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The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and Its Consequences On The International Relations
The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and Its Consequences On The International Relations
The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late December 1979 to support the communist
regime they implemented in 1978 which faced both inner and outer troubles. This
invasion brought a shift in international relations that turned against Moscow and started
a new phase of the Cold War. After almost 10 years of Dtente, the invasion of
Afghanistan stopped neatly the Soviet-US rapprochement and rather pushed both sides to
undertake a military buildup in Europe. Moreover, the Soviet influence over the non-
aligned and Third World countries had considerably reduced afterwards. In addition, the
conflict provided a fertile ground to Islamic movements. In spite of the social and
economic issues in the USSR that existed prior to the invasion, the Afghan events
progressively increased the pressure Moscow was facing both in the domestic and
international realms.
I chose this particular focus because international relations are relevant and useful in
providing explanations to the events occurring on the following decade in Europe and in
start in East-West confrontations after a decade of Dtente. The fact that Moscow has
invaded a pacific country outside USSR after previous tests in Angola and Ethiopia
shows that the Soviets are still seeking to impose their ideology through military
strength.1 Furthermore, the Soviet Union seems to have reached a turning point, having
depart[ed] from long standing policy of caution and now us[ing] its own forces to annex
2
a nation not previously regarded as part of the Soviet Empire. After their moves in
Africa, together with Cubans, which caused little protest in the West, Soviets felt that the
Moreover, what distinguishes this invasion from the previous operations is that it now
contravenes with the operational code of the Cold War based on shared perception of
power.3 The recent events in Iran were also an argument for the proponents of the
favorable gains the Soviets were making, even indirectly, against capitalism. This is
perhaps why the international reactions to the invasion came quickly and strongly from
the West, but also from the Third World, both in ways that surprised Moscow.
1
The Danger: A new Cold War, Toronto Star, January 5 1980, p.B6.
2
Experts see soviets peace moves after Afghanistan, Toronto Star, January 22 1980, p.A8.
3
War or Peace?, Sunday Star, January 27 1980, P. A10.
3
Third World severe criticism towards USSR is regarded as a gain for the West, especially
because Moscow had tried for a long time to establish ties with African and Asian
countries. Now, because of the invasion, all its gains vanish and the Kremlin appears to
4
be isolated on the international stage. The sole states that have defended the Soviet
Union against a US-led condemnation at the UN are East Germany and Viet Nam.5
Moreover, many countries now fear a similar treatment on their own land if they dont
comply with the Kremlins will. Moscow, which attacked a small state that neither
represented a threat to its interests nor represented the Western camp, is increasingly seen
by the Third World countries as a deliberate aggressor more than a liberator of peoples
oppressed by capitalism.
The invasion has thus operated a shift in relations between the Superpowers and the non-
aligned states, raising doubt on Moscows dominance over these states and alienating
most of them.6 It even pushes most of the Third World countries to request aid from the
West, which is now regarded as a friend and possible ally. 7 The situation is similar in
the Muslim World, [w]here just a month ago, the Americans were the helpless target
(...), today the Moslem countries are virtually united in their anti-Soviet fury. 8
4
US sanctions make sense, Sunday Star, January 13 1980, P. A8.
5
Third World turns on Soviets, Toronto Star, January 10 1980, P.A8.
6
Ibid.
7
US sanctions make sense, Sunday Star, January 13 1980, P. A8.
8
Ibid.
4
The unprecedentedness of the soviet move in Afghanistan makes the Western countries
concerned about the eventuality of further aggressions in this region of Wests crucial
strategic interests. This is especially concerning in the case of Pakistan and Iran, with the
thus have dramatic consequences. The situation is alarming for West precisely because of
the uncertainness of the Soviets intentions.9 In this new phase of the Cold War, the
invasion reflects the Soviet reaction to American policy and the plight of Soviet-
American relations.10 In response, the US will install their nuclear missiles in Western
Europe. 11
In Europe, USSR had its hands tied and therefore tried to exploit weaknesses and breach
elsewhere in order to keep the revolution alive. Russia, with its lack of economic power,
has come to see the military as a mean to take pride of place in the Soviet grand
strategy.12 An important concern for the US is therefore to deter the Soviet Union from
progressively removing the legal barriers that prevented it from (legally) providing
9
Experts see soviets peace moves after Afghanistan, Toronto Star, January 22 1980, p.A8.
10
Ibid.
11
Afghanistan could become Moscows own Vietnam, Toronto Star, January 2 1980, P. A8.
12
Assessing the costs of the soviet invasion, Sunday Star, April 20 1980, P.B4
13
Weve been through crisis before, Sunday Star, January 27 1980, P. A10.
14
UN initiative aims at Soviet troops pull-out, Toronto Star, January 4 1980, P.A12.
5
Another consequence of the invasion is the apparent rapprochement between China and
the United States. At the UN, China requested the immediate withdrawal of Soviets
troops.15 For the first time, a US minister of Defense had gone to China and was invited
to inspect a combat tanks canons in January 1980.16 This anecdote illustrates how
despite sensitive topics, such as Taiwan or the human rights, which still divide the two
countries, President Carter seems to have chosen its side and decided to be not only anti-
17
Soviet, but pro-Chinese. Both countries agreed to coordinate their efforts to improve
the defenses of the neighbor countries of Afghanistan.18 However, because of the several
an actual rapprochement.
For the Soviets, the operation in Afghanistan was a totally justified act of assistance done
to preserve the democratic system established in the aftermaths of the 1978 April
Revolution. Therefore, the provision of troops on the ground was a move of comradeship
upon the request of the Afghan government and made without a single grain of
15
China, Pakistan blast Moscow in a UN confrontation, Sunday Star, January 6 1980, P.A6.
16
Soviet aggression brings US and China together, Sunday Star, January 13 1980, P.A8.
17
Ibid.
18
Soviet aggression brings US and China together, Sunday Star, January 13 1980, P.A8.
6
avarice.19 However, they expected the United States to seek a pretext to revive the
for this, real or imagined. 21 Thus, the Soviets did not trust the United States, which had
not ratified the SALT II agreement yet, and accused it of breaking the peaceful
coexistence Moscow had been trying to build for a decade.22 In the need of preserving
the ideals established by the 1978 Revolution, which both the United States and China
attempt to combat, the Kremlin had no other choice that using military actions in
23
Afghanistan. It was a question of survival of the Afghan communist regime while the
Western powers, besides China, were trying to pursue aggression by sending weapons
The Western countries willingness to apply sanctions against the Soviet Union is a
tangible proof of their attempt to destabilize Moscow and to discredit the communist
regime. It was suspected that the divisions within the Western Camp would avoid the
Soviets to face a united front of western sanctions after the invasion, allowing them to
maneuver without great fear of destabilizing their foreign relations. Although the Soviets
19
Minutes of the Meeting of the CPSU CC Plenum on the situation in Afghanistan, 23 June 1980, June
23, 1980, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RGANI (formerly TsKhSD).
20
Minutes of the Meeting of the CPSU CC Plenum on the situation in Afghanistan, 23 June 1980, June
23, 1980, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RGANI (formerly TsKhSD).
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Soviet Foreign Ministry Circular to Soviet Ambassadors on the Situation in Afghanistan, Instructions
for Meeting with Heads of Government, December 27, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital
Archive.
7
25
Afghanistan, they thought the rest of the World would be divided. Some momentum in
the US and other countries press tries to hide the divisions of the West.26
Three weeks after the invasion, Soviets are satisfied with the disordered international
response towards the Soviet Union. They interpret the lack of unity in NATO regarding
27
measures against them as evidence they had acted in a good way. Moreover, the fact
that many Western countries and members of NATO have not followed the US-led
towards USSR. This split in the international community towards the USSR was seen as
even stronger during the UN General Assembly, when a motion condemning the soviet
aggression was proposed. Although 104 delegations voted for the condemnation of the
events in Afghanistan, many voted without soul and 48 abstained and voted against.28
This indicates how the US influence at the United Nations had declined. In addition,
Canada, Argentina and Brazil do not agree on which sanctions should be applied against
29
the Soviet Union. The latter of these three countries has even undertaken a massive
25
Excerpt from Politburo Meeting on Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, March 18, 1979, History and
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, p.84.
26
Ibid.
27
CC CPSU Politburo transcript (excerpt), January 17, 1980, History and Public Policy Program Digital
Archive, p.42-44.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Report on the talks of Gyula Horn, representative of the HSWP CC Foreign Department in The
United States and Canada, January 23, 1980, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive,
National Archives of Hungary.
8
The introduction of Soviet troops may have, on the long-run, negative effects on Soviet
Unions foreign policy. The consequences of facing NATO on one side and China on the
other at the same time may brings significant damage to the Soviet Unions interests, as
opposed to the little gains made by the Afghan policy so far.31 This is especially true
concerning the effect on Third World, because it has crossed the permissible bounds of
confrontation (). 32
In consequence, the USSRs credibility in the non-aligned
movement is greatly affected. Afghanistan will be isolated and will depend only on the
Soviet Union. Moreover, its neighborhood will increasingly be entangled in an arms race
pushed by both US and China. Then, these two states will also undermine the Soviet
Unions credibility in the Third World and in Europe, where Dtente has failed.
The United States is concerned by its inability to assess Soviets intentions in this crisis,
in which the Soviet Union appears to be seeking to break peaceful relations between both
countries. The Americans emphasized that they could not accept that the Soviet Union
should use its advantage in the sphere of traditional arms outside the borders of the
for the US needs for raw materials." Moreover, Soviets interpreted the Afghan crisis as
31
Some Ideas About Foreign Policy Results of the 1970s (Points)' of Academician O. Bogomolov of the
Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System sent to the CC CPSU and the KGB,
January 20, 1980, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive.
32
Ibid.
9
chance way US used in order to justify long-term foreign policy acts which are hostile to
the Soviet Union and directed at changing the balance of power in their favor.
Soviet original documents and western newspapers articles diverge on many aspects but
converge on the consequences of the invasion in the process of breaking Dtente and the
While the newspaper articles emphasis the breaking from the East-West confrontation
old rules, the documents show that Soviets interpreted very differently the same events.
The contrast is very clear on the meaning given to Moscows sending of troops in
Afghanistan. In the western newspapers, the terms invasion and attack appear in
almost each article when describing the events. Journalists and analysts make clear that
the purpose of the invasion was to bring Afghanistan under Moscow's firm control in an
imperialist manner. On the other side, the two previous terms are never used to describe
the issue in the original documents: both words ironically appear to refer to US
behaviors against the Soviet Union. Politburo members strikingly insist many times in
on the international reactions. For western journalists, the Third World had criticized
relatively homogenously the Soviet Union, seeing only little opposition on the issue of
It is also interesting to notice that as soon as two or three weeks after the invasion,
western commentators underline that Afghanistan could be Soviet Unions own Viet
Nam while documents do not even refer to any delay. Both sources agree on the fact
that the Western limited protests against soviet intervention in Africa made the Soviet
Although both western newspapers and soviet documents agree that Dtente was over,
that a new phase of military confrontations has started in Europe, they try to lay the
blame on the others camp. Surprisingly, the letter written by a Soviet Academician to
KGB and Politburo warns them about a multitude of dangers would face after the
invasion. This letter contrasts astonishingly with the ambient thoughts inside Kremlin
This papers main findings bear on the very different interpretations the authors had on
the invasion and on the unexpected and undesirable consequences that it had on
Moscows foreign policy, namely the Sino-Rapprochement and the alienation of Third
World. Even in the very first month after it occurrence, Moscows power of influence and
It would be relevant to investigate how further reactions in the Muslim world have
unfolded for the past 40 years and lead to the Islamic terrorist actions, in both the former
Soviet and Western worlds. Cold War is over, but types of conflicts involving the
Western World have evolved. To understand them, the actions made during the Cold
need to be scrutinized.