Republic of the Philippines intestate court and in his stead, SILVERIO SR. was appointed as the new administrator.
SUPREME COURT Thereafter, an active exchange of pleadings to remove and appoint a new administrator ensued
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 208828-29 August 13, 2014
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC., MONICA P. OCAMPO and ZEE2
RESOURCES, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated March 8, 2013 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) insofar as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 121173 and 122024 are concerned, and Resolution 2 dated
July 4, 2013 denying petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The CA nullified the
preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City ("intestate court"),
Branch 57 in Sp. Proc. No. M-2629 and reversed said court's Order dated August 18, 2011
declaring the sales and derivative titles over two properties subject of intestate proceedings as
null and void.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
The late Beatriz S. Silverio died without leaving a will on October 7, 1987. She was survived by
her legal heirs, namely: Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (husband), Edmundo S. Silverio (son), Edgardo
S. Silverio (son), Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. (son), Nelia S.Silverio-Dee (daughter), and Ligaya S.
Silverio (daughter). Subsequently, an intestate proceeding (SP PROC. NO. M-2629) for the
settlement of her estate was filed by SILVERIO, SR.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties filed different petitions and appeal challenging
several orders ofthe intestate court that went all the way up to the Supreme Court. To better
understand the myriad of factual and procedural antecedents leading to the instant consolidated
case, this court will resolve the petitions in seriatim.
The Petitions
CA-G.R. SP No. 121172
The first petition of the three consolidated petitions is CA-G.R. SP No. 121172 wherein petitioner,
RICARDO S. SILVERIO JR. ("SILVERIO JR.") assails the Order ofthe intestate court dated 16
June 2011 reinstating RICARDO SILVERIO SR. ("SILVERIO SR.") as administrator to the estate
of the late Beatriz Silverio.
The administrator first appointed by the Court was EDGARDO SILVERIO ("EDGARDO"), but by
virtue of a Joint Manifestation dated 3 November 1999 filed by the heirs of BEATRIZ D.
SILVERIO, the motion to withdraw as administrator filed by EDGARDO was approved by the
between SILVERIO SR. and SILVERIO JR. The flip-flopping appointment of administrator is
summarized below:
In an Order dated 3 January 2005, SILVERIO SR. was removed as administrator and in his
stead, SILVERIO, JR. was designated as the new administrator. A motion for reconsideration
was separately filed by SILVERIO SR. and Nelia Silverio-Dee ("SILVERIO-DEE") and on 31 May
2005, the intestate court issued an Omnibus Order affirming among others, the Order of 3
January 2005. Inthe same Order, the intestate court also granted the motion of SILVERIO JR. to
take his oath as administrator effective upon receipt of the order and expunged the inventory
report filed by SILVERIO SR.
On 12 December 2005 the intestate court acting on the motion filed by SILVERIO SR. recalled
the Order granting letters of administration to SILVERIO JR. and reinstated SILVERIO SR. as
administrator. Then again, the intestate court acting on the motion for partial consideration to the
Order dated 12 December 2005 filed by SILVERIO JR. issued an Omnibus Order dated 31
October 2006 upholding the grant of Letters of Administration to SILVERIO JR. and removed
SILVERIO SR., ad administrator for gross violation of his duties and functions under Section 1,
Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
SILVERIO SR. moved for reconsideration of the above Order whereas SILVERIO-DEE on the
other hand, filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 97196. On 28 August 2008, the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) rendered a decision
reinstating SILVERIO, SR. as administrator, the decretal portion of the Order reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The portions of the Omnibus Order upholding the
grant of letters of administration to and the taking of an oath of administration by Ricardo
Silverio, Jr., as well as the removal of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of
Beatriz Silverio, are declared NULL and VOID. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued is
MADE PERMANENT in regard to the said portions. Respondent RTC is ORDERED to reinstate
Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of Beatriz Silverio. Costs against the Private
Respondents.
SO ORDERED."
SILVERIO JR. filed a Petition for review on Certioraribefore the Supreme Court docketed as
G.R. No. 185619 challenging the 28 Augsut 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals. On 11
February 2009, the Supreme Court issued a resolution denying the petition for failure to
sufficiently show any reversible error inthe assailed judgment to warrant the exercise by the
Court of discretionary appellate jurisdiction. Acting on SILVERIO JR.s motion for
reconsideration, the Supreme Court on 11 February 2011, denied the motion with finality. An
entry of judgment was made on 29 March 2011.
On 25 April 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed before the intestate court, an urgent motion to be
reinstated as administrator of the estate. Acting on the motion, the intestate court issued the now
challenged Order dated 16 June 2011, the pertinent portion of the Order reads:
xxxx
"WHEREFORE, upon posting of a bond in the sum of TEN MILLION PESOS, the same to be
approved by this Court, Mr. Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. is hereby ordered reinstated as the
Page 1 of 18
Administrator to the estate of the late Beatriz Silverio and to immediately take his oath as such,
and exercise his duties and functions as are incumbent under the law upon the said position.
xxx."
xxxx
CA-G.R. SP No. 121173
xxxx
On 15 March 2011, heirs SILVERIO JR., EDMUNDO and LIGAYA represented by her legal
guardian moved for the disqualification and/or inhibition of JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. based on the
following grounds: (1) Absence of the written consent of all parties in interest allowing JUDGE
GUANLAO, JR. to continue hearing the case considering that he appeared once as counsel in
the intestate proceedings; (2) JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. has shown bias and partiality in favor of
SILVERIO SR. by allowing the latter to pursue several motions and even issued a TRO in
violation of the rules against forum shopping; (3) Heir LIGAYAs Petition for Support and Release
of Funds for Medical Support has not been resolved; and (4) It is in the best interest of all the
heirs that the proceedings be presided and decided by the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
On 23 March 2011, JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. issued an order denying the Motion for
Disqualification and/or Inhibition. The movants filed a motion for reconsideration but the same
was denied in an order dated 14 June 2011. Hence, the instant petition.
xxxx
CA-G.R. SP NO. 122024
xxxx
The intestate court in its Omnibus Order dated 31 October 2006, ordered among others, the sale
of certain properties belonging to the estate. The portion of the order which is pertinent to the
present petition reads:
"WHEREFORE, above premises considered, this Court for the foregoing reasons resolves to
grant the following:
(1) xxx
(2) xxx
(3) Allowing the sale of the properties located at (1) No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes
Park, Makati City, covered by T.C.T. No. 137155 issued by Register of Deeds of
Makati City; (2) No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City covered by T.C.T. No.
4137154 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City; and (3) No. 19 Taurus St.,
Bel-Air Subd. Makati City covered by TCT No. 137156 issued by the Register of
Deeds of Makati City to partially settle the intestate estate of the late Beatriz S.
Silverio, and authorizing the Administrator to undertake the proper procedure or
transferring the titles involved to the name of the estate; and
(4) To apply the proceeds of the sale mentioned in Number 3 above to the payment of
taxes, interests, penalties and other charges, if any, and todistribute the residue
among the heirs Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr., Ligaya S. Silverio
represented by Legal Guardian Nestor S. Dela Merced II, Edmundo S. Silverio and
Nelia S. SilverioDee in accordance with the law on intestacy.
SO ORDERED."
By virtue of the aforesaid Order, SILVERIO, JR. on 16 October 2007 executed a Deed of
Absolute Salein favor of CITRINE HOLDINGS, Inc. ("CITRINE") over the property located at No.
3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. CITRINE became the registered owner thereof on 06
September 2010 as evidenced by TCT No. 006-201000063.
A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise executed in favor of Monica P. Ocampo (notarized on
September 16, 2010) for the lot located at No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City.
On 23 December 2010, TCT No. 006-2011000050 was issued toMonica P. Ocampo. The latter
subsequently sold said property to ZEE2 Resources, Inc. (ZEE2) and TCT No. 006-2011000190
was issued on 11 February 2011 under its name.
In the interim, or on 12 December 2006 SILVERIO-DEE filed a petition for certioraribefore the
Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 with prayer for injunctive relief. As prayed
for, the Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 5 February 2007. On 4
July 2007, the Court issueda Writ of Preliminary Injunction conditioned upon the posting of the
bond in the amount of two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00). SILVERIO-DEE posted the required
bond on February 5, 2007 but in an order dated 3 January 2008, the Court ruled that the bond
posted by SILVERIO-DEE failed to comply with A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC. The Court, however, did
not reverse the ruling granting the injunction but instead ordered SILVERIO-DEE to comply with
A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC. The Court also increased the bond from two million to ten million. On 29
February 2008, the Court issued a Resolution approving the ten million bond and issued the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction. Eventually, on 28 August 2008 the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division)
issued a decision reinstating SILVERIO SR. as administrator and declaring the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction permanent in regard to the appointment of administrator.
On 04 February 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Application for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order/Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction (With Motion For the Issuance of Subpoena
Ad Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum) praying among others, that a TRO be issued
restraining and/or preventing SILVERIO, JR., MONICA OCAMPO, CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC.
and their successors-in-interest from committing any act that would affect the titles to the three
properties.
On 14 February 2011, SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion (a) To Declare as Null and
Void the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010; (b) To cancel the Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 006-2011000050; and (c) To reinstate the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in
the name of Ricardo C. SilverioSr. and the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio.
Page 2 of 18
On 28 February 2011 the Intestate Court issued an Order granting a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining SILVERIO JR., their agent or anybody acting in their behalf from committing any
act that would affect the titles to the properties and enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati
City from accepting, admitting, approving, registering, annotating or in any way giving due
course to whatever deeds, instruments or any other documents involving voluntary or involuntary
dealings which may have the effect of transferring, conveying, encumbering, ceding, waiving,
alienating, or disposing in favor of any individual or any entity of the subject properties.
Subpoena ad testificandumand duces tecumwas also issued by the intestate court requiring
SILVERIO, JR., MONICA OCAMPO and ALEXANDRA GARCIA of CITRINE to testify and bring
with them any books and documents under their control to shed light on the circumstances
surrounding the transaction involving the properties in question.
On 9 March 2011, SILVERIO Sr. filed a Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 14
February 2011. On 18 August 2011, the intestate court rendered the now assailed Order the
decretal portion of the Order is quoted hereunder:
"WHEREFORE, this Court hereby orders that:
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010 as VOID:
2. The Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050 in the name of defendant
MONICA OCAMPO or any of her successors-in-interestincluding all derivative titles,
as NULL AND VOID;
3. The Transfer Certificate of Title TCT No. 006-2011000190 in the name of ZEE2
RESOURCES, INC. or any of its successors-in-interest including all derivative titles,
as NULL AND VOID;
4. (T)he Register of Deeds of Makati City to CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No.
006-2011000050, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000190 and all of its
derivative titles; and 5. Reinstating the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in the
name of RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. AND THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE
BEATRIZ SILVERIO, and AS TO THE INTSIA PROPERTY:
1. The Register of Deeds ofMakati City to CANCEL Transfer Certificate
ofTitle No. 006-2010000063, in the name of CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and
all of its derivative titles; and
2. The reinstatement of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223612 in the name
of RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. and the INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE
LATE BEATRIZ SILVERIO.
SO ORDERED."
x x x x3
The consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by respondent Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. ("Silverio, Jr.")
before the CA questioned the following issuances of the intestate court: CA-G.R. SP No. 121172
Order dated June 16, 2011 reinstating Silverio, Sr. as Administrator; CA-G.R. SP No. 121173
(1) Order dated March 23,2011 granting Silverio, Sr.s application for preliminary injunction
enjoining Silverio, Jr. or anyone acting on their behalf from committing any act that would affect
the titles to the subject properties and enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati City from
accepting, admitting, approving, registering, annotating or in any way giving due course to
whatever deeds, instruments or any other documents involving the Cambridge and Intsia
properties, (2) Order dated March 23, 2011 which denied Silverio, Jr.s motion or disqualification
and/or inhibition of Judge Guanlao, Jr., and (3) Order dated June 14, 2011 denying the motion
for reconsideration of the March 23, 2011 Order (granting application for preliminary injunction);
and in CA-G.R. SP No. 122024 Order dated August 18, 2011 declaring the Deed of Absolute
Sale, TCT and all derivative titles over the Cambridge and Intsiaproperties as null and void.
On March 8, 2013, the CA rendered its Decision, the falloof which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Court hereby disposes and orders the
following:
1. The petition in CA G.R. SP No. 121172is DENIEDfor lack of merit. Accordingly, the
16 June 2011 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 reinstating
MR. RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. as Administrator is AFFIRMED.
2. The petition in CA GR. S.P. No. 121173is partly DENIEDfor lack of merit insofar as it
questions the 23 March 2011 Order denying RICARDO SILVERIO, JRs Motion for
Disqualification and/or Inhibition of Judge Honorio E. Guanlao, Jr. The petition is partly
GRANTEDin that the Preliminary Injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 57 is herebydeclared NULL and VOID for being issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
3. The petition in CA G.R.-S.P. No. 122024is GRANTED. Accordingly, the 18 August
2011 Order declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificate of Title and all
derivative titles over the Cambridge and Intsia Property null and void is hereby
REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.4
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (petitioner) filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration 5 "insofar as its ruling
in CA-G.R. SP No. 122024" praying that the August 18, 2011 Order of the intestate court be
affirmed. By Resolution dated July 4, 2013, the CA denied his motion for partial reconsideration.
Hence, this petition contending thatthe CA committed a reversible error in upholding the validity
of the Intsia and Cambridgeproperties upon the ground that the intestate court cannotannul the
sales as it has a limited jurisdiction only and which does not includeresolving issues of
ownership. It is asserted that the CA should nothave stopped there and looked into the nature of
the properties sold, which formed part of the conjugal partnership of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. and
Beatriz S. Silverio.
Petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the order of the intestate court annulling the sales of the
Cambridge and Intsia properties. In the alternative, should the said sales be upheld, petitioner
prays that this Court (1) declare the sales to be valid only to the extent of 50% net remainder
share of the late Beatriz less the corresponding shares therefrom of petitioner and the other
legal compulsory heirs, and (2) order respondent Silverio, Jr. to account for the proceeds of
sales for distribution of the residue among the legal/compulsory heirs.
Page 3 of 18
In their Comment, respondents Silverio, Jr., Monica Ocampo and Citrine Holdings, Inc. argued
that the intestate court should not have ruled on the validity of the sale of the subject properties
to third parties after it itself had authorized their disposal in partial settlementof the estate,
especially so when separate actions assailing the new titles issued to said third parties were
already instituted by petitioner.
As to the issue of alleged lack ofprior consent of petitioner to the aforesaid sales as the surviving
spouses with a 50% conjugal share in the subject properties, respondents point out that such is
belied by the October 31, 2006 Order of the intestate court, which clearly showed that counsels
of all the heirs were present at the hearing of June 16, 2006 and no objection was made by them
to the sale of the properties and the partial settlement of the Estate of Beatriz S. Silverio,
together with the transfer of titles of these properties in the name of the Estate as prayed for in
petitioners Manifestation and Motion dated April 19, 2006. Petitioner had not challenged or
appealed the said order authorizing the sale of the subject properties. Thus, it is too late in the
day for petitioner to raise this factual issue before this Court, not to mention that it cannot be
ventilated in the present appeal by certiorari as thisCourt is not a trier of facts.
Respondent ZEE2 Resources Corporation filed its Comment contending that the intestate court
improperly nullified the titles despite the fact that the present registered owners, who are
indispensable parties, were not impleaded. Indeed, a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked
and may be cancelled only in a direct proceeding brought for the purpose. Respondent points
out that petitioner himself recognized thata direct action is required to annul a Torrens title ashe
initially instituted two civil complaints before the RTC of Makati City seeking to annul, among
others, the TCTs issued to respondent Ocampo for the Cambridge property. After failing to
secure restraining orders in these two civil cases, petitioner filed in the intestate court his Urgent
OmnibusMotion dated February 14, 2011 to annul the said titles, including that of ZEE2. In any
case, respondent maintains that it is a buyer of good faith and for value, of which the intestate
court never made a determination nor did the aforesaid Urgent Omnibus Motion and Supplement
to the Omnibus Motion dated March 4, 2011 contain allegations indicating that respondent ZEE2
was not a buyer in good faith and for value.
According to respondent ZEE2, petitioners act of filing a separate complaint with application for
a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction on January 31, 2011 in another
court (Civil Case Nos. 11-084 of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143) constitutes willful and
deliberate forum shopping asthe former also prayedsimilar primary reliefs and setting up the
alleged nullity of the subject deeds of absolute sale as those raised in the Urgent Omnibus
Motion and Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion filed in the intestate court.
At the outset, we emphasize that the probate court having jurisdiction over properties under
administration has the authority not only to approve any disposition or conveyance, but also to
annul an unauthorized sale by the prospective heirs or administrator. Thus we held in Lee v.
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 856:
Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval.
It is well-settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the
decedents estate. In the early case of Godoy vs. Orellano, we laid down the rule that the sale of
the property of the estate by an administrator without the order of the probate court is void and
passes no title to the purchaser. And in the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that: x
xxx
It being settled that property under administration needs the approval of the probate court before
it can be disposed of, any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void.
Asearly as 1921 in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano(42 Phil 347), We laid down the rule that a
sale by an administrator of property of the deceased, which is not authorized by the probate
court is null and void and title does not pass to the purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void the disposition of the
property under administration, made by private respondent, the same having been effected
without authority from said court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or
approve the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can declare it
null and void for as long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold
petitioners contention that the probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render
meaningless the power pertaining to the said court. (Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). (italics ours)
Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an
administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any
unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no
need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed by respondent Silverio, Jr. with prior
approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006. Subsequently,
however, the sale was annulled by the said court on motion by petitioner.
In reversing the intestate courts order annulling the sale of the subject properties, the CA noted
that said ruling is anchored on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed at the time when
the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still in effect. It
then concluded that the eventual decision in the latter case making the writ of preliminary
injunction permanent only with respect to the appointment of petitioner as administrator and not
to the grant of authority to sell mooted the issue of whether the sale was executed at the time
when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction were in effect.
The CAs ruling on this issue is hereunder quoted:
The more crucial question that needs to be addressed is: Whether the authority to sell the
properties in question granted under the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order, was nullified by the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. A look at the dispositive portion of
the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 would lead us to reasonably conclude that the grant of
authority to sell is still good and valid. The fallo of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The portions of the Omnibus Order upholding the
grant of letters of administration to and the taking of an oath of administration by Ricardo
Silverio, Jr., as well as the removal of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of
Beatriz Silverio, are declared NULL and VOID. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued is
made permanent in regard to the said portions. Respondent RTC is ORDERED to reinstate
Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the Estate of Beatriz Silverio. Costs against the Private
Respondents.
SO ORDERED."
The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate [sic] court in so far as it authorizes the
saleof the three properties in question was not declared by the Court of Appeals, Seventh
Division as null and void.It is axiomatic that it is the dispositive portion of the decision that finally
invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes the
corresponding duties or obligations.
From all the foregoing, We declare that it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
intestate court when it ordered the sale of the Cambridge Property and Intsia Property as NULL
and VOID citing as justification the decision of the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division in CAG.R.
SP No. 97196. To reiterate, the injunction order which was made permanent by the Court of
Appeals (Seventh Division) was declared to be limited only to the portion ofthe Omnibus Order
Page 4 of 18
that upheld the grant of letters of administrationby SILVERIO, JR. and the removal of SILVERIO,
SR. as administrator and nothing else.
Anent the preliminary injunction issued by the intestate court in its Order dated 23 March 2011
and challenged by SILVERIO JR. in CA-G.R. SP No. 121173, we find that it was issued with
grave abuse of discretion as it was directed against acts which were already [fait]accompli. The
preliminary injunction sought to: 1) restrain SILVERIO JR., their agents, or anybody acting in
their behalf or any person from committing any act that would affect the titles to the subject
properties belonging to the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz Silverio and (2) enjoining the
Register of Deeds of Makati City from accepting, admitting, approving, registering, annotating or
in any giving due course to whatever deeds, instruments or any other documents involving
voluntary or involuntary dealings which may have the effect of transferring, conveying,
encumbering, ceding, waiving, alienating or disposing in favor of any individual or any entity the
above-enumerated properties belonging to the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz Silverio.
However, the records show that when the preliminary injunction was issued on 23 March 2011
new titles over the disputed properties were already issued to CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and
ZEE2 RESOURCES INC.7(Emphasis supplied.)
We affirm the CA.
It bears to stress that the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order was issued by the intestate court
acting upon pending motions filed by petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr., father and son,
respectively, who are the central figures in the now decade-old controversy over the Intestate
Estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio. The intestate court flip-flopped in appointing as
administrator of the estate petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr., their personal conflicts
becoming more evident to the intestate court as the proceedings suffered delays. At the hearing
of the urgent motion filed by Edmundo Silverio to sell the subject properties and partially settle
the estate, the much awaited opportunity came when the heirs represented by their respective
counsels interposed no objection to the same.
While it is true that petitioner was eventually reinstated as Administrator pursuant to the August
28, 2008 decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 (petition for certiorari filed by Nelia Silverio-Dee),
weagree with the CA that the permanent injunction issued under the said decision, as explicitly
stated in its fallo, pertained only to the portions of the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order
upholding the grant of letters of administration to and taking of an oath of administration by
respondent Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA would have expressly set aside as well the directive
in the same Omnibus Order allowing the sale of the subject properties. Moreover, the CA
Decision attained finality only on February 11, 2011 when this Court denied with finality
respondent Silverio, Jr.s motion for reconsideration of the February 11, 2009 Resolution
denyinghis petition for review (G.R. No. 185619).1wphi1
The CA therefore did not err in reversing the August 18, 2011 Order of the intestate court
annulling the sale of the subject properties grounded solely on the injunction issued in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97196. Respondents Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced by the flip-
flopping appointment of Administrator by the intestate court, having relied in good faith that the
sale was authorized and with prior approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated
October 31, 2006 which remained valid and subsisting insofar as it allowed the aforesaid sale.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 8, 2013 and Resolution dated
July 4, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP Nos. 121173 and 122024 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,vs.FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,vs.FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN
LUIS, Respondent.
FACTS:
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia
Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,
Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the
time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his
death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because
she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent,
possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Mila filed a
motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. Thus, a new trial ensued.
(2) Trial Court (new): dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It found
that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in
the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph
2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the
vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.
(3) CA: reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court
ISSUES:
(1) Whether venue was properly laid, and
(2) Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the
Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20,
1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
(3) Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
RULING:
(1) Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
Page 5 of 18
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the
province "in which he resides at the time of his death."
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. While petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to
the time of his death. From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
(2) Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. As such,
the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26
thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A.,
she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law
Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the
said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as
they must be alleged and proved.Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for
further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.
(3) Yes. Respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may
arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless,
we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties
that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP vs. SEBASTIAN AGTARAP
FACTS: Joaquin Agtarap died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without any known
debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with Lucia
Garcia (Lucia), and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April 24, 1924. Joaquin
and Lucia had three childrenJesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose (survived by three
children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa). Joaquin married Caridad on February 9, 1926.
They also had three childrenEduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her daughter
Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay
City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and 874-(38255). Joseph,
a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and had been
appropriating for himself P26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
Eduardo asked to be appointed administrator. He was latter appointed by the probate court and
was issued with letters of administrator. Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition.
They alleged that the two subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia,
and that, upon Lucias death in April 1924, they became the pro indiviso owners of the subject
properties. They said that their residence was built with the exclusive money of their late father
Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the house were shouldered by Gloria and Teresa,
while the restaurant (Manongs Restaurant) was built with the exclusive money of Joseph and
his business partner.
Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order of Partition, holding that considering that the bulk of the
estate property were acquired during the existence of the second marriage as shown by TCT
No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its face that decedent was married to
Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict by evidence other than their negative
allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce accounted by the second marriage and the
compulsory heirs thereunder. It also declared that the real estate properties belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification of the October 23,
2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs. However, before the RTC could
issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to the CA. The CA settled,
together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose,
Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros. Moreover, the CA the estate of Milagros in the intestate
proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court for the probate of
the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that she would receive from
Joaquins estate. CA also affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this case belong to the
first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title were registered in
the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, is vested
with the power and authority to determine questions of ownership.
HELD: Yes. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement
of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court
merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one
in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title
to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of
the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is,
then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice
to the final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are
all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent
to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the
Page 6 of 18
estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the
inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties are
all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the
ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties are
conjugal is but collateral to the probate courts jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
FACTS: Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was
survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate
grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including
petitioner Emilio III, all by Federicos and Cristinas only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who
predeceased his parents. After Cristinas death, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over
Cristinas estate. Federico, opposed the petition, and filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabels petition
for letters of administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate
of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabels parents
marriage being declared null and void.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedents estate on
his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed
an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfathers opposition, alleging
that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and
manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina. Federico died. Almost a year thereafter or on 9
November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of
decedent Cristinas intestate estate. On appeal by certiorari, the Supreme Court in an earlier
case reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court. The Court decided to include
Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristinas estate, giving weight to his interest in Federicos
estate.
ISSUE: Who between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of the
decedents estate.
HELD: Isabel. The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is
laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to
have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected
by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment of
an administrator. This order of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse,
the next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in
jurisprudence. The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the
estate of a decedent is the prospective administrators interest in the estate. This is the same
consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference
in the appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who
will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in the
alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. In all, given that
the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a
decedents estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein
greater than any other candidate.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not
ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling
among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set
forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the
one to be appointed as administrator. Given Isabels unassailable interest in the estate as one of
the decedents legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of
Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left
entirely to the sound discretion of the Court and depends on the facts and the attendant
circumstances of the case.
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this case even as we
reiterate Isabels and her siblings apparent greater interest in the estate of Cristina.
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference mapped out in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one over the
other.
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on the one
hand, and Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the time their paternal
grandparents were alive, which can be characterized as adverse interest of some kind
by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is immediately interested in the estate;
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working
harmoniously as co-administrators may result in prejudice to the decedents estate,
ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and
Page 7 of 18
 3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristinas estate, has
not looked after the estates welfare and has acted to the damage and prejudice
thereof.
The evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the
estate. Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio IIIs appointment as administrator of the
subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually
acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
LEE vs. RTC of QUEZON CITY
Facts:
Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance Company, Inc.
on 1956. At the time of the companys incorporation, Dr. Ortaez owned ninety percent (90%) of
the subscribed capital stock.
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortaez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortaez), three
legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortaez) and five illegitimate
children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her
siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortaez). <3 Peaches <3
Special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortaez submitted an inventory of the estate of their
father which included 2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company,
representing 50.725% of the companys outstanding capital stock.
Juliana (wife) and Jose (legit child) sold 1,014 and 1,011 shares respectively to FLAG.
The legal family entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez,
partitioning the estate among themselves. This was the basis of the number of shares separately
sold by them.
The lower court declared the shares of stock as null and void. CA affirmed.
Meanwhile, the FLAG-controlled board of directors, increased the authorized capital stock of
Philinterlife, diluting in the process the 50.725% controlling interest Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, in the
insurance company. Enderes filed an action at the SEC. The SEC hearing officer dismissed the
case acknowledging the jurisdiction of the civil courts.
Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao as president and secretary of Philinterlife ignored the orders
nullifying the sales of the shares of stock. <3 Peaches <3
Issue:
WON the sale of the shares of stock of Philinterlife is void. (YES)
Ruling:
YES. Our jurisprudence is clear that
o (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final
adjudication requires court approval and
o (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there
being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under
NCC 533 which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the
heir without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent. However, an heir can only
alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate
by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have
been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. This means that
an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property
therein. <3 Peaches <3
It goes without saying that the increase in Philinterlifes authorized capital stock, approved on
the vote of petitioners non-existent shareholdings and obviously calculated to make it difficult for
Dr. Ortaezs estate to reassume its controlling interest in Philinterlife, was likewise void ab initio.
Ruiz v CA
Estate of Hilario Ruiz v CA G.R. No. 118671. January 29, 1996
FACTS:
Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his
adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters,
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testators death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar
Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the
probate and approval of Hilario Ruizs will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
Edmond Ruiz
ISSUE:
whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estates
debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate
for the support of the testators grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to certain
heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
RULING:
1. No. Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of
the decedents estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to widow and children and does not
extend it to the deceaseds grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
2. No. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has
been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be
fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs.
3. No. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real
and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised so long as it
is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration, He cannot unilaterally
assign to himself and possess all his parents properties and the fruits thereof without first
submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased,
rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the
obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their
veracity, propriety and justness.
UnionBankv.SantibanezG.R.No.149926.February23,2005(SpecPro 2016)
FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim
Santibaez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00.
In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of
the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations.
On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement. Again, Efraim
and Edmund executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later
loan.
In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. A testate proceeding was
commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the special administrator of
the estate. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his
sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves
and take possession of the three (3) tractors. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with
Page 8 of 18
Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the
FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Bank.
Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay.
Thus, Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez,
Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City.
Edmund was not served with Summons since he was in the United States. Florence,
on the other hand, filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since
she was not a party thereto.
Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to Edmund and
Florence as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of the
joint agreement estopped Florence, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said
document.
Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to recover a sum of money from the
deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She
points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing
probate proceedings. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her
and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it
may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.
ISSUE: W/N the suit for collection of sum of money was properly filed against the heirs in a
separate action
HELD: The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank, purportedly a
creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate
court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is
mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by
informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine
each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and
obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early
delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for
any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the
promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the
late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with
the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the
said promissory notes and continuing guaranty.
GARCIA - QUIAZON v BELEN
Facts:
Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and his common-law wife Ma. Lourdes Belen.
When Eliseo died intestate, Elise represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a Petition for Letters
of Administration before the RTC of Las Pias City in order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and
to prevent the dissipation of its value. She likewise sought her appointment as administratrix of
her late fathers estate.
Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with her two children, filed an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue asserting that Eliseo was a
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City. In addition to their claim of improper
venue,the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed
administratix of Eliseos estate.
RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting
the necessary bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to
prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common
residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the
time of Eliseos death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos
estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a
resident of Las Pias City.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.
2. Whether or not Elise is qualified to be administrator of the estate.
Ruling:
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at
the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance [now
Regional Trial Court] in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from
that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(Emphasis supplied).
The term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence as distinguished from legal
residence or domicile. This term resides, like the terms residing and residence, is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word domicile still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms residence
and domicile but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term inhabitant. In other words, resides should be viewed
or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the
same meaning. As thus defined, residence, in the context of venue provisions, means nothing
more than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming
the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in
Las Pias City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
PILAPIL vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES, February 5, 2007 G.R. No. 150175
Facts:
Page 9 of 18
Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata), consisting of her surviving
sister, Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina); Rizalinas daughter, ErlindaPilapil (Erlinda); and the other
nephews and nieces of Donata,. Respondents, on the other hand, are the heirs of the late
MaximinoBriones (Maximino), composed of his nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and
grandnieces, in representation of the deceased siblings of Maximino.
Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. When Maximino
died, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husbands estate, which then issued
appointedDonata as the administratrix of Maximinos estate.Donata died. Erlinda instituted a
petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband,
Gregorio, were appointed as administrators of Donatas intestate estate.
SilverioBriones, a nephew of Maximino, filed for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate
of Maximino, which was initially granted. The trial court also issued an order, allowing Silverio to
collect rentals from Maximinos properties. But then, Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set
Aside the Order, claiming that the said properties were already under his and his wifes
administration as part of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverios Letters of Administration for the
intestate estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC.
The heirs of Maximino filed a complaint against the heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment,
and recovery of possession of real property. They alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the
estate of Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the
knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the real properties belonging
to the intestate estate of Maximino. Furthermore, the facts show that after Donatas death,
Erlinda took possession of the real properties, and continued to manage the same and collect
the rental fees thereon. Donata and, subsequently, Erlinda, were so obviously exercising rights
of ownership over the real properties, in exclusion of all others, which must have already put the
heirs of Maximino on guard if they truly believed that they still had rights thereto.
The heirs of Maximino knew he died on 1 May 1952. They even attended his wake. They did not
offer any explanation as to why they had waited 33 years from Maximinos death before one of
them, Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino on
21 January 1985. After learning that the intestate estate of Maximino was already settled in
aspecial proceeding, they waited another two years, before instituting, on 3 March 1987, a
complaint for partition, annulment and recovery of the real property belonging to the estate of
Maximino.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents right to recover possession of the disputed properties, based on
implied trust, is also barred by laches.
Held:
Yes. Respondents right to recover possession of the disputed properties, based on implied trust,
is also barred by laches.
Considering the circumstances in the afore-quoted paragraphs, as well as respondents conduct
before this Court, particularly the belated submission of evidence and argument of new issues,
respondents are consistently displaying a penchant for delayed action, without any proffered
reason or justification for such delay.
It is well established that the law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who
sleep when the law requires them to act. The law does not encourage laches, indifference,
negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a party to deserve the considerations of the courts,
he must show that he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings.
In view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
Sabidong vs. Solas
A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25, 2013
Facts:
Trinidad Sabidong, complainants mother, is one of the longtime occupants of a parcel of land,
designated as Lot 11 originally registered in the name of C. N. Hodges and situated at Jaro, Iloilo
City. The Sabidongs are in possession of one-half portion of Lot 11 of the said Hodges Estate, as
the other half-portion was occupied by Priscila Saplagio. In 1983 ejectment suit however
Saplagio was ordered to vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased to her.
In 1984, respondent who was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City Offered to
Purchase on installment Lots 11 and 12. The Administratrix of the Hodges Estate rejected
respondents because the actual occupant of Lot 12 manifested their intention to buy it. He was
nevertheless informed that he may file an offer to purchase Lot 11 "should the occupant fail to
avail of the priority given to them which the respondent immediately made.
The probate court (Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 27) in Special Proceedings No. 1672
("Testate Estate of the Late Charles Newton Hodges, Rosita R. Natividad, Administratrix"),
approved the offer upon the courts observation that the occupants of the subject lots "have not
manifested their desire to purchase the lots they are occupying up to this date and considering
time restraint and considering further, that the sales in favor of the x x x offerors are most
beneficial to the estate x x x".
Consequently the title of the lot was transferred to the respondent. Later on a writ of demolition
was issued by the probate court in favor of respondent and against all adverse occupants of Lot
11.
In 1999, a complaint was initiated against the respondent in the Supreme Court alleging the
prohibition for court personnel to buy properties in litigation. The complaint likewise alleged that
the respondent committed deception, dishonesty, oppression and grave abuse of authority. It
was alleged that complainant and his family were made to believe by the respondent that he is
the representative of the Estate. The complainant relied on the representations of the
respondent that he was authorized to facilitate the sale, with more reason that respondent
represented himself as the City Sheriff;
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is prohibited to purchase the property subject of probate.
Held:
Page 10 of 18
NO. For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during
the pendency of the litigation involving the property. 34 Where the property is acquired after the
termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in
Civil Case No. 14706 which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that
as it may, it can not be said that the property is no longer "in litigation" at that time considering
that it was part of the Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but
also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. 36 A property
forming part of the estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the
probate court issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The rule
is that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the
probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated. 37 The probate court loses
jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. 38 Since there is no evidence
to show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed and
terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated November 21,
1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the operation of Article 1491 (5) of the
Civil Code.
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not violate the
rule on disqualification to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then pending
before another court (RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.
ARANAS vs. MERCADO
FACTS:
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his
second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado,
Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M.
Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado
and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate
shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation
Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks
of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.
Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the
appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio's estate. The RTC granted the petition
considering that there was no opposition. The letters of administration in favor of Teresita.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio for the
consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his
death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal properties" worth P6,675,435.25 in
all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry
valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30
shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the
inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be
examined regarding it. Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8, 1993, 3
supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir
Realty shares of stock; 4 the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991
involving real properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir
Realty shares of stock with total par value of P4,440,700.00; 5 and the certificate of stock issued
on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.
Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory.
The RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present evidence and for
Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory.
Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on
the inventory.
The RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory
submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included. The RTC denied the
administratrix's motion for approval of inventory and orders the said administratrix to re-do the
inventory of properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S.
Mercado. The RTC also directed the administratrix to render an account of her administration of
the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession.
Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the
order of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353
located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty,
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision insofar as the inclusion of the inclusion
of parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301 square
meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various
parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and January
10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is concerned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory
notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for
corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
RULING: No. The CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was
unwarranted and erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES
and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued
on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the
Page 11 of 18
Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB
entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve
the case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.
RATIO:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for
purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator,
but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the
decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the
estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the
inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
Under Section 6 (a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be
granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to
serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving
spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation and submission of the inventory
of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and
responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of
administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within
three months. Within three (3) months after his
appointment every executor or administrator shall
return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all
the real and personal estate of the deceased which has
come into his possession or knowledge. In the
appraisement of such estate, the court may order one
or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or
their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and
personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the
phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties
must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the
administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no
properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless
of their being in the possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the
estate of the decedent is "to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities
of the executor or the administrator, and in malting a final and equitable distribution (partition) of
the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate." Hence, the RTC that
presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of
what properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA
cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties
are to be included or excluded from the inventory in the absence of "positive abuse of
discretion," for in the administration of the estates of deceased persons, "the judges enjoy ample
discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the
action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion." As
long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as
part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special
and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate,
not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding
said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be
still revised. As the Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement
of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court
merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one
in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title
to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of
the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is,
then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience.
The probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding
the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without
prejudice to final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested
parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership.
Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution
of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in
the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
The inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the
important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs.
Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein
Teresita herself, to "bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she) may
have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any
other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of
each heir, and in the account of the partition." Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also
provided that any advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir "may be heard and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the
court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir." Rule 90
thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the
Page 12 of 18
matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the
inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the
decedent.
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the
inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an
intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded
under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the possession of the
administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude
properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC
commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular
performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-
judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually
refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge,
tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical
manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG AND FRANCISCO VILLAFRIA, SUBSTITUTED BY DR. RUEL
B. VILLAFRIA, Petitioners, v. MA. GRACIA RIOZA PLAZO AND MA. FE RIOZA
ALARAS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the-Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution,2 dated March 13, 2009 and April 23,
2009, respectively, of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 107347, which affirmed the
Judgment3dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nasugbu, Batangas,
Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217.
The antecedent facts are as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his
children with his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as
several properties including a resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 51354
and No. 51355, each with an area of 351 square meters, and a family home, the land on which it
stands is covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both located in Nasugbu, Batangas. 4redarclaw
In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of
Possession5dated September 15, 1993, respondents alleged that sometime in March 1991, they
discovered that their co-heirs, Pedro's second wife, Benita Tenorio and other children, had sold
the subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are now
deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria, without their knowledge and
consent. When confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the same, showing respondents
a document she believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which, however, did not
refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.6 The
document actually evidenced receipt from Banco Silangan of the amount of P87,352.62
releasing her and her late husband's indebtedness therefrom.7 Upon inquiry, the Register of
Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no record of any transaction involving the
subject properties, giving them certified true copies of the titles to the same. When respondents
went to the subject properties, they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the resort had been
demolished. They were not, however, able to enter as the premises were padlocked.
Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an extra-judicial settlement
of estate of their late father was published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, they caused
the annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties before the Register of Deeds
of Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among others, for the annulment of all documents
conveying the subject properties to the petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant
thereto.8redarclaw
In their Answer,9 petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack of
personal knowledge and good faith in acquiring the subject properties. In the course of his
testimony during trial, petitioner Francisco further contended that what they purchased was only
the resort.10 He also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and
Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides, among others, that respondents' co-heirs sold the
family home to the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for P1 million as well as a Deed of
Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for P650,000.00.11redarclaw
On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject properties to petitioners
and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the documents of conveyance offered by
petitioners.as well as the circumstances surrounding the execution of the same. Specifically, the
Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized by a notary public who was not duly commissioned as
such on the date it was executed.12 The Deed of Sale was undated, the date of the
acknowledgment therein was left blank, and the typewritten name "Pedro Rioza, Husband" on
the left side of the document was not signed.13 The trial court also observed that both documents
were never presented to the Office of the Register of Deeds for registration and that the titles to
the subject properties were still in the names of Pedro and his second wife Benita. In addition,
the supposed notaries and buyers of the subject properties were not even presented as
witnesses who supposedly witnessed the signing and execution of the documents of
conveyance.14 On the basis thereof, the trial court ruled in favor of respondents, in its Judgment,
the pertinent portions of its fallo provide:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
4. a) Declaring as a nullity the Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiation and
Waiver of Rights and Sale" (Exh. "1", Villafria) notarized on December 23, 1991 by Notary Public
Antonio G. Malonzo of Manila, Doc. No. 190, Page No. 20, Book No. IXII, Series of 1991.
b) Declaring as a nullity the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. "2", Villafria), purportedly executed by
Benita T. Rioza in favor of spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, purportedly notarized
by one Alfredo de Guzman, marked Doc. No. 1136, Page No. 141, Book No. XXX, Series of
1991.
c) Ordering the forfeiture of any and all improvements introduced by defendants Francisco
Villafria dnd Maria Butiong in the properties covered by TCT No. 40807, 40808, 51354 and
51355 of the Register of Deeds for Nasugbu, Batangas.
5. Ordering defendant Francisco Villafria and all persons, whose occupancy within the premises
of the four (4) parcels of land described in par. 4-c above is derived from the rights and interest
of defendant Villafria, to vacate its premises and to deliver possession thereof, and all
improvements existing thereon to plaintiffs, for and in behalf of the estate of decedent Pedro L.
Rioza.
6. Declaring the plaintiffs and the defendants-heirs in the Amended Complaint to be the
legitimate heirs of decedent Pedro L. RifSoza, each in the capacity and degree established, as
well as their direct successors-in-interest, and ordering the defendant Registrar of Deeds to
issue the corresponding titles in their names in the proportion established by law, pro indiviso, in
Page 13 of 18
TCT Nos. 40807, 40808, 51354, 51355 and 40353 (after restoration) within ten (10) days from
finality of this Decision, upon payment of lawful fees, except TCT No. 40353, which shall be
exempt from all expenses for its restoration.
With no costs.
15
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's Judgment in its Decision16 dated October 31, 2006 in
the following wise:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The person before whom the resort deed was acknowledged, Alfredo de Guzman, was not
commissioned as a notary public from 1989 to July 3, 1991, the date the certification was
issued. Such being the case, the resort deed is not a public document and the
presumption of- regularity accorded to public documents will not apply to the same. As
laid down in Tigno, el al. v. Aquino, et al.:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the authority of the notarial
officer. If the notary public does net have the capacity to notarize a document, but does so
anyway, then the document should be treated as unnotarized. The rule may strike as rather
harsh, and perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to parties in good faith relying on the proferred
authority of the notary public or the person pretending to be one. Still, to admit otherwise would
render merely officious the elaborate process devised by this Court in order that a lawyer may
receive a notarial commission. Without such a rule, the notarization of a document by a
duly-appointed notary public will have the same legal effect as one accomplished by a
non-lawyer engaged in pretense.
The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect. Notarization of a private
document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to the
contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest
requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from
imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally.Parenthetically,
the settlement/family home deed cannot be considered a public document. This is
because the following cast doubt on the document's authenticity, to
wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1.) The date of its execution was not indicated;
2.) The amount of consideration was superimposed;
3.) It was not presented to the Registry of Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas for annotation;
and
4.) Not even the supposed notary public," Alfredo de Guzman, or the purported buyer, the
Spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc, were presented as witnesses.
Concededly, the absence of notarization in the resort deed and/or the lacking details in the
settlement/family home deed did not necessarily invalidate the transactions evidenced by the
said documents. However, since the said deeds are private documents, perforce, their due
execution and authenticity becomes subject to the requirement of proof under the Rules
on Evidence, Section 20, Rule 132 of which provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Sec. 20. Proof of private document. - Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution aijd .authenticity must be proved
either:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.The
Complaining Heirs insist that the settlement/family home and the resort deed are void as their
signatures thereon are forgeries as opposed to the Villafrias who profess the deeds'
enforceability. After the Complaining Heirs presented proofs in support of their claim that
their signatures were forged, the burden then fell upon the Villafrias to disprove the same,
or conversely, to prove the authenticity and due execution of the said deeds. The
Villafrias failed in this regard.
As aforestated, the Villafrias did not present as witnesses (a) the notary public who
purportedly notarized the questioned instrument, (b) the witnesses who appeared] in the
instruments as eyewitnesses to the signing, or (c) an expert to prove the authenticity and
genuineness of all the signatures appearing o,n the said instruments. Verily, the rule that,
proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that is, the
identity and authenticity of the document must be reasonably established as a pre-
requisite to its admission, was prudently observed by the lower court when it refused to
admit the settlement/family home and the resort deeds as their veracity are doubtful.17
Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son Ruel Villafria, filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated November 24, 2006 raising the trial court's lack of jurisdiction. It was alleged that when the
Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession was filed,
there was yet no settlement of Pedro's estate, determination as to the nature thereof, nor was
there an identification of the number of legitimate heirs. As such, the trial court ruled on the
settlement of the intestate estate of Pedro in its ordinary jurisdiction when the action filed was for
Judicial Partition. Considering that the instant action is really one for settlement of intestate
estate, the trial court, sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction when it
ruled upon the issues of forgery and ownership. Thus, petitioner argued that said ruling is void
and has no effect for having been rendered without jurisdiction. The Motion for Reconsideration
was, however, denied by the appellate court on February 26, 2007.
On appeal, this Court denied on June 20, 2007, petitioner's Petition for Review on Certiorari for
submitting a verification of the petition, a certificate of non-forum shopping and an affidavit of
service that failed to comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice regarding competent
evidence of affiant's identities.18 In its Resolution19 dated September 26, 2007, this Court also
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in the absence of any compelling reason to
warrant a modification of the previous denial. Thus, the June 20, 2007 Resolution became final
and executory on October 31, 2007 as certified by the Entry of Judgment issued by the
Court.20redarclaw
On January 16, 2008, the Court further denied petitioner's motion for leave to admit a second
motion for reconsideration of its September 26, 2007 Resolution, considering that the same is a
prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 52, in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended. Furthermore, petitioner's letter dated December 18, 2007
pleading the Court to take a second, look at his petition for review on certiorari and that a
decision thereon be rendered based purely on its merits was noted without action.21redarclaw
Unsatisfied, petitioner wrote a letter dated March 24, 2008 addressed to then Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno praying that a decision on the case be rendered based on the .merits and not
on formal requirements "as he stands to lose everything his parents had left him just because
the verification against non-forum shopping is formally defective." However, in view of the Entry
of Judgment having been made on October 31, 2007, the Court likewise noted said letter without
action.22redarclaw
On November 27, 2008, the RTC issued an Order, issuing a Partial Writ of Execution of its
October 1, 2001 Decision with respect to the portions disposing of petitioner's claims as affirmed
by the CA.
The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed, on February 11, 2009, a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment and Order before the CA assailing the October 1, 2001 Decision as well as the
November 27, 2008 Order of the RTC on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
In its Decision dated March 13, 2009, however, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the
rulings of the trial court in the following wise:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Although the assailed Decision of the Court a quo has already become final and executory and
Page 14 of 18
in fact entry of judgment was issued on 31 October 2007, supra, nevertheless, to put the issues
to rest, We deem it apropos to tackle the same.
The Petitioner argues that the assailed Decision and Order of the Court a quo, supra, should be
annulled and set aside on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
We are not persuaded,
xxxx
Section 2 of the Rules as stated above provides that the annulment of a judgment may "be
based only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction." In RP v. The Heirs of Sancho
Magdato, the High Tribunal stressed that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
There is extrinsic fraud when "the unsuccessful party had been prevented from exhibiting
fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him
away from court, ... or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; ..."Otherwise put, extrinsic or collateral fraud pertains to
such fraud which prevents the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the
court, or is used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy. This refers
to acts intended to keep the unsuccessful party away from the courts as when there is a false
promise of compromise or when one is kept in ignorance of the suit.
The pivotal issues before Us are: (1) whether there was a time during the proceedings
below that the Petitioners ever prevented from exhibiting fully their case, by fraud or
deception, practiced on them by Respondents, and (2) whether the Petitioners were kept
away from the court or kept in ignorance by the acts of the Respondent?
We find nothing of that sort. Instead, what We deduced as We carefully delved into the
evidentiary facts surrounding the instant case as well as the proceedings below as
shown in the 36-page Decision of the Court a quo, is that the Petitioners were given
ample time to rebut the allegations of the Respondents and had in fact addressed every
detail of Respondent's cause of action against them. Thus, Petitioners' allegation of the
Court a quo's lack of jurisdiction is misplaced.
Our pronouncement on the matter finds support in the explicit ruling of the Supreme Court
in Sps. Santos, et al. v. Sps. Lumbao, thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
It is elementary that the active participation of a party in a case pending against him
before a court is tantamount to recognition of that court's jurisdiction and willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case which will bar said party from later on impugning the
court's jurisdiction.In fine, under the circumstances obtaining in this case the Petitioners are
stopped from assailing the Court a quo's lack of jurisdiction.
Too, We do not find merit in the Petitioners' second issue, supra.
As mentioned earlier, entry of judgment had already been made on the assailed Decision and
Order as early as 31 October 2007.
xxxx
It maybe that the doctrine of finality of judgments permits certain equitable remedies
such as a petition for annulment. But the rules are clear. The annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of the Regional Trial
Courts is resorted to only where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner, supra.
If Petitioners lost their chance to avail themselves of the appropriate remedies or appeal
before the Supreme Court, that is their own look out. The High Tribunal has emphatically
pointed out in Mercado, et al. v. Security Bank Corporation, thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
A principle almost repeated to satiety is that "an action for annulment of judgment cannot and is
not a substitute for the lost remedy of-appeal." A party must have first availed of appeal, a
motion for new trial or a petition for relief before an action for annulment can prosper. Its
obvious rationale is to prevent the party from benefiting from his inaction or negligence.
Also, the action for annulment of judgment must be based either on (a) extrinsic fraud or
(b) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. Having failed to avail of the remedies and
there being a clear showing that neither of the grounds was present, the petition must be
dismissed. Only a disgruntled litigant would find such legal disposition
unacceptable.23When the appellate court denied Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in its
Resolution dated April 23, 2009, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari on
June 10, 2009, invoking the following ground:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14, NASUGBU, BATANGAS, ACTED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION IN ENTERTAINING THE SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE SETTLEMENT
OF ESTATE OF PEDRO RIOZA AND THE CIVIL ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE OF
THE HEIRS AND THIRD PERSONS IN ONE PROCEEDING.24
Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents was captioned as "Judicial
Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession," the allegations therein show that
the cause of action is actually one for settlement of estate of decedent Pedro. Considering that
settlement of estate is a special proceeding cognizable by a probate court of limited jurisdiction
while judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession are ordinary civil
actions cognizable by a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in
entertaining the latter while it was sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction. This is in view of the
prohibition found in the Rules on the joinder of special civil actions and ordinary civil
actions.25 Thus, petitioner argued that the ruling of the trial court is void and has no effect for
having been rendered in without jurisdiction.
Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised before the appellate court that since the finding of
forgery relates only to the signature of respondents and not to their co-heirs who assented to the
conveyance, the transaction should be considered valid as to them. Petitioner also denies the
findings of the courts below that his parents are builders in bad faith for they only took
possession of the subject properties after the execution of the transfer documents and after they
paid the consideration on the sale.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioner maintains that since respondents' complaint alleged the following causes of action, the
same is actually one for settlement of estate and not of judicial partition:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. That Pedro L. Rioza, Filipino and resident of Nasugbu, Batangas at the time of his death,
died intestate on November 16, 1989. Copy of his death certificate is hereto attached as Annex
"A";
2. That Plaintiffs together with the Defendants enumerated from paragraph 2-A to 2-J are the
only known heirs of the above-mentioned decedent. The plaintiffs and the Defendants
Rolando, Rafael, Antonio, Angelito, Lorna all surnamed Rioza, and Myrna R. Limon or Myrna R.
Rogador, Epifanio Belo and Ma. Theresa R. Demafelix are the decedent's legitimate children
with his first wife, while Benita Tenorio Rifioza, is the decedent's widow and Bernadette Rioza,
the decedent's daughter with said widow. As such, said parties are co-owners by virtue of an
intestate inheritance from the decedent, of the properties enumerated in the succeeding
paragraph;
Page 15 of 18
3. That the decedent left the following real properties all located in Nasugbu,
Batangas:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
16. That the estate of decedent Pedro L. Rioza has no known legal indebtedness;
17. That said estate remains undivided up to this date and it will be to the best interest of all
heirs that same be partitioned judicially.26
Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of action pertaining to the
properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their
interests thereon, may fall under an action for settlement of estate. However, a complete reading
of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the allegations therein,
and the reliefs prayed for, the action is clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title and
recovery of possession.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estate
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will
and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or
legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters
of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so
in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the
entire estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an
extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for
partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit
shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument,
or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a
bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal
property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the
payment of any just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that
the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2)
years after the death of the decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.27
In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. A person having the right to compel
the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint
the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which
partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the
property.28
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of respondents in their
complaint are but customary, in fact, mandatory, to a complaint for partition of real estate.
Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate; (2) that respondents, together
with their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is represented by a judicial
representative duly authorized for the purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the only known
heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an account and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5)
that Pedro's estate has no known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful heirs to the
decedent's estate, pray for the partition of the same in accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is
clear, therefore, that based on the allegations of the complaint, the case is one for judicial
partition. That the complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the decedent,
properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not perforce make it an action for
settlement of estate.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed
to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or.
fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be
judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the
order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. 29 An exception to this rule,
however, is found in the aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who
left no will and no debts due from his estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an
ordinary action for partition without submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying
for the appointment of an administrator by the court.30 The reason is that where the deceased
dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to
administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they
are immediately entitled.31redarclaw
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died
without a will, leaving his estate without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner'.s
contention, respondents were under no legal obligation to submit me subject properties of the
estate to a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to
have the same partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially, by Pereira v. Court of Appeals:32redarclaw
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no" debts or obligations, if they do
not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows
the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary
action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons
to take a different course of action. It should be noted that recourse to an administration
proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for
not resorting to an action for partition. Where' partition is possible, either in or out of court,
the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and
compelling reasons.
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending
obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the
property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such
case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous
and unnecessary proceedings.33
Thus, respondents committed no error in filing an action for judicial partition instead of a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate as the same is expressly permitted by law. That the
complaint contained allegations inherent in an action for settlement of estate does not mean that
there was a prohibited joinder of causes of action for questions as to the estate's properties as
well as a determination of the heirs, their status as such, and the nature and extent of their titles
to the estate, may also be properly ventilated in partition proceedings alone.34 In fact, a complete
inventory of the estate may likewise be done during the partition proceedings, especially since
the estate has no debts.35 Indeed, where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to
the heirs, then they may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings, dispensing of
the risks of delay and of the properties being dissipated.36redarclaw
Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint al$o prayed for the annulment of title and
recovery of possession does not strip the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case. Asking for the annulment of certain transfers of property could very well be achieved in an
Page 16 of 18
action for partition,37as can be seen in cases where courts determine the parties' rights arising
from complaints asking not only for the partition of estates but also for the annulment of titles
and recovery of ownership and possession of property.38 In fact, in Bagayas v.
Bagayas,39 wherein a complaint for annulment of sale and partition was dismissed by the trial
court due to the impropriety of an action for annulment as it constituted a collateral attack on the
certificates of title of the respondents therein, this Court found the dismissal to be improper in the
following manner:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action for partition premised on the
existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties, the Court categorically
pronounced that a resolution on the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title
issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack. It must be borne in mind that what
cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. As
pronounced in Lacbayan:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule
is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of
title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the
Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means
ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document. Petitioner
apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be
confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner's petition for annulment of sale on the
ground that it constituted a collateral attack since she was actually assailing Rogelio and
Orlando's title to the subject lands and not any Torrens certificate of title over the same.
Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement of the issue of ownership. In fact,
the determination as to the existence of the same is necessary in the resolution of an action for
partition, as held in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia:40redarclaw
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of
whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise
legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the
property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition
either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on
the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in
the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real
estate in question is in order, x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition" directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also
deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [cjourt after the- parties
have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party
or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question,
x x x.41redarclaw
An action for partition, therefore, is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership
between the parties.42 Unless and until the issue of co-ownership is definitively resolved, it would
be premature to effect a partition of an estate.43redarclaw
In view of the foregoing, petitioner's argument that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in
entertaining -the action of settlement of estate and annulment of title in a single proceeding is
clearly erroneous for the instant complaint is precisely one for judicial partition with annulment of
title and recovery of possession, filed within the confines of applicable law and jurisprudence.
Under Section 144 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),45 amending Batas Pambansa Big. 129,
the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of
the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since the action herein was not merely for
partition and recovery of ownership but also for annulment of title and documents, the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Hence, considering that the
trial court clearly had jurisdiction in rendering its decision, the instant petition for annulment Sf
judgment must necessarily fail.
Note that even if the instant action was one for annulment of title alone, without the prayer for
judicial partition, the requirement of instituting a separate special proceeding for the
determination of the status and rights of the respondents as putative heirs may be dispensed
with, in light of the fact that the parties had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and
had already presented evidence regarding the issue of heirship. 46 In Portugal v. Portugal-
Beltran,47 the Court explained:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to
Portugal's estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication
under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule
is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should
be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in
case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
xxxx
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of
Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the
case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to
establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the
estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous
in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case - subject of the present case, could and
had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction
over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject Portugal's estate to administration proceedings since a determination of
petitioners' status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial
court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the
trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x.48
Thus, in view of the clarity of respondents' complaint and the causes of action alleged therein, as
well as the fact that the trial court, in arriving at its decision, gave petitioner more than ample
opportunity to advance his claims, petitioner cannot now be permitted to allege lack of
jurisdiction just because the judgment rendered was adverse to them. To repeat, the action filed
herein is one for judicial partition and not for settlement of intestate estate. Consequently, that
respondents also prayed for the annulment of title and recovery of possession in the same
proceeding does not strip the court off of its jurisdiction for asking for the annulment of certain
transfers of property could very well be achieved in an action for partition.
As for petitioner's contention that the sale must be considered valid as to the heirs who assented
to the conveyance as well as their allegation of good faith, this Court does not find any
Compelling reason to deviate from the ruling of the appellate court. As sufficiently found by both
courts below, the authenticity and due execution of the documents on which petitioner's claims
are based were inadequately proven. They were undated, forged, and acknowledged before a
notary public who was not commissioned as such on the date they were executed. They were
never presented to the Register of Deeds for registration. Neither were the supposed notaries
and buyers of the subject properties presented as witnesses.
While it may be argued that Benita, one of the co-heirs to the estate, actually acknowledged the
Page 17 of 18
sale of the resort, the circumstances surrounding the same militate against the fact of its
occurrence. Not only was the Deed of Sale supposedly executed by Benita undated and
unsigned by Pedro, but the document she presented purportedly evidencing her receipt of her
share in the sale, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and
Benita from a bank.

Moreover, credence must be given on the appellate court's observations as to petitioners'

actuations insofar as the transactions alleged herein are concerned. First, they were seemingly
uncertain as to the number and/or identity of the properties bought by them.49 In their Answer,
they gave the impression that" they bought both the resort and the family home and yet, during
trial, Francisco Villafria claimed they only bought the resort. In fact, it was only then that they
presented the subject Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of Sale.50Second, they never
presented any other document which would evidence their actual payment of consideration to
the selling heirs.51Third, in spite of the blatant legal infirmities of the subject documents of
conveyance, petitioners still took possession of the properties, demolished several cottages, and
introduced permanent improvements thereon.

In all, the Court agrees with the appellate court that petitioners failed to adequately substantiate,
with convincing, credible and independently verifiable proof, their claim that they had, in fact,
purchased the subject properties. The circumstances surrounding the purported transfers cast
doubt on whether they actually took place. In substantiating their claim, petitioners relied solely
on the Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of Sale, who utterly failed to prove their authenticity
and due execution. They cannot, therefore, be permitted to claim absolute ownership of the
subject lands based on the same.

Neither can they be considered as innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land the latter is building on is one's own
without knowledge of any defect or flaw in one's title.52 However, in view of the manifest defects
in the instruments conveying their titles, petitioners should have been placed on guard. Yet, they
still demolished several cottages and constructed improvement on the properties. Thus, their
claim of good faith cannot be given credence.

Indeed, a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence, may
no longer be modified in any respect except to correct clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues
between the parties being deemed resolved and. laid to rest.53 It is a fundamental principle in our
judicial system and essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the
fruits of the verdict.54 Exceptions to the immutability of final judgment are allowed only under the
most extraordinary of circumstances.55 Yet, when petitioner is given more than ample opportunity
to be heard, unbridled access to the appellate courts, as well as unbiased judgments rendered
after a consideration of evidence presented by the parties, as in the case at hand, the Court
shall refrain from reversing the rulings of the courts below in the absence of any showing that the
same were rendered with fraud or lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution, dated March 13, 2009 and April 23, 2009, respectively, of the Court Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 107347, which affirmed the Judgment dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217, insofar as it concerns the resort
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 51354 and No. 51355, and family home covered by
TCT No. 40807 and 40808, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 18 of 18