SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 156273. October 15, 2003]

HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO and MARIA ROTEA, namely:

ESPERANZA R. EDJEC, BERNARDA R. SUELA, RUBY C. ROTEA,
BERNARDA R. ROTEA, ELIA R. VDA. DE LIMBAGA, VIRGINIA R.
ARBON, ROSALINDA R. ARQUISOLA, CORAZON ROTEA, FE R.
EBORA, CARIDAD ROTEA, ANGELES VDA. DE RENACIA, JORGE
ROTEA, MARIA LUISA ROTEA-VILLEGAS, ALFREDO R. ROTEA,
represented by his heirs LIZBETH ROTEA and ELEPETH ROTEA;
LUIS ROTEA, represented by his heir JENNIFER ROTEA; and
ROLANDO R. ROTEA, represented by his heir ROLANDO R.
ROTEA JR., petitioners, vs. MACTAN - CEBU INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AUTHORITY, respondent.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

THE HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO AND MARIA ROTEA, petitioners herein, are
the successors-in-interest of the former registered owners of two (2) parcels of land
situated in Lahug, Cebu City, designated as Lot No. 916 with an area of 2,355 square
meters under TCT No. RT-7543 (106) T-13694, and Lot No. 920 consisting of 3,097
square meters under TCT No. RT-7544 (107) T-13695.[1]
In 1949 the National Airport Corporation as the predecessor agency of
respondent Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) wanted to acquire Lots
Nos. 916 and 920 above described among other parcels of land for the proposed
expansion of LahugAirport.[2] To entice the landowners to cede their properties, the
government assured them that they could repurchase their lands once Lahug Airport was
closed or its operations transferred to Mactan Airport.[3] Some of the landowners executed
deeds of sale with right of repurchase in favor of the government but many others,
including the owners of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 herein mentioned, refused the offer
because the payment was perceived to be way below the market price.[4]
On 16 April 1952, as the negotiations for the purchase of the lots necessary for the
expansion and improvement of Lahug Airport irredeemably broke down, the Civil
Aeronautics Administration as the successor agency of the National Airport Corporation
filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, for the expropriation of Lots
Nos. 916 and 920 and other subject realties, docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881.
 On 29 December 1961 the trial court promulgated its Decision in Civil Case No. R-
1881 condemning Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and other lots for public use upon payment of
just compensation.[5] Petitioners predecessors were paid P7,065.00 for Lot No. 916
andP9,291.00 for Lot No. 920 with consequential damages by way of legal interest
from 16 November 1947. No appeal was taken from the Decision on Lots Nos. 916 and
920, and the judgment of condemnation became final and executory.[6] Thereafter, the
certificates of title for these parcels of land were issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines under TCT No. 58691 for Lot No. 916 and TCT No. 58692 for Lot No. 920,
which under RA 6958 (1990) were subsequently transferred in favor of respondent
MCIAA.[7]
At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to
MCIAA, Lahug Airport ceased operations as the Mactan Airport was opened for incoming
and outgoing flights.[8] Lots Nos. 916 and 920 which had been expropriated for the
extension ofLahug Airport were not utilized.[9] In fact, no expansion of Lahug Airport was
undertaken by MCIAA and its predecessors-in-interest.[10] Hence, petitioners wrote then
President Fidel V. Ramos and the airport manager begging them for the exercise of their
alleged right to repurchase Lots Nos. 916 and 920.[11] Their pleas were not heeded.[12]
On 11 March 1997 petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages with
RTC of Cebu City against respondent MCIAA to compel the repurchase of Lots Nos. 916
and 920, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-20015. In the main, petitioners averred that
they had been convinced by the officers of the predecessor agency of respondent MCIAA
not to oppose the expropriation proceedings since in the future they could repurchase the
properties if the airport expansion would not push through. MCIAA did not object to
petitioners evidence establishing these allegations.
When the civil case was pending, one Richard E. Enchuan filed a Motion for Transfer
of Interest alleging that he acquired through deeds of assignment the rights of some of
herein petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920.[13] The Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) also sought to intervene in the civil case claiming that it leased in good
faith Lot No. 920 from the predecessor agencies of respondent MCIAA and that it built
thereon its Regional Equipment Services and its Region 7 Office.[14]
On 12 April 1999 the trial court found merit in the claims of petitioners and granted
them the right to repurchase the properties at the amount pegged as just compensation
in Civil Case No. R-1881 but subject to the alleged property rights of Richard
E. Enchuanand the leasehold of DPWH.[15] The trial court opined that the expropriation
became illegal or functus officio when the purpose for which it was intended was no
longer there.[16]
Respondent MCIAA appealed the Decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 64456.
On 20 December 2001 the Court of Appeals reversed the assailed Decision on the
ground that the judgment of condemnation in Civil Case No. R-1881 was unconditional
so that the rights gained therefrom by respondent MCIAA were indicative of ownership in
fee simple.[17] The appellate court cited Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan[18] which held
that mere deviation from the public purpose for which the power of eminent domain was
exercised does not justify the reversion of the property to its former owners, and Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals[19] which is
allegedly stare decisis to the instant case to prevent the exercise of the right of
repurchase as the former dealt with a parcel of land similarly expropriated under Civil
Case No. R-1881.[20]
On 28 November 2002 reconsideration of the Decision was denied. [21] Hence, this
petition for review.
Petitioners argue that Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan does not apply to the case
at bar since what was involved therein was the right of reversion and not the right of
repurchase which they are invoking. They also differentiate Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals[22] from the instant case in that the landowners in the
MCIAA case offered inadmissible evidence to show their entitlement to a right of
repurchase, while petitioners herein offered evidence based on personal knowledge for
which reason MCIAA did not object and thus waived whatever objection it might have had
to the admissibility thereof. Finally, petitioners allege that their right to equal protection of
the laws would be infringed if some landowners are given the right to repurchase their
former properties even as they are denied the exercise of such prerogative.
On the other hand, respondent MCIAA clings to our decisions
in Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan and Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v.
Court of Appeals. According to respondent MCIAA there is only one instance when
expropriated land may be repurchased by its previous owners, and that is, if the decision
of expropriation itself provides [the] condition for such repurchase. Respondent asserts
that the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 is absolute and without conditions, thus, no
repurchase could be validly exercised.
This is a difficult case calling for a difficult but just solution. To begin with, there exists
an undeniable historical narrative that the predecessors of respondent MCIAA had
suggested to the landowners of the properties covered by the Lahug Airport expansion
scheme that they could repurchase their properties at the termination of the airports
venture.[23] Some acted on this assurance and sold their properties; [24] other landowners
held out and waited for the exercise of eminent domain to take its course until finally
coming to terms with respondents predecessors that they would not appeal nor block
further the judgment of condemnation if the same right of repurchase was extended to
them.[25] A handful failed to prove that they acted on such assurance when they parted
with the ownership of their lands.[26]
In resolving this dispute, we must reckon with the rulings of this Court
in Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan and Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v.
Court of Appeals, which define the rights and obligations of landowners whose properties
were expropriated when the public purpose for which eminent domain was exercised no
longer subsists. In Fery, which was cited in the recent case of Reyes v. Court of
Appeals,[27] we declared that the government acquires only such rights in expropriated
parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties -

If x x x land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that
purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of
course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the
property so expropriated. If x x xland is expropriated for a public street and the
expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it for a public street,
then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the
former owner, unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary x x x x If, upon
the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title,
then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it
be the State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have
the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings
x x x x When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally,
either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no
rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to
a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion
to the former owner x x x x [28]

In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, respondent Chiongbian sought to

enforce an alleged right of repurchase over her properties that had been expropriated in
Civil Case No. R-1881. This Court did not allow her to adduce evidence of her claim, for
to do so would unsettle as to her properties the judgment of condemnation in the eminent
domain proceedings. We also held therein that Chiongbians evidence was both
inadmissible and lacking in probative value -

The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and grant title to Lot No. 941 in
fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition imposed to the
effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right
to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or
abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as
the Lahug Airport. CHIONGBIAN cannot rely on the ruling in Mactan-
Cebu International Airport vs. Court of Appeals wherein the presentation
of parol evidence was allowed to prove the existence of a written agreement
containing the right to repurchase. Said case did not involve expropriation
proceedings but a contract of sale x x x x To permit CHIONGBIAN to prove the
existence of a compromise settlement which she claims to have entered into with the
Republic of the Philippines prior to the rendition of judgment in the expropriation
case would result in a modification of the judgment of a court which has long become
final and executory x x x x And even assuming for the sake of argument that
CHIONGBIAN could prove the existence of the alleged written agreement
acknowledging her right to repurchase Lot No. 941 through parol evidence, the Court
of Appeals erred in holding that the evidence presented by CHIONGBIAN was
admissible x x x x Aside from being inadmissible under the provisions of the Statute
of Frauds, [the] testimonies are also inadmissible for being hearsay in nature x x x x [29]
 We adhere to the principles enunciated in Fery and in Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority, and do not overrule them. Nonetheless the weight of their import,
particularly our ruling as regards the properties of respondent Chiongbian in Mactan-
CebuInternational Airport Authority, must be commensurate to the facts that were
established therein as distinguished from those extant in the case at bar. Chiongbian put
forth inadmissible and inconclusive evidence, while in the instant case we have
preponderant proof as found by the trial court of the existence of the right of repurchase
in favor of petitioners.
Moreover, respondent MCIAA has brought to our attention a significant and telling
portion in the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 validating our discernment that the
expropriation by the predecessors of respondent was ordered under the running
impression thatLahug Airport would continue in operation -

As for the public purpose of the expropriation proceeding, it cannot now be

doubted. Although Mactan Airport is being constructed, it does not take away the
actual usefulness and importance of the Lahug Airport: it is handling the air traffic
both civilian and military. From it aircrafts fly toMindanao and Visayas and pass thru
it on their flights to the North and Manila. Then, no evidence was adduced to show
how soon is the Mactan Airport to be placed in operation and whether
the Lahug Airport will be closed immediately thereafter. It is up to the other
departments of the Government to determine said matters. The Court cannot substitute
its judgment for those of the said departments or agencies. In the absence of such
showing, the Court will presume that the Lahug Airport will continue to be in
operation (emphasis supplied). [30]

While the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 could have simply acknowledged the
presence of public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain regardless of the survival
of Lahug Airport, the trial court in its Decision chose not to do so but instead prefixed its
finding of public purpose upon its understanding that Lahug Airport will continue to be in
operation. Verily, these meaningful statements in the body of the Decision warrant the
conclusion that the expropriated properties would remain to be so until it was confirmed
that Lahug Airport was no longer in operation. This inference further implies two (2)
things: (a) after the Lahug Airport ceased its undertaking as such and the expropriated
lots were not being used for any airport expansion project, the rights vis--vis the
expropriated Lots Nos. 916 and 920 as between the State and their former owners,
petitioners herein, must be equitably adjusted; and, (b) the foregoing unmistakable
declarations in the body of the Decision should merge with and become an intrinsic part
of the fallo thereof which under the premises is clearly inadequate since
the dispositive portion is not in accord with the findings as contained in the body thereof.[31]
Significantly, in light of the discussion above, the admission of petitioners during the
pre-trial of Civil Case No. CEB-20015 for reconveyance and damages that respondent
MCIAA was the absolute owner of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 does not prejudice petitioners
interests. This is as it should be not only because the admission concerns a legal
conclusion fiercely debated by the parties[32] but more so since respondent was truly the
absolute owner of the realties until it was apparent that Lahug Airport had stopped doing
business.
To sum up what we have said so far, the attendance in the case at bar of standing
admissible evidence validating the claim of petitioners as well as the portions above-
quoted of the Decision in the expropriation case volunteered no less than by respondent
itself, takes this case away from the ambit of Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
v. Court of Appeals[33] but within the principles enunciated in Fery as mentioned earlier. In
addition, there should be no doubt that our present reading of the fallo of the Decision in
Civil Case No. R-1881 so as to include the statements in the body thereof afore-quoted
is sanctioned by the rule that a final and executory judgment may nonetheless be clarified
by reference to other portions of the decision of which it forms a part. In Republic v. De
Los Angeles[34] we ruled -

This Court has promulgated many cases x x x wherein it was held that a judgment
must not be read separately but in connection with the other portions of the decision
of which it forms a part. Hence x x x the decision of the court below should be taken
as a whole and considered in its entirety to get the true meaning and intent of any
particular portion thereof x x x x Neither is this Court inclined to confine itself to a
reading of the said fallo literally. On the contrary, the judgment portion of a decision
should be interpreted and construed in harmony with the ratio decidendi thereof
x xx x As stated in the case of Policarpio vs. Philippine Veterans Board, et
al., supra, to get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof
should be resorted to but the same must be considered in its entirety. Hence, a
resolution or ruling may and does appear in other parts of the decision and not merely
in the fallo thereof x x x x The foregoing pronouncements find support in the case
of Locsin, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 63 Phil., 87, 91-92, wherein this Court allowed a
judgment that had become final and executory to be clarified by supplying a word
which had been inadvertently omitted and which, when supplied, in effect changed the
literal import of the original phraseology x x x x This is so because, in the first place,
if an already final judgment can still be amended to supply an omission committed
through oversight, this simply means that in the construction or interpretation of an
already final decision, the fallo or dispositive portion thereof must be correlated with
the body of such final decision x x x x [I]f an amendment may be allowed after a
decision has already become final x x x such amendment may consist x x x either in
the x xx interpretation of an ambiguous phrase therein in relation to the body of the
decision which gives it life.[35]

We now resolve to harmonize the respective rights of the State and petitioners to the
expropriated Lots Nos. 916 and 920.
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority[36] is correct in stating that one would not
find an express statement in the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 to the effect that the
[condemned] lot would return to [the landowner] or that [the landowner] had a right to
repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned
or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug Airport. This omission
notwithstanding, and while the inclusion of this pronouncement in the judgment of
condemnation would have been ideal, such precision is not absolutely necessary nor is it
fatal to the cause of petitioners herein. No doubt, the return or repurchase of the
condemned properties of petitioners could be readily justified as the manifest legal effect
or consequence of the trial courts underlying presumption that Lahug Airport will continue
to be in operation when it granted the complaint for eminent domain and the airport
discontinued its activities.
The predicament of petitioners involves a constructive trust, one that is akin [37] to the
implied trust referred to in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code, If an absolute conveyance of
property is made in order to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward
the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established. If the fulfillment of the obligation is
offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand the reconveyance of the
property to him. In the case at bar, petitioners conveyed Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to the
government with the latter obliging itself to use the realties for the expansion
of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its bargain, the government can be compelled by
petitioners to reconvey the parcels of land to them, otherwise, petitioners would be denied
the use of their properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated
when the expropriation was authorized.
Although the symmetry between the instant case and the situation contemplated by
Art. 1454 is not perfect, the provision is undoubtedly applicable. For, as explained by an
expert on the law of trusts: The only problem of great importance in the field of
constructive trusts is to decide whether in the numerous and varying fact situations
presented to the courts there is a wrongful holding of property and hence a threatened
unjust enrichment of the defendant.[38] Constructive trusts are fictions of equity which are
bound by no unyielding formula when they are used by courts as devices to remedy any
situation in which the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the
beneficial interest.[39]
In constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary and passive in which the trustees
sole duty is to transfer the title and possession over the property to the plaintiff-
beneficiary.[40] Of course, the wronged party seeking the aid of a court of equity in
establishing a constructive trust must himself do equity.[41] Accordingly, the court will
exercise its discretion in deciding what acts are required of the plaintiff-beneficiary as
conditions precedent to obtaining such decree and has the obligation to reimburse the
trustee the consideration received from the latter just as the plaintiff-beneficiary would if
he proceeded on the theory of rescission.[42] In the good judgment of the court, the trustee
may also be paid the necessary expenses he may have incurred in sustaining the
property, his fixed costs for improvements thereon, and the monetary value of his services
in managing the property to the extent that plaintiff-beneficiary will secure a benefit from
his acts.[43]
The rights and obligations between the constructive trustee and the beneficiary, in
this case, respondent MCIAA and petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920, are echoed in
Art. 1190 of the Civil Code, When the conditions have for their purpose the
extinguishment of an obligation to give, the parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions,
shall return to each other what they have received x x x x In case of the loss, deterioration
or improvement of the thing, the provisions which, with respect to the debtor, are laid
down in the preceding article shall be applied to the party who is bound to return x x x x
Hence, respondent MCIAA as representative of the State is obliged to reconvey Lots
Nos. 916 and 920 to petitioners who shall hold the same subject to existing liens thereon,
i.e., leasehold right of DPWH. In return, petitioners as if they were plaintiff-beneficiaries
of a constructive trust must restore to respondent MCIAA what they received as just
compensation for the expropriation of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 in Civil Case No. R-1881,
i.e., P7,065.00 for Lot No. 916 and P9,291.00 for Lot No. 920 with consequential
damages by way of legal interest from 16 November 1947. Petitioners must likewise pay
respondent MCIAA the necessary expenses it may have incurred in sustaining the
properties and the monetary value of its services in managing them to the extent that
petitioners will be benefited thereby. The government however may keep whatever
income or fruits it may have obtained from the parcels of land, in the same way that
petitioners need not account for the interests that the amounts they received as just
compensation may have earned in the meantime. As a matter of justice and convenience,
the law considers the fruits and interests as the equivalent of each other.[44]
Under Art. 1189 of the Civil Code, If the thing is improved by its nature, or by time,
the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor x x x, the creditor being the
person who stands to receive something as a result of the process of
restitution. Consequently, petitioners as creditors do not have to settle as part of the
process of restitution the appreciation in value of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 which is the
natural consequence of nature and time.
Petitioners need not also pay for improvements introduced by third parties, i.e.,
DPWH, as the disposition of these properties is governed by existing contracts and
relevant provisions of law. As for the improvements that respondent MCIAA may have
made on Lots Nos. 916 and 920, if any, petitioners must pay respondent their prevailing
free market price in case petitioners opt to buy them and respondent decides to sell. In
other words, if petitioners do not want to appropriate such improvements or respondent
does not choose to sell them, the improvements would have to be removed without any
obligation on the part of petitioners to pay any compensation to respondent MCIAA for
whatever it may have tangibly introduced therein.[45]
The medium of compensation for the restitution shall be ready money or cash payable
within a period of three hundred sixty five (365) days from the date that the amount to be
returned by petitioners is determined with finality, unless the parties herein stipulate and
agree upon a different scheme, medium or schedule of payment. If after the period of
three hundred sixty five (365) days or the lapse of the compromise scheme or schedule
of payment such amount owed is not settled, the right of repurchase of petitioners and
the obligation of respondent MCIAA to reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and/or the latters
improvements as set forth herein shall be deemed forfeited and the ownership of those
parcels of land shall vest absolutely upon respondent MCIAA.
Finally, we delete the award of P60,000.00 for attorneys fees and P15,000.00 for
litigation expenses in favor of petitioners as decreed in the assailed Decision of 12 April
1999 of the trial court. It is not sound public policy to set a premium upon the right to
litigate where such right is exercised in good faith, as in the present case, albeit the
decision to resist the claim is erroneous.[46]
The rule on awards of attorneys fees and litigation expenses is found in Art. 2208 of
the Civil Code -

In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than
judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interests;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff's valid and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled
workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability
laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

As noted in Mirasol v. De la Cruz,[47] Art. 2208 intends to retain the award of attorneys fees
as the exception in our law and the general rule remains that attorneys fees are not
recoverable in the absence of a stipulation thereto.
In the case at bar, considering the established absence of any stipulation regarding
attorneys fees, the trial court cannot base its award on any of the exceptions enumerated
in Art. 2208. The records of the instant case do not disclose any proof presented by
petitioners to substantiate that the actuations of respondent MCIAA were clearly
unfounded or purely for the purpose of harassment; neither does the trial court make any
finding to that effect in its appealed Decision.
While Art. 2208, par. (4), allows attorneys fees in cases of clearly unfounded civil
actions, this exception must be understood to mean those where the defenses are so
untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad faith. Evidence must be presented to
the court as to the facts and circumstances constituting the alleged bad faith, otherwise,
the award of attorneys fees is not justified where there is no proof other than the bare
statement of harassment that a party to be so adjudged had acted in bad faith. The
exercise of judicial discretion in the award of attorneys fees under Art. 2208, par. (11),
demands a factual, legal or equitable justification that would bring the case within the
exception and justify the grant of such award.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64456 dated 20 December 2001 and
its Resolution of 28 November 2002 denying reconsideration of
the Decision are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of RTC-Br. 19 of Cebu City dated 12 April 1999 in Civil Case No. CEB-
20015 is MODIFIED IN PART by -
(a) ORDERING respondent Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA) TO RECONVEY to petitioner Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea,
namely: Esperanza R. Edjec, Bernarda R. Suela, Ruby
C. Rotea, Bernarda R. Rotea, Elia R. Vda DeLimbaga, Virginia R. Arbon, Rosalinda
R. Arquisola, Corazon Rotea, Fe R. Ebora, Caridad Rotea, Angeles Vda. De Renacia,
Jorge Rotea, Maria Luisa Rotea-Villegas, Alfredo R. Rotea, represented by his heirs,
namely: Lizbeth Rotea and Elepeth Rotea; Luis Rotea, represented by his heir
Jennifer Rotea; and Rolando R. Rotea, represented by his heir Rolando R. Rotea Jr., Lot
No. 916 with an area of 2,355 square meters and Lot No. 920 consisting of 3,097 square
meters in Lahug, Cebu City, with all the improvements thereon evolving through nature
or time, but excluding those that were introduced by third parties, i.e., DPWH, which shall
be governed by existing contracts and relevant provisions of law;
(b) ORDERING petitioner Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea TO
PAY respondent MCIAA what the former received as just compensation for the
expropriation of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 in Civil Case No. R-1881, i.e., P7,065.00 for Lot
No. 916 andP9,291.00 for Lot No. 920 with consequential damages by way of legal
interest from 16 November 1947. Petitioners must likewise PAY respondent MCIAA the
necessary expenses that the latter may have incurred in sustaining the properties and the
monetary value of its services in managing the properties to the extent that petitioners will
secure a benefit from such acts. Respondent MCIAA however may keep whatever
income or fruits it may have obtained from the parcels of land, in the same way that
petitioners need not account for the interests that the amounts they received as just
compensation may have earned in the meantime;
(c) ORDERING respondent MCIAA TO CONVEY to petitioners the improvements it
may have built on Lots Nos. 916 and 920, if any, in which case petitioners SHALL PAY for
these improvements at the prevailing free market price, otherwise, if petitioners do not
want to appropriate such improvements, or if respondent does not choose to sell them,
respondent MCIAA SHALL REMOVE these improvements WITHOUT ANY
OBLIGATION on the part of petitioners to pay any compensation to respondent MCIAA
for them;
(d) ORDERING petitioners TO PAY the amount so determined under letter (b) of
this dispositive portion as consideration for the reconveyance of Lots Nos. 916 and 920,
as well as the prevailing free market price of the improvements built thereon by
respondent MCIAA, if any and desired to be bought and sold by the parties, in ready
money or cash PAYABLE within a period of three hundred sixty five (365) days from the
date that the amount under letter (b) above is determined with finality, unless the parties
herein stipulate a different scheme or schedule of payment, otherwise, after the period of
three hundred sixty five (365) days or the lapse of the compromise scheme or schedule
of payment and the amount so payable is not settled, the right of repurchase of petitioners
and the obligation of respondent MCIAA to so reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and/or
the improvements shall be DEEMED FORFEITED and the ownership of those parcels of
land shall VEST ABSOLUTELY upon respondent MCIAA;
(e) REMANDING the instant case to RTC-Br. 19 of Cebu City for purposes of
determining the amount of compensation for Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to be paid by
petitioners as mandated in letter (b) hereof, and the value of the prevailing free market
price of the improvements built thereon by respondent MCIAA, if any and desired to be
bought and sold by the parties, and in general, securing the immediate execution of
this Decision under the premises;
(f) ORDERING petitioners to respect the right of the Department of Public Works and
Highways to its lease contract until the expiration of the lease period; and
(g) DELETING the award of P60,000.00 for attorneys fees and P15,000.00 for
litigation expenses against respondent MCIAA and in favor of petitioners.
This Decision is without prejudice to the claim of intervenor one Richard
E. Enchuan on his allegation that he acquired through deeds of assignment the rights of
some of herein petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, and Tinga, JJ., concur.