MAJOR HAZARD FACILITIES

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
SOME ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS

AFAP - As far as (reasonably) practicable

DG - Dangerous goods
Employer - Employer who has management control of the facility
Facility - any building or structure at which Schedule 1 materials are
present or likely to be present for any purpose
FMEA/FMECA - Failure modes and effects analysis/ Failure modes and
effects criticality analysis
FTA - Fault tree analysis
HAZID - Hazard identification
HAZOP - Hazard and operability study
HSR - Health and safety representative
LOC - Loss of containment
LOPA Layers of protection analysis

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SOME ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS

MHF - Major hazard facility

MA - Major accident
OHS - Occupational health & safety
PFD Process Flow Diagram
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
PSV Pressure safety valve
SMS - Safety management system

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DEFINITION

Hazard

Regulatory definition per Part 20 of the Occupational Health and Safety (Safety
Standards) Regulations 1994 :
A hazard means the potential to cause injury or illness

Interpreted: Any activity, procedure, plant, process, substance, situation or

other circumstance that has the potential to cause harm.

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INTRODUCTION

HAZID is critical to safety duties and the safety report

Employer must identify all major accidents and their related causes using a
systematic and documented HAZID approach
The process must be transparent
HAZID results must be reflected in risk assessment, SMS, adoption of
control measures and safety report

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INTRODUCTION

An example - Gramercy Alumina Refinery, US Department of Labor Report ID

No. 16-00352, 5 July 1999 at 5am

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INTRODUCTION

Were the hazards identified?

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INTRODUCTION

HAZID process must be ongoing to ensure existing hazards are known, and
New hazards recognised before they are introduced:
- Prior to modification of facility
- Prior to change in SMS or workforce
- Before and during abnormal operations, troubleshooting
- Plant condition monitoring, early warning signals
- Employee feedback from routine participation in work
- After an incident

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INTRODUCTION

Information from accident investigations can be useful as input to

determine contributing causes

Emergency Preparation
7% 5%
2% Quality Assurance
4%
1% Other Training
12% Industry Guidance
5%
Incident Investigation
1%
Employee Participation
4%
Facility Siting

4% Internal Auditing and Oversight

8%
Safe Work Practices
Management of Change
7% Engineering Design & Review
4%
Maintenance Procedures
5% HAZCOM
8% Operator Training
Operating Procedures
13% Process Hazard Analysis
10%
Process Safety Information

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HAZID REQUIREMENTS

A systematic, transparent and comprehensive HAZID process should be

used based on a comprehensive and accurate description of the facility
MAs and the underlying hazards should not be disregarded simply
because:
- They appear to be very unlikely
- They have not happened previously
- They are considered to be adequately controlled by existing measures

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HAZID REQUIREMENTS
The risk diagram can be useful for illustrating this aspect, as
shown below

Increasing risk
Relative Frequency of Occurrence

Breakdowns
Public criticism
Safety Report Influence
High technology and high
Staff Protest pickets
complaints hazard system failures
Personal injury Class actions
Industrial Market collapse
stoppage Fatality (fatalities)
Fire &
Maintenance OH&S Catastrophic
Explosion

Consequence Severity

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HAZID REQUIREMENTS

Exclusions
The HAZID process (for MHF compliance) is not intended to identify all
personnel safety concerns
Many industrial incidents are caused by personnel safety breaches, such as
the following:
- Person falls from height
- Electrocution
- Trips/slips
- Contact with moving machinery
- etc

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HAZID REQUIREMENTS

Exclusions
These are generally incidents that do not relate to the storage or processing
of Schedule 9 materials and are covered by other parts of an Employers
safety management system for a facility such as:
- Permit to work
- Confined space entry and management
- Working at heights
- Work place safety assessments
- etc

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HAZID APPROACH

What can go wrong?

What incidents or scenarios could
arise as a result of things going
wrong?
What could cause or could
contribute to these incidents?

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HAZID APPROACH

Considers all operating modes of the facility, and all activities that are
expected to occur
Human and system interfaces together with engineering issues
Dynamic process to stay ahead of any changes in the facility that could erode
the safe operating envelope or could introduce new hazards

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HAZID APPROACH

The HAZID approach is required to:

Be team-based
Use a a process that is systematic
Be pro-active in searching for hazards
Assess all hazards
Analyse existing controls and barriers - preventative and mitigative
Consider size and complexity in selecting approach to use

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HAZID APPROACH

Consideration needs to be given in selecting the HAZID technique

Some issues to take into account are:
- Life cycle phase of plant
- Complexity and size
- Type of Process or activity covering:
o Engineering or procedural
o Mechanical, process, or activity focussed

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 HAZID APPROACH

Life Cycle Phases of a Project

Concept The HAZID approach can be used in the

first stages of the life cycle phase of a
project
Design Prior to design phase, little information will
be available and the HAZID approach will
need to be undertaken on flow diagrams
Construction
Assumptions will need to be transparent
and documented
Commission

Production

Decommission

Disposal
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HAZID APPROACH

Complexity and Size

The complexity and size of a facility includes the number of activities or
systems, the number of pieces of equipment, the type of process, and the
range of potential outcomes
Some HAZID techniques may get bogged down when they are applied to
complex processes
For example, event tree and fault tree analyses can become time
consuming and difficult to structure effectively
However, simple techniques may not provide sufficient focus to reach
consensus, or confidence in the identification of hazards

Conclusion: Start with simple techniques and build

in complexity as required

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HAZID APPROACH

Type of Process or Activity

Where activities are procedural or human error is dominant then task
analysis may be appropriate (e.g. task analysis, procedural HAZOP, etc)
Where knowledge of the failure modes of equipment is critical (e.g. control
equipment, etc) then FMEA may be appropriate

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HAZID APPROACH

Type of Process or Activity

Where the facility is readily shown on a process flow diagram or a process
and instrumentation diagram, then HAZOP may be used
Where multiple failures need to be combined to cause an accident, or
multiple outcomes are possible then fault tree analysis and event tree
analysis may be beneficial

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CONSULTATION

The MHF Regulations require Employers to consult with employees in

relation to:
- Identification of major hazards and potential major accidents
- Risk assessment
- Adoption of control measures
- Establishment and implementation of a safety management system

- Development of the safety report

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CONSULTATION

Consultation is also required in relation to the roles that the Employer defines
for employees
The adequacy of the consultation process is a key step in decision-making
with regards to the granting of licences
A teamwork approach between the Employer, HSRs and employees is strongly
advocated for the safety report development process as a whole

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CONSULTATION

Employees have a significant effect on the safety of operations, as a result

of their behaviour, attitude and competence in the conduct of their safety-
related roles
The involvement of the employees in the identification of hazards and
control measures enhances:
- Their awareness of these issues
and
- Is critical to the achievement of safe operation in practice

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CONDUCTING THE HAZID

HAZID Team Selection

The team selection for the area or plant is critical to the whole hazard
identification process
Personnel with suitable skills and experience should be available to cover
all issues for discussion within the HAZID process
A well managed, formalised approach with appropriate documentation is
required
Team selection and training in methodology used is to be provided

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CONDUCTING THE HAZID

HAZID Team Selection

Facilitated multi-disciplinary team based approach

Suitably qualified and experienced independent person to facilitate
Suitably experienced and qualified personnel for the process, operations
and equipment involved

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CONDUCTING THE HAZID

HAZID Team Selection

These employees MAY BE the HSRs but DO NOT HAVE TO BE

However, the HSRs should be consulted in selection of appropriate persons -
this process must be documented and be transparent
No single person can conduct a HAZID
A team approach will be most effective

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CONDUCTING THE HAZID

HAZID Study Team

The typical study team would comprise:

Study facilitator

Technical secretary

Operations management

HSR/Operations representative

Project engineer or project design engineer for new projects

Process engineer

Maintenance representative

Instrument electrical representative

Note: the above team make up is indicative only

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CONDUCTING THE HAZID

HAZID Planning

The following steps are required:

Planning and preparation

Defining the boundaries and provide system description
Divide plant into logical groups
Review P&IDs and process schematics to ensure accuracy
Optimise HAZID process by means of preplanning work involving relevant
stakeholders (operations, maintenance, technical and safety personnel)

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 CONDUCTING THE HAZID CONSIDER THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

What has gone wrong in the past?

Root Cause
Historical Historical Records
conditions Process Experience
Near Misses

Identified
What could go wrong currently?
Hazards
HAZID Workshop
Existing HAZOP Study
conditions Scenario Definitions
Checklists

What could go wrong due to change?

Change Management unforeseeable
Future What-If Judgement
conditions Prediction

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CONDUCTING THE HAZID

It is tempting to disregard Non-Credible Scenarios BUT

Non-credible scenarios have happened to others

Worst cases are important to emergency planning

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IT HAPPENED TO SOMEONE ELSE

Aftermath of an explosion
(U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD, SIERRA
CHEMICAL COMPANY REPORT NO. 98-001-I-NV, January 1988)

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CONDUCTING THE HAZID

Issues for consideration

Equipment can be off-line

Safety devices can be disabled or fail to operate
Several tasks may be concurrent
Procedures are not always followed
People are not always available
How we act is not always how we plan to act
Things can take twice as long as planned
Abnormal conditions can cross section limits
Power failure

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 CONDUCTING THE HAZID HAZID PROCESS

Define boundary System description

Divide system into sections

Analyse each section

asset or equipment failure
external events Existing studies
process operational deviations
hazards associated with all materials Selected methods
human activities which could contribute to incidents
interactions with other sections of the facility

Systematically record all hazards

Independent check

Hazard Register Revisit after risk assessment

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CONDUCTING THE HAZID

Meeting Venue

Hold on site if possible

Avoid interruptions if possible
Schedule within the normal work pattern, or within the safety report
activities
Meetings less than 3 hours are not effective
Meetings that last all day are also not effective, however practicalities may
require all day meetings
Dont underestimate the time required

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CONDUCTING THE HAZID

Recording Detail
The level of detail is important for:
- Clarity
- Transparency and

- Traceability
A system (hazard register) is required for keeping track of the process for
each analysed section of the facility
The items to be recorded are:
- Study team
- System being evaluated
- Identified hazard scenario
- Consequences of the hazard being realised
- Controls in place to prevent hazard being realised and their adequacy
- Opportunity for additional controls

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HAZID TECHNIQUES - OVERVIEW

Checklists - questions to assist in hazard identification

Increasing effort required

Brainstorming - whatever anyone can think of

What If Analysis - possible outcomes of change
HAZOP - identifies process plant type incidents
FMEA/FMECA - equipment failure causes
Task Analysis maintenance activities, procedures
Fault Tree Analysis - combinations of failures

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CHECKLISTS

Simple set of prompts or checklist questions to assist in hazard identification

Can be used in combination with any other techniques, such as What If
Can be developed progressively to capture corporate learning of organisation
Particularly useful in early analysis of change within projects

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CHECKLISTS

Initiating General Causes Initiating Causes

Events
Overfills And Improper Operating Error
Spills Operation Inadequate / Incorrect Procedure
Failure To Follow Procedure
Outside Operating Envelope
Inadequate Training

Vessel/Tanker Corrosion Wet H2S Cracking

Shell Failure General Process
Cooling Water
Steam / Condensate
Service Water
Mechanical Missiles
Impact Crane
Vehicles

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CHECKLISTS

Advantages
Highly valuable as a cross check review tool following application of other
techniques
Useful as a shop floor tool to review continued compliance with SMS

Disadvantages
Tends to stifle creative thinking
Used alone introduces the potential of limiting study to already known
hazards - no new hazard types are identified
Checklists on their own will rarely be able to satisfy regulatory
requirements

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BRAINSTORM

Team based exercise

Based on the principle that several experts with different backgrounds can
interact and identify more problems when working together
Can be applied with many other techniques to vary the balance between
free flowing thought and structure
Can be effective at identifying obscure hazards which other techniques
may miss

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BRAINSTORM

Advantages
Useful starting point for many HAZID techniques to focus a groups ideas,
especially at the projects concept phase
Facilitates active participation and input
Allows employees experience to surface readily
Enables thinking outside the square
Very useful at early stages of a project or study

Disadvantages
Less rigorous and systematic than other techniques
High risk of missing hazards unless combined with other tools
Caution required to avoid overlooking the detail
Relies on experience and competency of facilitator

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WHAT IF

What if analysis is an early method of identifying hazards

Brainstorming approach that uses broad, loosely structured questioning to
postulate potential upsets that may result in an incident or system
performance problems
It can be used for almost every type of analysis situation, especially those
dominated by relatively simple failure scenarios

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WHAT IF

Normally the study leader will develop a list of questions to consider at the
study session
This list needs to be developed before the study session
Further questions may be considered during the session
Checklists may be used to minimise the likelihood of omitting some areas

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WHAT IF

Example of a What If report for a single assessed item

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WHAT IF

Advantages
Useful for hazard identification early in the process, such as when only
PFDs are available
What If studies may also be more beneficial than HAZOPs where the project
being examined is not a typical steady state process, though HAZOP
methodologies do exist for batch and sequence processes

Disadvantages
Inability to identify pre-release conditions

Apparent lack of rigour

Checklists are used extensively which can provide tunnel vision, thereby
running the risk of overlooking possible initiating events

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HAZOP

A HAZOP study is a widely used method for the identification of hazards

A HAZOP is a rigorous and highly structured hazard identification tool
It is normally applied when PFDs and P&IDs are available
The plant/process under investigation is split into study nodes and lines
and equipment are reviewed on a node by node basis
Guideword and deviation lists are applied to process parameters to develop
possible deviations from the design intent

HAZOP results in a very a systematic assessment of hazards

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HAZOP

Example of a HAZOP report for a single assessed item

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HAZOP

Advantages
Will identify hazards, and events leading to an accident, release or other
undesired event
Systematic and rigorous process
The systematic approach goes some way to ensuring all hazards are
considered

Disadvantages
HAZOPs are most effective when conducted using P&IDs, though they can
be done with PFDs
Requires significant resource commitment
HAZOPs are time consuming
The HAZOP process is quite monotonous and maintaining participant
interest can be a challenge

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FMEA/FMECA

Objective is to systematically address all possible failure modes and the

associated effects on a technical system
The underlying equipment and components of the system are analysed in
order to eliminate, mitigate or reduce the failure or the failure effect
Best suited for mechanical and electrical hardware systems evaluations

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FMEA/FMECA

Example of an FMEA/FMCEA report for a single assessed item

Potential Potential Potential Comments Recommendations

Failure Effects of Causes
Mode Failure of
Failure
Open Wrong Wear and Commissioning The integrity of the
indicator indication of tear and test position indicators for
switch failed valve back to procedures the Diverter system
control system must ensure equipment is critical to
causing that all diverter the logic of the control
possible equipment system.
incorrect indicators are It is recommended that
controller correctly wired the position indicators
action to be to the diverter are discretely function
taken control system tested prior to
commencement of each
program

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FMEA/FMECA

Advantages
Generally applied to solve a specific problem or set of problems
FMEA/FMECA was primarily considered to be a tool or process to assist in
designing a technical system to a higher level of reliability
Designed correction or mitigation techniques can be implemented so that
failure possibilities can be eliminated or minimized

Disadvantages
It is very time consuming and needs specialist skills from different
backgrounds to obtain maximum effect
Very hard to assess operational risks within an FMEA/FMECA (like they can
be within a HAZOP or What if study)

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TASK ANALYSIS

Technique which analyses human interactions with the tasks they perform,
the tools they use and the plant, process or work environment
Approach breaks down a task into individual steps and analyses each step
for the presence of potential hazards
Used widely to manage known injury related tasks in workplace
Excellent tool for hazard identification related to human tasks

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TASK ANALYSIS

Disadvantages
Does not address plant process deviations which are not related to human
interaction

Caution
Relies on multi-disciplined input with specific input of person who normally
carries out the task
Often assumed to be the only tool of hazard identification or risk
assessment, as it is used generally at the shop floor

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FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

Graphical technique approach

Provides a systematic description of the combinations of possible
occurrences in a system which can result in an identified undesirable
outcome (top event)
This method combines hardware failures and human failures
Uses logic gates to define modes of interaction (ANDs/ ORs)

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FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

Process
vessel over
pressured

AND

Pressure PSV does not

rises relieve

AND OR

Process Control Set point

pressure fails high Fouling inlet too high
rises or outlet
PSV too PSV stuck
small closed

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FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

Advantages
Quantitative - defines probabilities to each event which can be used to
calculate the probability of the top event
Easy to read and understand hazard profile

Easily expanded to bow tie diagram by addition of event tree

Disadvantages
Need to have identified the top event first

More difficult than other techniques to document

Fault trees can become rather complex

Time consuming approach

Quantitative data needed to perform properly

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REVIEW AND REVISION
The following are examples of when a HAZID revision should occur

Organizational
changes

New
projects
Process or
HAZID condition
Revision monitoring
changes
Incident
investigation
results

Abnormal conditions
through design envelope
changes

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SOURCES OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Loss Prevention In The Process Industries, Second Edition, Reed Educational

and Professional Publishing, F. P Lees,1996
Guidelines for Hazard Analysis, Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper
No.6, NSW Department of Planning, June 1992
HAZOP and HAZANs, Notes on the Identification and Assessment of Hazards,
Second Edition, Trevor Kletz, The Institution of Chemical Engineers, 1986

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SOURCES OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, Second Edition, Centre for

Chemical Process Safety, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1992
Layer of Protection Analysis, Simplified Process Risk Assessment, Centre for
Chemical Process Safety, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 2001
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, Geoff Wells, The Institution of
Chemical Engineers, 19.
MIL-STD-1629A, 1980
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, J. Moubray, RCM II, 2000

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QUESTIONS?

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