Scientific Misconduct, Plagiarism, and Institutional Control of Misconduct

Ragnvald Kalleberg, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Abstract

Scientic misconduct refers to fraud, to serious violations of the internal research ethical norms related to the truth-
commitment of science. The three most common examples used to illustrate such misconduct, are fabrication of ctitious
data, falsication of data and methods, and plagiarism. The next section is focused on the historical emergence of modern
research ethics in early modernity, as an integrated element in the scientic revolution. Robert Merton labeled this system of
values and norms the ethos of science. As aset of institutional imperatives it has perhaps been the most efcient system of
internal self-control invented in the modern world. The last section deals with developments in research ethics after World
War II. Before World War II institutional control of misconduct was informal, based on the self-correcting power of indi-
viduals and groups. Today the traditional system of self-regulation is more explicitly cultivated and supervised, com-
plemented with procedures and committees on higher levels, such as at the level of organizations. The task of new procedures
and institutions is to comple guard, control, stimulate and further develop traditional self-regulation, not to replace it.

The Phenomenon of Scientific Misconduct
What kinds of malpractices are covered by the concept of scien-
tic misconduct? There is no general denition and termi-
nology agreed on across disciplines, institutions, and
countries. Denitions vary in breadth. In its policy document
on research integrity Johns Hopkins University in 1988 used
a relatively narrow denition: Research fraud is the intentional
falsication or fabrication of data or results, plagiarism,
misconduct in the application of research procedures so as to
bias results, or other deceptive research or reporting practices
(Steneck, 1994, p. 318). The European Science Foundation
(ESF, 2011) also focuses on other forms of misconduct, gener-
ally identied as failure to meet clear ethical and legal require-
ments. The ESF gives examples of serious deviations such as
misrepresentation of interests, breach of condentiality, lack
of informed consent and abuse of research subjects or mate-
rials (Section 1.3).
It can be useful to order the norms and values of research in
four groups: (1) Internal norms about the production and
testing of knowledge claims. These are norms regulating the
inner workings of research communities in their search for
valid knowledge. Such norms also include those safeguarding
the autonomy of researchers and research institutions. (2)
More external norms, regulating the relationships between
researchers and living beings studied, for instance individual
persons, groups, institutions, and animals. (3) Norms regu-
lating the relations to those nancing and using research. (4)
Norms relevant for the communication of scientic knowledge
to those outside of the specialized research elds researchers
in other specialized elds included. We can label this fourth
subgroup of norms the cultural and democratic obligations
of science (Kalleberg, 2014).
Norms and values in the different groups are related to each
other and partly overlapping. They are all relevant for the social
and behavioral sciences. Good referencing behavior, free and
informed consent from those studied, conict of interests,
and appropriate dissemination of scientic knowledge to those
outside of a research eld are examples from each group of
norms. Within the social sciences there has been much discus-
sion about norms regulating the relationships to those studied,
for instance in well-known social psychological experiments,
such as Stanley Milgrams authority experiments and Philip
Zimbardos prison experiment. We can label serious violations
of each type of norms as scientic misconduct. In this article
the expression scientic misconduct is used in a more narrow
meaning, primarily referring to serious violations of norms in
the rst group. When such norms are violated, words like fraud
and dishonesty are often used. Norms and values in this group
have to do with the main task of scientic and scholarly
activity, its truth commitment.
There is general agreement about examples of major viola-
tions of the truth and truthfulness commitment of science.
Three types of violations are regularly mentioned, often talked
about as FFP. The acronym refers to fabrication of ctitious
data, falsication of data and methods, and plagiarism. During
the last quarter of a century several misconduct cases have been
uncovered and have got much publicity. The best known cases
have taken place at excellent research institutions in North
America, Europe, and Asia (for some well-known cases, see
Anderson et al., 2013, pp. 229231). It is usual that such cases
contain several types of misconduct, such as fabrication, falsi-
cation, and plagiarism, and also less serious violations of
norms.
Most empirical studies of misconduct have been about the
biomedical sciences, and most have been focused on
researchers in the United States. There are, however, no
convincing reasons to assume that the social sciences are
special with regard to scientic misconduct. Serious miscon-
duct and questionable practices have also been documented
in these disciplines (see for instance Israel and Hay, 2006;
Necker, 2014).
Fabrication refers to fabrication of ctitious data and results,
whereas falsication refers to inappropriate manipulation of
data, methods, and results (see for instance Israel and Hay,
2006, Chapter 8). Plagiarism concerns authorship. In the
Oxford English Dictionary, plagiarism is dened as the action
or practice of taking someone elses work, idea, etc., and

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Volume 21 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.03022-1 313
314 Scientific Misconduct, Plagiarism, and Institutional Control of Misconduct
passing it off as ones own. Obviously, the criticizable element
is not to use the ideas and words of others, but to present them
as ones own. Posner (2007, p. 6) identies plagiarism as a type
of intellectual fraud and gives the following, more elaborate
denition: unauthorized copying that the copier claims
(whether explicitly or implicitly, and whether deliberately or
carelessly) is original with him /sic/ and the claim causes the
copiers audience to behave otherwise than it would if it
knew the truth. (For denitions of plagiarism and a typology
of plagiarism, see Weber-Wulff, 2014, pp. 314.)
In Europe, some cases of plagiarism have become widely
known during the past years, due to the fact that leading poli-
ticians have been forced to leave their positions because plagia-
rism was discovered in their doctoral dissertations. The two
most spectacular cases have been that of the German Minister
of Defense in 2011, and the German Minister of Education of
Research in 2013 (Weber-Wulff, 2014, pp. 2931, 57, 58).
Fabrication, falsication, and plagiarism do not represent
an exhaustive typology of violations related to the truth and
honesty commitment of science. Failure to report conict of
interest, ctitious authorship (so-called gift and ghost author-
ship), change of design or results because of pressure from
institutions nancing the research are examples of related
violations. If we underline originality as a basic internal value
in science, phenomena such as salamisation (to divide results
up in so small bits as possible in order to increase the number
of publications) and self-plagiarism would also be relevant
examples.
Scientic and scholarly research is an institutional phenom-
enon, regulated by norms and values practiced within scientic
networks. Such communities often include researchers and
research groups spread out around the globe. Norms regulating
research ethics consequently also refer to sets of norms and
values of a transnational and institutional character, and not
only to the practices and ideals of individual researchers in
a certain location. There can be no private science or scientic
knowledge, nor a science based on dignied sages dissemi-
nating esoteric knowledge that is not to be controlled by
competent and independent peers. Peer review and replication
of results from others are typical examples of this institutional
character. Ziman (2000, p. 4) gives this characterization of the
institution of science: Although research scientists often have
a great deal of freedom in what they do and how they do it,
their individual thoughts and actions only have scientic
meaning in these larger schemes. Like many facts of life, this
is so obvious that it was for long overlooked . The sociological
dimension is thus fundamental to our picture. It is still regu-
larly overlooked by researchers and institutions when the focus
is on research ethics. But misconduct, or good conduct, is also
an institutional phenomenon, not only a matter of the
morality of individual researchers.
Widely known cases of misconduct are often identied with
only one name, the main person responsible for the miscon-
duct, the single bad apple in a big basket of good apples. In
investigations of misconduct cases, however, also several other
problems in the relevant scientic community are regularly
discovered. They can be identied as system problems or as
questionable research practices (QRP) (see Steneck, 2006,
pp. 5961). Examples are sloppy control by coauthors,
not thorough enough checking by opponents, advisors, and
reviewers, and lack of relevant teaching and mentoring in insti-
tutions. Cases of misconduct regularly go hand in hand with
questionable practices. There are also examples of institutions
covering up misconduct instead of uncovering, handling, and
preventing it. This is a kind of serious institutional misconduct.
Institutions should instead establish research ethical commit-
tees, install procedures informing about where and how to
report suspicion of possible misconduct, develop routines for
protection of whistleblowers, procedures for handling of
misconduct cases, and programs for promoting good conduct
and preventing misconduct.
The Emergence of an Ethos of Science and
Institutionalized Self-Regulation
The most inuential analysis of the ethics of research as an
institutional phenomenon where researchers correct each other
has been given by Robert Merton. He labeled the phenomenon
the ethos of science, referring primarily to the internal norms
and values connected to the truth commitment of science. He
rst published his analysis in two small articles (Merton,
1938, 1942), later followed by several others (as Merton,
1957). His analysis was both based on an extensive historical
understanding of the emergence of modern science in the
seventeenth century, and reections based on the undermining
and destruction of the ethos of science in the twentieth century,
by market forces, nationalism, Nazism, and Communism
(Kalleberg, 2007; Enebakk, 2007).
Merton identied the ethos of science like this: The ethos
of science is that affectively toned complex of values and norms
which is held to be binding on the man /sic/ of science (1942,
pp. 268, 269; 1938, p. 258). This seminal denition was char-
acterized by the triple perspective of sociological imagination
(see Mills, 1959), comprising the interplay of individuals and
institutions embedded in historical processes (biographies, tradi-
tions). To underline this sociological perspective Merton used
the expression institutional imperative as a synonym for
norm. The problem with several later denitions of research
ethical norms, including many who criticized Merton, has
been a too narrow orientation only to individuals and their
ideals (or scientic conscience), not at the same time seeing
the institutional framework disciplining its members, and the
tensions between norms and counter-norms, including the
complexity of role-sets embedded in evolving elds of
research (Merton, 1963; Kalleberg, 2014).
Merton operated with a traditional, sociological typology of
social norms. The norms are expressed in the form of prescrip-
tions, proscriptions, preferences and permissions (1942,
p.269). The norms and values of the ethos of science are in oper-
ation as a set of shared and internalized norms and values, insti-
tutional imperatives, characterizing well-functioning scientic
communities. Merton did not claim that his typology
was exhaustive, nor that the different types were exclusive.
They are clearly internally related, partly overlapping each other.
Mertons scientistic interpretation of norms in science,
basing them on emotions and not reasons, is not tenable.
But that can be corrected at the same time as one preserves
the superior insights and realism in his analysis (see
Kalleberg, 2007, 2009). Mertons contributions illustrate
 Scientific Misconduct, Plagiarism, and Institutional Control of Misconduct
a typical phenomenon in the social and cultural sciences: clas-
sics are not only of historical interests, but also keep on being of
contemporary and systematic interest (see Calhoun, 2010).
The ethos of science in Mertons conception can be presented
as a set of six norms, the CUDOSH-norms: Communalism,
Universalism, Disinterestedness, Originality, Skepticism and
Humility (see Kalleberg, 2007, p. 141, 142). Communalism
refers to the fact that scientic activity is a sociological
phenomenon; there can be no isolated, private science.
Knowledge and insight have to be published, made public, in
order to be tested and recognized by the collective of peers.
Property rights in science are whittled down to a bare
minimum by the rationale of the scientic ethic (Merton,
1942, p. 273). Universalism concerns issues of scientic validity
and refers to the canon that truth claims, whatever their
source, are to be subjected to pre-established impersonal criteria;
consonant with observation and with previously conrmed
knowledge (Merton, 1942, p. 269, italics in original). This
institutional imperative can also be characterized as the
pursuit of truth, the truth-commitment of science. In a later
article Merton explained the relatively few cases of scientic
fraud, as compared to other elds, by the institutional
emphasis on the value of truth by whomsoever it is found,
and a commitment to the disinterested pursuit of truth
(Merton, 1957, p. 321). Disinterestedness concerns impartiality
in posing of questions, collection and interpretation of data,
and impartiality in argumentation. Science is done for the sake
of valid and reliable knowledge.
Originality requires that contributors in well-functioning
scientic communities are obliged to present new knowledge
and insight, and not only preserve the knowledge of a tradition.
As a historical sociologist of the seventeenth century scientic
revolution, Merton had a keen eye for identifying the histori-
cally new in the insistence on originality. Skepticism refers to
the obligation to check the validity of documentation and argu-
mentation, not just believing what authors claim. Skepticism
became institutionalized in many ways, two of them being
the scrutiny of peers reading the contributions and the mecha-
nism of peer review. The basic precept can be formulated like
this: only reliable documentation and consistent argumenta-
tion shall inuence the formation of opinions in well-func-
tioning scientic communities. Humility refers to the
institutional obligation to understand how little each researcher
and discipline understand of a complex reality, and how depen-
dent each individual researcher is on the transnational commu-
nity of scholars. This intellectual dependence does not only
include contemporaries, but also earlier and coming genera-
tions. The age-old metaphor often used to convey the meaning
of scientic humility in this strict meaning, is the following
here quoted as expressed by one of the greatest scientists of all
time, Isaac Newton: If I have seen farther it is by standing on
the shoulders of giants (Merton, 1942, p. 274, 275).
The ethos of science like other institutional ethoses, for
instance the protestant work ethic (Weber) does not have
to be codied in order to inuence action and interaction
within research groups and disciplines. The research ethic of
science can be characterized as the oldest internal control
system in the modern world, as old as modern science. Scien-
tic communities are unthinkable without it; research ethics
is internal to science. For Merton, there was little doubt that
315
all in all the amount of fraud was smaller within the social
system of science than in other institutions in a modern society.
The relatively small amount of deviance in science is due to an
institutional trait, its high degree of transparency. If one should
try to understand the phenomenon strictly individualistically,
without sociological imagination, one would have to rely on
an unrealistic presupposition of researchers as moral super-
beings. Merton (1957, p. 311) gave this general explanation
for the effectiveness of this kind of interactional self-correction:
Scientic research is typically, if not always, under the exacting
scrutiny of fellow experts, involving as it usually, though not always
does, the veriability of results by others. Scientic inquiry is in effect
subject to rigorous policing, to a degree perhaps unparalleled in any
other eld of human activity. Personal honesty is supported by the
public and testable character of science.
With the historical emergence of the ethos of science came
also violations of those norms and corresponding conicts.
Merton (1957) mentions several examples of fraud in the
history science, some of them based on the well-known book
by Babbage (1830) on fraud in science. Mertons most detailed
discussions of scientic misconduct were focused on plagia-
rism and priority struggles. When the requirement for origi-
nality emerged as part of the scientic revolution, also the
rst struggles about priority and plagiarism also emerged. An
early example is the bitter conict between Newton and Leib-
nitz about the invention of the calculus (Merton, 1957,
pp. 314, 315). Merton also noted the possible distorting effects
of the institutional obligation of originality in many academic
institutions, to transform the sheer number of publications
into a ritualized measure of scientic or scholarly accomplish-
ment (1957, p. 326).
Codification and Institutional Regulation of Research
Ethics after World War II
Before World War II institutional control of research ethical
norms was informal, based on the self-correcting power of
scientic communities. Extensive codication of research
ethics and institutional strategies to handle misconduct and
promote research integrity, are developments characteristic of
the period after World War II. The development came rst in
medical ethics, oriented to the more external norms of
science, focused on the protection of individuals studied. A
second wave started in the 1980s in the United States,
focused on fraud and deception, concerned with violations of
the rst set of research ethical norms regulating the inner
workings of scientic communities.
A classic sociological insight, associated with the work of
Emile Durkheim, can be articulated like this: deviation from
a norm can make visible and strengthen that same norm. Mer-
ton expressed it like this: Yet this very deviation from the norm
of universalism actually presupposed the legitimacy of the
norm . in the process of contemning their violation, the mores
are reafrmed (Merton, 1942, p. 271). It is worth noting that
Mertons (1938, 1942) articles actually were self-exemplifying.
He understood that the emerging anti-Semitism in Germany
316 Scientific Misconduct, Plagiarism, and Institutional Control of Misconduct
after World War I perverted leading scientists and institutions,
also before Hitler came to power in 1933. For instance, Nobel
Prize winners in physics (Philipp Lenard, Johannes Stark) in
the early 1920s rejected the work of Einstein because it was
produced by a Jew (Jewish vs Aryan physics) (Walker, 1995, further develop the ethical self-correction capacities of
Chapter 2). Such a violation of the norm of universalism in
the worlds leading science nation shocked the young
American sociologist. He felt compelled to explicate the
norms in order to identify, criticize, and correct the
misconduct. Karl Popper once characterized his The Open
Society and Its Enemies as his war effort, his intellectual
contribution to promote freedom and democracy. Mertons
contributions on the ethos of science can be characterized in
the same way.
Violation of basic norms in science, such as fabrication of
ctitious data and falsication of data, is dramatic and destruc-
tive, arousing strong emotions of anger and sorrow. But cases of
scientic misconduct can help science institutions to better see
the norms and their importance, and safeguard them institu-
tionally. The strong emotional reactions to such violations can
have a cognitive function in such socio-cognitive processes
(Kalleberg, 2009, pp. 259262).
The history of research ethics after World War II conrms
the general sociological insight about violations also strength-
ening values violated. Widespread codication of the ethos was
rst developed after World War II and the atrocities of German
medical doctors during the Nazi period. It started with the so-
called Doctors Trial, taking place in Nuremberg in 194647.
The defendants were medical doctors. They were convicted
because of cruel experimentation and murder of prisoners in
concentration camps. The trial led to the Nuremberg Code in
1947. The focus was on the more external norms regulating
the relationships between researchers and those studied. One
central guideline explicated for medical research, was the
requirement of free and informed consent from patients and
other persons participating.
The World Medical Association (WMA) was established in
1947. After 10 years of preparation, the Association in 1964
adopted The Declaration of Helsinki. It was built on the Nurem-
berg code and has established itself as the best known and most
inuential statement for medical ethics concerning informing
and protecting human beings participating in such research.
This code has inuenced legislation in the member countries
of WMA. The US Belmont Report (1978) was produced by the
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. It came as a response
to serious cases of missing or inadequate information of
research subjects. A fourth code was developed by the Council
for International Organizations of Medical Sciences. This code is
focused on guidelines for international medical research, also
involving participation by less developed countries. Guideline
2 is about review committees be they located on the institu-
tional, local, regional, national, or international level. All
proposals to conduct research involving human subjects
must be submitted for review of their scientic merit and
ethical acceptability to one or more scientic review and ethical
review committees. Projects must be approved before start-up
(on these four codes, see Israel and Hay, 2006, Chapter 3).
A second wave of institutional control of ethical practices
and procedures was started in the 1980s in United States.
It was focused on fraud and deception, concerned with viola-
tions of the truth-commitment of science, the rst set of
research ethical norms presented above. This wave has
generally consisted in measures introduced to secure and
individual researchers and research groups, for instance by
developing codes, introducing teaching arrangements, or
installing local and national research ethical committees to
handle misconduct cases. Such measures on an institutional
and national level are not introduced to replace the traditional
self-correcting and self-regulating activities of individuals and
groups, but to complement and strengthen them.
The reforms came as a consequence of a new understanding
of the prevalence of scientic misconduct and questionable
research practices. Up to the 1980s it was a widespread assump-
tion that scientic fraud was extremely rare. In 1987 the editor
of the prestigious journal Science even suggested only one case
in a million (Koshland, 1987). During the 1990s it became
more common in the United States to claim that misconduct
was more widespread than this. Some estimates were based
on reported cases that had been investigated by institutions
like the Ofce for Research Integrity (ORI). Such studies indi-
cated that the prevalence was one case in 100 000 researchers.
Other studies were based on misleading surveys producing too
high estimates, and talk about the tip of the iceberg. With refer-
ence to new empirical studies, including anonymous question-
naires where individual scientists informed about their own
misconduct, Steneck suggested the level of occurrence for
serious misconduct was rather one in 100 (2006, p. 58).
Several recent studies indicate the same order of magnitude,
between 1 and 3% (Fanelli, 2009; Anderson et al., 2013,
pp. 232235). Obviously it is very difcult to give a reliable
estimate of this type of phenomenon. But we now have good
grounds to claim that scientic misconduct today is not rare.
One to three researchers among one hundred having at least
once been responsible for scientic fraud is an alarmingly
high level.
There are good reasons to assume that the amount of
misconduct varies between the different types of fraud. The
amount of fabrication of ctitious data, for instance, is in all
probability much smaller than the amount of plagiarism. There
are probably also considerable variation between disciplines,
institutions, and countries. There is still little systematic knowl-
edge about this. In comparison with the United States, the
number of empirical studies of this phenomenon is low in
Europe. And we have even fewer studies in other regions of
the world.
Before World War II the relationships among basic research,
politics, and commercial activities, were looser and more indi-
rect than they are today. After World War II we have seen an
enormous growth of science, and science has got an increased
strategic and commercial relevance. To characterize the devel-
opment Ziman talks about the emergence of post-academic
science (Ziman, 2000, pp. 6782). The new structures have
put the ethos of science under new pressure, and have probably
increased the prevalence of scientic dishonesty during the past
3040 years, although that is difcult or impossible to
document.
The traditional ethos of science is an internal and informal
system of self-regulation, a set of institutional imperatives
 Scientific Misconduct, Plagiarism, and Institutional Control of Misconduct
operating at the level of researchers, groups, and networks of
individuals. In a recent contribution this institutional culture
of self-correction was analyzed and its continuing importance
underlined (Anderson et al., 2013, pp. 220222, 253). And
Ziman organizes his book (2000) around the Mertonian
norms and insists on the increased importance of research
ethics in the post-academic situation (Ziman, 1998). Today
this traditional system of self-regulation at the level of
individuals and groups has not only to be more explicitly
cultivated, taught, and supervised, but also has to be
complemented with procedures, positions, and committees
on higher levels, such as at the level of organizations, for
instance with research integrity ombud and ethical committees
in universities. Codes and institutions at the national (such as
the Norwegian research ethical committees, see www.etikkom.
no) and international level (see ESF, 2011; Singapore
statement, 2010; Montreal statement, 2013) are also needed.
The task of the new systems is to complement, guard, control,
and further develop traditional self-regulation in the research
communities, not to replace them. A legaladministrative
replacement system, for instance, would pervert the inner
workings of scientic communities and create more problems
than those solved (Kalleberg, 2015). The ethos of science can
only function optimally at the eld-specic level of working
scientists, as an essential and integrated element in their
scholarly and scientic work.
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