SYLLABUS FOR NEGLIGENCE

What is the test to determine negligence?

The test of negligence is as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? (Picart vs. Smith)

What/Who are the exceptions in using the ordinary diligence of a good

father as a standard in determining negligence?

The first exemption is in determining whether or not children are negligent

in particular accidents. In the case of Jarco Marketing vs. CA, the Court ruled that
a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without
discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same
presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a
person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has
acted with discernment.

However, this ruling has been abandoned since it restricts the judges to an
inflexible rule that changes only whenever there is an amendment to the law
changing the age of exemption from criminal liability.

Hence, the ruling in Taylor vs. Manila Electric Rail Road subsists as the test
in determining whether or not a child can be considered as negligent in particular
situations for failure to observe the diligence of a good father. If he is imbued
sufficient level of maturity and knowledge, then he is obliged to observe the
diligence of a good father.

Second, professional experts who holds himself out as being competent to

do things requiring professional skill, will be held liable for negligence if he fails
to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which
he attempts to do (Culion vs. Philippine).

Third, an intoxicated man does not assume automatic negligence when

faced in accidents. xx Mere intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is
but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove
negligence. It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or
sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no
greater degree of care is required than by a sober one xxx (Wright vs. Manila
Electric)

Lastly, an insane or demented person though criminally exempted from

liability is not freed from civil liability or damages for injuries he caused (US vs.
Baggay).
 What is the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur? When is it applicable as a
mode of evidence?

xxx Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself is rebuttable presumption
or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that
instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and
that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of
negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of
alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened
provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead
reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have
occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under
management and control of alleged wrongdoer xxx (Layugan vs. IAC)

The doctrine is only applicable in the absence of any proof to tie the
negligent act of the defendant with the injury sustained by the petitioner.

The requisites are:

xxx 1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3)
the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured xxx (DM Consunji vs. CA)

What are the exceptions in applying the doctrine?

xxx (1) where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents

evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the
injury complained of or where there is direct evidence as to the precise
cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on
the occurrence clearly appear. Finally, once 2) the actual cause of
injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or
by the defendant, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine
becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so
completely eludicated that no inference of defendant's liability can
reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence, as in this
case xxx (Layugan vs. IAC)
 Picart vs. Smith
37 Phil 809
March 15, 1918

The test of negligence is as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation?
The Court also introduced the criteria in determining negligence, to wit:
xxx Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position
of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another
was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding
against its consequences.
By applying the test of negligence it can be said that the act of the defendant
is the proximate cause of the injury while that of the plaintiff is the remote
cause.
xxx It is enough to say that the negligence of the defendant was in t his
case the immediate and determining cause of the accident and that the
antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case
xxx
 Taylor vs. Manila Rail Road
GR No. L-4977
March 22, 1910

The question brought before the Court is on what standard of conduct

shall be used in determining whether or not a child has been negligent or not?
Whether the diligence of a good father is equally applicable to children?
The Court held that in determining whether a child is negligent or not, his
level of maturity and knowledge should be taken into consideration. If he is
imbued sufficient level of maturity and knowledge, then he is obliged to observe
the diligence of a good father.
As the Court pronounced:
xxx In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown
youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average
boy of his age
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and
understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself
when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in
the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand
and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution
which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own
deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have
been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act,
so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been
incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate
and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury xxx
 Jarco Marketing vs. CA
GR No. 129792
December 21, 1999

The Court in determining whether the child is negligent applied the

conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that
they are incapable of contributory negligence.
In his book,former Judge Cezar S. Sangco stated:
xxx In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is
conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is,
on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same
presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in
a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it
is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since negligence may be
a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of
liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by
analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and
that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for
negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of
age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a
child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable
of contributory negligence as a matter of law xxx
 Del Rosario vs. Manila
GR no. L-35283
November 5, 1932

The presumption of negligence on the part of the company from the

breakage of this wire has not been overcome. They are deemed liable for the
death of the child.
xxx It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be
imputed to the deceased, owing to his immature years and the
natural curiosity which a child would feel to do something out of the
ordinary, and the mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a
companion of the age of 8 years does not, in our opinion, alter the case.
But even supposing that contributory negligence could in some
measure be properly imputed to the deceased, a proposition upon
which the members of the court do not all agree, yet such negligence
would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not having
been the determining cause of the accident xxx
 Ylarde vs. Aquino
G.R. No. L-33722
July 29, 1988

Were there acts and omissions on the part of private respondent Aquino
amounting to fault or negligence which have direct causal relation to the death
of his pupil Ylarde?

xxx The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils
in such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of
the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but natural for the children
to play around. Tired from the strenuous digging, they just had to
amuse themselves with whatever they found. Driven by their playful
and adventurous instincts and not knowing the risk they were facing
three of them jumped into the hole while the other one jumped on the
stone. Since the stone was so heavy and the soil was loose from the digging,
it was also a natural consequence that the stone would fall into the hole
beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate child caught by its heavy
weight. Everything that occurred was the natural and probable effect of the
negligent acts of private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child
Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by
private respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils
concerned to real danger xxx
 Culion vs. Philippine
GR No. 32611
November 3, 1930

In this connection it must be remembered that when a person holds

himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he
will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one
ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.

xxx The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the
engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was
experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. For this reason, possibly
the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the
carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the
danger of fire. But a person skilled in that particular sort of work would,
we think have been sufficiently warned from those circumstances to
cause him to take greater and adequate precautions against the danger.
In other words Quest did not use the skill that would have been
exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on
boats. There was here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy
antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence.
The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident,
but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not
have occured but for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The test of
liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether
Quest was free from blame.

We therefore see no escape from the conclusion that this accident is

chargeable to lack of skill or negligence in effecting the changes which
Quest undertook to accomplish xxx
 US vs. Pineda
GR No. L- 12858
January 22, 1918

A pharmacist is one of the professions obliged to observe a higher degree

of diligence more than the diligence of a good father.

xxx The profession of pharmacy, it has been said again and again, is one
demanding care and skill. The responsibility of the druggist to use care
has been variously qualified as "ordinary care," "care of a special high
degree," "the highest degree of care known to practical men." Even under
the first conservative expression, "ordinary care" with reference to the
business of a druggist, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has said must be
held to signify "the highest practicable degree of prudence,
thoughtfulness, and vigilance, and most exact and reliable safeguards
consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, in order that
human life may not be constantly be exposed to the danger flowing
from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicine xxx

Moreover, he can be made responsible for fraudulent act.

xxx The prosecution would have to prove to a reasonable degree of

certainty that the druggist made a material representation; that it was
false; that when he made it he knew that it was false or made it
recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as positive assertion;
that he made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the
purchaser; that the purchaser acted in reliance upon it, and that the
purchased thereby suffered injury xxx
 BPI vs. CA
G.R. No. 112392
February 29, 2000

BPI in allowing the withdrawal of private respondent's deposit, failed to

exercise the diligence of a good father of a family. In total disregard of its own
rules, petitioner's personnel negligently handled private respondent's account to
petitioner's detriment.
xxx While it is true that private respondent's having signed a blank
withdrawal slip set in motion the events that resulted in the withdrawal
and encashment of the counterfeit check, the negligence of petitioner's
personnel was the proximate cause of the loss that petitioner sustained.
Proximate cause, which is determined by a mixed consideration of logic,
common sense, policy and precedent, is "that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred." The proximate cause of the withdrawal and eventual loss of the
amount of $2,500.00 on petitioner's part was its personnel's negligence
in allowing such withdrawal in disregard of its own rules and the
clearing requirement in the banking system. In so doing, petitioner
assumed the risk of incurring a loss on account of a forged or counterfeit
foreign check and hence, it should suffer the resulting damage xxx
 Wright vs. Manila Electric
G.R. No. L-7760
October 1, 1914

Whether intoxication warrants a prima facie presumption of negligence:

xxx Mere intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a
circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove
negligence. It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is
drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed
to him, and no greater degree of care is required than by a sober one. If
one's conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it
is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober
The conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been injured
is not warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible to say that a sober
man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions
described xxx
 US vs. Baggay
G.R. No. 6659
September 1, 1911

Insane or demented person though not criminally liable is still civilly liable,
particularly liability for damages.
xxx True it is that civil liability accompanies criminal liability,
because every person liable criminally for a crime or misdemeanor
is also liable for reparation of damage and for indemnification of the
harm done, but there may be civil liability because of acts
ordinarily punishable, although the law has declared their
perpetrators exempt from criminal liability. Such is the case of a
lunatic or insane person who, in spite of his irresponsibility on
account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind, is still
reasonably and justly liable with his property for the
consequences of his acts, even though they be performed
unwittingly, for the reason that his fellows ought not to suffer for
the disastrous results of his harmful acts more than is necessary,
in spite of his unfortunate condition. Law and society are under
obligation to protect him during his illness and so when he is
declared to be liable with his property for reparation and
indemnification, he is still entitled to the benefit of what is necessary
for his decent maintenance, but this protection does not exclude
liability for damage caused to those who may have the misfortune
to suffer the consequences of his acts xxx
 Marinduque vs. Workmens
G.R. No. L-8110
June 30, 1956

Does the violation of an order of an administrative agency constitute

negligence?
xxx Many courts hold that violation of a statute or ordinance
constitutes negligence per se. Others consider the circumstances.
However there is practical unanimity in the proposition that
violation of a rule promulgated by a Commission or board is not
negligence per se xxx
Rather, a violation of an order of an administrative agency can be
considered only as rebuttable presumption of negligence. As oppose to a
violation of ordinance or statute enunciation negligence per se.
xxx not notorious negligence, which we have interpreted to
mean the same thing as gross negligence implying
conscious indifference to consequences pursuing a course of
conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury
utter disregard of consequences. Getting or accepting a free ride
on the companys haulage truck couldnt be gross negligence,
because as the referee found, no danger or risk was apparent xxx
 Layugan vs. IAC
G.R. No. 73998
November 14, 1988

In the absence of proof of negligence, the petitioner assails the doctrine of

res ipsa loquitur against the driver of the truck.
xxx Any immobile object along the highway, like a parked truck, poses
serious danger to a moving vehicle which has the right to be on the
highway. He argues that since the parked cargo truck in this case was a
threat to life and limb and property, it was incumbent upon the driver as
well as the petitioner, who claims to be a helper of the truck driver, to
exercise extreme care so that the motorist negotiating the road would be
properly forewarned of the peril of a parked vehicle
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself is rebuttable presumption
or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that
instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and
that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence
of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of
alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened
provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead
reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have
occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under
management and control of alleged wrongdoer xxx
However, the Court held that the doctrine does not apply in this case since
it satisfies the two exceptions of applying the doctrine, to wit:
xxx Hence, it has generally been held that the presumption of inference
arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome, 1) where
plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the
specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury complained
of or where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the
accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the
occurrence clearly appear. Finally, once 2) the actual cause of injury is
established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the
defendant, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes
inapplicable when the circumstances have been so completely
eludicated that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be
made, whatever the source of the evidence, as in this case xxx
 Ramos vs CA
G.R. No. 124354
April 11, 2002

The injury incurred by petitioner Erlinda does not normally happen absent
any negligence in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of an
endotracheal tube. As was noted in the Decision, the instruments used in the
administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all under the
exclusive control of private respondents Dr. Gutierrez and Dr. Hosaka.

Applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur:

xxx [with the] reasoning that the injury to the patient therein was one
which does not ordinarily take place in the absence of negligence in the
administration of an anesthetic, and in the use and employment of an
endotracheal tube. The court went on to say that "[o]rdinarily a person
being put under anesthesia is not rendered decerebrate as a consequence
of administering such anesthesia in the absence of negligence. Upon these
facts and under these circumstances, a layman would be able to say, as a
matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of
professional treatment were not as such as would ordinarily have
followed if due care had been exercised." Considering the application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the testimony of Cruz was properly given
credence in the case at bar xxx
 Batiquin vs. CA
G.R. No. 118231
July 5, 1996

The requisites for the Doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur are as follows:
xxx which arises upon proof that 1) instrumentality causing injury
was in defendant's exclusive control 2) and that the accident was
one which ordinary does not happen in absence of negligence. Res
ipsa loquitur is [a] rule of evidence whereby negligence of [the] alleged
wrongdoer may be inferred from [the] mere fact that [the] accident
happened provided [the] character of [the] accident and circumstances
attending it lead reasonably to belief that in [the] absence of negligence
it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown
to have been under [the] management and control of [the] alleged
wrongdoer . . . . Under [this] doctrine . . . the happening of an injury
permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces
substantial evidence that [the] injury was caused by an agency or
instrumentality under [the] exclusive control and management of
defendant, and that the occurrence [sic] was such that in the ordinary
course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used
xxx
Lastly, 3) the defendant must not be able to provide any explanation
to exculpate his liability.
It must be emphasized that the doctrine can be invoked when and only
when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available.
 DM Consunji vs. CA
G.R. No. 137873
April 20, 2001

xxx Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is
absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are
present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which
caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged
with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured
xxx

By proving the doctrine, the presumption of negligence against the

defendant arises.

xxx the defendants negligence is presumed or inferred when the

plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa
loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the
elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain. The
presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence
and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as
that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. It is not for the
defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or
inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes
into play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine
has been established xxx
 SYLLABUS FOR CAUSATION

What is proximate cause?

xxx that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by

any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom xxx ( Bataclan vs.
Medina)

What is remote cause?

It is the cause which some independent force merely took advantage

of to accomplish something not natural effect thereof.

xxx a remote cause cannot be considered as the legal cause of the

damage xxx ( Gabeto vs. Araneta)

xxx remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give
rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such
injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause,
such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which
result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent
act or condition is the proximate cause xxx (Urbano vs. IAC)

What is concurrent cause?

In the case of Africa vs. Caltex, concurrent cause is defined as the active
and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third persons
innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing about
the harmful so laong as the actors negligent conduct actively and continuously
operate bringing about the harm to another.
 xxx Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each
is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened,
the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery
may be had against any or all of the responsible persons xxx

What are three tests in determining proximate cause which is applicable in the
Philippines?

But for test is the cause without which the injury could not have resulted
(Bataclan vs. Medina).

On the other hand, Substantial Factor was explained as, xxx if the actor's
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that
the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the
manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable xxx
(Philippine Rabbit vs. IAC)

Lastly, cause and condition does not distinguish active nor passive and
static condition as long as it created a risk that has contributed to the accident
or injury.

xxx If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made
the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as
the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents
which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite
impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations,
particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other
active forces which have gone before xxx (Phoenix vs. IAC)

What is an efficient intervening cause?

Efficient intervening cause is one that destroys the causal connection

between the negligent act and injury and thereby negates liability.

xxx it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any

reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid
running over the two boys by swerving the car away [sufficient
intervening cause releaving Koh from liability] from where they were even
if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate
peril would be the natural course to take xxx (McKee vs. IAC)
 Bataclan vs. Medina
GR No. L-10126
October 22, 1957

The question faced before the Court is whether or not the proximate cause
of the accident is the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the
bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it. In such
case, Medina shall be exonerated from responsibility.
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.
We do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned
not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the
gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming
of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made
not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the
morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they
did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and
what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach
the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In
other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and
was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of
some of its passengers and the call for outside help
 Fernando vs. CA
GR No. 92087
May 8, 1992

Petitioners fault the city government of Davao for failing to clean a septic
tank for the period of 19 years resulting in an accumulation of hydrogen sulfide
gas which killed the laborers. They contend that such failure was compounded
by the fact that there was no warning sign of the existing danger and no efforts
exerted by the public respondent to neutralize or render harmless the effects of
the toxic gas. They submit that the public respondent's gross negligence was the
proximate cause of the fatal incident.
To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of
another, a claimant must establish the relation between the omission and the
damage. He must prove under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that the
defendant's negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury.
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an accident such as
toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one
removes its covers. The accident in the case at bar occurred because the
victims on their own and without authority from the public respondent
opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a
septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an
ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant
risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old
hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the
job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary
measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident.
In Culion Ice, Fish and Elect. Co., v. Phil. Motors Corporation (55 Phil.
129, 133), We held that when a person holds himself out as being competent to
do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he
fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work
which he attempts to do.
 Urbano vs. IAC
GR No. L-72964
January 7, 1988

Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who
personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused
by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm
which could have been infected by tetanus.
The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted
by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the
hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his
wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days
before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People
v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof
that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility
that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause
later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al.

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to
the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed
in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is
the proximate cause."
 Phoenix vs. CA
GR No. L-65295
March 10, 1987

A dump truck, owned by Phoenix, was parked askew (not parallel to the
street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the
way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning"
reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. Dionisio,
private respondent, claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car
to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result
of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some
permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge
dentures. He now asks for damages alleging that the proximate cause of suffering
the same is the negligent act of the driver.

Petitioner assails that Dionisios act is a sufficient intervening cause, and

that their drivers negligent act is only a passive and static condition.

Sufficient intervening cause vis--vis passive static condition vis--vis

forseeable intervening cause:

It has been agreed upon that indeed Dionisio was also negligent. He was
hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he
extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and
General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked
askew and sticking out onto the road lane. But nonetheless, the proximate cause
of his injury is the negligent act of the driver parking his truck in a skew.

The truck driver whether or not created a passive and static condition
is immaterial. As explained in this case:

xxx Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between
the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which
that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive static
condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to
be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of
necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing
the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and
passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are
the result of other active forces which have gone before. The defendant
who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act
may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the
gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as
the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created,
the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a
considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not
necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still
be liable to another who fans into it a month afterward. "Cause" and
"condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the
distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity
at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by
the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some
new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction
between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of
the risk and the character of the intervening cause xxx

As the Court ruled, there is no distinction whether a person provided

a static condition only or an active force as long it has created a risk in
which an injury later resulted. The improper parking of the dump truck
created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General
Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must
be held responsible.

Moreover, the negligent act of Dionisio is not just an ordinary

intervening cause but a forseeable intervening cause:

xxx Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one

which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate
under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be
negligence among other reasons, because of failure to guard
against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason.
Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary,
usual and customary wind arising later wig spread it beyond the
defendant's own property, and therefore to take precautions to
prevent that event. The person who leaves the combustible or
explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of
fire from some independent source. ... In all of these cases there is
an intervening cause combining with the defendant's conduct to
produce the result and in each case the defendant's negligence
consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk.

Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact

that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which
the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass.
Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk,
and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite
generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this
category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility xxx
 Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and
that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such
damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.
 Pilipinas Bank VS. CA
GR No. 105410
July 25, 1994

In the case at bench, the proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of
petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of private
respondent in the name of another depositor who had a similar first name. As
held by the trial court:
xxx Applying the test, the bank employee is, on that basis, deemed to have
failed to exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his
duties. As earlier stated, the bank employee posted the cash deposit in the
account of Florencio Amador from his assumption that the name Florencio
appearing on the ledger without, however, going through the full name, is
the same Florencio stated in the deposit slip. He should have continuously
gone beyond mere assumption, which was proven to be erroneous, and
proceeded with clear certainty, considering the amount involved and the
repercussions it would create on the totality of the person notable of which
is the credit standing of the person involved should a mistake happen. The
checks issued by the plaintiff in the course of his business were dishonored
by the bank because the ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated a balance
insufficient to cover the face value of checks xxx
 Quezon City vs. Dacat
GR No. 150304
June 15, 2005

That the negligence of petitioners, who rammed into a pile of earth/street

digging, was the proximate cause of the accident, to quote:

xxx Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February
28, 1988 which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when
his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging done
relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a
reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an
adequate warning to motorist especially during the thick of the night where
darkness is pervasive.

"Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular set

of events is transfixed by the attending circumstances so that the greater
the danger known or reasonably anticipated, the greater is the degree of
care required to be observed

The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the
responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads
and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same.
Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision found in
the subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the
City government liable. Harsh application of the law ensues as a result
thereof but the state assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and
repair of the roads and bridges and neither exception nor exculpation from
liability would deem just and equitable xxx
 Gabeto vs. Araneta
GR No. L015674
October 17, 1921

It is therefore evident that the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in

the middle of the street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued
to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out
and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily
responsible for the control of the animal, and the defendant cannot be charged
with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter.

xxx The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which
it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. Julio Pagnaya
had a natural interest in refuting this fact, as well as in exculpating himself
in other respects; and we are of the opinion that the several witnesses who
testified for the defendant gave a more credible account of the affair than
the witnesses for the plaintiff. According to the witnesses for the
defendant, it was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit it come
out of the horse's mouth; and they say that Julio, after alighting, led the
horse over to the curb, and proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing
the bridle was slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free
from control, started to go away as previously stated xxx
 Urbano vs. IAC
GR No. L-72964
Januay 7, 1988

The infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause

later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

The wound was therefore concluded as a remote cause.

xxx A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise
to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though
such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition,
such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause xxx
 Far East Shipping vs. CA
GR No. 130068
October 1, 1998

Concurrent causes are considered as proximate cause if:

xxx It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a

person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that
his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than
piaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where
several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from
liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient
that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and
that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense
to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted
from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the
other concurrent rortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury
are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury
would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of
the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible
persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that
one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the
injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a
proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other
actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as
though his acts were the sole cause of the injury xxx

If both paties are held liable, they may be regarded as tortfeasors who are
solidary liable.

xxx There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability

is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where
the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, although acting independently, are in combination
the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person,
it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed
to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.
Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a
third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for
the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code xxx
 Sabido vs. Custodio
GR No. L- 21512
August 31, 1966

Petitioner is being sued for allowing Sabido to hang on the bus which
eventually led to his death when he was side swiped by a 6x6 truck. To relieve
themselves from liability, petitioners impute the blame on the truck for over
speeding.
As the Court decided, both the drivers of the bus and truck are
solidary liable. Their concurrent actions are the proximate cause of the death of
Custodio, as explained:
xxx where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission
of two or more persons, although acting independently of each
other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a
single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in
what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible
for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused
the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the
acts of the other tort-feasor xxx
 Bataclan vs. Medina
GR No. L-10126
October 22, 1957

But for test as defined in this case, is the cause without which the
damages would not have resulted. In this case the but for test case is
determine as:
xxx we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle
turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking
of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that
the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call
for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the
driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark
(about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with
them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and
flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that
said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the
aid and effect the rescue requested from them xxx
 Philippine Rabbit vs. IAC
GR No. 66102-04
August 30, 1990

xxx It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact
that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of
the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from
being liable xxx

Here, the defendant bus was running at a fast speed when the accident
occurred and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid the accident. The
bus driver's conduct is thus a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the
passengers of the jeepney, not only because he was driving fast and did not
even attempt to avoid the mishap but also because it was the bus which was the
physical force which brought about the injury and death to the passengers of the
jeepney.
 Phoenix vs. IAC
GR No. L-65295
March 10, 1987

The Court held that the passive and active condition created by the truck
driver is immaterial. Nonetheless, he will still be made liable. As explained in
this case:

xxx Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between
the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which
that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive static
condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to
be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of
necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing
the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and
passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are
the result of other active forces which have gone before. The defendant
who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act
may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the
gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as
the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created,
the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a
considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not
necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still
be liable to another who fans into it a month afterward. "Cause" and
"condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the
distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity
at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by
the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some
new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction
between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of
the risk and the character of the intervening cause xxx

As the Court ruled, there is no distinction whether a person

provided a static condition only or an active force as long it has created
a risk in which an injury later resulted. The improper parking of the
dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving
down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the
truck driver must be held responsible.
 Manila Electric Company vs. Remoquillo
GR No. L-8328
May 18, 1956

The stringing of wires of such high voltage (3,600 volts), uninsulated and
so close to houses is a constant source of danger, the same is considered as a
passive static condition capable of bringing risks. Nonetheless, in this case it is
only considered as a remote cause.
xxx A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise
to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such
injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause,
such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances
which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause xxx
Applying the same, the Court held that:
xxx the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the
electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and
negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron
sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the
street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering
the latters length of 6 feet xxx
 Rodrigueza vs. Manila Railroad
GR No. 15688
November 19, 1921

The existence of the house of Rodrigueza may have created a condition

making the disaster possible, however, it is not considered as the proximate
cause.

xxx [The proximate cause] was the negligent act of the defendant in
causing this fire. The circumstance that Remigio Rodrigueza's house was
partly on the property of the defendant company and therefore in
dangerous proximity to passing locomotives was an antecedent
condition that may in fact have made the disaster possible, but that
circumstance cannot be imputed to him as contributory negligence
destructive of his right of action, because, first, that condition was not
created by himself; secondly, because his house remained on this ground
by the toleration, and therefore with the consent of the Railroad Company;
and thirdly, because even supposing the house to be improperly there, this
fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it xxx
 McKee vs. IAC
GR No. 68102
July 16, 1992

Efficient intervening cause is one that destroys the causal connection

between the negligent act and injury and thereby negates liability.
In this case:
xxx it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any
reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running
over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even
if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate
peril would be the natural course to take xxx
The negligent act of the driver is deemed to be the sufficient intervening
cause which negated the liability of Koh.
xxx Applying the above definition, although it may be said that the act
of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events,
it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths
because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the
negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the
tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have
resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given
by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into
its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of
the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the given
circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car xxx
 Manila Electric vs. Remoquillo
GR No. L-8328
May 18, 1956

Indeed there has been a violation of the permit for the construction of the
media agua which should be 3 feet away from the building. However, the same
was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it.
xxx Had said media agua been only one meter wide as allowed by the
permit, Magno standing on it, would instinctively have stayed closer to or
hugged the side of the house in order to keep a safe margin between the
edge of the media agua and the yawning 2-story distance or height from
the ground, and possibly if not probably avoided the fatal contact between
the lower end of the iron sheet and the wires xxx
Hence, the efficient intervening cause releasing the company from any
negligence and liability is the sole negligent act of Magno.
xxx the death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence and in
some measure by the too close proximity of the media agua or rather its edge
to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original
permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction
of the media agua. We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of
negligence or as lacking in due diligence. Although the city ordinance called for
a distance of 3 feet of its wires from any building, there was actually a distance
of 7 feet and 2 3/4 inches of the wires from the side of the house of Pealoza
[The] act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron
sheet with his hands was the proximate and principal cause of the
electrocution, then his heirs may not recover xxx
 Teague vs. Fernandez
GR No. L-29745
June 4, 1973

The question is whether or not the failure to comply with the

ordinance regarding building specification such as the measurements of
stairways is the proximate cause of the death of respondent.

xxx the general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is

not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of the
another agency if the occurrence if the accident in the manner in which it
happened was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to
prevent xxx

Hence the proximate cause is the overcrowding at the stairway, the same
problem which the ordinance would like to prevent.
 Urbano vs. IAC
GR No. L-72964
Januay 7, 1988

The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of

the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the
time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime.
Hence, the wound inflicted by Urbano is deemed to be a remote cause to
the death of Javier.
xxx A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action
if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition
or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause
and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause
of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened
but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act
or condition is the proximate cause xxx
 SYLLABUS: DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE/ DOCTRINE OF
DISCOVERED PERIL/ DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING NEGLIGENCE
What is the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance?
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of
prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance
to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the
consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the
plaintiff (Picart vs. Smith).
For example, it has been said that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear
of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident, unless
contradicted by other evidence. The rationale behind the presumption is that the
driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to
observe the vehicle in front of him (Raynera vs. Hiceta)
Does the other less negligent party released from any liability upon
assailing the doctrine?
Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last
clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept
of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has
itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Phoenix vs. CA)
This means that even if the doctrine of last clear chance indeed exists, it
does not rule in the favor of the defendant alone. The petitioner being equally
negligent must bear a part of his suffering.
What are the exceptions in applying the doctrine?
1) A passenger filing action against a carrier based on contract

does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the

carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable
to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground
that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence
(Bustamante vs. CA; Anuran vs. Buno)

2) It cannot apply between tortfeasors

Furthermore, "as between defendants: The doctrine cannot be

extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one
of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his
discovery of the latter's peril, and it cannot be invoked as between
 defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent
actor cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take
action which could have avoided the injury (Bustamante vs. CA)

3) It does not apply if the defendant was not aware of the existence of the peril
during the event.
it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last
opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril
or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be
expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could not
have known the existence of the peril (Pantranco vs. Baesa)
4) It does not apply if the defendant is required to act instantaneously during
the peril.

The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged
is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by
the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party
charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury (Ong vs.
Metropolitan)

5) It does not apply for breach of contractual obligation.

We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case.
Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the
performance of its contractual obligation to L.C. Diaz. This is a case of culpa
contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor
his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant
from liability (Consolidated Bank vs. CA)

6) It does not apply in emergency situation (EMRGENCY RULE)

The rationale of this rule is that a person who is confronted with a sudden
emergency might have no time for thought, and he must make a prompt
decision based largely upon impulse or instinct. Thus, he cannot be held to
the same standard of conduct as one who had an opportunity to reflect,
even though it later appears that he made the wrong decision
An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is
required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails
to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a
better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence
(Engada vs. CA)
 PICART vs. SMITH
37 Phil 809
March 15, 1918

Where both parties are negligent, how do we determine who is at fault?

What is the Doctrine of the Last Clear Chance?
In this case, Picart, riding on his pony, met a collision with an automobile.
He then asks for damages for the injuries he suffered. As the Court explains both
parties are negligent. It is therefore incumbent upon the Court to determine
whether Picart, being negligent, would still be adjudged with damages. To resolve
the case, the Court applied the Doctrine of the Last Clear Chance:
xxx The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was
guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the
last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made
liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior
negligence of the plaintiff xxx
But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in
such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately
and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the
two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the
defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable
interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party xxx
It must be emphasized that in applying this doctrine, the petitioner is not
freed from liability. Since both parties are at fault, the damages awarded shall be
mitigated to compensate for the other partys contributory negligence. As
explained in the cited case, Rakes vs. Atlantic:
xxx It was held that while the defendant was liable to the plaintiff by reason
of its negligence in having failed to keep the track in proper repair
nevertheless the amount of the damages should be reduced on account
of the contributory negligence in the plaintiff xxx
The Court also introduced the criteria in determining negligence, to wit:
xxx Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position
of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another
was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding
against its consequences.
 By applying the doctrine it can be said that the act of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury while that of the plaintiff is the remote cause.
xxx It is enough to say that the negligence of the defendant was in this
case the immediate and determining cause of the accident and that the
antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case xxx
 Bustamante vs. CA
GR No. 89880
February 6, 1991

What are the exceptions in applying the Doctrine of the Last Clear
Chance?

The petitioners are parents of deceased passengers asking for damages

resulting to the death of their sons and daughters. This was caused by the
collision of the bus passenger with the truck. The petitioners therefore prays a
collection for damages against the driver and owner of the truck.
The CA using the doctrine of last clear chance absolved the truck driver
imputing that the negligence of the bus driver is the proximate cause of the
injury. Furthermore, the latter has the last clear chance to minimize the peril but
it failed to do so.

xxx the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and his
reckless negligence in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was the
proximate cause of the collision." (Rollo, p. 95). Said court also noted that
"the record also discloses that the bus driver was not a competent and
responsible driver. His driver's license was confiscated for a traffic
violation on April 17, 1983 and he was using a ticket for said traffic
violation on the day of the accident in question (pp. 16-18, TSN, July 23,
1984). He also admitted that he was not a regular driver of the bus that
figured in the mishap and was not given any practical examination xxx

The Court judged differently assailing that the last clear chance does not
apply in the case at hand. The exceptions of application of the doctrine was
promulgated by the Court in this case:

xxx the principle of "last clear chance" applies "in a suit between the owners
and drivers of colliding vehicles. It 1) does not arise where a passenger
demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of
the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise
guilty of negligence."

Furthermore, "as between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended

into the field of 2) joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them
should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery
of the latter's peril, and it cannot be invoked as between 3) defendants
concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent actor cannot
defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action which
could have avoided the injury." Xxx
 Since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the
colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers
against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the
respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from
liability.
 Phoenix vs. IAC
GR No. L-65295
March 10, 1987

Doctrine of last clear chance vis--vis comparative negligence

Lastly, the truck driver assails the doctrine of the last clear chance that
private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident
and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear
chance" must bear his own injuries alone.
xxx The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to
grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that
the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed
to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the
common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction
where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an
absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as
it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines xxx
This means that even if the doctrine of last clear chance indeed
exists, it does not rule in the favor of the defendant alone. The
petitioner being equally negligent must bear a part of his suffering.
ART. 2179 of the Civil Code provides:
When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate cause of
his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was
only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
xxx The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his
employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior
negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that
increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril
precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission.
To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the
fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the
forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our
law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in
society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept
the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of
society xxx
 The comparative negligence of Dionisio led the court to mitigate the
award of damages, 20-80 ratio to the favor of Dionisio.
 Glan vs. IAC
GR No. 70493
May 18, 1989

The case involves a collision between a jeepney and a truck carrying

various hard ware materials owned by the petitioner. It resulted to the death of
some passengers, hence, the family of the deceased herein private respondents
ask for damages. From the investigations of policemen and testimony of
witnesses, the jeepney was found beyond the demarcation line in the middle of
the road, this means he is outside his lane. Furthermore, the jeepney was in zig
zagged manner before the collision.
The Court applying the doctrine of the last clear chance absolved the
petitioner. This case clearly manifest an exemption of the comparative
negligence applicable to two negligent parties. Allegedly, the truck driver was
not negligent because he has prevented the impending peril against the jeepney
driver.
xxx From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of
the jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last
clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at that distance of
thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving
his jeep away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time
to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In
those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of
avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect, as the
Appellate Court would have it, the truck to swerve and leave him a
clear path xxx
The Court similarly applied the explanation enshrined in the doctrinal case of
Picart vs. Smith:
xxx It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault,
for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong
side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also
negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent
is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent
acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence
of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an
appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and
fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to
the prior negligence of the other party xxx
 According to the Court, the death of the jeepney driver was caused by
his negligent act of not impeding the peril which is within his control to desist.
This case strictly applied the doctrine clearly deviating from latter jurisprudence
applying a comparative negligence between the parties. As the Court has proven,
the truck was already in the full stop. There is indeed an intervening time
between the acts of the parties, hence, clearly exonerating the truck driver
from liability. The intervening time should have been used by the jeepney
driver to save himself.
xxx Compassion for the plight of those whom an accident has robbed of
the love and support of a husband and father is an entirely natural and
understandable sentiment. It should not, however, be allowed to stand in
the way of, much less to influence, a just verdict in a suit at law xxx
 Pantranco vs. Baesa
GR No. 79050-51
November 14, 1989

The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance is not applied in blanket. The collision
of a bus and jeepney in this case has led the Court to re-emphasized two basic
exemptions in the application of the doctrine.
xxx 1) it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last
opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril
or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot
be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could not
have known the existence of the peril. In this case, there is nothing to show
that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he
saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane,
he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his
right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus
to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite
direction xxx
xxx a motorist who is properly proceeding on his own side of the highway
is generally entitled to assume that an approaching vehicle coming towards
him on the wrong side, will return to his proper lane of traffic. There was
nothing to indicate to David Ico that the bus could not return to its own
lane or was prevented from returning to the proper lane by anything
beyond the control of its driver xxx
Moreover, even if the jeepney had known the peril, the Court reiterated
that it would be impossible for anyone to prevent the same.
xxx By the time David Ico must have realized that the bus was not returning
to its own lane, it was already too late to swerve the jeepney to his right
to prevent an accident. The speed at which the approaching bus was
running prevented David Ico from swerving the jeepney to the right
shoulder of the road in time to avoid the collision. Thus, even assuming
that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the
actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it. This Court has held that
the last clear chance doctrine 2) "can never apply where the party
charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or
should have been discovered" xxx
Hence, it is the bus company who should bear the loss. It is his failure in
going back to his own lane upon seeing the jeepney which caused the
injury, thereby making his negligent act as the proximate cause.
Since the case at hand asked for damages arising from quasi delict,
the company alleviated itself from liability assailing the diligence of a good
father in supervision and election of its employees.
The Court ruled in the negative:
xxx When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there
instantly arises a presumption that the employer has been negligent
either in the selection of his employees or in the supervision over
their acts. Although this presumption is only a disputable
presumption which could be overcome by proof of diligence of a
good father of a family, this Court believes that the evidence
submitted by the defendant to show that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the case of Ramirez, as a company
driver is far from sufficient. No support evidence has been
adduced. The professional drivers license of Ramirez has not been
produced. There is no proof that he is between 25 to 38 years old.
There is also no proof as to his educational attainment, his age, his
weight and the fact that he is married or not. Neither are the result
of the written test, psychological and physical test, among other
tests, have been submitted in evidence [sic]. His NBI or police
clearances and clearances from previous employment were not
marked in evidence. No evidence was presented that Ramirez
actually and really attended the seminars xxx
 Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. CA
GR No. 97626
March 14, 1997

Private respondent, RMC Company, assails damages against the

Bank for allegedly allowing its deposit to be accounted in the account
another. Allegedly, their company secretary, Yabut, deposited instead in
the account of his husband the earnings of the company. Private
respondent asks for reimbursement of the amount P304,979.74. by virtue
of quasi delict:
There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by
the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause
and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case which may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. (Picart vs. Smith)
Applying the same, the proximate cause of the injury suffered by the
Bank is:
xxx the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in
validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips
prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that
the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the
self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper
validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate xxx
xxx proximate cause [is defined] as "that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred. . . ."
PROXIMATE CAUSE: In this case, absent the act of Ms. Mabayad in
negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms.
Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her
fraudulent scheme with impunity.
Even applying the Doctrine of the Last Clear Chance would still hold the
fact the bank has the last fair chance to avoid the peril:
 xxx Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in
entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the
opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it
cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear
opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully
observing their self-imposed validation procedure xxx
However, it cannot be denied that the company is equally negligent.
It was negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. Had it
done so, the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being
committed against RMC by its secretary. This calls for the application of
comparative negligence:
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
xxx When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded xxx
This prompted the Court to divide the damages with the ratio 60-40, in
favor of private respondent.
 Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District
GR No. L-7664
August 29, 1958

A young boy 14 years of age was found dead in one of the pools of the
respondent. Allegeing negligence in the respondent to assure the safety of its
customer, the parents of the deceased come before the Court praying for
damages arising from quasi delict.
The lower courts however found that the respondent is not remised in its
duty since every precaution or warning is available in the premises. Life guards
and other life saving materials can also be easily availed by customer. Moreover,
the life guard on duty upon knowing the situation immediately went to the relied
of the boy. The respondents relief operations team earnestly did their best
thereafter to save the life of the boy. However, the boy has been lifeless already
prior to the same.
Petitioner now rests to the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance, explaining that
even if Ong was indeed at fault, the respondent has the last fair chance or
opportunity to save the boys life.
The Court ruled in the negative assailing that the doctrine does not
apply in this case.
xxx Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool
and it being apparent that he went there without any companion in
violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the
pools, and it appearing that lifeguard responded to the call for help as
soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the
body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order
to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application
of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee..
xxx The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party
charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or
should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous
negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to
the injury xxx
 Anuran vs. Buno
GR No. L-21353
May 20, 1996

A passenger jeepney was parked on the road to Taal, Batangas. A motor

truck speeding along, negligently bumped it from behind, with such violence that
three of its passengers died, even as two others suffered injuries that required
their confinement. Hence, So, these suits were instituted by the representatives
of the dead and of the injured, to recover consequently damages against the
driver and the owners of the truck and also against the driver and the owners of
the jeepney.
The CA exonerated the owners and drivers of the jeepney using the
Doctrine of the Last Clear Chance:
xxx It explained that although "the driver of the ill-starred vehicle was not
free from fault, for he was guilty of an antecedent negligence in parking
his vehicle with a portion thereof occupying the asphalted road", it
considered the truck driver guilty of greater negligence which was the
efficient cause of the collision; and applying the doctrine of the "last
clear chance" said Court ordered the owners of the truck to pay,
solidarily with its driver xxx
The Court finds the reasoning of the CA erroneous. This case warrants the
exemption of the application of the doctrine.
xxx The principle about the "last clear chance" would call for application
in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It
does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the
carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable
to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground
that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence xxx
As the Court further explained, the common carries, by operation of law,
is obliged to observe utmost diligence towards their passengers.
xxx It must be remembered that the obligation of the carrier to transport
its passengers safely is such that the New Civil Code requires "utmost
diligence" from the carriers (Art. 1755) who are "presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they have
observed extraordinary diligence" (Art. 1756). In this instance, this legal
presumption of negligence is confirmed by the Court of Appeals' finding
that the driver of the jeepney in question was at fault in parking the vehicle
improperly. It must follow that the driver and the owners of the
jeepney must answer for injuries to its passengers xxx
 Raynera vs. Hiceta
GR No. 120027
April 21, 1999

Reynaldo Raynera, the deceased, crashed his motorcycle into the left rear
portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail lights. Due to the collision,
Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper Geraldino D. Lucelo rushed
him to the Paraaque Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the attending
physician pronounced Reynaldo Raynera dead on arrival. The family of the
deceased now asks for damages.
Imputing the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance, the Court ruled in favor of the
truck driver.
xxx We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of
the victim. Traveling behind the truck, he had the responsibility of
avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. He was in control of the
situation. His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable him to
see what was in front of him. He was traversing the service road where the
prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway xxx
NEGLIGENCE: The omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something, which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do.
PROXIMATE CAUSE: cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.
The doctrine imposts that between two negligent parties, the person who
has the last fair chance or opportunity to prevent the peril but fails to do so shall
suffer the consequences.
xxx It has been said that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of
another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident, unless
contradicted by other evidence. The rationale behind the presumption
is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as
he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.
Consequently, no other person was to blame but the victim himself since
he was the one who bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck.
He had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident xxx
 Canlas vs. CA
GR No. 112160
February 28, 2000

Canlas and Private respondent Manosca decided to undertake a business

venture. To pursue the same, Canlas decided to undertake a Special Power of
Attorney in favor of Manosca so that he could mortgage the lands for a loan.
Manosca was able to mortgage the land to Asian Savings Bank through the use of
an impostor who acted as Spouses Canlas. Petitioner asked for annulment of the
deed of real esate mortgage with the prayer of damages against the negligent act
of the respondent Bank.
The Court ruled that respondent Bank should reimburse the petitioner for
being remised in observance of its diligence, particularly in approving a loan with
impostors in the absence of any proof of their identities.
Applying the Doctrine of the Last Clear Chance, the Bank has within its
capacity the last fair chance to prevent the fraudulent act.
xxx In essence, the doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where
both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably
later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of
the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences
arising therefrom xxx
xxx Assuming that Osmundo Canlas was negligent in giving Vicente
Maosca the opportunity to perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting to latter
the owner's copy of the transfer certificates of title of subject parcels of
land, it cannot be denied that the bank had the last clear chance to
prevent the fraud, by the simple expedient of faithfully complying with
the requirements for banks to ascertain the identity of the persons
transacting with them xxx
For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking
institutions, whose business is impressed with public interest, respondent Asian
Savings Bank has to bear the loss sued upon.
Moreover, the Court held the REM as void.
xxx Settled is the rule that a contract of mortgage must be constituted only
by the absolute owner on the property mortgaged; a mortgage, constituted
by an impostor is void. Considering that it was established indubitably
that the contract of mortgage sued upon was entered into and signed by
impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses Osmundo
Canlas and Angelina Canlas, the Court is of the ineluctible conclusion and
finding that subject contract of mortgage is a complete nullity xxx
 Consolidated Bank vs. CA
GR No. 138569
September 11, 2003

LC Diaz, a client of petitioner bank, made a deposit through his employee.

During the transaction, the employee left the passbook in the possession of the
teller while he when to another bank. When employee returned, the passbook
was nowhere to be found. Allegedly, the teller cannot remember to whom she
gave the same. Consequently, Diaz found out that the passbook was used by
another thereby withdrawing an amount of P300,000. Private respondent now
prays for damages for the alleged negligence of the Bank.
To exonerate itself, Solidbank assails the application of the doctrine of the
last clear chance to which the Court ruled in the negative.
xxx We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case.
Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the
performance of its contractual obligation to L.C. Diaz. This is a case of
culpa contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the
defendant from liability. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance
by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the
plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract
xxx
Solidbanks rules on savings account require that the deposit book should
be carefully guarded by the depositor and kept under lock and key, if possible.
When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbanks tellers during withdrawals,
the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher degree of diligence
in safeguarding the passbook.
Likewise, Solidbanks tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in
insuring that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized
representative. The tellers know, or should know, that the rules on savings
account provide that any person in possession of the passbook is
presumptively its owner. If the tellers give the passbook to the wrong person,
they would be clothing that person presumptive ownership of the passbook,
facilitating unauthorized withdrawals by that person. For failing to return the
passbook to Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz, Solidbank and
Teller No. 6 presumptively failed to observe such high degree of diligence in
safeguarding the passbook, and in insuring its return to the party authorized
to receive the same.
 xxx In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract,
there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. The
burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent.
In contrast, in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that
the defendant was negligent. In the present case, L.C. Diaz has established
that Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook
only to the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a
presumption that Solidbank was at fault and its teller was negligent in not
returning the passbook to Calapre. The burden was on Solidbank to prove
that there was no negligence on its part or its employees xxx
The Court accepts that Diaz is also negligent. In this case, L.C. Diaz was
guilty of contributory negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its
authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor. Thus, the liability of
Solidbank should be reduced.
In Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals, where the Court held
the depositor guilty of contributory negligence, it allocated the damages
between the depositor and the bank on a 40-60 ratio. The Court applies this
ratio in this case.
 Engada vs. CA
GR No. 140698
June 20, 2003

The petitioner, driver of a pick up made a head on collision with Iran, the
driver of a Tamarraw FX. Allegedly, the pick ups right signal light flashed, at the
same time, it swerved to its left, encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and
headed towards a head-on collision course with it. Iran swerved to his left but
the pick-up also swerved to its right. Thus, the pick-up collided with the
Tamaraw, hitting the latter at its right front passenger side. The impact caused
the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its body. The passenger
therein also suffered injuries.

In his defense, petitioner avers that although his act of occupying the
Tamaraws lane was the initial act in the chain of events, Irans swerving to the
left after petitioner flashed his right turn signal, constituted a sufficient
intervening event, which proximately caused the eventual injuries and damages
to private complainant.

The Court introduced the emergency rule in defending the act of Iran.

xxx The rationale of this rule is that a person who is confronted with a
sudden emergency might have no time for thought, and he must make
a prompt decision based largely upon impulse or instinct. Thus, he
cannot be held to the same standard of conduct as one who had an
opportunity to reflect, even though it later appears that he made the wrong
decision xxx

xxx An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger

and is required to act without much time to consider the best means
that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was
brought by his own negligence xxx

Hence, the existence of this emergency rule barred the application of the
doctrine of the last clear chance.

xxx Instead, what has been shown is the presence of an emergency and the
proper application of the emergency rule. Petitioners act of swerving to
the Tamaraws lane at a distance of 30 meters from it and driving the
Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it approached the Tamaraw, denied Iran
time and opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was no clear
chance to speak of xxxx
 Moreover, the law requires diligence to be observed by vehicles who
overtakes or drives outside their lane.

It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose
of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it
that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in safety
(The Land Transportation and Traffic Code).