Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for
petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions.
While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision
in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding -elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
1
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-
C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of
a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what
constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive
office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces
all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of
law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an
attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney,
counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing
counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting
fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court.
(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193
N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
 ... for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their
rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as
an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before
any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or
while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava,
(105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them
in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect
of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small
part of work performed outside of any court and having no
2
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may
have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require
in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question
set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the
work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in
his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that
these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-
666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E.
313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting
orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys
engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he
is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
(111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show
that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of
law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the
members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be
Members of the Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the
provision "who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding
members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that
this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does
not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the
COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers
who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or
legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
3
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional
Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on
the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever
this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the
Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is
taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one
question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by
a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice
that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it
will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the Provision on
qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on
Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that
this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among
others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission
on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with
not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in
many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although
many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke,
Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois],
[1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term,
as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization
engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers
who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of
lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and
members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized
as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In
either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In
most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of
law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice
of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal
Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice
of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d
623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function
known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition
would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at
once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an
uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little
time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice
without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers
do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of
both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession.
(Ibid.).
4
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind
reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late
Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even
today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney
is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of
the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen,
know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal
work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work
also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more
time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than
in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the
planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need
not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be
avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig
engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and
other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services
outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as
tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the
lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator who
specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the
work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving,
document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find
that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for
many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation
work that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically,
so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial
litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of
prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both
by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common
of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below
quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure
from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a
revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy decisional
contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent
decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today
requires an accurate understanding of the nature and
implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved
corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-
making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us
the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional
contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be
processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional
factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and
the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data
processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress
5
the predictive component of the policy-making process,
wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment
thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of
action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly
engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the
subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little
organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of
advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-
disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions
by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through
an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and
the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in
business administration or management, functioning at the
legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of
other professions which are currently engaged in similar types
of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance
problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from each
and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the
business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is
assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is
the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele
composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and
industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many
people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer
does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the
corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm
out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others
have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other
corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal
problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer
who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of
concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal
research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary
(in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other
adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability
to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities
other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation
he is representing. These include such matters as determining
policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis
supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of
being isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's
work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can
be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his
work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes
offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running
of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be
engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large
MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After
all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number
of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign
country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area
coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the
6
overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger
attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries.
(Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in
the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated
lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who
fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the
difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot
in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the
traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study
to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an
incursion as well into the intertwining modern management
issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with
three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into
current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary
skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting
circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as
"intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying
theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect
the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer
reviews the globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for
are required to make, and the need to think about a
corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the
nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global
multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national
governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only
with public entities but with each other often with those
who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-
making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a
stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on
boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new
patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws
are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with
governmental policies toward the promotion and management
of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally
require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be
learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and
Race are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the
Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations.
Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable
factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups
actively revising their knowledge of the environment
coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such
external activities are better predictors of team performance
than internal group processes.
7
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the
corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking
ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and
to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three
factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has
been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking
regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems.
An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory
levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems physical, economic, managerial,
social, and psychological. New programming techniques now
make the system dynamics principles more accessible to
managers including corporate counsels. (Emphasis
supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better
decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context
of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement
value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize
the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases.
(Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-
based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in
all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools
provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including
hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case
of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the
legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration,
thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special
skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks
of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal
entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are
being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within
which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which
legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive
of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric
as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law"
is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in
trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's
Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as
one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the
firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an
increasingly diversified body of employees, managing
expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally
with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing
corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate
lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a
working knowledge of the management issues if only to be
able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup
of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate
Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
8
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to
have more than a passing knowledge of financial law
affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What
transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the
lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon
C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter
received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18,
1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office
as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared
null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having
passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has
been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124,
Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled
the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During
his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project
work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he
worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of
an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate,
and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a
legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of
NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election
law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before
the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal
capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in
initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod
also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous
hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission
(1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the
House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty.
Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a
team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various
contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top
officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer
(such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an
operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating
the contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central
9
Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis
supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's
Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and
(5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt
restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their
countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing
Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal
adviser of the United States Agency for International
Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in
Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law
Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so
than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the
law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in
renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with
an international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical
language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only
with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the
guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts,
an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law,
1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
 A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract
construction is the set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform
one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must
not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must
also state the recourse open to either party when the other
fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in
the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and
international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no
banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn
that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of
Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth
Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice
of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking
into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission,
143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must
be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to
his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does,
then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that
there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving
10
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority
can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil
Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in
this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the
ground that another person is more qualified for a particular
position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a
substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment
on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar,
consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of
its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond,
etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales,
Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to
the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of
the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and
 the last Members for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to
say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional
or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from
the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice,
perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw
say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz
states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law
practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of
law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as
evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers
almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in
advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In
that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr.
Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been
practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of
persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an
elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks
one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one
thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President?
And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action
be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
11
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public
hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he
possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The
judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only
upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case,
there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power,
since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by
the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom
the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body
in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential
nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court
would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the
spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the
procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for
help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
 No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the
procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches
away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the
procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the
agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first
deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the
respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent
Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while
the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office.
My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience
and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to
finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a
reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence
already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess
the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.
12
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even
more convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of
law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant
consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this
petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision
requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution).
Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are
best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown
the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution
and defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a
COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have been
"engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the
bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and
complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood,
"practice" refers to the actual performance or application of
knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it
connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To
"practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or
pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly
or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually
performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the
"practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a
clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In
the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a
corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be
said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists
in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768).
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's
self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for
such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C.
644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on
Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several
factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily
or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer
(People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4
S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when
one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public,
and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it
of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87
Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of
the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for compensation, as a service of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v.
13
Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as
preparation of documents involving the use of legal
knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law"
(Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank,
176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to
that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing
Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law; are
practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor,
94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure
which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is
within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of
law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship.
Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires
knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship,
such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he
cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession
or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in
determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets the
constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10)
years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are
peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do
so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as
appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform
any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so
HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which
could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice
of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal
opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which
do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become
engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a
succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs.
Villanueva:4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one
must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a
source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare
respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC
Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the
practice of law as a qualification for public office would be settled
one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was
not the result.
14
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr.
Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5
leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his
clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not
practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so
gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave
with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2
not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our
reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments
whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons
appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no
power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of
discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that
Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive
ability, proficiency in management, educational background,
experience in international banking and finance, and instant
recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not
questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a
specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my
constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for
even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has
practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not
dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity
where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can
claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for
COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court
and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if
there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business
corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or
operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in
Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in
the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the
practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional,
accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To
be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of one's decisive
choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise;
one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention
during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by
respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter
has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In
fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for
an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when
he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must
have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A.
and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania
during that period. How could he practice law in the United States
while not a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the
Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate),
University of Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry
Department; Operations, Latin American Department;
Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International
Finance Corporation
15
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various
companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine
Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital
Development Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief
Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission
Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the
December 1989 Coup Attempt Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer of the following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
 d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates
that respondent Monsod has given the law enough attention or a
certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in
all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice
for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers
working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal
services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but
not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an
effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal
knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry,
civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where
such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which
even an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary
well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has
reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law
at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary
for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain,
16
teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to
name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as
such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a
member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in
connection with litigation but also services rendered out of
court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of
any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge,
such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the
legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved,
must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank,
344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula
or definition of what constitutes the practice of law.
"Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an
attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of
any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when
the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires
the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without
adopting that definition, we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n
v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901.
(People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they
should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they
should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to
wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were
rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared
contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he
was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In
answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared
contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his
business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be
more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked
if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that
he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he
answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked
if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of
preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee
to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the
broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that
is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his
practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he
was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about
everything that is on the books as far as real estate is
concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate
broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in
connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing
of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like.
There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices
over the years and has charged for his services in that
connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person
designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an
agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to
appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings.
17
Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and
non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in
fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an
attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for
another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict.
"Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says
Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to
prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of
clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true
to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his
client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client
informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets
confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly
compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit.
"Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by
Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or
habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice
gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to
apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession,
trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State
v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes
frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of
People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind.
In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127,
p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within
the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself
recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of
practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
 l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having
customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public as engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the
a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public
circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or
when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments
public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of
informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1,
87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have

profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is
incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under
the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law
was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission
or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any
specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr.
Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of
foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the
foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the
practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous.
Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual
transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was
our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of
appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member

of the Constitutional Commission may possess the background,
competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices
as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but
18
 City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705; 1 and
the RTCs Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this
Court.

The antecedents:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before

the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father,
Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies

his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in
Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before
Republic of the Philippines the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The
SUPREME COURT petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior
Baguio City conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of
Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the
THIRD DIVISION said criminal case.

G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007 However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied
permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in
vs. conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court
HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, Respondents. laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.3

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions of law, with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002
promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay
19
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for
Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order
alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not
have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the
authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is
the Supreme Court alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the
public respondent MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public
respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with Criminal Case No.
00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution
dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive
writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of
Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio,
there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the
intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law
provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last,
petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which
expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the
inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without
the supervision of a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration
before the RTC, the petitioner filed a Second Motion for
Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the
reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the
strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance
the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending
the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the
petitioners Second Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to
20
Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already
denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the
instant Petition and assigns the following errors:
I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it
resolved to deny the prayer for the writ of injunction of the herein
petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity of
granting the writ;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,
TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT
RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN
PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS
NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT
IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;
III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD
IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE
OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO
DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE
LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic]
THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN
AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730,
PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS
BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTCS).4
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if
warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may take cognizance
of petitions filed directly before it.5
Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification,
and implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice
and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in
Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may
appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as
encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the
petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of
his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the
supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has
successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme
Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to
represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law
school.
21
Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized
by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by
the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or
other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney
for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730,
the Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an
inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple.
In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a
justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court,
a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent
or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.7
(Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No.
730 is subsequently changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it
now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the Court of
a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry
of Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real
distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court,
the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule
138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer,
as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while
the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an
agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule
138. The court a quo must have been confused by the fact that
petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of
appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a
quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against
petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for
the petitioners appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior
courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is
a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue
of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a
friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before
inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its
very nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime of Grave
Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor
is not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been
intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance of the injunctive court,
the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil
liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records
of the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that
22
therefore, petitioners appearance as private prosecutor appears to be
legally untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in instances
when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage,
violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against
popular representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case,
such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.10
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation,
waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No.
00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is
deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private
prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution
and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private
prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the public
prosecutor.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent filed a criminal
case against them with the Office of the City of Prosecutor of Baguio
City for usurpation of authority, grave coercion and violation of city
tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of parking fees by
petitioners from respondent. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-
affidavit, respondent asserted that he is a "practicing lawyer based in
Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building,
Session Road, Baguio City."2 However, certifications issued by the
Office of the Bar Confidant3 and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines4 showed that respondent has never been admitted to the
Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that respondent is liable for
indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.

In his Comment,5 respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5

of the complaint-affidavit that he is a practicing lawyer was an honest
mistake. He claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino
prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned after
Atty. Aquinos complaint-affidavit.6 It appears that Atty. Aquino had
previously filed a complaint-affidavit against petitioners involving
the same subject matter.

Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were drafted by the

same secretary; one for the May 5, 2005 parking incident at 10:00
oclock in the morning and another for the parking incident on the
G.R. No. 169517 March 14, 2006 same date but which occurred at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon.
Respondent insists that the complaint-affidavit regarding the 1:00
ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN and MALIYAWAO oclock parking incident correctly alleged that he is "a businessman
PAGAYOKAN, Petitioners, with office address at Room B-204, 2/F Lopez Building, Session
vs. Road, Baguio City."7 However, the complaint-affidavit regarding the
BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA, Respondent. 10:00 oclock parking incident, which is the subject of the instant
petition, erroneously referred to him as a practicing lawyer because
DECISION Atty. Aquinos secretary copied verbatim paragraph 5 of Atty.
Aquinos complaint-affidavit. Hence, it was inadvertently alleged that
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: respondent is a "practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office
address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio
Before us is an original petition1 for contempt filed by petitioners City," which statement referred to the person of Atty. Aquino and his
Rogelio Tan, Norma Tan and Maliyawao Pagayokan against law office address.
respondent Benedicto Balajadia.

23
Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquinos secretary, executed an
affidavit8 admitting the mistake in the preparation of the complaint-
affidavit. Respondent alleged that he did not read the complaint-
affidavit because he assumed that the two complaint-affidavits
contained the same allegations with respect to his occupation and
office address. Respondent claims that he had no intention of
misrepresenting himself as a practicing lawyer.
In their Reply,9 petitioners reiterate that respondent should be made
liable for indirect contempt for having made untruthful statements in
the complaint-affidavit and that he cannot shift the blame to Atty.
Aquinos secretary.
The sole issue for resolution is whether respondent is liable for
indirect contempt.
Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxxx
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as
such without authority;
x x x x.
In several cases,10 we have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law
by assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority
constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both. The liability for the unauthorized practice of
law under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in the nature
of criminal contempt and the acts are punished because they are an
affront to the dignity and authority of the court, and obstruct the
24
orderly administration of justice. In determining liability for criminal
contempt, well-settled is the rule that intent is a necessary element,
and no one can be punished unless the evidence makes it clear that he
intended to commit it.11
In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondents claim
that he never intended to project himself as a lawyer to the public. It
was a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty Aquino.
The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that
gave rise to the mistake in the drafting of the complaint-affidavit
conforms to the documentary evidence on record. Taken together,
these circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of
respondents complaint-affidavit was, indeed, the result of
inadvertence.
Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a
practicing lawyer was the result of inadvertence and cannot, by itself,
establish intent as to make him liable for indirect contempt. In the
cases where we found a party liable for the unauthorized practice of
law, the party was guilty of some overt act like signing court
pleadings on behalf of his client;12 appearing before court hearings as
an attorney;13 manifesting before the court that he will practice law
despite being previously denied admission to the bar; 14 or deliberately
attempting to practice law and holding out himself as an attorney
through circulars with full knowledge that he is not licensed to do
so.15
In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent
acted as an attorney or that he intended to practice law. Consequently,
he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt considering his lack of
intent to illegally practice law.
However, while the evidence on record failed to prove respondents
deliberate intent to misrepresent himself as an attorney and act as
such without authority, he is hereby warned to be more careful and
circumspect in his future actions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Respondent is
WARNED to be more careful and circumspect in his future actions.
SO ORDERED. MAKALINTAL, J.:

Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine

Bar, admitted to it on October 5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of
the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of
the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan,
and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of
death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of conviction was
affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was
changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence
respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the President on
August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was
remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal
laws of the Philippines."

On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco,

victim in the murder case, filed a verified complaint before this Court
praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant
to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time,
admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding pardon in
defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in the case of In
re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.

Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed

suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by
reason of his conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude. Murder
Republic of the Philippines is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes
SUPREME COURT everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or
Manila good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in
disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or
EN BANC depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his
fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of
A.M. No. L-363 July 31, 1962 right and duty between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v.
Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.
IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY.
DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent. The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional
pardon extended to respondent places him beyond the scope of the
Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint. rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is placed by him squarely on
Nestor M. Andrada for respondent. the Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy
25
and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent
viction, this Court decided in his favor and held: "When proceedings
to strike an attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for
a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon
operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for
the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted."
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before
us. In making it the Court proceeded on the assumption that the
pardon granted to respondent Lontok was absolute. This is implicit in
the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the citations to support
it, namely. In Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex.
Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs.
State the court said:
We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon
the record of the felony conviction could no longer be used as
a basis for the proceeding provided for in article 226. The
record, when offered in evidence, was met with an
unconditional pardon, and could not, therefore, properly be
said to afford "proof of a conviction of any felony." Having
been thus cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction was
taken away. A pardon falling short of this would not be a
pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act
of executive grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall,
344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there cited; Young
v. Young, 61 Tex. 191.
And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with
approval in the Lontok case is as follows:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the
offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is
full, it releases the punishment and blots out the existence of
guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent
as if he had never committed the offense. It granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities,
consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after
conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and
26
restores him to all his civil rights it makes him, as it were, a
new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but
conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term.
It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland,
which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offense by him
committed in connection with rebellion (civil war) against
government of the United States."
The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable
here. Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his
conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in
defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its
having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official
position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the
use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The
degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being
purged from the profession.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who
measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For
the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only
prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither
dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must
continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or
removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552,
556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly
bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of
all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample
them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues
recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to
the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the
nature of the crime for which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has
been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name stricken from
the roll of lawyers.
Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989,
Regala, JJ., concur. respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this
Padilla, J., took no part. Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon
her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in
C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.

On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A.

Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of
P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that
the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the
unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984.
Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the
unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately
P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984
for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also
for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984
for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within
ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were
dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for
insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of
dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank
concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no
effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.

Republic of the Philippines Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent
SUPREME COURT with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed
Manila as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-
EN BANC 38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a
decision dated 25 August 1987 which:
A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant
vs. (b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent. three (3) cases, and sentenced respondent to pay a fine of
P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of
P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359;
PER CURIAM:
27
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of
P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and
to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of
P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in
all three (3) cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in addition,
suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent
portion of the decision read as follows:
For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient
to sustain the conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED
subject to this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a
member of the Bar, and the offense for (sic) which she is
found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered
suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her
profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in
accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court. A copy of this decision must be forwarded to the
Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED. 1
On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9
January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her
"to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court,
the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this
Court a Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without
action respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that the Court of
Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and
28
executory upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for
review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the
Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari
when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a
petition for review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if
not a not painful penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty
of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on the case
during the trial on the merits at the lower court has always
been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of
the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to
the herein plaintiff-appellee.
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she
had not violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the
ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she did not
intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed
by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of
Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found
guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects
public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez,2 the Court
explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the
following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the
act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. . . . The thrust
of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
 practice is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property but an offense against public
order.
xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends
the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee
or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful
practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels
of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
3(Italics supplied)
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law
because she had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.
Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
provide as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court
on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a
Court of First Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court
of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for
29
any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and
after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his
profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the
premises. (Italics supplied)
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted
also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to
"obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22
does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer;
however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of
a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this
Court stressed that:
the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she
shall be a person of good moral character.1wphi1 This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to an
admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is
also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 5
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift
Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the
practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this
Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of
respondent.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ.,
concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., in the result.
 CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M.

Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He

practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek
medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program.
His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in
May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship

Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his
Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as
a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to
resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether
petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the
Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May
2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant
cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the
Rules of Court:

Republic of the Philippines SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to
SUPREME COURT the bar. Every applicant for admission as a member of the
Manila bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the
EN BANC Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007 charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner. Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that,
by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006,
R E S OLUTIO N petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be
30
allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned
on his retaking the lawyers oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant
with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so
delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a
duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the
legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement and payment of membership fees to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for
membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these
conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the
courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his
professional privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore
duly admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted
as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine
bar in accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good
and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of
Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen
of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character and a resident of the Philippines. 5 He must also produce
31
before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and
that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as
furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other
qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyers
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of
court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good
standing is a continuing requirement. This means continued
membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership
dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax; 12
compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal
profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary
control.14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino
citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases
prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership
in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice
accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in

the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to
its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license
or permit to engage in such practice." 18 Stated otherwise, before a
lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can
resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the
authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual

membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory

continuing legal education; this is specially significant to
refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only
remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and
as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a

member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is

hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated
above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar
Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the
Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

32
 Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one
requirement remains constant in all the jurisdictions where the
practice of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he
or she has "good moral character," and once he becomes a lawyer he
should always behave in accordance with the standard. In this
jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a condition
precedent1 to the practice of law, but an unending requirement for all
the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of
grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.2

In an Affidavit-Complaint3 dated June 6, 2001, filed with the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Emma T. Dantes, sought the
disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of
immorality, abandonment, and violation of professional ethics and
law. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 01-851.

Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent

purportedly engaged in illicit relationships with two women, one
after the other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the time
respondents illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular support to
complainant and their children, thus forcing complainant to work
abroad to provide for their childrens needs. Complainant pointed out
that these acts of respondent constitute a violation of his lawyers
oath and his moral and legal obligation to be a role model to the
community.

On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an

Order4 requiring respondent to submit his answer to the Affidavit-
Complaint.

A.C. No. 6486 September 22, 2004 Respondent submitted his Answer5 on November 19, 2001. Though
admitting the fact of marriage with the complainant and the birth of
EMMA T. DANTES, complainant, their children, respondent alleged that they have mutually agreed to
vs. separate eighteen (18) years before after complainant had abandoned
ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent. him in their Balintawak residence and fled to San Fernando,
Pampanga. Respondent claimed that when complainant returned after
DECISION eighteen years, she insisted that she be accommodated in the place
where he and their children were residing. Thus, he was forced to live
PER CURIAM: alone in a rented apartment.
33
Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best
school he could afford and provided for their needs. He even bought
two lots in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and gave
complainant adequate financial support even after she had abandoned
him in 1983.
Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to force
him to remit seventy percent (70%) of his monthly salary to her.
Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the
complaint. Complainant presented her evidence, both oral and
documentary,6 to support the allegations in her Affidavit-Complaint.
From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established
that on January 19, 1979, complainant and respondent were married 7
and lived with the latters mother in Balintawak. At that time,
respondent was just a fourth year law student. To make ends meet,
complainant engaged in the buy and sell business and relied on dole-
outs from the respondents mother.
Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and
Daisy, who were born on February 20, 1980,8 October 14, 19819 and
August 11, 1983,10 respectively. Complainant narrated that their
relationship was marred by frequent quarrels because of respondents
extra-marital affairs.11 Sometime in 1983, she brought their children
to her mother in Pampanga to enable her to work because respondent
had failed to provide adequate support. From 1986 to 2001,
complainant worked abroad as a domestic helper.
Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and
respondent to live separately, complainant asseverated that she was
just compelled to work abroad to support their children. When she
returned to the Philippines, she learned that respondent was living
with another woman. Respondent, then bluntly told her, that he did
not want to live with her anymore and that he preferred his
mistresses.
Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth
certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling, and Christian Dave, 12 all
34
surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his paramour 13
to prove the fact that respondent sired three illegitimate children out
of his illicit affairs with two different women. Letters of
complainants legitimate children likewise support the allegation that
respondent is a womanizer.14
In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to have
waived his right to cross-examine complainant, after he failed to
appear during the scheduled hearings despite due notice. He,
however, submitted his Comment/Opposition to the Complainants
Formal Offer of Evidence with Motion to Exclude the Evidence from
the Records of the Proceedings15 on August 1, 2002.
Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion to
Adopt Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Respondents
motion was denied because it was filed after the complainant had
already presented her evidence.16 Respondent was given a final
chance to present his evidence on July 11, 2003. Instead of presenting
evidence, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion
to Dismiss, which was likewise denied for being a prohibited
pleading under the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar
Discipline. Respondent submitted his Position Paper on August 4,
2003.
In respondents Position Paper,17 he reiterated the allegations in his
Answer except that this time, he argued that in view of the resolution
of the complaint for support with alimony pendente lite18 filed against
him by the complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City,19 the instant administrative case should be dismissed for
lack of merit.
On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the
Bar Confidant its Report20 and Resolution No. XVI-2004-230
involving CBD Case No. 01-851.21 The IBP recommended that the
respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-
taken.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
"Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct."
"Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of
the Integrated Bar."
"Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so
willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion
of good and respectable members of the community.22 To be the basis
of disciplinary action, the lawyers conduct must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree23 or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.24
In Barrientos vs. Daarol,25 we ruled that as officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More
specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping
mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession
and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only
master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character
is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned,
than the possession of legal learning.
35
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has
three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to
protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective
clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.26
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only
upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal
career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and
honored fraternity.27 They may be suspended from the practice of law
or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.28
Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit relationships
with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to
the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the
imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in
conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established
respondents commission of marital infidelity and immorality.
Evidently, respondent had breached the high and exacting moral
standards set for members of the law profession. He has made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity.29
In Toledo vs. Toledo,30 we disbarred respondent for abandoning his
lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a
child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,31 we ruled that abandoning
ones wife and resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within
that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which
shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,32 that moral
delinquency which affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community as exemplified by
behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution
of marriage.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in
a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of
the bar.33 Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could
accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. 34
However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels
the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most
appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is
hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in
the respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the
same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
36
A.C. No. 407 August 15, 1967
IN RE ATTORNEY JOSE AVANCEA, respondent.
J. Gonzales and Orense for respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General for complainant.
ANGELES, J.:
On January 12, 1951, the Supreme Court entered a resolution as
follows:
In Administrative Case No. 407, In re Atty. Jose Avancea, it
appearing that respondent was convicted in criminal case No.
10220 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People
of the Philippines vs. Jose Avancea, of the crime of
falsification of public document under Art. 172 of the Revised
Penal Code, and that in the decision rendered to that effect the
Court has found that said respondent has taken advantage of
the law profession in committing said crime to defraud his
clients, the Court ordered that respondent be, as he is hereby,
provisionally suspended from the practice of law, pending
final termination of the criminal case No. 10220, now pending
appeal in the Court of Appeals.
Jose Avancea, a member of the Bar, was charged with falsification
of public document before the Court of First Instance of Manila, in
criminal case No. 10220. After trial, he was found guilty as charged
and was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two years to
six years of prision correccional, to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The trial court also found that he took advantage of the law
profession in committing the crime of falsification of public
document to defraud his clients. A copy of the decision was sent to
the Supreme Court for whatever the action it may deem appropriate
to take in the premises. Conformably thereto, the Supreme Court
adopted the resolution hereinabove quoted.
From the decision of the lower court, Jose Avancea appealed to the
Court of Appeals. On February 28, 1962, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the lower court.
On a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court, the latter Court, on June 13, 1962, dismissed the
petition for lack of merit.
On January 21, 1963, Jose Avancea was committed to prison at the
National Penitentiary.1wph1.t
On September 25, 1963, the President of the Philippines extended
conditional pardon to Jose Avancea.
On October 1, 1963, Jose Avancea was discharged from
confinement.
In the decision of the trial court, the following is said:
The evidence on record conclusively establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt as the author of the
falsification of the Power of Attorney (Exhibit A), with grave
abuse of confidence. The accused is a lawyer and has taken
advantage of the law profession in committing the crime of
falsification of a public document to defraud his clients. A
lawyer of the type of the accused is a disgrace to the law
profession and should be disbarred.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals said:
A la vista de los datos expuestos el Juzgado cree y asi
concluye que el apelante no ha explicado satisfactoriamente
como Ilego a su posesion el poder especial Exhibito A; la
presuncion es concluyente que aquel es el autor de la
falsification de las firmas de los hermanos Joa que aparecen
en el poder especial Exhibito A. (People vs. Astudillo, 60
Phil. 338).
37
La conclusion es, pues, que el apelante fue quien preparo el
exhibito A; fue quien falsifico las firmas de los hermanos Jao
que aparecen en dicho document; y, fue quien Ilevo dicho
documento a la oficina del notario Tumblos para su
ratificacion.
EN SU VIRTUD, habiendose probado fuera de toda duda
racional la culpabilidad del apelante, y la decision apelada
estando de conformidad con las pruebas y la ley, la misma se
confirmation in toto, con las costas contra el apelante.
There can, therefore, be no doubt, that Jose Avancea has committed
the crime of falsification of public document against his clients with
grave abuse of confidence, having been found guilty thereof by final
judgment of competent jurisdiction. His acts amount to deceit,
malpractice or misconduct in office as an attorney, which constitute
grounds for removal from office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, not to mention conviction by final judgment of a
crime involving moral turpitude.
The fact that the respondent was extended conditional pardon by the
Chief Executive is of no moment. Such conditional pardon merely
partially relieved him of the penal consequences of his act, but did
not operate as a bar to his disbarment, especially so when he is being
disbarred on the ground of professional misconduct for which he had
been convicted by final judgment. (Cf. In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.)
Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered declaring Jose Avancea
disbarred from the practice of law, and striking his name from the roll
of attorneys.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro
and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 147824 August 2, 2007

ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner,

vs.
JUSTO J. PARAS, respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

This case presents another occasion to reiterate this Courts ruling

that the Guidelines set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Ronidel Olaviano Molina1 "do not require that a physician should
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the partys psychological condition."2

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, are the (a) Decision 3
dated December 8, 2000 and (b) Resolution 4 dated April 5, 2001 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915, entitled "Rosa Yap-
Paras, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Justo J. Paras, Defendant-Appellee."

On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J.

Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They begot four (4) children,
namely: Raoul (+), Cindy Rose (+), Dahlia, and Reuel.

Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed

with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a
complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under Article 36
of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She alleged
that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential
obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances:
38
 (a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature
in one mortgage transaction;
(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;
(c) he did not give financial support to his children; and
(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a
father.
To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered documentary and
testimonial evidence.
This is her story. She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She was then a
student of San Carlos University, Cebu City.5 He courted her,
frequently spending time at her "Botica."6 Eventually, in 1964,
convinced that he loved her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding
was considered one of the "most celebrated" marriages in Bindoy.7
After the wedding, she and Justo spent one (1) week in Davao for
their honeymoon.8 Upon returning to Bindoy, they resided at her
parents house. It was their residence for three (3) years until they
were able to build a house of their own.9 For the first five (5) years of
their marriage, Justo did not support her and their children because he
shouldered his sisters schooling.10 Consequently, she was the one
who spent for all their family needs, using the income from her
"Botica" and store.11
Justo lived the life of a bachelor. 12 His usual routine was to spend
time with his "barkadas" until the wee hours of the morning.
Oftentimes, he would scold her when she sent for him during
lunchtime.13 He also failed to provide for their childrens well-
being.14 Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted
with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her medication. Also,
in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their rest
house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice to
bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit of climbing
the rooftop.15
39
To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the
United States. Her sisters supported them throughout their two-year
stay there. However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and
left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she was
shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy in debt. She
then realized Justo was a profligate. At one time, he disposed without
her consent a conjugal piece of land.16 At other times, he permitted
the municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station free
of charge.
She endured all of Justos shortcomings, but his act of maintaining a
mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the last straw that
prompted her to file the present case. She found that after leaving
their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their
cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose,
obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justos deceased daughter
Cindy Rose Paras.17
As expected, Justo has a different version of the story.
He met Rosa upon his return to Bindoy after taking the bar
examinations in Manila.18 He frequently spent time in her store. 19
Believing he loved her, he courted her and later on, they became
sweethearts. In 1963, they decided to get married. However, it was
postponed because her family demanded a dowry. Their marriage
took place in 1964 upon his mothers signing a deed of conveyance
involving 28 hectares of coconut land in favor of Rosa.20
He blamed the subsequent dissipation of their assets from the slump
of the price of sugar and not to his alleged profligacy. 21 Due to his
business ventures, he and Rosa were able to acquire a 10-room
family house, expand their store, establish their gasoline station, and
purchase several properties. He also denied forging her signature in
one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did not dispose of a
conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the
renewal of a sugar crop loan before the banks authorized
employee.22
As to their marital relationship, he noticed the change in Rosas
attitude after her return from the United States. She became detached,
cold, uncaring, and overly focused on the familys businesses. 23 He
tried to reach her but Rosa was steadfast in her "new attitudinal
outlook." Before other people, he merely pretended that their
relationship was blissful.24
He did not abandon his family in the United States. It happened that
they only had tourist visas. When they were there, their childrens
tourist visas were converted into study visas, permitting them to stay
longer. For his part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as
municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately returned to the
Philippines.25
He spent for his childrens education. At first, he resented supporting
them because he was just starting his law practice and besides, their
conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He
admitted though that there were times he failed to give them financial
support because of his lack of income.26
What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosas act of
embarrassing him during his birthday celebration in 1987. She did
not prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that
she has nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her
lack of concern.27 This was further aggravated when she denied his
request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a mountainous
and NPA-infested area.28
As to the charge of concubinage, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not
his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was
impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee
Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision
upholding the validity of the marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did not
abandon the conjugal home as he was forced to leave after Rosa
posted guards at the gates of their house;29 (b) the conjugal assets
were sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there was no need
for Justo to shell out his limited salary;30 and (c) the charge of
40
infidelity is unsubstantiated.31 The RTC observed that the relationship
between the parties started well, negating the existence of
psychological incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration
of their marriage.32 And lastly, it ruled that there appeared to be a
collusion between them as both sought the declaration of nullity of
their marriage.33
Justo interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
In the interim, Rosa filed with this Court a petition for disbarment
against Justo, docketed as A.C. No. 5333, premised on the same
charges alleged in her complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage. On October 18, 2000, this Court rendered its Decision
finding him guilty of falsifying Rosas signature in bank
documents, immorality, and abandonment of his family. He was
suspended from the practice of law, thus:
In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wifes signature in
bank documents and other related loan instruments; and for
ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of
immorality and abandonment of his own family, the
penalties to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this
Decision be spread in respondents record as an attorney, and
notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
On December 8, 2000 or nearly two months after this Court
promulgated the Decision in A.C. No. 5333, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the
evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required
by law to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justos alleged
defects or idiosyncracies "were sufficiently explained by the
evidence," thus:
 Certainly, we cannot ignore what is extant on the record
first, the income which supported their children came from
the earnings of their conjugal properties and not singularly
from Rosas industry; second, Justo gave his share of the
support to his children in the form of allowances, albeit
smaller than that derived from the conjugal property; third, he
was booted out from their conjugal dwelling after he lost his
bid for re-election and as such did not voluntarily abandon his
home; and fourth, although unjustifiable in the eyes of the law
and morality, Justos alleged infidelity came after he was
driven out of his house by Rosa. x x x.
The Court of Appeals likewise held that Rosas inability to offer the
testimony of a psychologist is fatal to her case, being in violation of
the tenets laid down by this Court in Molina. 34 Thus, she failed to
substantiate her allegation that Justo is psychologically incapacitated
from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.35
Rosa filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the
instant petition for review on certiorari.
Rosa contends that this Courts factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 for
disbarment are conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the
Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also,
she argues that she filed the instant complaint sometime in May,
1993, well before this Courts pronouncement in Molina relied upon
by the Court of Appeals. She states that she could have presented an
expert to prove the root cause of Justos psychological incapacity had
she been required to do so. For relief, she prays that her marriage
with Justo be annulled on the bases of the Courts conclusive factual
findings in A.C. No. 5333; or in the alternative, remand this case to
the court a quo for reception of expert testimony in the interest of due
process.
In his comment on the petition, Justo asserts that the present case is a
"new matter completely foreign and removed" from A.C. No.
5333; hence, the factual findings of this Court therein are not
conclusive on this case. Besides, no hearing was conducted in A.C.
41
No. 5333 as it was decided merely on the bases of pleadings and
documents.
The parties opposing contentions lead us to the following three (3)
vital issues:
first, whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No.
5333 are conclusive on the present case;
second, whether a remand of this case to the RTC for
reception of expert testimony on the root cause of Justos
alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and
third, whether the totality of evidence in the case shows
psychological incapacity on the part of Justo.
The petition is bereft of merit.
I
Whether the factual findings of this Court in
A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case.
Rosa, sad to say, had made much ado about nothing. A reading of the
Court of Appeals Decision shows that she has no reason to feel
aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court even assumed that her charges
"are true," but concluded that they are insufficient to declare the
marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. The
pertinent portion of the Decision reads:
Applying these parameters to the sifted evidence, we find that
even if we assume Justos alleged infidelity, failure to support his
family and alleged abandonment of their family home are true,
such traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an
ideal husband and father. However, by themselves, these grounds
are insufficient to declare the marriage void due to an incurable
psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do not
manifest that he was truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that he must assume and discharge as a married person. While they
may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity,
they do not necessarily show incurability, such that while his acts
violated the covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show that
such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological
incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations
of marriage in the future.36
The Court of Appeals pointed this out in its Resolution denying
Rosas motion for reconsideration, thus:
Even as we are fully cognizant of the findings of the Supreme
Court in the disbarment case appellant filed against her
husband, namely, appellees falsification of documents to
obtain loans and his infidelity, these facts, by themselves, do
not conclusively establish appellees psychological incapacity
as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact,
we already went as far as to presume the existence of such
seeming depravities in appellees character in our earlier
judgment. However, as we emphasized in our Decision, the
existence of such eventualities is not necessarily conclusive
of an inherent incapacity on the part of appellee to discern
and perform the rudiments of marital obligations as
required under Article 36.37
Clearly, Rosas insistence that the factual findings in A.C. No. 5333
be considered "conclusive" on the present case is unmeritorious. The
Court of Appeals already "went as far as to presume the existence" of
Justos depravities, however, even doing so could not bring about her
(Rosas) desired result. As Rosas prayer for relief suggests, what she
wants is for this Court to annul her marriage on the bases of its
findings in A.C. No. 5333.38 Obviously, she is of the impression that
since her charges in A.C. No. 5333 were found to be true, justifying
the suspension of Justo from the practice of law, the same charges are
also sufficient to prove his psychological incapacity to comply with
the essential marital obligations.
Her premise is of course non-sequitur.
42
Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The basic
premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different
from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first
two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.39 The
Courts exposition in In re Almacen40 is instructive, thus:
x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are]
in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their]
primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed
the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n]
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to
speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Accordingly, ones unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically
mean ones unfitness as a husband or vice versa.41 The yardsticks for
such roles are simply different. This is why the disposition in a
disbarment case cannot be conclusive on an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage. While Rosas charges sufficiently proved Justos
unfitness as a lawyer, however, they may not establish that he is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his duties as a husband. In
the disbarment case, "the real question for determination is whether
or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such." Its purpose is "to protect the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court." On the other hand, in an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the ground of
psychological incapacity, the question for determination is whether
the guilty party suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental
incapacity that renders him truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants. Its purpose is to free the innocent party from a
meaningless marriage. In this case, as will be seen in the following
discussion, Justos acts are not sufficient to conclude that he is
psychologically incapacitated, albeit such acts really fall short of
what is expected from a lawyer.
II
Whether a remand of this case to the RTC is necessary.
The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological
incapacity has its origin in Molina.42 One of the Guidelines set forth
therein states:
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
43
In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,43 the Court clarified that the
above Guideline does not require that the respondent should be
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non
for the declaration of the nullity of marriage. What is important is
"the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
partys psychological condition."
Interestingly, in the same year (2000) that Marcos was decided, the
Court backtracked a bit when it held in Republic v. Dagdag44 that,
"the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts" and this
requirement was not deemed complied with where no psychiatrist or
medical doctor testified on the alleged psychological incapacity of
one party.
Significantly, the New Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,45 promulgated
by this Court on March 15, 2003, geared towards the relaxation of the
requirement of expert opinion. Section 2, paragraph (d) states:
(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that
either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage
at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage
but expert opinion need not be alleged.
In Barcelona v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court categorically explained
that under the New Rules, a petition for declaration of nullity under
Article 36 of the Family Code need not allege expert opinion on the
psychological incapacity or on its root cause. What must be alleged
are the physical manifestations indicative of said incapacity. The
Court further held that the New Rules, being procedural in nature,
apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption.
Later, in 2005, the Court reiterated the Marcos doctrine in Republic v.
Iyoy.47 Thus:
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there
is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to allege
expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines. Such psychological incapacity,
however, must be established by the totality of the evidence
presented during the trial.
Significantly, the present case is exactly akin to Pesca v. Pesca.48
Pesca stemmed from a complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 filed by a battered wife sometime in April
1994. The trial court, in its Decision dated November 15, 1995,
decreed the marriage void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of the husband. The Court of Appeals reversed
the trial courts Decision, applying the Guidelines set forth in Santos
v. Court of Appeals49 and Molina.50 When the matter was brought to
this Court, the wife argued that Santos and Molina should not have
retroactive application, the Guidelines being merely advisory and not
mandatory in nature. She submitted that the proper application of
Santos and Molina warranted only a remand of her case to the trial
court for further proceedings, not a dismissal. The Court declined to
remand Pesca51 on the premise that the Santos and Molina Guidelines
"constitute a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted,"
thus:
The doctrine of stare decisis, ordained in Article 8 of the
Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis
interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law. The interpretation or construction placed by the
courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
44
of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed
would thus constitute a part of the law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court
finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted,
that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in
favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar
rule of lex prospicit, non replicit.
The Court then opted to examine the evidence. It affirmed that the
wife failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part
of her husband. The Court then concluded that "emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility" cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity.
Applying the foregoing cases, Marcos, Barcelona, Iyoy, and Pesca, to
the instant case, there is no reason to remand it to the trial court. The
records clearly show that there is sufficient evidence to establish the
psychological condition of Justo.
III
Whether the totality of evidence in the case
shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo
as to justify the declaration of nullity of marriage.
The last issue left for this Courts consideration is whether the totality
of the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity on the part of Justo so as to justify the dissolution of the
marriage in question.
At this juncture, it is imperative that the parties be reminded of the
States policy on marriage. Article XV of the Constitution mandates
that:
SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.
 SEC. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
This State policy on the inviolability of marriage has been enshrined
in Article 1 of the Family Code which states that:
ART. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union,
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law, and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
Given the foregoing provisions of constitutional and statutory law,
this Court has held fast to the position that any doubt as to the
validity of a marriage is to be resolved in favor of its validity. 52
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
Of course, the law recognizes that not all marriages are made in
heaven. Imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect
unions. Thus, when the imperfection is psychological in nature and
renders a person incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations, the State provides refuge to the aggrieved spouse under
Article 36 of the Family Code which reads:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
In Molina,53 the Court laid down the Guidelines for the interpretation
and application of Article 36, thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
45
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. x x x.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, were mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that
the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their
"I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
46
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.
The foregoing Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements
mandated by the Court in Santos,54 to reiterate: psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability.
A review of the complaint, as well as the testimonial and
documentary evidence, shows that Rosas main grounds in seeking
the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Justo are his infidelity,
profligacy which includes the falsification of her signature in one
of the loan documents, failure to support the children, and
abandonment of the family. Both the courts below found the
charges unsubstantiated and untrue. However, this Court, in A.C. No.
5333 for disbarment, found the evidence sufficient to support Rosas
charges of sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, and
abandonment of family, thus:
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF
COMPLAINANTS SIGNATURE
The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation on the signatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras and
respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis--vis the questioned signature
"Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan documents,
contracts of mortgage and other related instrument, yielded the
following results:
CONCLUSION:
1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures
JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one and the same
person.
2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures
ROSA YAP PARAS were not written by one and the
same person. (Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis
ours;)
 The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent
forged the signatures of complainant. However, an analysis of
the above findings lead to no other conclusion than that the
questioned or falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y.
Paras were authored by respondent as said falsified signatures
were the same as the sample signatures of respondent.
To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by
complainant to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan from
the Bais Rural Bank of Bais City. Instead of exculpating
respondent, the presence of the SPA places him in hot water.
For if he was so authorized to obtain loans from the banks,
then why did he have to falsify his wifes signatures in the
bank loan documents? The purpose of an SPA is to especially
authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for and on behalf of the
principal using his own name.
ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND
CONCUBINAGE
The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The
affidavit-statements of his children and three other persons
who used to work with him and have witnessed the acts
indicative of his infidelity more than satisfy this Court that
respondent has strayed from the marital path. The baptismal
certificate of Cyndee Rose Paras where respondent was
named as the father of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108);
his naming the child after his deceased first-born daughter
Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn Ching and the child to
live in their house in Dumaguete City bolster the allegation
that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms. Ching,
the mother of his illegitimate child.
While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by
Rosa, such as sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature,
abandonment and inadequate support of children, are true,
nonetheless, there is nothing in the records showing that they were
caused by a psychological disorder on his part. In other words, the
47
totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
The records indicate that the marriage between the parties had a good
start, resulting in the birth of their four (4) children. The early days of
their cohabitation were blissful and harmonious. Justo was deeply in
love with Rosa, even persuading his mother to give her a dowry.
They were able to build a 10-room family home and acquire several
properties, thus, proving themselves to be responsible couple. Even
Rosa admitted that Justo took care of their children when they were
young. Unfortunately, the passage of time appeared to have taken its
toll on their relationship. The acts committed by Justo appeared to
have been the result of irreconcilable differences between them
caused by the death of their two (2) children and financial difficulties
due to his failure to win the mayoralty election and to sustain his law
practice. Furthermore, the superior business acumen of Rosa, as well
as the insolent attitude of her family towards Justo, busted his ego
and lowered his self-esteem.
There is no evidence that Justos "defects" were present at the
inception of the marriage. His "defects" surfaced only in the latter
years when these events took place; their two children died; he lost in
the election; he failed in his business ventures and law practice; and
felt the disdain of his wife and her family. Surely, these
circumstances explain why Rosa filed the present case only after
almost 30 years of their marriage.
Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justos "defects"
are incurable or grave.
The following catena of cases provides an adequate basis why the
marriage between Justo and Rosa should not be annulled.
In Dedel v. Court of Appeals55 which involved a promiscuous wife
who left her family to live with one of her many paramours, this
Court ruled that the acts of sexual infidelity and abandonment do
not constitute psychological incapacity absent a showing of the
presence of such promiscuity at the inception of the marriage,
thus:
x x x. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly
qualify as being mentally or physically ill to such an extent
that she could not have known the obligations she was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid
assumption thereof. It appears that respondents
promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a
blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in
church rites, and which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.
Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown
that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality
which make respondent completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her
youth, immaturity, or sexual promiscuity.
In Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,56 the wifes inability to conceive
led her husband to other women so he could fulfill his ardent wish to
have a child of his own flesh and blood. This Court ruled that this is
not a manifestation of psychological incapacity in the contemplation
of the Family Code. In Choa v. Choa,57 this Court declared that a
mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. And,
again, in Iyoy,58 a Filipina left her husband, married an American and
had a family by him, which she flaunted to her former husband. This
Court ruled that these acts, while embarrassing and hurting to the
latter, did not satisfactorily establish a serious or grave
psychological or mental defect of an incurable nature present at
48
the time of marriage; and that irreconcilable differences,
conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity, and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment per se do not warrant
a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36.
What is clear in this case is a husband who has gone astray from the
path of marriage because of a conflicting relationship with his wife
and her family and repeated lifes setbacks. While these do not justify
his sins, they are not sufficient to establish that he is psychologically
incapacitated.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and assume the basic
marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.59 As this Court
repeatedly declares, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes thereof manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those
provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code.60
Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which
the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, and abandonment,
and the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner refers only
to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.61
In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the
Court of Appeals. While this Court commiserates with Rosas plight,
however, it has no choice but to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915 are
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 266 April 27, 1963

PAZ ARELLANO TOLEDO, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JESUS B. TOLEDO, respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

49
This is a disbarment proceedings under Rule 128 of the Rules of
Court.
On 9 July 1956 Paz Arellano Toledo filed in this Court a sworn
complaint in the form of a letter alleging that she is the wife of Jesus
B. Toledo, a member of the Bar;1 that they were married on 27
December 1946 while he was still a second year student of law; that
she supported him and spent for his studies; that after passing the bar
examination and becoming a full-fledged member of the Bar he
abandoned her; that he is at present employed in the Bureau of
Mines2 and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City; and that he is
cohabiting with another woman who had borne him three children.
She prayed that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law.
On 11, July 1956, this Court directed the respondent to answer the
complaint within ten days from receipt of notice and a copy of the
complaint.3 The respondent mailed his answer in the form of a letter,
which was received in this Court on 4, October 1956, averring that
the complaint was not in due form because "It does not set out
distinctly, clearly and concisely the legal causes for the suspension or
disbarment of a member of the Philippine Bar as provided in the
Rules of Court hence his "answer could not be made in the logical
sequence of a formal pleading;" that there seems to be an irregularity
in the filing of the complaint because while the letter-complaint was
dated 25, June 1956, and received at the Docket Section of this Court
on 2, July 1956, by an employee whose initials are "A.L." 4 It was
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public on a later date, 5 July
1956; and the alleged information furnished by Esperanza D.
Almonte that the respondent was cohabiting with another woman
who had borne him three children is not true because her very
informant, whose true name is Leoncia D. Almonte, executed an
affidavit to the effect that the respondent was employed in the Bureau
of Lands, not in the Bureau of Mines, and that the three children
referred to by the complainant were the children of Mr. and Mrs.
Ruperto Ll. Jose, with whom the respondent was boarding. Attached
to his answer are the affidavit of Leoncia D. Almonte and a copy of
his answer to a complaint filed by the complainant with the Director
of Lands for abandonment and immorality. In 9 October 1956, this
Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation and on 11 October 1956 the record of the
50
case was received by the Office of the Solicitor General. On 19
November 1956, 10 December 1956, 7, 8, 14, and 15 February 1957,
18 March 1957 and 5 August 1957, the office of the Solicitor General
conducted hearings during which the complainant presented her
evidence both oral and documentary and the respondent, who
appeared in his own behalf, cross-examined her witnesses. The
respondent did not present evidence in his behalf but reserved the
right to present it under the provisions of Section 6, Rule 128. After
finding that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the
respondent, on 24 July 1958 the Solicitor General filed a complaint in
this Court charging the respondent with abandonment of his wife and
immorality for cohabiting with another woman by whom he has a
child, and praying that he be disbarred or suspended from the practice
of law. On 30 July 1958 the Clerk of Court sent to the respondent by
mail a copy of the complaint filed by the Solicitor General and
directed him to answer the same within 15 days from receipt thereof,
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 128. On 28 August 1958 the respondent
filed in this Court a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
"that the charges contained therein are not based on and supported by
the facts and evidence adduced at the investigation conducted by the
Office of the Solicitor General." On 2 September 1958 this Court set
the case for hearing on 17 September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the
morning. On 13 September 1958 the respondent filed a motion
praying that his motion to dismiss filed on 28 August 1958 be first
resolved or, that, should it be denied, he be given a period of ten days
within which to file an answer; that upon receipt of his answer the
case be returned to the Solicitor General for reception of his evidence
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 128; and that the hearing of the case set
for 17 September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning be held in
abeyance pending resolution of his motion. At the hearing of the case
on 17 September 1958, counsel for the respondent appeared and was
given a period of 15 days within which to submit a written
memorandum in lieu of oral argument, and the Solicitor General the
same period of time from receipt of a copy of the respondent's
memorandum within which to reply. On 22 October 1958, within the
extension of time previously granted, the respondent filed his
memorandum and on 17 November 1958, also within the extension
of time previously granted, the Solicitor General, his memorandum in
reply.
Section 6, Rule 128, provides:
The evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his
investigation may be considered, by the Supreme Court in the
final decision of the case, if the respondent had an opportunity
to object and cross-examine. If in the respondent's answer no
statement is made as to any intention of introducing
additional evidence, the case shall be set down for hearing,
upon the filing of such answer or upon the expiration of the
time to file the same. (Emphasis supplied)
The above-quoted rule in no uncertain terms requires the respondent
in disbarment or suspension proceedings from the practice of law to
file an answer to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General after
investigation and, should he desire to present evidence in his behalf,
to expressly say so in the answer. Instead of doing what the rule
requires, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss without stating that
he intended to present evidence in his behalf, thereby waiving his
right. The fact that at the close of the hearing conducted by the
Solicitor General, he made of record his desire to present evidence in
his behalf, is not sufficient. The correct manner and proper time for
him to make known his intention is by and in the answer seasonably
filed in this Court.
The complainant testified as follows: On 27 December 1946 she, a
dentist by profession, and the respondent, then a second year law
student, were married civilly in Camiling, Tarlac, by the Justice of the
Peace (Exhibit A). For a period of two weeks after their wedding,
they lived in the house of her parents at No. 76 General del Pilar
street in Camiling. After two weeks, the respondent went to Manila to
resume his studies at the Far Eastern University, 5 and she remained in
Camiling to practice her profession. While the respondent was still
studying, he either returned to Camiling once a week or she came to
Manila twice a week to visit with each other. Sometimes the
respondent stayed with her in Camiling for a week, and when she
came to Manila to buy dental materials she slept with him at his
boarding house or at the house on Economia street where he on lived
with his brother Cleto and Aniceto and cousin Felisa Bacera, who
cooked their meals for them. They were in good terms until about
51
three or four months before his graduation. On the day of his
graduation, he showed her indifference and humiliated and
embarrassed her by calling her a "provinciana" and telling her that
she was a nuisance whenever she came to see him. Nevertheless,
being his wife, she continued to see him while he was reviewing for
the bar examinations. She specifically mentioned that three days
before the last examination, she came to see him. A week after the bar
examinations, she again came to see him. Since then they became
actually separated and she never saw him again until the hearing of
the case. Through Mrs. Esperanza Almonte, she learned that the
respondent was employed in the Bureau of Lands and stationed at
Cagayan de Oro City. The respondent never wrote to her and asked
her to follow him at his place of work and she did not care to either.
Marina Payot gave the following testimony: From 28 February to 3
June 1955 she lived and worked as maid, laundress and cook for the
respondent, his family composed of himself, Mrs. Corazon Toledo
and their child in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The respondent and
Corazon Toledo lived as husband and wife, and have a child named
Angie who was less than a year old at the time she lived with them.
The couple slept together in the same room with their daughter Angie
and ate their meals together although sometimes Corazon ate alone
when the respondent was out somewhere. The respondent used to call
Corazon "Honey" and Corazon used to call the respondent "Jess".
Corazon Toledo is not the same person as the complainant.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation
of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case
not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Lino Domingo testified in the following manner: He is employed as
operator-mechanic in the Bureau of Public Highways in Malaybalay,
Bukidnon, and has resided there since 1952. He knows the
respondent because he headed a survey party that surveyed public
lands in Malaybalay for distribution to the landless. Sometime in
March 1955 he went to the respondent's place of residence and office
at Moreno street, where his friend Mr. Nieva, an Ilocano, also resided
to apply for a parcel of public land, and about ten times he went to
the respondent's place of residence and office. Among those who
lived with the respondent were Mrs. Corazon Toledo, Mr. Nieva, a
maid and Mr. Abad (the latter only slept at the place whenever he was
in town). He knew that Corazon Toledo, who is not the same person
as Paz Arellano Toledo, was the wife of the respondent. At the
respondent's place of residence and office, he saw a room where the
respondent, Corazon and a baby slept and where man's pajamas and
shirts were hung. One day at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
while the respondent and his (the witness') friend Mr. Abad were
repairing the front mudguard and seats of a station wagon behind the
respondent's place of residence and office, his friend Mr. Abad
introduced him to the respondent. He helped Abad place the seats of
the station wagon in their proper places and while he was helping
Abad, he heard the respondent address Corazon as "Mama" and ask
her for money to buy cigarettes. His friends Nieva and Abad used to
address Corazon as "Mrs. Toledo."
The respondent admits that he is married to the complainant (p. 14,
t.s.n.).The fact that he is cohabiting with another woman who had
borne him a child has been established by the testimony of Marina
Payot and Lino Domingo, whose sincerity and truthfulness have been
put to a severe and searching test by the investigating Solicitor in the
presence of the respondent who appeared in his own behalf and
cross-examined the witnesses during the investigation. Asked by the
investigating Solicitor how she came to testify at the investigation, or
whether anybody taught or coached her on what to testify or whether
she testified because of any promise of reward or consideration,
Marina Payot without hesitation and in a straight forward manner
answered that the complainant, Mr. Domingo and Mr. Reyes (the
latter is the complainant's counsel) spoke to her and told her to tell
nothing but the truth about the respondent's affair with his paramour
in Malaybalay; that nobody taught or coached her on what to testify
at the investigation; and that she was not promised anything by way
of reward or consideration or given money for testifying. Going
further in his investigation, the Solicitor asked the witness how she
was treated by the respondent to find out if she harbors any ill-feeling
or grudge against him and his alleged paramour, which could be a
motive for falsely testifying against them, and she answered that she
was well treated by the Toledos; that they considered her a sister; that
52
they paid regularly her salary of P15 a month; that they bought her a
dress during the town fiesta on May 15; that Corazon never scolded
her for she was a woman of few words, was kind and did not know
how to get angry; and that the reason she left them was because she
just felt lonesome for her parents. Further testing her credibility, the
Solicitor asked how the respondent's paramour looked, and she
described her as a woman of fair complexion. Comparing her
(Corazon) to the complainant, she said that the complainant was more
beautiful but Corazon was not ugly and that the latter had a nicer
figure, because she was stouter and taller than the complainant. To
find out if it was another and not the respondent who lived with
Corazon, the Solicitor asked her if she had not seen Teodoro Nieva,
who lived with the respondent and Corazon in the same house, kiss or
embrace Corazon, and she replied that she had not.
Testing the credibility of Lino Domingo, the investigating Solicitor
asked him whether he was related to Claudio Arellano, brother of the
complainant, and Lino readily answered that he is his brother-in-law
and added that he (Lino) is the cousin of the wife of Claudio. Asked
if he had been asked by the complainant to testify at the hearing, he
frankly answered in the affirmative. Questioned as to the description
of the respondent's paramour, the witness stated that Corazon is fair
in complexion, five feet tall; that she is taller and fairer in
complexion, more beautiful and has a nicer figure than the
complainant.
The testimony of these two witnesses are worthy of credence. Marina
Payot is a simple girl of eighteen years, a mere maid, scant in
education, and understands little English. She did not even finish the
sixth grade of the elementary course. The sharp and incisive
questions propounded to her by the investigating Solicitor and the
lengthy cross-examination to which she was subjected by the
respondent himself would have revealed herself if she was lying. The
apparent inconsistencies in her answers may be attributed to her
innocence and simple-mindedness and her failure to understand the
questions propounded to her. Moreover, she could not be expected to
remember the dates asked of her in the same way that a person of
more than average intelligence would. Add to this the fact that she
was subjected to a thorough examination by three lawyers and her
confusion was compounded. Lino Domingo's frank and ready
answers to the questions propounded by the Solicitor show sincerity
and do not reveal any intention to pervert the truth. And even if his
testimony be discarded, still the testimony of Marina Payot stands
unrebutted.

The annexes attached to the respondent's memorandum cannot be

taken into consideration for they were not properly introduced in
evidence during the investigation.

The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with

another woman who had borne him a child, has failed to maintain the
highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the
Bar.6

THEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred from the practice of law.

Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,

Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989

53
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then
Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo
charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality
and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar. The letter-complaint was
forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commission on Bar Discipline ("Commission"), for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required
complainant to submit a verified complaint within ten (10) days from
notice. Complainant complied and submitted to the Commission on
27 September 1988 a revised and verified version of her long and
detailed complaint against her husband charging him with immorality
and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent
was declared in default for failure to file an answer to the complaint
within fifteen (15) days from notice. The same Order required
complainant to submit before the Commission her evidence ex parte,
on 16 December 1988. Upon the telegraphic request of complainant
for the resetting of the 16 December 1988 hearing, the Commission
scheduled another hearing on 25 January 1989. The hearing
scheduled for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled two (2) more times-
first, for 25 February 1989 and second, for 10 and 11 April 1989. The
hearings never took place as complainant failed to appear.
Respondent Cordova never moved to set aside the order of default,
even though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent to him.
54
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed
the Commission that she and her husband had already "reconciled".
In an order dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required the parties
(respondent and complainant) to appear before it for confirmation
and explanation of the telegraphic message and required them to file
a formal motion to dismiss the complaint within fifteen (15) days
from notice. Neither party responded and nothing was heard from
either party since then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the
Commission, the IBP Board of Governors submitted to this Court its
report reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing him that
any further acts of immorality in the future will be dealt with more
severely, and ordering him to support his legitimate family as a
responsible parent should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as
follows:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976
and out of this marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the
couple lived somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year, respondent
Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to
Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely
G. Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and
children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G.
Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with
respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and
Fely Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova
gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in
the public market at Bislig, while at the same time failing to support
his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had
an apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would
separate from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to
Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent would, however, frequently come
home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect
the support of his legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant
found, upon returning from a trip to Manila necessitated by
hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was
no longer living with her (complainant's) children in their conjugal
home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, one
Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter Melanie
along with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from
the complinant, compelling complainant to go to court and to take
back her daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial Court,
Bislig, gave her custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to
live with Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to
give support to his legitimate family.
Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently
from complainant, stating that complainant and respondent had been
reconciled with each other.
After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the
IBP Board. We also agree that the most recent reconciliation between
complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not
excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the
respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting
upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself.
An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to
show that he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement
is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership
of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing
condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras,1 this Court, following the rule in the United
States, held that "the continued possession ... of a good moral
character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the
practice of the law ... and its loss requires suspension or disbarment,
even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for
disbarment. " 2 It is important to note that the lack of moral character
that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral
character relating to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of
55
an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages
the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for
instance, which makes "a mockery of the inviolable social institution
or marriage." 3 In Mortel, the respondent being already married,
wooed and won the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who
subsequently cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because
respondent's conduct in Mortel was particularly morally repulsive,
involving the marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter
cohabiting with the wife of his own son after the marriage he had
himself arranged, respondent was disbarred.
In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue
as a member of the bar by reason of his immoral conduct and
accordingly disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual
relations with the complainant who consequently bore him a son; and
to have maintained for a number of years an adulterous relationship
with another woman.
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2)
years an adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife,
in full view of the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of
his legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or
refused to support. After a brief period of "reform" respondent took
up again with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and
bringing along his young daughter to live with them. Clearly,
respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of
marriage and its elementary obligations before his own daughter and
the community at large.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from
the practice of law indefinitely and until farther orders from this
Court. The Court will consider lifting his suspension when
respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission
and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of
his legitimate family and that he has given up the immoral course of
conduct that he has clung to.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

56
 Republic of the Philippines On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the
SUPREME COURT Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Manila
The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
EN BANC
EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT
A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989
Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:
ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,
vs. 1) she was a second year medical
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent. student of the Southwestern University,
the Chairman of the Board of which
Federico A. Blay for complainant. was respondent Jose B. Aznar (pp. 11,
15, tsn, June 6, 1975);
Luciano Babiera for respondent.
2) she however failed in her Pathology
RESOLUTION subject which prompted her to
approach respondent in the latter's
house who assured her that she would
pass the said subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33,
PER CURIAM: tsn, June 6, 1975);

This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the 3) despite this assurance, however, she
ground of gross immorality. failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);

Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern 4) sometime in February, 1973,
University (Cebu), alleged in her verified complaint that respondent respondent told her that she should go
Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had carnal with him to Manila, otherwise, she
knowledge of her for several times under threat that she would fail in would flunk in all her subjects (pp. 42,
her Pathology subject if she would not submit to respondent's lustful 50, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ... ;
desires. Complainant further alleged that when she became pregnant,
respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced 5) on February 12, 1973, both
abortion. respondent and complainant boarded
the same plane (Exh. "A") for Manila;
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, from the Manila Domestic Airport, they
respondent filed his Answer denying any personal knowledge of proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of
complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the complaint the Ambassador Hotel where they
and by way of special defense, averred that complainant is a woman stayed for three days (Exhs. "K", "K-1"
of loose morality. to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1 975);
57
6) after arriving at the Ambassador
Hotel, they dined at a Spanish
restaurant at San Marcelino, Malate,
Manila for around three hours (pp 56-
57, tsn, June 6, 1975);
7) they returned to the hotel at around
twelve o'clock midnight, where
respondent had carnal knowledge of
her twice and then thrice the next
morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp.
154, 155 & 157, tsn, July 18, 1975);
8) complainant consented to the sexual
desires of respondent because for her,
she would sacrifice her personal honor
rather than fail in her subjects (p.6l, tsn,
June 6, 1975); ... ... ...;
9) sometime in March, 1973,
complainant told respondent that she
was suspecting pregnancy because she
missed her menstruation (p. 76, tsn,
July 17, 1975); ... ... ...;
10) later, she was informed by Dr.
Monsanto (an instructor in the college
of medicine) that respondent wanted
that an abortion be performed upon her
(p.82, tsn, July l7, 1975); ... ... ... ;
11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant
of respondent, and Dr. Monsato fetched
her at her boarding house on the pretext
that she would be examined by Dr. Gil
Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17, 1975);
12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr.
Ramas she was given an injection and
58
an inhalation mask was placed on her
mouth and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July
17, 1 975);
13) as a result, she lost consciousness
and when she woke up, an abortion had
already been performed upon her and
she was weak, bleeding and felt pain all
over her body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July 17,
1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40)
Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met
complainant and a man whom complainant introduced
as Atty. Aznar in front of the Ambassador Hotel (pp.
183-184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p. 41).
Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the
complainant, testified that abdominal examinations and x-ray
examination of the lumbro-sacral region of complainant showed no
signs of abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).
The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General
is summarized as follows:
Edilberto Caban testified that:
1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty.
Aznar stayed at Ambassador Hotel with
his wife and children; respondent never
came to Manila except in December,
1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);
2. He usually slept with respondent
everytime the latter comes to Manila
(p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp.
42-43).
Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent
stated that:
 1. In February, 1973, he went to
Ambassador Hotel to meet respondent;
the latter had male companions at the
hotel but he did not see any woman
companion of respondent Aznar;
2. He usually slept with respondent at
the Ambassador Hotel and ate with him
outside the hotel together with Caban
(pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan. 13, 1978;
Rollo, p. 43).
The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation
conducted by the Solicitor General, respondent Aznar was never
presented to refute the allegations made against him.
In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any
knowledge of the allegations in the complaint. As special defense,
respondent further alleged that the charge levelled against him is in
furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against
respondent by reason of the latter's approval of the recommendation
of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for the
school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of her subjects. It
is likewise contended that the defense did not bother to present
respondent in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
because nothing has been shown in the hearing to prove that
respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant.
Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a
categorical finding to the effect that respondent had carnal knowledge
of complainant, to wit:
From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was
compelled to go to Manila with respondent upon the
threat of respondent that if she failed to do so, she
would flunk in all her subjects and she would never
become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6,
1975). As respondent was Chairman of the College of
59
Medicine, complainant had every reason to believe
him.
It has been established also that complainant was
brought by respondent to Ambassador Hotel in Manila
for three days where he repeatedly had carnal
knowledge of her upon the threat that if she would not
give in to his lustful desires, she would fail in her
Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1" to "K-6" pp.
51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975);
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear
during the hearing. It is true that he presented
Edilberto Caban and Oscar Salangsang who testified
that respondent usually slept with them every time the
latter came to Manila, but their testimony (sic) is not
much of help. None of them mentioned during the
hearing that they stayed and slept with respondent on
February 12 to February 14, 1973 at Ambassador
Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that
respondent stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife
and children in December, 1972. The dates in
question, however, are February 12 to 14, 1973,
inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony, therefore, is
immaterial to the present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality
against respondent Aznar has been substantiated by sufficient
evidence both testimonial and documentary; while finding
insufficient and uncorroborated the accusation of intentional abortion.
The Solicitor General then recommends the suspension of respondent
from the practice of law for a period of not less than three (3) years.
On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to
Move in the premises to determine whether any intervening event
occurred which would render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p.
69).
On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and
motion praying that the case at bar be considered submitted for
decision on the bases of the report and recommendation previously
submitted together with the record of the case and the evidence
adduced (Rollo, p. 75).
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the
finding of the Solicitor General that respondent Aznar, under the facts
as stated in the Report of the investigation conducted in the case, is
guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and may therefore be removed or
suspended by the Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a member
of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as
to his culpability of the offense imputed upon him. With the
exception of the self-serving testimonies of two witnesses presented
on respondent's behalf, the records are bereft of evidence to exonerate
respondent of the act complained of, much less contradict, on
material points, the testimonies of complainant herself.
While respondent denied having taken complainant to the
Ambassador Hotel and there had sexual intercourse with the latter, he
did not present any evidence to show where he was at that date.
While this is not a criminal proceeding, respondent would have done
more than keep his silence if he really felt unjustly traduced.
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in
issue, to satisfy this Court that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy
continued membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor
downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law
profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once
pronounced by the Court:
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not
enough that he denies the charges against him; he
must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the
relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93)
and show proofs that he still maintains the highest
degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is
60
expected of him. ... In the case of United States v.
Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the
Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself
if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty, he
may not always expect the State to perform it for him.
If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to
himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things,
he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect that same
full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily
gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help
themselves. This is particularly so when he not only
declines to help himself but actively conceals from the
State the very means by which it may assist him
(Quingwa SCRA 439 [1967]).
The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is
partly to blame for having gone with respondent to Manila knowing
fully well that respondent is a married man ,with children, respondent
should merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less than
three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47).
On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated
April 18, 1989 alleges that since a period of about ten (10) years had
already elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made his
recommendation for a three (3) years suspension and respondent is
not practicing his profession as a lawyer, the court may now consider
the respondent as having been suspended during the said period and
the case dismissed for being moot and academic.
We disagree.
Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because
respondent reneged on a promise to marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).
More importantly. complainant's knowledge of of respondent's
marital status is not at issue in the case at bar. Complainant submitted
to respondent's solicitation for sexual intercourse not because of a
desire for sexual gratification but because of respondent's moral
ascendancy over her and fear that if she would not accede, she would
flunk in her subjects. As chairman of the college of medicine where
complainant was enrolled, the latter had every reason to believe that
respondent could make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel for
respondent would deem it "worthwhile to inform the the Court that
the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very rich man in his
own right and in fact is not practicing his profession before the court"
(Rollo, p. 70), mere suspension for a limited period, per se, would
therefore serve no redeeming purpose. The fact that he is a rich man
and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render
respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral
character precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto.
Good moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to
entitle one to continue in the practice of law. The ancient and learned
profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of
morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, ... " In Arciga v.
Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to
define the concept of immoral conduct, as follows:
straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that
warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community' (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the
intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of
intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of
six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground
of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac.
2nd 896).
In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married
man with children, to have taken advantage of his position as
chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student
in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal
knowledge of her under the threat that she would flunk in all her
subjects in case she refused.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED
and his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral

conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should
have moral integrity in addition to professional
probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an

inflexible standard as to what is grossly immoral
conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and
obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies
that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the
61
 On November 9, 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted
its Report and Recommendation, viz.:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Evidence of the complainant:
Manila
. . . complainant Victoria Barrientos was single and a
EN BANC resident of Bonifacio St., Dipolog City; that when she
was still a teenager and first year in college she came
to know respondent Transfiguracion Daarol in 1969 as
he used to go to their house being a friend of her sister
A.C. No. 1512 January 29, 1993 Norma; that they also became friends, and she knew
the respondent as being single and living alone in
VICTORIA BARRIENTOS, complainant, Galas, Dipolog City; that he was the General Manager
vs. of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc.
TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL, respondent. (ZANECO) and subsequently transferred his residence
to the ZANECO compound at Laguna Blvd. at Del
RESOLUTION Pilar St., Dipolog City (pp. 109-111, tsn, September
30, 1976).

That on June 27, 1973, respondent came to their house

PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on August 20, 1975,
complainant Victoria C. Barrientos seeks the disbarment of
respondent Transfiguracion Daarol, ** a member of the Philippine
Bar, on grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
After respondent filed his answer (Rollo, p. 12), the Court Resolved
to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation (Rollo, p. 18).
As per recommendation of the Solicitor General and for the
convenience of the parties and their witnesses who were residing in
the province of Zamboanga del Norte, the Provincial Fiscal of said
province was authorized to conduct the investigation and to submit a
report, together with transcripts of stenographic notes and exhibits
submitted by the parties, if any (Rollo, p. 20).
62
and asked her to be one of the usherettes in the
Mason's convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City, from
June 28 to 30, 1973 and, she told respondent to ask the
permission of her parents, which respondent did, and
her father consented; that for three whole days she
served as usherette in the convention and respondent
picked her up from her residence every morning and
took her home from the convention site at the end of
each day (pp. 112-114, tsn, id.).
That in the afternoon of July 1, 1973, respondent came
to complainant's house and invited her for a joy ride
with the permission of her mother who was a former
classmate of respondent; that respondent took her to
Sicayab in his jeep and then they strolled along the
beach, and in the course of which respondent proposed
his love to her; that respondent told her that if she
would accept him, he would marry her within six (6)
months from her acceptance; complainant told
respondent that she would think it over first; that from
then on respondent used to visit her in their house
almost every night, and he kept on courting her and
pressed her to make her decision on respondent's
proposal; that on July 7, 1973, she finally accepted
respondent's offer of love and respondent continued
his usual visitations almost every night thereafter; they
agreed to get married in December 1973 (pp. 115-119,
tsn, id.).
That in the morning of August 20, 1973, respondent
invited her, with the consent of her father, to a party at
the Lopez Skyroom; that at 7:00 p.m. of that day
respondent fetched her from her house and went to the
Lopez Skyroom (pp. 119-121, tsn, id); that at about
10:00 p.m. of that evening they left the party at the
Lopez Skyroom, but before taking her home
respondent invited her for a joy ride and took her to
the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City; respondent
parked the jeep by the beach where there were no
houses around; that in the course of their conversation
inside the jeep, respondent reiterated his promise to
marry her and then started caressing her downward
and his hand kept on moving to her panty and down to
her private parts (pp. 121-122, tsn. id.); that she then
said: "What is this Trans?", but he answered: "Day, do
not be afraid of me. I will marry you" and reminded
her also that "anyway, December is very near, the
month we have been waiting for" ([p], 122, tsn, id.),
then he pleaded, "Day, just give this to me, do not be
afraid" (ibid), and again reiterated his promise and
assurances, at the same time pulling down her panty;
that she told him that she was afraid because they
were not yet married, but because she loved him she
finally agreed to have sexual intercourse with him at
the back seat of the jeep; that after the intercourse she
wept and respondent again reiterated his promises and
assurances not to worry because anyway he would
marry her; and at about 12:00 midnight they went
63
home (pp.
122-124, tsn, id.).
After August 20, 1973, respondent continued to invite
her to eat outside usually at the Honeycomb
Restaurant in Dipolog City about twice or three times
a week, after which he would take her to the airport
where they would have sexual intercourse; that they
had this sexual intercourse from August to October
1973 at the frequency of two or three times a week,
and she consented to all these things because she
loved him and believed in all his promises (pp. 125-
127, tsn, id.).
Sometime in the middle part of September, 1973
complainant noticed that her menstruation which
usually occurred during the second week of each
month did not come; she waited until the end of the
month and still there was no menstruation; she
submitted to a pregnancy test and the result was
positive; she informed respondent and respondent
suggested to have the fetus aborted but she objected
and respondent did not insist; respondent then told her
not to worry because they would get married within
one month and he would talk to her parents about their
marriage (pp. 129-132, tsn, id.).
On October 20, 1973, respondent came to
complainant's house and talked to her parents about
their marriage; it was agreed that the marriage would
be celebrated in Manila so as not to create a scandal as
complainant was already pregnant; complainant and
her mother left for Manila by boat on October 22,
1973 while respondent would follow by plane; and
they agreed to meet in Singalong, Manila, in the house
of complainant's sister Delia who is married to Ernesto
Serrano (pp. 132-135, tsn, id.).
On October 26, 1973, when respondent came to see respondent did not come to see her (tsn. 48-150, tsn,
complainant and her mother at Singalong, Manila, id.); she consulted a lawyer and filed an administrative
respondent told them that he could not marry case against respondent with the National
complainant because he was already married (p. 137, Electrification Administration; the case was referred to
tsn, id.); complainant's mother got mad and said: the Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative
"Trans, so you fooled my daughter and why did you (ZANECO) and it was dismissed and thus she filed the
let us come here in Manila?" (p. 138, tsn, id.). Later present administrative case (pp. 150-151, tsn, id.).
on, however, respondent reassured complainant not to
worry because respondent had been separated from his Evidence for the Respondent
wife for 16 years and he would work for the
annulment of his marriage and, subsequently marry
complainant (p. 139, tsn, id.); respondent told
complainant to deliver their child in Manila and
assured her of a monthly support of P250.00 (p. 140,
tsn, id.); respondent returned to Dipolog City and
actually sent the promised support; he came back to
Manila in January 1974 and went to see complainant;
when asked about the annulment of his previous
marriage, he told complainant that it would soon be
approved (pp. 141-142, tsn, id.); he came back in
February and in March 1974 and told complainant the
same thing (p. 142, tsn, id.); complainant wrote her
mother to come to Manila when she delivers the child,
but her mother answered her that she cannot come as
nobody would be left in their house in Dipolog and
instead suggested that complainant go to Cebu City
which is nearer; complainant went to Cebu City in
April 1974 and, her sister Norma took her to the Good
Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill; she delivered a
baby girl on June 14, 1974 at the Perpetual Succor
Hospital in Cebu City; and the child was registered as
"Dureza Barrientos" (pp. 143-148, tsn, id.).

In the last week of June 1974 complainant came to

Dipolog City and tried to contact respondent by phone
and, thru her brother, but to no avail; as she was
ashamed she just stayed in their house; she got sick
and her father sent her to Zamboanga City for medical
treatment; she came back after two weeks but still
64
The evidence of the respondent consists of his sole
testimony and one exhibit, the birth certificate of the
child (Exh. 1). Respondent declared substantially as
follows: that he was born on August 6, 1932 in Liloy,
Zamboanga del Norte; that he married Romualda
Sumaylo in Liloy in 1955; that he had a son who is
now 20 years old; that because of incompatibility he
had been estranged from his wife for 16 years; that in
1953 he was baptized as a moslem and thereby
embraced the Islam Religion (pp.
173-180 tsn, Jan. 13, 1977); that he came to know
complainant's father since 1952 because he was his
teacher; likewise he knew complainant's mother
because they were former classmates in high school;
that he became acquainted with complainant when he
used to visit her sister, Norma, in their house; they
gradually became friends and often talked with each
other, and even talked about their personal problems;
that he mentioned to her his being estranged from his
wife; that with the consent of her parents he invited
her to be one of the usherettes in the Masonic
Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City held on June 28-
30, 1973 (pp. 185-192, tsn, id.); that the arrangement
was for him to fetch her from her residence and take
her home from the convention site; that it was during
this occasion that they became close to each other and
after the convention, he proposed his love to her on
July 7, 1973; that (sic) a week of courtship, she
accepted his proposal and since then he used to invite
her (pp. 193-194, tsn, id.).
That in the evening of August 20, 1973, respondent
invited complainant to be his partner during the
Chamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom;
that at about 10:00 p.m. of that evening after the affair,
complainant complained to him of a headache, so he
decided to take her home but once inside the jeep, she
wanted to have a joy ride, so he drove around the city
and proceeded to the airport; that when they were at
65
the airport, only two of them, they started the usual
kisses and they were carried by their passion; they
forgot themselves and they made love; that before
midnight he took her home; that thereafter they
indulged in sexual intercourse many times whenever
they went on joy riding in the evening and ended up in
the airport which was the only place they could be
alone
(p. 195, tsn, id.).
That it was sometime in the later part of October 1973
that complainant told him of her pregnancy; that they
agreed that the child be delivered in Manila to avoid
scandal and respondent would take care of expenses;
that during respondent's talk with the parents of
complainant regarding the latter's pregnancy, he told
him he was married but estranged from his wife; that
when complainant was already in Manila, she asked
him if he was willing to marry her, he answered he
could not marry again, otherwise, he would be charged
with bigamy but he promised to file an annulment of
his marriage as he had been separated from his wife
for 16 years; that complainant consented to have
sexual intercourse with him because of her love to him
and he did not resort to force, trickery, deceit or
cajolery; and that the present case was filed against
him by complainant because of his failure to give the
money to support complainant while in Cebu waiting
for the delivery of the child and, also to meet
complainant's medical expenses when she went to
Zamboanga City for medical check-up (pp. 198-207,
tsn, id.).
FINDING OF FACTS
From the evidence adduced by the parties, the
following facts are not disputed:
1. That the complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single,
a college student, and was about 20 years and 7
months old during the time (July-October 1975) of her
relationship with respondent, having been born on
December 23, 1952; while respondent Transfiguracion
Daarol is married, General Manager of Zamboanga
del Norte Electric Cooperative, and 41 years old at the
time of the said relationship, having been born on
August 6, 1932;
2. That respondent is married to Romualda A.
Sumaylo with whom be has a son; that the marriage
ceremony was solemnized on September 24, 1955 at
Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte by a catholic priest, Rev.
Fr. Anacleto Pellamo, Parish Priest thereat; and that
said respondent had been separated from his wife for
about 16 years at the time of his relationship with
complainant;
3. That respondent had been known by the Barrientos
family for quite sometime, having been a former
student of complainant's father in 1952 and, a former
classmate of complainant's mother at the Andres
Bonifacio College in Dipolog City; that he became
acquainted with complainant's sister, Norma in 1963
and eventually with her other sisters, Baby and Delia
and, her brother, Boy, as he used to visit Norma at her
residence; that he also befriended complainant and
who became a close friend when he invited her, with
her parents' consent, to be one of the usherettes during
the Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City
from June 28 to 30, 1973, and he used to fetch her at
her residence in the morning and took her home from
the convention site after each day's activities;
4. That respondent courted complainant, and after a
week of courtship, complainant accepted respondent's
love on July 7, 1973; that in the evening of August 20,
1973, complainant with her parents' permission was
66
respondent's partner during the Chamber of
Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom in the Dipolog
City, and at about 10:00 o'clock that evening, they left
the place but before going home, they went to the
airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked the jeep at
the beach, where there were no houses around; that
after the usual preliminaries, they consummated the
sexual act and at about midnight they went home; that
after the first sexual act, respondent used to have joy
ride with complainant which usually ended at the
airport where they used to make love twice or three
times a week; that as a result of her intimate relations,
complainant became pregnant;
5. That after a conference among respondent,
complainant and complainant's parents, it was agreed
that complainant would deliver her child in Manila,
where she went with her mother on October 22, 1973
by boat, arriving in Manila on the 25th and, stayed
with her brother-in-law Ernesto Serrano in Singalong,
Manila; that respondent visited her there on the 26th,
27th and 28th of October 1973, and again in February
and March 1974; that later on complainant decided to
deliver the child in Cebu City in order to be nearer to
Dipolog City, and she went there in April 1974 and her
sister took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at
Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that on June 14, 1974, she
delivered a baby girl at the Perpetual Succor Hospital
in Cebu City and, named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that
about the last week of June 1974 she went home to
Dipolog City; that during her stay here in Manila and
later in Cebu City, the respondent defrayed some of
her expenses; that she filed an administrative case
against respondent with the National Electrification
Administration; which complaint, however, was
dismissed; and then she instituted the present
disbarment proceedings against respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
 In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully January 13, 1977; Rollo, p. 47) Worse, he even suggested abortion.
recommend that after hearing, respondent Truly, respondent's moral sense is so seriously impaired that we
Transfiguracion Daarol be disbarred as a lawyer. cannot maintain his membership in the Bar. In Pangan v. Ramos (107
(Rollo, pp. 28-51). SCRA 1 [1981]), we held that:

After a thorough review of the case, the Court finds itself in full
accord with the findings and recommendation of the Solicitor
General.
From the records, it appears indubitable that complainant was never
informed by respondent attorney of his real status as a married
individual. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by
respondent only after the complainant became pregnant. Even then,
respondent misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry for
having been estranged from his wife for 16 years and dangled a
marriage proposal on the assurance that he would work for the
annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after all as it
turned out that respondent never bothered to annul said marriage.
More importantly, respondent knew all along that the mere fact of
separation alone is not a ground for annulment of marriage and does
not vest him legal capacity to contract another marriage.
(E)ven his act in making love to another woman while
his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid
and existing is contrary to honesty, justice, decency
and morality. Respondent made a mockery of marriage
which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a
Moslem convert and as such, could enter into multiple marriages and
has inquired into the possibility of marrying complainant (Rollo, p.
15). As records indicate, however, his claim of having embraced the
Islam religion is not supported by any evidence save that of his self-
serving testimony. In this regard, we need only to quote the finding of
the Office of the Solicitor General, to wit:

Interestingly enough. respondent lived alone in Dipolog City though

his son, who was also studying in Dipolog City, lived separately from
him. He never introduced his son and went around with friends as
though he was never married much less had a child in the same
locality. This circumstance alone belies respondent's claim that
complainant and her family were aware of his previous marriage at
the very start of his courtship. The Court is therefore inclined to
believe that respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his
sexual desires at the expense of the gullible complainant. It is not in
accordance with the nature of the educated, cultured and respectable,
which complainant's family is, her father being the Assistant
Principal of the local public high school, to allow a daughter to have
an affair with a married man.

But what surprises this Court even more is the perverted sense of
respondent's moral values when he said that: "I see nothing wrong
with this relationship despite my being married." (TSN, p. 209,
67
 When respondent was asked to marry complainant he
said he could not because he was already married and
would open him to a charge of bigamy (p. 200, tsn,
January 13, 1977). If he were a moslem convert
entitled to four (4) wives, as he is now claiming, why
did he not marry complainant? The answer is supplied
by respondent himself. He said while he was a
moslem, but, having been married in a civil ceremony,
he could no longer validly enter into another civil
ceremony without committing bigamy because the
complainant is a christian (p. 242, tsn, January 13,
1977). Consequently, if respondent knew, that
notwithstanding his being a moslem convert, he
cannot marry complainant, then it was grossly
immoral for him to have sexual intercourse with
complainant because he knew the existence of a legal
impediment. Respondent may not, therefore, escape
responsibility thru his dubious claim that he has
embraced the Islam religion. (Rollo,
p. 49).
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual
desires, respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated his moral
delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a member
of the Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct
(Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) is in order. Good moral character
is a condition which precedes admission to the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138,
Rules of Court) and is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. It
is a continuing qualification which all lawyers must possess (People
v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 682 [1990]; Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA
653 [1989]), otherwise, a lawyer may either be suspended or
disbarred.
As we have held in Piatt v. Abordo (58 Phil. 350 [1933], cited in
Leda v. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]):
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of
good character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law; its continued
68
possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No.
3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As aptly put
by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good
character is an essential qualification for admission of
an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is
bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and
unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney,
the court retains the power to discipline him (Piatt v.
Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).
Only recently, another disbarment proceeding was resolved by this
Court against a lawyer who convinced a woman that her prior
marriage to another man was null and void ab initio and she was still
legally single and free to marry him (the lawyer), married her, was
supported by her in his studies, begot a child with her, abandoned her
and the child, and married another woman (Terre vs. Terre, Adm.
Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992).
Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old,
proposed love and marriage to complainant, then still a 20-year-old
minor, knowing that he did not have the required legal capacity.
Respondent then succeeded in having carnal relations with
complainant by deception, made her pregnant, suggested abortion,
breached his promise to marry her, and then deserted her and the
child. Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who
measure up to the exacting standards of mental and moral fitness.
Respondent having exhibited debased morality, the Court is
constrained to impose upon him the most severe disciplinary action
disbarment.
The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members
the highest standard of morality. The members are, in fact, enjoined
to aid in guarding the Bar against the admission of candidates unfit or
unqualified because deficient either moral character or education (In
re Puno, 19 SCRA 439, [1967]; Pangan vs. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1
[1981]).

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good

moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character
and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of
the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and an officer
of the Court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave
himself in such a manner as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards (Tolosa
vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21, 26 [1989], citing Toledo vs. Toledo, 7
SCRA 757 [1963] and Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859 [1963]).

In brief, We find respondent Daarol morally delinquent and as such,

should not be allowed continued membership in the ancient and
learned profession of law (Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).

ACCORDINGLY, We find respondent Transfiguracion Daarol guilty

of grossly immoral conduct unworthy of being a member of the Bar
and is hereby ordered DISBARRED and his name stricken off from
the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all
courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of
the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent
Daarol.

SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22304 July 30, 1968

69
SAMAR MINING CO., INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
FRANCISCO P. ARNADO, POMPEYO V. TAN and RUFINO
ABUYEN, respondents-appellees.
Benedicto G. Arcinas for petitioner-appellant.
Villavieja and Zapanta for respondents-appellees.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
dismissing this case, with costs against the petitioner, and lifting the
writ of preliminary injunction therein issued.
Acting upon a claim for compensation, under Act No. 3428, filed by
Rufino Abuyen, on June 18, 1956, for a disease allegedly contracted
in the course of his employment, as foreman of the Samar Mining
Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the petitioner and docketed
as WC Case No. R-VI-217, decision was rendered, on October 14,
1958, by Pompeyo V. Tan an officer of Regional Office No. VI of
the Department of Labor sentencing petitioner herein:
1. To provide continued medical treatment and hospitalization
to the claimant in accordance with Section 13 of the Act until
his tuberculosis is cured or arrested;
2. To pay to the claimant a lump sum of TWO THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE (P2,523.00) PESOS
and a weekly compensation of P17.40 from date hereof until
he is cured or his pulmonary tuberculosis is arrested as
certified by a competent physician but the total compensation
should not exceed P4,000.00; payment to be made, thru the
Regional Office No. VI of the Department of Labor;
3. To pay to the workmen's compensation fund the amount of
P26.00 as administrative costs pursuant to Section of 55 of
Act 3428, as amended.
70
A reconsideration of said decision having been denied, on March 24,
1960, petitioner commenced Civil Case No. 42836 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, for a writ of certiorari and prohibition, with
preliminary injunction, against Francisco P. Arnado, as Regional
Administrator of said office, Pompeyo V. Tan, as the writer of said
decision, and claimant Abuyen, upon the ground that Tan had acted
without jurisdiction in hearing said claim and rendering decision
thereon, and that Arnado had committed a grave abuse of discretion
in sustaining and upholding said acts of Tan. Sustaining respondents'
objection, upon the ground of wrong venue, the case was, however,
dismissed by said court, the decision of which was, on June 30, 1961,
affirmed by Us.
On July 21, 1961, petitioner commenced, against the same
respondents in said Case No. 42836, the present action for certiorari
and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. Upon the filing of the case, said court issued a
restraining order, which was, later, followed by a writ of preliminary
injunction, upon the filing and approval of the requisite bond. After
appropriate proceedings, said court subsequently rendered the
decision mentioned in the opening paragraph hereof, dismissing the
petition, upon the ground that respondent Tan had authority to hear
and pass upon the aforementioned claim of Abuyen, and dissolving
the writ of preliminary injunction issued meanwhile. Hence, this
appeal by petitioner herein, who insists: 1) that, being merely a labor
attorney, respondent Tan had no authority to make the award
complained of; 2) that as Regional Administrator, respondent Arnado
could not delegate said authority to respondent Tan; and 3) that no
such delegation of authority to him has been made.
It is not disputed that respondent Tan is a labor attorney, assigned to
Regional Office No. VI of the Department of Labor, and that, as such,
he has no authority to hear claims for compensation under Act No.
3428 and to render decisions thereon. Based, however, upon Plan No.
20-A, submitted to the President of the Philippines by the
Government Survey and Reorganization Commission, and Executive
Order No. 218, dated December 10, 1956, particularly section 32
thereof 1 as well as on Rule 21, section 1, of the Rules of Procedure
promulgated by the Workmen's Compensation Commission, 2
pursuant to section 12, of Article III of said Plan No. 20-A, and
section 45 of Act No. 3428, as amended by Republic Act No. 772,3
we have held, as early as August 21, 1961
... that a regional office of the Department of Labor has
original jurisdiction to hear and determine claims for
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. If a
claim is controverted, it shall be heard and decided only by a
regularly appointed hearing officer or any other employee
duly designated by the Regional Administrator to act as
hearing officer. But when the claim is uncontroverted and
there is no necessity of requiring the claimant to present
further evidence, the Regional Administrator may enter an
award or deny the claim. Furthermore, an employer is duty
bound to controvert a claim within 14 days from the date of
the accident or illness of the laborer or within 10 days after he
or his representative first acquired knowledge of the said
accident or sickness. Failure to do so within the period
provided will result in the renunciation of his right to
controvert the claim. But an employer may reinstate his right
to controvert the claim by filing a petition under oath
specifying the reasons for his failure to do so. 4 .
We have repeatedly reiterated this view,5 which is now well settled.
In the case at bar, respondents-appellees contend and have introduced
evidence to the effect that Regional Administrator Arnado had by
virtue of an office order, dated November 29, 1957, and marked as
Exhibit 1 designated respondent Tan who is a duly qualified
Member of the Philippine Bar "as Hearing Officer in the case of
Rufino Abuyen vs. Samar Mining Co., WCC Case No. 44238 (R-VI-
217)." As a consequence, the only issue for determination is whether
or not there has been such designation in his favor.
Petitioner assails the evidence thereon upon the theory:
1) that the lower court erred in reopening the case, after its
submission for decision, for the reception of said evidence; and 2)
that the same is insufficient to establish the designation
aforementioned.
71
As regards the first alleged error, it appears that petitioner had asked
the lower court to render judgment on the pleadings; that, thereafter,
both parties submitted their respective memoranda; that, in order to
bolster up their contention, respondents attached to their
Memorandum, as Annex 1, the alleged designation of respondent Tan
by Regional Administrator Arnado that petitioner, however, objected
to the consideration of said Annex 1; that, accordingly, the lower
court deemed it best to reopen the case for the introduction of
additional evidence and the determination of the admissibility in
evidence of said Annex 1; and that the same was identified, marked
and admitted as Exhibit 1 at the rehearing.
In this connection, it should be noted that trial courts have
discretionary power to reopen a case either before or after rendition
of judgment, for the introduction of additional evidence, so as to
dispel doubts on material points. Such power is controlled by no
other rule than that of the paramount interest of justice, and its
exercise will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of clear abuse
thereof.6 No such abuse has been committed in the case at bar. On the
contrary, the exercise of said power by his Honor, the trial Judge,
served to promote the interest of justice, by clarifying the question
whether or not respondent Tan had been given the aforementioned
designation.
As a matter of fact, said Exhibit 1 merely confirmed the allegation in
respondents' answer to the effect that respondent Tan had acted "not
as Labor Attorney but as Hearing Officer designated pursuant to the
authority granted him by the previous Regional Labor Administrator
to try and hear the merits of the compensation case ... WCC Case No.
R-VI-217, Rufino Abuyen vs. Samar Mining Co., Inc." Moreover,
pursuant to the very cases cited by petitioner, 7 the truth of this
allegation had been deemed impliedly admitted by the petitioner,
when it submitted the case for judgment on the pleadings.8
Independently of the foregoing, the second alleged error is obviously
devoid of merit, the signature of Regional Administrator Arnado on
said Exhibit 1 having been identified by one of his subordinates, who,
as such, as familiar therewith.
One other point must be stressed. The illness on which Abuyen's
claim is based took place in 1956. Yet, through the present case,
and Civil Case No. 42836 of the Court of First Instance of Manila
petitioner has succeeded in prolonging the litigation, for the
compensation involved therein, for twelve (12) years. What is more,
petitioner's contention was based upon a theory that had been rejected
by this Court as early as August, 1961. Then again, the
compensability of Abuyen's disability had never been questioned by
petitioner herein. Hence, it is manifest that the purpose of this case,
like the previous one, has been merely to delay, a policy "Often
resorted to" in the language of Mr. Justice Reyes (J.B.L.) "as a
means of draining the resources of the poorer party" in this case a
tuberculosis patient "and of compelling it to submit out of sheer
exhaustion."9 Thus, the conduct of petitioner's counsel is hardly
compatible with the duty of the Bar to assist in the Administration of
Justice, not to obstruct or defeat the same.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with

treble costs, jointly and severally, against the petitioner and its
counsel, Attorney Benedicto G. Arcinas and let certified copy of this
decision be attached to the personal record of the latter, as a Member
of the Bar. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and

Fernando JJ., concur.
Castro, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

72
 EN BANC
A.C. No. 3056 August 16, 1991
FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent.
PER CURIAM:p
This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case
which complainant Attorney Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel
for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short), filed
against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to the
application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of
Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The present
complaint charges the respondent with the following offenses:
1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and
without sufficient justification, to act within reasonable time
(sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with
Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of the
corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS,
for the purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material
benefit from the person or persons interested therein.
2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.
3. Dishonesty.
4. Extortion.
5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself
in connection with pending official transaction before him.
73
6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)
As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent
Register of Deeds to register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment
(in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the
lot buyers. There was no action from the respondent.
Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve
or deny registration of the uniform deeds of absolute sale with
assignment. Still no action except to require V & G to submit proof
of real estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the
transactions.
Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent
Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents pending
compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement" between
them, which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round
trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money
per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City
house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives.
On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he
would act favorably on the 163 registrable documents of V & G if the
latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a
round trip plane ticket for him.
The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of
P2,000) was sent to respondent through his niece.
Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to
plane fare, respondent imposed additional registration requirements.
Fed up with the respondent's extortionate tactics, the complainant
wrote him a letter on May 20, 1987 challenging him to act on all
pending applications for registration of V & G within twenty-four
(24) hours.
On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the
transfer of 163 certificates of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground
that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as to
parties and subject matter. On May 26, 1987, Attorney Collantes
moved for a reconsideration of said denial, stressing that:
... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for
a period of nearly fifteen (15) years or for a sum total of more
than 2,000 same set of documents which have been repeatedly
and uniformly registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Tacloban City under Attys. Modesto Garcia and
Pablo Amascual Jr., it is only during the incumbency of Atty.
Vicente C. Renomeron, that the very same documents of the
same tenor have been refused or denied registration ... (p. 15,
Rollo.)
On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the
Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority
[LRA]). In a Resolution dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579), the
NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were registrable.
Heedless of the NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V
& Gs 163 deeds of sale with assignment.
Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the
NLTDRA on June 4, 1987 administrative charges (docketed as Adm.
Case No. 87-15), against respondent Register of Deeds.
Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G.
Bonifacio directed respondent to explain in writing why no
administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Respondent was further asked whether he would submit his case on
the basis of his answer, or be heard in a formal investigation.
In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of
extortion and of directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for
himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting his
action.
74
Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator
Bonifacio to hear Attorney Collantes' charges against him, Attorney
Renomeron waived his right to a formal investigation. Both parties
submitted the case for resolution based on the pleadings.
The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping
the charges of: (1) dishonesty; (2) causing undue injury to a party
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and (3) gross ignorance of the law and procedure. He
opined that the charge of neglecting or refusing, in spite repeated
requests and without sufficient justification, to act within a
reasonable time on the registration of the documents involved, in
order to extort some pecuniary or material benefit from the interested
party, absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming of a public
official, extortion, and directly receiving some pecuniary or material
benefit for himself in connection with pending official transactions
before him.
Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA
Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio on February 22, 1988,
recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez that the
respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be
reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented to him for
registration; and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction
will be dealt with more severely.
After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoez found
respondent guilty of grave misconduct.
Our study and consideration of the records of the case
indicate that ample evidence supports the Investigating
Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave
misconduct.
The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the
documents presented to him for registration and,
notwithstanding representations by the parties interested for
expeditious action on the said documents, he continued with
his inaction.
 The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally
denied the registration of the documents involved; that he
himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said
documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he formally
denied the registration thereof, that the Administrator then
resolved in favor of the registrability of the said documents in
question; and that, such resolution of the Administrator
notwithstanding, the respondent still refused the registration
thereof but demanded from the parties interested the
submission of additional requirements not adverted to in his
previous denial.
xxx xxx xxx
In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the
respondent claims that he neither touched nor received the
money sent to him, on record remains uncontroverted the
circumstance that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from
him the amount of P800.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare,
not in the original denomination of P100.00 bills but in
P50.00 bills. The respondent had ample opportunity to clarify
or to countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5
September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he never did
so.
... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in
office cannot serve to mitigate his liability. His being so
should have motivated him to be more aware of applicable
laws, rules and regulations and should have prompted him to
do his best in the discharge of his duties. (pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
Secretary Ordoez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino
that Renomeron be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of
leave credits and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-
employment in the government service, effective immediately.
As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the
Philippines, by Adm. Order No. 165 dated May 3, 1990, dismissed
the respondent from the government service (pp. 1419, Rollo).
75
Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in
the NLTDRA, Attorney Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16,
1987, a disbarment complaint against said respondent.
The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent
register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court
for his malfeasances as a public official. The answer is yes, for his
misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath
as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs.
De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to
delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of
his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension,
disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E.
Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which
is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He
thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders
rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the
proper. fair, speedy, and efficient administration of justice. As
an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that
demands that in his every exertion the only criterion he that
truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what as given the
law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From
a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are
expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of
honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which,
throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described
as moral character.
Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to
public service of the highest order.1wphi1 A lawyer is an
oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly
circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and
 whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest of truth WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C.
and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. Renomeron be disbarred from the practice of law in the Philippines,
(Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790; and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys
emphasis supplied.)
SO ORDERED.
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6).
Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials requires public officials and employees to process
documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and
prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or
material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their
office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be
affected by the functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]),
the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code
of Professional Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any
corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects

on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional
Responsibility.)

This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent,
honorable, and reliable" may practice the profession of law (Noriega
vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the
highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator
vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).

The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron

committed as a public official have demonstrated his unfitness to
practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge
Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G.
Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should therefore be disbarred. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
76
 EN BANC
A.M. No. 35 September 30, 1949
In re Attorney FELIX P. DAVID, petitioner.
Felix P. David in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo Bautista and Solicitor
Estrella Abad Santos for the Government.
REYES, J.:
The respondent, Felix P. David, a member of a Philippine Bar, is
charged with the malpractice for misappropriating funds entrusted to
him by his client, the complainant Briccio S. Henson. Respondent
having answered denying the charge, the complaint was referred to
the Solicitor General for investigation. After the investigation the
Solicitor General rendered his report finding the respondent guilty of
professional misconduct and recommending disciplinary action. The
Solicitor General reports the following facts to have been
conclusively established:
. . . that on February 15, 1947, respondent obtained P840 from
his client Briccio Henson to be applied to the payment of
inheritance and real estate taxes due from the estate of
Esteban Henson for 1945, 1946 and 1947 (p. 3, t. s. n.), for
which he signed a receipt (Annex 'A'; p. 3, t. s. n.). On several
occasions, complainant asked the respondent to show him the
official tax receipt evidencing the payment of said taxes, to
which the latter answered that he had already paid them, but
the receipts were left with his friend in San Fernando.
Respondent promised to give the receipt later. Complainant
waited patiently for it but it was never delivered. After the
respondent had failed to deliver the receipt, complainant
became suspicious and inquired from the provincial treasurer
of Pampanga about the matter. Said official gave the
information that the taxes were never paid. Consequently,
complainant requested the respondent to refund the money
given him for the payment of said taxes (p. 7, t. s. n., OSG),
77
but he failed to do so. Respondent made several promises to
return the money which he never complied. Neither had he
done anything to transfer the titles of the land in the name of
the heirs of Esteban Henson up to the present (p. 9, t. s. n.). In
view of this failure of the respondent, the complainant was
ultimately forced to pay the taxes out of his own pocket (p. 8,
t.s.n.).
Required to answer the complaint formulated by the Solicitor General
on the basis of his report, respondent failed to do so. And despite due
notice he likewise failed to appear at the hearing before this Court.
Indeed, we note from the Solicitor General's report that respondent,
instead of welcoming every opportunity for hearing, seems to have
wanted to avoid it. On this point the report says:
At the hearing held on May 26, 1948, both parties appeared
and the complainant had testified, the hearing was set for
continuance the following day. Both parties agreed in the
presence of the investigator to postpone said hearing for June
5, 1948. On June 5, 1948, complainant appeared, but
respondent did not show up, so to give the respondent a
chance, the investigator postponed the continuation of the
hearing to June 17. Both parties were duly subpoenaed
(attached to the records). On June 15th, respondent sent a
letter (attached to the records) to Assistant Solicitor General
Ruperto Kapunan, asking that the hearing be postponed to
June 25, 1948. According to the request, both parties were
again duly subpoenaed for June 25, 1948 (attached to the
record). In the subpoena sent to respondent, his attention was
invited to Rule 127, section 28, of the Rules of Court, which
provides that if he fails to appear and answer the charge, the
Solicitor in charge will proceed to hear the case ex parte. In
spite of this, on the morning of June 25, he again sent another
letter (attached to the records) to Assistant Solicitor General
Kapunan, asking that the hearing be transferred to July 7, or
8, 1948. In order that the respondent be given all the chances
to defend himself, his request was granted. In the subpoena
sent him setting the hearing for July 8, 1948, as requested, the
following remark was stated:
Failure on your part to appear will cause the investigator to
proceed with the investigation and to file the corresponding
recommendation to the Supreme Court. No further
postponement will be entertained.
It is worthwhile mentioning that every time the case was set
for hearing the complainant made his appearance.
On the morning of July 8, 1948, both parties appeared;
respondent made a formal request in person to the investigator
asking that the hearing be postponed to 2 o'clock p.m. of the
same day. Out of consideration to him, even to the
discomfiture of complainant, respondent's request was again
granted. But contrary to his assurance, the respondent again
failed to appear.
There is no question that respondent received from
complainant the sum of P840 for the specific purpose of
applying the same to the payment of taxes due from the estate
which he was engaged to settle. The receipt which he issued
for said amount as well as for the sum of P110 and a sack of
rice paid to him for his expenses and fee reads as follows: . . .
February 15, 1947.
Received from Mr. Briccio S. Henson the sum of eight
hundred and forty (P840) pesos to be paid as follows:
P210 -Inheritance tax of the heirs of the late Don
Esteban Henson.
P630 -Land taxes for 1945-1947.
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Failure on my part to deliver to him the official
receipts corresponding to the above mentioned
amount, I promise to return to him the whole amount
of P840 not later than April 16, 1947 without any
obligation on his part.
A separate amount of one hundred and ten (P110)
pesos and a sack of rice was paid to me for my
expenses and fee.
(Sgd.) Atty. FELIX DAVID.
Respondent did not care to testify. But through his unverified answer,
he would make it appear that he was entitled to and had been
promised a legal fee for his services and that, as this promise was not
complied with, he "saw it fit to withhold said amount (the P840 for
taxes) until he is paid." This explanation is obviously an afterthought
and clearly unfounded. For the established fact is that respondent at
first made complainant believe that the sum in question had already
been applied by him to the payment of taxes, and, as testified to by
complainant, for the little that respondent was able to do in
connection with the case entrusted to him, he has already received his
fee as shown by the above-copied receipt. The conclusion is therefore
irresistible that respondent misappropriated the money of his client.
This makes him guilty of unprofessional conduct.
In view of the gravity of the misconduct committed, the respondent
Felix P. David is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law
for a period of five years from the date this decision become final,
without prejudice to a more severe action if the sum misappropriated
is not refunded within one month from the same date.
Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor,
and Torres, JJ., concur.
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