WHERE POWER TO REGULATE PUBLIC UTILITIES RESIDES 7.
Petitioner argued that:
GR. 206020 1-UTAK v. Commission on Elections
Reyes, J.
COMELEC issued Resolution 9615 which provided for the rules implementing the Fair
Elections Act (RA 9006) which enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda. The
definition of public places where regulated by the COMELEC included PUVs and public
transport terminals. The placement of election propaganda in these public places is
prohibited and the violation thereof shall be a cause for the revocation of the public utility
franchise of the owner/operator. Petitioner sought clarification from the COMELEC and
asked the latter to reconsider the implementation of the foregoing. However, the COMELEC
denied their request. In the end, the SC ruled in favor of 1-UTAK.
DOCTRINE
In law, there is a clear distinction between "operation" of a public utility and the ownership
of the facilities and equipment used to serve the public. The right to operate a public utility
may exist independently and separately from the ownership of the facilities. They are
mutually exclusive. (from Tatad v. Garcia, Jr.)
The owner of a thing has the right to enjoy and dispose a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law.
A franchise or permit limits only certain aspects of ownership of the vehicle. The
limitation on the rights of ownership over a PUV is not the same with this. A franchise
or permit to operate affects the operation of the PUV, such as the safety, routes, zones of
operation, maintenance of vehicle, reasonable fares, or in certain cases, nationality.
FACTS
1. In February 2001, RA 9006 was passed and in January 2013, COMELEC promulgated
Resolution 9615 providing for the rules implementing RA 9006.
2. Such resolution included Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) which included public utility
vehicles and public transport terminals in its definition of a "public place" effectively
prohibiting the posting of any form of election propaganda in the said places.
3. Violation of the aforesaid meant the revocation of the public utility franchise of the owner
or operator of the PUV/ transport terminal liable.
4. In a letter dated 30 January 2013, petitioner 1-UTAK, through its president Melencio
Vargas, sought clarification from COMELEC and requested that the latter reconsider its
implementation of the assailed provisions and allow the private owners of PUVs and
transport terminals to post election campaign materials on their vehicles and terminals.
5. COMELEC en banc, in a Minute Resolution on February 5, 2013, denied petitioner's
request, opining that since PUVs and transport terminals are imbued with public
interest, the same are directly under the supervision and regulation of the Commission
for the duration of the election period to ensure equal opportunity, time and space for
all candidates in the placement of political advertisements.
6. Thus, petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.
a. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) in relation to Section 7(f) of Resolution 9615 of
the COMELEC, violate the free speech of the owners of the PUVs and
transport terminals
b. The prohibition also curtails their ideas of who should be voted by the public
c. There is no substantial public interest threatened by the posting of political
advertisements on PUVs and transport terminals to warrant COMELEC
prohibition
d. Assuming substantial public interest exists, the curtailment is greater than
necessary to achieve the desired governmental purpose which is to ensure
equal opportunity to all candidates
8. While COMELEC argued that:
a. Privately owned PUVs and transport terminals are subject to its regulation
b. It has the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, which includes the power to regulate
enjoyment/utilization of all franchises/permits for the operation of
transportation utilities
c. PUVs and private transport terminals hold a captive audience hence it is
within COMELEC's constitutional authority to prevent privately-owned PUVs
and terminals from serving campaign materials to their captive audience
d. Regulation simply aims to ensure equal campaign opportunity
e. Restriction of free speech is merely incidental and is no greater than what is
needed
ISSUE with HOLDING
1. Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) in relation to Section 7(f) of Resolution
9615 of the COMELEC are valid regulations. NO. Because the restriction imposed is:
a. A prior restraint on free speech
i. It restricts their liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of
public concern
ii. Prior restraint refers to official governmental restriction on forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination
iii. Any system of prior restraint of expression bears a heavy
presumption against its validity
iv. It is an undue prohibition on the freedom of owners of PUVs and
private transport terminals to express their preference through the
posting of election campaign material
v. Freedom of speech enjoys a preferred status in the hierarchy of
rights
vi. Adiong v. COMELEC
1. Here, the Court struck down the COMELEC's prohibition
against the posting of decals on "mobile place"
2. "the regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to
express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to
convince others to agree with him"
3. The expression becomes a statement by the owner,
primarily his own and not of anybody else
b. Repugnant to the free speech clause
i. It is not a valid content-neutral regulation.
1
ii. A content-neutral regulation is merely concerned with the incidents
of speech, or one that merely controls the time, place, or manner,
and under well-defined standards.
iii. A content-neutral regulation is constitutionally permissible, provided
that the following requisites occur:
1. Government regulation is within the constitutional power
of the government
2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression
4. The incidental restriction on the freedom of expression is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
iv. Though Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution 9615 are
content-neutral regulations since they merely control the place
where the election materials may be posted, they are still repugnant
to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for
a valid content-neutral regulation
v. Aforesaid section and items are not within the constitutionally
delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4 Article IX-C
1. The court had set limitations on this delegated power,
specifically in Adiong
2. In Adiong, the court held that supervisory power does not
extend to the very freedom of an individual to express his
preference of candidates in an election by placing stickers
on his vehicle
3. In National Press Club v. COMELEC, the Court
emphasized that the grant of supervisory and regulatory
powers to the COMELEC is limited to ensuring equal
opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply among
candidates.
4. In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC, the Court
declared unconstitutional a regulation prohibiting release
of election surveys prior to election since it actually
suppresses a whole class of expression"
5. In this case, there is a marked difference between the
franchise to operate for the use of public and the
ownership per se of the vehicles used for transport.
6. In law, there is a clear distinction between "operation"
of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities
and equipment used to serve the public. The right to
operate a public utility may exist independently and
separately from the ownership of the facilities. They are
mutually exclusive. (from Tatad v. Garcia, Jr.)
7. The owner of a thing has the right to enjoy and
dispose a thing, without other limitations than those
established by law.
8. A franchise or permit limits only certain aspects of
ownership of the vehicle. The limitation on the rights of
ownership over a PUV is not the same with this.
9. A franchise or permit to operate affects the operation of
the PUV, such as the safety, routes, zones of operation,
maintenance of vehicle, reasonable fares, or in certain
cases, nationality.
10. Posting a decal expressing support for a certain candidate
will not in any manner affect the operation of the PUV as
such.
vi. There is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free speech
of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals
c. Not necessary to further the stated governmental interest
i. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution 9615 also failed to
satisfy the fourth requisite of a valid content-neutral regulation: the
incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest
ii. There is no necessity to restrict the rights of PUV owners and
terminals to free speech to further governmental interest
iii. Resolution No. 9615 was promulgated by COMELEC to implement
the provisions of RA 9006, however, the prohibition on posting of
election campaign materials on PUVs and terminals was not
provided for therein
iv. There are more than sufficient provisions in the present election
laws that would ensure what COMELEC wanted to ensure here
v. A strict implementation of the present election laws would suffice to
achieve the governmental interest of ensuring equal time, space
and opportunity for candidates in elections
vi. In addition, what COMELEC may regulate is only the
franchise/permit to operate and not the ownership per se of the
PUVs and transport terminals.
d. Not justified under the captive-audience doctrine
i. The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot,
as a practical matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can
be restricted (i.e. if the audience has no way to avoid the speech
can be restricted).
ii. This is in the guise of censorship, which undertakes selectively to
shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they
are more offensive than others.
iii. A government regulation based on captive-audience doctrine may
only be justified if the supposed captive audience CANNOT avoid
exposure to the intrusive speech. Otherwise, the restriction is not
justified.
iv. COMELEC's reliance on the US case Lehman v City of Shaker is
misplaced because in the Lehman case the political advertisement
was for PUVs OWNED by the government. The Court here held that
in these circumstances, the managerial decision to limit car card
space to innocuous and less controversial commercial and service-
oriented advertising does not rise to the dignity of First Amendment
violation.
2
 e. Violative of the equal protection clause.

i. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated

should be treated alike and is aimed at all official state actions. This
guarantees equality and not identity of rights
ii. It is conceded that the classification under Section 7 (g) items (5)
and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not limited to existing conditions
and applies equally to the members of the purported class, but the
classification remains constitutionally impermissible since it is not
based on substantial distinction and is not germane to the purpose
of the law.
iii. There is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and
transport terminals and owners of private vehicles.
iv. If owners of private vehicles are allowed to express their political
views by posting election campaign materials on their properties,
then so should the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In terms
of ownership, the distinction between owners of PUVs and transport
terminals and owners of private vehicles is merely superficial and
do not make for a valid classification.
v. Election campaign materials posted on private vehicles and other
places frequented by the public, e.g., commercial establishments,
would also be seen by many people. Thus, there is no reason to
single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the prohibition
against posting of election campaign materials

It bears stressing that the freedom to advertise one's political candidacy is clearly a
significant part of our freedom of expression. A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or
reason is a violation of the most valuable feature of the democratic way of life.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby

GRANTED. Section 7 (g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7 (f) of Resolution No. 9615
issued by the Commission on Elections are hereby declared NULL and VOID for being
repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

OTHER NOTES
The Court also ruled that the rulings in National Press Club and Osmea find no application
in the case at hand. Both cases sustained the section of R.A. No. 6646 which prohibited
newspapers, radio broadcasting, or TV stations and mass media from selling or giving print
space or airtime for campaign or other political purposes except to the COMELEC during
election campaign.

The Court held that the restriction in those two cases had a direct relation to the enjoyment
and utilization of the franchise or permit. The print space/ airtime is an integral part of the
franchise or permit to operate mass media utilities, hence the restriction is proper.

While in this case, the posting of election campaign materials does not have any relation to
the franchise or permit of PUVs and transport terminals to operate as such.

DIGESTER: Kim