OTC-27603-MS

HPHT Well Integrity: Load-Resistance Monitoring and Predictive Analysis

Bibek Das, SafeQ Services; Robello Samuel, University of Houston

Copyright 2017, Offshore Technology Conference

This paper was prepared for presentation at the Offshore Technology Conference held in Houston, Texas, USA, 14 May 2017.

This paper was selected for presentation by an OTC program committee following review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s). Contents of
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Abstract
In recent years, in the post Macondo era, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE)
has come out with proposals and regulations that require monitoring of Deep Water (DW) and High
Pressure/High Temperature (HPHT) wells in real-time. As new wells are being drilled in DW and HPHT
environment, much of this drilling is supported from the Onshore Drilling Centers located onshore miles
away from the offshore field. Real time monitoring (RTM) plays an important role in identifying leading
and lagging indicators of barrier failure. High bandwidth fiber optic cables are now allowing high levels
of communication and real time data.
Predictive Analytics is a natural step to follow RTM. However, the challenge that stills lies ahead is
whether to apply Data-driven prognosis, Model-based prognosis or a fusion approach; and which Machine
Learning Algorithm is best suited to address a specific well barrier reliability issue in HPHT environment.
Producing oil and gas from deepwater reservoirs with pressures greater than 15,000 psi and temperatures
of 350F at the mudline subjects the equipment to major loads. The major loads in HPHT conditions can
be attributed to: (i) heat transfer between hot fluid and equipment leading to lateral expansion/contraction
loads in response to the temperature changes of the fluid; (ii) high collapse pressure due to high formation
pressure; (iii) higher corrosion damage rates under sour conditions, and (iv) tensile loads due to the buoyed
weight.
In light of the new BSEE requirements on load monitoring and data collection for HPHT operations, this
paper discusses the major loads in HPHT conditions, and the different predictive analysis models that are
available. The paper discusses particularly the load-resistance monitoring and predictive analysis approach
with respect to HPHT well integrity. If we monitor the right data, extract the right features, predictive
analytics can identify the integrity issues in advance, and procedures can be implemented to maintain the
barrier integrity, reliability and thus prevent any fluid leakage.

Regulatory Background
The offshore oil and gas industry has been drilling production wells in deeper water. With such deep
water production wells and subsea production systems come the challenges of High Pressure and High
Temperature (HPHT) environment (Pressures greater than 15,000 psia [15 ksi, 103.43 MPa] and temperature
greater than 350 F (177 C). Figure 1 (Wood Group Mustang, 2015) shows the subsea drilling and
production depths the industry has reached as of March 2015. The deepest well was drilled to 10,385ft
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(3,165m) off India. The deepest subsea tree is in Tobago field, US GOM, at 9,627ft (2,934m). The world's
deepest floating facility is the BW Pioneer FPSO in 8,200 ft (2,500m) at Cascade/Chinook, US GOM.

Figure 1Subsea Drilling and Production Depths (Wood Group Mustang, 2015)

In Gulf Mexico (GOM) the regulatory regime and the industry as a whole has been adapting to this
paradigm shift. This is both as a result of the Macondo accident in 2010 and the challenges of designing and
operating subsea production systems in deepwater and HPHT well environment. Some of the significant
regulatory changes and introduction of new technical specifications that the industry witnessed in the last
couple of years are discussed below.

30 CFR Part 250

The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) amended and updated the regulations
regarding oil and natural gas production safety on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) by addressing issues
such as safety and pollution prevention equipment design and maintenance, production safety systems,
subsurface safety devices, and safety device testing. It calls for regulatory oversight of critical equipment
involving production safety systems. New regulations to enhance safety and environmental protection
have been consolidated. These regulations pertain to offshore oil and gas drilling, completions, workovers
and decommissioningon blowout preventer (BOP) and well-control requirements, including incorporation
of industry standards and revision of existing regulations, and adopting reforms in the areas of well
design, well control, casing, cementing, real-time well monitoring, and subsea containment. Subpart G
of 30 CFR Part 250 on Well Operations and Equipment was updated in 2016. Significant changes to
either specification requirement or performance based assessment were included for safe drilling margin
requirement, accumulator systems, BOP inspection and test approach, and real-time monitoring. Subpart H
of 30 CFR Part 250 on Production Safety Systems underwent an overhaul in 2016. Significant changes to
requirements on analysis of critical equipment throughout its life, design verification and test requirements
were included.
Real time monitoring (RTM) plays an important role in identifying leading and lagging indicators
of barrier failure. In recent years, in the post Macondo era, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement (BSEE) has come out with proposals and regulations that requires monitoring of Deep Water
(DW) and High Pressure/High Temperature (HPHT) wells in real-time. As new wells are being drilled in
DW and HPHT environment, much of this drilling is supported from the Onshore Drilling Centers located
OTC-27603-MS 3

onshore miles away from the offshore field. High bandwidth fiber optic cables are now allowing high levels
of communication and real time data.

API 17TR8: High-pressure High-temperature Design Guidelines

API 17TR8 provides design guidelines for oil and gas subsea equipment utilized in HPHT environments
(Pressures greater than 15,000 psia [15 ksi, 103.43 MPa] and temperature greater than 350 F (177 C). It
provides design guidelines for pressure-containing components, seals and fastener components that come
in contact with or are immediately adjacent to wellbore fluids operating at HPHT conditions.

HPHT Background
The last couple of decades witnessed major HPHT plays in GOM. As shown in Figure 2 (US EIA, 2016) the
Lower Tertiary and the Jurassic fields have experienced the most technical challenges due to the combination
of water depth, well depth, high temperature, high pressure, and geological features of the subsalt. These
projects are located in the deepest water depth, which results in the highest well costs of the GOM at about
$230MM (US EIA, 2016).

Figure 2Water depth and well depth by major play in GOM (US EIA, 2016)

Producing oil and gas from deepwater reservoirs with pressures greater than 15,000 psi and temperatures
of 350F at the mudline subjects the equipment to major loads. The major loads in HPHT conditions can
be attributed to: (i) heat transfer between hot fluid and equipment leading to lateral expansion/contraction
loads in response to the temperature changes of the fluid; (ii) high collapse pressure due to high formation
pressure; (iii) higher corrosion damage rates under sour conditions, and (iv) tensile loads due to the buoyed
weight.
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Different corrosion mechanics in HPHT conditions may include Hydrogen sulphide Corrosion, Hydrogen
Induced Cracking (HIC), Stress corrosion cracking (SCC), Sulphide Stress Corrosion Cracking etc.
Presence of H2S in the fluid downhole will result in Hydrogen Induced Stress Corrosion Cracking/Sulphide
Stress Corrosion Cracking. In high-tensile steel casings, for example, the rate of crack propagation is high.
The crack propagation rate is also influenced by partial pressure of hydrogen, high temperatures and lower
pH values. In low pH environment the atomic hydrogen is reduced to H2 molecule faster.
HPHT operating conditions present us with unique challenges on selection of material for the equipment.
High pressure, temperature, sour environment presents us with a unique combination of fatigue stress,
corrosion, and other failure mechanisms that calls for material verification and validation. The hazards
analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) should identify these failure mechanisms. The
ultimate goal is to increase the capacity as compared to the load presented by HPHT conditions (Figure 3)
so as to reduce the probability of failure.

Figure 3Load, Resistance and Failure Probablity

Table 1Hydrogen Induced Stress Corrosion Cracking Factors

Influencing factor Description

Acidic fluid In low pH environment the atomic hydrogen is reduced to H2 molecule faster.

High concentration of H2S results in hydrogen uptake (high hydrogen partial pressure) in stress
Partial Pressure
concentration areas that embrittles the metal surface.1

Mechanical stress Tensile loads due to the buoyed weight.

Because the solubility of hydrogen increases at higher temperatures, raising the temperature can increase
Temperature
the diffusion of hydrogen. The effect of temperature on both the corrosion rate and the scale retention rate

Real-Time Monitoring
The Deepwater Horizon disaster in April 2010 resulted in many investigations and audits of MMS's Offshore
Safety Program with recommendations for potential areas of improvement. One such report was the DOI
OIG report (No. CR-EV-MMS-0015-2010, that recommended "Analyze the benefits of obtaining electronic
access to real-time data transmitted from offshore platforms/drilling rigs, such as operators' surveillance
cameras and BOP monitoring systems, and/or other automated control and monitoring systems to provide
BOEMRE with additional oversight tools."
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BSEE's RTM initiative led to the workshop report on Application of Real-Time Monitoring of Offshore
Oil and Gas Operations in 2015. One of the findings of the repor was that "During drilling operations,
remote monitoring centers can focus on abnormal trends or well events, providing an additional "set of
eyes" for the rig, offering advice, support, and improved access to onshore technical experts; this allows rig
personnel to concentrate on drilling operations. If rig personnel encounter operational issues that require
assistance, RTM makes it possible to collaborate with specialists onshore, without the need to fly them out
to the rig. Remote centers can also check the incoming information stream for valid and reliable data, which
allows the development of a knowledge base and additional post-processing data analysis." (Transportation
Research Board 2015 Executive Committee, 2015).
30 CFR Part 250 will require gathering and monitoring real-time well data using an independent,
automatic, and continuous monitoring system capable of recording, storing, and transmitting data regarding
the following:
i. The BOP control system;
ii. The well's fluid handling system on the rig; and
iii. The well's downhole conditions with the bottom hole assembly tools (if any tools are installed).
The operator will be required to develop and implement a real-time monitoring plan, which along with all
real-time monitoring data, must be made available to BSEE upon request. This plan must also include actions
to be taken if any real-time monitoring capabilities or communications between rig and onshore personnel
are lost, and a protocol for response to any significant and/or prolonged interruption of monitoring or
onshore-offshore communications, including the operator's protocol for notifying BSEE of any significant
and/or prolonged interruptions.

HPHT Well Integrity, Drilling Integrity and Downhole Monitoring

To ensure well integrity in HPHT environment demands not only the application of new technologies but
also stricter safety procedures and dependable equipment and systems from bottom-hole to the drilling rig.
Industry Standards like NORSOK D-10 and API 65, and recommended practices like API RP 96 have
defined well integrity and given a high level overview on its significance. However, the questions that still
lie in front of us are (1) how to implement well barrier engineering in the performance metrics to make
real time decisions, and (2) how to integrate various aspects of the formation, well condition, new drilling
technologies and technologically advanced drilling rigs to ensure well integrity.
The use of RTM in HPHT well integrity and drilling integrity will require downhole monitoring and data
analysis. The data collected may include pressure, hydraulic, torque, tension, and temperature. Monitored
data can also include fluid dynamics and pressures, mud flow and quantity and density, and mud temperature
and properties. Data collected is not only the measured data but also calculated data. Calculated data may
include hydrostatic pressure, pore pressure, and equivalent circulating density (ECD).
The significance of monitoring real-time loads on well barriers and the resistance or strength of barriers
can be understood using general load-capacity concept (Figure 3) of mechanical component design. The
load uncertainty in Figure 3 represents the dynamic conditions that the HPHT systems are exposed to and
the capacity uncertainty represents the variation of strength of the equipment in HPHT service with time.
The probability of failure is based on the probability of load exceeding capacity. Eq. 1 (Das & Samuel,
2015) shows the expected probability of failure, F:
Eq.(1)
The expected probability of success or the expected reliability, R, is calculated as:
Eq.(2)
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Based on the load-capacity model, failure occurs whenever the load exceeds capacity of the system.
There are two sequential processes involved in HPHT equipment failure: damage initiation and damage
growth. The parameters such as pressure, temperature, presence of H2S, pH level, etc. are influenced by
geology and geography of well location. Additionally, general well path, casing design, drillstring design,
bit-size, coupling and pipe selections also play an important role in both damage initiation and damage
growth processes. During well construction, corrosion should be an important factor to be considered
and the usage of corrosion-resistant materials specified where malignant conditions are anticipated during
the well life. Corrosion inhibitors can be used after well construction. Nevertheless, certain degree of
corrosion is potentially unavoidable and may be a determining factor in the life of a well. In addition to
external parameters, the material design characteristics to withstand different loading conditions (tensile
stresses during drilling) and corrosive environment (presence of H2S) for long term are equally vital. The
identification of different inherent and external factors for each failure is essential to achieve effective
damage growth modeling. This can only be achieved by RTM.
Figure 4 shows an example of how RTM can provide data to monitor failure characteristics related to
each failure, and be used in identifying leading indicators for each failure.

Figure 4Potential Controllable Factors and RTM

New Technology Qualification: Risk Management and Reliability Assurance

HPHT environment also demands new technology and material. This has led the industry to apply both
prescriptive rules and performance based approaches. One of the key objectives of the performance-based
approach is to demonstrate the implementation of appropriate controls to manage the risk and reliability
assurance of critical system/sub-system/equipment. The identification of critical equipment is an integrated
process of managing the risks. Hazard Identification studies (HAZID), Hazard and Operability studies
(HAZOP), Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and Layer of Protection Analysis
(LOPA) can be used to identify the safety critical equipment whose failure will cause or contribute
substantially to a major accident or the purpose of which is to prevent or limit the effect of a major accident.
Such risk assessment methods can be helpful in determining the variables to be monitored.
OTC-27603-MS 7

Figure 5New Technology Qualification - What are we trying to achieve?

Predictive Analytics
Predictive Analytics is a natural step to follow RTM. However, the challenge that stills lies ahead is whether
to apply Data-driven prognosis, Model-based prognosis or a fusion approach; and which Machine Learning
Algorithm is best suited to address a specific well barrier reliability issue.
Well integrity assurance in HPHT operations demands not only the application of new technologies but
also stricter safety procedures and dependable equipment and systems from bottom-hole to the drilling rig.
Industry Standards like NORSOK D-10 and API 65, and recommended practices like API RP 96 have
defined well integrity and given a high level overview on its significance. However, the questions that still
lie in front of us are how to implement well barrier engineering in the performance metrics to make real time
decisions, and how to integrate various aspects of the formation, well condition, and different operations
to ensure well integrity.
There are four main prognosis approaches (Figure 6) to estimate a Well Barrier's Remaining Useful Life
(RUL), which can be used as a measure for system reliability at any given time in the future life of a HPHT
well. These are (1) experience-based prognosis, (2) data-driven prognosis, (3) model-based prognosis and
(4) fusion approach.

Figure 6Hierarchy of Prognostics Approaches

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The experience-based approach considers historical time to failure data which are used to model the
failure distribution. They estimate the life of a component under nominal usage conditions by applying
methods like Weibull analysis. The data-driven approach uses data provided by the sensors to predict future
faults and degradation. The model-based approach depends on the availability of a mathematical model of
system failure which is used to estimate the future evolution of degradation. Data driven approaches can
be used to trend failure rates against time; and can also help to determine inspection frequencies for certain
classes of equipment and can influence future replacement equipment selection.

Figure 7Combining RTM and Historical Data - Damage Growth Modeling Framework

The drawback of using standalone data driven stochastic models is the absence of engineering element of
barrier (for example casing), the formation, and well conditions itself. Also confidence on data, availability
of sufficient data and application limitation of the data driven method employed are some issues that increase
the uncertainty.

Figure 8Conceptual Illustration of Data Driven Approach to estimate Remaining Useful Life

The Physics of failure approach to reliability analysis uses knowledge of degradation processes and the
load profile applied to equipment, material properties and HPHT environmental conditions in which the
OTC-27603-MS 9

equipment is being operated, to identify potential failure mechanisms that individually or in combination
may lead to the barrier failure and loss of well integrity.

Figure 9von Mises Stress and Burst failure (Das & Samuel, 2015)

Figure 10Effect of fluid temperature on tubing (Das & Samuel, 2015)

The Fusion approach uses knowledge about the physical process to make the prediction as well as
information from observed data to make adjustment to the prediction. The industry has yet to utilize the
advantage of a fusion approach. The limitation to successful application includes the need for both robust
data and model.
Regression algorithms are used to predict the failure of casing which is based on the load-capacity model
described in previous section. The binary classification is that of stress levels that the casing is subjected to,
below and above the casing capacity post drilling. Such methods can be applied to build models for stress
level using polynomial relations. Thus we see a combination of classification and regression model being
used to fit the collected data to analyze damage growth.
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Figure 11Correlation of attributes (Das, 2017)

Figure 12Crack growth estimation using Support Vector Regression

Conclusion
In Gulf of Mexico (GOM) the offshore oil and gas industry has been adapting to the paradigm shift of
drilling production wells in HPHT environment. The regulations are also adapting to promote safety with
30 CFR Part 250 that requires gathering and monitoring of real-time well data for HPHT wells. Real time
monitoring (RTM) plays an important role in identifying leading and lagging indicators of barrier failure.
OTC-27603-MS 11

The paper emphasizes the role realtime data, historical operations, failure and maintenance data, along with
Physics of failure models and engineering concepts, will play to better predict integrity issues in advance.
If we monitor the right data, extract the right features, predictive analytics can identify the integrity
issues in advance. The concept of Condition Based Monitoring and Maintenance can be fully realized and
procedures can be implemented in advance, to maintain the barrier integrity, reliability and thus enhance
safety of HPHT drilling, completions and operations.
It should be noted that data on HPHT well operations is critical to not only the monitoring program but
also in anticipating and identifying issues in a timely manner. The accessibility and accuracy of data also
plays an important role in reducing the uncertainties of predictive analysis.

Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Manesha Kachroo (SafeQ Services) for her insights to improve the quality
of the paper. The authors extend thanks to Man Pham (Anadarko) for his insights on regulatory and standards
regime.

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