Dela cruz vs Paras
Facts: Being the principal cause in the
decadence of morality and because of their
other adverse effects on this community as
explained above, no operator of night clubs,
cabarets or dance halls shall henceforth be
issued permits/licenses to operate within the
jurisdiction of the municipality and no
license/permit shall be issued to any
professional hostess, hospitality girls and
professional dancer for employment in any of
the aforementioned establishments. The
prohibition in the issuance of licenses/permits to
said persons and operators of said
establishments shall include prohibition in the
renewal thereof. Section 4. Revocation of
Permits and Licenses. The licenses and
permits issued to operators of night clubs,
cabarets or dance halls which are now in
operation including permits issued to
professional hostesses, hospitality girls and
professional dancers are hereby revoked upon
the expiration of the thirty-day period given them
as provided in Section 8 hereof and thenceforth,
the operation of these establishments within the
jurisdiction of the municipality shall be illegal.
On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition
with preliminary injunction were filed with the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan. 5 The
grounds alleged follow:
1. Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a
municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful
business, occupation or calling.
2. Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the
petitioners' right to due process and the equal
protection of the law, as the license previously
given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn
without judicial hearing. 3. That under
Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, by
Presidential Decree No. 259, the power to
license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses
including night clubs, has been transferred to the
Department of Tourism." 6 The cases were
assigned to respondent Judge, now Associate
Justice Paras of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, who issued a restraining order on
November 7, 1975
Issue: whether or not a municipal corporation,
Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by respondents,
1 can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the
operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a
lawful occupation, such clubs employing
hostesses.
Held: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POLICE
POWER OF THE STATE; POWER OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS TO ENACT
LEGISLATION PURSUANT THERETO.
Police power is granted to municipal
corporations in general terms as follows:
General power of council to enact ordinances
and make regulations. The municipal council
shall enact such ordinances and make such
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred upon it by law and
such as shall seem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and convenience of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for
the protection of property therein." (Sec. 2238,
Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines,
(1917).
2. ID ; ID.; ID.; WHEN ORDINANCES MAY BE
PRONOUNCED INVALID. An ordinance
enacted by virtue thereof, according to Justice
Moreland, speaking for the Court in the leading
case of United States v Phil. 165 (1913 ) "is
valid, unless contravenes the fundamental law of
the Philippine Island, or an Act of the Philippines
Legislature, or unless it is against public policy,
or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating, or in derogation of common right.
Where the power to legislate upon a given
subject, and the mode of its exercise and the
details of such legislation are not prescribed, the
ordinance passed pursuant thereto must be a
reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be
pronounced invalid."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATION BY VIRTUE OF
THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE. The
general welfare clause authorizes such
ordinances "as shall seem necessary and proper
to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and convenience of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for
the protection of property therein. "It is a general
rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the
implied power found in the general welfare
clause must be reasonable, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of the corporation,
and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of
the State.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE NO.
84 OF BOCAUE BULACAN; TEST OF
REASONABLENESS TO UPHOLD IT
VALIDITY, NOT MET. In two leading cases,
this Court had stressed reasonableness,
consonant with the general powers and
purposes of municipal corporations, as well as
consistency with the laws or policy of the state. It
cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of
a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify
under the term reasonable. The objective of
fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable
end can be attained by a measure that does not
encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved
could have been attained by reasonable
restriction rather than by an absolute prohibition.
The admonition in U.S. vs. Salavaria, 39 Phil.
102 (1918) should be heeded: "The Judiciary
should not lightly set aside legislative action
when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police
regulation ." It is clear that in the guise of police
regulation, there was in this instance a clear
invasion of personal or property rights, personal
in the case of those individuals desirous of
patronizing those night clubs and property in
terms of the investment made and salaries to be
earned by those therein employed.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 938;
POWER GRANTED TO MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS IS THAT OF REGULATION,
NOT PROHIBITION. The first Section of R.A.
No 938 was amended to include not merely "the
power of regulate, but likewise 'prohibit . . ." The
title, however, remained the same. It is worded
exactly as Republic Act No. 938. It is to be
admitted that as thus amended, if only the above
portion of the Act were considered, a municipal
council way go as far as to prohibit the operation
of night clubs. If that were all, then the appealed
decision is not devoid if support in law. That is
not all, however. The title was not in any altered.
It was not change one with. The exact wording
was followed. The power granted remains that
or regulation, not prohibition. There is thus Act
No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the
operation of night clubs would give rise to a
constitutional question.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTE TO BE
CONSTRUED TO FREE IT FROM
CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY. Since there
is no dispute as the title limits the power to
regulating, not prohibiting, it would result the
statute being invalid if, as was done by the
Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night
club was prohibited. There is a wide gap
between the exercise power "to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals." in the language of the
Administrative Code, such competence
extending to all "the great public needs." to
quote from Holmes, and to interdict any calling,
occupation, or enterprise. In accordance with the
well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that between two possible
interpretations by one of which it will be free
from constitutional infirmity and by the other
tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be
preferred. A construction that would save rather
than one that would affix the seal of doom
certainly commends itself.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT UPHOLDING THE
VALIDITY OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE NO. 84
CANNOT BE SUSTAINED. It is clear that
municipal corporations cannot prohibit the
operation of night clubs. They may be regulated,
but not prevented from carrying on their
business. It would he, therefore, an exercise in
futility if the decision under review were
sustained. All that petitioners would have to do
so is to apply once more for licenses to operate
night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because
no such businesses could legally open. would
he subject to judicial correction. That is to
comply with the legislative will to allow the
operation and continued existence of night clubs
subject to appropriate regulations. In the
meanwhile, to compel petitioners so close their
establishments, the necessary, result of an
affirmance, would amount to no more than a
temporary termination of their business. During
such time, their employees would undergo a
period of deprivation. Certainly, if such an
undesirable outcome can be avoided. it should
be. The law should not be susceptible to the
reproach that it displays less than sympathetic
concern for the plight of those who, under a
mistaken appreciation of a municipal power,
were thus left without employment. Such a
deplorable consequence is to be avoided. If it
were not thus, then the element of arbitrariness
enters the picture. That it to pay lets, very much
less, than full deference to the due process
clause with its mandate of fairness and
reasonableness.
Binay vs Domingo
Facts: petitioner Municipality, through its
Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which
reads: LLjur
"A RESOLUTION TO
CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY
THE ONGOING BURIAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
 INITIATED BY THE OFFICE
OF THE MAYOR, OF
EXTENDING FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE OF FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00)
TO A BEREAVED FAMILY,
FUNDS TO BE TAKEN OUT
OF UNAPPROPRIATED
AVAILABLE FUNDS
EXISTING IN THE
MUNICIPAL TREASURY."
Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial
Assistance Program, are bereaved families of
Makati whose gross family income does not
exceed two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a
month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of
other requirements, would receive the amount of
five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief from
the Municipality of Makati. Metro Manila
Commission approved Resolution No. 60.
Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a
disbursement fund of four hundred thousand
pesos (P400,000.10) for the implementation of
the Burial Assistance Program. Resolution No.
60 was referred to respondent Commission on
Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in audit.
Based on its preliminary findings, respondent
COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and
disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for
the implementation thereof. Two letters for
reconsideration (Annexes "E" and "F", Rollo, pp.
45 and 48, respectively) filed by petitioners
Mayor Jejomar Binay, were denied by
respondent in its Decision No. 1159.
Issue: whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-
enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the
Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of
police power under the general welfare clause.
Held:
1. POLITICAL LAW; INHERENT POWERS OF
THE STATE; POLICE POWER; CONSTRUED.
The police power is a governmental function,
an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was
born with civilized government. It is founded
largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et alienum
non laedas" and "Salus populi est suprema lex."
Its fundamental purpose is securing the general
welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. It is the most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In
a sense it is the greatest and most powerful
attribute of the government. It is elastic and must
be responsive to various social conditions.
(Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it
depends the security of social order, the life and
health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence
in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment
of private and social life, and the beneficial use
of property, and it has been said to be the very
foundation on which our social system rests. (16
C.J.S., p. 896) However, it is not confined within
narrow circumstances of precedents resting on
past conditions; it must follow the legal progress
of a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs.
LAC, supra).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT INHERENT IN MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS; VALID DELEGATION,
REQUIRED. Police power is inherent in the
state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit
v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182).
Before a municipal corporation may exercise
such power, there must be a valid delegation of
such power by the legislature which is the
repository of the inherent powers of the State. A
valid delegation of police power may arise from
express delegation, or be inferred from the mere
fact of the creation of the municipal corporation;
and as a general rule, municipal corporations
may exercise police powers within the fair intent
and purpose of their creation which are
reasonably proper to give effect to the powers
expressly granted, and statutes conferring
powers on public corporations have been
construed as empowering them to do the things
essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable
for the safety of the people.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DELEGATION THEREOF TO
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS MUST BE
CONFERRED IN EXPRESS TERM. The so-
called inferred police powers of such
corporations are as much delegated powers as
are those conferred in express terms, the
inference of their delegation growing out of the
fact of the creation of the municipal corporation
and the additional fact that the corporation can
only fully accomplish the objects of its creation
by exercising such powers. (Crawfordsville vs.
Braden, 28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal
corporations, as governmental agencies, must
have such measures of the power as are
necessary to enable them to perform their
governmental functions. The power is a
continuing one, founded on public necessity. (62
C.J.S., p. 273) Thus, not only does the State
effectuate its purposes through the exercise of
the police power but the municipality does also.
(U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF POLICE POWER
EXERCISED BY MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS. Municipal governments
exercise this power under the general welfare
clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with
authority to "enact such ordinances and issue
such regulations as may be necessary to carry
out and discharge the responsibilities conferred
upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary
and proper to provide for the health, safety,
comfort and convenience, maintain peace and
order, improve public morals, promote the
prosperity and general welfare of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and
insure the protection of property therein."
(Sections 91, 149, 177 and 208, BP 337). And
under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local
government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary and
proper for governance such as to promote
health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve
morals, and maintain peace and order in the
local government unit, and preserve the comfort
and convenience of the inhabitants therein."
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS;
EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW; NOT
VIOLATED IN CLASSIFYING PAUPERS AS
SUBJECT OF LEGISLATION. There is no
violation of the equal protection clause in
classifying paupers as subject of legislation.
Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different
groups may receive varying treatment. Precious
to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local
councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus,
statutes have been passed giving rights and
benefits to the disabled, emancipating the
tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil,
housing the urban poor, etc.
Tano v. Socrates, G.R. No. 110249,
[August 21, 1997], 343 PHIL 670-734
On December 15, 1992, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa
City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 banning the
shipment of all live fish and lobster outside
Puerto Princesa City effective for five years. To
implement the ordinance, the City Mayor of
Puerto Princesa City issued Office Order No. 23
dated January 23, 1993, ordering inspections on
cargoes containing live fish and lobster being
shipped out from air and sea. Likewise, on
February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Provincial Government of
Palawan, enacted Resolution No. 33 and
Ordinance No. 2, series of 1993, prohibiting the
catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling
and shipment of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms for a period of five years.
Petitioners challenged the
aforementioned ordinances and office order on
the ground that it deprived them of due process
of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted
them from the practice of their trade.
The Supreme Court ruled that the challenged
ordinances do not suffer any infirmity, both
under the Constitution and applicable laws,
including the Local Government Code. There is
no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies
as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.
The Local Government Code vests
municipalities with the power to grant fishery
privileges in municipal waters and impose
rentals, fees or charges therefor. The
Sangguniangs are directed to enact ordinances
that protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger
the environment such as dynamite fishing and
other forms of destructive fishing. One of the
devolved powers under the Code is the
enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters
including the conservation of mangroves. In light
then of the principles of decentralization and
devolution and the powers granted therein to
local government units under the General
Welfare Clause and those which involve the
exercise of police power, the validity of the
questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.
The ordinances find full support under
R.A. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic
Environment Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act,
approved on 19 June 1992 which adopts a
comprehensive framework for the sustainable
development of Palawan compatible with
protecting and enhancing the natural resources
and endangered environment of the province.
The dissenting opinion of Justice
Bellosillo relies upon the lack of authority on the
part of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto
Princesa to enact Ordinance No. 15, series of
1992, as the subject thereof is within the
jurisdiction and responsibility of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under
P.D. No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975, and
the ordinance is unenforceable for lack of
approval by the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
under P.D. 704. But BFAR is no longer under
the Department of Natural Resources (now
DENR), but under the Ministry of Agriculture and
Food and converted into a mere staff agency
thereof. The approval that should be sought
would be that of the Secretary of the Department
of Agriculture. However, the requirement of
approval by the Secretary has been dispensed
with.
PREFERENTIAL RIGHT OF
SUBSISTENCE OR MARGINAL FISHERMEN
TO THE USE OF MARINE RESOURCES IS
NOT AT ALL ABSOLUTE. Anent Section 7 of
Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of
communal marine and fishing resources, but of
their protection, development and conservation.
As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question
are meant precisely to protect and conserve our
marine resources to the end that their enjoyment
may be guaranteed not only for the present
generation, but also for the generations to come.
The so-called "preferential right" of subsistence
or marginal fishermen to the use of marine
resources is not at all absolute. In accordance
with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources
belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, their "exploration, development and
utilization . . . shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State." Moreover, their
mandated protection, development and
conservation as necessarily recognized by the
framers of the Constitution, imply certain
restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there
may be in favor of anyone.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL
GOVERNMENT; MUNICIPALITIES; SCOPE OF
POWER OVER ITS MUNICIPAL WATERS.
Section 5(c) of the LGC "shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to the local
government units in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for
the people of the community." The LGC vests
municipalities with the power to grant fishery
privileges in municipal waters and impose
rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by
appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives,
noxious or poisonous substances, electricity,
muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of
fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the
provisions of applicable fishery laws. Further,
the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang
panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan
are directed to enact ordinances for the general
welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants,
which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that
"[p]rotect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger
the environment such as dynamite fishing and
other forms of destructive fishing . . . and such
other activities which result in pollution,
acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and
lakes, or of ecological imbalance.
ANY PROVISION ON A POWER OF A
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT SHALL BE
LIBERALLY INTERPRETED IN ITS FAVOR.
The centerpiece of LGC is the system of
decentralization as expressly mandated by the
Constitution. Indispensable to decentralization is
devolution and the LGC expressly provides that
"[a]ny provision on a power of a local
government unit shall be liberally interpreted in
its favor, and in case of doubt, any question
thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution
of powers and of the lower local government
unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power shall be interpreted in
favor of the local government unit concerned."
Devolution refers to the act by which the
National Government confers power and
authority upon the various local government
units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.
HAS THE POWER TO ENFORCE
FISHERIES LAWS IN MUNICIPAL WATERS
INCLUDING THE CONSERVATION OF
MANGROVE. One of the devolved powers
enumerated in the section of the LGC on
devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of
mangroves. This necessarily includes the
enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out
such fishery laws within the municipal waters.
The term "municipal waters," in turn, includes
not only streams, lakes, and tidal water within
the municipality, not being the subject of private
ownership and not comprised within the national
parks, public forest, timber lands, forest
reserves, or fishery reserves, but also marine
waters included between two lines drawn
perpendicularly to the general coastline from
points where the boundary lines of the
municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and
a third line parallel with the general coastline
and fifteen kilometers from it. Under P.D. No.
704, the marine waters included in municipal
waters is limited to three nautical miles from the
general coastline using the above perpendicular
lines and a third parallel line.
HAS THE POWER, INTER ALIA, TO
ENACT ORDINANCE TO ENHANCE THE
RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO A BALANCED
ECOLOGY. Under the general welfare clause
of the LGC,local government units have the
power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It
likewise specifically vests municipalities with the
power to grant fishery privileges in municipal
waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges
therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances,
the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous
substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other
deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute
any violation of the provisions of applicable
fishery laws. Finally, it imposes upon the
sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang
panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan
the duty to enact ordinances to "[p]rotect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties
for acts which endanger the environment such
as dynamite fishing and other forms of
destructive fishing . . . and such other activities
which result in pollution, acceleration of
eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of
ecological imbalance."
White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R. No.
122846,
[January 20, 2009], 596 PHIL 444-472
The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the RTC and affirmed the
constitutionality of the Ordinance. 24 First, it
held that the Ordinance did not violate the right
to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it
only penalizes the owners or operators of
establishments that admit individuals for short
time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach
of police power is only constrained by having a
lawful object obtained through a lawful method.
The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied
since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is
a lawful method since the establishments are
still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect
on the establishments is justified by the well-
being of its constituents in general. Finally, as
held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators
Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty is
regulated by law.
The test of a valid ordinance is well
established. A long line of decisions including
City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to
be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
The Ordinance prohibits two specific
and distinct business practices, namely wash
rate admissions and renting out a room more
than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to
be rooted in the police power as conferred on
local government units by the Local Government
Code through such implements as the general
welfare clause.
We cannot discount other legitimate
activities which the Ordinance would proscribe
or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a
wash rate or renting the room out for more than
twice a day. Entire families are known to choose
to pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the
power is momentarily out in their homes. In
transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest
between trips have a legitimate purpose for
abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed
any person or groups of persons in need of
comfortable private spaces for a span of a few
hours with purposes other than having sex or
using illegal drugs can legitimately look to
staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient
alternative.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful
uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a
product and the petitioners of lucrative business
ties in with another constitutional requisite for
the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police
power measure. It must appear that the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means
must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. 71 It must also be
evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under
the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded. 72
Lacking a concurrence of these
requisites, the police measure shall be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police
power is subject to judicial review when life,
liberty or property is affected. 73 However, this
is not in any way meant to take it away from the
vastness of State police power whose exercise
enjoys the presumption of validity.
 The behavior which the Ordinance
seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and
could in fact be diminished simply by applying
existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as
curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug
dealers through active police work would be
more effective in easing the situation. So would
the strict enforcement of existing laws and
regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
These measures would have minimal intrusion
on the businesses of the petitioners and other
legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that
the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by
merely paying the whole day rate without any
hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in
fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by
charging their customers a portion of the rent for
motel rooms and even apartments.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is
REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Social Justice Society vs Atienza
Facts: Chevron[1] is engaged in the business of
importing, distributing and marketing of
petroleum products in the Philippines while Shell
and Petron are engaged in the business of
manufacturing, refining and likewise importing,
distributing and marketing of petroleum products
in the Philippines.[2] The DOE is a governmental
agency created under Republic Act (RA) No.
7638[3] and tasked to prepare, integrate,
coordinate, supervise and control all plans,
programs, projects and activities of the
government relative to energy exploration,
development, utilization, distribution and
conservation. Petitioners Social Justice Society,
Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S.
Tumbokon, in an original petition for mandamus
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, sought to
compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr.,
then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance was
enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Manila. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the
Pandacan Oil Terminals from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under the
reclassification to cease and desist from
operating their businesses within six months
from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are
the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil
companies. After we rendered our decision on
March 7, 2007, ruling that respondent had the
ministerial duty under the Local Government
Code (LGC) to enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city,[13]
including Ordinance No. 8027, the oil companies
and DOE sought to intervene and filed motions
for reconsideration in intervention on March 12,
2007 and March 21, 2007 respectively.
Petitioners attacked the validity of Ordinance
8027.
Issue: WON Ordinance 8027 is valid.
Held: Yes. The tests of a valid ordinance are
well established. For an ordinance to be valid, it
must not only be within the corporate powers of
the LGU to enact and be passed according to
the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy and (6) must not be
unreasonable. Ordinance No. 8027 was passed
by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in the
exercise of its police power. Police power is the
plenary power vested in the legislature to make
statutes and ordinances to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety
and general welfare of the people.[116] This
power flows from the recognition that salus
populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people
is the supreme law).[117] While police power
rests primarily with the national legislature, such
power may be delegated.[118] Section 16 of the
LGC, known as the general welfare clause,
encapsulates the delegated police power to local
governments:[119]
Section 16. General Welfare. Every local
government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-
reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain
peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police
power through their respective legislative
bodies, in this case, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or the city council. Specifically, the
Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the
general welfare of the city:
Section. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panglungsod, as the legislative branch of the
city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of
the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section
16 of this Code xxxx
As with the State, local governments may be
considered as having properly exercised their
police power only if the following requisites are
met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its exercise and (2) the means employed
are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must
be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful
method. Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for
the purpose of promoting sound urban planning,
ensuring health, public safety and general
welfare[123] of the residents of Manila. The
Sanggunian was impelled to take measures
to protect the residents of Manila from
catastrophic devastation in case of a
terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
Towards this objective, the Sanggunian
reclassified the area defined in the ordinance
from industrial to commercial.
Social Justice Society Officers vs Alfredo
Lim
Facts: These petitions are a sequel to the case
of Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr.8
(hereinafter referred to asG.R. No. 156052),
where the Court found: (1) that the ordinance
subject thereof Ordinance No. 8027 was
enacted "to safeguard the rights to life, security
and safety of the inhabitants of Manila;"9 (2) that
it had passed the tests of a valid ordinance; and
(3) that it is not superseded by Ordinance No.
8119.10 Declaring that it is constitutional and
valid,11 the Court accordingly ordered its
immediate enforcement with a specific directive
on the relocation and transfer of the Pandacan
oil terminals.Highlighting that the Court has
soruled that the Pandacan oil depots should
leave, herein petitioners now seek the
nullification of Ordinance No. 8187, which
contains provisions contrary to those embodied
in Ordinance No. 8027. On 14 May 2009, during
the incumbency of former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim
(Mayor Lim), who succeeded Mayor Atienza, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance
No. 8187.
The new Ordinance repealed, amended,
rescinded or otherwise modified Ordinance No.
8027, Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119, and all
other Ordinances or provisions inconsistent
therewith46 thereby allowing, once again, the
operation of "Pollutive/Non-Hazardous and
Pollutive/Hazardous manufacturing and
processing establishments" and "Highly
Pollutive/Non-Hazardous[,]
Pollutive/Hazardous[,] Highly Pollutive/Extremely
Hazardous[,] Non-Pollutive/Extremely
Hazardous; and Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous;
and Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous
manufacturing and processing establishments"
within the newly created Medium Industrial Zone
(1-2) and Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3) in the
Pandacan area.
To support their petition for prohibition against
the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8187, the
petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS) officers
allege that: xxx The enactment of the assailed
Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power
because the measures provided therein do not
promote the general welfare of the people xxx 2.
The conditions at the time the Court declared
Ordinance No. 8027 constitutional in G.R. No.
156052 exist to this date; 3. Despite the finality
of the Decision in G.R. No. 156052, and
notwithstanding that the conditions and
circumstances warranting the validity of the
Ordinance remain the same, the Manila City
Council passed a contrary Ordinance, thereby
refusing to recognize that "judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of the legal system of the
Philippines;
Mayor Lim responded that (1) it is the function of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod to enact zoning
ordinances, for which reason, it may proceed to
amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8119 without
prior referral to the Manila Zoning Board of
Adjustment and Appeals (MZBAA) as prescribed
under Section 80 (Procedure for Re-Zoning) and
the City Planning and Development Office
(CPDO) pursuant to Section 81 (Amendments to
the Zoning Ordinance) of Ordinance No. 8119,
especially when the action actually originated
from the Sangguniang Panlungsod itself; (2) the
Sangguniang Panlungsod may, in the later
ordinance, expressly repeal all or part of the
zoning ordinance sought to be modified; and (3)
the provision repealing Section 23 of Ordinance
No. 8119 is not violative of Section 26, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, which requires that
every bill must embrace only one subject and
that such shall be expressed in the title.
On the substantive issues, he posits that the
petitions are based on unfounded fears; that the
assailed ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power; that it is consistent with the general
welfare clause and public policy, and is not
unreasonable; that it does not run contrary to the
Constitution, municipal laws, and international
conventions; and that the petitioners failed to
overcome the presumption of validity of the
assailed ordinance.
Issue: WON Ordinance 8187 is valid.
Held: No. The fact remains, however, that
notwithstanding that the conditions with respect
to the operations of the oil depots existing prior
to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not
substantially differ to this day, as would later be
discussed, the position of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod on the matter has thrice changed,
largely depending on the new composition of the
council and/or political affiliations. The foregoing,
thus, shows that its determination of the "general
welfare" of the city does not after all gear
towards the protection of the people in its true
sense and meaning, but is, one way or another,
dependent on the personal preference of the
members who sit in the council as to which
particular sector among its constituents it wishes
to favor.
Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor
and the city councilors, has changed its view on
the matter, favoring the citys economic related
benefits, through the continued stay of the oil
terminals, over the protection of the very lives
and safety of its constituents, it is imperative for
this Court to make a final determination on the
basis of the facts on the table as to which
specific right of the inhabitants of Manila should
prevail. For, in this present controversy, history
reveals that there is truly no such thing as "the
will of Manila" insofar as the general welfare of
the people is concerned.
If in sacrilege, in free translation of Angara124
by Justice Laurel, we say when the judiciary
mediates we do notin reality nullify or invalidate
an act of the Manila Sangguniang Panlungsod,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to the Court by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them.
The issue of whether or not the Pandacan
Terminal is not a likely target of terrorist attacks
has already been passed upon in G. R. No.
156052. Based on the assessment of the
Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban
Development of the City of Manila and the then
position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,132 the
Court was convinced that the threat of terrorism
is imminent. It remains so convinced. The same
best interest of the public guides the present
decision. The Pandacan oil depot remains a
terrorist target even if the contents have been
lessened. In the absence of any convincing
reason to persuade this Court that the life,
security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila
are no longer put at risk by the presence of the
oil depots, we hold that Ordinance No. 8187 in
relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and
unconstitutional.
There is, therefore, no need to resolve the rest
of the issues.
Neither is it necessary to discuss at length the
test of police power against the assailed
ordinance. Suffice it to state that the objective
adopted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod to
promote the constituents general welfare in
terms of economic benefits cannot override the
very basic rights to life, security and safety of the
people.