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582 (2012) Lori Beaman: Science Et Al
582 (2012) Lori Beaman: Science Et Al
582 (2012) Lori Beaman: Science Et Al
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REPORTS
acknowledged. We thank G. Charness, N. Feltovich, U. Gneezy, meeting in Barcelona, and the Behavioral and Experimental SOM Text
M. Kocher, P. Kuhn, and P. Rey-Biel, as well as seminar participants Economics Symposium in Maastricht, for valuable comments. Fig. S1
at the University of Arizona at Tucson, the University of California Tables S1 to S3
at Santa Barbara, and the University of Athens and participants at Supporting Online Material
the Economic Science Association meetings in Innsbruck and www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/335/6068/579/DC1 14 July 2011; accepted 15 December 2011
Melbourne, the Markets, Organization and Votes in Economics Materials and Methods 10.1126/science.1211180
Female Leadership Raises Aspirations in leadership positions at the village level. Exploit-
ing a rule that requires the random selection of
villages where only women could compete for this
and Educational Attainment for Girls: position, we compared the aspirations of parents
for their sons and daughters aged 11 to 15, as
A Policy Experiment in India well as the aspirations of adolescents for them-
selves across villages with female and male leaders.
We next examined whether changes in girls
Lori Beaman,1* Esther Duflo,2* Rohini Pande,3* Petia Topalova4*
aspirations were accompanied by changes in
educational outcomes and time spent on domes-
Exploiting a randomized natural experiment in India, we show that female leadership influences adolescent tic chores. Finally, we investigated the potential
girls career aspirations and educational attainment. A 1993 law reserved leadership positions for women channels for this effect.
Table 1. Parents aspirations for their children. The first set of values consists of number in column 5 says that the gap in overall aspirations for girls versus boys
means and standard deviations (in brackets) of the variable in the column has shrunk by 0.136 standard deviation (more than 20%) in twice-reserved
heading in never-reserved village councils. The coefficients in the remainder of village councils relative to never-reserved ones. Standard errors corrected for
the table are ordinary least-squares results for the dependent variable in the heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village council level are shown below the
column heading and measure the difference in aspirations for boys and girls coefficients in parentheses. The sample size is 6140. The normalized average is
relative to the never-reserved sample. The row denoted Gap for never-reserved computed across the four outcomes (columns 1 to 4), which are first normalized
village councils shows the gap in aspirations between boys and girls. The by subtracting the mean for never-reserved village councils and dividing by the
subsequent Difference in gap rows show the gap in aspirations for boys and standard deviation in the never-reserved sample. All estimates control for village
girls relative to the gap in the never-reserved sample. For example, the last characteristics described in table S1 and for respondent gender.
Table 2. Adolescents aspirations. Data are presented as in Table 1. The sample size is 3680. All estimates control for village characteristics described in table S1.
Does not wish to Wishes to
Wishes to have Wishes to
be housewife or graduate or get Normalized Wishes to
a high- marry after
whatever in-laws higher average be pradhan
education job age 18
prefer education
Means and SDs in never-reserved village councils
Boys 0.998 0.157 0.980 0.296 0.248 0.499
[0.048] [0.364] [0.141] [0.457] [0.447] [0.500]
Girls 0.600 0.166 0.660 0.195 0.260 0.485
[0.490] [0.373] [0.474] [0.396] [0.758] [0.500]
Coefficients
Never reserved
Gap 0.398 0.008 0.319 0.099 0.507 0.017
(0.026) (0.020) (0.025) (0.018) (0.034) (0.026)
Reserved once
Boys 0.008 0.053 0.004 0.038 0.050 0.013
(0.011) (0.022) (0.013) (0.026) (0.029) (0.035)
Girls 0.031 0.062 0.010 0.035 0.045 0.010
(0.034) (0.021) (0.031) (0.022) (0.045) (0.039)
Difference in gap 0.023 0.009 0.014 0.003 0.005 0.003
(0.036) (0.028) (0.034) (0.028) (0.052) (0.039)
Reserved twice
Boys 0.008 0.014 0.003 0.034 0.017 0.057
(0.017) (0.034) (0.021) (0.047) (0.048) (0.056)
Girls 0.083 0.086 0.088 0.035 0.182 0.049
(0.043) (0.036) (0.041) (0.035) (0.056) (0.055)
Difference in gap 0.075 0.099 0.085 0.001 0.166 0.008
(0.042) (0.051) (0.049) (0.045) (0.057) (0.053)
Table 3. Adolescents educational outcomes and time use. Data are presented as in Table 1. The sample size is 3680. All estimates control for village
characteristics described in table S1.
1 if can Total time on
1 if attends Grade Normalized
read and domestic chores
school completed average
write (minutes per day)
Means and SDs in never-reserved village councils
Boys 0.744 0.947 5.538 0.055 29.298
[0.436] [0.225] [2.166] [0.760] [50.841]
Girls 0.684 0.908 5.409 0.058 108.231
[0.465] [0.289] [2.386] [0.898] [96.884]
Coefficients
Never reserved
Gap 0.060 0.038 0.132 0.112 78.954
(0.019) (0.014) (0.113) (0.041) (4.845)
Reserved once
Boys 0.005 0.020 0.019 0.020 5.095
(0.022) (0.013) (0.117) (0.042) (3.719)
Girls 0.010 0.002 0.002 0.004 6.844
(0.026) (0.015) (0.138) (0.051) (7.178)
Difference in gap 0.005 0.018 0.021 0.024 1.748
(0.029) (0.021) (0.153) (0.058) (6.475)
Reserved twice
Boys 0.005 0.012 0.094 0.025 2.869
(0.044) (0.031) (0.247) (0.100) (6.881)
Girls 0.098 0.050 0.587 0.223 14.772
(0.049) (0.029) (0.237) (0.102) (10.153)
Difference in gap 0.093 0.062 0.681 0.248 17.641
(0.051) (0.033) (0.243) (0.102) (8.971)