Proceedings of the IEEE SoutheastCon 2015, April 9 - 12, 2015 - Fort Lauderdale, Florida

Cyber Security for Smart Grid Systems:

Status, Challenges and Perspectives

Danda B. Rawat Chandra Bajracharya
Department of Electrical Engineering Department of Electrical Engineering
Georgia Southern University Georgia Southern University
Statesboro, GA 30460, USA Statesboro, GA 30460, USA
db.rawat@ieee.org cbajracharya@GeorgiaSouthern.edu

AbstractThe transformation of traditional energy networks and power management whereas the last four deal with power
to smart grids revolutionizes the energy industry in terms of and information flows in the smart grid. These domains are

reliability, performance, and manageability by providing bi- connected with each other through secure communication links
directional communications to operate, monitor, and control
power flow and measurements. However, communication net- as shown in Fig. 1.

works in smart grid bring increased connectivity with increased
severe security vulnerabilities and challenges. Smart grid can be
target for cyber terrorism because of its critical nature.
a prime
As a result, smart grid security is already getting a lot of attention
from governments, energy industries, and consumers. There have

been several research efforts for securing smart grid systems in
academia, government and industries. This article provides a

comprehensive study of challenges in smart grid security, which
we concentrate on the problems and proposed solutions. Then, we
outline current state of the research and future perspectives. With

this article, readers can have a more thorough understanding of
smart grid security and the research trends in this topic.
Index
TermsCyber security, Smart Grid, Network Security
in Power Grid, Smart Grid Security.
I. I NTRODUCTION
The integration of electrical distribution system with com-

munication networks forms smart grid where power and
information flow is expected to be bi-directional [1], [2]. Fig. 1. The NIST conceptual model for smart grid [1].

This transformation of traditional energy networks to smart
grids revolutionizes the energy industry in terms of reliability, Smart grid has different components and assets such as

performance, and manageability by providing bi-directional power generations, distributions, consumers, regional control
communications to operate, monitor, and control power flow centers, substations, field devices, communication and net-

and measurements. Furthermore, smart grid is expected to working devices, phase measuring units, protecting relays,
automate the systems with the help of advanced communica- intelligent electronic devices, remote terminal units, human
tion systems.
Along with several benefits the communication machine interfaces, home appliances, circuit breakers, log
networks offers in smart grid, they bring the private power servers, data concentrators, protocol gateway, tap changers,
control
systems to the public communication networks and smart meters, etc. All of these components are connected in
associated security vulnerabilities [1][6]. Smart grid can be a smart grid to operate, monitor, and control power flow and
prime target for cyber terrorism because of its critical nature. measurements. Thus, the legacy cyber-security techniques are
As a result, cyber security for smart grid is getting a lot of not sufficient to meet the cyber security requirement of the
attention from governments, energy industries, and consumers. smart grid and its assets. For instance, consumers are con-

There have been several research efforts for securing smart cerned about their privacy as their lifestyle could be exposed
grid systems in academia, government and industries [6][8]. to malicious users because of compromised data communi-

According to National Institute of Standards and Technol- cation networks. Similarly, Advanced Metering Infrastructure
ogy (NIST) conceptual model for smart grid, communication (AMI), commonly known as the smart meter, could be easily

networks connect power system components as shown in compromised however once they are compromised, it is almost
Fig. 1. There are seven logical domains: Markets, Service impossible to change their passwords (PINs) as these devices
Operations, Bulk Generation, Transmission, Distri-
Provider, do not have their own keyboards to change passwords/PINs.
bution and Customer. The first three deal with data collection Thus, a controller may be needed to deploy new passwords

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 Proceedings of the IEEE SoutheastCon 2015, April 9 - 12, 2015 - Fort Lauderdale, Florida

Generation, operation
and control Sub-station and
Transmission
automatically once it is compromised. Thus, the smart grid Distribution Consumers

systems have unique features, goals and objectives to provide

reliable power supply and robust communications.
This article provides a comprehensive study of challenges in
smart grid security, which we concentrate on the problems and
solutions for cyber attacks and defense solutions. In
proposed
this paper, specifically, we present the following issues:
We outline the different requirements of smart grid sys-
tems and compare them with the traditional Internet. We

then provide network vulnerabilities in the smart grid
systems. It is noted that the most of the cyber attacks in
smart
grid systems are coming through malicious threats
in communication networks. Neighborhood Area Home Area
Wide Area Networks (WAN) Networks (NAN) Networks (HAN)
Because of the nature of the power grid and its impact in

case of blackout, attack detection should be quick so as to Fig. 2. A typical communication framework for smart grid systems.
have uninterrupted power supply. Thus, it is essential to

deploy malicious attack prevention and defense solutions
Examples of WAN include optical fiber networks, WiMAX,
to protect the entire smart grid. Thus, we outline cyber

attacks and respective defense solutions for the smart
and the latest cellular networks (such as 4G/LTE). Smart grid
relies on wired and wireless communication networks, thereby
grid.
inheriting both benefits they offer and security vulnerabilities.
Then we outline current state of the research and future per-
The smart grid has potential of introducing new security
spectives. With this article, readers can have a more thorough
vulnerabilities into the power system and thus different cyber
understanding of smart grid security and the research trends
defense solutions are needed in different levels to safe guard
in this topic.
the entire system.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We
present a background and smart grid architecture in Section A. Features of Smart Grid Networks

II followed by the requirements and objectives of smart grid
The smart grid network is expected to be larger than the
security in Section III. Cyber attacks and defense solutions for
existing Internet and share the somewhat similar architecture.
smart grid systems are presented in Section IV. The challenges
However, there are significant differences between them.
for securing smart grids are presented in Section V followed
by the summary in Section VI. 1) Latency requirements: Internet (network of networks) is
intended to provide data services (sharing files, surfing,
II. BACKGROUND AND C OMMUNICATION N ETWORK etc.) to the users with high speed data rate. However,
A RCHITECTURE FOR THE S MART G RID S YSTEMS smart grid networks are intended for reliable, secure and
Electrical power networks are very complex since, for real-time communication with low latency.
there are over 2000 power distribution substations,
example, 2) Data size and flow: Internet has generally bursty type
over 5500 energy facilities distributed throughout the country, communications however smart grid is expected to be
130 million customers all over the United States [9].
and over bulky [10] and has periodic data communications be-
Typical communication framework for smart grid system is cause of big size of the network and real time commu-
shown in Fig. 2. Home appliances of consumers are connected nication and monitoring requirements [11].
to Home Area Network (HAN) and they report their need and 3) Communication model: In traditional power grids, the
usagepattern of electricity in real-time to control and monitor typical model for communication is one-way where elec-
the real-time power consumption. Smart metering system is tronic devices report their readings to the control center.
composed
of a micro-controller and a communication board to But in smart grid, communication is bi-directional and
communicate with the gateway. Third party who provides elec- real-time.
tricity and manages operations relies on meter readings to pro- 4) Password/PIN update process: In typical Internet, all
vide value-added services for consumers. HAN covers single end/networking devices have keyboards to enter/change
home or business. The HAN could use ZigBee, Bluetooth, Wi- PIN or password. However, in smart grid, end devices

Fi, etc. HANs are connected to Neighborhood Area Network such as smart meter and/or some home appliances might
(HAN) through Neighborhood Area Network (NAN) gateway. not have keyboard to change or enter password/PIN.
NAN covers HANs, sub-stations and distribution systems. Thus smart grid needs some sort of automated process
Note that a HAN could be treated as a single device at NAN as for this to deploy new policies and/or to change pass-
HAN gateway could aggregate the information received from words.
HAN and forward that to NANs. The NANs are connected 5) Layered network architecture: There are different net-
to Wide Area Network (WAN) through NAN gateways. WAN works in smart grid at different levels such as HAN,
covers power generations to transmissions as shown in Fig. 2. NAN and WAN. The HAN works like a node for

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NAN and NAN works like a node for WAN through
their respective gateways. Furthermore, for reliability,
smart grid is expected to use variety of access networks
including wireless, wired and fiber optical networks.
B. Power
Systems Communication Network Protocols
There are various proprietary protocols and few open stan-
dard protocols [12]. Two widely-used communications proto-
cols in power systems are
1) Distributed Networking Protocol 3.0 (DNP3): DNP3
was originally developed by General Electric Inc. that was
made public in 1993. The DNP3 is the predominant standard
used in North American power systems [12], [13]. Physical
layer of the its initial version was based on serial com-
munication protocols (such as RS-232, RS-422, or RS-485).
However, its current version is based on TCP/IP model which
supports recent communication technologies with end-to-end
communications.
2) International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 61850:
IEC 61850 protocol is recently standardized with Ethernet-
based communications for modern power substation automa-
tion by the International Electrotechnical Commission [14].
IEC 61850 was designed to replace DNP3 in smart grid
communications, however, current IEC 61850 is only limited
within a power substation communications. Unlike DNP3,
IEC 61850 built with a series of protocol stacks to support
of services which are time-critical and monitoring.
a variety
Power substation communication deals with a number of time-
critical messages with end-to-end delay of 3 milliseconds to
500 milliseconds.
There
are different types of messages with different require-
ments: Type 1A/P1 and Type 1A/P2 messages have strict
time delay requirements since they are used for fault isolation
and power system protection purposes. The delay requirements
for the Type 1A/P1 type messages is milliseconds and for
the Type 1A/P2 type messages is 10 milliseconds. Next,
the Type 1B/P1 and Type 1B/P2 messages are used for
routine communications among automated components of
power systems. The delay requirements for the Type 1B/P1
message has 100 milliseconds and for the Type 1B/P2 is
20 milliseconds. Similarly, Type 2 and Type 3 messages
for monitoring and readings in substations which
are used
have less time-critical requirements. The delay requirement for
Type 2 is 100 milliseconds whereas it is 500 milliseconds
for Type 3 messages.
III. S MART G RID S ECURITY R EQUIREMENTS AND
O BJECTIVES
Cyber attacks in smart grid systems depend on the several
factors.
Integration of bi-directional communication networks,
incentives to attackers, socioeconomic impact of the blackouts,
etc. Basically, the attack risk in the smart grid system relies
on three factors as shown in Fig. 3. Formally, the risk can be
defined as
Risk = Assets V ulnerabilities T hreats, (1)
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Smart grid Threats
Assets
Risk
Vulnerabilities
Fig. 3. Evaluating the risks in smart grid systems.
where Assets are the smart grid devices (such as smart meters,
substations, data, network devices, etc.), vulnerabilities allow
an attacker to reduce a systems information assurance, and
T hreats are the attacks coming from outside or inside of the
smart grid systems.
In (1), the Risk can be minimized or made zero if one
the quantity on the right side is minimized or made zero.
Note that in smart grid systems, Assets cannot be zero in the
smart grid. T hreats cannot be made zero as they are coming
from unknown places or attackers. Thus, the main goal is to
minimize the V ulnerabilities in the smart grid to minimize
the overall Risk in (1).
A. Security Objectives in the Smart Grid Systems
Objectives of smart grid security is to comply with policies
while securing information using Confidentiality, Integrity and
Availability, also known as the CIA triad. The CIA triad [15]
is a model designed to guide policies for information security
in smart grid systems which is shown in Fig. 4.
y
In t
ali t
e
gr i
nti
ty
de
nfi
Co
Smart Grid Systems,
Assets, and Operations
Availability
Fig. 4. The CIA triad for smart grid security systems.
Confidentiality in the smart grid systems is needed to make
sure that access to information is restricted to only authorized
people and it is designed to prevent unauthorized access. In
other words, it is equivalent to privacy. In smart grid systems
where home appliances are connected to power grids for real-
time bi-directional data communication and electricity flow,
privacy is one of the important issues for the customers. If the
information falls on wrong hand, they can keep track of the
life style of the people, what appliances they use, whether the
people are in there, etc. and misuse the information.
Integrity of information in smart grid is needed to maintain
and assure the accuracy and consistency of data/information.
The information should not be modified in an unauthorized
or undetected manner. This feature helps the smart grid to
provide robust real-time monitoring systems.
Availability in the smart grid implies that the information
must be available to authorized parties when it is needed
without any security compromise. Power systems is expected
to be available 100% of the time, thus data availability
 Proceedings of the IEEE SoutheastCon 2015, April 9 - 12, 2015 - Fort Lauderdale, Florida
also involves preventing denial-of-service attacks leading to
blackouts.
Furthermore, Authenticity is also important in smart grid
as it is important to validate that both parties involved
systems
are who they claim to be. Authenticity of the information can
be verified by using some features such as digital signatures
to give evidence that the message data is genuine.
B. Smart Grid Security Requirements
The cyber security objectives for the smart grid is to
follow CIA triad to guide policies for information security
and provide
robust power supply. In addition to CIA triad, the
NIST report [1], [15], [16] recommends other specific security
requirements for the smart grid including physical security of
grid assets.
1) Self-healing and Resilience Operations in the Smart
Grid: In smart grid systems, communication network is open
as smart grid assets are distributed over large geographical
area. Thus it is challenging to ensure the security in every
single node in the smart grid to be invulnerable to cyber at-
tacks.Thus the smart grid network must have some self-healing
capability against cyber attacks. Network must consistently
perform profiling and estimating to monitor the data flow and
power flow status to detect any abnormal incidents due to
cyber attacks. To make data communication network available
for power system operations, resilience data communication is
essential.
2) Authentication and Access Control: There are millions
of electronics
devices deployed throughout the power systems
and millions of home appliances are connected to smart
meters, authentication is the key process of verifying the
identity of a device or user to protect smart grid systems from
unauthorized access. Furthermore, access control is used in
smart grid to ensure that resources are accessed only by the
appropriate parties that are correctly identified.
3) Communication Efficiency and Security: The smart grid
communication needs to be efficient to support real-time mon-
itoring and secure with self healing cyber defense solutions
to protect from any security attacks. As these features are
contradicting, trade-off between these parameters should be
considered in smart grids.
C. Automated Policy/Password Update Process
Most
of the nodes (e.g., smart meters) in the smart grid
do not have keyboards which makes the process of changing
password/PIN
more difficult. Furthermore, manually changing
passwords in such million devices is not feasible, thus the
smart grid needs an automated process to deploy the policies
and/or passwords in real-time to prevent any attacks.
IV. C YBER ATTACKS AND D EFENSE S OLUTIONS FOR
S MART G RID S YSTEMS
In order to secure the sensitive data and smart grid, the
Fig. 5 shows five important layers that should be considered
when defining cyber security schemes for the smart grid. Data
security is in innermost layer and the WAN security is in the
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outermost layer. Note that cyber attacks could be at any layers
to vandalize the entire smart grid.
Data security
Application Security
HAN level security
NAN level security
WAN level security
Fig. 5. Smart grid security using multiple levels of protection against attacks.
In the following sections, we present classification of attacks
in the smart grid systems.
A. Attack Classifications based on Networks
1) Home Area Networks (HAN) Attacks: Typical HAN
attacks target the home appliances and smart meters. HANs
use wired or wireless connections to provide interface to
smart grid to support consumer awareness of energy consump-
tion and to support demand response functionality in real-
time. However, HAN is vulnerable to security attacks and
the malicious users could use sophisticated attacks through
easily accessible devices such as the smart meters and the
associated communications hardware to interrupt the smart
grid systems. Attackers could easily exploit the vulnerabilities
available within the firmware of HAN devices and use reverse
engineering of devices to attack the grid. Thus all of the known
threats to such a network must be identified and addressed to
avoid any damages caused by cyber vandalism to smart grid
initiated at HAN level. Several approaches have been proposed
in the literature to provide secure and reliable communications
between the smart meter and consumer equipment in HAN
to avoid security attacks. A security framework has been
proposed in [17] which integrates HAN device registration
and enrollment processes into a single network access au-
thentication procedure. This scheme prevents unauthorized
access to HAN by malicious users. A freshness counter based
session key exchange scheme has been proposed in [18] to
ensure defense against replay attacks (also known as playback
attack) between the smart devices inside a house and the
smart meter. This scheme helps prevent smart grid from valid
data being delayed or transmitted repeatedly by malicious
or fraudulent users. A scheme is proposed in [19] where
security labels are used for data packets and enforce the
information flow policy to avoid attacks in the grid through
HAN. Other security mechanisms includes frequency hopping
in wireless, dynamic security key management, advanced
encryption schemes, intrusion prevention systems, intrusion
detection systems, authentication and authorization.
2) Neighborhood Area Network (NAN) Attacks: Typical
NAN attacks target the power sub-station and distribution cen-
ters. The NAN interfaces HAN with WAN in smart grid and
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attacks could be coming directly through power substations or
through HAN gateways. Thus protecting NAN is important to
protect the entire smart grid. A intrusion detection framework
proposed in [20] where cyber attacks are detected at
has been
NAN level with the help of NAN intrusion detection system
(IDS) using support vector machine (SVM) and artificial
intelligent schemes. A 4-way handshaking mechanism has
been proposed in [21] to establish secure links before smart
grid assets start their communications. Note that HAN devices
should be limited to communicating only with a HAN manager
application within the meter to minimize cyber attacks.
3) Wide Area Network (WAN) Attacks: WAN attacks are
targeted to power generation and control devices. Note that
WAN infrastructures may be utility owned or public access
depending on the business model of utility offices. There are
different WAN standards including ANSI C12.21 and ANSI
C12.22. In ANSI C12.21 based WAN access protocol uses
two-way authentication using DES encryption of a randomly
generated token [22]. The ANSI C12.21 protocol is session-
based thus a timeout can be implemented to release the
session which reduces chances of cyber attacks based on the
permanent key. ANSI C12.22 adds another layer of security
by having data encryption using AES-128 bit on top of WAN
authentication. In ANSI C12.22 standard each communication
must be authenticated before any other operations. Note that
the security schemes used in smart grid should provide highest
level of
security with minimal system and device performance
impacts related to encryption, decryption, re-keying functions,
intrusion
detection, intrusion prevention, etc.
B. Attack Classifications based on Network Layers
Typical cyber attacks in the smart gird based on CIA Triad
can be classified as below:
1) Cyber Attacks Targeting Confidentiality These at-
tacks allow access to information to unauthorized users
in the smart grid [23], [24]. Malicious users misuse the
information to harm others or take advantages from it.
2) Cyber Attacks Targeting Integrity Main motivation of
these types of attacks is to disrupt the data exchange in
the smart grid by illegally modifying or inserting false
information [25][28].
3) Cyber Attacks Targeting Availability Attackers main
motivation is to block or delay the communication in
the smart grid so that the power delivery could be
interrupted. This type of attack is also known as denial-
of-service attack. A typical attacks are listed in Table I.
TABLE I
T YPICAL C YBER ATTACKS TARGETING AVAILABILITY IN P OWER G RIDS .
Network Layer Attacks in Smart Grids
Application layer CPU exhausting [29], [30]
Network and Data flooding [31], [32]
Transport layer Buffer overflow [33], [34]
MAC layer Man-in-the-middle attacks [35], [36]
Physical layer Jamming channels [37], [38]
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C. Cyber Defense Solutions for Smart Grid Systems
To provide defense to cyber attacks targeting confidentiality
in the power grid, network coding has been presented to main-
tain data privacy in the grid where all aspects of privacy such
as anonymity, unlinkability, unobservablity, and undetectablity
have been achieved [23], [24].
Defense against cyber attacks targeting integrity, several
approaches have been proposed [25][28]. To prevent integrity
attacks, a power fingerprinting technique has been proposed
in [25], a volt-var control (VVC) based scheme has been
proposed in [27], and a Trusted Network Connect (TNC) base
approach had been studied in [28].
There are several cyber defense solutions against attacks
targeting availability (e.g. [29][38]). Solutions to channel
jamming attacks include frequency hopping based on pre-
shared sequence or uncoordinated rendezvous methods [37],
[38] where transmitter and receiver meet to a common channel
for communication while avoiding the jammer.
In man-in-the-middle attacks, the cyber security solutions
include use of in-depth packet analysis (e.g., IDS) since
packets sniffed by the attacker have unmatched MAC and IP
address pairs [35], [36].
To deal with buffer-overflow attacks in the smart grid, a
flocking-based models of power system operation for the grid
has been proposed in [33] and a Discrete-Time Markov Chain
(DTMC) model has been studied in [34].
A top-down analysis has been performed to prevent data
flooding attacks including other attacks in [31]. A defense
solution to puppet attack that results in denial-of-services in
AMI network has been studied in [32].
In order to overwhelm networking devices which have lim-
ited computing resources, attackers can flood computationally
intensive requests using application layer attacks [29], [30].
A DDoS Shield based suspicion assignment mechanism and
a DDoS-resilient scheduler have been proposed to prevent
application layer attacks in [29].
V. C HALLENGES AND F UTURE R ESEARCH D IRECTIONS
There are several challenges to secure smart grid systems
from multitude of attacks and meet the security requirements
and objectives of smart grid as smart grid assets are distributed
over large geographic areas. Because of the critical nature
of power systems and socioeconomic impact of blackouts,
smart grid can be a prime target for cyber terrorism. The
cyber defense solutions should protect all aspects of smart
grid systems. The defense solution integrate multiple de-
fense techniques including proactive real-time intrusion pre-
vention/detection systems (IPS/IDS) using machine learning
and artificial intelligence, network segmentation, controlled
wireless propagation, authentication, authorization, certifica-
tion. The proposed solutions should comprise of scalable,
resilient, and adaptive cyber security/defense techniques for
smart grid operation without affecting any legitimate smart
grid operations.
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VI. S UMMARY
Communication networks in smart grid bring increased
connectivity to revolutionize the energy industry in terms of
reliability, performance, and manageability by providing bi-
directional communications to operate, monitor, and control
power flow and measurements. However, communication net-
works bring severe security vulnerabilities with them. Further-
more, smart grids can be a prime target for cyber terrorism
because of their critical nature and socioeconomic impact of
blackouts. In this paper, we have provided a compact survey
of cyber security attacks and defense techniques in smart grid
that are targeted at different networks and protocol
systems
layers. With this article, readers can have a more thorough
understanding
of smart grid security, its requirements and
objectives, and the future research directions in this topic.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work is supported partly by the National Science
Foundation (NSF) grant-CNS 1405670 and Georgia Southern
University. Any opinion, finding, and conclusions or recom-
mendations expressed in this material are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the views of NSF.
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