Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Consti I Cases
Consti I Cases
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
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FACTS:
Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan
that his child will be his beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death
the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall be administered
by his brother Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when
Florentino died and Francisco then took charge of Florentinos benefits for
the child. On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabaas filed
a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money to be placed in favor
of her and for her to be the childs trustee and the childs benefits. Francisco
asserted the terms of the insurance policy and that as a private contract its
terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended
beneficiaries.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
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FACTS:
President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which states
that all owners, users or drivers shall have at all times one pair of early
warning devise (EWD) in their cars acquire from any source depending on
the owners choice. The Letter of Instruction was assailed by petitioner
Leovillo Agustin to have violated the constitution guarantee of due process
against Hon Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner, Hon. Juan Ponce
Enrile, Minister of national Defense, Hon. Juinio, Minister of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication and Hon. Aquino, Minister of Public
Highways. Because of such contentions, the Implementing Rules and
Regulation was ordered to be suspended for a period of 6 months. Petitioner
alleges that EWD are not necessary because vehicles already have hazard
lights (blinking lights) that can be use as a warning device. Also petitioner
contest that the letter of instruction violates the delegation of police power
because it is deemed harsh, oppressive and unreasonable for the motorists
and those dealers of EWD will become instant millionaires because of such
law.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Petitioners contentions are without merit because the exercise of
police power may interfere with personal liberty or property to ensure and
promote the safety, health and prosperity of the State. Also, such letter of
instruction is intended to promote public safety and it is indeed a rare
occurrence that such contention was alleged in a instruction with such noble
purpose. Petitioner also failed to present the factual foundation that is
necessary to invalidate the said letter of instruction. In cases where there is
absence in the factual foundation, it should be presumed that
constitutionality shall prevail. Pres. Marcos on the other hand possesses vital
statistics that will justify the need for the implementation of this instruction.
As signatory to the 1968 Vienna Conventions on Road Signs and Signals, our
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country must abide with the standards given as stated in our Constitution
that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of International
Law as part of the law of the land. In the case at bar, the Vienna Convention
also requires the use of EWD. Vehicle owners are not obliged to buy an EDW.
They can personally create a EWD provided that it is in accordance to the
specifications provided by law. Petitioners allegation against the
manufacturers of EDW being millionaires is deemed to be an unfounded
speculation. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed. The restraining order
regarding the implementation of the Reflector Law is lifted making the said
law immediately executory.
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
It is apparent from the foregoing provision that the law does not
intend to curtail absolutely the right of government employees to self-
organization or be affiliated with any labor organization, subject only to the
limitation that such organization does not impose the obligation to strike or
to join in strike if said employees are engaged in governmental functions.
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FACTS:
The action in question was upon complaint of the respondents Bureau
of Printing Employees Association (NLU) Pacifico Advincula, Roberto
Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran filed by an acting
prosecutor of the Industrial Court against herein petitioner Bureau of
Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department
of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma the Director of the Bureau of
Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma
have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing
the employees of the Bureau of Printing particularly the members of the
complaining association petition, in the exercise of their right to self-
organization an discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their
employment in order to discourage them from pursuing the union activities.
The petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma
denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to the and, by way of
affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents Pacifico
Advincula,Roberto Mendoza Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were
suspended pending result of an administrative investigation against them for
breach of Civil Service rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of
Printing has no juridical personality to sue.
ISSUE:
RULING:
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FACTS:
Plaintiffs are the undivided joint owners of three apartment buildings situated
in Manila. They executed three lease contracts one for each of the three
apartments. The apartment buildings were used for billeting and quartering
officers of the US Armed Forces stationed in Manila. Six months after when
Japan surrendered, plaintiffs approached the defendants and requested the
return of the apartment buildings. Plaintiffs requested to renegotiate said
leases, to execute a lease contract for a period of three years and to pay a reasonable
rental higher than those payable under the old contracts. Respondents sent a letter
refusing to execute new leases but advised that the US Army will vacate the
apartments. Not being in conformity with the old lease agreements, plaintiffs formally
requested Tillman to cancel said leases and to release the apartments. Tillman refused
to comply with the request. Because of the assurance that the US
Government would vacate the premises, the plaintiffs took no further steps to
secure possession of the buildings and accepted the monthly rentals tendered by
respondents. On February 17, 1947, plaintiffs served a formal notice to the
occupants demanding: (a) cancellation of said leases; (b) increase in rentals
to P300 a month; (c) execution of new leases (d) release of said apartment
buildings within thirty days of said notice in the event of failure to comply with said
demands. The thirty-day period lapsed without any of the respondents complying with
the demand. Plaintiffs commenced an action in the Municipal Court of Manila in
the form of an action for Unlawful Detainer against respondents. Respondents
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the
defendants and over the subject matter of the action because the real party
in interest was the US Government and not the individual defendants.
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Furthermore, the respondent argued that the war between the US and her
allies on one side and Germany and Japan on the other had not yet been terminated
and consequently the period of the three leases has not yet expired. Also, a foreign
government like the US cannot be sued in the courts of another state without its
consent. That even though the US Government was not named as the
defendant in the complaint, it is nevertheless the real defendant as the
parties named are officers of the US Government. The Municipal Court
dismissed the action. The CFI of Manila affirmed the order of the lower court.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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FACTS:
There are two petitions that have been consolidated because they
raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the
power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the protective
cloak of independence of the constitutionally-created office to which they
belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.
1st case -> G.R. No. 19623: Petition for Certiorari which assails on
jurisdictional grounds the Decision dated March 31, 2011 rendered by the
Office of the dismissing petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices, upon a
finding of guilt on the administrative charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and
Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. The petition
primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which
gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office
of the Ombudsman.
2nd case -> G.R. No. 196232, is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
seeking to annul, reverse and set aside (1) the undated Order requiring
petitioner Wendell Barreras-Sulit to submit a written explanation with
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ISSUES:
RULING:
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an
obvious gap in the law. Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution confers
upon the President the power to appoint the Ombudsman and his Deputies,
viz: Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and
Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter.
Such appointments shall require no confirmation.
FACTS:
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The court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the suit involved is
one against the Government, which may not be sued without its consent.
ISSUE:
RULING:
No. The suit is properly directed against the officials and against them
alone, not against the Government, which does not have any interest in the
outcome of the controversy between plaintiffs on the one hand, and Panlilio
on the other. The suit is against the officials to compel them to act in
accordance with the rights be established by the contending architects have
established their respective rights and interests in the funds retained and in
the credit for the work done.
FACTS:
The heirs of Bania Sr. filed a complaint for damages against the
Estate of Nieveras and Balagot. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a
Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck
of petitioner. The case was transferred to branch presided by Judge Firme.
The heirs of Bania Sr. amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its
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ISSUE:
RULING:
Hence, the SC held that the driver of the dump truck was performing
duties or tasks pertaining to his office. Municipality cannot be held liable for
the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the
discharge of governmental functions.
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
WON the State can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of
land.
RULING:
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FACTS:
E. Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at his work. One day,
while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped
by a government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven to
have been negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and
he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could
never perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even earn at
least half of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the
government which later authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue
of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring
suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the
Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit). The lower court then
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determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the
same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the
driver of the ambulance.
HELD:
No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from
suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause
of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and
submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose
any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such
provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private
individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the
discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor
even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its
agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a
special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who
receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of
the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of
the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust
confided to him.
-0In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a
government officer acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability
from the government. The Government \does not undertake to guarantee
to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since
that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.
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FACTS:
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action of the Shipping Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in its
meeting on August 25, 1950,the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original
contract with the Shipping Commission; that he had repeatedly demanded from the
Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused
to do so. He, therefore, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his
complaint, a writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its
equipment and appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the
rightful possession thereof On February 3, 1951, the lower court issued the writ of
replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was
divested of its possession of said vessel. On March 1, 1951, Pan Oriental Shipping Co.
filed its answer denying the right of Froilan to the possession of the said vessel; it
alleged that the action of the Cabinet on August 25, 1950, restoring Froilan to
his rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission was null and void;
that, in any event, Froilan had not complied with the condition precedent imposed by
the Cabinet for the restoration of his rights to the vessel under the original contract;
that it suffered damages in the amount of P22, 764.59 for wrongful replevin in the
month of February, 1951, and the sum of P17,651.84 a month as damages suffered
for wrongful replevin from March 1, 1951; it is alleged that it has incurred necessary
and useful expenses on the vessel amounting to P127,057.31 and claimed the right to
retain said vessel until its useful and necessary expenses had been reimbursed(Rec. on
App. pp. 8-53). In view, however, of the order of the order of the lower court dated
February 3, 1952, holding that the payment made by Froilan's obligation to the
Shipping Administration, which order had already become final, the counter claim of
the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. against the Republic of the Philippines was no longer
feasible, said counterclaim was barred by prior judgment and stated no cause of action.
It was also alleged that movant was not subject to the jurisdiction of the court in
connection with the counterclaim. This motion was opposed by the Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. in its written opposition dated June 4, 1952 .
ISSUE:
HELD:
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automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and
other defense he might have against the state.
FACTS:
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treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests."The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of
said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all
before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn order was made with the
agents and defendants siting the cancellation of all existing timber license
agreements in the country, ceasing and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. and
granting the plaintiffs " such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises." Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental
consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter
of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to
present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film
evidence in the course of the trial.
CAUSE OF ACTION
Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegation. Forests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass. Twenty-five (25) years
ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more
than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the
country's land area.
More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin
old growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the
Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth forests.
Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have
granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut
the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is
hereto attached as Annex "A". At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about
200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of
forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
The defendants shall create a great devastation over Mother earth
and people of the country for public safety and shall destroy our healthful
ecology.
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ISSUE:
Does the higher court affirm the petitioners pray concerning the right
of healthful ecology in the country?
RULING:
Yes, the court affirm the petition as conformably with the enunciated
right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the rightto health, as well as
the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning theconservation,
development and utilization of the country's natural resources
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No.
192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and
proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically
forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation
and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the
licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by
law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for
the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3
thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3.Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to
ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality
of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the
population to the development and the use of the country's natural
resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as
well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value
system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources
Sec. 2.Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and
Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of
the foregoing policy. (2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in
charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and
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FACTS:
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ISSUE:
HELD:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being
sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is
a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of
States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are
constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states
have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between
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sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts).
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to
limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their
competence and preparation for a medical education.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public
interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The
State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they
are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in
a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a
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sense of satisfaction. The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to
quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled
to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the
NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly
misplaced, like a hopeless love. No depreciation is intended or made against the private
respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an
absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is
a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not
excited his interest. In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the
latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the
appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his
potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant
future. We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should
never have left the farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers
who could be better as merchants. It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps
to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course
for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we
may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we
are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.
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AGLIPAY V. RUIZ
GR 45459
13 MARCH 1937
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
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These consolidated cases are petitions for certiorari stating that the
President has abused her power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 dated
September 28, 2005. Petitioners herein pray that such order be declared as
null and void for being unconstitutional.
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In G.R. No. 169659 Bayan Muna v. Eduardo Ermita, partylist Bayan Muna
and HR members Satur Ocampo, Crispin Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza,
Joel Virador and Teodoro Casino, COURAGE = organization of Govt
employees and CODAL (Counsels for Defense of Liberties) pray that E.O. 464
be declared unconstitutional and that Executive Sec. Eduardo Ermita be
prohibited from imposing sanctions on officials who appear before Congress
due to congressional summons. They also contend that E.O. 464 infringes on
their rights and impedes them to fulfil their respective obligations.
In G.R. No. 169660 Francisco Chavez vs. Eduardo Ermita, Francisco Chavez
claims that his constitutional rights as a citizen and taxpayer and law
practicioner are affected by the enforcement of E.O. 464 thus he prays that
such order be declared null and unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 169667 Alternative Law Groups vs. Eduardo Ermita, ALG claims
that the group has legal standing to institute the petition to enforce its
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.
On October 11, 2005, Senate of the Philippines alleging that it has a vital
interest in the resolution of the issue of validity in E.O. 464, claims that it
prohibits the valid exercise of the Senates powers and functions and
conceals information of great public interest and concern.
ISSUES:
RULING:
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FACTS:
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providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly
to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The SC ruled that the issue is not a political question but rather a
justiciable one. This is especially true in cases where the power of the
Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a
function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Political
questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a
particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or
validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-
political. What is confronting the SC is not the wisdom of the act of the
incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his
constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a
constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the
President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright
justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the
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FACTS:
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly
agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the
service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country.
These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as
viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits,
restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power.
That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it
gives foreign trading intervention.
ISSUE:
RULING:
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faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties.Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in
fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of
commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the
United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the
concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid
exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise,
beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The
act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO
allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a
member.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
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HELD:
FACTS:
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an
appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which
controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit issued to
him.
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They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE
OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES
AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers
Act, is already inoperative and that all EOs issued pursuant to said CA had
likewise ceased.
ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
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2. Criminal case 3626 same situation as above stated but this time in the
name of GONAFREDA ORACION.
4. Criminal case 3627 same situation as the next preceding case but this
time in the name of his son Dennis Batulanon.
In all cases, accused did then and there release to herself the same and
received the loans and thereafter misappropriated and converted them into
her own use and benefit. Also in all cases, she refused to bring back the
same despite demands.
These informations were filed in the Regional Trial Court of General Santos
City. Petitioner pleaded not guilty.
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Petitioner Batulanon denied charges against her. She contended that she did
not sigh vouchers of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo who according to her are
nonetheless members of the cooperative. Lastly, she said that its been an
accepted practice that she can release loan in the absence of Gopio Jr who is
in charge with such responsibility.
RTC convicted her guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner brought it to
Court of Appeals (CA)but the latter affirmed with modifications the ruling of
RTC. CA modification is that petitioner is guilty of falsification of PRIVATE
documents.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but CA denied it.
ISSUE/S:
HELD:
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FACTS:
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In the hearing, the government proved that the price of the property
at the time of taking was P2.37 per square meter. Amigable, on the other
hand, presented a newspaper showing that the price was P6.775.
The public respondent Judge ruled in favor of Amigable and directed
the Republic of the Philippines to pay Amigable the value of the property
taken with interest at 6% and the attorney's fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision of Article 1250 of the New Civil Code is
applicable in determining the amount of compensation to be paid to private
respondent Amigable for the property taken.
HELD:
Not applicable. Article 1250 of the NCC provides that the value of
currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis
of payment which would be the value of peso at the time of taking of the
property when the obligation of the government to pay arises. It is only
when there is an agreement that the inflation will make the value of
currency at the time of payment, not at the time of the establishment, the
basis for payment.
The correct amount of compensation would be P14,615.79 at P2.37
per square meter, not P49,459.34, and the interest in the sum of
P145,410.44 at the rate of 6% from 1924 up to the time respondent court
rendered its decision as was awarded by the said court should accordingly be
reduced.
FACTS:
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Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, and the constitutionality of Section
32 thereof.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over
violations of Republic Act No. 4670;
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HELD:
SAYSON v. SINGSON
G.R. NO. L-30044
1973 DEC 19
FACTS:
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5, 1967 ... . The committee on award accepted the bid of the Singkier Motor
Service for the sum of P43,530.00. ... Subsequently, it was approved by the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications; and on May 16,1967 the
Secretary sent a letter-order to the Singkier Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu
requesting it to immediately deliver the items listed therein for the lot price
of P43,530.00. ...It would appear that a purchase order signed by the
District Engineer, the Requisitioning Officer and the Procurement Officer, was
addressed to the Singkier Motor Service. ... In due course the Voucher No.
07806 reached the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit. He then
made inquiries about the reasonableness of the price. ... Thus, after finding
from the endorsements of the Division Engineer and the Commissioner of
Public Highways that the prices of the various spare parts are just and
reasonable and that the requisition was also approved by no less than the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications with the verification of V.M.
Secarroa representative of the Bureau of Supply Coordination, Manila, he
approved it for payment in the sum of P34,824.00, with the retention of
20% equivalent to P8,706.00 to submit the voucher with the supporting
papers to the Supervising Auditor, which he did. ... The voucher was paid on
June 9, 1967 in the amount of P34,824.00 to Singson. On June 10,1967,
Highway Auditor Sayson received a telegram from Supervising Auditor
Fornier quoting a telegraphic message of the General Auditing Office which
states: "In view of excessive prices charge for purchase of spare parts and
equipment shown by vouchers already submitted this Office direct all
highway auditors refer General Office payment similar nature for appropriate
action." ... In the interim it would appear that when the voucher and the
supporting papers reached the GAO, a canvass was made of the spare parts
among the suppliers in Manila, particularly, the USI(Phil.), which is the
exclusive dealer of the spare parts of the caterpillar tractors in the
Philippines. Said firm thus submitted its quotations at P2,529.64 only which
is P40,000.00 less than the price of the Singkier. ... In view of the
overpricing the GAO took up the matter with the Secretary of Public Works in
a third endorsement of July 18, 1967. ... The Secretary then circularized a
telegram holding the district engineer responsible for overpricing." What is
more, charges for malversation were filed against the district engineer and
the civil engineer involved. It was the failure of the Highways Auditor, one of
the petitioners before us, that led to the filing of the mandamus suit below,
with now respondent Singson as sole proprietor of Singkier Motor Service,
being adjudged as entitled to collect the balance of P8,706.00, the contract
in question having been upheld. Hence this appeal by
Certiorari.
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ISSUE:
RULING:
No. The claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law,
morals or public policy, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the
collection of such claim against the State but a ordinary action for specific
performance. The suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the
Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State,
which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent
of the State. In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with
the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act 327 which
prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the government
may be filed: "In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims,
other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and
decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after
their presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to other
persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall
be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is
received by him."
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FACTS:
ISSUES:
RULING:
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the form of ordinances, and shall take effect in the same as zoning or
subdivision regulations. The Building Code shall be administered and
enforced by the local officials concerned.
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the
US Armed Forces
HELD:
No they are not immune. They state that the doctrine of immunity
from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is
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being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The
cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government are
removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This
situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in
excess of the powers vested in him.
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
HELD:
AO Nos. 57 and 82 are both constitutional and valid. This is due to the
fact that EO279, in effect, gave the Secretary of Natural Resources
the authority to conclude joint v e n t u r e , c o - p r o d u c t i o n , o r
production sharing agreements for the exploration,
development and utilization of mineral resources. Furthermore, the
constitutionality of these administrative orders goes to show that the
utilization of inalienable lands of public domain is not merely done
through license, concession or lease since the options are now also
open to the State through direct undertaking or by entering into co-
production, joint venture, or production sharing agreements.
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FACTS:
On July 20, 1974, petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a letter-
complaint against private respondents for alleged overlapping and
encroachment of the "Ullmann" claim over the "Ped" claim.
Since the protest case was filed after Pres. Decree No. 463 (Mineral
Resources Development Decree of 1974) took effect on May 17, 1974, the
provisions of the law were made applicable to petitioners.
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ISSUES:
RULING:
Having resolved the question of jurisdiction, the Court shall next determine if
public respondents acted within their jurisdiction, or if they committed grave
abuse of discretion which would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for.
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to perform annual work obligations on the "Ped" claim since 1952, the
conclusion is only partly correct. Annual work obligations, consisting of
payment of assessment and taxes, had in fact been paid up to the year
1975, although not by petitioners. The record shows that the payor was the
Baguio Gold Mining Company, to which the "Ped" claim, among others, had
been assigned by private respondents for operation.Respondent Minister
evidently knew of the existence of the amicable settlement, since he
discussed the terms thereof in his decision. Nevertheless, respondent
Minister overlooked the fact that from the terms of the settlement,
petitioners clearly were not liable to pay the assessment works for the years
in question and that consequently there was no basis for a finding of
abandonment of the "Ped" claim by petitioners.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process.
EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive.
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The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a
subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to
defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before
they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and
is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against
the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
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FACTS:
On June 20, 1964, Quirico del Mar (hereinafter referred to del Mar)
filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu petition for mandamus (civil
case R-8465) against the Philippine Veterans Administration (herein after
referred to the PVA to compel the latter to continue paying him monthly life
pension of P50 from the date of its cancellation in March 1950 to June 20,
1957, and thereafter, or from June 22 1957 his monthly life pension, as
increased by Republic Act 1920, of P100 and to pay to him as well the
monthly living allowance of P10 for each of his unmarried minor children
below eighteen years of age, pursuant to the said Republic Act 1920 which
took effect on June 22, 1957. Del Mar also asked for compensatory, moral
and exemplary damages. In his petition below, del Mar averred that he
served during World War II as chief judge advocate of the Cebu Area
Command (a duly recognized guerrilla organization) with the rank of major;
that he subsequently obtained an honorable discharge from the service on
October 20, 1946 on a certificate of permanent total physical disability; that
upon proper claim presented and after hearing and adjudication, the
Philippine Veterans Board (the PVA's predecessor granted him a monthly life
pension of P50 effective January 28, 1947; that in March 1950, the said
Board discontinued payment of his monthly life pension on the ground that
his receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government, through
the United States Veterans Administration, by reason of military service
rendered in the United States Army in the Far East during World War II,
precluded him from receiving any further monthly life pension from the
Philippine Government; that he wrote the said Board twice demanding that it
continue paying his monthly life pension, impugning the cancellation thereof
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as illegal; and that his demands went unheeded. After due trial, the court a
quo rendered judgment upholding del Mar claims.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner can file a suit against a Government agency such
as the PVA without consent.
RULING:
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FACTS:
ISSUE/S:
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HELD:
No, PNR is NOT immune. The State divested itself of its sovereign
capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its
predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become
immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of articles
1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers
The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate
or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined
by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized." (Nat.
Airports Corp. vs. Teodoro and Phil. Airlines, Inc., 91 Phil. 203, 206; Santos
vs, Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 285; Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. USA, 104 Phil. 593.)
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FACTS:
On July 13, 1990 the Court held in the case of Metropolitan Traffic
Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, that the
confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was
not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila
Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid
down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets.
Even the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations was not directly
prescribed or allowed by the decree. After no motion for reconsideration of
the decision was filed the judgment became final and executor. Withstanding
the Gonong decision still violations of the said decision transpired, wherein
there were several persons who sent complaint letters to the Court regarding
the confiscation of drivers licenses and removal of license plate numbers. On
May 24, 1990 the MMA issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing
itself to detach license plate/tow and impound
attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or
obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila. On July 2, 1991, the Court
issued a resolution regarding the matter which stated that the Ordinance No.
11, Section 2 appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court, and
that the Court has received several complaints against the enforcement of
such ordinance.
ISSUE:
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HELD:
SSS vs. CA
G.R. NO. L-41299
1983 FEB 21
FACTS:
Spouses David and Socorro Cruz, applied and granted a real estate
loan by the SSS with residential lot located at Pateros, Rizal as collateral.
The spouses Cruz complied with their monthly payments. When delayed
were incurred in their monthly payments SSS filed a petition for foreclosure
of their real estate mortgage executed by the spouses Cruz on the ground
that the spouses Cruz defaulted in payment, Pursuant for these application
for foreclosure notices were published on the second notice the counsel for
spouses Cruz sent a letter to SSS informing the latter that his clients are up
to date in their payment of the monthly amortization and the SSS should
discontinued the publication of the notices of foreclosure. This request
remain unheaded, this spouses Cruz filed an action for damages against SSS
before RTC in Rizal. SSS invoking its immunity from suit being an agency of
the government performing government function. The trial court and court
of appeal nevertheless awarded damages in favor of spouses Cruz which was
affirmed by court of appeal, Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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Negative. The SSS has a distinct legal personality and it can be sued
for damages. The SSS does not enjoy immunity from suit by express
statutory consent. It has corporate power separate and distinct from the
government. SSS own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be
sued in court. These words sue and be sued embrace all civil process
incident to a legal action. So that even assuming that the SSS, as it claims,
enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental function,
by virtue of the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the
government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the
SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability that statutory law has
given to the private citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of
his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of
the court; subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
FACTS:
Petitioner raised the issue of EOs constituitonality and filed case in the lower
court. However, the court sustained the the confiscation of the carabaos
and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the
bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive
order, as raised by the petitioner. Therefore, petitioner appealed the decsion
to IAC with the following contentions:
ISSUE:
RULING:
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The Supreme Court agreed with Ynot and declared the Executive Order
to be unconstitutional because it ordered the outright confiscation of the
carabaos without giving the accused a right to be heard before a competent
and impartial tribunal as required by due process. The Court also
commended Ynot for asserting his rights, and stated that: The strength of
democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the
people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but
weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and
impress.
FACTS:
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The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only
barrios were barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are
exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating
barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has
delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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FACTS:
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appeal.
ISSUE:
HELD:
No. In People vs. Santos (1936), this court express its approval of an
administrative order that would amount to an excess of the regulatory power
vested in an administrative official. We reaffirmed such a doctrine in a 1951
decision, where we again made clear that where an administrative order
betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the act, the
mandate of the act must prevail and must be followed. Justice Barrera in
Victorias Milling Company, Inc. vs SSC citing Parker and Davis thus: a rule
is binding on the court so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is
followed and its scope is within the statutory granted by the legislature,
even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein of its
innate wisdom. On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is
at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the
law means.
No lesser administrative executive office or agency then can, contrary to the
express language of the constitution, assert for itself a more extensive
prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to observe the constitutional mandate.
There must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment. Its term
must be followed. In the terse language of the present Chief Justice, an
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. Respondents can
be sustained therefore only if it can be shown that the rules and regulations
promulgated by them were in accordance with what the Veterans Bill of
Rights provides.
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
HELD:
The petition was dismissed. According to the findings of the court, the
alleged violations are merely internal rules of procedures rather than what
petitioners claim to be constitutional requirements for enacting laws. In this
case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to this Court.
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FACTS:
Antonio Bengson and Teodoro Cruz were rivals in the 1998 elections in
nd
the 2 District of Pangasinan. They were running for Congress. Cruz won by
a significant margin over the incumbent Bengson. Bengson then filed a quo
warranto proceeding in the HRET (House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal) alleging that Cruz is not a natural born citizen, as defined by law;
hence he should be disqualified from holding office. The HRET subsequently
declared and affirmed Cruz as the winner. Bengson filed a motion for
reconsideration alleging that Cruz was indeed born a Filipino and he is
defined under the 1935 Constitution as a natural born citizen. Cruz however
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lost his citizenship when he enlisted in the US Army in 1985. He also swore
allegiance to the US without consent from the Philippines. Cruz, on the other
hand, argued that he regained his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of Republic
Act No. 2630 which provides that:
Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service
to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or
after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United
States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
ISSUE:
HELD:
US VS GUINTO
FEBRUARY 26, 1990
G.R. NO. 76607
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FACTS:
These cases are consolidated because they all involve the doctrine
of state immunity.
1) US VS GUINTO (GR No. 76607)
The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in
Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for
contracts for barber services in the said base which was won by a certain
Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award to the bid winner
because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included
in the invitation to bid, and subsequently, to conduct a rebidding.
ISSUE:
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HELD:
A state may not be sued without its consent. This doctrine is not
absolute and does not say the state may not be sued under any
circumstance. The rule says that the state may not be sued without its
consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents. The
consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or
impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special
law. Consent is implied when the sate enters into a contract or it itself
commences litigation.
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
HELD:
No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding
that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to
propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR.
What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the
initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several
instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having
the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This
practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The
proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no
showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt
his over what has been done.
PNB v. CIR
G.R. No. L-32667
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
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RULING:
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
HELD:
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
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letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the
publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty,
either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said
communication is not absolutely privileged.
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS COMELEC
G.R. 119976
SEPT. 18, 1995
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
HELD:
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the
term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law.
When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile
of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her
actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose
Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte
while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary
intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important
milestones.
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16 MARCH 1995
FACTS:
For an overview of the distribution in the province, see the below table for
the population distribution, census 1990 and 1994:
ISSUES:
RULING:
The basic powers of COMELEC are spelled out in Section 2(c), Article
IX of the Constitution, which states:
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Resolution No. 2736. Section 1 is then annulled and set aside. The petition
praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to
the Second District of the province of Leyte is denied.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
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FACTS:
On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties,
avers that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list
representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory, wherein the twenty (20%) percent
congressional seats for party-list representatives is filled up at all times.
ISSUE:
HELD:
No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same
declared therein a policy to promote proportional representation in the
election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that
would benefit them.
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FACTS:
Abundo argues that the RTC and the COMELEC erred in uniformly
ruling that he had already served three consecutive terms and is, thus,
barred by the constitutional three-term limit rule to run for the current
2010-2013 term. In gist, Abundo arguments run thusly:
1. Aldovino, Jr. is not on all fours with the present case as the former
dealt with preventive suspension which does not interrupt the
continuity of service of a term;
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5. The COMELEC missed the point when it ruled that there was no
interruption in the service of Abundo since what he considered as an
"interruption" of his 2004-2007 term occurred before his term started;
and
ISSUE:
HELD:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post; and
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FACTS:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for
the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive
Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in
the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one
item to another in the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of
expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to
another here.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
No. The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike
an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is
unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right.
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Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid,
its application to the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's
Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of religious books and
pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one
thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite
another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon."
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the
exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the
sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or
exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue
purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise
of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to
general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.
FACTS:
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and
executory. Fabian appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred that
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently
provides that:
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ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
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RULING:
The Court held that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship
under RA 9225 may exercise their right to vote under the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, RA 9189.
The Court held that present day duals may now exercise their right of
suffrage provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189.
FACTS:
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act
No. 1797) that were repealed during the time of former President
Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to
retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions.
Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement
benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino
vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not
give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the
Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out
that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was
one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Taada v.
Tuvera
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General
Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD:
No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued
pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was
never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override the
decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to
enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the
repeal of existing laws. The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is
unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or
items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of
an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in
the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the
others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its
entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its
entirety or not at all.
FACTS:
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Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB employees union herein petitioner filed claim
for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits.
On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which was
signed into law by Pres. Corazon Aquino and which was published in the
Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for
benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank.
In May 1992, Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB
to reopen despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening,
respondent Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of the
bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992
or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after
15 days following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the
authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause unless
otherwise provided. Citing Tanada vs Tuvera, this clause refers to the date
of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication, which cannot in any
event be omitted. The reason is that such omission would affect due process
in so far as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed
to govern it.
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
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2. Whether or not E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern?
RULING:
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
HELD:
No. It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more
solid existence and expansive construal. The Courts high regard to such
power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically
ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that
the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a
proper subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-
extensive with the power to legislate. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
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FACTS:
When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared
cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of
Palawan. This district then included, among other territories, the Municipality
of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected Representative as a
domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district
for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010.
On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitras second term as
Representative), Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a "highly urbanized
city" and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. The
direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto
Princesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective provincial
officials.
On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of
Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voters Registration Record
from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio
Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He
subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a
resident of Aborlan. Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and
Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a petition to deny due course
or to cancel Mitras COC.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10,
2010 elections was upheld in a vote of 11-3. The respondents were not able
to present a convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitras evidence of
effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his
representation on this point in his COC. Likewise, the "COMELEC could not
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present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitras statement in his
COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation."
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
HELD:
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including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any
post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be
confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and
the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads
of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any
matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws
pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of
a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning
delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law
initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure
of the Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct
role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
FACTS:
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the
Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime
in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be examined by the special
committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who
delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor.
During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said
representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right against
self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to
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ISSUE:
Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its
questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation.
HELD:
FACTS:
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Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the
inquiry was beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose. One of the defendants in the case before the
Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention.
The Court granted it and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee to comment on the petition in intervention.
ISSUE:
RULING:
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FACTS:
ISSUES:
RULING:
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While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this
objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission,
by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials,
sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission
exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to
hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday
of May 1992 and for all the following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called regional elections,
should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local
election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution
mandates the synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-
readings-on-separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the
Senate can become laws they must pass through three readings on separate
days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the
necessity of the bills immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the Presidents certification of
necessity in the following manner:
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the
national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents
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certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply
with the three separate readings requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs
in the ARMM is constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options
open to Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM
officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013
elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain
in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized
elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the
terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013]
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to
appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in the
2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
FACTS:
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On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the
president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to
issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in
session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary
designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the temporary
designation shall not exceed one year.
During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad
interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting
capacity.
ISSUE:
HELD:
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the
president. The choice is the presidents to make and the president normally
appoints those whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained to choose
the undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether
temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence.
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Anent the issue that GMA appointed outsiders, such is allowed. EO 292
also provides that the president may temporarily designate an officer
already in the government service or any other competent person to perform
the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may
even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government
service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
Appointments in an Acting
Ad Interim Appointments
Capacity
It is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect Acting appointments are a
immediately and can no longer way of temporarily filling
be withdrawn by the President important offices but, if
once the appointee has abused, they can also be a
Description
qualified into office. The fact way of circumventing the
that it is subject to confirmation need for confirmation by the
by the COA does not alter its Commission on
permanent character (Matibag Appointments.
vs Benipayo)
Submitted to Yes No
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the COA
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
HELD:
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BERMUDEZ VS TORRES
GR NO. 131429
AUGUST 4, 1999
FACTS:
On 10 October 1997, Bermudez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac,
a petition for prohibition and/or injunction, and mandamus, with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of injunction/temporary restraining order, against
herein respondents, challenging the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the
ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. After
hearing, the trial court considered the petition submitted for resolution and,
in due time, issued its now assailed order dismissing the petition. The
subsequent move by petitioners to have the order reconsidered met with a
denial.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the
power to appoint. In the exercise of the power of appointment, discretion is
an integral part thereof.
When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to
appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as
necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It
should be here pertinent to state that the President is the head of
government whose authority includes the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices.
It is the considered view of the Court that the phrase upon recommendation
of the Secretary, found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the
Revised Administrative Code, should be interpreted to be a mere advise,
exhortation or endorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and
not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The President,
being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do
away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the
exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as
having acted beyond the scope of his authority.
FACTS:
On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted
each official and employee of the government the productivity incentive
benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the employees one
month basic salary but which amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO
provided that the productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for the
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ISSUE:
HELD:
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Pres. can,
by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action or
decision of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureau or offices
under him.
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits,
enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits
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without approval from him and directing the refund of the excess over the
prescribed amount, the Pres. was just exercising his power of control over
executive departments.
The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive
benefits and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among
government personnel by committing limited resources of government for
the equal payment of incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising
his power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of the government
agencies who granted incentive benefits to their employees without
appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the
uneven distribution of government resources.
The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is
his control of executive departments.
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify
allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing of the Hello Garci
tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department
including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry
without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum,
prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate
Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before
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the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a
result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the
Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the Chain of Command.
Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court
Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.
ISSUE:
RULING:
PDAF
G.R. NO. 208566
FACTS:
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The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines
since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum,
discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several
legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority
Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is
integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following
manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40
million for hard projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings,
schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship grants,
medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for
hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby
certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their
department provided that the request for realignment is approved or
concurred by the legislator concerned.
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the
GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a)
the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been
around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived
from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of
corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy,
exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system
had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping
lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs
(non-government organizations) which would make it appear that
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government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact
going to ghost projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission
on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various
petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the
pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
HELD:
a. Separation of Powers
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive
will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
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(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall
involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other
national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the
president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate.
But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the
GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will
appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the
appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the
approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting
which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local
affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can
develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with
the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of
representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass
or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an
instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national
officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is
contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy.
Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but
worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
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The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is
that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution which provides: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Belgica et al
emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the
Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular
legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the
Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which
amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit: (i) PD
910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from
certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the
Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource
development and for other purposes which the President may direct;(ii) PD
1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs
earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund)
which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI
of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to
be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the
case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
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WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on
4.) accountability
(a) and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-
enactment authority (a) to identify the projects they desire to be
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funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations; (b) and in the
areas of fund release and realignment. Thus, legislators have been, in one
form or another, authorized to participate in the various operational aspects
of budgeting, violating the separation of powers principle. That the said
authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter
its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law. Informal practices, through
which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of
budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment.
2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability
since legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power
of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress.
3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion
only appears as a collective allocation limit. Legislators make intermediate
appropriations of the PDAF only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside
of the law. Thus, actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been
written into the General Appropriations Bill and are thus put into
effect without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment
legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget
within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment
and consequently impairs the Presidents power of item veto. As petitioners
aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting
the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific
projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his
national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all
other legislators with legitimate projects.
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5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not
self-executing due to the qualifying phrase as may be defined by law.
Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the
policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from
ruling on this issue. In any event, the above-stated argument on this score
is largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the
Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which
actually belies the avowed intention of making equal the unequal. The
gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact
of office, without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a result, a district
representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of
funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would
be relatively underdeveloped compared to the former. To add, what rouses
graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives and in
some years, even the Vice-President who do not represent any locality,
receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the
CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development
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YES.Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President under Section 8 of
PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power as it does not
lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya
Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide
latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct
and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law.
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
No. The declaration made by the SBMA Board declaring HPPL as the
winning bidder was neither final nor unassailable. Under LOI No. 620, all
projects undertaken by the SBMA are subject to the approval of the Office of
the President. Hence, the Board of SBMA is under the control and
supervision of the President of the Philippines. Therefore, the declaration
made by the Board did not vest any right in favor of HPPL.
HPPL cannot invoke that it was suing only on an isolated transaction. The
conduct of bidding is not an isolated transaction. It is doing business here
in the Philippines. The Supreme Court emphasized that as a general rule,
doing or engaging in or transacting business in the Philippines is a case
to case basis. It has often been held that a single act or transaction may be
considered as doing business when a corporation performs acts for which it
was created or exercises some of the functions for which it was organized.
The amount or volume of the business is of no moment, for even a singular
act cannot be merely incidental or casual if it indicates the foreign
corporations intention to do business.
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MARCOS VS.MANGLAPUS
G.R. NO. 88211
SEPTEMBER 15, 1989
FACTS:
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the President has the power to prohibit the Marcoses from
entering the country.
2. Whether or not the issue is non-justifiable (not the within the jurisdiction
of court) as contended by the solicitor general.
RULING:
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court. The court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The issue at hand is
not a political question beyond the jurisdiction of the court. However, in the
exercise of the power of judicial review, the function of the court is simply to
check and not to supplant the executive. It is not for the court to determine
the wisdom of the executives action. Its only power is to determine if the
chief executive has gone beyond the constitutional limits of her jurisdiction.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
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Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect
one year after such publication. We clarified this publication requirement in
Tanada vs. Tuvera:
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not
be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. COA
Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative regulation
or letter of instruction which does not need publication to be effective and
valid. It is not an implementing rule or regulation of a statute but a directive
issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing prohibition
imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and
his official family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from
holding multiple offices and receiving double compensation.
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FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:
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There are several requisites before the President may interfere in local
fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national
government; (2 )consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and
the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local
leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of
the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and
Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in
no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of
national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
current one.
FACTS:
This case is all about the Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of
the SC dated January 30, 2002 affirming the judgment of the CA, which in
turn affirmed that of the RTC, declaring that there is valid and perfected
waste management contract between the government of the Philippines and
the respondent corporation and dismissing the petition filed by the petitioner
for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petition for certiorari is the proper remedy for the
Petitioner instead of appealing the decision of the RTC?
RULING:
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for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Well-settled is the rule
that the special civil action for certiorari may not be invoked as a substitute
for the remedy of appeal.
Petitioners failure to appeal the decision of the trial court is a fatal defect
which, standing by itself, already fully justifies the dismissal of its petition.
Petitioner has failed to bring out any matter which could justify a reversal.
FACTS:
Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional
Trial Court seek to prohibit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)
from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries or
compensation for such would tantamount to a diminution of their salary,
which is unconstitutional. Earlier however, or on June 7, 1987, the Court en
banc had already reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice which directs
the continued withholding of taxes of the justices and the judges of the
judiciary but the SC decided to rule on this case nonetheless to settle the
issue once and for all.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the
payment of income tax.
HELD:
No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their
deliberations, was NOT to exempt justices and judges from general taxation.
Members of the judiciary, just like members of the other branches of the
government, are subject to income taxation. What is provided for by the
constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their
continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be subject to the
whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be
subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.
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Yes. The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary of the members of
the judiciary and such increase will immediately take effect thus the
incumbent members of the judiciary (at the time of the passing of the law
increasing their salary) shall benefit immediately.
Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the members of the
judiciary but such will only be applicable to members of the judiciary which
were appointed AFTER the effectivity of such law.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and
reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired.
Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the
IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public
domain somehow against the regalian doctrine.
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Petitioner Yao was denied due process but not on the grounds he
ardently invoked. While he indeed resorted to the wrong mode of appeal and
his right to appeal is statutory, it is still an essential part of the judicial
system that courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party
of the prerogative, but instead afford every party-litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the
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All magistrate should heed to the demand of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the
Constitution. It is their solemn and paramount duty to uphold the
Constitution and the principles enshrined therein, lest they be lost in the
nitty-gritty of their everyday judicial work.
FACTS:
Asiavest appealed. In its defense, PNCC alleged that the foreign judgment
cannot be enforced here because of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
PNCC, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact.
Asiavest assailed the arguments of PNCC on the ground that PNCCs counsel
participated in all the proceedings in the Malaysian Court.
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ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes. PNCC failed to prove and substantiate its bare allegations of want
of jurisdiction, want of notice, collusion and/or fraud, and mistake of fact. On
the contrary, Asiavest was able to present evidence as to the validity of the
proceedings that took place in Malaysia. Asiavest presented the certified and
authenticated copies of the judgment and the order issued by the Malaysian
Court. It also presented correspondences between Asiavests lawyers and
PNCCs lawyers in and out of court which belied PNCCs allegation that the
Malaysian court never acquired jurisdiction over it. PNCCs allegation of fraud
is not sufficient too, further, it never invoked the same in the Malaysian
Court.
The Supreme Court notes, to assail a foreign judgment the party must
present evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Otherwise, the judgment
enjoys the presumption of validity so long as it was duly certified and
authenticated. In this case, PNCC failed to present the required evidence.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a land title verification request with the LRA. The
request prompted by an alleged claim of ownership of a certain Manotok
over the land which petitioners occupy, and which they perceive as public
land.LRA-Task Force issued a report stating, among others that appearing on
the survey plan, Lots 62 and 69 were bounded by Estero Maypajo. The Task
Force also found a patent was issued in favor of some private persons.
Petitioners sought the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor for legal action
on OCTs Nos. 820 and 7477. The OSG wrote a letter to public respondent for
a review and evaluation of the records on the issuance of the said titles. In
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its reply, public respondent contend that the parcels of land described in the
said titles were originally registered in the Manila Registry of Deeds.
ISSUE:
RULING:
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2001 MAY 21
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CAOIBES VS.OMBUDSMAN.
G.R. 132177
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
The ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and a
court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for
determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein. It
appears that the case involves two members of the judiciary who were
entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture.
Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court
which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and
its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot
determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a
judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The
Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case
before it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to
deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to
arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is
dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.
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FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari from the order of the Municipal Court of
Kabankalan. The prolonged thrusts of the petition: 1. The setting aside, by
certiorari of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by
Judge Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases and 2.
The petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal
cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
A search warrant is issued to search seven (7) dead bodies which are
believed to be buried in the hacienda of Sola, which turned out to be true.
After due preliminary examination of the complainants witnesses and his
other evidence, the municipal court found probable cause against the
accused. It thus issued an order for their arrest. However, without giving the
prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their
temporary release.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The Supreme Court has the power to order a change of venue to avoid
a miscarriage of justice. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the
question of transferring the place of trial, in this case, from Himamaylan to
Bacolod City. The Constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could
order a change of venue or place or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 wisely incorporated the
ruling in the landmark decision of People vs. Gutierrez, where Justice J.B.L.
Reyes as ponente vigorously and categorically affirmed: In the particular
case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality
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where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to
make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for
which courts have been established.
Why a change of venue is imperative was made clear in the Comment of the
Solicitor General. Thus: The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above
constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in this
case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their
way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of this
fear, they may either to refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives.
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege. The
revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow
and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including,
among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to
legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the
concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has
Constitutional underpinnings. The claim of executive privilege is highly
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FACTS:
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ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS:
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The case was dismissed by the respondent finding that the case is a
simple breach of contract which should have been filed in a regular court.
Respondent stated that it has no jurisdiction to determine the legality or
validity of the contract because the entities involved are private
corporations.
ISSUE:
RULING:
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In the present case, all three corporations comprising the CIIF were
organized as stock corporations. The UPCB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares
of LEGASPI OIL, 91.42 % of the shares of GRANEXPORT, and 92.85 % of the
shares of UNITED COCONUT. Obviously, the below 51% share of the stock of
LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned
or controlled corporation. Our concern has thus been limited to
GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT as we go back to the second requisite.
Unfortunately, it is in this regard that petitioner failed to substantiate his
contentions. There is no showing that GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT
was vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
propriety in nature. The Court concludes that the CIIF companies are, as
found by public respondent, private corporations not within the scope of its
jurisdiction.
GENERAL VS.ROCO.
G.R. 143366
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
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FACTS:
Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the
inquiry was beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose. One of the defendants in the case before the
Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention.
The Court granted it and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee to comment on the petition in intervention.
ISSUE:
RULING:
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FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari praying for the reversal of the
Decision dated August 31, 1999as well as the Resolution dated November
29, 1999, rendered by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
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RULING:
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2) No, the respondent did not merely occupy a confidential position but
rather complete his duties and responsibilities for a great measure of both
ability and dependability.
Section 1 of the general rules in the implementing rules of Presidential
Decree No. 807 states that appointments in the Civil Service except as to
those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly
technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined a far as practicable by competitive examination.
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
RULING:
It is not disputed that, except for his lack of CES or CSE eligibility, De
Jesus possesses the basic qualifications of a Graft Investigation Officer III,
as provided in the earlier quoted Qualification Standards. Such being the
case, the CSC has the ministerial duty to grant the request of the
Ombudsman that appointment be made permanent effective December 18,
2002.
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the CA should be set aside and that of
the CSC reinstated?
RULING:
The decision of the CSC held that, while petitioners reassignment was
originally made in the exigency of the service without reduction in her rank,
status, or salary, respondent City Mayor failed to advance sufficient reason
to warrant petitioners continuous reassignment for more than three years
which appears too long for one to conduct the study assigned to her.
Petitioners reassignment to various offices should be considered more than
merely a temporary one. For all intents and purposes, her reassignment,
lasting nearly ten years now, is a removal without cause as Budget Officer of
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the City of Pasig. The petitioner should now be returned to her original
position for her indefinite detail to other positions would amount to her
removal without cause from the position to which she has been permanently
appointed.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition[1] with prayer for temporary
restraining order seeking to nullify Executive Order No. 81 and
Memoranda Nos. 01592 and 01594.
On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive
Order No. 81[3] (EO 81 for brevity) entitled Transferring the Sports
Programs and Activities of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
to the Philippine Sports Commission and Defining the Role of DECS in
School-Based Sports.
Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Andrew B. Gonzales
(Secretary Gonzales for brevity) issued Memorandum No. 01592 on
January 10, 2000. Memorandum No. 01592 temporarily reassigned, in the
exigency of the service, all remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or
bureaus of the DECS effective March 15, 2000.
On January 21, 2000, Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No.
01594 reassigning the BPESS staff named in the Memorandum to various
offices within the DECS effective March 15, 2000. Petitioners were among
the BPESS personnel affected by Memorandum No. 01594. Dissatisfied with
their reassignment, petitioners filed the instant petition.
In their Petition, petitioners argue that EO 81 is void and unconstitutional
for being an undue legislation by President Estrada. Petitioners maintain
that the Presidents issuance of EO 81 violated the principle of separation of
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powers. Petitioners also challenge the DECS Memoranda for violating their
right to security of tenure.
Petitioners seek to nullify EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda. Petitioners
pray that this Court prohibit the PSC from performing functions related to
school sports development. Petitioners further pray that, upon filing of the
petition, this Court issue a temporary restraining order against respondents
to desist from implementing EO 81.
During the pendency of the case, Republic Act No. 9155 (RA 9155 for
brevity), otherwise known as the Governance of Basic Education Act of
2001, was enacted on August 11, 2001. RA 9155 expressly abolished the
BPESS and transferred the functions, programs and activities of the DECS
relating to sports competition to the PSC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda valid.
RULING:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for being moot and
academic.
The enactment of RA 9155 has rendered the issues in the present case
moot and academic. Since RA 9155 abolished the BPESS and transferred
the DECS functions relating to sports competition to the PSC, petitioners
now admit that it is no longer plausible to raise any ultra vires assumption
by the PSC of the functions of the BPESS. Moreover, since RA 9155
provides that BPESS personnel not transferred to the PSC shall be retained
by the DECS, petitioners now accept that the law explicitly protects and
preserves their right to security of tenure.
Although the issue is already academic, its significance constrains the
Court to point out that Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292 for brevity),
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, expressly grants the
President continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
EO 81 is a valid exercise of the Presidents delegated power to reorganize
the Office of the President. The law grants the President this power in
recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
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On the other hand, the transfer of functions or agencies does not result
in the employees cessation in office because his office continues to exist
although in another department, agency or office. In the instant case, the
BPESS employees who were not transferred to PSC were at first temporarily,
then later permanently reassigned to other offices of the DECS, ensuring
their continued employment. At any rate, RA 9155 now mandates that
these employees shall be retained by the Department.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
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HELD:
FACTS:
Petitioner Jaramilla and private respondent Suyat both ran for the
position of Member of the Sangunniang Bayan in Ilocos Sur in the 2001
elections. After the election the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
the winners and the Certificate of Canvass shows that respondent Suyat was
ranked No. 9 and petitioner Jaramilla was ranked No. 7. Respondent, upon
review, discovered that petitioner was credited with only twenty three (23)
votes and not seventy three (73) votes. Respondent Suyat filed before the
COMELEC en banc an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Order to Reconvene,
which is treated as Petition for Correction of Manifest Error. Petitioner, in his
answer contend that said petition should be dismissed for having been filed
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ISSUE:
RULING:
Under Art. IX-C of the Constitution it provides that all election cases
shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
However, said provision applies only in cases where the COMELEC exercises
its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, and not when it merely exercises
purely administrative functions. Such an error in the tabulation of the
results, which merely requires a clerical correction without the necessity of
opening ballot boxes or examining ballots, demands only the exercise of the
administrative power of the COMELEC. Hence, the Commission en banc
properly assumed original jurisdiction over the aforesaid petition.
FACTS:
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ISSUES:
RULING:
1) No. The Rules of Court, promulgated by the Supreme Court, applies only
to judicial bodies under its general power of supervision. The COMELEC is an
independent, administrative body over which the SC has jurisdiction only to
the extent that it may review the COMELECs decisions, ordinances or rulings
on certiorari. Assuming the COMELEC adopted the ROC suppletorily, it does
not have the power to adopt rules on the disqualification of its members
because the Constitution provides that its members may only be removed
through impeachment. The older de Vera should be able to inhibit himself
solely on the basis of ethics.
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
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HELD:
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Article III of the 1987 Constitution comes in. This is so, because, when
the application for a warrant of arrest is made and the information is filed
with the court, the judge will then determine whether or not a probable
cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The trial court
misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information
filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor. The order to get the approval of
the Provincial Fiscal is not only superfluous but unwarranted.
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
HELD:
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FACTS:
On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) 408 (500) pursuant to Decree No. 55173 of the
Court of First Instance of Albay. OCT No. 55173 was subdivided and further
subdivided resulting in the issuance of several titles, which are now the
subjects of herein petition in the name of private respondents. Petitioner
Republic of the Philippines filed a case with the trial court to judicially
declare the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) issued to herein private
respondents null and void on the ground that the subject land, on which the
OCT was based, has the features of a foreshore land based on an
investigation conducted by the DENR. Respondents, on the other hand
contend that Director of Lands found Jose Baritua's land to be "definitely
outside of the foreshore area." Within the time for pleading, private
respondents EANCRA Corporation, Lolita Alcazar and Salvador Alcazar filed
their answer with cross-claim, while the rest, namely, Felix S. Imperial,
Feliza S. Imperial, Elias S. Imperial and Miriam S. Imperial filed a motion to
dismiss. They contended that the adjudication by the cadastral court is
binding against the whole world including the Republic since the cadastral
proceedings are in rem and the government itself through the Director of
Lands instituted the proceedings and was a direct and active participant
therein. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an
objection to the motion to dismiss. After hearing the motion to dismiss, the
trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the judgment
rendered by the cadastral court was not foreshore. Petitioner appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit and for failure to file the appellants brief
within the extended period granted to petitioner. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE:
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HELD:
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction has jurisdiction over the
appealed decision of the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
RULING:
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
RULING:
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FACTS:
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ISSUE:
RULING:
Under Sec. 2, Art. IX-D of the 1987 Constitution provides that: first
paragraph: the COA shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine,
audit and settle all accounts of the government; second paragraph: the
Commission shall have the exclusive authority to define the scope of its
audit and examination. The Constitutional Commission placed the word
exclusive to qualify the authority of the COA. Thus, the COA has the
exclusive authority to decide on disallowances of unnecessary government
expenditures. Government agencies and officials however, remain bound by
the findings and conclusions of the COA, whether the matter falls under the
first or second paragraph of Sec., unless of course such findings and
conclusions are modified or reversed by the courts. The power of the COA to
examine and audit government agencies, while non-exclusive, cannot be
taken away from the COA as provided under Section 3, Art. IX-D of the
Constitution.
FACTS:
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On May 18, 1995, eleven suspected members of the notorious robbery gang,
"Kuratong Baleleng," were killed in an alleged shootout with composite
teams from the PNP.
On May 22, 1995, Senior Police Officer 2 Eduardo de los Reyes of the Central
Intelligence Command made an expose', stating that there was no shootout.
De los Reyes stated that the eleven suspected members of the "Kuratong
Baleleng" gang were victims of summary execution.
ISSUE:
RULING
It is evident that the petitioners have not borne out any distinction between
"the duty to investigate" and "the power to conduct preliminary
investigations"; neither have the petitioners established that the latter
remains with the Special Prosecutor. Thus, this Court can only reject the
petitioners' first proposition.
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FACTS:
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ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
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deliveries of supplies purportedly for the use of said institution, when in fact
no such deliveries of supplies were ever made, to the damage and prejudice
of said college in the amount of P9,200.00 and the accused Mila C.
Balmadrid, Jesus C. Balmadrid, Jose P. Concepcion and Juan G. Atencia, are
private persons and in their desire to conceal such fictitious transactions,
between ECBAL ENTERPRISES and CAIC for the purchase of supplies falsified
public documents which are grossly disadvantageous to the aforesaid college
in the amount of P9,200.00.
ISSUE:
RULING:
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
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FACTS:
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appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were
unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly
repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act
of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new law, cannot
even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of
several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only
barrios were barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are
exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating
barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has
delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is
constitutional?
HELD:
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conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the
President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the
legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its
expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means
or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented,
considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information
and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function
is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and
verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.
FACTS:
ISSUES:
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HELD:
1. No. The petitioner does not seek to determine Honasans right in the
exercise of his office in the Senate. What the petitioners allege is
COMELECs failure to comply with certain requirements pertaining to
the conduct of the special election. Hence, the court has jurisdiction.2.
Yes. Special election was held validly. Hence, petition has no merit.
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FACTS:
30 July 1998 Majority Leader said he had received a letter signed by the 7
Lakas Senators, stating that they had selected Guingona as the Minority
Leader. Senate President formally recognized Sen. Guingona as Minority
Leader.
31 July 1998 Sen. Santiago and Tatad filed petition for quo warranto
pertinent laws/provisions/concepts:
Sec 16(1), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution, The Senate shall elect its President
and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members. Each House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary.
Sec. 16(3), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution, Each House may determine the rules
of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A
penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
Sec 1, Par. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution, The judicial power shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
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law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition? (YES)
2. Was Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position
of Senate Minority Leader? (NO)
3. Did Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Guingona
as the Minority Leader? (NO)
RULING:
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To intrude on the jurisdiction of the legislature (in the case) would amount
to Judicial Legislation a clear breach of separation-of-powers.
Thus, Guingona cannot be Senate Minority Leader because (1) he voted for
Fernan and (2) the bloc of Senators who voted for him also voted for
Fernan.
SC: unlike with selection of Senate President, Consti. is not explicit in the
manner of selecting the Minority Leader must be prescribed by the Senate.
(Consti. vests in each house of Congress the power to determine the rules of
its proceedings. [Sec. 16(3),Art. VI])
SC: neither has argument have clear support of Rules: the Rules of the
Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders.
Petitioners were unable to prove clearly and sufficiently their entitlement to
the office of the Senate minority leader. Absent any clear-cut guidelines, no
way to establish that illegality or irregularity tainted Guingonas assumption
of the office of the Senate minority leader.
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For this reason, the SC had, in the past, declined to assume jurisdiction over
cases involving the discipline of members of the Legislative (Alejandrino
v.Quezon [1924] suspension of a Senator for assaulting a fellow Senator;
Osmena v. Pendatun [1960] suspension of a Senator for imputing bribery to
Pres. Garcia) and the interpretation of rules of procedure of a house (Arroyo
v. De Venecia). Principles: Congress Organizations and Sessions Election of
Officers.
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NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No.
179295).
FACTS:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board
of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list
election which was held in May 2007.
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts,
while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5,
Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-
list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list
elections shall be entitled to one seat;
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4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners
more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule,
same case).
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower
house?
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats
allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-
list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall
be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule,
200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list
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IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the
votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows
those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats.
In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast
(called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number
of seats given to these two- percenters are then deducted from the total
available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner
2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus
17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the
tabulation).
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one
party shall dominate the party-list system.
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FACTS:
After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner. Ruiz filed a
motion for reconsideration, contending that Farinas could not validly
substitute for Chevylle Farinas, since the latter was not the official candidate
of LAMMP, but was an independent candidate. On June 3, 1988, Farinas took
his oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives. Comelec
dismissed the MR on the ground that the matter is now within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal.
ISSUES:
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Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
determination of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent
Farias is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of
the House of Representatives?
HELD:
FACTS:
On August 28, 1998, Senator Blas F. Ople filed Senate Resolution No.
157 directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to conduct an
inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the charges of then Defense Secretary
Orlando Mercado that a group of active and retired military officers were
organizing a coup detat to prevent the administration of then President
Joseph Estrada from probing alleged fund irregularities in the Armed Forces
of the Philippine.
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On the same date, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III also filed Resolution No.
160, directing the appropriate senate committee to conduct an inquiry, in
aid of legislation, into the alleged mismanagement of the funds and
investment portfolio of the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits
System (AFP-RSBS)
The Senate President referred the two resolutions to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee)
and the Committee on National Defense and Security.
During the public hearings conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee (hereafter called the Committee), it appeared that the AFP-RSBS
purchased a lot in General Santos City, designated as Lot X, MR-1160, for
P10,500.00 per square meter from private respondent Atty. Nilo J.
Flaviano. However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds
indicated that the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000.00 per square
meter.
The Committee thereafter caused the service of a subpoena to
respondent Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify before
it. Respondent refused to appear at the hearing. Instead, he filed a petition
for prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City,
Branch 23, which was docketed as SP Civil Case No. 496.
On October 21, 1998, the trial court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order directing the Committee to CEASE and DESIST from proceeding with
the inquiry in P.S. 160 particularly in General Santos City and/or anywhere
in Region XI or Manila on matters affecting the patenting/titling and sale of
Lot X, MR-1160-D to AFP-RSBS, and from issuing subpoenas to witnesses
from Region XI, particularly from General Santos City, pending the hearing
of the petition for prohibition and injunction.
On November 5, 1998, the Committee filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction, and (b) failure to state a
valid cause of action. It further argued that the issuance of the Temporary
Restraining Order was invalid for violating the rule against ex-parte issuance
thereof; and that the same was not enforceable beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court. On November 11, 1998, the trial court denied
petitioners motion to dismiss and granted the writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
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RULING:
The principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation
belongs to Congress, execution to the Executive, and settlement of legal
controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain
of the others.When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on
respondent Flaviano to appear and testify before it in connection with its
investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS
funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. This is clearly provided in Article VI, Section 21 of the
Constitution, thus:
Hence, the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, or any court for
that matter, had no authority to prohibit the Committee from requiring
respondent to appear and testify before it.
FACTS:
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Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through
the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the
investigation.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even
on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation
only in 1995 and in 2006. Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never
been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet
form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the
Senates internet web page.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate,
or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the
Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure
even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of
publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply
with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a
persons liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could
be arrested and detained by the Senate.
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
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FACTS:
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ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
HELD:
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FACTS:
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with
others, was charged with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory
herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred
that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her
immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a
president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the
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president would allow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and
conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the
functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to
be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE:
HELD:
No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of
immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of
the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue
of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any
other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in
a criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding
against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the
protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction.
The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed
by any other person.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive
relief asked for by the petitioners Anak Mindanao Party List Group (AMIN)
and Mamalo Descendants Organization, Inc. (MDO) that assailed the
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ISSUE:
Is EO 364 and 379 issued by Gloria Arroyo unconstitutional?
RULING:
No, the presidential issuances namely EO Nos. 364 and 379 are not
unconstitutional. Section 31 under the administrative Code of 1987 states
that the president, subject to policy in the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency shall have continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the office of the President thereby
allowing him to transfer any agency under the office of the president from
other departments or agencies. Since the PCUP and NCIP were formed as
agencies under the office of the president, they can be controlled by the
president. The NCIP, although independent to a certain degree, was placed
by Congress under the office of the President and such, is still subject to
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the Presidents power of control and supervision granted under Section 17,
article VII of the Constitution with respect to its performance of
administrative functions.
FACTS:
Petitioner Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation is a domestic
corporation engaged in the export of processed crabmeat and other seafood
products. Petitioner was incorporated on 20 October 1992 and registered
under its previous corporate name of Phillips Seafood Masbate, Inc.
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Simultaneously, the appellate court dismissed the petition for review for
having been filed out of time as petitioner opted to appeal to the Office of
the President instead of filing a Rule 43 petition to the Court of Appeals
within the reglementary period. On 24 November 2006, the Court of Appeals
issued the second assailed resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the petition for review for
having files out of time?
RULING:
No. E.O. No. 226 apparently allows two avenues of appeal from an
action or decision of the BOI, depending on the nature of the controversy.
One mode is to elevate an appeal to the Office of the President when the
action or decision pertains to either of these two instances: first, in the
decisions of the BOI over controversies concerning the implementation of
the relevant provisions of E.O No. 226 that may arise between registered
enterprises or investors and government agencies under Article 7,and
second, in an action of the BOI over applications for registration under the
investment priorities plan under Article 36.
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from the decision of respondent BOI, save in cases mentioned under Articles
7 and 36.
In relation to Article 82, E.O. No. 226, Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure expressly includes respondent BOI as one of the
quasi-judicial agencies whose judgments or final orders are appealable to
the Court of Appeals via a verified petition for review. Appeals from
judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be
brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the
requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and
adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-
judicial agencies.
Petitioner cannot invoke Article 36 of E.O. No. 226 to justify its appeal
to the Office of the President. Article 36, along with Article 7, which allows
recourse to the Office of the President, applies to specific instances, namely,
controversies between a registered enterprise and a government agency and
decisions concerning the registration of an enterprise, respectively. Expresio
unius est exclusio alterius. This enumeration is exclusive so that other
controversies outside of its purview, including petitioners entitlement to an
ITH, can invoke only the appellate judicial relief provided under Article 82. In
the instant case, the denial of petitioners application for an ITH is not within
the cases where the law expressly provides for appellate recourse to the
Office of the President. That being the case, petitioner should have elevated
its appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
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FACTS:
In the wake of the Oakwood Incident, the President issued Proc. 427
and G.O. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the AFP to
suppress the rebellion. After hours-long negotiations, the Oakwood
occupation ended and the president lifted the declaration of a state of
rebellion.
ISSUE:
RULING:
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(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has
attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive
or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion
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and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her
Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII,
as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23
(2), Article VI.
VILLAROSA VS.HRET
G.R. NO. 143351 & 144129
SEPTEMBER 14, 2000
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
RULING:
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FACTS:
HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the
source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment.
The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of
courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the
life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that
there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can
protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate
the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our
government.
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FELIPE V LEUTERIO
G.R. NO. L-4606
MAY 30, 1952
FACTS:
March 12, 1950: Benefit inter-collegiate oratorical contest was held in Naga with
8 contestants and 5 judges (Felipe chairman) where 1stprize was awarded to Nestor
Nosce and 2ndto Emma Imperial. Four days after, Imperial addressed a letter to the
Board of Judges protesting the verdict, and alleging that one of the Judges had
committed a mathematical mistake which was refused. She then filed a complaint in
CFI. The grades given by judges were tallied and the contestant receiving the lowest
number (1 was highest) got 1stprize.Nosce and Imperial both got the lowest number of
10.
The chairman, with the consent of the board, broke the tie awarding 1sthonors to
Nosce and 2ndto Imperial.
For the convenience of the judges the typewritten forms contained blank spaces in
which, after the names of the rival orators and their respective orations, the judge
could not jot down the grades he thought the contestants deserved according to
"Originality", "
Timeliness", "English", "Stage Personality", "Pronunciation and Enunciation" and
"Voice". From such data he made up his vote. Imperial asserts that her total should be
95 instead of 94 and therefore should rank 3rdplace in Rodriguez' vote. And if she got 3
from Rodriguez, her total vote should have been 9 instead of ten, with the result that
she copped first place in the speaking joust.
ISSUE:
WON courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of judges of
an oratorical competition
HELD:
NO. The important thing is Rodriguez'vote during and immediately after the
affair. His vote in Exhibit 3 definitely gave General place No. 3 and Imperial place No. 4.
His calculations recorded on Exhibit 3 were not material. In fact the Chairman did not
bother to fill out the blank spaces in his own form, and merely set down his conclusions
giving one to Imperial, 2 to Benavides etc. without specifying the ratings for "Voice",
"English", "Stage Personality" etc. In other words what counted was the vote. Like the
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ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the Word apply the highest
tenets of sportsmanship: finally of the referee's verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of
protest. The participants are supposed to join the competition to contribute to its
success by striving their utmost: the prizes are secondary.
Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a long period affords
some reason for doubting the existence of the right sought to be enforced, especially
where occasion for its assertion must have often arisen; and courts are cautious before
allowing it, being loath to establish a new legal principle not in harmony with the
generally accepted views thereon.
We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the respondent judge
reasoned out that where there is a wrong there is a remedy and that courts of first
instance are courts of general jurisdiction. The flaw in his reasoning lies in the
assumption that Imperial suffered somewrongat the hands of the board of judges. If at
all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean
the same thing. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or
violation of a right. As stated before, a contestanthas no right to the prize unless and
until he or she is declared winner by the board of referees or judges.
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of
"damnum absque injuria".
This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different
proposition. But then her action should be directed against the individual judge or
judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges.
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to assail the validity of EO 185.
RULING:
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FACTS:
Petitioners file special civil action for prohibition and injunction in the
sala of respondent Judge, seeking to declare the Tax Census Act as
unconstitutional, illegal and invalid since it transgress freedom of liberty and
protection from unreasonable search and seizures.
Petitioners in this special civil action seek the setting aside of the writ
of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge and would restrain him
perpetually from further hearing the suit for prohibition and injunction
pending before him. Petitioners predicate their plea on the allegation that
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction as the Tax Census Act is valid and constitutional,
there being neither any self-incrimination feature nor unreasonable search
and seizure taint, there being moreover a presumption of its conformity with
the fundamental law and no grave and irreparable injury being suffered by
the other respondents, petitioners before respondent Judge. Petitioners
likewise justify their contention that there was a grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent Judge in the issuance of such writ of preliminary
injunction due to his failure to consider the serious injury it would cause the
paramount public interest, to realize that the enforcement of penal laws
cannot thus be restrained.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge ought to have issued the writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the Tax Census Act.
RULING:
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---------------------------------
FACTS:
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the Court of Appeals in its cases CA-G.R. Nos. 16265-66-R, Tuason &
Co.Inc vs Bruna Rosete and Buenaventura Dizon. The CFI, after the
appellate writ of execution of the judgment against Rosete and Dizon, as
prayed for by the landowner Tuason and Company. Subsequently, on
November 19, 1960, the CFI issued orders of demolition of the houses of the
evictees or judgment debtors.
The land-owner J.M. Tuason & Co. had also applied a writ of
prohibition in the CFI of Quezon City against the Land Tenure administration,
the Auditor General, and the Solicitor General, to restrain them from
instituting expropriation proceedings of the petitioner Companys land in
Quezon City, as expressed and specifically authorized by RA No. 2616, that
became law, without executive; the Company claiming mainly that the RA
was unconstitutional, null and void, as legislation aimed at depriving it of its
property for the benefit of squatters and occupants, even if the property had
been actually subdivided, and its lots were being sold to the public; and that
respondent officers threatened to enforce said law by initiating expropriation
proceedings.
ISSUES:
RULING:
As to the first issue, we are satisfied that the writ of injunction issued
by the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 28842-R is null and void for want of
jurisdiction. The authority of said Court to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, injunction, certiorari and habeas corpus is expressly limited by
statute to their issuance in aid of its appellate jurisdiction (Judiciary Act,
sec.3) and it has been repeatedly ruled by us that the jurisdiction of the CA
to issue such writs must be based on the existence of a right to it from the
judgment on the merits in the main case.
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate
review over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death,
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FACTS:
On May 23, 1997, Florentino M. Alumbres, filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, a Criminal Complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief
for the destruction of complainants eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in
authority. It was alleged that he requested Caoibes to return the executive
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ISSUE:
HELD:
It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary
who were entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office
furniture. Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme
Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all
courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman
cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against
a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The
Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court
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personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as
to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should
hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act
subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the
Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this
matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and
recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in
determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes
upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative
concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez.
The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a
case before it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is
to deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to
arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a
dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.
FACTS:
On May 21, 1984, the petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the
private respondent for a period of one year for the stipulated rental of
P3,000.00 a month. Pursuant to the lease contract, the private respondent
deposited with the petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid
rentals or any damage to the leased premises except when caused by
reasonable wear and tear. On May 31, 1985, the private respondent vacated
the property. He thereafter requested the refund of his deposit minus the
sum of P1,000.00, representing the rental for the additional ten days of his
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occupancy after the expiration of the lease. The petitioner rejected this
request. He said the lessee still owed him for other charges, including the
electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for repainting of the
leased premises to restore them to their original condition.
When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition for
review was denied on September 29, 1987, as so too was his motion for
reconsideration, on December 1, 1987. He is now before us to fault the
respondent court, principally for sustaining the memorandum decision of the
regional trial court. His contention is that it violates Article VIII, Section 14
of the Constitution which states no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.
ISSUE:
RULING:
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the legislature that enacted it and the executive that approved it. This norm
is based on a becoming respect that the judiciary is expected to accord the
political departments of the government which, it must be assumed in
fairness, thoroughly studied the measure under challenge and assured
themselves of its constitutionality before agreeing to enact it.
FACTS:
ISSUES:
Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution
through a peoples initiative.
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Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions
to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
HELD:
According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic
requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the
COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino
petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People . The petitioners failed
to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of
the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and
misleading which renders the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
Disallowing Revision through Initiatives. The framers of the constitution
intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is
intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution
may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative
and the executive is a radical change, therefore constitutes a revision.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary. Even assuming
that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present
petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with
the constitution before complying with RA 6735 Petition is dismissed.
FACTS:
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An
Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to
have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the
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private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that
the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by
the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid
exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate
the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other
similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled
in favor of the City.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed
infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause
which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or
seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who
goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene
purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to
freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance
is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates
that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare.
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
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RULING:
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PEOPLE VS LAGUA
JANUARY 31, 2006
FACTS:
Accused Isidro Flores y Lagua was charged with 181 counts of rape
committed against his minor ward. On august 27, 2004 the trial court
rendered judgment finding accused guilty as charged and imposed the death
penalty on him for each count of rape.
Accused filed a motion for new trial but same was denied and the
records of the case were ordered transmitted to the CA for its review
pursuant to this courts decision in People vs. Mateo.
For accuseds failure to file his appellants brief despite notice to his
counsel, the CA declared his appeal as abandoned and dismissed.
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ISSUE:
RULING:
Yes. Review by the CA of the trial courts judgment imposing the death
penalty is automatic and mandatory. It is mandatory and leaves the
reviewing court without any option.
FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated January 9, 2002 and its Resolution dated June
26, 2002, dismissing petitioners Second Amended Complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-99-36483 filed in Branch 223 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City.
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ISSUES:
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RULING:
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same. The Order of the trial court dated January 3, 2001 denying
respondents motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint was
received by the respondent on January 16, 2001. Respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration on January 18, 2001 which was denied on February 28,
2001. Respondent received the order denying its motion for reconsideration
on March 27, 2001. On the same day, it filed a Notice to File Petition for
Certiorari. On April 2, 2001, the petition for certiorari was filed with the
Court of Appeals. Clearly, the same was timely filed hence the appellate
court correctly entertained the same.
FACTS:
The Civil Service Commission (petitioner) via the present petition for
mandamus seeks to compel the Department of Budget and Management
(respondent) to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the
same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the
constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.
By petitioners claim, the amount of P215,270,000.00 was appropriated for
its Central Office by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2002, while the
total allocations for the same Office, if all sources of funds are considered,
amount to P285,660,790.44.1 It complains, however, that the total fund
releases by respondent to its Central Office during the fiscal year 2002 was
only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of
P5,807,392.30.
To petitioner, this balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the
basis of its "no report, no release" policy whereby allocations for agencies
are withheld pending their submission of the documents mentioned in
Sections 3.8 to 3.10 and Section 7.0 of National Budget Circular No. 478 on
Guidelines on the Release of the FY 2002 Funds
ISSUE:
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RULING:
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
How many votes are needed for the Commission on Election En Banc
to reach a decision. Whether or not 3 is the majority vote of all its members.
RULING:
For the foregoing reasons then, this Court hereby abandons the
doctrine laid down in Cuaand holds that the COMELEC En Banc shall decide
a case or matter brought before it by a majority vote of "all its
members," and NOT majority of the members who deliberated and
voted thereon.
WHEREFORE, private respondents motion for reconsideration is hereby
DENIED.
YENKO VS GUNGON
G.R. NO. 165450
AUGUST 13, 2009
FACTS:
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ISSUES:
RULING:
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FACTS:
On October 20, 1999, the grant of this rice subsidy and health care
allowance in the total amount of P4,350,000.00 was disallowed in audit
under Notice of Disallowance No. 99-001-STF (98), stating that R.A. No.
8292 does not provide for the grant of said allowance to employees and
officials of the university.
BSU requested the lifting of the disallowance with the COA Regional
Office but it was denied in COA-CAR Decision No. 2000-3 dated 26 January
2000. Citing Section 55 (2) of R.A. No. 8522 or the General Appropriation
Act of 1998, it held that a non-existent item, project, activity, purpose, or
object of expenditure cannot be funded by augmentation from savings or by
the use of appropriations. It further held that the grant of said allowances
lacked statutory basis, transgressed the constitutional proscription on
additional, double, or indirect compensation and ran counter to the
provisions of the Salary Standardization Law.
BSU thereafter filed a Petition for Review of Decision No. 2000-3 with
the COA, which petition was denied in Decision No. 2003-1125 dated 17 July
2003. The Commission ratiocinated:
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ISSUES:
RULING:
No, BSU is not authorized to grant health care allowance and rice
subsidy to its employees. The granting of health care allowance and rice
subsidy to its employees is a clear violation of Section 8, Article IX-B of the
1987 Philippine Constitution. This provision states that:
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive
additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically
authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of Congress, any
present, emolument, office or title of any kind from any foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional,
double or indirect compensation. The allowances given by BSU to its
employees are considered double compensation because these are beyond
the benefits and allowances provided by the Salary Standardization Law.
Furthermore, COA correctly ruled that the "other programs/projects" under
R.A. No. 8292 and its Implementing Rules should be of the same nature as
instruction, research, and extension. In BSU's case, the disbursements were
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for rice subsidy and health care allowances which are, in no way, intended
for academic programs similar to instruction, research, or extension. Section
4 (d) of this law cannot, therefore, be relied upon by BSU as the legal basis
for the grant of the allowances.
No, the employees of BSU should not reimburse the amounts that they
have received from the university. The ruling in Philippine Ports Authority
applies to this case. The BSU employees received the rice subsidy and health
care allowances in good faith since the benefits were authorized by Board
Resolution No. 794, series of 1997. They had no knowledge that the grant of
said benefits lacked statutory basis. Therefore, a refund is unnecessary.
PLANAS VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 167594
MARCH 10, 2006
FACTS:
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On May 13, 2004, Planas filed before the Quezon City Board of
Canvassers a Petition for the Suspension of the Canvassing of Votes in favor
of Defensor who appeared to be leading the congressional race, citing the
above-stated April 15, 2004 memorandum-recommendation of the NCR
Acting Director.
On May 14, 2004, the COMELEC First Division, by Resolution of May
14, 2004, granted Cortiguerras petition and accordingly denied due course
and cancelled Cabochans Certificate of Candidacy and declared invalid
Defensors substitution for her.
On May 15, 2004, Planas counsel submitted to the Quezon City Board
of Canvassers a copy of the above-said May 14, 2004 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division on Cortiguerrass petition and moved that the votes
in favor of Defensor be no longer read. His motion was, however, denied on
the ground that there was yet no order from the COMELEC Central Office
disqualifying Defensor.
Planas thereupon filed on May 17, 2004 with the COMELEC First
Division a Petition for Intervention, and a Most Urgent Petition/ Motion to
Suspend Canvass and Proclamation, invoking said Divisions May 14, 2004
Resolution granting Cortiguerras petition and accordingly denying due
course to Defensors substitution for Cabochan.
Also on May 17, 2004, Defensor was proclaimed as the winning
candidate for the congressional seat of the Third District of Quezon City.
On May 18, 2004, Cabochan filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On
even date, Defensor filed a Motion to Intervene and Motion for
Reconsideration-in-Intervention before the same Division. Both Cabochans
and Defensors motions alleged that, among other things, the First Division
cannot nullify the En Banc Resolution firstly because it has no authority or
jurisdiction to do so, for it is the COMELEC En Banc that has jurisdiction to
set aside a decision of a COMELEC Division; and secondly, because
Commissioners Javier, Borra and Garcillano, who signed the COMELEC First
Division resolution also signed the COMELEC En Banc Resolution of April 20,
2004.
On March 11, 2005, the COMELEC En Banc issued the challenged
Resolution reversing the May 14, 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division.
Hence, the present petition of Planas (hereinafter referred to as
petitioner), he arguing that the COMELEC En Banc acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
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RULING:
Petitioner argues that since the COMELEC First Division May 14, 2004
Resolution invalidating the Certificates of Candidacy of Cabochan and
Defensor did not attain finality before the May 10, 2004 elections because
[said Resolution] was rendered subsequent to the day of the elections, the
COMELEC was never divested of jurisdiction over the case by the mere fact
of the proclamation of Defensor as winner.
Respecting the second issue, petitioner invokes the provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code, specifically Section 250 which requires
notaries public to affix to all acknowledgements taken and certified by
them, according to law, a statement of the date on which their commissions
expire.
The general rule is that the proclamation of a congressional
candidate divests COMELEC of jurisdiction in favor of the HRET. This rule,
however, is not without exception.
In the case at bar, at the time of the proclamation of Defensor who
garnered the highest number of votes, the Division Resolution invalidating
his certificate of candidacy was not yet final, hence, he had at that point in
time remained qualified. Therefore, his proclamation was valid or legal.
Following Mutuc then, as at the time of Defensors proclamation the
denial of his COC due course was not yet final, his proclamation was valid or
legal and as he in fact had taken his oath of office and assumed his duties as
representative, the COMELEC had been effectively divested of jurisdiction
over the case. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
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FACTS:
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RULING:
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PARREO VS COA
G.R. NO. 162224
FACTS:
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monthly pension in accordance with sec. 27 of P.D. 1638 which provides that
a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired
list and his retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner requested for reconsideration but AFP JAGO denied his request.
Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly
pension but on January 9, 2003, COA denied his claim for lack of jurisdiction.
COA ruled that the issue at hand requires the courts as mandated by the
constitution to determine the validity of the law re: P.D. 1638 sec. 27.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but on January 13, 2004, in its
resolution COA denied the motion further ruling that even if assumed
jurisdiction over the claim, petitioners entitlement to the retirement benefits
he was previously receiving must necessarily cease upon the loss of his
Filipino citizenship in accordance with sec. 27 of P.D. 1638 as amended.
Petitioner argued that P.D. 1638, as amended applies prospectively and
should apply only to those who joined the military service after its
effectivity.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
ABS-CBN was granted a franchise which provides that it shall pay a
3% franchise tax and the said percentage tax shall be in lieu of all taxes on
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ISSUE:
Does the in lieu of all taxes provision in ABS-CBNs franchise exempt
it from payment of the local franchise tax?
HELD:
NO. The right to exemption from local franchise tax must be clearly
established beyond reasonable doubt and cannot be made out of inference
or implications.
The uncertainty over whether the in lieu of all taxes provision pertains to
exemption from local or national taxes, or both, should be construed against
Respondent who has the burden to prove that it is in fact covered by the
exemption claimed. Furthermore, the in lieu of all taxes clause in
Respondents franchise has become ineffective with the abolition of the
franchise tax on broadcasting companies with yearly gross receipts
exceeding P10 million as they are now subject to the VAT.
FACTS:
On February 18, 2002, Smart filed a special civil action for declaratory
relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, for the ascertainment of its rights
and obligations under the Tax Code of the City of Davao. Smart contends
that its telecenter in Davao City is exempt from payment of franchise tax to
the City, on the following grounds: (a) the issuance of its franchise under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7294 subsequent to R.A. No. 7160 shows the clear
legislative intent to exempt it from the provisions of R.A. 7160; (b) Section
137 of R.A. No. 7160 can only apply to exemptions already existing at the
time of its effectivity and not to future exemptions; (c) the power of the City
of Davao to impose a franchise tax is subject to statutory limitations such as
the "in lieu of all taxes" clause found in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7294; and (d)
the imposition of franchise tax by the City of Davao would amount to a
violation of the constitutional provision against impairment of contracts.
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On July 19, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition. The
trial court noted that the ambiguity of the "in lieu of all taxes" provision in
R.A. No. 7294, on whether it covers both national and local taxes, must be
resolved against the taxpayer. The RTC ratiocinated that tax exemptions are
construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of
the taxing authority and, thus, those who assert a tax exemption must
justify it with words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical not to be
misinterpreted. On the issue of violation of the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution, the trial court cited Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
v. Marcos, and declared that the citys power to tax is based not merely on a
valid delegation of legislative power but on the direct authority granted to it
by the fundamental law. It added that while such power may be subject to
restrictions or conditions imposed by Congress, any such legislated limitation
must be consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.Smart filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Thus, the
instant case.
ISSUE:
Whether Smart is liable to pay the franchise tax imposed by the City of
Davao.
RULING:
Yes.
On March 27, 1992, Smarts legislative franchise (R.A. No. 7294) took effect.
Section 9 thereof, quoted hereunder, is at the heart of the present
controversy.
The grantee shall file the return with and pay the tax due thereon to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative in
accordance with the National Internal Revenue Code and the return shall be
subject to audit by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Smart argues that it is not covered by Section 137, in relation to Section 151
of R.A. No. 7160, because its franchise was granted after the effectivity of
the said law. We agree with Smarts contention on this matter. The
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II. The "in lieu of all taxes" Clause in R.A. No. 7294
The "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Smarts franchise is put in issue before the
Court. In order to ascertain its meaning, consistent with fundamentals of
statutory construction, all the words in the statute must be considered. The
grant of tax exemption by R.A. No. 7294 is not to be interpreted from a
consideration of a single portion or of isolated words or clauses, but from a
general view of the act as a whole. Every part of the statute must be
construed with reference to the context.
Tax exemptions are never presumed and are strictly construed against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. They can only be
given force when the grant is clear and categorical. However, Congress did
not expressly exempt Smart from local taxes. Congress used the "in lieu of
all taxes" clause only in reference to national internal revenue taxes. The
only interpretation, under the rule on strict construction of tax exemptions,
is that the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Smart's franchise refers only to
national and not to local taxes.
It should be noted that the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in R.A. No. 7294 has
become functus officio with the abolition of the franchise tax on
telecommunications companies.
In support of its argument that the "in lieu of all taxes" clause is to be
construed as an exemption from local franchise taxes, Smart submits the
opinion of the Department of Finance, through the BLGF, dated August 13,
1998 and February 24, 1998, regarding the franchises of Smart and Globe,
respectively. Smart presents the same arguments as the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company in the previous cases already decided by this
Court.
Petitioner likewise argues that the BLGF enjoys the presumption of regularity
in the performance of its duty. It does enjoy this presumption, but this has
nothing to do with the question in this case. This case does not concern the
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regularity of performance of the BLGF in the exercise of its duties, but the
correctness of its interpretation of a provision of law.
Smart gives another perspective of the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Section
9 of R.A. No. 7294 in order to avoid the payment of local franchise tax. It
says that, viewed from another angle, the "in lieu of all taxes" clause
partakes of the nature of a tax exclusion and not a tax exemption. A tax
exemption means that the taxpayer does not pay any tax at all. Smart pays
VAT, income tax, and real property tax. Thus, what it enjoys is more
accurately a tax exclusion.
However, as previously held by the Court, both in their nature and effect,
there is no essential difference between a tax exemption and a tax
exclusion. An exemption is an immunity or a privilege; it is the freedom from
a charge or burden to which others are subjected. An exclusion, on the other
hand, is the removal of otherwise taxable items from the reach of taxation,
e.g., exclusions from gross income and allowable deductions. Consequently,
the rule that a tax exemption should be applied in strictissimi juris against
the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the government applies equally to tax
exclusions.
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Another argument of Smart is that the imposition of the local franchise tax
by the City of Davao would violate the constitutional prohibition against
impairment of contracts. The franchise, according to petitioner, is in the
nature of a contract between the government and Smart.
In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the
exercise of the States power of taxation save only where a tax exemption
has been granted for a valid consideration.
FACTS:
Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo wrote a letter dated July 28, 2003 to the
Civil Service Commission (CSC), requesting the approval of the amendment
of qualification standards for Director II positions in the Central
Administrative Service and Finance and Management Service of the Office of
the Ombudsman. The CSC issued Opinion No. 44, s. 2004 disapproving the
request on the ground that Director II position, being third level eligibility, is
covered by the Career Executive Service. The Office of the Ombudsman,
thus, filed a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside and nullify CSC
Opinion No. 44, s. 2004.
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The Office of the Ombudsman asserts that its specific, exclusive and
discretionary constitutional and statutory power as an independent
constitutional body to administer and supervise its own officials and
personnel, including the authority to administer competitive examinations
and prescribe reasonable qualification standards for its own officials, cannot
be curtailed by the general power of the CSC to administer the civil service
system. Any unwarranted and unreasonable restriction on its discretionary
authority, such as what the CSC did when it issued Opinion No. 44, s. 2004,
is constitutionally and legally infirm.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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Sec. 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other
than the Deputies, shall be appointed by the Ombudsman according to the
Civil Service Law.
To further ensure its independence, the Ombudsman has been vested with
the power of administrative control and supervision of the Office. This
includes the authority to organize such directorates for administration and
allied services as may be necessary for the effective discharge of the
functions of the Office, as well as to prescribe and approve its position
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PANDI VS. CA
G.R. NO. 116850
APRIL 11, 2002
FACTS:
August 9, 1993: Dr. Macacua, Regional Director & Sec. of Health of the
DOH-ARMM issued a Memorandum designatingDr. Pandi (then DOH-ARMM
Assistant Regional Secretary), as OIC of the IPHO-APGH in Lanao del Sur. Dr.
Macacua also designatedDr. Sani (then the Provincial health officer of the
IPHO-APGH) to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office.- September 15, 1993: Lanao del Sur
Provincial Governor issued Office Order NO. 07 designatingDr.Saberas the OIC of the
IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.-Dr. Sanichallenged the Memorandum transferring him in
a complaint filed with the RTC claiming therein that he was appointed as provincial
health officer of the IPHO-APGH in a permanent capacity.-Dr. Saberfiled a petitioner
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for quo warranto with a prayer for preliminary injunction, claiming that he is lawfully
designated OIC of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. The CA issued a TRO enjoining Pandi
from further discharging his functions as OIC of the IPHO-APGH.-Dr. Sanifiled a
Motion for Intervention.- November 6, 1993: After President Ramos issued E.O. 133
transferring the powers & functions of the DOH in the region to the Regional
Government of ARMM, Dr. Macacua (as DOH-ARMM Sec.-Designate) issued a2nd
Memorandumreiterating the designation of Dr. Pandi as OIC of the
IPHO-APGH and thedetail of Dr. Sani to the Regional office in
Cotabato City.-Drs. Pandi & Macacua sought the dismissal of Dr. Sabers petitioner
on the ground that the issues therein had become moot & academic because of the
enactment of the ARMM Local Government Code, as well as the execution of the Memo
of agreement between the DOH-National Government and the ARMM Regional
Government.
-CA:designation of Dr. Saber as OIC of IPHO-APGH upheld; the Provincial Governor
has the power to appoint the provincial health officer under the LGC of 1991; Dr. Sani
cannot claim to have permanent designation as provincial health officer because he
was not appointed by the Provincial Governor.
ISSUE:
WON the Provincial Governor can designate the OIC of the IPHO-APGH (WON
the appointment of Saber is valid) at that time.
HELD:
No. When Saber was appointed by the provincial governor on September 15,
1993, the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur was still a national government
official paid entirely from national funds. The provincial health officer was still
appointed by the national Secretary of Health to a region and not to a
province. The Secretary of Health exercised supervision and control over the provincial
health officer. The Secretary of Health was also the official authorized by law to assign
the provincial health officer to any province within the region. Indisputably, on
September 15, 1993, Provincial Governor Mutilan had no power to designate Saber as
Officer-in-Charge of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Consequently, the designation of
Saber as such Officer-in-Charge is void.- The provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur
became a provincial government official only after the effectivity of the ARMM Local
Code, which was enacted by the Regional Assembly on January 25, 1994 and
approved by the Regional Governor on March 3, 1994. Prior to the ARMM Local Code
but after the issuance of Executive Order No. 133, the Regional Governor appointed
the provincial health officer while the Regional Secretary of Health could assign the
provincial health officer to any province within the ARMM. The Provincial Governor
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FACTS:
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ISSUE:
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HELD:
The mandatory review by this Court is only required for cases where
the penalty imposed is death. Where the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a review of the trial court
decision is conducted only when the accused files a notice of appeal. Neither
the Decision of this Court in Mateo nor the abolition of the death penalty has
changed this. As the penalty imposed by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals in the case at bar is reclusion perpetua, the review by this Court is
not mandatory and, therefore, the accused-appellants can validly withdraw
their appeal.
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