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PEOPLE VS.

NARVAEZ

FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder

(qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano

Rubia. Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia when the two

were constructing a fence (that would

prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill).

Narvaez, who was taking a nap when he heard sounds of

construction, awoke and asked them to stop destroying his

house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer

responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead."

Narvaez lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher first, then

Rubia, who was running towards the jeep to get his gun.

Both died.

Narvaez voluntarily surrendered and claimed he

killed in defense of his person and of his rights. The CFI

convicted him of murder qualified by treachery with the

aggravating circumstance of evident premediation and the

mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the

company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal

battle with the Narvaez over certain pieces of property. At

the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for

annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher

and Co. to be annulled). Narvaez had leased his property

from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership

uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, Narvaez received

a letter terminating the contract because he allegedly


didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his

house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after

letter.

ISSUE: W/N CFI erred in convicting Narvaez despite the

fact that he was acting in defense of his person and of his

rights.

HELD/RATIO: YES (with respect to rights) Narvaez

ordered released i reduced and he had already served it as he was

imprisoned for 14 years.

Defense of his person - NO

The courts said that although the fencing of Narvaez

house was indeed a form of aggression against him, this

aggression was not done against his person but rather on

his rights to property. However, in consideration of the

violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of

the civil code, which recognizes the right of owners to

close and fence their land. But the Narvaez cant

subscribe to the article because his ownership of the land

being awarded by the government was still pending,

therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted

that Narvaez

Defense of his rights YES (although incomplete)

The argument of the justifying circumstance of self defense

is applicable only if the 3 requirements are

fulfilled, according to Art. 11(1) RPC:

1. Unlawful aggression.

2. Reasonable necessity of means employed to


prevent or repel attack.

3. Lack of sufficient provocation on part of

person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression due to the utterance of

Fleischer and the invasion of Narvaezs property was

clear. The pending case regarding ownership was decided

only over a year after the incident, and even then,

Fleischer had given Narvaez until the end of the year to

leave the land. Lack of sufficient provocation was clear

because Narvaez was asleep in his house, then asked

Fleischer to stop so they could talk. Firing a shotgun from

a window, however, was a disproportionate means of

resistance.

Since not all requisites present, defendant is

credited w/ the special mitigating circumstance of

incomplete defense, pursuant to A13(6) RPC. These

mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender &

passion & obfuscation.

DISSENTS:

Abad Santos: Self-defense in the penal code refers to

unlawful aggression on persons and not property.

Gutierrez, Jr.: Appellant defended from an attack on his

property that was not coupled with an attack on his

person. There should be no special mitigating

circumstance of incomplete defense. The sentence should

have been modified to prision mayor and the defendant

should have been ordered released immediately.


People vs. Narvaez

Facts: In the afternoon of August 22, 1968, GRACIANO JUAN, JESUS VERANO, CESAR
VERANO, CESAR IBANEZ, GEORGE FLEISCHER and FLAVIANO RUBIA were fencing the
land of George Fleischer, situated in MAITUM, SOUTH COTABATO. At the place of fencing is
the house and rice drier of appellant MAMERTO NARVAEZ. At that time appellant was
sleeping and was awakened by the sound of the chiseling of the walls of his house. He then
arose and saw the fencing. If the fencing continued appellant would be prevented from entering
his house and rice mill bodega. So he addressed the group, through Rubia to stop and talk
things over. To which Fleischer answered no and continued the fencing. At this instance,
appellant lost his equilibrium and got his gun and shot Fleischer, hitting him. Rubia ran
towards the jeep, and knowing that there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia likewise
hitting him. Both Fleischer and Rubia died

Issue: WON the aggression was unlawful

Held: YES, it was unlawful. The angry order of Fleischer to continue the fencing would have
resulted in the further chiselling of the wall of appellants house as well as the closure of the
access to and from his house and rice mill is an aggression against appellants property rights.
However, when the appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his
resistance was disproportionate to the attack. The third element is also present. There was no
provocation on the part of the appellant, since he was asleep at first and was only awakened by
the noise produced by the victims and laborers. His plea for the deceased and their men to stop
and talk things over with him was no provocation at all. Appellants act in killing the deceased
was not justifiable, since not all the elements for justification are present. The crime committed
is HOMICIDE on two counts mitigated by the privileged extenuating circumstance of
incomplete self defense as well as by two generic mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and obfuscation. He was sentenced to 4 months of imprisonment and considering
that appellant has been under detention for 14 years since his voluntary surrender, his
immediate release was ordered.

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