Renato Cayetano vs Christian Monsod
Generally,
Posted on November 27, 2012
201 SCRA 210
G.R. No. 100113
September 3, 1991
Facts:
Christian Monsod was nominated by then President Corazon C. Aquino as chairman
of the COMELEC. Cayetano questioned the appointment for Monsod allegedly
lacked the necessary qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for
at least 10 years.
The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.However,
a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
It was established that after graduating from the College of Law and hurdling the Bar,
respondent worked in his fathers law office for a short while, then worked as an
Operations Officer in the World Bank Group for about 2 years, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans, and coordinating
legal, economic and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines, he
worked with the Meralco Group, served as Chief Executive Officer of an investment
bank and has subsequently worked either as Chief Executive Officer or Consultant of
various companies.
Issue
1. Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC.
2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of
discretion in confirming Monsods appointment.
Held
1. YES. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in courtIn general, all advice
to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an
appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a
creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held
to constitute law practice.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice
of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. In general, a practice of law
requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court.
A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . . . for valuable
consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as
an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner,
referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to
settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages
in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged
in the practice of law.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been
paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than 10 years. Atty. Monsods
past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec
Chairman by the president is mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment
is essentially within the discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition
that the appointee should possess the qualification required by law. From the
evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective power since there
is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.
PRIMITIVO ANSAY, ETC., ET AL. vs. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ET AL
G.R. No. L-13667 April 29, 1960
FACTS: On July 25, 1956, appellants filed against appellees in the Court of First
Instance of Manila a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the years 1954
and 1955. The lower court citing article 142 of the Civil Code granted appellees
motion to dismiss holding that the grant of a bonus is not a legal duty but a moral
obligation and that the court has no power to compel a party to comply with a moral
obligation.
A motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this appeal.
Appellants contend that there exists a cause of action in their complaint because their
claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law as a natural obligation.
ISSUE: Whether or not courts may compel performance of natural obligations?
HELD: No. Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or
natural. Civil obligations are a right of action to compel their performance. Natural
obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not
grant a right of action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary
fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been delivered
or rendered by reason thereof.
It is thus readily seen that an element of natural obligation before it can
be cognizable by the court is voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly
retention can be ordered but only after there has been voluntary performance. But here
there has been no voluntary performance. In fact, the court cannot order the
performance.
From the legal point of view a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable
obligation. It is so when it is made a part of the wage or salary compensation.
(Philippine Education Co. vs. CIR and the Union of Philippine Education Co.,
Employees (NUL) (92 Phil., 381; 48 Off. Gaz., 5278)
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) v. Adil, Confesor and Villafuerte,
et al., G.R. No. L-48889, 11 May 1989.
19MAR
[GANCAYCO, J.]
FACTS: On February 10, 1940 spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte
obtained an agricultural loan from the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (AIB), now
the Development of the Philippines (DBP), in the sum of P2,000.00, Philippine
Currency, as evidenced by a promissory note of said date whereby they bound
themselves jointly and severally to pay the account in ten (10) equal yearly
amortizations. As the obligation remained outstanding and unpaid even after the lapse
of the aforesaid ten-year period, Confesor, who was by then a member of the Congress
of the Philippines, executed a second promissory note on April 11, 1961 expressly
acknowledging said loan and promising to pay the same on or before June 15, 1961.
The trial court ordered the spouses to pay the loan but this was reversed on appeal.
ISSUE#1: Does prescription operate to discharge a debt even if it there was
acknowledgment of the debtor?
ISSUE#2: Is the conjugal partnership of Confesor and Villafuerte bound by the
execution of the second promissory note?
HELD#1: NO.
This is not a mere case of acknowledgment of a debt that has prescribed but a new
promise to pay the debt. The consideration of the new promissory note is the pre-
existing obligation under the first promissory note. The statutory limitation bars the
remedy but does not discharge the debt. A new express promise to pay a debt barred
will take the case from the operation of the statute of limitations as this proceeds
upon the ground that as a statutory limitation merely bars the remedy and does not
discharge the debt, there is something more than a mere moral obligation to support a
promise, to wit a pre-existing debt which is a sufficient consideration for the new
the new promise; upon this sufficient consideration constitutes, in fact, a new cause
of action.
HELD#2: YES.
Under Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. As such administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal
partnership. No doubt, in this case, respondent Confesor signed the second promissory
note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence the conjugal partnership is
liable for this obligation.