Excerpts from Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis

by Paul Cohen

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Main excerpt (definition of truth beginning of Section I.4, p. 11)

Having now given rules for forming valid statements we come to the problem of
identifying these statements with the intuitively true statements. This discussion
will be carried out in the spirit of traditional mathematics, that is to say, outside of
any formal language. We shall use some elementary notions of set theory. After we
have formalized set theory itself, then of course this discussion can he expressed in
that formal system. In our original discussion, we had a finite number of symbols.
This was important for foundational purposes, in order to reduce mathematics to
a formal game playable by a computing machine. However, for some purposes it
is of interest to allow arbitrarily many constant and relation symbols. We write
the proofs of Sections 4 and 5 for this more general case.
Assume now that we are dealing with a collection S of statements involving
constants c , I, and relation symbols R , J, where each R has a fixed
number of variables. Let M be a non-empty set and let c c be a map from
the constant symbols to elements of M , not necessarily distinct, and R R
a map which associates to a k-ary relation symbol, a subset of the k-fold direct
product, M M M . We shall then say that we have an interpretation of the
constants c and the relation symbols R in the set M . To every statement using
only these constant symbols and relation symbols, we shall associate its truth
value under this interpretation. Intuitively, of course, we merely mean whether
or not the statement is true in M under the given interpretation of the constant
and relation symbols. However, a precise definition is easy to give if we proceed
by induction on the length of formulas.

1
DEFINITION. Let A be a formula with free variables among x1 , . . . , xn , n 0,
and let x1 , . . . , xn be elements of M . We define the truth value of A (in M ) at
x1 , . . . , x n .
1. If A is of the form xi = xj , xi = c, or ci = cj , then A is true at x1 , . . . , xn if
xi = xj , xi = c, or ci = cj , respectively.
2. If A is R(t1 , . . . , tm ) where R is an m-ary relation symbol and each ti is a
constant symbol or one of the x1 , . . . , xn , then A is true at x1 , . . . , xn if the m-
tuple ht1 , . . . , tm i is in R (the subset of M m associated with R under the given
interpretation).
3. If A is a propositional function of formulas, we evaluate the truth of A at
x1 , . . . , xn by means of the propositional calculus.
4. If A is of the form (y)B(y, x1 , . . . , xn ) [resp. (y)B(y, x1 , . . . , xn )] then A is
true at x1 , . . . , xn if, for all y in M [resp. for some y in M ] B(y, x1 , . . . , xn ) is true
at y, x1 , . . . , xn .

*
Other excerpts
It should be emphasized that these functions are real" mathematical objects
and not objects of any formal system . . . [Section I.7, p. 26.]
The theorems of the previous section are not results about what can be proved
in particular axiom systems; they are absolute statements about functions. [Sec-
tion I.9, p. 39.]
We have now arrived at a rather peculiar situation. On the one hand A is
not provable in Z1 and yet we have just given an informal proof that A is true.
(There is no contradiction here since we have merely shown that the proofs in Z1
do not exhaust the set of all acceptable arguments.) [Section I.9, p. 41.]
The requirement that the axioms be given recursively is essential; otherwise we
could take for the set of all true statements of Z1 . [Section I.10, p. 45.]

An excerpt from Kleene

The terms: 0, 00 , 000 , . . . , which represent the particular natural numbers under
the interpretation of the system, we call numerals, and we abbreviate them by
the same symbols 0, 1, 2, . . . , respectively, as we use for natural numbers
intuitively (. . . ). Moreover, whenever we have introduced an italic letter, such as
x, to designate an intuitive natural number, then the corresponding bold italic

2
 0 0
x shall designate the corresponding numeral 0(x) , i.e. 0 with x accents
letter x
(x 0) . . .

Let P (x1 , . . . , xn ) be an intuitive number-theoretic predicate. We say that

P (x1 , . . . , xn ) is numeralwise expressible in the formal system, if there is a formula
P(x1 , . . . , xn ) with no free variables other than the distinct variables x1 , . . . , xn
such that, for each particular n-tuple of natural numbers x1 , . . . , xn ,

x1 , . . . , xn ) is provable, and
(i) if P (x1 , . . . , xn ) is true, then P(x

x1 , . . . , x n ) is provable.
(ii) if P (x1 , . . . , xn ) is false, then not P(x
[ 41, p. 195, Kleene S.; Introduction to Metamathematics, New York, Van
Nostrand 1952.]

Pierre-Yves Gaillard