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Mohanty Pramana
Mohanty Pramana
Author(s): J. N. Mohanty
Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 38, No. 3, Fiftieth Anniversary, Department of
Philosophy, University of Hawaii (Jul., 1988), pp. 251-260
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398865
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J. N. Mohanty A fragment of the Indian philosophical tradition-
Theory ofpramtna
There are two ways in which one may look critically at a tradition: from within
or from the outside. In this article, I intend to do it the first way. Raising the
sort of questions that I will be asking already implies a certain estrangement
from that tradition, but at the same time I do so not in order to find the faults
or limitations which may characterize it, but with a view to continuing and
creatively advancing the traditional modes of thinking. Living outside the
country where that tradition developed and still has deep roots, and exposed
to a powerful and temporally and culturally more relevant mode of thinking,
one runs the risk of being an over-hasty, shallow, and even arrogant critic of a
long and hallowed tradition. One gathers the illusion of being free, free from all
tradition, and thus justified in critiquing one's own. But if that sense of free-
dom is illusory, this critique is superficial. If the critic claims to be free from all
traditions, he will be forgetting what Gadamer has so poignantly reminded us:
that he will be thinking from within a new tradition, for example, the tradition
of (modern) rationalism.
In talking about the Indian philosophical tradition, I will be referring to the
Indian darsanas, the classical philosophical schools-and only indirectly to the
scriptures from which those schools derive their ideas and motivations. This
decision, justified by usage of antiquity, leaves us with a less ambiguous dis-
course to reflect upon, and makes it possible to avoid many familiar pitfalls.
Talking about Indian philosophy, it is not uncommon, for example, to insist
that Indian philosophy is deeply spiritual, that its goal is not simple intellectual
jugglery, but spiritual transformation of one's nature, that philosophy is a
means to the attainment of moksa or spiritual freedom. Such large claims are,
to say the least, highly misleading; in a familiar construal, they may even be
false. The following remarks may partly clear the way for a more fruitful reflec-
tion on the nature of Indian philosophy.
In the first place, there is no doubt that the Upanisadsexhibit a strong spiri-
tual motivation: knowing the atman is said to bring about an end to worldly
sufferings and a state of spiritual freedom (whatever the latter may mean). It is
a frequent mistake not to distinguish between the spirituality of the Upanisads
and the alleged spirituality of the darsanaseven when the latter trace their ideas
and doctrines back to the Upanisads. Secondly, thinkingabout spiritual matters
is not itself spiritual. To assert this is not to degrade such thinking, but only to
reiterate its nature qua thinking. Qua thinking, it may be thorough or super-
ficial, adventurous or conventional, logically rigorous or lacking in rigor, criti-
cal or creative-but neither spiritual nor nonspiritual. Consider an analogous
point: thinking about perception is not itself perceptual. Another thing often
lost sight of by those who argue for the spiritual character of the darsanas is
that, although the darsanas, at least some of them, recognize sabda as a
pramdna or means of true knowledge, they do not eo ipso identify saibdawith
experience of some sort. This matter about which the philosophical tradition
had great clarity is misconstrued by those who want to argue that recognition
of sabda as a pramdna is tantamount to according to the spiritual experiences
of the "seers" an authoritative status. I will return to this confusion later. The
same sort of confusion characterizes such cliches as that the Indian philos-
ophies make use of intuition rather than intellect. Quite apart from the fact
that the uses of "intuition" and "intellect" are many and muddled, I wish to
remind those who revel in such cliches that none of the darsanasuses a pramana,
which suffers a renderinginto that much misused word "intuition."
Without belaboring my point any further, let me turn to the positive char-
acterizations that I intend to submit. I will divide my remarks into three
groups: those concerning pramdna or means of true cognition; those concern-
ing prameya or objects of true cognition; and the overall status of the theory, its
aim and its relation to other sorts of inquiry.
11
A philosophical theory needs not only to elaborate a view about the nature of
things, but also to back up this account with a theory of evidence, rationaljusti-
fication, and critical appraisal. It needs not only to use evidence, rational justi-
fications, and critical appraisals, but also to have a theory of those theoretical
practices. It needs to have generalized answers to such questions as: when is a
cognitive claim valid? What sorts of evidences are acceptable in adjudicating
the validity of a cognitive claim? What sorts of justifications of beliefs are ac-
ceptable? In critically appraising rival claims, what criteria are admissible?
Where there are conflicting criteria, what are their relative strengths and weak-
nesses? These are the tasks to which the pramianatheory addresses itself. It is a
singular sign of the high level of intellectual sophistication of the darsanas that
they all, at some time or other in the course of their development, came up with
their theories ofpramdna.
As is rather well known, these theories differed not alone with regard to the
definition of pramin.a (and the implied concept of prami, that is, true cogni-
tion), but also with regard to the number of pramdnas and their specific na-
tures. My purpose here is to draw attention to some striking features that
emerge in these discussions, and which throw some light, however dim, on the
Indian concept of rationality.
To begin with, let us note an important difference in locution, which, how-
ever, is not a mere matter of locution, but points to deep substantive issues. In
the Western philosophical tradition, it was usual, until recent times, to ask:
does knowledge arise from reason or from experience?The rationalists and the
253
It is really here that the true foundation and the deeper roots of the Hindu
tradition lie. The mere recognition of sabda as a pramdna is itself a novel
feature of the Indian epistemologies.The Western epistemologies recognize one
or more of the following sorts of knowledge: perception, reasoning, introspec-
tion, and memory. Many, in more recent philosophy, have come to emphasize
the decisive role that language plays in shaping our knowledge. But to the best
of my knowledge, no one recognizes language-or verbal utterance-as a
means by itself of acquiring knowledge about the world. And yet how much do
we know simply by hearing others, by reading books and so forth, not to
speak of the religious and moral beliefs that we derive from perusal of the
scriptures? The Indian epistemologies consequently recognized sabda (that is,
hearing the utterances of a competent speaker) not only as a pramdna, but as
the decisive source of our cognitions about all those matters that transcend the
limits of possible sensory experience.
To bring out some peculiarities of the thesis of sabda-pramana,I would like
to emphasize the following points.
First, sabda, as a pramina, is not a mere word, but a sentence-and that,
too, is not a written, but a spoken sentence. There is undoubtedly a priority of
the spoken and the heard over the written.
Secondly, with regard to language learning, most Indian theorists emphasize
imperative sentences rather than indicative sentences. The sentence utterances
are primarily-if not exclusively-to give orders, to suggest courses of action
to be undertaken or avoided, and so forth, and not to state facts.
Thirdly, in their theory of meaning (both of words and of sentences), most
Indian theorists have subscribed to a pure referential theory and do not have a
concept of sense as distinguished from reference. (Since I made this diagnosis
two decades ago, several people have tried to show where to look for such a
theory of sense. Most convincing of these attempts is by Mark Siderits. While
Siderits is right in tracing a sort of sense theory to the Buddhist apoha theory, I
think my general diagnosis is correct.) A direct referential theory permits the
theory of sabdapramdnato collapse the distinction between understanding and
knowing. While translations of empty expressions like "hare's horn" a la
Russell abound in the Nyaya literature, the real stumbling block before the
theory is to have some reasonably acceptable account of what it is to under-
stand a false sentence. Sabdapramdnamust be-even for the Naiyayika, if they
are to be consistent-intrinsically true. False sentences cannot generate any
understanding (sdbdabodha), not to speak of prama. But, of course, on the
theory, sabdabddhdand sabdajanyapramdare the same! The enormous problems
that this identification generates are all too obvious.4
Fourthly, there is one area of knowledge where the claim of sabda to be an
irreducible pramdna is strongest: this is the domain of what ought and ought
not to be done. If factual truths may possibly be established either by percep-
tion or by reasoning of some sort, our only source of knowing what ought and
257
What sort of theories ofprameya, of possible objects of true knowledge, did the
Indian philosophers hold? Given the great variety of ontologies-ranging from
the pluralism of Nyaya-Vaisesika to the monism of Advaita Vedanta-what
can be done at this point is to draw attention to some salient features of those
ontologies.
The first thing to be noted is that these ontologies do not countenance any
abstract entity of the sorts that ontologies in the West admit. Among the
familiar abstract entities, we have Fregean senses (for example, propositions),
numbers, and universals. I have already said that, in my view, full-fledged
Fregean senses are not to be found. Numbers are reduced to properties (gunas)
of sets. Universals, although common, are not the sort of rarefied entities
amenable only to the grasp of pure reason, which characterize them in the
Western metaphysical tradition. They are rather more concrete entities, per-
ceived through the same sense organ by which their instances are. Nor are there
pure unactualized possibilities. It is not surprising that these last creatures are
absent, for their habitat in the Western metaphysical tradition, God's mind,
does not play that role of creating out of nothing in Indian thought. In the ab-
sence of possibilia and of abstract entities such as propositions, some standard
concepts of necessary truth and its opposite contingent truth just cannot find
any formulation in the Indian systems. Thus, we have accounts of what the
world does consist of, but not of what might have been or could not possibly
not be. Recall that the standard formulation of vydpti is extensional ("It is
never the case that in all those loci where smoke is present, fire is absent"), but
not modal ("It is impossible that.... ").
One reason why, in traditional Western metaphysics, the metaphysical
scheme claimed a sort of necessity over and against those features of the world
which the sciences study is that metaphysics and science have stood sharply
separated ever since the beginning of metaphysics in Aristotle. Metaphysics, on
this account, is concerned not with beings, but with being qua being-the lat-
ter, that is 'being qua being', being construed in various well-known ways (the
highest being; the most general predicates or categories; the meaning of
'being'-to recall a few). For the Indian metaphysicians, science and meta-
physics remain continuous. Both undertake to understand the structure of the
258 Mohanty
world; they differ only in their order of generality. The Advaita Vedanta is the
only exception in this regard: the world being unreal, on this theory, it is left
to empirical science; and metaphysics, if that is what para vidyd needs to be
called (which is indeed doubtful), is the knowledge of the one Being underly-
ing beings.
If creation out of nothing, and so creation in the strict sense, has no place in
Indian thought, that simply is not a marginal phenomenon for the darsanas,
but-as I believe it can be shown-determines some very central features not
only of the Indian cosmologies, but also of the metaphysical notions of God,
substance, time and, negation. Unfortunately, I cannot undertake an investiga-
tion of that problem on this occasion.
IV
In this last and concluding section, I would like to make a few remarks on the
pramdna-prameyastructure in its entirety, that is, on the philosophical en-
terpriseas illustratedin the darsanas.While engaged in highly sophisticatedphi-
losophical activity, the Indian thinkers did not explicitly and self-consciously
focus on the nature of their enterprise. It is generally in response to the skepti-
cal challenges of a Madhyamika that sometimes they would, while defending
their enterprise, remark on the nature of what they would be doing. Without
going into textual details, let me state some of the main issues.
1. The Madhyamika critique is not merely a critique of the epistemology,
but also a critique of the ontology. The critic insists on their mutual depen-
dence. You cannot decide what the pramidnasare unless you have decided what
things there are to be known. And you cannot settle this latter question unless
you have, at hand, the means of knowing. Where, then, do you begin? If the
circularity cannot be broken, why not give up the entire enterprise?
2. The pramdna-prameyatheorist's response to this challenge has been, in
brief, that it presupposes an unnecessarily strong reading of the unity of the
two parts of a darsana. There is no one-to-one relation between a pramana
and its prameya. One and the same thing can be known by more than one
pramdna. One and the same system of ontology can be made to go together
with different epistemologies: consider the Nyaya and the Vaisesika. The
mutual dependence that threatens the relation between cognition in general
and object in general is broken by specifying both and establishing a many-one
or one-many relation between terms on each side.
3. What (2) entails is that a darsana is not a seamless unity such that parts of
it cannot be taken out of the context of that system. My interpretation goes
against the traditionalist's view of it, which regards each darsana as a unique
point of view. Among moderns, the Russian emigre, David Zilberman, (whose
259
untimely death was a serious loss to the cause of Indian philosophy) held this
holistic view of a darsana-which I reject here.
5. Students of the darsanas often wonder from where did the early
masters-the authors of the sutras and Bhdsyas-derive that framework (the
list ofpramdnas and prameyas) which the later authors went on refining. To say
that they elaborated a way of seeing-using the verbal root 'drs' (= to see) is
not to assuage that anxiety. It is not in any case true that the later authors
simply refined and clarified the framework suggested by the founding fathers.
They also changed and modified it within limits (which also speaks against a
strong holistic reading of the darsanas.) The more common response was to
trace the framework back to the sruti (the heard texts with no human author).
Consider the intellectual phenomenon that philosophical systems as diverse as
Nyaya and Vedanta claimed affiliation with the sruti. How then should the
nature of sabdapramdnabe construed so that this paradoxical situation may be
rendered intelligible?I suggest that for this purpose the nature of sabdapramdna
as applied to sruti be construed in a manner that is implicit in the tradition's
understanding of itself but not explicitly formulated as such. And it is here
that I differ from the orthodoxy in interpreting the role of sruti vis-a-vis the
philosophies.
The apauruseyatvaof sruti means, for me, neither that the texts are not com-
posed at all (thus I deny its literal construction) nor that those texts express
some supernormal, mystic experience. Not the first, for there is enough internal
evidence that the texts were composed and also because the literal construal
makes no sense. Not the second, for-in my view-sentences do not express
experiences, but rather thoughts. This last thesis I would like to defend, but
260 Mohanty
this is not the occasion to do so. Setting aside these two commonly held inter-
pretations, I wish to suggest the following.
First, in understanding the sruti texts, it is utterly irrelevant and of no use to
appeal to the intentions of their authors. The texts, the words themselves, are
primary in the sense that they are available to us, and it is they that define for
us the tradition. We use them to interpret our experiences, our world, and our-
selves, and in doing so we also interpret those words themselves. Whereas orth-
odoxy ascribes to the words of the sruti what it takes to be the meaning, I
leave open the possibilities of interpreting them. It is this plasticity of meaning,
this endless possibility of interpretation, the continuing challenge they make
to us, which sets the texts of the sruti apart from those of smrti. They are
foundational not because they express truths which are infallible, but because
they define the parameters within which the Hindu philosophers asked ques-
tions, understood their concerns, and appraised their answers. In this sense,
sabda (as sruti) is not itself a pramina, but underlies the latter's applications.
Apauruseyasrutiis not the supremepramdna, infallible and raised above all the
rest. It is rather the source of all those concerns and inquiries(not answers) in
the solution of which the differentpramdnasexhibit their special philosophical
relevance.
Who, then, is thinking within that tradition? My answer is that it is not nec-
essary to be thinking within the tradition, to subscribe to any or all of the an-
swers of the schools, but what is necessary is to share the concerns as sources
of philosophical problems. I define the tradition, then, in terms of concerns,
rather than in terms of beliefs.
NOTES