PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ALFONSO DATOR and BENITO GENOL, accused (Acquitted)

PASTOR TELEN, accused-appellant.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us on appeal is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 1733 convicting the appellant of
the crime of violation of Presidential Decree No. 705.
Pastor Telen and his co-accused, Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol, were charged with the crime of violation of Section 68[2] of Presidential Decree No. 705,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code,[3] in an Information that reads:

That on or about the 29th day of October, 1993 at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, in barangay Laboon, municipality of Maasin, province of Southern Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with
intent of gain, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess 1,560.16 board feet of assorted lumber flitches valued at TWENTY-THREE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (23,500.00), Philippine Currency, without any legal document as required under existing forest laws and regulations
from proper government authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon being arraigned on May 27, 1994, Pastor Telen and his co-accused, Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol, assisted by counsel, separately entered the plea of
Not guilty to the charge in the Information. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
It appears that on October 29, 1993, Police Station Commander Alejandro Rojas of Maasin, Southern Leyte, and SPO1 Necitas Bacala, were on board a
police patrol vehicle heading towards Barangay San Rafael, Maasin, Southern Leyte. Upon reaching Barangay Laboon of the same municipality, they noticed a
Isuzu cargo truck loaded with pieces of lumber bound toward the town proper of Maasin. Suspicious that the cargo was illegally cut pieces of lumber, Police
Station Commander Rojas maneuvered their police vehicle and gave chase. [4]
Upon catching up with the Isuzu cargo truck in Barangay Soro-soro, Maasin, Southern Leyte, they ordered the driver, accused Benito Genol, to pull
over. Benito Genol was left alone in the truck after his companions hurriedly left. When asked if he had the required documents for the proper transport of the
pieces of lumber, Genol answered in the negative. Genol informed the police authorities that the pieces of lumber were owned by herein appellant, Pastor Telen,
while the Isuzu cargo truck bearing Plate No. HAF 628 was registered in the name of Southern Leyte Farmers Agro-Industrial Cooperative, Inc. (SLEFAICO) which
is a local cooperative. Consequently, Police Officers Rojas and Bacala directed Benito Genol to proceed to the Maasin Police Station, Maasin, Southern Leyte for
further investigation.[5]
On November 5, 1993, Forest Ranger Romeo Galola was fetched from his office at the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO),
Maasin, Southern Leyte by SPO1 Necitas Bacala to inspect the pieces of lumber that were confiscated on October 29, 1993 in Soro-soro, Maasin, Southern Leyte
from Pastor Telen. Galola and his immediate supervisor, Sulpicio Saguing, found that the cargo consisted of forty-one (41) pieces of Dita lumber and ten (10)
pieces of Antipolo lumber of different dimensions with a total volume of 1,560.16 board feet. [6]
Subsequently, SPO1 Bacala issued a seizure receipt [7] covering the fifty-one (51) pieces of confiscated Dita and Antipolo lumber and one (1) unit of Isuzu
cargo truck with Plate No. HAF 628. The confiscated pieces of lumber and the cargo truck were turned over to SPO3 Daniel Lasala, PNP Property Custodian,
Maasin, Southern Leyte who, in turn, officially transferred custody of the same to the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte. [8]
The defense denied any liability for the crime charged in the Information. Pastor Telen, a utility worker at the Integrated Provincial Health Office, Southern
Leyte for nineteen (19) years, testified that he needed lumber to be used in renovating the house of his grandparents in Barangay Abgao, Maasin, Southern Leyte
where he maintained residence. Knowing that it was prohibited by law to cut trees without appropriate permit from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Telen sought the assistance of a certain Lando dela Pena who was an employee at the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte. Dela Pena
accompanied Telen to the office of a certain Boy Leonor, who was the Officer in Charge of CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte. Leonor did not approve of the plan
of Telen to cut teak or hard lumber from his (Telen) mothers track of land in Tabunan, San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte. However, Leonor allegedly allowed
Telen to cut the aging Dita trees only. According to Telen, Leonor assured him that a written permit was not anymore necessary before he could cut the Dita trees,
which are considered soft lumber, from the private land of his mother, provided the same would be used exclusively for the renovation of his house and that he
shall plant trees as replacement thereof, which he did by planting Gemelina seedlings.[9]
On September 15, 1993, Telen requested his cousin, Vicente Sabalo, to hire for him a cargo truck in order to haul the sawn lumber from the land of his mother
in Tabunan, San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte. His cousin obliged after Telen assured him that he had already secured verbal permission from Boy Leonor,
Officer in Charge of CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte, before cutting the said lumber.[10]
After having been informed by Vicente Sabalo on October 29, 1993 at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon that a cargo truck was available for hire, Telen
instructed his cousin to personally supervise the hauling of the sawn lumber for him inasmuch as he was busy with his work in the office. At around 7:00 oclock in
the evening, Telen learned from his daughter that the sawn lumber were confiscated by the police in Barangay Soro-soro, Maasin, Southern Leyte.[11]
Upon arrival in Barangay Soro-Soro, Telen was accosted by Police Station Commander Alejandro Rojas who demanded from him DENR permit for the sawn
lumber. After confirming ownership of the sawn lumber, Telen explained to Rojas that he had already secured verbal permission from Boy Leonor to cut Dita trees,
which are considered soft lumber, to be used in the renovation of his house and that he had already replaced the sawn Dita trees with Gemelina seedlings, but to
no avail. Rojas ordered that the pieces of lumber and the Isuzu cargo truck be impounded at the municipal building of Maasin, Southern Leyte for failure of Telen
to produce the required permit from the DENR.[12]
Pastor Telen appeared before Bert Pesidas, CENRO hearing officer, in Maasin, Southern Leyte for investigation in connection with the confiscated pieces of
lumber. Telen had tried to contact Officer-in-Charge Boy Leonor of the CENRO Maasin, Southern Leyte after the confiscation of the sawn lumber on October 29,
1993 and even during the investigation conducted by the CENRO hearing officer for three (3) times but to no avail, for the reason that Boy Leonor was assigned at
a reforestation site in Danao, Cebu province.[13]
Alfonso Dator, was the accounting manager of SLEFAICO, Inc., a local cooperative engaged in buying and selling abaca fibers. Dator testified that on October
29, 1993 at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, a certain Vicente Sabalo, accompanied by their company driver, Benito Genol, proposed to hire the Isuzu cargo truck
owned by SLEFAICO, Inc. to haul pieces of coconut lumber from Barangay San Jose to Barangay Soro-soro in Maasin, Southern Leyte. He readily acceded to the
proposal inasmuch as the owner of the alleged coconut lumber, according to Sabalo, was Pastor Telen, who is a long time friend and former officemate at the
provincial office of the Department of Health. Besides, the fee to be earned from the hauling services meant additional income for the cooperative.[14]
 At about 6:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, Dator met the Isuzu cargo truck of SLEFAICO, Inc. at the Canturing bridge in Maasin, Southern Leyte,
being escorted by a police patrol vehicle, heading towards the municipal town proper. At the municipal hall building of Maasin, he learned that the Isuzu truck was
apprehended by the police for the reason that it contained a cargo of Dita and Antipolo lumber without the required permit from the DENR. He explained to the
police authorities that the Isuzu cargo truck was hired merely to transport coconut lumber, however, it was impounded at the municipal building just the
same.[15] Due to the incident Dator lost his job as accounting manager in SLEFAICO, Inc. [16]
For his defense, Benito Genol testified that he was employed by the SLEFAICO, Inc. as driver of its Isuzu cargo truck. Aside from transporting abaca fibers,
the Isuzu cargo truck was also available for hire.[17]
While Genol was having the two tires of the Isuzu cargo truck vulcanized on October 29, 1993 in Barangay Mantahan, Maasin, Southern Leyte, Vicente
Sabalo approached him andoffered to hire the services of the cargo truck. Genol accompanied Sabalo to the residence of the accounting manager of SLEFAICO,
Inc., Alfonso Dator, which was nearby, and the latter agreed to the proposal of Sabalo to hire the Isuzu cargo truck to haul pieces of coconut lumber from San
Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte, for a fee.[18]
At 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, Genol, Sabalo and a son of Alfonso Dator, proceeded to San Jose after fetching about six (6) haulers along
the way in Barangay Soro-soro. Upon arrival in San Jose, Genol remained behind the steering wheel to take a rest. He was unmindful of the actual nature of the
lumber that were being loaded. After the loading, Genol was instructed to proceed to Barangay Soro-soro in front of the lumberyard of a certain Jimmy Go. Before
the lumber could be unloaded at 8:00 oclock in the evening Genol was approached by Police Station Commander Alejandro Rojas who demanded DENR permit
for the lumber. The pieces of lumber were confiscated by Rojas after Genol failed to produce the required permit from the DENR office. [19]
Vicente Sabalo corroborated the testimonies of the three (3) accused in this case. He testified in substance that he was requested by his cousin, Pastor Telen,
to engage the services of a cargo truck to transport sawn pieces of lumber from San Jose to be used in the renovation of his house in Abgao, Maasin, Southern
Leyte; that he approached Benito Genol and offered to hire the services of the Isuzu cargo truck that he was driving; that both of them asked the permission of
Alfonso Dator who readily acceded to the proposal for a fee of P500.00; [20] that he saw Genol remained behind the steering wheel as the loading of the lumber was
going on in San Jose; and that the lumber and the Isuzu cargo truck were confiscated in Barangay Soro-soro for failure of his cousin, Pastor Telen, to show to
Police Station Commander Alejandro Rojas any written permit from the DENR for the subject lumber.[21]
After analyzing the evidence, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. CONVICTING the accused PASTOR TELEN beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged and there being no modifying circumstances, and with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable, the herein accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, which is two (2) degrees higher than PRISION MAYOR maximum, the authorized penalty similar to Qualified Theft, and to pay
the costs. His bail for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and he shall be committed to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila thru the Abuyog
Regional Prisons, Abuyog, Leyte via the Provincial Warden, Maasin, Southern Leyte;
2. ACQUITTING co-accused Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol on reasonable doubt for insufficiency of evidence; and cancelling their bail;
3. CONFISCATING and SEIZING the 1,560.16 board feet of illegal lumber worth P23,500.00 and ORDERING the CENRO Maasin, Southern Leyte to sell the lumber at
public auction under proper permission from the Court, with the proceeds thereof turned over to the National Government thru the National Treasury under proper
receipt, and to REPORT the fact of sale to this Court duly covered by documents of sale and other receipts by evidencing the sale within five (5) days from the
consummation of sale; and
 4. DIRECTING the CENRO authorities to coordinate with its Regional Office for immediate administrative proceedings and determination of any administrative liability of
the truck owner, SLEFAICO Inc. if any, otherwise, to release the truck to its owner.

SO ORDERED.

In his appeal Pastor Telen interpose the following assignments of error:

I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 68,
P. D. 705, AS AMENDED, BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND FOR BEING NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH
DENR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 79, SERIES OF 1990.
II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA FOR THE ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF SEC. 68, P. D. 705, AS AMENDED, IT BEING A PATENTLY ERRONEOUS PENALTY NOT WARRANTED BY ANY PROVISION
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE OR JURISPRUDENCE.
III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VALUE OF THE CONFISCATED LUMBER IS P23,500.00 FOR NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH
VALUE WAS ESTABLISHED DURING THE TRIAL.

The appeal is not impressed with merit.

It is not disputed that appellant Pastor Telen is the owner of the fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Antipolo and Dita lumber with a total volume of 1,560.16 board
feet. He alleged that the pieces of lumber were cut from the track of land belonging to his mother in San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte which he intended to use in
the renovation of his house in Barangay Abgao of the same municipality. After having been confiscated by the police, while in transit, in Barangay Soro-soro,
appellant Telen failed to produce before the authorities the required legal documents from the DENR pertaining to the said pieces of lumber.
The fact of possession by the appellant of the subject fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Antipolo and Dita lumber, as well as his subsequent failure to produce
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known
as the Revised Forestry Code.[22] Section 68 of the code provides:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License.-Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber
or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber
or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings
on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed,
as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
Appellant Telen contends that he secured verbal permission from Boy Leonor, Officer-in-Charge of the DENR-CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte before
cutting the lumber, and that the latter purportedly assured him that written permit was not anymore necessary before cutting soft lumber, such as the Antipolo and
Dita trees in this case, from a private track of land, to be used in renovating appellants house, provided that he would plant trees as replacements thereof, which
he already did. It must be underscored that the appellant stands charged with the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, a special
statutory law, and which crime is considered mala prohibita. In the prosecution for crimes that are considered mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the
law has been violated.[23] The motive or intention underlying the act of the appellant is immaterial for the reason that his mere possession of the confiscated pieces
of lumber without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations gave rise to his criminal liability.
In any case, the mere allegation of the appellant regarding the verbal permission given by Boy Leonor, Officer in Charge of DENR-CENRO, Maasin, Southern
Leyte, is not sufficient to overturn the established fact that he had no legal documents to support valid possession of the confiscated pieces of lumber. It does not
appear from the record of this case that appellant exerted any effort during the trial to avail of the testimony of Boy Leonor to corroborate his allegation. Absent
such corroborative evidence, the trial court did not commit an error in disregarding the bare testimony of the appellant on this point which is, at best, self-serving.[24]
The appellant cannot validly take refuge under the pertinent provision of DENR Administrative Order No. 79, Series of 1990 [25] which prescribes rules on the
deregulation of the harvesting, transporting and sale of firewood, pulpwood or timber planted in private lands. Appellant submits that under the said DENR
Administrative Order No. 79, no permit is required in the cutting of planted trees within titled lands except Benguet pine and premium species listed under DENR
Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, namely: narra, molave, dao, kamagong, ipil, acacia, akle, apanit, banuyo, batikuling, betis, bolong-eta, kalantas,
lanete, lumbayao, sangilo, supa, teak, tindalo and manggis.
Concededly, the varieties of lumber for which the appellant is being held liable for illegal possession do not belong to the premium species enumerated under
DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987. However, under the same DENR administrative order, a certification from the CENRO concerned to the effect
that the forest products came from a titled land or tax declared alienable and disposable land must still be secured to accompany the shipment. This the appellant
failed to do, thus, he is criminally liable under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 necessitating prior acquisition of permit and legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations. The pertinent portion of DENR Administrative Order No. 79, Series of 1990, is quoted hereunder, to wit:

In line with the National Reforestation Program and in order to promote the planting of trees by owners of private lands and give incentives to the tree farmers,
Ministry Administrative Order No. 4 dated January 19, 1987 which lifted the restriction in the harvesting, transporting and sale of firewood, pulpwood or
timber produced from Ipil-Ipil (leucaenia spp) and Falcate (Albizzia falcataria) is hereby amended to include all other tree species planted in private lands
except BENGUET PINE and premium hardwood species. Henceforth, no permit is required in the cutting of planted trees within the titled lands or tax declared
A and D lands with corresponding application for patent or acquired through court proceedings, except BENGUET PINE and premium species listed under
DENR Administrative Order No 78, Series of 1987, provided, that a certification of the CENRO concerned to the effect that the forest products came from a
titled land or tax declared alienable and disposable land is issued accompanying the shipment.
 Appellant Telen next contends that proof of value of the confiscated pieces of lumber is indispensable, it being the basis for the computation of the penalty
prescribed in Article 309 in relation to Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code; and that in the absence of any evidence on record to prove the allegation in the
Information that the confiscated pieces of lumber have an equivalent value of P23,500.00 there can be no basis for the penalty to be imposed and hence, he
should be acquitted.
The appellants contention is untenable. It is a basic rule in criminal law that penalty is not an element of the offense. Consequently, the failure of the
prosecution to adduce evidence in support of its allegation in the Information with respect to the value of the confiscated pieces of lumber is not necessarily fatal to
its case. This Court notes that the estimated value of the confiscated pieces of lumber, as appearing in the official transmittal letter[26] of the DENR-CENRO,
Maasin, Southern Leyte addressed to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of the same province, is P23,500.00 which is alleged in the Information. However, the
said transmittal letter cannot serve as evidence or as a valid basis for the estimated value of the confiscated pieces of lumber for purposes of computing the proper
penalty to be imposed on the appellant considering that it is hearsay and it was not formally offered in evidence contrary to Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
In the case of People vs. Elizaga,[27] the accused-appellant therein was convicted of the crimes of homicide and theft, and the value of the bag and its contents
that were taken by the accused-appellant from the victim was estimated by the prosecution witness to be P500.00. In the absence of a conclusive or definite proof
relative to their value, this Court fixed the value of the bag and its contents at P100.00 based on the attendant circumstances of the case. More pertinently, in the
case of People vs. Reyes,[28] this Court held that if there is no available evidence to prove the value of the stolen property or that the prosecution failed to prove it,
the corresponding penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant should be the minimum penalty corresponding to theft involving the value of P5.00.
In the case at bench, the confiscated fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Dita and Antipolo lumber were classified by the CENRO officials as soft, and therefore
not premium quality lumber.It may also be noted that the said pieces of lumber were cut by the appellant, a mere janitor in a public hospital, from the land owned
by his mother, not for commercial purposes but to be utilized in the renovation of his house. It does not appear that appellant Telen had been convicted nor was he
an accused in any other pending criminal case involving violation of any of the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code (P.D. No. 705, as amended). In view of the
attendant circumstances of this case, and in the interest of justice, the basis for the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be the minimum amount under
Article 309 paragraph (6) of the Revised Penal Code which carries the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods for simple theft.
Considering that the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft under Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the said decree, the imposable penalty on the appellant shall be increased by two degrees, that is, from arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods to prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods.[29] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[30] the penalty to be imposed on
the appellant should be six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 1733 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that appellant Pastor Telen is sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO
LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and
VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents.

DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:

Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property
which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to
Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest
products in favor of the government?
These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution.
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to
Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel
in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the
truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23,
1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the truck
should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. On June 22, 1989, Regional Executive Director
[1]

Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugans action of confiscation andordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of
Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989
of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989. Subsequently,
[2]

the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989
that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary. Pending
[3]

resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner
Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, which issued a writ ordering the return of the
[4] [5]

truck to private respondents. Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter
[6]

alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989. Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by
[7]
the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial courts order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal
question. Hence, this present petition, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the decision
[8] [9]

of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27,
1993, the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order of petitioners was granted by this Court.
[10]

Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for
replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277.
Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant case falls within the
exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violated because they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2)
the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority to confiscate
and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the
commission of the crime.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the opinion that the plea of
petitioners for reversal is in order.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition
that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery
can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction
then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal
to ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of
[11]

action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of
[12]

administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts
of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and
complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we
are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This
doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a
case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the
[13] [14]

administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative
[15]

agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
[16] [17]

President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
[18]

unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
[19] [20]

proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the
[21]

urgency of judicial intervention. [22]

 In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him
following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to
[23]

avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus:

xxx

If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary. [24]

It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing
to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law.
Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek courts intervention by filing an action for
replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and
management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the
very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well
within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified
encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate
unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of
[25] [26]

MWSS vs. Vasquez, this Court held:

[27]

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will
stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this
case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there was violation of due
process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due
process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard , not solely by verbal
[28]

presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative [29]

proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance
[30]
to be heard on his motion for reconsideration, as in the instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to
[31]

present their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of
Executive Director Baggayan. In Navarro III vs. Damasco, we ruled that :
[32]

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon
is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.

Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck because the administrative officers of the
DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts under the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended
by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:

SECTION 68. xxx

xxx

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as
well as the machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Underline ours)

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents thinking not only because the aforequoted provision
apparently does not mention nor include conveyances that can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact
that private respondents interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other
provision of Section 68-A , which is quoted herein below:

SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this
Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, theDepartment Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to
dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Underline ours)

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate
and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase to dispose of the same is broad
enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter. In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose
projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and
[33]

they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. In this wise, the [34]

observation of the Solicitor General is significant, thus:

But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities and in view of the urgency to conserve the
remaining resources of the country, that the government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and
distinct from criminal proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended to supplant the inadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry laws through
criminal actions. The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-is most revealing:

WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of
Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules
and regulations;

WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts more responsive to present situations and realities;

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only conveyances, but forest products as well. On the
other hand, confiscation of forest products by the court in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power
on confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A
would not have provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, supra. [35]

Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the petitioners themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12,
1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that the truck of private respondents was not used in the commission of the crime. This order, a copy of
which was given to and received by the counsel of private respondents, reads in part , viz. :

xxx while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the commission of the crime, we uphold your claim that the truck owner is not liable for
the crime and in no case could a criminal case be filed against her as provided under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. xxx [36]

We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated order and obviously misinterpreted the intention of petitioners.
What is contemplated by the petitioners when they stated that the truck "was not used in the commission of the crime" is that it was not used in
the commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action be filed against the owner thereof for violation of Article 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck was being used in the commission of another crime,
that is, the breach of Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12, 1989, petitioners pointed out:

xxx However, under Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended and further amended by Executive Order No.277 specifically provides for the confiscation of the
conveyance used in the transport of forest products not covered by the required legal documents. She may not have been involved in the cutting and gathering
of the product in question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is therefor liable. xxx
[37]

Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and punishable under Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that,
when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 order that private respondents could not be charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have committed an act constituting a crime under Section
68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O.
No.277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:

SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. - Any person who shall cut , gather , collect , or remove timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license
agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code
xxx. (Underscoring ours; Section 68, P.D.705 before its amendment by E.O.277 )

SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.705, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without license. -Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx." (Underscoring ours; Section 1, E.O No. 277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended)

With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or
possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear
from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and inserted the words shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code . When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of
the law.[38]

From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and
retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin
suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course
of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.
Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to ones recourse to the courts and more importantly,
being an element of private respondents right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the property
sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained. To detain is defined as to mean to hold
[39]

or keep in custody, and it has been held that there is tortuous taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise
[40]

or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient. Under the Rules
[41]

of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceedings, that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of
property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax
assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the
property. Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It
[42]

should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products with out the required permit of the DENR
in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants
the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating
the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture
proceeding is legally permissible, hence , no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR
in pursuance to the authority given under P.D.705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the
Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and
that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads :

SECTION 8 . REVIEW - All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the
Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless
appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts
except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated
July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent;
and the Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED.