal which can revise and set aside
the proceeding. We know of no principle which can distinguish this case from a grant made to a native Indian, authorizing him to hold a
particular tract of land in severalty.

As such a grant could not separate the Indian from his nation, nor give a title which our courts could distinguish from the title of his
tribe, as it might still be conquered from, or ceded by his tribe, we can perceive no legal principle which will authorize a court to say that
different consequences are attached to this purchase because it was made by a stranger. By the treaties concluded between the
United States and the Indian nations whose title the plaintiffs claim, the country comprehending the lands in controversy has been
ceded to the United States without any reservation of their title. These nations had been at war with the United States, and had an
unquestionable right to annul any grant they had made to American citizens. Their cession of the country without a reservation of this
land affords a fair presumption that they considered it as of no validity. They ceded to the United States this very property, after having
used it in common with other lands as their own, from the date of their deeds to the time of cession, and the attempt now made, is to
set up their title against that of the United States.

The proclamation issued by the King of Great Britain in 1763 has been considered, and we think with reason, as constituting an
additional objection to the title of the plaintiffs.

By that proclamation, the Crown reserved under its own dominion and protection, for the use of the Indians, "all the land and territories
lying to the westward of the sources of the rivers which fall into the sea from the west and northwest," and strictly forbade all British
subjects from making any purchases or settlements whatever or taking possession of the reserved lands.

It has been contended that in this proclamation, the King transcended his constitutional powers, and the case of Campbell v.
Hall, reported by Cowper, is relied on to support this position.

It is supposed to be a principle of universal law that if an uninhabited country be discovered by a number of individuals who
acknowledge no connection with and owe no allegiance to any government whatever, the country becomes the property of the
discoverers, so far at least as they can use it. They acquire a title in common. The title of the whole land is in the whole society. It is to
be divided and parceled out according to the will of the society, expressed by the whole body or by that organ which is authorized by
the whole to express it.
If the discovery be made and possession of the country be taken under the authority of an existing government, which is acknowledged
by the emigrants, it is supposed to be equally well settled, that the discovery is made for the whole nation, that the country becomes a
part of the nation, and that the vacant soil is to be disposed of by that organ of the government which has the constitutional power to
dispose of the national domains, by that organ in which all vacant territory is vested by law.

According to the theory of the British Constitution, all vacant lands are vested in the Crown, as representing the nation, and the
exclusive power to grant them is admitted to reside in the Crown as a branch of the royal prerogative. It has been already shown that
this principle was as fully recognized in America as in the Island of Great Britain. All the lands we hold were originally granted by the
Crown, and the establishment of a regal government has never been considered as impairing its right to grant lands within the
chartered limits of such colony. In addition to the proof of this principle, furnished by the immense grants already mentioned of lands
lying within the chartered limits of Virginia, the continuing right of the Crown to grant lands lying within that colony was always admitted.
A title might be obtained either by making an entry with the surveyor of a county in pursuance of law or by an order of the governor in
council, who was the deputy of the King, or by an immediate grant from the Crown. In Virginia, therefore, as well as elsewhere in the
British dominions, the complete title of the Crown to vacant lands was acknowledged.

So far as respected the authority of the Crown, no distinction was taken between vacant lands and lands occupied by the Indians. The
title, subject only to the right of occupancy by the Indians, was admitted to be in the King, as was his right to grant that title. The lands,
then, to which this proclamation referred were lands which the King had a right to grant, or to reserve for the Indians.

According to the theory of the British Constitution, the royal prerogative is very extensive so far as respects the political relations
between Great Britain and foreign nations. The peculiar situation of the Indians, necessarily considered in some respects as a
dependent and in some respects as a distinct people occupying a country claimed by Great Britain, and yet too powerful and brave not
to be dreaded as formidable enemies, required that means should be adopted for the preservation of peace, and that their friendship
should be secured by quieting their alarms for their property. This was to be effected by restraining the encroachments of the whites,
and the power to do this was never, we believe, denied by the colonies to the Crown.

In the case of Campbell v. Hall, that part of the proclamation was determined to be illegal, which imposed a tax on a conquered
province, after a government had been bestowed upon it. The correctness of this decision cannot be questioned, but its application to
the case at bar cannot be admitted. Since the expulsion of the Stuart family, the power of imposing taxes by proclamation has never
been claimed as a branch of regal prerogative, but the powers of granting, or refusing to grant, vacant lands, and of restraining
encroachments on the Indians have always been asserted and admitted.

The authority of this proclamation, so far as it respected this continent, has never been denied, and the titles it gave to lands have
always been sustained in our courts.

In the argument of this cause, the counsel for the plaintiffs have relied very much on the opinions expressed by men holding offices of
trust, and on various proceedings in America to sustain titles to land derived from the Indians.

The collection of claims to lands lying in the western country made in the 1st volume of the Laws of the United States has been referred
to, but we find nothing in that collection to support the argument. Most of the titles were derived from persons professing to act under
the authority of the government existing at the time, and the two grants under which the plaintiffs claim are supposed by the person
under whose inspection the collection was made to be void, because forbidden by the royal proclamation of 1763. It is not unworthy of
remark that the usual mode adopted by the Indians for granting lands to individuals has been to reserve them in a treaty or to grant
them under the sanction of the commissioners with whom the treaty was negotiated. The practice in such case to grant to the Crown
for the use of the individual is some evidence of a general understanding that the validity even of such a grant depended on its
receiving the royal sanction.

The controversy between the Colony of Connecticut and the Mohegan Indians depended on the nature and extent of a grant made by
those Indians to the colony; on the nature and extent of the reservations made by the Indians, in their several deeds and treaties, which
were alleged to be recognized by the legitimate authority; and on the violation by the colony of rights thus reserved and secured. We do
not perceive in that case any assertion of the principle that individuals might obtain a complete and valid title from the Indians.

It has been stated that in the memorial transmitted from the Cabinet of London to that of Versailles, during the controversy between the
two nations respecting boundary which took place in 1755, the Indian right to the soil is recognized.
But this recognition was made with reference to their character as Indians and for the purpose of showing that they were fixed to a
particular territory. It was made for the purpose of sustaining the claim of His Britannic Majesty to dominion over them.

The opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor General, Pratt and Yorke, have been adduced to prove that in the opinion of those great law
officers, the Indian grant could convey a title to the soil without a patent emanating from the Crown. The opinion of those persons would
certainly be of great authority on such a question, and we were not a little surprised when it was read, at the doctrine it seemed to
advance. An opinion so contrary to the whole practice of the Crown and to the uniform opinions given on all other occasions by its great
law officers ought to be very explicit and accompanied by the circumstances under which it was given, and to which it was applied
before we can be assured that it is properly understood. In a pamphlet written for the purpose of asserting the Indian title, styled "Plain
Facts," the same opinion is quoted, and is said to relate to purchases made in the East Indies. It is, of course, entirely inapplicable to
purchases made in America. Chalmers, in whose collection this opinion is found, does not say to whom it applies, but there is reason to
believe that the author of Plain Facts is, in this respect, correct. The opinion commences thus:

"In respect to such places as have been or shall be acquired by treaty or grant from any of the Indian princes or governments, your
Majesty's letters patent are not necessary."

The words "princes or governments" are usually applied to the East Indians, but not to those of North America. We speak of their
sachems, their warriors, their chiefmen, their nations or tribes, not of their "princes or governments." The question on which the opinion
was given, too, and to which it relates, was whether the King's subjects carry with them the common law wherever they may form
settlements. The opinion is given with a view to this point, and its object must be kept in mind while construing its expressions.

Much reliance is also placed on the fact, that many tracts are now held in the United States under the Indian title, the validity of which is
not questioned.

Before the importance attached to this fact is conceded, the circumstances under which such grants were obtained, and such titles are
supported, ought to be considered. These lands lie chiefly in the eastern states. It is known that the Plymouth Company made many
extensive grants which, from their ignorance of the country, interfered with each other. It is also known that Mason to whom New
Hampshire, and Gorges, to whom Maine was granted, found great difficulty in managing such unwieldy property. The country was
settled by emigrants, some from Europe, but chiefly from Massachusetts, who took possession of lands they found unoccupied, and
secured themselves in that possession by the best means in their power. The disturbances in England, and the civil war and revolution
which followed those disturbances, prevented any interference on the part of the mother country, and the proprietors were unable to
maintain their title. In the meantime, Massachusetts claimed the country and governed it. As her claim was adversary to that of the
proprietors, she encouraged the settlement of persons made under her authority, and encouraged likewise their securing themselves in
possession, by purchasing the acquiescence and forbearance of the Indians. After the restoration of Charles II, Gorges and Mason,
when they attempted to establish their title, found themselves opposed by men who held under Massachusetts and under the Indians.
The title of the proprietors was resisted, and though in some cases compromises were made and in some, the opinion of a court was
given ultimately in their favor, the juries found uniformly against them. They became wearied with the struggle, and sold their property.
The titles held under the Indians were sanctioned by length of possession, but there is no case, so far as we are informed, of a judicial
decision in their favor.

Much reliance has also been placed on a recital contained in the charter of Rhode Island, and on a letter addressed to the governors of
the neighboring colonies, by the King's command, in which some expressions are inserted, indicating the royal approbation of titles
acquired from the Indians.

The charter to Rhode Island recites

"That the said John Clark and others had transplanted themselves into the midst of the Indian nations, and were seized and
possessed, by purchase and consent of the said natives, to their full content, of such lands,"

&c. And the letter recites, that

"Thomas Chifflinch and others, having, in the right of Major Asperton, a just propriety in the Narraghanset Country, in New England, by
grants from the native princes of that country, and being desirous to improve it into an English colony, . . . are yet daily disturbed."
The impression this language might make, if viewed apart from the circumstances under which it was employed, will be effaced, when
considered in connection with those circumstances.

In the year 1635, the Plymouth Company surrendered their charter to the Crown. About the same time, the religious dissentions of
Massachusetts expelled from that colony several societies of individuals, one of which settled in Rhode Island, on lands purchased
from the Indians. They were not within the chartered limits of Massachusetts, and the English government was too much occupied at
home to bestow its attention on this subject. There existed no authority to arrest their settlement of the country. If they obtained the
Indian title, there were none to assert the title of the Crown. Under these circumstances, the settlement became considerable.
Individuals acquired separate property in lands which they cultivated and improved; a government was established among themselves,
and no power existed in America which could rightfully interfere with it.

On the restoration of Charles II, this small society hastened to acknowledge his authority, and to solicit his confirmation of their title to
the soil, and to jurisdiction over the country. Their solicitations were successful, and a charter was granted to them, containing the
recital which has been mentioned.

It is obvious that this transaction can amount to no acknowledgment that the Indian grant could convey a title paramount to that of the
Crown, or could in itself constitute a complete title. On the contrary, the charter of the Crown was considered as indispensable to its
completion.

It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of possession has never been questioned. The claim
of government extends to the complete ultimate title, charged with this right of possession and to the exclusive power of acquiring that
right. The object of the Crown was to settle the seacoast of America, and when a portion of it was settled, without violating the rights of
others, by persons professing their loyalty, and soliciting the royal sanction of an act, the consequences of which were ascertained to
be beneficial, it would have been as unwise as ungracious to expel them from their habitations, because they had obtained the Indian
title otherwise than through the agency of government. The very grant of a charter is an assertion of the title of the Crown, and its
words convey the same idea. The country granted is said to be "our island called Rhode Island," and the charter contains an actual
grant of the soil as well as of the powers of government.

The letter was written a few months before the charter was issued, apparently at the request of the agents of the intended colony, for
the sole purpose of preventing the trespasses of neighbors, who were disposed to claim some authority over them. The King, being
willing himself to ratify and confirm their title was, of course, inclined to quiet them in their possession.

This charter and this letter certainly sanction a previous unauthorized purchase from Indians under the circumstances attending that
particular purchase, but are far from supporting the general proposition, that a title acquired from the Indians would be valid against a
title acquired from the Crown, or without the confirmation of the Crown.

The acts of the several colonial assemblies prohibiting purchases from the Indians have also been relied on as proving that,
independent of such prohibitions, Indian deeds would be valid. But we think this fact, at most, equivocal. While the existence of such
purchases would justify their prohibition, even by colonies which considered Indian deeds as previously invalid, the fact that such acts
have been generally passed, is strong evidence of the general opinion, that such purchases are opposed by the soundest principles of
wisdom and national policy.

After bestowing on this subject a degree of attention which was more required by the magnitude of the interest in litigation, and the able
and elaborate arguments of the bar, than by its intrinsic difficulty, the court is decidedly of opinion, that the plaintiffs do not exhibit a title
which can be sustained in the courts of the United States, and that there is no error in the judgment which was rendered against them
in the District Court of Illinois.

Judgment affirmed with costs.

U.S. Supreme Court

Chavez v. United States, 175 U.S. 552 (1899)

Chavez v. United States

No. 14

Argued October 17-18, 1899

Decided December 22, 1899

175 U.S. 552

APPEAL FROM THE COURT

OF PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS

Syllabus

In Mexico, in 1831, a departmental assembly or territorial deputation had no power or authority to make a grant of lands, and the fact
that the governor presided at a meeting of the territorial deputation at the time such a grant was made, makes no difference, as the
power to make the grant was exclusively in the governor, and the territorial deputation had no jurisdiction in the matter.

The statement of the case will be found in the opinion of the Court.

MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Private Land Claims refusing to confirm the title of the appellant to some 5,000 acres
of land in New Mexico, about one league from the Manzano grant. The title is evidenced by a grant by the territorial deputation of New
Mexico, made in 1831, and the first question in the case relates to the authority of that body to make the grant.

It is also contended that if the territorial deputation did not have the power to make the grant, and that power rested with the governor
of the department, his presence in the territorial deputation as its ex officio president when the grant was made, and, so far as the
record shows, his not protesting but acquiescing in its action, was equivalent to and the same as a grant made by himself in his official
character as governor.

It is further stated that, by reason of the action of the governor in writing the letter dated December 22, 1831, and hereinafter set forth,
that officer ratified and confirmed the grant, and in effect made it his own.

It appears from the record that, on February 28, 1831, citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya petitioned the honorable corporation of Tome,
and asked it that it would append to his petition its own report to the most excellent deputation, so that that body should grant him the
land described in the petition. The corporation of Tome, on the 19th of March, 1831, granted the prayer of the petitioner, and adopted a
resolution which provided that his petition should

"go before the most excellent territorial deputation, which, as the authority competent, may accede to the donation of the land prayed
for by the said petitioner without injuring the pastures and watering places for the passers-by."

The resolution was accordingly forwarded to the territorial deputation, and that body on November 12, 1831, took action as follows:

"(Extract from record of proceedings of the territorial deputation,"

"session of November 12, 1831)"

"The foregoing record having been read and approved, a petition of citizen Nerio Montoya, a resident of Valencia, in which he asks for
the donation, for agricultural purposes, of a tract of vacant land in the Manzano within the limits of the Ojo de en Medio as far as the
rancheria, was taken up and the report of the respectable corporation council of Tome, in which it is set forth that there is no objection
to the concession of the said land, having been heard it was ordered that it be granted."

"* * * *"

"The session was adjourned."

"Santiago Abreu, President (Rubrick)"

"Juan Rafael Ortiz (Rubrick)"

"Anto. Jose Martinez (Rubrick)"

"Jose Manl. Salazar (Rubrick)"

"Teodosio Quintana (Rubrick)"

"Ramon Abreu, Secretary (Rubrick)"

In accordance with this action, the following direction by the deputation, signed by its secretary, was given the alcalde of the proper
jurisdiction:

"Santa Fe, November 12, 1831"

"The honorable the deputation of this territory, having received the report of the constitutional council of Tome, appended to this
petition, has resolved in this day's session to grant the land prayed for by the petitioner, charging the alcalde of said jurisdiction to
execute the document that will secure the grantee in the grant hereby made to him."

"Abreu, Secretary"

The alcalde thereupon executed a document which, after reciting that, "In obedience to the decree of the most excellent deputation of
this territory made under date of November 12 of the current year on the margin of the petition which, under date of February 28, the
citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya, resident of this said jurisdiction, presented to this honorable council, and on which petition is recorded
the report made by this council, in accordance with which report its excellency has deemed it proper to accede to the petition of
Montoya, granting him full and formal possession of the tract he prayed for," etc., declared that "Montoya, whenever he may choose or
think best to do, may notify me to proceed with him to the locality to place him in possession of the property granted him, with all the
customary formality," etc. This was dated December 7, 1831, and signed by the alcalde.

On December 12 in the same year, the same alcalde, "in compliance with the provision made by this most excellent deputation of this
territory and the notification given me by the citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya," proceeded with Montoya to the tract of land granted him
and placed him in possession thereof, the act being signed by the alcalde. There was also put in evidence on the trial of the action in
the court below, on the question of ratification, the following:

"Office of the Political Chief of New Mexico"

"By your official communication of the 20th instant, I am advised of your having executed the decree of the most excellent deputation
granting to the citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya a tract of land."

"But in regard to the inquiry you make of me, as to how much your fee should be, I inform you that I am ignorant in the premises, and
that you may, if you choose to do, put the question to the assessor (asesor), who is the officer to whom it belongs, to advise the
justices of first instance in such cases."

"God and Liberty. Santa Fe, December 22, 1831."

"Jose Antonio Chavez"

"To Alderman Miguel Olona"

Various mesne conveyances were put in evidence on the trial, showing the transfer to the appellant of whatever title Montoya had to
the land described, and it was then admitted that the appellant herein has succeeded to all the rights of the original grantee, if any, in
this case. Evidence of possession under this grant was also given.

The court below held that the departmental assembly or territorial deputation had no power or authority to make a grant of lands at the
time the grant in this case was attempted to be made, and that the fact that the governor may have presided at the meeting at the time
the action was taken made no difference, as the power to make the grant was exclusively in the governor, and the territorial deputation
had no jurisdiction in the matter. The claim was therefore rejected.

We think that in thus deciding, the court below was right.

We refer to some of the cases which show the territorial deputation did not have the power to make a grant, but only the power to
subsequently approve it.

In United States v. Vallejo, 1 Black 541, it was held that the Mexican law of 1824 and the regulations of 1828 altered and repealed the
Spanish system of disposing of public lands, and that the law and the regulations from the time of their passage were the only laws of
Mexico on the subject of granting public lands in the territories. It was also held that the governor did not possess any power to make
grants public lands independently of that conferred by the act of 1824 and the regulations of 1828. Mr. Justice Nelson, who delivered
the opinion of the Court in that case, refers to the various sections of the law of 1824, and also to the regulations of November, 1828,
for the purpose of showing that the governors of the territories were authorized to grant vacant lands within their respective territories
with the object of cultivation or settlement, and that the grants made by them to individuals or families were not to be definitively valid
without the previous consent of the departmental assembly, and when the grant petitioned for had been definitively made a patent,
signed by the governor, was to be issued, which was to serve as a title to the party. This case did not decide that the territorial
deputation could not make a valid grant, because the grant was made by the governor, but the various extracts from the law and
regulations indicate very plainly that the authority to initiate a grant of public lands existed in the governor alone, and not in the
assembly.

In United States v. Vigil, 13 Wall. 449, it was held that departmental assemblies (territorial deputations) had no power to make a grant.

In his argument at the bar, counsel for this appellant contended that the territorial deputation had lawful power and authority to make
the grant to Montoya, and in order to maintain that proposition, stated that it was necessary to discuss the effect of the decision of this
Court in United States v. Vigil. He claimed that what was said as to the lack of power in the territorial deputation to make a grant was
not necessary to the decision of the Court in that case, and that such expressions as were therein used regarding the question would
not therefore constitute a precedent now binding on this Court.

In Vigil's case, there was a petition to the departmental assembly, through the Governor of New Mexico, asking for a grant of land
which in fact amounted to over two million, the grantees binding themselves, if the grant were made, to construct two wells for the relief
and aid of travelers, and to establish two factories for the use of the state, and to protect them from hostile invasion. The governor
transmitted the petition to the assembly, but declined to recommend that favorable action should be taken upon it. The assembly,
notwithstanding this refusal, granted the tract on January 10, 1846, for the purpose of constructing wells and cultivating the land, etc.,
and the question was as to the validity of this grant.

The opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Davis, who stated that it had been repeatedly decided by this Court that the only laws in force
in the territories of Mexico, for the disposition of public lands, with the exception of those relating to missions and towns, were the act of
the Mexican Congress of 1824 and the regulations of 1828. In the course of his opinion, he said:

"These regulations conferred on the governors of the territories, 'the political chiefs,' as they are called, the authority to grant vacant
lands, and did not delegate it to the departmental assembly. It is true the grant was not complete until the approval of the assembly,
and in this sense the assembly and governor acted concurrently, but the initiative must be taken by the governor. He was required to
act in the first instance -- to decide whether the petitioner was a fit person to receive the grant, and whether the land itself could be
granted without prejudice to the public or individuals. In case the information was satisfactory on these points, he was authorized to
make the grant, and at the proper time to lay it before the assembly, who were required to give or withhold their consent. They were in
this respect an advisory body to the governor, and sustained the same relation to him that the Senate of the United States does to the
President in the matter of appointments and treaties."

A subsequent portion of the opinion dealt with the case upon the assumption that the grant had been made by the governor, and even
in that case it was said the grant would have been invalid because it violated the fundamental rule on which the right of donation was
placed by the law; that the essential element of colonization was wanting, and that the number of acres granted was enormously in
excess of the maximum quantity grantable under the law. This in nowise affected the prior ground upon which the opinion was based,
that the departmental assembly had no power to make the grant. That was the essential and material question directly involved in the
case, while the second ground mentioned was based upon an assumption that, even if the governor had made the grant, it would still
have been void for the reason stated. The court did not base its decision that the departmental assembly had no power to make the
grant because of its enormous extent. It held that the assembly had no power to make any grant, no matter what its size. It is, as we
think, a decision covering this case.

In Hayes v. United States, 170 U. S. 637, the grant was by the territorial deputation of New Mexico, and it was stated by MR. JUSTICE
WHITE, speaking for the Court, that

"it cannot be in reason held that a title to land derived from a territory which the territorial authorities did not own, over which they had
no power of disposition, was regularly derived from either Spain or Mexico or a State of the Mexican nation."

No presumption that the territorial deputations had authority to make grants can arise from the fact that in some instances those bodies
assumed to make them. The case in this respect bears no resemblance to United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51, 32 U. S. 96, or
to United States v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 436, 33 U. S. 447, 33 U. S. 453. In those cases, it was not denied that the governor had authority in
some circumstances to make grants, and it was therefore held that a grant made by him was prima facie evidence that he had not
exceeded his power in making it, and that he who denied it took upon himself the burden of showing that the officer by making the
grant had transcended the power reposed in him. There is in the case before us no evidence that the territorial deputation had the
power, in any event, to make grants other than the fact that in some instances it assumed to make them.

The cases heretofore decided in this Court, and some of which have been above referred to, show that such fact is inadequate to prove
the existence of the authority.

It is, however, urged that the record of the action of the territorial deputation in regard to this grant shows that the governor and ex
officio president of the deputation was present when the deputation decided to make the grant as petitioned for, and that his being so
present and attesting the action of the deputation was equivalent to the making of the grant himself as governor. We do not think so.
He did not assume to make any grant whatever, and certainly none in his character as governor. It does not even appear beyond doubt
that he was present when the deputation made the grant. His signature is perfectly consistent with a mere authentication of the
previous action of that body.

The petition of Montoya was addressed primarily to the corporation of Tome, and he requested that corporation to send his petition,
approved by it, to the deputation to make him a grant of the land described in his petition. Acting under that request, the corporation of
Tome sent his petition to the "most excellent territorial deputation," and asked that body to accede to the donation of the land prayed
for. In conformity to the petition, the territorial deputation itself made the grant. The fact that the governor, being ex officio a member of
the deputation, signed as president of that body the record of the act of the deputation is not the equivalent of a grant by him in his
official character of governor, nor does such act bear any resemblance to a grant by him. No one on reading the record would get the
idea that the governor was himself making the grant, or that he thereby intended so to do. It does not even show that he was in favor of
the grant as made by the deputation. His signing the record constituted nothing more than an authentication of the act of the
deputation. It purported to be nothing else. He might have properly signed the record if in fact he had voted against the grant, and had
been opposed to the action of the assembly. He might have signed the record as an authentication, and yet have been absent at the
time of the action of the assembly. In any event, it was his signature as an ex officio member or presiding officer of the deputation,
attesting or perhaps assenting to its action, and it was not his action as governor making a grant in that capacity. The signature by the
secretary alone, to the instrument (above set forth, dated November 12, 1831) which recites the previous action of the deputation, and
charges the alcalde of the jurisdiction to execute the document which will secure the grantee in the grant, is simply a direction to the
alcalde, and has no materiality upon this branch of the case other than as confirming the view that the grant was solely that of the
deputation.
We cannot hold that, when the power was given under the laws of Mexico to the governor to make grants of lands, he in any manner
exercised that power, or performed an act equivalent to its exercise, by presiding ex officio at a meeting of the territorial deputation
which made a grant of lands in conformity to a petition solely addressed to it and by authenticating as president the action of the
deputation in deciding that the grant should be made.

The two positions, president of the deputation and governor, are separate and distinct, and the action of a governor merely as
president of the deputation, and of the nature above described is not in any sense and does not purport to be his separate and
independent action as governor, making a grant of lands pursuant to a petition addressed to him officially. As governor, he might refuse
the grant upon a petition addressed to himself, when as president of the deputation he might sign the record authenticating its action in
regard to a petition addressed solely to that body. And it is obvious from the wording of the record that the president of the deputation
was not assuming to act as governor upon a petition addressed to himself, but only as the president of the deputation. It might have
been that he acquiesced in the assumption by the deputation of the right to make the grant, but his act of signing the record cannot be
tortured into a grant or as the equivalent of a grant by himself.

It is further urged that there has been what amounts to a grant by the governor by reason of his letter of December 22, 1831, signed by
him and above set forth, thus, as is claimed, ratifying the grant of the deputation and making it his own.

The only evidence that the person who signed the letter was the governor at that time is the heading of the letter, "Office of the Political
Chief of New Mexico." It will be also noted that the person signing it is not the same one who signed the record of November 12, 1831,
as president of the deputation. But, assuming that Chavez was governor in December, 1831, when he signed the letter, he therein
simply acknowledged the receipt of the official communication of the alcalde, in which that officer reports that he had executed the
decree "of the most excellent deputation, granting to the citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya a tract of land." In reply to the question as to
how much the alcalde's fee should be, he answered that he was ignorant of the premises, and advised the alcalde to put the question
to the assessor, the officer to whom it belonged to advise the justices in the first instances in such cases.

Now what does the governor ratify by this letter? Nothing.

The contention in favor of the grant, based upon the letter, is that, assuming the governor had power to make the grant, it was his duty
when he learned from the report of the alcalde that one had been made by the deputation, and that possession had been delivered
under it, to protest against and to deny the power of the deputation to make such grant, and unless he did so, his silence was evidence
of the fact that he not only approved the act of the deputation in making the grant, but that he approved it as his own, and that such
approval was the same as if the governor had himself made the grant, and in substance and effect it was his grant.

This contention, we think, is not founded upon any legal principle, and is in itself unreasonable. The writer of the letter is not the same
person who signed the record of the proceedings of the deputation. The report of the alcalde gave him the information which, it is true,
he may have had before, that the deputation had assumed the power to grant the land. His protest as to the legality of such action
would not have altered the fact that it had occurred, while, on the other hand, his silence might simply be construed as evidence of his
unreadiness at that time to dispute, or possibly of his belief in the validity of the action of the deputation. Or his silence might have been
simply the result of his approval of the act of the alcalde in obeying the commands of the deputation, while he thought it was not the
proper occasion upon which to contest or deny the validity of the grant which the deputation had actually made. Many reasons for his
silence might be suggested, but the claim that it equaled in law a positive grant by the governor is, as we think, untenable.

While such silence is entirely consistent with other views that might have been held by the governor, it certainly cannot properly be
ascribed, as a legal inference from the facts stated, to his desire to make the grant himself, nor could it be said that his desire (if he had
it) was the legal equivalent of an actual grant.

His knowledge that another body had assumed to make a grant is not equivalent to the making of the grant himself, and he was the
person who alone had power to make it. There is nothing in the letter which aids the plaintiff herein.

Finally, it distinctly appears that the possession of the parties is insufficient in length of time to prove a valid title. In United States v.
Chaves, 159 U. S. 452, the possession was under the claim of a grant made by the governor of New Mexico to the alleged grantees.
The grant had been lost, but it had been seen and read by witnesses, and its existence had been proved by evidence sufficient, as was
stated in the opinion (page 159 U. S. 460), to warrant "the finding of the court below that the complainants' title was derived from the
Republic of Mexico, and was complete and perfect at the date when the United States acquired sovereignty in the Territory of New
Mexico, within which the land was situated."
We do not question the correctness of the remarks made by MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS in regard to evidence of possession and the
presumptions which may under certain circumstances be drawn as to the existence of a grant.

We do not deny the right or the duty of a court to presume its existence in a proper case, in order to quiet a title and to give to long
continued possession the quality of a rightful possession under a legal title. We recognize and enforce such rule in the case of United
States v. Chavez, decided at this term, in which the question is involved. We simply say in this case that the possession was not of a
duration long enough to justify any such inference.

There is no proof of any valid grant, but, on the contrary, the evidence offered by the plaintiff himself and upon which he bases the title
that he asks the court to confirm, shows the existence of a grant from a body which had no legal power to make it, and which therefore
conveyed no title whatever to its grantee, and the evidence is, as given by the plaintiff himself, that it was under this grant alone that
possession of the lands was taken. We cannot presume (within the time involved in this case) that any other and valid grant was ever
made. The possession of the plaintiff and of his grantors up to the time of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in 1848, had not been long
enough to presume a grant. Crespin v. United States, 168 U. S. 208; Hayes v. United States, 170 U. S. 637, 170 U. S. 649; Hays v.
United States, ante, 175 U. S. 248. The possession subsequently existing, we cannot notice. Same authorities.

We think the judgment of the court below should be

Affirmed.

G.R. No. 1413 March 30, 1904

ANDRES VALENTON, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
MANUEL MURCIANO, defendant-appellee.

Montagne and Dominguez for appellants.

Del Pan, Ortigas and Fisher for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

I. The findings of fact made by the court below in its decision are as follows:

First. That in the year 1860, the plaintiffs, and each one of them, entered into the peaceful and quiet occupation and
possession of the larger part of the lands described in the complaint of the plaintiffs, to wit [description]:

Second. That on the date on which the plaintiffs entered into the occupation and possession of the said lands, as above set
forth, these lands and every part thereof were public, untilled, and unoccupied, and belonged to the then existing Government
of the Philippine Islands. That immediately after the occupation and possession of the said lands by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs
began to cultivate and improve them in a quiet and peaceful manner.

Third. That from the said year 1860, the plaintiffs continued to occupy and possess the said lands, quietly and peacefully, until
the year 1892, by themselves, by their agents and tenants, claiming that they were the exclusive owners of said lands.

Fourth. That on or about the 16th day of January, 1892, Manuel Murciano, defendant in this proceeding, acting on behalf of
and as attorney in fact of Candido Capulong, by occupation a cook, denounced the said lands to the then existing
Government of the Philippine Islands, declaring that the said lands every part thereof were public, untilled, and unoccupied
lands belonging to the then existing Government of the Philippine Islands, and petitioned for the sale of the same to him.

Fifth. That before the execution of the sale heretofore mentioned, various proceedings were had for the survey and
measurement of the lands in question at the instance of the defendant, Murciano, the latter acting as agent and attorney in
fact of said Candido Capulong, a written protest, however, having been entered against these proceedings by the plaintiff
Andres Valenton.
 Sixth. That on the 14th day of July, 1892, Don Enrique Castellvie Ibarrola, secretary of the treasury of the Province of Tarlac,
in his official capacity as such secretary, executed a contract of purchase and sale, by which said lands were sold and
conveyed by him to the defendant, Manuel Murciano, as attorney for the said Candido Capulong.

Seventh. That on the 19th day of July, 1892, said Candido Capulong executed a contract of purchase and sale, by which he
sold and conveyed the said lands to the defendants, Manuel Murciano.

Eight. That from the said 14th day of July, 1892, Manuel Murciano has at no time occupied or possessed all of the land
mentioned, but has possessed only certain in distinct and indefinite portions of the same. That during all this time the plaintiffs
have opposed the occupation of the defendant, and said plaintiffs during all the time in question have been and are in the
possession and occupation of part of the said lands, tilling them and improving them by themselves and by their agents and
tenants.

Ninth. That never, prior to the said 14th day of July,, 1892, has the defendant, Manuel Murciano, been in the peaceful and
quiet possession and occupation of the said lands, or in the peaceful and quiet occupation of any part thereof.

Upon these facts the Court of First Instance ordered judgment for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiffs had lost all right to the
land by not pursuing their objections to the sale mentioned in the sixth finding. The plaintiffs excepted to the judgment and claim in this
court that upon the facts found by the court below judgment should have been entered in their favor. Their contention is that in 1890
they had been in the adverse possession of the property for thirty years; that, applying the extra ordinary period of prescription of thirty
years, found as well in the Partidas as in the Civil Code, they then became the absolute owners of the land as against everyone,
including the State, and that when the State in 1892 deeded the property to the defendant, nothing passed by the deed because the
State had nothing to convey.

The case presents, therefore, the important question whether or not during the years from 1860 to 1890 a private person, situated as
the plaintiffs were, could have obtained as against the State the ownership of the public lands of the State by means of occupation. The
court finds that at the time of the entry by the plaintiff in 1860 the lands were vacant and were public lands belonging to the then
existing Government. The plaintiffs do not claim to have ever obtained from the Government any deed for the lands, nor any
confirmation of their possession.

Whether in the absence of any special legislation on the subject a general statute of limitations in which the State was not expressly
excepted would run against the State as to its public lands we do not find it necessary to decide. Reasons based upon public policy
could be adduced why it should not, at least as to such public lands as are involved in this case. (See Act No. 926, sec. 67.) We are,
however, of the opinion that the case at bar must be decided, not by the general statute of limitation contained in the Partidas, but by
those special laws which from the earliest times have regulated the disposition of the public lands in the colonies.

Did these special laws recognize any right of prescription against the State as to these lands; and if so, to what extend was it
recognizes? Laws of very early date provided for the assignment of public lands to the subjects of the Crown. Law 1, title 12, book 4 of
the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias is an example of them, and is as follows:

In order that our subjects may be encouraged to undertake the discovery and settlement of the Indies, and that they may live
with the comfort and convenience which we desire, it is our will that there shall be distributed to all those who shall go out to
people the new territories, houses, lots, lands, peonias, and caballerias in the towns and places which may be assigned to
them by the governor of the new settlement, who in apportioning the lands, will distinguish between gentlemen and peasants,
and those of lower degree and merit, and who will add to the possessions and better the condition of the grantees, according
to the nature of the services rendered by them, and with a view to the promotion of agriculture and stock raising. To those who
shall have labored and established a home on said lands and who shall have resided in the said settlement for a period of four
years we grant the right thereafter to sell and in every other manner to exercise their free will over said lands as over their own
property. And we further command that, in accordance with their rank and degree, the governor, or whoever may be invested
with our authority, shall allot the Indians to them in any distribution made, so that they may profit by their labor and fines in
accordance with the tributes required and the law controlling such matters.

And in order that, in allotting said lands, there may be no doubt as to the area of each grant, we declare that apeonia shall
consist of a tract fifty feet in breadth by one hundred in length, with arable land capable of producing one hundred bushels of
wheat or barley, ten bushels of maize, as much land for an orchard as two yokes of oxen may plough in a day, and for the
planting of other trees of a hardy nature as much as may be plowed with eight yokes in a day, and including pasture for twenty
 cows, five mares, one hundred sheep, twenty goats, and ten breeding pigs. A caballeria shall be a tract one hundred feet in
breadth and two hundred in length, and in other respects shall equal five peonias that is, it will include arable land capable
of producing five hundred bushels of wheat or barley and fifty bushels of maize, as much land for an orchard as may be
ploughed with ten yokes of oxen in a day, and for the planting of other hardy trees as much as forty yokes may plough in a
day, together with pasturage for one hundred cows, twenty mares, five hundred sheep, one hundred goats, and fifty breeding
pigs. And we order that the distribution be made in such a manner that all may receive equal benefit therefrom, and if this be
impracticable, then that each shall be given his due.

But it was necessary, however, that action should in all cases be taken by the public officials before any interest was acquired by the
subject.

Law 8 of said title 12 is as follows:

We command that if a petition shall be presented asking the grant of a lot or tract of land in a city or town in which one of our
courts may be located, the presentation shall be made to the municipal council. If the latter shall approve the petition, two
deputy magistrates will be appointed, who will acquaint the viceroy or municipal president with the council's judgment in the
matter. After consideration thereof by the viceroy or president and the deputy magistrates, all will sign the grants, in the
presence of the clerk of the council, in order that the matter may be duly recorded in the council book. If the petition shall be
for the grant of waters and lands for mercantile purpose, it shall be presented to the viceroy or municipal president, who will
transmit it to the council. If the latters shall vote to make the grant, one of the magistrates will carry its decision to the viceroy
or president, to the end that, upon consideration of the matter by him, the proper action may be taken.

It happened, in the course of time, that tracts of the public land were found in the possession of persons who either had no title papers
therefor issued by the State, or whose title papers were defective, either because the proper procedure had not been followed or
because they had been issued by persons who had no authority to do so. Law 14, title 12 book 4 of said compilation (referred to in the
regulations of June 25, 1880, for the Philippines) was the first of a long series of legislative acts intended to compel those in possession
of the public lands, without written evidence of title, or with defective title papers, to present evidence as to their possession or grants,
and obtain the confirmation of their claim to ownership. That law is as follows:

We having acquitted full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands territories, and possession not heretofore ceded away by
our royal predecessors, or by, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which
are held without proper and true deeds of grants be restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving
before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures,
and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also the future
and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming
them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered
for us to dispose of as we may wish.

We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts designated, at such time as shall to them
seem most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to
them, and to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those who are in possession
by virtue of proper deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored
to us to be disposed of at our will.

While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it
has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he
did that the State remained the absolute owner.

In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands belong to the Crown which have not been
granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who proceeded him. This statement excludes the idea that there might be lands no so
granted, that did not being to the king. It excludes the idea that the king was not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some
private person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all the occupants of the public lands are
required to produce before the authorities named, and within a time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And those who had good title
or showed prescription were to be protected in their holdings. It is apparent that it was not the intention of the law that mere possession
for a length of time should make the possessors the owners of the lands possessed by them without any action on the part of the
authorities. It is plain that they were required to present their claims to the authorities and obtain a confirmation thereof. What the
period of prescription mentioned in this law was does not appear, but latter, in 1646, law 19 of the same title declared "that no one shall
be 'admitted to adjustment' unless he has possessed the lands for ten years."

In law 15, title 12, book 4 of the same compilation, there is a command that those lands as to which there has been no adjustment with
the Government be sold at auction to the highest bidder. That law is as follows:

For the greater good of our subjects, we order and command that our viceroys and governing presidents shall do nothing with
respect to lands the claims to which have been adjusted by their predecessors, tending to disturb the peaceful possession of
the owners thereof. As to those who shall have extended their possession beyond the limits fixed in the original grants, they
will be admitted to a moderate adjustment with respect to the excess, and new title deeds will be issued therefor. And all those
lands as to which no adjustment has been made shall, without exception, be sold at public auction to the highest bidder, the
purchase price therefor to be payable either in cash or in the form of quitrent, in accordance with the laws and royal
ordinances of the kingdoms of Castile. We leave to the viceroys and president the mode and from in which what is here
ordered shall be carried into effect in order that they may provide for it at the least possible cost; and in order that all
unnecessary expense with respect to the collections for said lands may be avoided, we command that the same be made by
our royal officers in person, without the employment of special collectors, and to that end availing themselves of the services
of our royal courts, and, in places where courts shall not have been established, of the town mayors.

And whereas, title deeds to lands have been granted by officers not authorized to issue them, and such titles have been
confirmed by us in council, we command that those holding such a certificate of confirmation may continue to possess the
lands to which it refers, and will, within the limits stated in the confirmation certificate, be protected in their possession; and
with respect to any encroachment beyond such limits will be admitted to the benefits of this law.

Another legislative act of the same character was the royal cedula of October 15, 1754 (4 Legislacion Ultramarina, Rodriguez San
Pedro, 673). Articles 3, 4, and 5 of this royal cedula as follows:

3. Upon each principal subdelegate's appointment, which will be made in the manner prescribed in article 1 of this cedula, and
upon his receipts of these instructions, of which every principal subdelegate already designated or who may hereafter be
appointed shall be furnished a copy, said subdelegate will in his turn issue a general order to the courts in the provincial
capitals and principal towns of his district, directing the publication therein, in the manner followed in connection with the
promulgation or general orders of viceroys, presidents, and administrative courts in matters connected with my service, of
these instructions, to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the promulgation and
publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not the same shall be cultivated of tenanted, may, either
in person or through their attorneys or representatives, appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue
of which said lands are occupied. Said subdelegates will designate as the period within which such documents must be
presented a term sufficient in length and proportionate to the distance the interested party may have to travel for the purpose
of making the presentation. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties interested that in case of their failure to
present their title deeds within the term designated, without a just and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of an evicted
from their lands, and they will be granted to others.

4. If it shall appear from the titles or instruments presented, or if it shall be shown in any other legal manner that said persons
are in possession of such royal lands by virtue of a sale or adjustment consummated by duly authorized subdelegates prior to
the said year 1700, although such action may not have been confirmed by my royal person, or by a viceroy or president, they
shall in no wise be molested, but shall be left in the full and quiet possession of the same; nor shall they be required to pay
any fee on account of these proceedings, in accordance with law 15, title 12, book 4 of the Recopilacion de los Indias, above
cited. A note shall be made upon said title deeds to the effect that his obligation has been complied with, to the end that the
owners of such rival lands and their successors may hereafter be free from denunciation, summons, or other disturbance in
their possession.

Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession,
as a valid title by prescription; provided, however, that if the lands shall not be in state of cultivation or tillage, the term of three
months prescribed by law 11 of the title and book cited, or such other period as may be deemed adequate, shall be
designated as the period within which the lands must be reduced to cultivation, with the warning that in case of their failure so
to do the lands will be granted, with the same obligation to cultivate them, to whomsoever may denounce them.
 5. Likewise neither shall possessors of lands sold or adjusted by the various subdelegates from the year 1700 to the present
time be molested, disturbed, or denounced, now or at any other time, with respect to such possession, if such sales or
adjustments shall have been confirmed by me, or by the viceroy or the president of the court of the district in which the lands
are located while authorized to exercise this power. In cases where the sales of adjustments shall not have been so
confirmed, the possessors will present to the courts of their respective district and to the other officials hereby empowered to
receive the same, a petition asking for the confirmation of said sales and adjustments. After the proceedings outlined by the
subdelegates in their order with respect to the measurement and valuation of the said lands, and with reference to the title
issued therefor, shall have been duly completed, said courts and officials will make an examination of the same for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the sale or adjustment has been made without fraud and collusion, and for an adequate and
equitable price, and a similar examination shall be made by the prosecuting attorney of the district, to the end that, in view of
all the proceedings and the purchase or adjustment price of the land, and the media anata having been duly, etc., paid into the
royal treasury, as well as such additional sum as may be deemed proper, there will be issued to the possessor, in my royal
name, a confirmation of his title, by virtue of which his possession and ownership of lands and waters which it represents will
be fully legalized, to the end that at no time will he or his heirs or assigns be disturbed or molested therein.

The wording of this law is much stronger than that of law 14. As is seen by the terms of article 3, any person whatever who occupied
any public land was required to present the instruments by virtue of which he was in possession, within a time to be fixed by the
authorities, and he was warned that if he did not do so he would be evicted from his land and it would be granted to others. By terms of
article 4 those possessors to whom grants had been made prior to 1700, were entitled to have such grants confirmed, and it was also
provided that not being able to prove any grants it should be sufficient to prove "that ancient possession," as a sufficient title by
prescription, and they should be confirmed in their holdings. "That ancient possession" would be at least fifty-four years, for it would
have to date from prior to 1700. Under article 5, where the possession dated from 1700, no confirmation could be granted on proof of
prescription alone.

The length of possession required to be proved before the Government would issue a deed has varied in different colonies and at
different times. In the Philippines, as has been seen, it was at one time ten years, at another time fifty-four years at least. In Cuba, by
the royal cedula of April 24, 1833, to obtain a deed one had to prove, as to uncultivated lands, a possession of one hundred years, and
as to cultivated lands a possession of fifty years. In the same islands, by the royal order of July 16, 1819, a possession of forty years
was sufficient.

In the Philippines at a later date royal of September 21, 1797 (4 Legislacion Ultramarina, Rodriguez San Pedro, p. 688), directed the
observation of the said royal cedula of 1754, but apparently without being subject to the period of prescription therein assigned.

The royal order of July 5, 1862 (Gaceta de Manila, November 15, 1864), also ordered that until regulations on the subject could be
prepared the authorities of the Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and the
said royal cedula of 1754.

The royal order of November 14, 1876 (Guia del Comprador de Terrenos, p. 51), directed the provincial governors to urge those in
unlawful possession of public lands to seek an adjustment with the State in accordance with the existing laws. The regulations as to the
adjustment (composicion) of the titles to public lands remained in this condition until the regulations of June 25, 1880. This is the most
important of the modern legislative acts upon the matter of "adjustment" as distinguished from that of the sale of the public lands.

The royal degree approving these regulations is dated June 25, 1880, and is as follows:1

Upon the suggestion of the colonial minister, made in conformity with the decree of the full meeting of the council of state, I
hereby approve the attached regulations for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the
Philippine Islands.

Articles 1, 4, 5, 8, and part of article 6 are as follows:

ART. 1. For the purpose of these regulations and in conformity with law 14, title 12, book 4 of the Recompilation of Laws of the
Indies, the following will be regarded as royal lands: All lands whose lawful ownership is not vested in some private, persons,
or, what is the same thing, which have never passed to private ownership by virtue of cession by competent authorities, made
either gratuitously or for a consideration.
 ART. 4. For all legal effects, those will be considered proprietors of the royal lands herein treated who may prove that they
have possessed the lands without interruption during the period of ten years, by virtue of a good title and in good faith.

ART. 5. In the same manner, those who without such title deeds may prove that they have possessed their said lands without
interruption for a period of twenty years if in a state of cultivation, or for a period of thirty years if uncultivated, shall be
regarded as proprietors thereof. In order that a tract of land may be considered cultivated, it will be necessary to show that it
has been broken within the last three years.

ART. 6. Interested parties not included within the two preceding articles may legalize their possession and thereby acquire the
full ownership of the said lands, by means of adjustment proceedings, to be conducted in the following manner: . . .

(5) Those who, entirely without title deeds, may be in possession of lands belonging to the State and have reduced said lands
to a state of cultivation, may acquire the ownership thereof by paying into the public treasury the value of the lands at the time
such possessors or their representatives began their unauthorized enjoyment of the same.

(6) In case said lands shall never have been ploughed, but are still in a wild state, or covered with forest, the ownership of the
same may be acquired by paying their value at the time of the filing of the claim, as stated in the fourth paragraph."

ART. 8. If the interested parties shall not ask an adjustment of the lands whose possession they are unlawfully enjoying within
the time of one year, or, the adjustment having been granted by the authorities, they shall fail to fulfill their obligation in
connection with the compromise, by paying the proper sum into the treasury, the latter will, by virtue of the authority vested in
it, reassert the ownership of the State over the lands, and will, after fixing the value thereof, proceed to sell at public auction
that part of the same which either because it may have been reduced to cultivation or is not located within the forest zone is
not deemed advisable to preserve as the State forest reservation.

The other articles of the regulations state the manner in which applications should be made for adjustment, and the proceedings
thereon.

Do these regulations declare that those who are included in article 4 and 5 are the absolute owners of the land occupied by them
without any action on their part, or that of the State, or do they declare that such persons must seek an adjustment and obtain a deed
from the State, and if they do not do so within the time named in article 8 they lose all interest in the lands?

It must be admitted from the wording of the law that the question is not free from doubt. Upon a consideration, however, of the whole
matter, that doubt must, we think, be resolved in favor of the State. The following are some of the reasons which lead us to that
conclusion:

(1) It will be noticed that article 4 does not say that those persons shall be considered as owners who have occupied the lands for ten
years, which would have been the language naturally used if an absolute grant had been intended. It says, instead, that those shall be
considered owners who may prove that they have been in possession ten years. Was this proof to be made at any time in the future
when the question might arise, or was it to be made in the proceedings which these very regulations provided for that purpose? We
think that the latter is the proper construction.

(2) Article 1 declares in plain terms that all those lands as to which the State has never executed any deeds are the property of the
State that is, that on June 25, 1880, no public lands belonged to individuals unless they could exhibit a State deed therefor. This is
entirely inconsistent with the idea that the same law in its article 4 declares that the lands in question in this case became the property
of the plaintiffs in 1870, and were not in 1880 the property of the State, though the State had never given any deed for them.

(3) The royal decree, by its terms, relates to lands wrongfully withheld by private persons. The word detentados necessarily implies
this. This is inconsistent with the idea that by article 4 of the plaintiffs, in 1870, became the absolute owners of the lands in question,
and were not therefore, in 1880, withholding what did not belong to them.

(4) In the preface to this decree and regulations, the following language is used:

SIR: The uncertain, and it may be said the precarious, state of real property in various parts of the Philippine Islands, as yet
sparsely populated; the necessity for encouraging the cultivation of these lands; the advantage of increasing the wealth and
 products of the Archipelago; the immense and immediate profit which must result to all classes of interests, public as well as
private, from the substitution of full ownership, with all the privileges which by law accompany this real right, for the mere
possession of the lands, have long counseled the adoption of the provisions contained in the following regulations, which,
after consulation with the Philippine council, and in conformity with an order passed at a full meeting of the council of state, the
subscribing minister has the honor to submit for the royal approval. These regulations refer not only to tenants of royal lands in
good faith and by virtue of a valid title, but also to those who, lacking these, may, either by themselves reducing such lands to
cultivation or by the application of intelligence and initiative, causing their cultivation by others who lack these qualities, be
augmenting the wealth of the Archipelago.2

This preface is the most authoritative commentary on the law, and shows without doubt that those who held with color of title and good
faith were, notwithstanding, holding wrongfully, and that true ownership should be substituted for their possession.

(5) This doubt suggested by the wording of the law was the subject of inquiries directed to the officers in Manila charged with its
execution. These inquiries were answered in the circular of August 10, 1881, published in the Gaceta de Manila August 11, 1881, as
follows:

Should possessors of royal lands under color of title and in good faith seek adjustment?

It is evident that they must do so, for it is to them that article 4 of the regulations refers, as also the following article covers
other cases of possession under different circumstances. It should be well understood by you, and you should in turn have it
understood by other, that the adjustment of lands whose ownership has not passed to private individuals by virtue of cession
by competent authorities, is optional only for those within the limits of the common district (legua comunal) as provided by
article 7. In all other cases where the interested parties shall fail to present themselves for the adjustment of the lands
occupied by them shall suffer the penalties set forth in article 8 of said regulations.

In determining the meaning of a law where a doubt exists the construction placed upon it by the officers whose duty it is to administer it
is entitled to weight.

(6) There is, moreover, legislative construction of these regulations upon this point found in subsequent laws. The royal decree of
December 26, 1884, (Berriz Anuario, 1888, p. 117), provides in articles 1 that

All those public lands wrongfully withheld by private person in the Philippines which, in accordance with the regulations of
June 25, 1880, are subject to adjustment with the treasury, shall be divided into three groups, of which the first shall include
those which, because they are included in articles 4 and 5, and the first paragraph of article 7, are entitled to free adjustment.

There were exceptions to this rule which are not here important. Article 10 provides that if the adjustment is free for those mentioned in
articles 4 and 5, who are included in the second group, the deed shall be issued by the governor of the province. Article 11 says that if
the adjustment is not free, because the applicant has not proved his right by prescription, then no deed can be issued until the proper
payment has been made. The whole decree shows clearly that the legislator intended that those mentioned in article 4 and 5 should
apply for a confirmation of their titles by prescription, as well as those mentioned in article 6. In fact, for the adjustment of those of the
first group, which necessarily included only those found within articles 4 and 5, a board was organized (art. 15) in each pueblo whose
sole duty it was to dispatch applications made said two articles.

(7) The royal decree of August 31, 1888 (Berriz Anuario, 1888, p. 120), is another legislative construction of this regulation. That
decree repealed the decree of 1884, and divided all lands subjects to adjustment under the regulations of June 25, 1880, into two
groups. In the first group were all those lands which bordered at any points on other State lands, and those which, though not bordering
on State lands, measured more than 30 hectares. In the second group were those which were bounded entirely by lands of private
persons and did not exceed 30 hectares. For the second group a provincial board was organized, and article 10 provides a hearing
before this board, and declares

If no protest or claim shall be filed, and the adjustment must be free because the occupant has proved title by prescription, as
provided in articles 4 and 5 of the regulations promulgated June 25, 1880, the proceedings shall be duty approved, and the
head officer of the province will, in his capacity of deputy director general of the civil administration, issue the corresponding
title deed.
The policy pursued by the Spanish Government from the earliest times, requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain deeds therefor
from the State, has been continued by the American Government in Act No. 926, which takes effect when approved by Congress.
Section 54, sixth paragraph of that act, declares that the persons named in said paragraph 6 "shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and to have received the same." Yet such persons are required by section
56 to present a petition to the Court of Land Registration for a confirmation of these titles.

We have considered the regulations relating to adjustment that is, those laws under which persons in possession might perfect their
titles. But there were other laws relating to the sale of public lands which contained provisions fatal to the plaintiff's claims. The royal
decree of January 26, 1889 (Gaceta de Manila, March 20, 1889), approved the regulations for the sale of public lands in the
Philippines, and it was in accordance with such regulations that the appellee acquired his title. Article 4 of those regulations required
the publication in the Gaceta de Manila of the application to purchase, with a description of the lands, and gave sixty days within which
anyone could object to the sale. A similar notice in the dialect of the locality was required to be posted on the municipal building of the
town in which the land was situated, and to be made public by the crier. Articles 5 and 6 declared to whom such objections shall be
made and the course which they should take. Article 8 is as follows:

ART. 8. In no case will the judicial authorities take cognizance of the suit against the decrees of the civil administration
concerning the sale of royal lands unless the plaintiff shall attach to the complaint documents which show that he has
exhausted the administrative remedy. After the proceeding in the executive department shall have been terminated and the
matter finally passed upon, anyone considering his interests prejudiced thereby may commence a suit in the court against the
State; but in no case shall an action be brought against the proprietor of the land.

Similar provisions are found in the regulations of 1883, approved the second time by royal order of February 16 (Gaceta de Manila,
June 28, 1883). Articles 18 and 23 of said regulations are as follows:

ART. 18. Possessors of such lands as may fall within the class of alienable royal lands shall be obliged to apply for the
ownership of the same, or for the adjustment thereof within the term of sixty days from the time of the publication in the bulletin
of Sales of the notice of sale thereof.

ART. 23. The judicial authorities shall take cognizance of no complaint against the decrees of the treasury department
concerning the sale of lands pertaining to the state unless the complainant shall attached to the complaint documents which
proved that he has exhausted the administrative remedy.

This prohibition appears also in the royal order of October 26, 1881 (Gaceta de Manila, December 18, 1881) which relates evidently
both to sales of public lands and also to the adjustments with the occupants.

Article 5 of this royal order is as follows:

During the pendency of proceedings in the executive department with respect to grants of land, interested parties may present
through executive channels such protest as they may deemed advisable for the protection of their right and interests. The
proceeding having once been completed, and the grant made, those who consider their interests prejudiced thereby may
proceed in court against the State, but under no circumstances against the grantees of the land.

The American legislation creating the Court of Land Registration is but an application of this same principle. In both systems the title is
guaranteed to the petitioner, after examination by a tribunal. In Spanish system this tribunal was called an administrative one, in the
American a judicial one.

The court finds that the plaintiffs made a written protest against the sale to the defendants while the proceedings for the measurements
and survey of the land were being carried on, but that they did not follow up their protest. This, as held by the court below, is a bar their
recovery in this action, under the articles above cited.

The plaintiff state in their brief that a great fraud was committed on them and the State by the defendant in applying for the purchase of
this lands as vacant and belonging to the public, when they were in the actual adverse possession of the plaintiffs.

We have seen nothing in the regulations relating to the sale of the public lands which limited their force to vacant lands. On the contrary
there are provisions which indicate the contrary. In the application for the purchase the petitioner is article 3 of the regulations of 1889
required to state whether any portion of the land sought has been broken for cultivation, and to whom such improvements belong.
Article 9 provides that if one in possession applies to purchase the land, he renounces his right to a composicion under the laws
relating to that subject. By article 13 the report of the officials making the survey must contain a statement as to whether any part of the
land is cultivated or not and if the applicant claims to be the owner of such cultivated part.

In the regulations of January 19, 1883 (Gaceta de Manila, June 28, 1883) is the following article:

ART. 18. Possessors of such lands as may fall within the class of royal alienable lands shall be obliged to apply for the
ownership of the same, or for the adjustment thereof, within the term of sixty days from the time of the publication in the
Bulletin of Sales of the notice of sale thereof.

In view of all these provisions it seems impossible to believe that the legislators even intended to leave the validity of any sale made by
the State to be determined at any time in the future by the ordinary courts on parol testimony. Such would be the result if the contention
of the plaintiffs is to be sustained. According to their claim, this sale and every other sale made by the State can be set aside if at any
time in the future it can be proved that certain persons had been in possession of the land for the term then required for prescription.

If this claim is allowed it would result that even though written title from the State would be safe from such attack by parol evidence, by
means of such evidence damages could have been recovered against the State for lands sold by the State to which third persons
might thereafter prove ownership but prescription. The unreliability of parol testimony on the subject of possession is well known. In this
case in the report which the law required to be made before a sale could be had it is stated by an Ayudante de Montes that the tract
had an area of 429 hectares, 77 ares, and 96 centares uncultivated, and 50 hectares, 19 ares, and 73 centares broken for cultivation.
The official report also says (1890) that the breaking is recent. Notwithstanding this official report, the plaintiffs introduced evidence
from which the court found that the greater part of the tract had been occupied and cultivated by the plaintiffs since 1860.

It is hardly conceivable that the State intended to put in force legislation under which its property rights could be so prejudiced.

We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in these Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these
lands by prescription, without any action by the State, and that the judgment below declaring the defendant the owner of the lands must
be affirmed.

II. What has been said heretofore makes it unnecessary to consider the motion for a new trial, made by the defendant on the ground
that the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence.

III. The exception of the defendant to the order vacating the appointment of the receiver can not be sustained. The defendant at no time
made any showing sufficient to authorize the appointment of a receiver.

The case does not fall under No. 4 of section 174 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Neither party in his pleadings asked any relief as to
the crops. They were not, therefore, "the property which is the subject of litigation."

Neither does the case fall under No. 2 of section 174, for the same reason.

Moreover, under No. 2 it must be shown that the property is in danger of being lost. There was no showing of that kind. The pleadings
say nothing upon the subject. In the motion for the appointment of the receiver it said that the plaintiffs are insolvent. There is no
evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, to support this statement. A bare, unsworn statement in a motion that the adverse party is insolvent
is not sufficient to warrant a court in appointing a receiver for property in his possession.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed. Neither party can recover costs in this court.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Cooper, McDonough and Johnson, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-2468 July 16, 1906

MAGDALENA CANSINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
GERVASIO VALDEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Wade H. Kitchens, for appellants.

Isabelo Artacho, for appellees.

WILLARD, J.:

The decision in this case was announced on the 30th of April, 1906. The grounds of that decision are as follows: The case is almost
identical with the case of Valenton vs. Murciano1 (2 Off Gaz., 434), decided on the 30th of March, 1904. The similarity extends even to
the dates and to the location of the land, for we judge from the description of the property involved in this suit and the description of the
property involved in the case of Valenton vs. Murciano that they are two adjoining tracts of land, one situated in the Province of
Pangasinan and the other in the Province of Tarlac, the boundary line between the two tracts of land.

In the case of Valenton vs. Murciano, the defendant bought the land from the Spanish Government by a deed dated the 14th of July,
1892. In this case the plaintiff, Magdalena Cansino, bought the property in question, as public lands of the State from the Spanish
Government and received a deed therefor on the 27th of October, 1893. In the former case the plaintiffs went into possession of the
land in 1860 and claimed ownership thereof by the extraordinary prescription of thirty years. In this case some of the defendants
testified that they went into possession in 1862 and they claimed the ownership of this land by the same extraordinary prescription. In
either one of the cases did the occupants have any written title to the land.

In Valenton vs. Murciano we decided that title to lands such as were involved in that case could not be acquired by prescription while
they were the property of the State. The decision in that case governs and controls this case and upon its authority judgment in this
case was affirmed.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Carson, JJ., concur.

U.S. Supreme Court

Carino v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449 (1909)

Carino v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands

No. 72

Argued January 13, 1909

Decided February 23, 1909

212 U.S. 449

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Syllabus

Writ of error is the general, and appeal the exceptional, method of bringing Cases to this Court. The latter method is in the main
confined to equity cases, and the former is proper to bring up a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands affirming a
judgment of the Court of Land Registration dismissing an application for registration of land.
Although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No. 926 of 1903 of the Philippine Commission which provides for the
registration and perfecting of new titles, one who actually owns property in such province is entitled to registration under Act No. 496 of
1902, which applies to the whole archipelago.

While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations, sovereignty is absolute, practically it is a question of strength and of varying
degree, and it is for a new sovereign to decide how far it will insist upon theoretical relations of the subject to the former sovereign and
how far it will recognize actual facts.

The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands occupied by the inhabitants, and under the Organic Act
of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, providing that property rights are to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants, one who
actually owned land for many years cannot be deprived of it for failure to comply with certain ceremonies prescribed either by the acts
of the Philippine Commission or by Spanish law.

The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends
those safeguards to all.

Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many years, and against the government which seeks to
deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of a subsequently enacted registration act.

Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the Philippine Islands prior to their acquisition by the
United States, and one occupying land in the Province of Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is entitled to the
continued possession thereof.

7 Phil. 132 reversed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

This was an application to the Philippine Court of Land Registration for the registration of certain land. The application was granted by
the court on March 4, 1904. An appeal was taken to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Benguet on behalf of the government
of the Philippines, and also on behalf of the United States, those governments having taken possession of the property for public and
military purposes. The Court of First Instance found the facts and dismissed the application upon grounds of law. This judgment was
affirmed by the supreme court, 7 Phil. 132, and the case then was brought here by writ of error.

The material facts found are very few. The applicant and plaintiff in error is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies.
For more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, as far back as the findings go, the plaintiff and his ancestors had
held the land as owners. His grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle, according to
the custom of the country, some of the fences, it seems, having been of much earlier date. His father had cultivated parts and had used
parts for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had been recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he had
inherited or received the land from his father in accordance with Igorot custom. No document of title, however, had issued from the
Spanish Crown, and although, in 1893-1894 and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one under the royal decrees then in
force, nothing seems to have come of it, unless, perhaps, information that lands in Benguet could not be conceded until those to be
occupied for a sanatorium, etc., had been designated -- a purpose that has been carried out by the Philippine government and the
United States. In 1901, the plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him,
that process, however, establishing only a possessory title, it is said.

Before we deal with the merits, we must dispose of a technical point. The government has spent some energy in maintaining that this
case should have been brought up by appeal, and not by writ of error. We are of opinion, however, that the mode adopted was right.
The proceeding for registration is likened to bills in equity to quiet title, but it is different in principle. It is a proceeding in rem under a
statute of the type of the Torrens Act, such as was discussed in Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71. It is nearer to law than to
equity, and is an assertion of legal title; but we think it unnecessary to put it into either pigeon hole. A writ of error is the general method
of bringing cases to this Court, an appeal the exception, confined to equity in the main. There is no reason for not applying the general
rule to this case. Ormsby v. Webb, 134 U. S. 47, 134 U. S. 65; Campbell v. Porter, 162 U. S. 478; Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of
Columbia, 195 U. S. 322.
Another preliminary matter may as well be disposed of here. It is suggested that, even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it
registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its
operation. But that act deals with the acquisition of new titles by homestead entries, purchase, etc., and the perfecting of titles begun
under the Spanish law. The applicant's claim is that he now owns the land, and is entitled to registration under the Philippine
Commission's Act No. 496, of 1902, which established a court for that purpose with jurisdiction "throughout the Philippine Archipelago,"
2, and authorized in general terms applications to be made by persons claiming to own the legal estate in fee simple, as the applicant
does. He is entitled to registration if his claim of ownership can be maintained.

We come, then, to the question on which the case was decided below -- namely, whether the plaintiff owns the land. The position of the
government, shortly stated, is that Spain assumed, asserted, and had title to all the land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to
permit private titles to be acquired; that there was no prescription against the Crown, and that, if there was, a decree of June 25, 1880,
required registration within a limited time to make the title good; that the plaintiff's land was not registered, and therefore became, if it
was not always, public land; that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and so that the plaintiff has no rights that the
Philippine government is bound to respect.

If we suppose for the moment that the government's contention is so far correct that the Crown of Spain in form asserted a title to this
land at the date of the Treaty of Paris, to which the United States succeeded, it is not to be assumed without argument that the
plaintiff's case is at an end. It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from
the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded
to those in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true also that, in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against
foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants
of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of
strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the
past, and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide.

The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor General, in his argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never
was brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials
would not have granted to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish laws, and
which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain, it does not follow
that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his land.
The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles throughout an important part of the island of Luzon, at least, for
the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to enforce.

The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United States. Whatever consideration may have
been shown to the North American Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy the land. It is obvious that,
however stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent
with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their
country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 12, 32 Stat. 691, all the property and rights acquired there by the
United States are to be administered "for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof." It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus
assumed by the United States with regard to what was unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its
own. The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those
safeguards to all. It provides that "no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws."

5. In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was ready to declare in the
next breath that "any person" did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had become
such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land
what they, by native custom and by long association -- one of the profoundest factors in human thought -- regarded as their own.

It is true that, by 14, the government of the Philippines is empowered to enact rules and prescribe terms for perfecting titles to public
lands where some, but not all, Spanish conditions had been fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives for not more than sixteen hectares
of public lands actually occupied by the native or his ancestors before August 13, 1898. But this section perhaps might be satisfied if
confined to cases where the occupation was of land admitted to be public land, and had not continued for such a length of time and
under such circumstances as to give rise to the understanding that the occupants were owners at that date. We hesitate to suppose
that it was intended to declare every native who had not a paper title a trespasser, and to set the claims of all the wilder tribes afloat. It
is true again that there is excepted from the provision that we have quoted as to the administration of the property and rights acquired
by the United States such land and property as shall be designated by the President for military or other reservations, as this land since
has been. But there still remains the question what property and rights the United States asserted itself to have acquired.

Whatever the law upon these points may be, and we mean to go no further than the necessities of decision demand, every
presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that
when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be
presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly, in a
case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt. Whether justice
to the natives and the import of the organic act ought not to carry us beyond a subtle examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even
beyond the attitude of Spanish law, humane though it was, it is unnecessary to decide. If, in a tacit way, it was assumed that the wild
tribes of the Philippines were to be dealt with as the power and inclination of the conqueror might dictate, Congress has not yet
sanctioned the same course as the proper one "for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof."

If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us
that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate
pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not
assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers, or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, Title
12, Law 14 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, while it
commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by
good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles
in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the
powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their books.

Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited in 3 Phil. 546:

"Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a
valid title by prescription."

It may be that this means possession from before 1700; but, at all events, the principle is admitted. As prescription, even against Crown
lands, was recognized by the laws of Spain, we see no sufficient reason for hesitating to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines
in regard to lands over which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.

The question comes, however, on the decree of June 25, 1880, for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private
individuals in the Philippine Islands. This begins with the usual theoretic assertion that, for private ownership, there must have been a
grant by competent authority; but instantly descends to fact by providing that, for all legal effects, those who have been in possession
for certain times shall be deemed owners. For cultivated land, twenty years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, thirty. Art. 5. So
that, when this decree went into effect, the applicant's father was owner of the land by the very terms of the decree. But, it is said, the
object of this law was to require the adjustment or registration proceedings that it described, and in that way to require everyone to get
a document of title or lose his land. That purpose may have been entertained, but it does not appear clearly to have been applicable to
all. The regulations purport to have been made "for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals." (We follow
the translation in the government's brief.) It does not appear that this land ever was royal land or wrongfully occupied. In Article 6, it is
provided that "interested parties not included within the two preceding articles [the articles recognizing prescription of twenty and thirty
years] may legalize their possession, and thereby acquire the full ownership of the said lands, by means of adjustment proceedings, to
be conducted in the following manner."

This seems, by its very terms, not to apply to those declared already to be owners by lapse of time. Article 8 provides for the case of
parties not asking an adjustment of the lands of which they are unlawfully enjoying the possession, within one year, and threatens that
the treasury "will reassert the ownership of the state over the lands," and will sell at auction such part as it does not reserve. The
applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his father ever was made. Finally, it
should be noted that the natural construction of the decree is confirmed by the report of the council of state. That report puts forward as
a reason for the regulations that, in view of the condition of almost all property in the Philippines, it is important to fix its status by
general rules on the principle that the lapse of a fixed period legalizes completely all possession, recommends in two articles twenty
and thirty years, as adopted in the decree, and then suggests that interested parties not included in those articles may legalize their
possession and acquire ownership by adjustment at a certain price.
It is true that the language of Articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those "who may prove" possession for the necessary time, and we do
not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the
notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words "may prove" (acrediten), as well, or
better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.

The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law. The royal decree of February 13, 1894, declaring forfeited titles that were capable of adjustment under the decree of 1880,
for which adjustment had not been sought, should not be construed as a confiscation, but as the withdrawal of a privilege. As a matter
of fact, the applicant never was disturbed. This same decree is quoted by the Court of Land Registration for another recognition of the
common law prescription of thirty years as still running against alienable Crown land.

It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem not without difficulties for courts of a
different legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act
of Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case, we are of opinion
that law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice
and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.

Judgment reversed.

G.R. No. L-2506 April 16, 1906

F. STEWART JONES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General, for appellant.

Pillsbury and Sutro, for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

On the 16th day of January, 1904 F. Stewart Jones presented a petition to the Court of Land Registration asking that he be inscribed
as the owner of a certain tract of land situatd in the Province of Benguet, and within the reservation defined in Act No. 636. The
Solicitor-General appeared in the court below and opposed the inscription upon the ground that the property was public land. At the
trial he objected to any consideration of the case on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to register land situated in that
reservation. The objections were overruled and judgment entered in favor of the petitioner, from which judgment the Government
appealed to this court.

The act creating the Court of Land Registration (No. 496) gave it jurisdiction throughout the Archipelago. By Act No. 1224, which was
approved August 31, 1904, and which applied to pending cases, the court was deprived of jurisdiction over lands situated in the
Province of Benguet. That act, however, contained a proviso by which the court was given jurisdiction over applications for registration
of title to land in all cases coming within the provisions of Act No. 648. Act No. 648 provides in its first section that

The Civil Governor is hereby authorized and empowered by executive order to reserve from settlement or public sale and for
specific public uses any of the public domain in the Philippine Islands the use of which is not otherwise directed by law.

Section 2 provides: "Whenever the Civil Governor, in writing, shall certify that all public lands within limits by him described in the
Philippine Islands are reserved for civil public uses, either of the Insular Government, or of any provincial or municipal government, and
shall give notice thereof to the judge of the Court of Land Registration, it shall be the duty of the judge of said court" to proceed in
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 627. Act No. 627, which relates to military reservations, provides that when notice is given to
the Court of Land Registration of the fact that any land has been so reserved, it shall be the duty of the court to issue notice that claims
for all private lands within the limits of the reservation must be presented for registration under the Land Registration Act within six
months from the date of issuing such notice, and that all lands not so presented within said time would be conclusively adjudged to be
public lands, and all claims on the part of private individuals for such lands, not so presented, would be forever barred.
On the 26th day of August, 1903, the following letter was directed by Governor Taft to the judge of the Court of Land Registration:

SIR: You are hereby notified, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 648, entitled "An act authorizing the Civil Governor
to reserve for civil public purposes, and from sale or settlement, any part of the public domain not appropriated by law for
special public purposes, until otherwise directed by law, and extending the provisions of Act Numbered Six hundred and
twenty-seven so that public lands desired to be reserved by the Insular Government for public uses, or private lands desired to
be purchased by the Insular Government for such uses, may be brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act;"
that the Philippine Commission has reserved for civil public uses of the Government of the Philippine Islands the lands
described in Act No. 636, entitled "An act creating a Government reservation at Baguio, in the Province of Benguet," enacted
February 11, 1903.

It is therefore requested that the land mentioned be forthwith brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act and
become registered land in the meaning thereof, and that you proceed in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 648.

Very respectfully,
(Signed)WM. H. TAFT,
"Civil Governor."

The court of Land Registration, acting upon this notice from the Governor, issued the notice required by Act No. 627, and in pursuance
of that notice Jones, the appellee, within the six months referred to in the notice, presented his petition asking that the land be
registered in his name.

The first claim of the Government is that the provisions of Act No. 648 were not complied with in the respect that this letter of the
Governor did not amount to a certificate that the lands had been reserved. The Solicitor-General says in his brief:

To bring these lands within the operation of section 2 of Act No. 648 it was necessary for the Civil Governor first to certify that
these lands were reserved for public uses, and second to give notice thereof to the Court of Land Registration.

We do not think that this contention can be sustained. Act No. 648 conferred power upon the Governor to reserve lands for public
purposes, but it did not make that power exclusive. The Commission did not thereby deprive itself of the power to itself make
reservations in the future, if it saw fit; neither did it intend to annul any reservations which it had formerly made. The contention of the
Government is true when applied to a case where the land has not been reserved by the Commission. In such a case it would be the
duty of the Governor to first reserve it by an executive order, and then to give notice to the Court of Land Registration, but where the
land had already been reserved by competent authority, it not only was not necessary for the Governor to issue any executive order
reserving the land but he had no power to do so. In such cases the only duty imposed upon him was to give notice to the Court of Land
Registration that the land had been reserved. This notice was given in the letter above quoted. The court had jurisdiction to try the
case.

The petitioner Jones, on the 1st day of May, 1901, bought the land in question from Sioco Cario, an Igorot. He caused his deed to the
land to be recorded in the office of the registrar of property on the 8th day of May of the same year. Prior thereto, and while Sioco
Cario was in possession of the land, he commenced proceedings in court for the purpose of obtaining a possessory information in
accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law. This possessory information he caused to be recorded in the office of the registrar
of property on the 12th day of March, 1901.

The evidence shows that Sioco Cario was born upon the premises in question; that his grandfather, Ortega, during the life of the
latter, made a gift of the property to Sioco. This gift was made more than twelve years before the filing of the petition in this case that
is, before the 16th day of January, 1904. Sioco's grandfather, Ortega, was in possession of the land at the time the gift was made, and
has been in possession thereof for many years prior to said time. Upon the gift being made Sioco took possession of the property, and
continued in such possession until his sale to Jones, the petitioner. Since such sale Jones has been in possession of the land, and is
now in such possession. For more than twelve years prior to the presentation of the petition the land had been cultivated by the owners
thereof, and the evidence is sufficient, in our opinion, to bring the case within section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to show
such an adverse possession thereof for ten years as is required by the section. The evidence of Sioco Carino shows that what he did in
the way of presenting a petition to the Spanish Government in regard to a deed of the land was done by order of the then comandante,
and was limited to securing a measurement thereof, as he then believed. These acts did not interrupt the running of the statute of
limitations.
Acts Nos. 627 and 648 provide that the provisions of section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall be applicable to all proceedings
taken under either one of these acts. These acts in effect provide that in determining whether the applicant is the owner of the land or
not, the general statute of limitations shall be considered, and shall be applied against the Government. The evidence showing, as we
have said, such an adverse possession, the petitioner proved his ownership of the land if the Commission had authority to make the
statute of limitations applicable to these proceedings.

The claim of the Government is that this provision is void; that the act thereby disposes of public lands; that Congress is the only
authority that can take such action, and that it has never authorized or approved the action of the Commission in applying the statute of
limitations to proceedings under Acts Nos. 648 and 627. We do not think that this contention can be sustained. Section 12 of the act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, provides as follows:

SEC. 12. That all the property and rights which may have been acquired in the Philippine Islands by the United States under
the treaty of peace with Spain, signed December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, except such land or other property
as shall be designated by the President of the United States for military and other reservations of the Government of the
United States, are hereby placed under the control of the Government of said Islands, to be administered for the benefit of the
inhabitants thereof, except as provided in this act.

This gives the Government of the Philippine Islands power to dispose of these lands, and of all public lands, and to pass the law in
question, unless there is some provision in other parts of the act of July 1, 1902, which takes away or limits that power. The
government says that such limitation is found in section 13 of the act. That section and sections 14 and 15 are as follows:

SEC. 13. That the Gonvernment of the Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of this Act and except as herein provided,
shall classify according to its agricultural character and productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and regulations for
the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands, but such rules and regulations shall
not go into effect or have the force of law until they have received the approval of the President, and when approved by the
President they shall be submitted by him to Congress at the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and unless
disapproved or amended by Congress at said session they shall at the close of such period have the force and effect of law in
the Philippine Islands: Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not exceed sixteen hectares in extent.

SEC. 14. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered to enact rules and regulations
and to prescribe terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their title to public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the
transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions required by the Spanish laws
and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title; and
the Philippine Commission is authorized to issue patents, without compensation, to any native of said Islands, conveying title
to any tract of land not more than sixteen hectares in extent, which were public lands and had been actually occupied by such
native or his ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.

SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered, on such terms as it may
prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other
citizens of said Islands such parts and portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the United States
in said Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person, and for the sale and conveyance of
not more than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation or association of persons: Provided, That the grant
or sale of such lands, whether the purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments, shall be conditioned upon actual and
continued occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold for a period of not less than five years, during which
time the purchaser or grantee can not alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to
transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the estates of decedents.

It is first to be noted that section 13 does not apply to all lands. Timber and mineral lands are expressly excluded. If the Commission
should pass laws relating to mineral lands without submitting them to Congress, as it has done (Act No. 624), their validity would not be
determined by inquiring if they had been submitted to Congress under section 13, but rather by inquiring if they were inconsistent with
other provisions of the act relating to mineral lands. In other words, the fact that such laws were not submitted to Congress would not
necessarily make them void.

The same is true of legislation relating to coal lands, as to which sections 53 and 57 contain provisions. By section 57 this Government
is authorized to issue all needful rules and regulations for carrying into effect this and preceding sections relating to mineral lands. Such
regulations need not be submitted to Congress for its approval. Act No. 1128, relating to coal lands, was not submitted.
The act of Congress also contains provisions regarding the purchase of lands beloning to religious orders. Section 65 provides as to
those lands as follows:

SEC. 65. That all lands acquired by virtue of the preceding section shall constitute a part and portion of the public property of
the Government of the Philippine Islands, and may be held, sold, and conveyed, or leased temporarily for a period not
exceeding three years after their acquisition by said Government, on such terms and conditions as it may prescribe, subject to
the limitations and conditions provided for in this Act. . . . Actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by
the Government shall have the preference over all others to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings within such reasonable
time as may be determined by said Government.

Does the clause "subject to the limitations and conditions of this act" require a submission to Congress of legislation concerning such
land? If it does, then Act No. 1120, which contains such provisions, is void, because it was never so submitted.

Section 18 of the act of Congress provides as follows:

That the forest laws and regulations now in force in the Philippine Islands, with such modifications and amendments as may
be made by the Government of said Islands, are hereby continued in force.

Must these modifications and amendments be submitted to Congress for its approval? If they must be, then Act No. 1148, relating
thereto, is void, because it was not so submitted.

It seems very clear that rules and regulations concerning mineral, timber, and coal lands, and lands bought from religious orders need
not be submitted to Congress. If they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the act of Congress relating to the same subjects, they
are valid.

Congress, by section 12 of the act, gave to the Philippine Government general power all property acquired from Spain. When it
required the Commision to immediately classify the agricultural lands and to make rules and regulations for their sale, we do not think
that it intended to virtually repeal section 12. Such, however, would be the effect of the rule contended for by the Govenrment. If,
notwithstanding the provisions of section 12, any law which in any way directly or indirectly affects injuriously the title of the
Government to public lands must be submitted to the President and Congress for approval, the general power given by section 12 is
taken away. An examination of some of the laws of the Commission will show that a holding such as is contended for by the
Government in this case would apparently require a holding that such other laws were also void. Act No. 496, which established the
Court of Land Registration, the court that tried this case, provides in section 38 that the decrees of the court shall be conclusive on and
against all persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof. Neither the President nor Congress ever gave their
consent to this law. They never consented that the title of the Government to public lands should be submitted to the judgment of the
courts of the Islands. That this law provides a means by which the Government may be deprived of its property in such lands is
apparent. In this very case, if the Government had not appealed from the judgment, or if it should withdraw its appeal, the lands would
be lost to it--lands which the Attorney-General claims are public lands. The land could not be more effectually lost by the law shortening
the statute of limitations than by this law making the decrees of the Court of Land Registration binding on the Government. In fact, the
former law could not in any way prejudice the Government if it were not for the latter law making the judgments of this court binding
upon it. Both of these laws in an indirect way affect the title to public lands, but we do not think that for that reason they are included in
the terms "rules and regulations" used in section 13 of the act of Congress.

Act No. 1039 granted to the Province of Cavite and to the pueblo of Cavite certain public lands. This act never was submitted either to
the President or Congress. Acts Nos. 660 and 732 authorized the leasing of parts of the San Lazaro estate. The Government leased
the sanitarium at Benguet, and provided for its sale. None of these acts were ever submitted to the President or Congress, which
authorized such disposition. The Government owns many isolated tracts of land, such as the Oriente Hotel, for example. It has
reclaimed from the sea a large tract of land in connection with the works of the port of Manila. If the Government should desire to sell
this reclaimed land or to lease a part of it for the site of an hotel, or should desire to sell the Oriente Hotel building, we do not think
legislation to accomplish such purposes would require the previous approval of the President and of Congress. The general purpose of
section 13 was to require the Government to classify agricultural lands and to pass a homestead law that is, a law which would state
the rules and regulations by virtue of which title to the public lands of which it can be decided in every case whether an act of the
Commission constitutes a rule or regulation within the meaning of section 13. It is sufficient to say that the law in question (Act No.
648), making a statute of limitations run against the Government when the title to few scattered tracts of land throughout the
Archipelago is under consideration, is not such a rule or regulations as required previous submission to the President and Congress. It
will be observed that be section 86 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, Congress reserves the right to annul all legislation of the
Commission.

There is nothing in section 14 which requires the rules and regulations therein mentioned to be submitted to Congress. But it is said
that although as to Act No. 648 submission to Congress was not required, it is nevertheless void when applied to one not a native of
the Islands, because forbidden by this section; and that this section limits the power of the Commission to declare possession alone
sufficient evidence of title to cases in which the claimant is native and in which the amount of land does not exceed 16 hectares.

Section 14 is not limited to agricultural lands, as are sections 13 and 15. It includes mineral and timber lands. So far as it relates to
proceedings theretofore taken under Spanish laws its benefits are not limited to natives of the Islands nor to tracts not more than 16
hectares in extent. Where the only claim is possession, no possession for any definite time prior to August 13, 1898, is required, nor is
proof of any possession whatever after that date demanded. According to the strict letter of the section a native would be entitled to a
patent who proved that he had been in possession for the months of July and August only of 1898. It is not stated whether or not one
who receives such a patent must occupy the land for five years thereafter, as required by section 15. Neither is it stated whether or not
a person who was in possession for the month of August, 1898, would be entitled to a patent in preference to the actual settler spoken
of in section 6. When legislating upon the subject-matter of section 14, the Commission, in Act No. 926, did not make such a limitation
as has been suggested. Section 54, paragraph 6, of that act is as follows:

All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural public land, as defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and
two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the
taking effect of this act, except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to
such land under the provision of this chapter.

It is seen that this section does not exclude foreigners, nor is it limited to tracts not exceeding 16 hectares in extent. To adopt the view
that the power of the Commission is so limited would require a holding that this section is void as to foreigners and as to all tracts of
land over 16 hectares in extent.

This paragraph of section 54 of Act No. 926 is in substance a continuation of Act No. 648 and an extension of its provisions to all the
lands of the Islands.

To adopt the construction contended for would lead to an unjust result. By the terms of the first part of section 14 the Commission has
the power to perfect the title to 100 hectares of land as to which a Spaniards may have done nothing more than to file an application
relating thereto, and of which he never was in possession, while by the last party of the section the Commission would be entirely
without power to make any rules by which a native who by himself and his ancestors had been in possession of 100 hectares. Such a
discrimination in favor of foreigners and against the natives could not have been intended. It could not have been the purpose of
Congress to give the Commission ample power to legislate for the benefit of foreigners and to limit its power to legislate for the benefit
of natives.

The meaning of these sections is not clear, and it is difficult to give to them a construction that will be entirely free from objection. But
we do not think that authority given by the Commission to issue to a native a patent for 16 hectares of land of which he was in
possession during the month of August, 1898, was intended to limit the general power of control which by section 12 is given to the
Commission.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance the appellant. After the expiration of twenty days let final
judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days thereafter let the cause be remanded to the lower court for proper
procedure. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Tracey, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925

VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.

Monico R. Mercado for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon
and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the
second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that
the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the
latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.

For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every allegation contained therein and, as special defense,
alleged that the land in question was a property of the Government of the United States under the administration and control of the
Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with law.

After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the
plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering
the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands
took this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the
plaintiff and defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled
to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the
ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale
be cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands.

The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and
Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been in possession thereof for
about eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to
Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi
had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the
sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia
and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except
during the revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidence introduced at the trial,
the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in
her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the
purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on
December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative
investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant
the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said
document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for
forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the
case being one of title to real property (Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.

With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the appellant in his assignments of error.lawphi1.net
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely,
and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is
controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela
Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his
predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he
sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that
it is beyond the reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of Cario vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449 1), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover,
the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession,
personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly
since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela
Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant
of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the
courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had
acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property,
at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to
Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was
void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.

The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to
recover possession thereof.lawphi1.net

If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private property of the
plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession thereof
and hold it.

For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without
special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-3793 February 19, 1908

CIRILO MAPA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellant.

Attorney-General Araneta for appellant.

Basilio R. Mapa for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

This case comes from the Court of Land Registration. The petitioner sought to have registered a tract of land of about 16 hectares in
extent, situated in the barrio of San Antonio, in the district of Mandurriao, in the municipality of Iloilo. Judgment was rendered in favor of
the petitioner and the Government has appealed. A motion for a new trial was made and denied in the court below, but no exception
was taken to the order denying it, and we therefore can not review the evidence.

The decision of that court was based upon Act No. 926 section 54, paragraph 6 which follows:

All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and
two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the
 taking effect of this act, except when prevented by war, or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
to such land under the provisions of this chapter.

The only question submitted to the court below or to this court by the Attorney-General is the question whether the land in controversy
is agricultural land within the meaning of the section above quoted. The findings of the court below upon that point are as follows:

From the evidence adduced it appears that the land in question is lowland, and has been uninterruptedly, for more than twenty
years, in the possession of the petitioner and his ancestors as owners and the same has been used during the said period,
and up to the present, as fish ponds, nipa lands, and salt deposits. The witnesses declare that the land is far from the sea, the
town of Molo being between the sea and the said land.

The question is an important one because the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined by said act of Congress of July 1, is found
not only in section 54 above quoted but in other parts of Act No. 926, and it seems that the same construction must be given to the
phrase wherever it occurs in any part of that law.

The claim of the Attorney-General seems to be that no lands can be called agricultural lands unless they are such by their nature. If the
contention of the Attorney-General is correct, and this land because of its nature is not agricultural land, it is difficult to see how it could
be disposed of or what the Government could do with it if it should be decided that the Government is the owner thereof. It could not
allow the land to be entered as a homestead, for Chapter I of Act No. 926 allows the entry of homesteads only upon "agricultural public
lands" in the Philippine Islands, as defined by the act of Congress of July 1, 1902. It could not sell it in accordance with the provisions
of Chapter II of Act No. 926 for section 10 only authorizes the sale of "unreserved nonmineral agricultural public land in the Philippine
Islands, as defined in the act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two." It could not lease it in accordance with the provisions
of Chapter III of the said act, for section 22 relating to leases limits them to "nonmineral public lands, as defined by section eighteen
and twenty of the act of Congress approved July first, nineteen hundred and two." It may be noted in passing that there is perhaps
some typographical or other error in this reference to sections 18 and 20, because neither one of these sections mentions agricultural
lands. The Government could not give a free patent to this land to a native settler, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV, for
that relates only to "agricultural public land, as defined by act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two."

In fact, by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 926, the Government could do nothing with this land except to lay out a town site thereon
in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V, for section 36 relating to that matter, says nothing about agricultural land.

The question before us is not what is agricultural land, but what definition has been given to that phrase by the act of Congress. An
examination of that act will show that the only sections thereof wherein can be found anything which could be called a definition of the
phrase are sections 13 and 15. Those sections are as follows:

SEC. 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of this act and except as herein provided,
shall classify according to its agricultural character and productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and regulations for
the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands, but such rules and regulations shall
not go into effect of have the force of law until they have received the approval of the President, and when approved by the
President they shall be submitted by him to Congress at the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and unless
disapproved or amended by Congress at said session they shall at the close of such period have the force and effect of law in
the Philippine Islands: Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not exceed sixteen hectares in extent.

SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered on such terms as it may
prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other
citizens of said Islands such parts and portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the United States
in said Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person and for the sale and conveyance of not
more than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation or association of persons: Provided, that the grant or
sale of such lands, whether the purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments shall be conditioned upon actual and
continued occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold for a period of not less than five years, during which
time the purchaser or grantee can not alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to
transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the estates of decedents.

It is seen that neither one of these sections gives any express definition of the phrase "agricultural land." In fact, in section 15 the word
"agricultural" does not occur.
There seem to be only three possible ways of deciding this question. The first is to say that no definition of the phrase "agricultural
land" can be found in the act of Congress; the second, that there is a definition of that phrase in the act and that it means land which in
its nature is agricultural; and, third, that there is a definition in the act and that the phrase means all of the public lands acquired from
Spain except those which are mineral or timber lands. The court below adopted this view, and held that the land, not being timber or
mineral land, came within the definition of agricultural land, and that therefore Section 54 paragraph 6, Act No. 926 was applicable
thereto.

1. There are serious objections to holding that there is no definition in the act of the phrase "agricultural land." The Commission in
enacting Act No. 926 expressly declared that such a definition could be found therein. The President approved this act and it might be
said that Congress, by failing to reject or amend it, tacitly approved it. Moreover, if it should be said that there is no definition in the act
of Congress of the phrase "agricultural land," we do not see how any effect could be given to the provisions of Act No. 916, to which we
have referred. If the phrase is not defined in the act of Congress, then the lands upon which homesteads can be granted can not be
determined. Nor can it be known what land the Government has the right to sell in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II, nor
what lands it can lease in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III, nor the lands for which it can give free patents to native settlers
in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV, and it would seem to follow, necessarily, that none of those chapters could be put into
force and that all that had up to this time been done by virtue thereof would be void.

2. The second way of disposing of the question is by saying that Congress has defined agricultural lands as those lands which are, as
the Attorney-General says, by their nature agricultural. As has been said before, the word "agricultural" does not occur in section 15.
Section 13 says that the Government "shall classify according to its agricultural character and productiveness and shall immediately
make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral land." This is the
same thing as saying that the Government shall classify the public lands other than timber or mineral lands according to its agricultural
character and productiveness; in other words, that it shall classify all the public lands acquired from Spain, and that this classification
shall be made according to the agricultural character of the land and according to its productiveness.

One objection to adopting this view is that it is so vague and indefinite that it would be very difficult to apply it in practice. What lands
are agricultural in nature? The Attorney-General himself in his brief in this case says:

The most arid mountain and the poorest soil are susceptible of cultivation by the hand of man.

The land in question in this case, which is used as a fishery, could be filled up and any kind of crops raised thereon. Mineral and timber
lands are expressly excluded, but it would be difficult to say that any other particular tract of land was not agricultural in nature. Such
lands may be found within the limits of any city. There is within the city of Manila, and within a thickly inhabited part thereof an
experimental far. This land is in its nature agricultural. Adjoining the Luneta, in the same city, is a large tract of land, Camp Wallace,
devoted to sports. The land surrounding the city walls of Manila, between them and the Malecon Drive on the west, the Luneta on the
south, and Bagumbayan Drive on the south and east, is of many hectares in extent and is in nature agricultural. The Luneta itself could
at any time be devoted to the growing of crops.

The objection to adopting this construction on account of its uncertainty is emphasized when we consider that whether certain land was
or was not agricultural land, as defined by the act of Congress, and therefore subject to homestead entry, to sale, or to lease in
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 926, would be a question that would finally have to be determined by the courts, unless there
is some express provision of the law authorizing the administrative officers to determine this question for themselves. Section 2 of Act
No. 926 relating to homesteads provides that the Chief of The Bureau of Public Lands shall summarily determine whether the land
described isprima facie under the law subject to homestead settlement. Section 13, relating to the sale of public lands, provides simply
that the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall determine from the certificate of the Chief of the Bureau of Forestry whether the land
applied for is more valuable for agricultural than for timber purposes, but it says nothing about his decisions as to whether it is or is not
agricultural land in its nature. Section 26 relating to the lease of public lands provides that the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall
determine from the certificate of the Chief of the Bureau of Forestry whether the land applied for is more valuable for agricultural than
for timber purposes and further summarily determine from available records whether the land is or is not mineral and does not contain
deposits of coal or salts. Section 34 relating to fee patents to native settlers makes no provision for any determination by the Chief of
Bureau of Public Lands in regard to the character of the land applied for.

After homesteads have been entered, lands, sold, and leases made by the administrative officers on the theory that the lands were
agricultural lands by their nature, to leave the matter of their true character open for subsequent action by the courts would be to
produce an evil that should if possible be avoided.
3. We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands," and after a careful
consideration of the question we are satisfied that the only definition which exists in said act is the definition adopted by the court
below. Section 13 says that the Government shall "Make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public
lands other than timber or mineral lands." To our minds, that is the only definition that can be said to be given to acricultural lands. In
other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not
timber or mineral lands. As was said in the case of Jones vs. The Insular Government (6 Phil Rep., 122, 133) where these same
section of the act of Congress were under discussion:

The meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult to give to them a construction that would be entirely free from
objection.

But the construction we have adopted, to our minds, is less objectionable than any other one that has been suggested.

There is nothing in this case of Jones vs. The Insular Government which at all conflicts with the result here arrived at. The question as
to whether the lands there involved were or were not agricultural lands within the meaning of the sections was neither discussed nor
decided. In fact, it appears from the decision that those lands, which were in the Province of Benguet, were within the strictest definition
of the phrase "agricultural lands." It appears that such lands had been cultivated for more than twelve years. What that case decided
was, not that the lands therein involved and other lands referred to in the decision by way of illustration were not agricultural lands but
that the law there in question and the other laws mentioned therein were not rules and regulations within the meaning of section 13.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., and Torres, J., concur.

Johnson, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

TRACEY, J., concurring:

By its title as well as throughout its text Act No. 926 is restricted to the "Public domain of the Philippine Islands" and to "public lands" in
said Islands. This act, drawn in furtherance of an act of Congress, must be interpreted according to the American understanding of the
words employed and the meaning of these terms as definitely fixed by decisions of the United States Supreme Court.

"Public domain" and "public lands" are equivalent terms. (Barker vs. Harvey, 181, U.S., 481, 490.

The words "public lands" are habitually used in our legislation to describe such as are subject to sale or other disposal under
general laws. (Newhall vs. Sanger, 92 U.S., 761)

A grant of public lands applies only to lands which at the time are free from existing claims. (Bardon vs. Northern Pacific R.R.
Co., 145 U.S., 535, 543.)

These words do not include land reserved for the use of certain Indian tribes, although still the property of the United States
(Leavenworth, etc., vs. United States, 92 U.S., 733), nor lands covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the tide. (Mann vs.
Tacoma Land Co., 153 U.S., 273.) And the same was held of the words "unoccupied and unappropriated public lands." (Shively vs.
Bowlby, 152 U.S., 1.)

In Wilcox vs. Jackson (13 Peters, 498, 513) it was held that whenever a tract of land has been legally appropriated to any purpose,
from that moment it becomes severed from the mass of public lands and no subsequent law will be construed to embrace it, although
no express reservation is made. There have been similar rulings in regard to reservations for military purposes, for town sites,
educational purposes, and for mineral and forest uses. Consequently Act No. 926 applies only to the lands of the United States in
these Islands not already devoted to public use or subject to private right, and this construction necessarily excludes from its scope
lands devoted to the use of municipalities, including public buildings and such tracts as Wallace Field and the strip surrounding the
walls of the City of Manila. As the act has no application to them, they are not public lands in this sense, and can not be included within
the term "agricultural public lands."

In referring to agricultural lands as being defined in the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Commission must have had in
mind this well-settled meaning of the terms employed and have used the word "agricultural" to distinguish and include such public
lands, not otherwise appropriated as, were not devoted to forestry and mining which is consistent with the direction of section 13 of the
act of Congress that public lands, other than timber or mineral lands, should be classified according to their agricultural character and
productiveness.

In view of the restricted scope of these statutes under the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, this direction as to the
classification of all remaining lands not forest or mineral in character, "according to their agricultural nature and productiveness," may
fairly be considered a definition of them as agricultural lands, with the result of freeing the act of the Commission from ambiguity.

It was apparently the intention of Congress that such classification, in a general way, should be immediately made, but the fact that it
has been delayed does not prevent the designation of any particular parcel of land, upon being granted by the Government, as coming
under one of these heads.

For these reason, I concur in the interpretation put upon this act in the majority opinion.

Carson, J., concurs.

G.R. No. L-13298 November 19, 1918

CORNELIO RAMOS, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, objector-appellee.

Basilio Aromin for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

This is an appeal by the applicant and appellant from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, denying the registration
of the larger portion of parcel No. 1 (Exhibit A of the petitioner), marked by the letters A, B, and C on the plan, Exhibit 1, of the
Government.

One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose,
Province of Nueva Ecija, in the year 1882. He took advantage of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, to obtain a possessory
information title to the land, registered as such on February 8, 1896. Parcel No. 1, included within the limits of the possessory
information title of Restituto Romero, was sold in February, 1907, to Cornelio Ramos, the instant petitioner, and his wife Ambrosia
Salamanca.

Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. Opposition was entered by the Director of Lands on the ground
that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government and by the Director of Forestry on the ground that the first
parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed with the objectors and excluded parcel No. 1 from registration. So much for the facts.

As to the law, the principal argument of the Solicitor-General is based on the provisions of the Spanish Mortgage Law and of the Royal
Decree of February 13, 1894, commonly known as the Maura Law. The Solicitor-General would emphasize that for land to come under
the protective gis of the Maura Law, it must have been shown that the land was cultivated for six years previously, and that it was not
land which pertained to the "zonas forestales." As proof that the land was, even as long ago as the years 1894 to 1896, forestal and not
agricultural in nature is the fact that there are yet found thereon trees from 50 to 80 years of age.

We do not stop to decide this contention, although it might be possible, following the doctrine laid down by the United States Supreme
Court with reference to Mexican and Spanish grantes within the United States, where some recital is claimed to be false, to say that the
possessory information, apparently having taken cognizance of the requisites for title, should not now be disturbed.
(Hancock vs. McKinney [1851], 7 Tex., 192; Hornsby and Roland vs.United States [1869], 10 Wall., 224.) It is sufficient, as will later
appear, merely to notice that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title.

Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as amended by Act No. 1908, reads as follows:

6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen
hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next
preceding the twenty-sixth day of July, nineteen hundred and four, except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the same,
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.

There are two parts to the above quoted subsection which must be discussed. The first relates to the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of what, for present purposes, can be conceded to be agricultural public land, under a bona fide
claim of ownership.

Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise
over his own property. Relative to actuality of possession, it is admitted that the petitioner has cultivated only about one fourth of the
entire tract. This is graphically portrayed by Exhibit 1 of the Government, following:

The question at once arises: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title sufficient to
give title to the entire tract of land?lawphil.net

The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a
tract under claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.
(Barr vs. Gratz's Heirs [1819], 4 Wheat., 213; Ellicott vs. Pearl [1836], 10 Pet., 412; Smith vs. Gale [1892], 144 U. S., 509.) Of course,
there are a number of qualifications to the rule, one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the
portion actually in possession of the claimant. It is here only necessary to apply the general rule.
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the
property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment. (See arts. 446, 448, Civil Code.)
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said
that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on the supposition that he premises
consisted of agricultural public land.

The second division of the law requires consideration of the term "agricultural public land." The law affirms that the phrase is denied by
the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, known as the Philippine bill. Turning to the Philippine Bill, we find in sections 13 to 18 thereof that
three classes of land are mentioned. The first is variously denominated "public land" or "public domain," the second "mineral land," and
the third "timber land." Section 18 of the Act of Congress comes nearest to a precise definition, when it makes the determination of
whether the land is more valuable for agricultural or for forest uses the test of its character.

Although these sections of the Philippine Bill have come before the courts on numerous occasions, what was said in the case of
Jones vs. Insular Government ([1906], 6 Phil., 122), is still true, namely: "The meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult to
give to them a construction that will be entirely free from objection." In the case which gave most serious consideration to the subject
(Mapa vs. Insular Government [1908], 10 Phil., 175), it was found that there does exist in the Act of Congress a definition of the phrase
"agricultural public lands." It was said that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as used in Act No. 926 means "those public lands
acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands."

The idea would appear to be to determine, by exclusion, if the land is forestal or mineral in nature and, if not so found, to consider it to
be agricultural land. Here, again, Philippine law is not very helpful. For instance, section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917
provides: "For the purposes of this chapter, 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land,
including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character." This definition of "public forest," it will be noted, is
merely "for the purposes of this chapter." A little further on, section 1827 provides: "Lands in public forests, not including forest
reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for
forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be
agricultural lands." With reference to the last section, there is no certification of the Director of Forestry in the record, as to whether this
land is better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.

The lexicographers define "forest" as "a large tract of land covered with a natural growth of trees and underbrush; a large wood." The
authorities say that he word "forest" has a significant, not an insignificant meaning, and that it does not embrace land only partly
woodland. It is a tract of land covered with trees, usually of considerable extent. (Higgins vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 114 N. Y.
Supp., 262; People vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 110 N. Y. Supp., 512.)

The foresters say that no legal definition of "forest" is practicable or useful. B. H. Baden-Powell, in his work on Forest Law of India,
states as follows:

Every definition of a forest that can be framed for legal purposes will be found either to exclude some cases to which the law
ought to apply, or on the other hand, to include some with which the law ought not to interfere. It may be necessary, for
example, to take under the law a tract of perfectly barren land which at present has neither trees, brushwood, nor grass on it,
but which in the course f time it is hoped will be "reboise;" but any definition wide enough to take in all such lands, would also
take in much that was not wanted. On the other hand, the definition, if framed with reference to tree-growth, might (and indeed
would be almost sure to) include a garden, shrubbery, orchard, or vineyard, which it was not designed to deal with.

B. E. Fernow, in his work on the Economics of Forestry, states as follows:

A forest in the sense in which we use the term, as an economic factor, is by no means a mere collection of trees, but an
organic whole in which all parts, although apparently heterogeneous, jumbled together by accident as it were and apparently
unrelated, bear a close relation to each other and are as interdependent as any other beings and conditions in nature.

The Director of Forestry of the Philippine Islands has said:

During the time of the passage of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, this question of forest and agricultural lands was
beginning to receive some attention and it is clearly shown in section 18 of the above mentioned Act; it leaves to the Bureau of
Forestry the certification as to what lands are for agricultural or forest uses. Although the Act states timber lands, the Bureau
has in its administration since the passage of this act construed this term to mean forest lands in the sense of what was
necessary to protect, for the public good; waste lands without a tree have been declared more suitable for forestry in many
instances in the past. The term 'timber' as used in England and in the United States in the past has been applied to wood
suitable for construction purposes but with the increase in civilization and the application of new methods every plant
producing wood has some useful purpose and the term timber lands is generally though of as synonymous with forest lands or
lands producing wood, or able to produce wood, if agricultural crops on the same land will not bring the financial return that
timber will or if the same land is needed for protection purposes.

xxx xxx xxx

The laws in the United States recognize the necessity of technical advice of duly appointed boards and leave it in the hands of
these boards to decide what lands are more valuable for forestry purposes or for agricultural purposes.

In the Philippine Islands this policy is follows to as great an extent as allowable under the law. In many cases, in the opinion of
the Bureau of Forestry, lands without a single tree on them are considered as true forest land. For instance, mountain sides
which are too steep for cultivation under ordinary practice and which, if cultivated, under ordinary practice would destroy the
big natural resource of the soil, by washing, is considered by this bureau as forest land and in time would be reforested. Of
course, examples exist in the Mountain Province where steep hillsides have been terraced and intensive cultivation practiced
but even then the mountain people are very careful not to destroy forests or other vegetative cover which they from
experience have found protect their water supply. Certain chiefs have lodged protests with the Government against other
tribes on the opposite side of the mountain cultivated by them, in order to prevent other tribes from cutting timber or destroy
cover guarding their source of water for irrigation.

Dr. M. S. Shaler, formerly Dean of the Lawrence Scientific School, remarked that if mankind could not devise and enforce
ways dealing with the earth, which will preserve this source of like "we must look forward to the time, remote it may be, yet
equally discernible, when out kin having wasted its great inheritance will fade from the earth because of the ruin it has
accomplished."

The method employed by the bureau of Forestry in making inspection of lands, in order to determine whether they are more
adapted for agricultural or forest purposes by a technical and duly trained personnel on the different phases of the
conservation of natural resources, is based upon a previously prepared set of questions in which the different characters of
the land under inspection are discussed, namely:

Slope of land: Level; moderate; steep; very steep.

Exposure: North; South; East; West.

Soil: Clay; sandy loam; sand; rocky; very rocky.

Character of soil cover: Cultivated, grass land, brush land, brush land and timber mixed, dense forest.

If cultivated, state crops being grown and approximate number of hectares under cultivation. (Indicate on sketch.)

For growth of what agricultural products is this land suitable?

State what portion of the tract is wooded, name of important timber species and estimate of stand in cubic meters per hectare,
diameter and percentage of each species.

If the land is covered with timber, state whether there is public land suitable for agriculture in vicinity, which is not covered with
timber.

Is this land more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes? (State reasons in full.)

Is this land included or adjoining any proposed or established forest reserve or communal forest? Description and ownership
of improvements.
 If the land is claimed under private ownership, give the name of the claimant, his place of residence, and state briefly (if
necessary on a separate sheet) the grounds upon which he bases his claim.

When the inspection is made on a parcel of public land which has been applied for, the corresponding certificate is forwarded
to the Director of Lands; if it is made on a privately claimed parcel for which the issuance of a title is requested from the Court
of Land Registration, and the inspection shows the land to be more adapted for forest purposes, then the Director of Forestry
requests the Attorney-General to file an opposition, sending him all data collected during the inspection and offering him the
forest officer as a witness.

It should be kept in mind that the lack of personnel of this Bureau, the limited time intervening between the notice for the trial
on an expediente of land and the day of the trial, and the difficulties in communications as well as the distance of the land in
question greatly hinder the handling of this work.

In the case of lands claimed as private property, the Director of Forestry, by means of his delegate the examining officer,
submits before the court all evidence referring to the present forest condition of the land, so that the court may compare them
with the alleged right by the claimant. Undoubtedly, when the claimant presents a title issued by the proper authority or
evidence of his right to the land showing that he complied with the requirements of the law, the forest certificate does not
affect him in the least as such land should not be considered as a part of the public domain; but when the alleged right is
merely that of possession, then the public or private character of the parcel is open to discussion and this character should be
established not simply on the alleged right of the claimant but on the sylvical condition and soil characteristics of the land, and
by comparison between this area, or different previously occupied areas, and those areas which still preserve their primitive
character.

Either way we look at this question we encounter difficulty. Indubitably, there should be conservation of the natural resources of the
Philippines. The prodigality of the spendthrift who squanders his substance for the pleasure of the fleeting moment must be restrained
for the less spectacular but surer policy which protects Nature's wealth for future generations. Such is the wise stand of our
Government as represented by the Director of Forestry who, with the Forester for the Government of the United States, believes in "the
control of nature's powers by man for his own good." On the other hand, the presumption should be, in lieu of contrary proof, that land
is agricultural in nature. One very apparent reason is that it is for the good of the Philippine Islands to have the large public domain
come under private ownership. Such is the natural attitude of the sagacious citizen.

If in this instance, we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the Government, in the long run of cases, has its
remedy. Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the
Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the
Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes. Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical
expert who speaks with authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director
of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.

We hold that the petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked registration, under the
provisions of subsection 6, of section 54, of Act No. 926, as amended by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and the
Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and his possessory information.

Judgment is reversed and the lower court shall register in the name of the applicant the entire tract in parcel No. 1, as described in plan
Exhibit A, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street and Fisher, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-25010 October 27, 1926

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PAULINO ABELLA, ET AL., claimants;
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, petitioner-appellant.

Francisco, Lualhati and Lopez for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

This is a petition for the registration of a certain parcel or tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija,
Philippine Islands. It appears from the record that on the 21st day of September, 1915, the appellant Maria del Rosario presented a
petition in the Court of First Instance for the registration under the Torrens system, of the very land now in question by virtue of her
appeal. In that case, after issue joined and after hearing the evidence, the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno, judge, denied the
registration of all of the northern portion of the land included in her petition represented by Exhibit 1, which was the plan presented in
that action, upon the ground that said portion was more valuable for timber purposes than for agricultural purposes. From that judgment
Maria del Rosario appealed.

The Supreme Court after a consideration of the evidence affirmed the decision of the lower court. In the course of that decision the
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Moir, said: "We have examined the plans and all the evidence presented in this case and
are of the opinion that the trial court was correct in its declaration that this send a did not mean the old road to Bogabon. The fact that
nearly all the northern property is forestry land is a further indication that the applicant's possessory information title did not include the
land running up to the road to Bongabon, because all the papers which the applicant has regarding this property call the
land palayero." 1

Judge Nepomuceno in his decision directed that the appellant herein present an amended plan in that case, showing the particular part
or parcel of the land in question which she was entitled to have registered. We have no evidence before us showing that order of Judge
Nepomuceno was ever complied with.

Nothing further seems to have occurred with reference to the registration of the land included in the former case until the 26th day of
April, 1921, when the Acting Director of Lands presented the petition in the present case for the registration, under the cadastral
survey, of a portion of land located in the municipality of San Jose, which included the very land claimed by Maria del Rosario in the
former action. She presented her opposition in the present action, claiming the very land which she claimed in the former action. The
only proof which she presented in support of her claim in the present action was the proof which she had presented in the former
action. No proof was adduced in addition thereto, which in the slightest degree showed that she was entitled to the registration of any
other parcel of land than those which had been conceded to her in the first action.

Upon the issue and the proof adduced in the present case the Honorable C. Carballo, Auxiliary Judge of the Sixth Judicial District,
ordered registered in the name of Maria del Rosario, under the cadastral survey, lots 3238, 3240, 3242 and 3243, which are the very
lots which had been ordered registered in her name in the former action. From that judgment she appealed to this court upon the
ground that the lower court committed an error in not registering all of the land included in her opposition in her name.1awph!l.net

In this court she presented a motion for rehearing and in support thereof presents some proof to show that the northern portion of the
land in question is not forestry land but that much of it is agricultural land. With reference to said motion for rehearing, it may be said
that all of the proof which is presented in support thereof existed at the time of the trial and might, with reasonable diligence, have been
presented. It cannot, therefore, be considered now. It is not newly discovered evidence. And moreover if it should be accepted it would
not be sufficient to justify the granting of a new trial.

After a careful examination of the entire record and the evidence adduced during the trial of this cause as well as that adduced during
the trial of the first cause, we are fully persuaded that no error has been committed. Whether particular land is more valuable for
forestry purposes than for agricultural purposes, or vice-versa, is a question of fact and must be established during the trial of the
cause. Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral is a question to be settled in each particular case, unless the
Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority conferred upon it, prior to the intervention of private interest, set aside for forestry or
mineral purposes the particular land in question. (Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10.) During the trial of the
present cause the appellant made no effort to show that the land which she claimed, outside of that which had been decreed in her
favor, was more valuable for agricultural than forestry purposes. For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Avancea, C. J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-13756 January 30, 1919

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, ET AL., petitioners.

VICENTE JOCSON, ET AL., appellants,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, objector-appellee.

Mariano Locsin Rama and J. E. Blanco for appellants.

Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

MOIR, J.:

In the cadastral land registration for the town of Hinigaran, Occidental Negros, the appellants sought to register the three lots or parcels
of land involved in this appeal, which registration was opposed by the Director of Forestry.

The trial court found that lot 1104 was almost entirely "forestry" land, that a small portion of lot 1154 and all of lots 1158 were "forestry"
lands, to which appellants had no title, and declared the lots public lands, and refused registration of the parts of these lots to which
opposition had been filed by the Forestry Bureau. The claimants excepted and perfected their bill of exceptions and brought the case to
this court for review, setting up the following assignments of error:

1. The court erred in not holding to have been proven the facts that the lots 1104, 1154, and 1158 of the cadastral survey of
Hinigaran were possessed by Bibiano Jocson as owner during his lifetime and from a time prior to the year 1880, and, after
his death, by his heirs, on which lots nipa plants were planted and now exists and that these latter are not spontaneous plants
utilized by said heirs.

2. The court erred in not holding to have been proven the a part of lot No. 1158 is rice and pasture land that was possessed
as owner by Bibiano Jocson during his lifetime and peaceably long before 1880, a possession continued by his heirs who still
enjoy the use of the land up to the present time.

3. The court erred in not holding to have been proven that on that same lot 1158, there has existed since the year 1890, and
still exists, a fish hatchery which has been possessed and enjoyed by the heirs of Bibiano Jocson, as owners, for more than
27 years, not counting the prior possession of their predecessor in interest.

4. The court erred in holding that lot No. 1158 and part of lots 1104 and 1154 are forest land, finding this fact as sufficiently
proven by the sole and absurd testimony of the ranger to the effect that nipa is a plant of spontaneous growth and in not
planted; and , as the photographs only refer to small portions of the area of the lot, the court also erred in holding that the
whole lot was covered with firewood trees, while in fact but a very small portion of it is covered with trees which protect the
nipa plants and the fish hatchery, it having been proven that a large part of the lot was sown with rice and used as pasture
land.

5. The court erred in not holding that the parts of lots 1104, 1154 and 1158, covered by mangrove swamps, are agricultural
land, and in not holding to have been proven that these swamp are not available, inasmuch as they are drained at low tide;
errors committed with manifest violation of law and disregard of the jurisprudence established by the Honorable Supreme
Court of the Philippine.

6. The court erred in not holding that the claimants and appellants, by their peaceable, public, and continuous possession for
more than forty years, as owners, including that held by their predecessors in interests, had acquired by prescription lots 1104,
 1154, and 1158, in conformity with act No. 190, section 41, which, without exception, is applicable to the State as well as to
private parties, and by extraordinary prescription of thirty years.

7. The court erred in not adjudicating said lots to the claimants and appellants, in consideration of the possession they have
had for more than forty years, form the time of their predecessor in interest to the present time, thus violating the legal
provision whereby the holders of land who have been in its possession for ten years prior to the enactment of the land law, Act
No. 926, by the United States Philippine Commission, are to be deemed the absolute owners of such land, and to be
presumed to have applied for the same and to have complied with the Spanish laws and all the proceedings required by the
Royal Decrees on the composition of titles; and, therefore, pursuant to said Act now in force, the land in question should be
adjudicated to the possessors thereof.

8. The court erred in not granting the new trial requested by the appellants, the motion therefor being based on the ground
that his findings of facts, if there are any, are openly and manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence.

It is not necessary to consider all these assignments of error, for the main question involved is whether manglares[mangroves] are
agricultural lands or timber lands. If they are timber lands the claimants cannot acquire them by mere occupation for ten years prior to
July 26, 1904; if not, they can so acquire them under the Public Land Act, and no grant or title is necessary.

This being a cadastral case there are no findings of fact, but the trial court states that lot 1104 was in possession of claimants and their
ancestors for more than thirty years and lot 1154 for more than twenty-five years. Lot 1158 is declared to be wholly "forestal." The are
of the lots does not appear.

The evidence fully sustains the contention of the claimants that they have been in possession of all of those lots quietly, adversely and
continuously under a claim of ownership for more than thirty years prior to the hearing in the trial court. There is not a word of proof in
the whole record to the contrary. They set up no documentary title. They do claim the parts of the lands denied registration are
"mangles" with nipa and various other kinds of aquatic bushes or trees growing on them, and that in 1890 on lot 1158 they constructed
a fishpond (vivero de peces) which was later abandoned as unprofitable, and that part of this lot is pasture land, part palay and part
"mangles."

The attorney-General contends in his brief that the parts of the lands denied registration are public forest and cannot be acquired by
occupation, and that all "manglares are public forests."

In the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, there is a classification of all public lands of the Philippine Islands, and in mentioning forestry
land the Act of Congress used the words "timber land." These words are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act as
"terrenos forestales." We think there is an error in this translation and that a better translation would be "terrenos madereros." Timber
land in English means land with trees growing on it. The manglar plant would never be called a tree in English but a bush, and land
which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it can not be called "timber land."

The photographs filed by the Government as exhibits in this case show that at two places there were trees growing on this land, but the
forester who testified for the Government always calls these lots "mangles," and he says the trees which are growing on the lands are
of no value except for firewood. The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglar or nipa swamp does not change the general
character of the land from manglar to timber land.

That manglares are not forestry lands within the meaning of the words "Timber lands" in the Act of Congress has been definitely
decided by this Court in the case of Montano vs. Insular Government (12 Phil. Rep., 572). In that case the court said:

Although argued at different times, five of these cases have been presented substantially together, all being covered by one
brief of the late Attorney-General in behalf of the Government in which, with many interesting historical and graphic citations
he described that part of the marginal seashore of the Philippine Islands known as manglares, with their characteristic
vegetation. In brief, it may be said that they are mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grow various
kindered plants which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their
seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exists naturally, but which are
also, to some extent, cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the mangrove, like trees, as well as for the
useful nipa palm propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they can not
be so regarded in the sense in which the term is used in the cases cited or in general American jurisprudence. The waters
 flowing over them are not available for purpose of navigation, and they "may be disposed of without impairment of the public
interest in what remains."

The court on page 573 further said:

It is a kindred case to Cirilo Mapa vs. The Insular Government . . . (10 Phil. Rep., 175).

As some discussion has arisen as to the scope of that decision, it appears opportune to reaffirm the principle there laid down.
The issue was, whether lands used as a fishery, for the growth of nipa, and as salt deposits, inland some desistance from the
sea, and asserted, thought not clearly proved, to be overflowed at high tide, could be registered as private property on the
strength of ten years' occupation, under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 of the Philippine Commission. The point
decided was that such land within the meaning of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, was agricultural, the reasoning leading
up to that conclusion being that Congress having divided all the public lands of the Islands into three classes it must be
included in tone of the three, and being clearly neither forest nor mineral, it must of necessity fall into the division of
agricultural land.

In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this court said that the phrase "agricultural lands" as used in Act No.
926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.

Whatever may have been the meaning of the term "forestry" under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, classified
the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands
are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.

The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its
enactment.

These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands the trial court should have considered them agricultural lands. If they are
agricultural lands then the rights of appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.

Paragraph 6 of section 54 of that Act provides as follows:

All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and
two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the
taking effect of this Act, except when prevented by war of force majuere, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to
such land under the provisions of this chapter.

xxx xxx xxx

This Act went into effect July 26th, 1904. Therefore, all persons who were in possession of agricultural public lands under the
conditions mentioned in the above section of Act No. 926 on the 26th of July, 1894, are conclusively presumed to have a grant to such
lands and are entitled to have a certificate of title issued to them. (Pamintuan vs.Insular Government, 8 Phil., Rep., 485.)

While we hold that manglares as well as nipa lands are subject to private acquisition and ownership when it is fully proved that the
possession has been actual, complete and adverse, we deem it proper to declare that each case must stand on its own merits.

One cannot acquire ownership of a mangrove swamp by merely cutting a few loads of firewood from the lands occasionally. The
possession must be more complete than would be required for other agricultural lands.

The appellants were in actual possession of the lots in question from 18821, and their ancestors before that date, and they should have
been declared the owners and title should have been issued to them.

There is no need to consider the other points raised on appeal.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the case is returned to the lower court, with instruction to enter a decree in conformity
with this decision. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Araullo and Avancea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-48321 August 31, 1946

OH CHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo for appellant.
Vicente Constantino for appellee.
Ferrier, Gomez and Sotelo and J. T. Chuidian as amici curiae.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located in the municipality of Guinayangan, Province of
Tayabas in the name of the applicant.

The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot, and on his disqualification, as alien, from
acquiring lands of the public domain.

The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
the lot from 1880 to filing of the application for registration on January 17, 1940.

The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that the lower court, committed an error in not declaring
null and void the sale of the lot to the applicant.

The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be applicable to the case, then he would apply for the
benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141).

The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he
or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders
and decrease promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information under the Mortgaged Law
(section 19, Act 496). All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant below to the public domain.
An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest
since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or
that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. (Cario vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed.,
594.) The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessors in interest begun
in 1880.

As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is entitled to decree or registration of the lot, because he
is alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain (sections 48, 49, C.A. No. 141).

As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of the Public Land Act, it seems unnecessary to make
pronouncement in this case on the nature or classifications of the sought to be registered.

It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant immediate predecessor in interest would have been
entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of
his immediate predecessor in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to have been acquired by him. The benefits
provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate predecessors in interest should comply with the condition precedent for the
grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least
since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the lot
amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot
which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a
person as the applicant who is disqualified.

It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void. In a suit between vendor and vendee for the
annulment of the sale, such pronouncement would be necessary, if the court were of the opinion that it is void. It is not necessary in
this case where the vendors do not even object to the application filed by the vendee.

Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed, without costs.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

GR No. L-46935 April 18, 1941

GREGORIO REYES UY UN, recurrent,

vs.
MAMERTA PEREZ and ISIDORO VILLAPLANA, appealed.

D. Claro M. Recto in representation of the appellant.

D. Potenciano A. Magtibay in representation of the respondents.

IMPERIAL, J .:

The appellant asks in his request for certiorari to review and revoke the decision issued by the Court of Appeal declaring null the sale
made by the Sheriff on September 21, 1934 of the land in dispute, declaring valid sale of improvements Existing in the same and
ordering that such improvements be sold to satisfy the amount that the appellant paid as auction price amounting to P379.85, without
costs.

The appellant initiated the case in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas to recover from the appellants the ownership and possession
of an agricultural land of 10 hectares, located in the municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas, as well as the improvements
that exist In the same one consisting of 333 pieces of first-class and 200 non-fructiferous coconuts.

The relevant facts in the case are exposed by the Court of Appeals in these terms:

Martin Villaplana was a possessor of a land, as owner, from the time of the Spanish Government, having declared it for the
purpose of assessing the year 1902, and having introduced in the improvements consisting of coconut trees, the oldest of
which has 60 year old. On May 27, 1916, Martin Villaplana sold the land to his son Vicente Villaplana, married to the
defendant Mamerta Perez. On December 7, 1922 Vicente Villaplana requested it as "Free Patent." Vicente Villaplana having
contracted a debt of P291.05 by Gregorio Reyes Uy Un on February 13, 1931, and having been sued for the payment of said
amount and sentenced to pay it on May 5, 1933, the corresponding order of execution was issued, Which was completed on
September 21, 1934, Selling the property to the demadante (Exhibit A). The 20 of April of 1935 was when it was sent to
Vicente Villaplana and title gratiuito. On December 13, 1934, the possession of the land was granted to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un
by virtue of an order of the Guinayangan Peace Court, Tayabas, but in July 1935 the defendants, who are the wife and
children of Vicente Villaplana, Having been released from it on September 10 of the same year by virtue of a preliminary
prohibition issued in this case.

The Court of Appeal, after reviewing the evidence presented at the first instance, stated that the land was public and that it was part of
the public lands of the State that could be made available through a gratuitous conscription. In its first statement of error, the appellant
maintains that such a conclusion is erroneous and inconsistent with the facts established by the Court of Appeals itself. He argues that
the Court of Appeal declared that Martin Villaplana owned the land as owner since 1902, declaring it in the property with his own
property and having cultivated it by sowing in the coconut trees that are now more than 60 years old and that his Son Vicente
Villaplana and his wife owned it in the same concept, the land ceased to be public land and became private and, therefore,

And have in their favor the presumption juris et de jure of having fulfilled all the necessary conditions for the concession of the
Government and will have the right to a certificate of title under the provisions of said Law. In accordance with said legal provision the
appeals and its cause They had an incoactive Sunday law on the ground, which enabled them to request and obtain confirmation of
said right and to be issued the certificate of title in accordance with the Le de la Registry de la Proprit; also had in his favor the
presumption juris et de jure that it had complied with all the conditions parala granting of the title; But until the title was issued they did
not have the juridical concept of being the real owners of the land or that stopped belonging to the public lands of the State susceptible
of alienation. That this was the legal condition of the land until the government issued the free title, is confirmed by Article 54 of the
same law that provides that from now on it will not be possible to acquire title, legal right or right by reason of equity on land Of the
public domain by prescription or by possession or occupation as owner, or by agreement or by virtue of any law in force prior to the
American occupation, except as expressly provided by the laws dictated after such occupation of the Philippine Islands by the U.S. The
fact that Vicente Villaplana requested December 7, 1922 titled gratiuito of the land is another fact that shows that in his feeling he had
not acquired a perfect title of it and that it remained public land of the State. We conclude, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not
err in declaring that the land was public and subject to the provisions of Law No. 2874.

In the second error, it is claimed that the Court of Appeal should have declared that the land at issue could not be granted by a free title
and that this title, issued on April 20, 1935, is null and void and may affect Rights that the appellant had acquired on the spot. Having
declared that the land remained public on the date the title was issued, it is obvious that it was subject to the provisions of the Law of
Public Land and, consequently, the gratuitous title that was issued in favor of Vicente Villaplana is legal and valid.

To support his theory that the land had become private property, that Vicente Villaplana and his deceased Martin Villaplana were the
exclusive owners of the same and that he succeeded in the title of the first when acquiring it in public auction, the appellant quotes the
settled by This Court in the affairs of Cario v. Insular Government of the Philippines Islands, 212 US, 449, 53 Law. Ed., 594, 597; 41
Phil., 935, 940-941; Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. The Director of Lands , 27 Phil., 246, 248; And Susi vs. Razon and the
Director of Lands , 48, Phil., 424, where it was stated that the agricultural land that has been owned under the conditions prescribed by
the Public Land Law has ceased to be public land to become oprified land, And that the one who possessed it has the presumption
juris et de jure of having obtained concession from the Government and that he has the right to register it in his name according to the
Law of the Registry of Property. The issues cited are, however, distinguished from the present in that in this one who owned the land
and from which their rights derive the resident is the same that recognized the condition of the land to be public property of the State
and not only recognized that Continued to be public land, but requested that a free title be issued in accordance with the Public Land
Law.

In the last error, the appellant maintains that the Court of Appeals must have confirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance that
declared valid the sale by public auction of the land made by the Sheriff in his favor. Since the land was public property of the State
when the Sheriff sold the public on September 21, 1934, and Vicente Villaplana did not own it, it is obvious that the former did not
acquire the domain of the land that did not have it yet The executed Vicente Villaplana and, consequently, the sale was null and of no
legal effect. The sale, in addition, can not be declared valid under the precept of article116 of Law No. 2874, as amended by article 23
of Law No. 3517, which prohibits encumbrance and alienation,

If the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is upheld, the petition of certiorari is denied , with the costs to the appellant. That is
how it is commanded.

Avancea, Pres., Diaz, Laurel, and Horrilleno. MM., Are satisfied.

G.R. No. L-19535 July 10, 1967

HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA; PIO, CLEMENTE, SERAFIA, PORFIRIO and ESTEBAN, all surnamed MINDANAO; MARIA and
GLICERIA, both surnamed SEDARIA; DULCE CORDERO, VICTORIA DE LOS REYES and JOSE GARCIA, applicants-appellants,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Government oppositor-appellees.
VICENTE V. DE VILLA, JR., and VICENTE S. DE VILLA, SR., private oppositors-appellees.

Jose L. Matias and H. A. Jambora for applicants-appellants.

Francisco Villanueva, Jr. and Gregorio L. Oquitania for private oppositors-appellees.
Manuel Reyes Castro for oppositor-appellee Director of Forestry.

MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City) dismissing appellants' "application for registration of the
parcel of land consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of Sampiro, Municipality of San Juan, Province of
Batangas, and designated in amended plan PSU-103696 as Lot A."

The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.

On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of the land above described pursuant to the provisions of Act 496.
They alleged that the land had been inherited by them from their grandfather, Pelagio Zara, who in turn acquired the same under a
Spanish grant known as "Composicion de Terrenos Realengos" issued in 1888. Alternatively, should the provisions of the Land
Registration Act be not applicable, applicants invoke the benefits of the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b) of C.A.
141 as amended, on the ground that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and adverse possession of the land
in concept of owner for more than 30 years immediately preceding the application.

Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and by Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. The latter's opposition recites:

x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, was included in
the area of the parcel of land applied for registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this
Court, which was decided by this same Court through the then incumbent Judge, the Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on
September 30, 1949; that the parcel sought to be registered by the applicants was declared public land in said decision; that
they (the oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S. de Villa, Sr.) have an interest over the land in question because for
a period more than sixty (60) years, the de Villas have been in possession, and which possession, according to them, was
open continuous, notorious and under the claim of ownership; that the proceeding being in rem, the failure of the applicants to
appear at the case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 to prove their imperfect and incomplete title over the property, barred them from
raising the same issue in another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 which was
affirmed in the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 5847-R is concerned, there is already "res-adjudicata" in other words, the
cause of action of the applicant is now barred by prior judgment; and that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the decision of the Court in said case having transferred to the Director of Lands.

On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included as oppositor) filed a motion to dismiss, invoking the
same grounds alleged in its opposition, but principally the fact that the land applied for had already been declared public land by the
judgment in the former registration case.

The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss by order dated January 27, 1961, holding, inter alia,
that "once a parcel of land is declared or adjudged public land by the court having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject anymore of
another land registration proceeding x x x (that) it is only the Director of Lands who can dispose of the same by sale, by lease, by free
patent or by homestead."

In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forestry filed a brief as appellee. The
decisive issue posed by applicants-appellants is whether the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the application of Vicente S.
de Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107 hectares in question to be public land, precludes a subsequent application by an alleged possessor
for judicial confirmation of title on the basis of continuous possession for at least thirty years, pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of
the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended. This provision reads as follows:

The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or
an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.1wph1.t
The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended by Republic Act No. 2061 to December 31, 1968.

It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for registration of their title of ownership under Act 496 or for judicial
confirmation of their "imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and continuous possession for at least thirty years. It may be that
although they were not actual parties in that previous case the judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the first
alternative, since the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their predecessor had constructive notice by publication. Even so this is
a defense that properly pertains to the Government, in view of the fact that the judgment declared the land in question to be public land.
In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed by such declaration, for precisely the proceeding
contemplated in the aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the land is public. The basis of the decree of
judicial confirmation authorized therein is not that the land is already privately owned and hence no longer part of the public domain,
but rather that by reason of the claimant's possession for thirty years he is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant.

On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees have the necessary personality to file an opposition, we find in their
favor, considering that they also claim to be in possession of the land, and have furthermore applied for its purchase from the Bureau of
Lands.1wph1.t

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court a quo for trial and judgment on the merits, with
costs against the private oppositors-appellees.

Reyes, J.B.L., Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.