IMBONG v. COMELEC
8), alleging that it
Nature: Petition for Declaratory Relief
Ponente: J. Makasiar
Background:
16 March 1967 Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed
Resolution No. 2 calling for a Constitutional Convention to
propose constitutional amendments to be composed of 2
delegates from each representative district who shall have the
same qualifications as those of Congressmen.
Congress, acting as a Legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914,
implementing Res. No. 2
17 June 1969 Congress, as a Constitutional Assembly, passed
Resolution No. 4, amending Res. No. 2, by providing that the
convention shall be composed of 320 delegates aproportioned
among existing representative districts according to the
population, Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2
delegates
24 August 1970 Congress, as a Legislative body, enacted Republic
Act No. 6132, aka The 1971 Constitutional Convention Act,
implementing Res. Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing RA No.
4914).
Facts:
Sec. 2: apportionment of delegates
Sec. 4: consideres all public officers/employees as resigned when they
file their candidacy
Sec. 5: disqualifies and elected delegate from running for any public
office in the election or from assuming any appointive office/
position until the final adjournment of the Const-Convention.
Par. 1, Sec. 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from
giving support/representing a delegate to the convention.
These are two separate but related petitions, filed by
petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, who are
running as candidates for the [1971] Constitutional Convention.
Both parties are questioning the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132,
(Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law, as well as the
particular provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and Par. 1 of 8;
while Imbong impugns only Par. 1 of Sec.
prejudices their rights as candidates for the Constitutional
Convention .
Issue/s: Whether the rights of the petitioners to run for candidates for
the Const-Convention are prejudiced by RA No. 6312 Whether RA No.
6312 is unconstitutional
Held: No. Prayers of both petitioners are denied, provisions assailed by
petitioners are constitutional.
Ratio Decidendi:
Sec. 2: The Court held that the apportionment provided cannot conflict
with its own intent expressed therein, because it merely obeyed and
implemented the intent of the Congress, as a Constituent Assembly, in Res.
No. 4
Sec. 4: The Court held this provisions validity since it is merely an
application of, and in consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII
of the Constitution, and that it does not constitute a denial of due process
or of the equal protection of the law.
Sec. 5: The Court held that the State has the right to create office and the
parameters to qualify or disqualify its members. It further reasoned that
the function of a delegate is far-reaching and has a more enduring effect
than that of any ordinary legislator shaping the fundamental law of the
land, which makes the classifications repugnant to the sense of justice.
Par. 1, Sec. 8: The Court held that the ban against political parties /
organizational groups is constitutional because, as also discussed by the
amica curiae, it serves as an appropriate response to the clear and present
danger of the debasement of the electoral process. It provides for the
equal protection of the laws, wherein the candidates must depend on their
individual merits and not the support of their political parties or
organizations.
The Court sustains the constitutionality of the enactment of RA No. 6312
by the Congress, as a Legislative body, exercising its broad lawmaking
authority.
 FACTS: This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate
but related petitions of running candidates for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.
Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law
VERSION 2: IMBONG V. COMELEC Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8
Petitioner: Imbong
Respondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor (Comelec ISSUE: Whether the Congress has a right to call for ConCon and whether
Members) the parameters set by such a call is constitutional.
Petitioner: Gonzales
Respondent: Comelec RULING: The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional
Ponente: Makasiar Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions
assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.
RELATED LAWS:
Resolution No 2 (1967) Calls for Constitutional Convention to be
composed of 2 delegates from each representative district who shall be RATIO:
elected in November, 1970. Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of
Constitution
RA 4919 implementation of Resolution No 2 Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:
o Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full
Resolution 4 (1969) amended Resolution 2: ConCon shall be composed authority to propose amendments, or call for convention
of 320 delegates approportioned among existing representative districts for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by
according to the population. Provided that each district shall be entitled Res 2 and 4
to 2 deledates. Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Res 4 and is
enough that the basis employed for such apportions is
RA 6132 Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonsales is not reasonable for
4. that case granted more representatives to provinces with less
population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the
Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file number of delegates I other provinces with more population.
their candicacy Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to
qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this
Sec 2: apportionment of delegates disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to
prevent political figures from controlling elections and to allow
Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office them to devote more time to the Concon.
in the election or from assuming any appointive office/position until the Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and
final adournment of the ConCon. also to assure candidates equal opportunity since candidates
must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support
Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving of political parties. This provision does not create discrimination
support/representing a delegate to the convention. towards any particular party/group, it applies to all
organizations.

Arturo Tolentino vs Commission on Elections (1971)
41 SCRA 702 Political Law Amendment to the Constitution
Doctrine of Proper Submission
FACTS: The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance
plebiscite concerning only the proposal to lower the voting age from 21
to 18. This was even before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then
under revision) had been approved. Arturo Tolentino then filed a motion
to prohibit such plebiscite.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.
RULING: Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed, there will be an
improper submission to the people. Such is not allowed.
The proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes
cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people
for ratification. Election here is singular which meant that the entire
constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only.
Furthermore, the people were not given a proper frame of reference in
arriving at their decision because they had at the time no idea yet of what
the rest of the revised Constitution would ultimately be and therefore
would be unable to assess the proposed amendment in the light of the
entire document. This is the Doctrine of Submission which means that
all the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to the
people for the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.
Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR
G.R. No. 86889 December 4, 1990
FACTS: On 10 June 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the
Philippines, which includes, among others, the raising of livestock, poultry
and swine in its coverage.
Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry
business, avers that it would be adversely affected by the enforcement of
sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of the said law. Hence, it prayed
that the said law be declared unconstitutional. The mentioned sections of
the law provies, among others, the product-sharing plan, including those
engaged in livestock and poultry business.
Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar
with crop or tree farming. That the land is not the primary resource in this
undertaking and represents no more than 5% of the total investments of
commercial livestock and poultry raisers. That the land is incidental but
not the principal factor or consideration in their industry. Hence, it argued
that it should not be included in the coverage of RA 6657 which covers
agricultural lands.
ISSUE: Whether or not certain provisions of RA 6657 is unconstitutional
for including in its definition of Agriculture the livestock and poultry
industry?
RULING: The Court held YES.
Looking into the transcript of the Constitutional Commission on the
meaning of the word agriculture, it showed that the framers never
intended to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the government.
Further, Commissioner Tadeo pointed out that the reasin why they used
the term farmworkers rather than agricultural workers in the said law
is because agricultural workers includes the livestock and poultry
industry, hence, since they do not intend to include the latter, they used
farmworkers to have distinction.
Hence, there is merit on the petitioners argument that the product-
sharing plan applied to corporate farms in the contested provisions is
unreasonable for being consficatory and violative of the due process of
law.

Patricio Dumlao vs Commission on Elections
95 SCRA 392 Political Law Constitutional Law Equal Protection crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints
Eligibility to Office after Being 65
Judicial Review; Requisites thereof
Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has
already retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement
benefits therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides, among others, that
retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office.
Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence
unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye
of the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr.
These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan
are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52
regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the
campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from
running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the
mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation
would already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of
action.
RULING: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this
case should have never been merged. Dumlaos issue is different from
Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the
requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards
that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review,
namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal
and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to
decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for
against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify
them from office as null and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection
is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of
the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on
reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and
regulated differently from another class.
For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been
validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of
younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require
that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they
assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a
reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated,
a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger
blood in our political elective echelons.
On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may
also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be
retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be
reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could
be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has
retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired,
as provided for in the challenged provision.
VERSION 2: DUMLAO v. COLEMEC
FACTS: Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has
filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the
forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.
He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection
and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has
received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under
the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of
the term of office to which he seeks to be elecOted, shall not be qualified
to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.
He claimed that the aforecited provision was directed insidiously against
him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely
arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.
His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidcay
of a person who was convicted of a crime given that there was judgment
for conviction and the prima facie nature of the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes.
He also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by
respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the
ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution,
which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be
free from any form of harassment and discrimination." Apart form this,
hey also attacked the term of office and the election period. These were
Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4; Sec 6, and Sec 1 of BP 52.
ISSUES:
1. Did petitioners have standing
2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the Constitution?
RULING:
1. No
2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted.
Petition granted
RATIO:
1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In order to
determine judicial review, three requisites are present:
a. actual case and controversy
b. proper party
c. existence of a constitutional question
a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition has yet
been filed for his disqualification. It was only a hypothetical question.
b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement? No one has
yet been adversely affected by the operation of the statutes.
c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity
for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural
regularity would require that his suit be dismissed.
However, they relaxed the procedural standard due to the public interest
involved and the imminent elections.
2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification.
If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one
class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For
purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly
classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that
age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are
not so compulsorily retirable.
The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or may not
be a reasonable classification. Young blood can be encouraged to come in
to politics.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has already
retired, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office,
as provided for in the challenged provision.
The need for new blood assumes relevance.
The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is
emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared
himself tired an unavailable for the same government work, but, which,
by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again.
It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the
application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not
deny equal protection, neither does it permit such denial.
both of them would be ineligible to run for public office.
A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges
have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a
person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which
carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold
office during the term of the sentence.
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie
evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present
danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time constraints will
prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof
to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed
to be substituted for a judicial determination. Igot's petition was
meritorious.

In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid
all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is
arbitrary and unreasonable. hat constitutional guarantee is not violated
by a reasonable classification is germane to the purpose of the law and
applies to all those belonging to the same class.

The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local
governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that
purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be
susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical
inconsistencies.

Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the constitutional
provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the fundamental law,
is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified
from running from public office on the ground alone that charges have
been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns
before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of
proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of
disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as