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Safety Feedback - Notice 3-2002 PDF
Safety Feedback - Notice 3-2002 PDF
DGEP/SE
NOTICE 3-2002
SUMMARY
Several times in the last few years there have been instances where a PSV has
operated and the downstream manual isolation valve has closed. This downstream
isolation valve is usually a locked open ball valve. The consequences can be an
overpressurisation of the pipework / flange between the PSV and the isolation valve.
This can cause a large uncontrollable leak in the process area, say during an
emergency situation, and could be a platform threatening event. (Refer also to
Safety Feedback Notice 04_2001)
Attached are photos showing how padlock locking plates have been broken etc., due
to this self-closing phenomenon.
PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS
GS-EXP-303 defines line sizes upstream and downstream of a PSV. For the
downstream piping a maximum value of V2 = 100,000 kg/m/sec2 is recommended
( = density of gas, V = gas flow velocity). In one case where the downstream valve
tried to shut the result forV2 was found to be closer to 200,000 kg/m/sec2. Hence
the downstream pipework is to small and the flow velocity too high.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
If (in the case of the arrangement in photo 2) the ball valve had had its spindle
vertical and not horizontal then the flow from the PSV would have been less likely to
develop a significant internal torque.
Often the ball valve is placed directly next to the PSV (see photo 2) and the piping
reducer is located after the ball valve. If the ball valve had been located after the
reducer then the internal flow would be more regular with a significant lower chance
RECOMMENDATIONS
Mobile locking
plate blocked
and bent.
All three PSVs in service on the inlet Slug Catcher from a remote field were
simultaneously affected by the failure of their bellows during relief of pressure from the
Slug Catcher. Each PSV bonnet vented directly to atmosphere. Hence during this
platform shutdown there were three serious gas leaks in the process area.
This happened after the Emergency Shut-Down of the platform was initiated by an
event external to the concern reported here (i.e. loss of power generation).
PIC
SDV D/S
SDV HV process
Slug Catcher
ESDV
Interfield
pipelines
Investigation findings
Following initiation of the ESD (and/or initiation of the High High pressure trip on the
Slug Catcher), the gas outlet valve SDV closed at a normal travelling speed, whilst the
inlet valves (SDV and ESDV) responded with a substantially longer time. In this
blocked outlet scenario, the flaring valve PCV failed to operate quickly enough to
reduce the pressure in the vessel. The pressure continued to rise until the relief valves
activated.
At the time of PSVs lifting, the inlet gas flowrate to the vessel was maintained almost
constant by the inlet control valve HV from the significant gas inventory at a higher
pressure in the interfield pipelines, whilst the flowrate through the PSVs was already
diminished by the progressive opening of the flaring valve (PCV).
Low flowrate through PSVs of a higher design capacity induced them to enter into a
chattering mode almost immediately. After an estimated duration of 20 sec the bellows
failed by fatigue and/or by combined effect of fatigue and pressure pulsations created
by chattering.
To be noted that the design of the piping connecting the PSVs to the vessel was within
the requirements of API RP520 Part II (pressure drop less than 3%).
Comments
Recent work commissioned by and recent experience from the UKs Health Safety
Executive (HSE) demonstrated that chattering of PSVs can lead very quickly to failure
of the bellows. This failure might not be always detected, as it has been reported that
bellows are often found to be broken when valves are taken onshore for a strip down
(although this report has not been quantified).
For large diameters of pipelines, travelling time of inlet SDVs / ESDVs are always
limited by mechanical aspects. Hydraulic actuators required by large valve bores are
generally less speedy, creating process conditions for potential PSV chattering.
Although optimum settings are highly commendable for all valve and controller
response times, the pressure relief system is required to offer the highest reliability to
cater for human error and abnormal situations.
It should be noted that optimisation of process control and/or shutdown schemes will
not eliminate the possibility that the PSVs could again lift and be expected to relief
pressure under sub-optimal flow conditions. As the PSVs are the last resort pressure
protection for the vessel they must be capable of relieving pressure up to design inlet
flowrates (or under fire relief conditions if worse). It is apparent that the process
pressure control scheme is designed to react to reduce the potential for vessel
pressure to reach relief conditions and, therefore, will, if operating correctly, take flow
away from the relief valves.
It is also clear that interaction between PSVs, where vessels need to be protected by
multiple valves, requires careful design attention, particularly where the PSVs are
mounted on a common inlet manifold and there is potential for pressure fluctuations
within the manifold as PSVs sequentially lift and draw flow from each other.
Chattering is not only a concern for the integrity of the bellows. Severe chattering is
also likely to damage the valve spindle (by mechanical friction and scoring) and guide
bush. The performance of the valve may be significantly altered by these mechanical
damages. Therefore the recommendations below apply also to conventional relief
valves.
Recommendations
The following actions are recommended for all gas treatment installations:
On existing installations:
For all similar configurations where a inventory of gas is existing upstream a vessel
fitted with spring loaded PSVs (e.g. Primary Separator connected to interfield
pipelines), the following should be reviewed:
Operating conditions,
Design of the piping connecting the PSVs to the vessel, with particular
attention to pressure drop between the vessel and PSV
Correct staggering of the PSV setpoints in case of multiple PSVs,
Travelling time of all valves,
Tuning parameters of flaring controllers (to ensure that pressure control valves
react to foreseeable transients quickly enough to reduce the demand upon
PSVs).
Connection of bonnet vents to a disposal system rather than directly to
atmosphere (GS-SAF-261)
Check that potential for PSV chattering is limited in the scenario of a blocked outlet,
even in the event of a defect in the normal (i.e. PCS) flaring control loop.
In case of doubt, either develop a process model and simulate actual potential for
chattering, and/or replace spring loaded PSV(s) by pilot operated PSV(s);see note
below. In most cases similar API RP526 flange to flange dimensions can be obtained
from Vendors for pilot operated valves.
On new installations:
Unless otherwise can be demonstrated, give preference to pilot operated PSVs for
clean service on Primary Separator(s) connected to interfield pipelines, or to pipelines
of a significant length or in cases where there is a high potential for chattering due to
either the interaction between multiple PSVs or PSVs and pressure control valves.
Select pilots of a modulating-action type, to minimise potential for chattering.
The TFE General Specification GS SAF 261 ruling the pressure protection and relief
systems will be modified in section 4.5.2 at the time of its next update by adding the
chattering prevention in the reasons for selecting pilot operated valves.
Note GS-SAF-261 (Section 4.5.1.2) states that if the relief valve is located where
venting to atmosphere could cause a hazard, the bonnet vent shall be piped to another
disposal system, independent of the relief valve discharge system.
Note; Pilot operated valves can be inherently less safe than spring operated due
to the chance of pilot lines becoming block with rust, hydrates, etc. It is
important that this assessed when selecting the appropriate type of PSV.