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Towards an Aristotelian sense of obligation*

Stephen Grant
Richmond upon Thames College, London
ABSTRACT. This article develops an Aristotelian account of moral obligation,
and defends the account in the face of certain standard Kantian criticisms.
Specifically, Aristotelian obligations may be interpreted as being dependent on
virtue in such a way that they do not apply to non-virtuous agents, and there-
fore lack universality. The article draws on various aspects of Aristotles own
work to set out an initial account, and then on recent discussions within the
analytic tradition on this subject. An Aristotelian position is developed which
focuses on the distinction between the subjective and objective senses in which
virtues of character need to be understood. At the objective level, the virtues are
the dispositions required for any human being to live the best life. At the sub-
jective level, the virtues are the dispositions of character which are present in cer-
tain persons, but absent in others. It is at the objective level that we can locate
an Aristotelian account of how the demands of practical reason ground univer-
sal moral obligations.

KEYWORDS. Aristotle, Kant, obligation, virtue, normativity

INTRODUCTION

O ne feature of morality is that it is normative. If I tell you I think

killing is bad and helping the downtrodden is good, then I not only
express the way I see the world, but I indicate the sorts of actions I believe
people ought to perform or avoid. One of the questions we can now ask
is what justifies my claim that such actions are to be performed or
avoided, and this brings us directly to the familiar battle lines between
rival moral theories. For the utilitarian, specific normative claims are
* I am grateful to Matthew Carmody, Peter Goldie, Adrian Samuel, Paul Sheehy and Paul Sper-
ring for their detailed and helpful comments on this paper.

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ETHICS NETWORK 14, no. 2 (2007): 159-174.
2007 by European Centre for Ethics, K.U.Leuven. All rights reserved. doi: 10.2143/EP.14.2.2023966
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justified if they require actions which will maximise happiness. For the
Kantian, the rightness of the action is determined according to whether
or not it conforms to the moral law. For the Platonist, the action is right
if it reflects an understanding of the Form of the Good. In each case,
there is a foundational theory which explains the source of normativity,
giving us an ultimate reason as to why there are such things as moral obli-
gations at all, and why a particular action might be seen as one instance
of such an obligation.
The aim of this article is to provide an Aristotelian account of
obligation, traditionally thought to be a problem for Aristotle for a num-
ber of reasons. His focus is on questions such as the development of
good character and virtue, and he never develops what one might term a
theory of moral obligation. In addition, obligations are specifically related
to actions, and Kantian duty or the utilitarian requirement to act in such
ways which maximise utility seem better starting points for addressing the
key issues in this area because they are act-centred rather than agent-cen-
tred. A number of key works from Aristotelian thinkers have done much
to redress this over recent years, with Phillippa Foot (1978, 2001) and
Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) setting out in detail Aristotelian accounts of
normativity. This article draws on much of the work they have done, but
focuses on the narrower issue of the universally binding nature of moral
obligation.
This presents a unique problem for the Aristotelian, in that the concept
of virtue is central to her moral theory, and moral obligation must therefore
dependent on virtue in some way. But this becomes problematic if we accept
the common sense claim that there are some non-virtuous agents. If obli-
gation is dependent on virtue, and someone lacks the virtues, then might one
not argue that she lacks obligations? This problem is closely related to Aris-
totles emphasis on the right sort of upbringing being central to developing
the virtues. This appears to make virtue dependent on the kind of upbring-
ing we happen to receive, and this is where the contingency emerges as to
whether or not one develops the virtues. An Aristotelian needs to explain

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how the contingency of our moral development can be reconciled with the
universality of moral obligation.
In answering these challenges, I shall set out an initial account, and
then suggest the kinds of criticisms one might expect from a distinctly
Kantian perspective, the source of so much material on this subject over
recent years.1 That so much of the material available comes from this
source is a reflection of the obvious theoretical appeal one finds in
explaining the universally binding nature of moral obligation in terms of
the universally binding nature of rationality, as opposed to the fluctuat-
ing pull of inclination.
I shall suggest that there are sound Aristotelian responses to these
challenges, and that the response can usefully be understood when we
conceive of virtues in two different senses. The first sense is the objec-
tive requirements which obtain with regard to any human being over what
is required to lead the best life. Virtues of character are necessary to lead
such a life on the grounds that certain other goods are made possible as
a result of the virtues, an obvious example being friendship. As such,
virtues are both part of the best life for any human, and also a means to
certain further features of that life. The second sense in which we need
to understand virtues is as a part of the character of certain persons, those
we think of as being virtuous agents. Such persons have internalised at the
subjective level the objective requirements for leading the best life. Non-
virtuous agents have failed to acquire the virtues of character at the sub-
jective level, but are still bound by such virtues at the objective level. The
universality of our moral obligations must be understood as a conse-
quence of how the virtues bind us in the objective sense.

ARISTOTLE AND OBLIGATION

The key test for an Aristotelian in this context is trying to provide an

account of the law-like demand which obligation makes of all of us the

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sense in which obligation compels us to act in a particular way, often in

opposition to our desires. There are moments when it is not simply that
we feel we ought to do something and experience some reticence due to
competing demands. Rather, we feel we must do it, and no competing
demand carries any real force. What follows should not be understood as
an attempt to set out Aristotles theory of moral obligation. In addition
to the fact that Aristotle himself did not address this question in the terms
in which the current debate is framed, an exegetical account would be
hampered by a range of debates surrounding the correct interpretation of
key relevant discussions such as the nature of the practical syllogism and
the incontinent agent.2 In light of these difficulties, what I offer here is
better understood as an account of what an Aristotelian can say about the
nature of moral obligation, and how she can confront the challenge posed
by Kantians in such a context.
How then, do we explain the acquisition of moral obligations from an
Aristotelian perspective? The overwhelming focus in Aristotle is on produc-
ing the right sort of character. In the first instance, we require the right sort
of upbringing. We need to have our character shaped in such a way that
we come to enjoy the performance of good actions, and to dislike engag-
ing in bad actions. This sort of moral education is essential, in that none of
us is born with the virtues or vices already present, merely with the poten-
tial to develop them as a result of the social environment in which we are
raised. If we are consistently encouraged and rewarded when we perform
good actions, we will start to take pleasure in them, and we will reach the
point where we acquire the disposition both to perform noble actions and
to enjoy them. This sort of habituation results in such dispositions becom-
ing central to how we react to the world we encounter, and a key explana-
tory factor as to how we come to acquire dispositions is that they are partly
constituted by emotions which have come to be directed in certain ways
rather than others over the course of our upbringing.
We come to describe these sorts of dispositions as virtues when they
contribute to the leading of a flourishing life. As the best life for any

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human is one lived in accordance with virtue, then each of us has a rea-
son to act virtuously. Moreover, as we are essentially social beings, the
virtues must involve our treatment of others, as a failure to develop sat-
isfying relationships with others will damage a crucial part of a good life.
Although this means that we have good reasons based on self-interest to
be virtuous, the truly virtuous agent performs good actions, and has come
to enjoy the performing of these actions for their own sake, as against per-
forming them for the sake of the pleasure we might derive from them.
We must act virtuously and we will find such acts pleasurable. It is not that
we must act virtuously because we will find such acts pleasurable.
Many actions of the virtuous agent will be performed without need
for forethought, such as when we unthinkingly help someone in diffi-
culty. Younger, virtuous agents will certainly feel an obligation to act under
certain circumstances, where any reasons for performing alternative
actions are overcome by the emotional force of the virtues they have
acquired. Once we combine a virtuous character with the experience and
greater powers of reason that come with age, we have the possibility of
a level of wisdom which allows us to recognise that virtue is in our own
interest, rather than opposed to it, as the virtuous life contributes to the
best life for any human. Such qualities of character ensure we are capa-
ble of recognising the appropriate circumstances in which acts of courage,
temperance, or magnanimity are required, and because good character
involves having the right sorts of emotional responses, such conclusions
have motivational force. The conclusion of the process of moral reason-
ing will be a virtuous action we are required to perform, and can be
described as a moral obligation.
What then can be said to explain the force which allows us to
describe this as an obligation? One quick and easy answer which needs
to be set aside is that an expression such as I had to help her can be
understood as expressing a thought such as the reasons for helping her
were much stronger than those of not helping, or I felt very strongly
that helping her was the thing to do. The reason why such an approach

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wont do is that, as Bernard Williams points out, necessity is not the

same as decisiveness (1981, 126). In practice this becomes particularly
important when we realise that either of the putative analyses of the
first proposition could be followed by but I still didnt help her. If we
are to take seriously the had to or the must of such expressions, then
we must make sense of them as expressions of the necessity of comply-
ing with obligation, rather than just expressing a sense of feeling that
there was a powerful but not irresistible reason to perform a particular
action. In light of this, the force of the sentiments which are inculcated
in us must be such that they provide not simply a reason to act, but one
which compels us to act in the face of whatever opposing reasons we
may be aware of.

THE KANTIAN CRITIQUE

One problem which any Kantian is likely to find in the sort of Aristotelian
account set out above is that it fails adequately to address the demands
which moral obligations place upon us. In Kantian terms, moral impera-
tives will not turn out to be universal, in that the most one can hope to
achieve is the claim that if we accept a particular view of what a flourish-
ing life consists in, then we must act in accordance with the virtues
required to achieve that sort of life. But if this argument is addressed to
someone who disagrees over what a flourishing life consists in, or who
refuses to accept that certain key virtues are essential for achieving such
a life, then there is no further appeal we can make from within the moral
realm. This means in turn that all those for whom the force of such
appeals carries no weight have no reason to act virtuously and they will
feel no sense of obligation. Only a categorical imperative can provide the
law-like necessity which applies to all agents, irrespective of inclination,
and only practical reason can provide this inescapable source of norma-
tivity within the moral realm.

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To respond to this sort of attack, it is worth setting out in greater

detail why the kind of Aristotelian account of obligation set out earlier is
said to fail the Kantian test, and then suggest how one might respond. In
The Sources of Normativity (1996), Christine Korsgaard argues that for a the-
ory to stand up, it must be able to answer what she calls the normative
question (ibid, 16). This question is why must I do it?, where the must
is one which springs from the demands of morality. There are three
criteria which must be met for there to be a satisfactory response (ibid, 16-
17). The first is that the answer is one which the agent herself must accept,
and it is not sufficient that we judge from a third-person perspective that
she must act in a particular way. It must be an answer such that the agent
herself feels that it brings her moral enquiry to an end with a clear answer
that she must act. The second criterion is that of transparency, which
is to say that the agent must be aware not only of what she must do,
but why she must do it. Justification is a part of any adequate answer to
a normative question because we must understand the nature of the moral
theory under which we are acting to be sure we are not acting under the
influence of a motive we do not wish to endorse. Finally, the answer
must appeal, in a deep way, to our sense of who we are, to our sense of
identity (ibid, 17). Korsgaard emphasises that the extent of what moral-
ity can demand of us, even giving up our lives in some cases, means that
it must mean that on occasion the alternative to death is even worse
not being ourselves any more (ibid 18).3 A satisfactory answer to the
question will bring the questioning to the end. The unconditional answer
must be one which makes it impossible, unnecessary or incoherent to ask
why again (ibid 33).
The question now becomes whether or not an Aristotelian can meet
the criteria which Korsgaard has set down, and she suggests certain ways
in which she could not. The problem which Korsgaard highlights is essen-
tially that once we reach the end of moral explanation in this kind of the-
ory, we can still ask significantly if we must act in accordance with what
it suggests our obligations are. If the question can still be asked in such

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a way that a reasonable person might still demand an answer, then we

have not reached the unconditional point that an adequate moral theory
must lead us to. Such a response can be inferred from her criticisms of
Bernard Williams (ibid 48-75, Williams 1985).
She understands Williams to be arguing that if we find that a social
world promoted the best life or at least a flourishing life for human
beings, this would justify the values embodied in that social world
(Korsgaard 1996, 75). According to Korsgaard, Williams asserts that nor-
mativity would have to be established by congruence with human flour-
ishing. But this means we could ask whether or not we must act in accor-
dance with an obligation based on this premise, and the fact that the
question stands in need of an answer indicates the inadequacy of the the-
ory. If an obligation is one which stems from a series of moral values
which will produce a flourishing life for me, must I obey it? If this is a
genuine question, then it raises genuine doubts, and if there are genuine
doubts then we do not seem to have the certainty embodied in the must
of our moral obligations. For this reason, the Aristotelian must offer an
account for the force of obligation in the face of the normative question.
To highlight the force of this challenge it is worth providing a specific
example of the kind of individual the Aristotelian is thought to be unable
to deal with.

JIMMY THE GENT BURKE

James Burke4 was a prominent New York wiseguy from the 1950s until
1980, when he was convicted of murder and sent to prison for life,
where he died in 1996. He never knew his real parents, and was raised
in a series of different foster homes, where occasional kindness punc-
tuated the more regular physical, sexual, and psychological abuse. At
the age of thirteen, his then foster father died in a car accident when he
lost control of the car whilst attempting to punch Burke. The foster

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mother blamed Burke for this and commenced a process of beating him
for the slightest misdemeanour. The age of thirteen also saw his first
arrest, and he was regularly arrested and beaten by the police until the
age of eighteen, when he received a five year sentence for trying to pass
fraudulent cheques. Prison allowed him to make the acquaintance of
members of the organised crime families with whom he would work
until 1980.
From an Aristotelian standpoint, Burkes failure to have his feelings
guided in the right manner meant that he was unable to develop the
virtues of character which would have allowed him to lead a flourishing
life. Indeed, he positively revelled his life of crime:

The thing youve got to understand about Jimmy is that he loved to

steal. He ate and breathed it. I think if you ever offered Jimmy a bil-
lion dollars not to steal, hed turn you down and then try to figure out
how to steal it from you. It was the only thing he enjoyed. It kept him
alive (Pileggi 2005, 80).

Now, to place this in the context of the wider discussion, Burkes upbring-
ing appears to have prevented him from developing the virtues, and the
course he chose for his life reveals a conscious decision to commit him-
self to a life of vice. The reason why this poses such a powerful threat to
any Aristotelian sense of obligation is that if obligation is dependent upon
virtue, and Burke had no virtues, then we might conclude that he had no
obligations. But this conflicts with the deeply held intuition that regard-
less of his upbringing and his chosen life, he had an obligation to treat
others with respect. For a Kantian, this intuition can be cashed out in
terms of the fact that Burke was a rational being, and his obligations
obtain purely in light of his rationality. A further, related problem which
arises is whether or not Burke had any reason to do the right thing. If he
consistently desired to steal, had no desire to treat others with respect, and
had no great fear of imprisonment, then could we not say that he had no
reason to act virtuously?

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How might the Aristotelian argue that someone without virtue is still
bound by the obligations which stem from virtue, and still has a reason
to act virtuously? The first step is to draw a distinction between two dif-
ferent senses of virtue, the objective and the subjective. At the objective
level, we can think of the virtues as a series of dispositions which make
the best life possible for any human. When we talk of virtues in this sense,
we make an objective claim which holds in light of the fundamentals of
human nature. For example, humans are naturally social beings, and the
best life is one which will therefore include successful relationships with
others. Friendship is one obvious reflection of this, and true friendship
requires a genuine concern for ones friend. This in turn requires the
virtues. These sorts of objective claims about what any human needs to
flourish ground the universal obligations which bind all humans.
When discussed in this objective sense, the virtues just are the excel-
lences which humans need to lead the best life. These need to be distin-
guished from talk of the virtues at the subjective level. When we describe
a particular person as virtuous, we claim that at the subjective level, they
have developed in such a way that they have internalised the disposi-
tions which correspond to what is objectively required to lead the best
life. The virtuous person has the right sorts of dispositions, and knows
that these are part of the best life for any human. In the context of this
discussion, it means the virtuous agent recognises what her obligations
are, and is motivated to act in accordance with them. The non-virtuous
agent struggles to recognise these obligations as a consequence of an
upbringing which has failed to habituate her to the enjoyment of virtu-
ous actions.
This means the Aristotelian can resist the claim that non-virtuous
agents have no obligations simply because they lack the virtues at the sub-
jective level. But the question now arises as to whether one can meet the
more demanding requirements set out by Korsgaard. Does the preceding
account explain how the non-virtuous agent could be brought to accept that
she must act in accordance with virtue, that the reasons are transparent,

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and that she recognises she must do this to preserve her identity? There
are certainly passages in Aristotle which suggest that it may be impossi-
ble to achieve this. In one well-known claim at the beginning of the Ethics
we are told that it is not unimportant how we are habituated from our
early days; indeed it makes a huge difference or rather all the difference
(Aristotle 2000, 1103b). This suggests that the way in which we develop
early on may set our character for the future, and such a reading is sup-
ported by some of the claims in his theory of action: so too from the
start it was open to the unjust person and the intemperate person not to
become such, so that they are what they are voluntarily; but now that
they have become what they are, it is no longer possible for them to be
otherwise (Ibid 1114a). Taken together, this suggests that after a certain
point the vices become so ingrained that it no longer becomes possible
to convince the non-virtuous agent that she is bound by the virtues and
needs to alter her behaviour accordingly.
There are two ways in which the Aristotelian can proceed. The first
is simply to reject the practicality of Korsgaards criteria. One might argue
it is enlightenment fantasy to think that the power of reason can bring the
non-virtuous agent to see the error of her ways, and to believe this can
be done is to understate the force of inclination and to overstate the
power of reason. Such a line of thought would allow the Aristotelian to
claim that the virtues bind us unconditionally at the objective level, but
the corruption of the emotions and the development of the vices through
bad habits can make it impossible at the subjective level for some persons
to understand how the virtues bind, and they are therefore unable to live
virtuously. If one has not been sensitised to the needs of others through
the right sort of emotional education, reason cannot fill this gap. The
non-virtuous agent will fail to perceive the world in the way the virtuous
agent does, and will struggle to understand the nature of virtue in much
the same way the colour blind person will struggle to understand the
world of colour. There is simply an inability to perceive the world as it is
for other humans.

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One obvious drawback with this line of argument is that it becomes

very difficult to justify punishing those who have lacked the right upbring-
ing and have strayed too often from the path of righteousness. If their cur-
rent psychology is so entirely corrupted by their past behaviour and habits
that they are really not capable of thinking and behaving otherwise, this
suggests their non-virtuous actions in the present are not voluntary, and
therefore not punishable by Aristotles own lights. The idea that we are not
justified in punishing those who seem most deserving of it seems deeply
counter-intuitive, and this makes a second response more appealing.
We can offer a less radical interpretation of Aristotle to the effect
that the inculcation of the right habits from a very early age is of vital
importance, but this does not rule out the possibility of leading a more
virtuous life in cases where someone has not had this. If we return to the
example of Jimmy Burke, he apparently acquired the rudimentary basics
of certain virtues alongside his more violent tendencies. He seemed to
combine a bizarre combination of generosity and an enthusiasm for homi-
cide (Pileggi 2005, 78). One of the unsubstantiated anecdotes about him
was that he was so distressed on learning that another gangster had failed
to repay his own mother the $5,000 that he owed her that Burke repaid
the money himself.5 Such characters are aware of the importance of oth-
ers, but restricted the class of persons to whom they show respect, and
the sorts of actions they view as unacceptable. The appeal would there-
fore be an attempt to bring them to see their respect for certain other per-
sons in certain circumstances as something which needs to be extended
more widely. We would be appealing to existing features of what Williams
calls their subjective motivational set (1981, 102), and trying to bring
them to see the wider implications of certain existing commitments. In
the terms I have used, there is a basis at the subjective level which pro-
vides a source to which one can appeal to bring such persons to under-
stand the binding nature of obligation.
On this presentation of an Aristotelian position, the fully virtuous
agent is one whose emotions and reason co-operate within the pursuit of

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virtuous action. The right habits simply make it easier for certain people
to lead a virtuous life. The right upbringing means they will develop the
right habits, making it enjoyable to perform the right actions. The non-
virtuous agent has been unfortunate in missing out on the right upbring-
ing, but this does not mean she can evade the fact that she is bound by
a set of virtues which obtain simply in light of her humanity. If we con-
front the question of whether or not she can be brought to see this, then
we can plausibly expect her to recognise that certain features from her
existing sense of obligation should be extended to conform to standards
she already accepts in a more restricted way. The respect she already
shows to certain persons should be extended to others on the grounds
that they also have the needs and capacities present in those to whom
consideration is already granted
The approach at the subjective level can be supplemented with an
appeal at the objective level which appeals to pure practical reason. Cer-
tain fundamental aspects of our nature mean humans can only lead a
flourishing life if they live in accordance with virtue. A life of virtue
makes possible ends for which any rational human would wish given our
nature. Friendship is only possible if we have a genuine concern for the
welfare of others. Good health can only be maintained if we balance the
satisfaction of sensual pleasure against the dangers of excess. The avoid-
ance of unnecessary conflict and hurt can only be accomplished if we
understand when and to what degree it makes sense to be angry. Jimmy
Burke murdered most of his own crew to avoid paying them for a rob-
bery they carried out for him. These were the people with whom he
socialised for years before he killed them. The one exception was the
person who provided the evidence which led to his conviction and years
of imprisonment before an early death. It is not in anyones self-interest
to live such a life, and the aim would be to bring the person to see this.
It is then possible that this will motivate more virtuous behaviour, which
in turn will lead to the internalisation of more virtuous dispositions
through habituation.

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Is it not possible that some people may lie beyond the appeal I have
suggested we can make? If someone lacks even the crude foundations of
the virtues of character which would allow us to convince her that her
obligations bind her with respect to all persons, and cannot be brought
through rational argument to see that a life lived in accordance with virtue
is binding upon her, can the Aristotelian pass the normative test? I sug-
gest that the answer to this is no, and that we must concede in such cases
that obligations would not be binding according to Korsgaards criteria.
The Aristotelian response may well have to be that such an individual
could not be treated as a person, and should not be seen either as hav-
ing obligations or the same rights as others. In his discussion of morbid
pleasures he argues that where mental illness or childhood victimisation
lead to a delight in such pleasures, these people are outside the bound-
aries of vice (2000, 1149a). If we are really confronted with someone
whose character places them wholly beyond the kind of appeal set out
above, then we could argue that certain fundamental features of their
character are at odds with what is standard for a human being and they
cannot therefore be regarded in the same way. In such cases the Aris-
totelian is probably no worse off than the Kantian, for whom non-rational
humans will also be devoid of obligations.
These considerations allow us better to understand how the Aris-
totelian can meet Korsgaards criteria. The appeal to the non-virtuous
agent will be transparent if we can bring her to accept that the wish for
the best life she can have brings with it certain commitments which obtain
purely in light of her humanity, and which hold independently of her
existing desires. Such an argument is one we plausibly expect any rational
agent to accept once we set out the relationship between the good life and
the virtues required to achieve it. The question of appealing to the iden-
tity of the non-virtuous agent is the most challenging given the tendency
of the vices to shape the understanding of any moral argument. I have
suggested than even those agents we view as non-virtuous will tend to
have certain virtuous dispositions to which we can appeal, and the task will

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be one of trying to bring such a person to accept the wider application

of those dispositions. This in turn can lead to the development of differ-
ent habits such that the existing bases of virtue come to dominate gen-
eral character.
The key claim for the Aristotelian is that there are certain features of
human nature which determine the outline of what the best life is for any
human. The virtues are the dispositions of character which make that life
possible as well as partly-constituting it. Our obligations are the require-
ments which those virtues place upon us. There is however a deceptive
simplicity here, in that a full understanding of this is not a matter of straight-
forward practical reason, but one which requires both reason and the right
sort of emotional attunement. Those who lack this understanding are bound
by the virtues but struggle to live by them. It is only when both reason and
the right feelings are present that we are comfortable with the compelling
force of obligation. It also means that when one is asked the normative
question Korsgaard wishes to put to the Aristotelian as to whether or not
she really must conform to her obligations, the answer will be obvious.

REFERENCES
Aristotle. 2000. Nicomachean Ethics. Tr. and ed. Roger Crisp. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Foot, Phillippa. 1978. Virtues and Vices. Oxford: Blackwell.
Foot, Phillippa. 2001. Natural Goodness. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1999. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Nagel, Thomas. 1996. Universality and the Reflective Self in Korsgaard (1996), 200-
209.
Pileggi, Nicholas. 2005. Goodfellas. London: Bloomsbury.
Williams, Bernard. 1981. Internal External Reasons. Reprinted in Moral Luck
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 101-113.
Williams, Bernard. 1981. Practical Necessity. Reprinted in Moral Luck. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 124-131.
Williams, Bernard. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana Press.

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NOTES

1. I shall look principally at Christine Korsgaard. 1996. The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. Other key works from Kantian-inspired thinkers which focus dis-
tinctly on the question of normativity are Stephen Darwall. 1983. Impartial Reason, Cornell: Cor-
nell University Press. Jonathan Dancy. 2000. Practical Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. For a discussion of the practical syllogism, including the different interpretations of it, see
Paula Gottlieb, The Practical Syllogism, in Richard Kraut (ed.) 2006 The Blackwell Guide to Aris-
totles Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, 218-234. For one of many discussions of incontinence,
see A.W. Prices Acrasia and Self-control in the same volume, 234-255. For a detailed discus-
sion of both these areas of Aristotles thought, see Sarah Broadie, 1991. Ethics with Aristotle, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
3. This rather curious criterion is one criticised by Thomas Nagel in his response in the lat-
ter sections of the book (206). As he points out, it would rather cheapen the motive of an act of
self-sacrifice to say that we made it because we didnt want to lose our identity. The explanation
ought surely to stop earlier with the claim that we made the sacrifice because we care about the
survival of others.
4. Burke was the basis for the character of Jimmy Conway, played by Robert DeNiro in
Martin Scorseses 1990 film Goodfellas. The details of Burkes life which follow are taken from the
book on which the film was based, Nicholas Pileggis Goodfellas, 2005 London: Bloomsbury. This
name has also been changed from the original title of Wiseguys, which it had when first published
in 1985.
5. This story is rather less moving if we believe the epilogue, which is that Burke then killed
the gangster later the same day for failing to respect the institution of motherhood.

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