NAME: _______________________________________ DATE: __________________ PERIOD: ______

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Federalist No. 10 (Excerpts)
The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
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To the People of the State of New York: divided mankind into parties, inflamed them
! with [dislike for each other], and [made] them
AMONG the numerous advantages promised much more [likely to anger and harm] each
by a well-constructed Union, none [is other than to cooperate for their common
stronger] than its tendency to break and good. . . .
control the violence of faction. !
! The inference to which we are brought is,
By a faction, I understand a number of that the causes of faction cannot be removed;
citizens, whethera majority or a minority of and that relief is only to be sought in the
the whole, who are united and [motivated] by means of controlling its effects.
some common impulse of passion, or of !
interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, [It] may be concluded that a pure democracy,
or to the permanent and [shared] interests of by which I mean a society consisting of a small
the community. number of citizens, who [all come together to
! govern themselves], can [provide] no cure for
There aretwo methods of removing the the mischiefs of faction. . . .
causes of faction: the one, by destroying the !
liberty which is essential to its existence; the A Republic, by which I mean a Government in
other, by giving to every citizen the same which the [people elect others to represent
opinions, the same passions, and the same them] opens a different prospect, and promises
interests. the cure for which we are seeking
! !
[This first method of removing the cause of a The two great points of difference between a
faction is worse]. Liberty is to faction what air democracy and a republic are: first, the
is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly [entrusting] of the government, in [a republic],
expires. But it [would be more ridiculous] to to a small number of citizens elected by the
abolish liberty, which is essential to political rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens,
life, [simply] because it nourishes faction, than and greater [part] of country, over which [a
it would be to wish the [removal] of air, which republic governs]. . . .
is essential to animal life, [just] because it !
[gives] fire its destructive agency. [Thus] the influence of [factions] may kindle a
! flame within their particular States, but will be
[The second option] is as [impractical], as the unable to spread a general [fire] through the
first [is] unwise. As long as the reason of man other States. A rage forany improper or
continuesand he is at liberty to excercise it, wicked project, will be less [likely] to pervade
different opinions will be formedThe the whole body of the union, than a particular
protection of [this ability to reason freely] is member of [the union]; in the same proportion
the first object of Government. as such a malady is more likely to taint a
! particular county or district, than an entire
Thecauses of faction are thus sown in the State.
nature of man; and we see them everywhere !
brought into different degrees of activity, [T]herefore, we, [the Federalists] behold a
according to the different circumstances of Republican remedy for the diseases most
civil society. A zeal for different opinions incident to Republican Government.
concerning religion, concerning government, !
and many other points, . . . have, in turn, PUBLIUS
RUSH-U1 / F14
NAME: _______________________________________ DATE: __________________ PERIOD: ______
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Federalist No. 51 (Excerpts)
The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the
Different Departments
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[How shall we maintain] in practice the necessary partition of power among the several
departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is . . . by so
contriving the interior structure of the government [so] that its several constituent parts may . . .
be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. . . .
!
In order to lay afoundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of
government, which to a certain extent is admitted [by all] to be essential to the preservation of
liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own . . . [yet] have as little
agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others.
!
[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the othersAmbition must
be made to counteract ambition.
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If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next
place oblige it to control itself. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great
variety of interests, parties and sects which it embraces . . . there [is little reason] to provide . . . a
will independent of the society itself. [T]he larger the society . . . the more duly capable it will be of
self-government.
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PUBLIUS
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Washingtons Farewell Address (Excerpts)
Let me now take a more comprehensive [complete] view, and warn you in the most solemn
manner against the baneful [harmful] effects of the spirit of [political] party generally. . . .
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It [a political party] agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms, kindles
the animosity [ill-will] of one part against another, foments [encourages] occasionally riot and
insurrection [rebellion]. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption. . . . Thus the policy
and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another. . . .
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So likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils.
Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating [allowing] the illusion of an imaginary common
interest in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities [and
transferring into one nation the dislikes] of the other, betrays [tricks] the former into a
participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate . . . justification. It leads also
to concessions [allowances] to the favorite nation of privileges denied to others. . . .
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. . . [F]ree people ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign
influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government.