Cayetano vs.

Monsod

201 SCRA 210

September 1991

The Practice of Law

Facts:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position
of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.

Issue:

Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

Held:

In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance
before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law
means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past work
experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The
respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of
the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

Cayetano v. MonsodG.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991Facts:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to
the position of Chairman of theCOMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of
the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having
been engagedin the practice of law for at least ten years.On June 5, 1991, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.On June
18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as acitizen and taxpayer, filed
the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation
and thec o n s e q u e n t a p p o i n t m e n t o f M o n s o d a s C h a i r m a n o f t h e C o m m i s s i o n
on Elections be declared null and void.
Issue:
Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1 (1), Article IX-C
of the 1987 Constitution?
Held:
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C, that there shall be a Commission
on Elections composed of a C h a i r m a n a n d s i x C o m m i s s i o n e r s w h o s h a l l b e
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
t h e i r appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree,
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall bemembers of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.Atty.
Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been dues paying member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He hasalso been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.At this point, it might be helpful to
define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual
or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who
practice alone are often called"sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm
is usually a partnership and members of the firm are thepartners. Some firms may be
organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In
either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms,
there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates."Hence, the
Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation,
implicitlyd e t e r m i n e d t h a t h e p o s s e s s e d t h e n e c e s s a r y q u a l i f i c a t i o n s a s r e q u i
r e d b y l a w. T h e j u d g m e n t r e n d e r e d b y t h e Commission in the exercise of such
an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a
clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art.
VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall
the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. Inthe instant case, there is no occasion for
the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a graveabuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant
the issuance of the writsprayed, for has been clearly shown.Besides in the leading case
of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, he Court said that, Appointment is an
essentiallydiscretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is
vested according to his best lights, the onlycondition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then
the appointmentcannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a politicalquestion involving considerations of wisdom which
only the appointing authority can decide

CRUZ VS MINA
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER,
VS.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO AND HON.
ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, RESPONDENTS

Facts:

Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as

private prosecutor, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his
appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge
Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or
friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance
was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of
Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said
criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for
petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19
governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the
ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation
of trial.

Issue:

whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party litigant

Ruling:
 The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court,
where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law
student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer.
Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace,
a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the
bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party without the supervision of a member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

Ferdinand Cruz vs Mina

G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F.
GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDALAGUILLES, Respondents.

FACTS

:Ferdinand Cruz, a third year law student, filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance as
privateprosecutor for the criminal case of grave threats, where his father is the complaining witness.
MeTC denied hispetition, so he elevated this to the RTC. The RTC denied his petition, stating that since t

here was no claim forcivil liability

for damages,

petitioners appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable

ISSUE

: Can the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats be prosecuted despite the absence of a claim for
civilliability for damages?

YESHELD

:Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,

every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable

except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of
neutrality,flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation. The basic rule applies in
the instantcase, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising fromthe offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civilaction, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.The petitioner is correct in stating that

there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution

of the civilaspect in the criminal case for grave threats, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave
Threats isdeemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully
intervene toprosecute the civil aspect

FIRST DIVISION

ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN G.R. No. 169517

and MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN,

Petitioners, Present:

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),

- versus - Ynares-Santiago,

Austria-Martinez,

Callejo, Sr., and

Chico-Nazario, JJ.

BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA,

Respondent. Promulgated:

March 14, 2006

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is an original petition[1] for contempt filed by petitioners Rogelio Tan, Norma Tan and
Maliyawao Pagayokan against respondent Benedicto Balajadia.

Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent filed a criminal case against them with the Office of
the City of Prosecutor of Baguio City for usurpation of authority, grave coercion and violation of city tax
ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of parking fees by petitioners from respondent. In
paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent asserted that he is a practicing lawyer based in
Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City.[2]
However, certifications issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant[3] and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines[4] showed that respondent has never been admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners
claim that respondent is liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.

In his Comment,[5] respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit that he
is a practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino
prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned after Atty. Aquinos complaint-affidavit.[6]
It appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaint-affidavit against petitioners involving the
same subject matter.

Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were drafted by the same secretary; one for the May 5,
2005 parking incident at 10:00 oclock in the morning and another for the parking incident on the same
date but which occurred at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon. Respondent insists that the complaint-affidavit
regarding the 1:00 oclock parking incident correctly alleged that he is a businessman with office address
at Room B-204, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City.[7] However, the complaint-affidavit
regarding the 10:00 oclock parking incident, which is the subject of the instant petition, erroneously
referred to him as a practicing lawyer because Atty. Aquinos secretary copied verbatim paragraph 5 of
Atty. Aquinos complaint-affidavit. Hence, it was inadvertently alleged that respondent is a practicing
lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio
City, which statement referred to the person of Atty. Aquino and his law office address.

Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquinos secretary, executed an affidavit[8] admitting the mistake in the preparation
of the complaint-affidavit. Respondent alleged that he did not read the complaint-affidavit because he
assumed that the two complaint-affidavits contained the same allegations with respect to his occupation
and office address. Respondent claims that he had no intention of misrepresenting himself as a
practicing lawyer.
In their Reply,[9] petitioners reiterate that respondent should be made liable for indirect contempt for
having made untruthful statements in the complaint-affidavit and that he cannot shift the blame to Atty.
Aquinos secretary.

The sole issue for resolution is whether respondent is liable for indirect contempt.

Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been
filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be
fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may
be punished for indirect contempt:

xxxx

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

x x x x.

In several cases,[10] we have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an attorney
and acting as such without authority constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both. The liability for the unauthorized practice of law under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt and the acts are punished because they are an
affront to the dignity and authority of the court, and obstruct the orderly administration of justice. In
determining liability for criminal contempt, well-settled is the rule that intent is a necessary element,
and no one can be punished unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.[11]

In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondents claim that he never intended to project
himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty Aquino.
The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that gave rise to the mistake in the drafting
of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary evidence on record. Taken together, these
circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondents complaint-affidavit was, indeed,
the result of inadvertence.
Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the result of
inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to make him liable for indirect contempt. In the
cases where we found a party liable for the unauthorized practice of law, the party was guilty of some
overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf of his client;[12] appearing before court hearings as an
attorney;[13] manifesting before the court that he will practice law despite being previously denied
admission to the bar;[14] or deliberately attempting to practice law and holding out himself as an
attorney through circulars with full knowledge that he is not licensed to do so.[15]

In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an attorney or that he
intended to practice law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt considering his
lack of intent to illegally practice law.

However, while the evidence on record failed to prove respondents deliberate intent to misrepresent
himself as an attorney and act as such without authority, he is hereby warned to be more careful and
circumspect in his future actions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Respondent is WARNED to be more careful and circumspect in
his future actions.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO B.M. No. 1678

RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY,

Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,*

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

GARCIA,

VELASCO, JR.

NACHURA,

REYES and

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

Promulgated:

December 17, 2007

x----------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice
of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His application was approved and he
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. [1] On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to
the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether
petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys
and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of
law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyers oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. [2] It is so delicately affected with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare. [3]

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful
observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and
confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.[4]

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the
statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for
admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character and a resident of the Philippines. [5] He must also produce before this Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. [6]

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
educational, moral and other qualifications;[7] passing the bar examinations;[8] taking the lawyers
oath[9] and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of
the license to practice.[10]

The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good standing is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership
dues in the IBP;[11] payment of the annual professional tax; [12] compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement;[13]faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and
being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control. [14]
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the
Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino
citizens save in cases prescribed by law.[15] Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the
bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage
in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. [16]

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of [RA 9225].[17]Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA
9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires
his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions (he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or
permit to engage in such practice.[18] Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the
authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially
significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a
lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance
with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after
which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.

Victorino A. Savellano for complainant.

Nestor M. Andrada for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DISBARMENT; CONVICTION OF CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. Under

section 5, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder is such a
crime.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; "MORAL TURPITUDE" CONSTRUED. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything
which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in
disbarment status, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and
duty between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279, pp.
428-429.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF PARDON. The rule that pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a
bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted applies only
where the pardon is absolute, but not where, as in this case, the pardon granted is conditional and
merely remitted the unexecuted portion of the penalty. In such a case, the attorney must be judged
upon the fact of his conviction for the crime he has committed.

4. ID.; REQUISITES FOR THE PRACTICE OF LAW. The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those
who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate
to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after
admission; the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal.

DECISION

MAKALINTAL, J.:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5, 1945.
In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of the
murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators
was sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of conviction was
affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G. R. No. L-7101), but the penalty was changed to reclusin perpetua. After
serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the President on
August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted "on condition that he shall not
again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library

On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a
verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers
pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts
alleged by complainant regarding his previous conviction but pleading the conditional pardon in defense,
on the authority of the decision of this Court in the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.

Under section 5 of Rule 127 a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder
is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment
statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between
man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279, pp. 428-429.

The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent
places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is placed by him squarely on
the Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the
Governor-General. In a subsequent proceeding for his disbarment on the ground of such conviction, this
Court decided in his favor and held: "When proceedings to strike on attorneys name from the rolls are
founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for
disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any
proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted."cralaw virtua1aw
library

It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the Court
proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was absolute. This is
implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the citations to support it, namely, In re
Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott v. State 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 380. Thus in
Scott v. State the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We are of the opinion that after he received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony
conviction could no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article 226. This record,
when offered in evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon, and could not therefore, properly be
said to afford "proof of a conviction of any felony." Having been thus cancelled, all its force as a felony
conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of this would not be pardon, according to the judicial
construction which that act of executive grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S.
95 U.S. 149, and cases there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191."cralaw virtua1aw library

And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok case is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and
when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the
eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching;
if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights;
it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity."

The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted the
unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland,
which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offenses by him committed in connection with the rebellion
(civil war) against the government of the United States."cralaw virtua1aw library

The foregoing considerations render In re Lontok inapplicable here. Respondent Gutierrez must be
judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense.
The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in band, by taking
advantage of his official position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of a
motor vehicle. People v. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to
justify his being purged from the profession.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of
mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only
prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character.
These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission; the lawyer must continue to
adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263,
27 Law ed., 552, 556; "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the
laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws,
to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and
office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body
politic."cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which
respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name stricken
from the roll of lawyers.

Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
People vs. Tuanda [A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990]

16AUG

[Per Curiam]

FACTS:

Atty. Fe Tuanda was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in violation of B.P. 22 with a fine and
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant Herminia Marquez.
Respondent appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court and imposed
upon Atty. Fe Tuanda, in addition, the suspension from the practice of law until further orders from the
Supreme Court. The respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
noted respondents Notice of Appeal and advised her to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable
Supreme Court, the proper forum. In the said motion, responded stated:

that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the
lower courts penalty of fine considering that accused-appellants action on the case during the trial on
the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of
the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the imposed suspension for Atty. Tuanda may be lifted.

HELD:

NO. Motion to Lift Order of Suspension denied.

RATIO:

[T]he crimes of which respondent was convicted [also] import deceit and violation of her attorneys oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to obey the laws of the
land. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and
affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense.
EN BANC

[A.C. No. 6486. September 22, 2004]

EMMA T. DANTES, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one requirement remains constant in all the
jurisdictions where the practice of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has
good moral character, and once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in accordance with the
standard. In this jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a condition precedent [1] to the practice
of law, but an unending requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty
of grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. [2]

In an Affidavit-Complaint[3] dated June 6, 2001, filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Emma T. Dantes, sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of
immorality, abandonment, and violation of professional ethics and law. The case was docketed as CBD
Case No. 01-851.

Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent purportedly engaged in illicit

relationships with two women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the
time respondents illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular support to complainant and their
children, thus forcing complainant to work abroad to provide for their childrens needs. Complainant
pointed out that these acts of respondent constitute a violation of his lawyers oath and his moral and
legal obligation to be a role model to the community.

On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order[4] requiring respondent to submit
his answer to the Affidavit-Complaint.

Respondent submitted his Answer[5] on November 19, 2001. Though admitting the fact of marriage with
the complainant and the birth of their children, respondent alleged that they have mutually agreed to
separate eighteen (18) years before after complainant had abandoned him in their Balintawak residence
and fled to San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent claimed that when complainant returned after
eighteen years, she insisted that she be accommodated in the place where he and their children were
residing. Thus, he was forced to live alone in a rented apartment.

Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best school he could afford and provided
for their needs. He even bought two lots in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and gave
complainant adequate financial support even after she had abandoned him in 1983.

Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to force him to remit seventy percent
(70%) of his monthly salary to her.

Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the complaint. Complainant presented
her evidence, both oral and documentary, [6] to support the allegations in her Affidavit-Complaint.
From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established that on January 19, 1979,
complainant and respondent were married [7] and lived with the latters mother in Balintawak. At that
time, respondent was just a fourth year law student. To make ends meet, complainant engaged in the
buy and sell business and relied on dole-outs from the respondents mother.

Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and Daisy, who were born on February
20, 1980,[8] October 14, 1981[9] and August 11, 1983,[10] respectively. Complainant narrated that their
relationship was marred by frequent quarrels because of respondents extra-marital affairs. [11] Sometime
in 1983, she brought their children to her mother in Pampanga to enable her to work because
respondent had failed to provide adequate support. From 1986 to 2001, complainant worked abroad as
a domestic helper.

Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and respondent to live separately, complainant
asseverated that she was just compelled to work abroad to support their children. When she returned to
the Philippines, she learned that respondent was living with another woman. Respondent, then bluntly
told her, that he did not want to live with her anymore and that he preferred his mistresses.

Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling,
and Christian Dave,[12] all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his paramour [13] to
prove the fact that respondent sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with two different
women. Letters of complainants legitimate children likewise support the allegation that respondent is a
womanizer.[14]

In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine
complainant, after he failed to appear during the scheduled hearings despite due notice. He, however,
submitted his Comment/Opposition to the Complainants Formal Offer of Evidence with Motion to
Exclude the Evidence from the Records of the Proceedings [15] on August 1, 2002.

Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion to Adopt Alternative Dispute Resolution
Mechanism. Respondents motion was denied because it was filed after the complainant had already
presented her evidence.[16] Respondent was given a final chance to present his evidence on July 11,
2003. Instead of presenting evidence, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to
Dismiss, which was likewise denied for being a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Bar Discipline.Respondent submitted his Position Paper on August 4, 2003.

In respondents Position Paper,[17] he reiterated the allegations in his Answer except that this time, he
argued that in view of the resolution of the complaint for support with alimonypendente lite[18] filed
against him by the complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, [19] the instant
administrative case should be dismissed for lack of merit.

On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the Bar Confidant
its Report[20] and Resolution No. XVI-2004-230 involving CBD Case No. 01-851.[21] The IBP recommended
that the respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.

Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-taken.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.
[22]
To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyers conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree[23] or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency. [24]

In Barrientos vs. Daarol,[25] we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good
moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of
the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those
moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals,
those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives,
accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import,
as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible purposes, namely:
(i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective
clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves. [26]

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also
throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored
fraternity.[27] They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor.[28]

Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the
subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the
imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary
evidence, sufficiently established respondents commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently,
respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law
profession. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity.[29]

In Toledo vs. Toledo,[30] we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with
another woman who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,[31] we ruled that abandoning
ones wife and resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community.

We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,[32] that moral delinquency which affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community as exemplified by behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.

The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of
the bar.[33] Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should never be decreed. [34] However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense
compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents
record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
275 SCRA 302 Legal Ethics Duties to the Court Contempt of Court by a Lawyer

Atty. Damaso Flores was involved in a suit involving a debt of 1.8 million peso he loaned from one
Rolando Ligon. A compromise agreement was reached and whereby Flores agreed to surrender a cockpit
(which he was holding under lease) to Ligon in case of breach. In 1986, Flores breached was accused of
breaching the [compromise] agreement and so eventually a writ of execution was issued against
Flores ordering the latter to surrender the cockpit to Ligon because of the said breach. Flores appealed
and the Court of Appeals as well as the Supreme Court nullified the writ of execution [because it was
later determined that Flores did not breach the compromise agreement].

On April 5, 1988, the Supreme Court ordered the lower court to order the restoration of the cockpit to
Flores. Judge Abesamis of the trial court however only received the mittimus on April 13, 1988 and then
the next 2 days, he received subsequent pleadings from Flores and Ligon. Considering this, Judge
Abesamis was only able to issue an order favorable Flores on April 20, 1988. But Ligon was able to secure
a TRO from the Court of Appeal enjoining Judge Abesamis from restoring the cockpit to Flores on the
ground of intervening events because apparently, Ligon was able to buy the property from Floress
lessors. This was opposed by Flores until it reached the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court noted
that such fact [of the supervening event] should be addressed by the trial court and not the SC.

From May 1989 to June 1989, Flores filed criminal and administrative cases against Judge Abesamis,
accusing him of partiality, evident bad faith, and gross negligence, as well as of serious misconduct,
inefficiency and ignorance of the law, in deliberately delaying action on his motions to obtain possession
of the cockpit. The cases were dismissed for lack of merit.

In November 1989, Judge Abesamis issued a writ of execution ordering the restoration of the cockpit to
him but this was again opposed by Ligon on the ground of the supervening event which should be
discussed by the trial court. Judge Abesamis ruled in favor of Ligon. It was ruled by the trial court that
Ligons lawful acquisition of title to the cockpit and Flores continuing failure to pay his debt of about
P1.8 million to the former were supervening events warranting Ligons retention of the cockpit and
precluding its restoration to Flores. This ruling was eventually affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court

In 1993, Flores, however, again filed complaints against Abesamis for serious misconduct etc but they
were again dismissed for lack of merit.

In 1995, Flores once more filed in the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against Judge Abesamis, he
accused Judge Abesamis of transgressing the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for alleged bias and
prejudice in granting a partys motion which caused undue injury to complainant.

The case was again dismissed. The Assistant Ombudsman however ordered Flores to explain why he
should not be cited for he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for willful disregard of the judgments
and orders of the Ombudsman and those of the Court of Appeals; abuse of the processes of the courts;
and forum-shopping.

ISSUE: Whether or not Flores is guilty of contempt of court.

HELD: Yes. Flores knew that Judge Abesamis cannot restore the cockpit to him because of the TRO issued
by the Court of Appeals. He also knew that that the specific Orders of Judge Abesamis upon which his
criminal complaint was grounded had already been sustained by higher courts, and consequently, his
complaint was completely devoid of merit. Flores actually resorted to administrative prosecution (or
institution of criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeal or
review provided by law from court judgments or orders, on the theory that the Judges orders had
caused him undue injury. This is impermissible.

Flores thus abused the processes of the court. He resorted to the administrative procedure for
disciplining Judges prescribed by law, and even to criminal prosecution, notwithstanding that
determination of the correctness of the orders of Judge Abesamis. It would appear that improper
motives underlay the filing of his complaints: either to vent his wrath against someone, anyone, because
of his frustrations in his attempts to regain possession of the cockpit, or to so intimidate the respondent
Judges as to make them more malleable in their subsequent actuations with respect to his future
motions.

Finally, his initiation of the complaint was forum shopping of the most blatant sort, a clear attempt to re-
ventilate or re-litigate issues already passed upon and definitively resolved by this Court, affirming action
on those same issues by the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court. Flores is thus guilty of
contempt; he was ordered to pay a fine by the SC.
THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5333. October 18, 2000]

ROSA YAP PARAS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS, respondent.

DECISION

MELO, J:

This has reference to a case for disbarment initiated by complainant Rosa Yap Paras against her husband,
Atty. Justo de Jesus Paras. The parties exchanged tirades and barbs in their copious pleadings, hurling
invectives, cutting remarks and insults at each other. Reduced to its essentials, Rosa Paras charged her
husband with dishonesty and falsification of public documents, harassment and intimidation, and
immorality for siring a child with another woman. Respondent denied the allegations, contending that
his wife, in cahoots with her family, is out to destroy and strip him of his share in their multi-million
conjugal assets.

The parties come from wealthy families in Negros Oriental. They were married on May 21, 1964 and
have two grown-up children. They have vast sugarlands and other businesses.Respondent was a
Municipal Judge for 14 years and served as Mayor in their town for 2 terms during the administration of
President Aquino. Complainant is a businesswoman. Sometime in 1988, their marriage fell apart when
due to "marital strain that has developed through the years," respondent left his wife and children to live
with his mother and sister in Dumaguete City and thence started his law practice. Complainant, in the
meantime, filed a case for the dissolution of their marriage, which case is still pending in court.

The complaint charged:

DISHONESTY, FALSIFICATION and FRAUD

respondent obtained loans from certain banks in the name of complainant by counterfeiting
complainant's signature, falsely making it appear that complainant was the applicant for said
loans. Thereafter, he carted away and misappropriated the proceeds of the loans.

. . . to guarantee the above loans, respondent mortgaged some personal properties belonging to the
conjugal partnership without the consent of complainant.

GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT AND CONCUBINAGE

Respondent is . . . engaged in the immoral and criminal act of concubinage as he maintained an illicit
relationship with one Ms. Jocelyn A. Ching, siring an illegitimate child with her while married to
complainant.

UNETHICAL AND UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Respondent abused courts of justice and misused his legal skills to frighten, harass and intimidate all
those who take a position diametrically adverse to his sinister plans by unethically filing complaints and
other pleadings against them. He utilized strategies to obstruct justice.

OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
(Respondent) utilized strategies to obstruct justice. In the criminal actions initiated against him,
respondent used his legal skills not to prove his innocence but to derail all the proceedings.

(Complaint, Rollo, p. 2)

In his Answer, respondent interposed the following defenses:

(1) On the Charge of Falsification of Public Documents:

That during the sugarboom in the 1970's, his wife executed in his favor a Special Power of Attorney to
negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan authorizing him "to borrow money and apply for and secure
any agricultural or crop loan for sugar cane from the Bais Rural Bank, Bais City . . ." (Rollo, Annex "3", p.
262)

(2) On the Charge of Forgery:

That the Report of the National Bureau of Investigation which found that "the questioned signatures
(referring to the alleged forged signatures of complainant) and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J.
PARAS were written by one and the same person"(Annex "B" of the Complaint, Rollo, p. 26) was
doctored, and that his wife filed against him a string of cases for falsification of public documents
because he intends to disinherit his children and bequeath his inchoate share in the conjugal properties
to his own mother.

(3) On the Charge of Grossly Immoral Conduct and Concubinage:

That this is a malicious accusation fabricated by his brother-in-law, Atty. Francisco D. Yap to disqualify
him from getting any share in the conjugal assets. He cites the dismissal of the complaint for
concubinage filed against him by his wife before the City Prosecutor of Negros Oriental as proof of his
innocence.

Respondent, however, admits that he, his mother and sister, are solicitous and hospitable to his alleged
concubine, Ms. Jocelyn Ching and her daughter, Cyndee Rose (named after his own deceased daughter),
by allowing them to stay in their house and giving them some financial assistance, because they pity Ms.
Ching, a secretary in his law office, who was deserted by her boyfriend after getting her pregnant.

(4) On the Charge of Obstruction of Justice:

That "the legal remedies pursued by (him) in defense and offense are legitimate courses of action done
by an embattled lawyer."

The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines investigated the
complaint against respondent summarizing the causes of action as follows:

(1) Falsification of complainant's signature and misuse of conjugal assets; and

(2) Immorality and criminal acts of concubinage with one Ms. Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching (for) siring an
illegitimate child with her while married to complainant, and, abandonment of his own family.

(Rollo, Report of the IBP, p. 34)

No actual hearing was conducted as the parties agreed to merely submit their respective memoranda,
depositions, and other pieces of evidence attached to their pleadings.

Thereafter, the CBD found respondent guilty as charged and recommended:

(1) Respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months on the first charge; and

(2) Respondent's indefinite suspension from the practice of law on the second charge.

(ibid., p. 57)

The CBD held that the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent for falsification and use of
falsified documents (Criminal Case No. 11768) and for concubinage (I.S. No. 93-578) will not bar the
filing of an administrative case for disbarment against him. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is required for conviction, while in an administrative complaint, only a preponderance of evidence
is necessary.

The CBD gave credence to the NBI Report that "the questioned signatures (referring to the signatures
appearing in the loan agreements, contracts of mortgage, etc.) and the standard sample signatures of
respondent were written by one and the same person." This affirms the allegation of complainant Rosa
Yap Paras that her husband forged her signatures in those instruments. Respondent denies this but his
denial was unsubstantiated and is, therefore, self-serving.

In finding respondent liable for Immorality, the CBD relied heavily on the uncontroverted sworn affidavit-
statements of respondent's children and three other eyewitnesses to respondent's illicit affair with Ms.
Jocelyn Ching. For a better appreciation of their statements, their affidavits are hereby reproduced in
full. Thusly,

"I, DAHLIA Y. PARAS, of legal age, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, but presently living in
Dumaguete City, after being duly sworn hereby depose and say:

1. I am a nurse by profession. I finished my BSN degree at the College of Nursing, Silliman University.

2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras and my father Justo J. Paras. My father has left the family home in Bindoy
and now lives at his mother's house at San Jose Ext., Dumaguete City.

3. My father has a "kabit" or concubine by the name of Ma. Jocelyn Ching. They have a child named
Cyndee Rose, who was delivered at the Silliman University Hospital Medical Center on July 19, 1990.

4. Jocelyn used to be the secretary of my father and Atty. Melchor Arboleda when they practice law
together in 1988 to 1989. Their relationship started in 1989. When she became pregnant, my father
rented an apartment for her at the Amigo Subdivision, Dumaguete City.

5. Following delivery of the baby, my father built a house for Jocelyn in Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros
Oriental. My father spend time there often with Jocelyn and their child.

6. I used to visit my father at San Jose Extension these past years, and almost every time I was there, I
would see Jocelyn, sitting, watching TV, serving coffee in my father's law office, and one time, she was
washing my father's clothes.
7. I first saw their child Cyndee Rose in 1992, about early May, at San Jose Extension. I was there to ask
for my allowance. He was there at the time, and when I looked at Cyndee Rose closely, I became
convinced that she was my father's daughter with Jocelyn.

8. Incidentally, I had an elder sister also named Cindy Rose (now deceased).

9. In September 1992 when I went to visit my father, I saw toys and child's clothes in my father's room.

10. Whenever, I saw Jocelyn at San Jose Extension, I wanted to talk to her or be alone with her, but she
would deliberately avoid me. I could see that she was hiding something from me." p. 109, Records.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT

xxxxxxxxx

1. . . . sometime during the period of April-September, 1992, I made several visits to my father at his
mother's house in San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City, where he had moved after he left our home in
Bindoy;

2. That these visits were made on different times and different days of the week;

3. That most of my visits, I would meet a woman who was also living at my father's place. This woman is
now known to me to be Ma. Jocelyn Ching;

4. That my basis for observing that Ms. Ching was living in my father's house is that during my visits,
whether during office hours or after office hours, I would meet her at my father's place, not his office;
she was wearing house clothes and slippers, such as skimpy clothes, shorts and T-shirt, not street or
office clothes; she was generally unkempt, not made up for work or going out; on one occasion, I even
saw her, washing my father's clothes as well as a small child's clothing; and she conducted herself around
the house in the manner of someone who lived there;

5. That on one of my visits, I confirmed that Ms. Ching was living with my father from Josie Vailoces, who
was then a working student living at my father's place;

6. Ms. Vailoces subsequently confirmed under oath the fact that my father and Ms. Jocelyn Ching were
living together as husband and wife at my father's place in a deposition taken in connection with Civil
Case No. 10613, RTC-Dumaguete City, Branch 30, the Honorable Enrique C. Garovillo, presiding. A copy
of the transcript of the deposition of Ms. Vailoces is already part of the record of this case. For emphasis,
photocopies of the pertinent portion of the written deposition of Josie Vailoces is hereto attached as
Annexes "A"and "A-1." p. 111, Records

Respondent's son has this to say:

"I, RHOUEL Y. PARAS, 15 years old, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, but presently living in
Dumaguete City, after being duly sworn according to law, depose and say:

1. I am a high school student at the Holy Cross High School, Dumaguete City.

2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras, and my father Justo J. Paras, a lawyer.

3. My father has left our home in Bindoy, and now lives at his mother's house in San Jose Extension,
Dumaguete City. He is not giving us support any more.

4. However, from October 1991 to December 1992, I was getting my allowance of P50.00 a week. I would
go to their house at San Jose Extension and personally ask him for it.

5. In October 1992, between 11:30 AM and 1:00 PM, I went to San Jose Extension for my weekly
allowance. I asked Josephus, an adopted son of my father's sister, if my father was around.Josephus said
my father was in his room.

6. So I went direct to his room and because the door was not locked, I entered the room without
knocking. There I saw my father lying in bed side by side with a woman. He was only wearing a brief. The
woman was wearing shorts and T-shirt.

7. They both appeared scared upon seeing me. My father hurriedly gave me P100.00 and I left
immediately because I felt bad and embarrassed.

8. Before that incident, I used to see the woman at my father's house in San Jose Extension. Every time I
went to see my father, she was also there.

9. I later came to know that she was Ms. Jocelyn Ching, and that she was my father's "kabit" or
concubine.

10. I am no longer getting my weekly allowance from my father." p. 112, Records

Added to the foregoing sworn statements of respondent's children is the damaging statement under
oath of Virgilio Kabrisante who was respondent's secretary when respondent was a mayor of Bindoy,
Negros Oriental which reads as follows:

"I, VIRGILIO V. KABRISANTE, of legal age, married, Filipino, a resident of Malaga, Bindoy, Negros Oriental,
after having been sworn in accordance with law, do hereby depose and state that:

1. I personally know Justo J. Paras, having been his secretary during his incumbency as Mayor of Bindoy,
Negros Oriental. In fact, through the latter's recommendation and intercession, I was later on appointed
as OIC Mayor of the same town from December 1986 to January 1987.

2. When Justo J. Paras decided to practice law in Dumaguete City, I became his personal aide and
performed various chores for the same. As his personal aide, I stayed in the same house and room with
the latter.

3. Sometime in January 1989, Justo J. Paras confided to me that he felt attracted to my lady friend
named Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. He then requested me to invite the latter to a dinner date at Chin Loong
Restaurant.

4. Conveying the invitation which was accepted by Ma. Jocelyn Ching, the latter, Justo J. Paras and myself
then had dinner at the above-mentioned restaurant.

5. At the behest of Justo J. Paras, I invited Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching, on several occasions, always to a picnic
at a beach in Dauin, Negros Oriental. Said invitations were always accepted by the latter.
6. At each of the above-mentioned picnics, I observed that Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching had
become more and more intimate with each other.

7. Sometime in March 1989, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening on a Friday, I accompanied Justo J.
Paras to the area in front of the Silliman University Medical Center, where he said he was going to meet
someone.

8. After waiting for a few minutes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching arrived and immediately boarded at the back seat
of the Sakbayan vehicle I was driving for Justo J. Paras. The latter then requested me to drive both of
them (Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching) to Honeybee Motel somewhere in Sibulan, Negros Oriental.

9. When we arrived there, Justo J. Paras asked me to wait for them outside the room, while he and Ma.
Jocelyn A. Ching entered the said room.

10. I waited outside the room for about two (2) hours after which the two of them emerged from the
room. We then proceeded to Chin Loong to eat supper.

11. After eating supper, we dropped Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching off in front of the Dumaguete City Cockpit.

12. This meeting was repeated two more times, at the same place and always on a Friday.

13. On April 3, 1988, I went home to Bindoy and stopped working for Justo Paras." pp. 56-57, Records.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT

xxxxxxxxx

1. Sometime in May 1989, I returned to Dumaguete City to look for a job, having been jobless since I left
Dumaguete City to go home to Bindoy, Negros Oriental.

2. While looking for a job, I stayed at the house where my friend, Bernard Dejillo was staying at
Mangnao, Dumaguete City. My friend Bernard Dejillo was occupying a room at the second floor of the
said house which he shared with me.

3. Sometime in the last week of May 1989, in the course of my job hunting, I met Justo J. Paras. Having
not seen each other for some time, we talked for a while, discussing matters about the barangay
elections in Bindoy, Negros Oriental.

4. When our discussion was finished, Justo J. Paras asked me where I was staying, to which I answered
that I was staying at the aforementioned house. He then requested me to find out if there was an
available room at the said house which he could rent with Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. I told him that I would
have to ask my friend Bernard Dejillo about the matter.

5. When I arrived at the house that evening, I asked my friend Bernard Dejillo about the matter, to which
the latter signified his approval. He told me that a room at the first floor of the same house was available
for rental to Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching.

6. The next day, I immediately informed Justo J. Paras of Bernard Dejillo's approval of his request.

7. Sometime in the first week of June 1989, Ma. Jocelyn Ching moved in to the room she had rented at
the first floor of the house I was also staying at.
8. Almost every night thereafter, Justo J. Paras would come to the house and stay overnight. When he
came at night Justo J. Paras and I would converse and while conversing, drink a bottle of Tanduay
Rum. Oftentimes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching would join in our conversation.

9. After we finish drinking and talking, Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn Ching would enter the room rented
and sleep there, while I would also go upstairs to my room.

10. The next morning I could always observe Justo J. Paras came out of said room and depart from the
house.

11. The coming of Justo J. Paras to the house I was staying ceased after about one (1) month when they
transferred to another house.

12. I myself left the house and returned to Bindoy, Negros Oriental some time in June 1989.

13. Sometime in January 1993, on a Saturday at about noontime, I went to the house of Justo J. Paras to
consult him about a Kabataang Barangay matter involving my son. When I arrived at his house, I noticed
that the same was closed and there was no one there.

14. Needing to consult him about the above-mentioned matter, I proceeded to the resthouse of Justo J.
Paras located at Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental.

15. When I arrived at the said resthouse, Justo J. Paras was not there but the person in charge of the said
resthouse informed me that Justo J. Paras was at his house at Barangay Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros
Oriental. The same person also gave me directions so that I could locate the house of Justo J. Paras he
referred to earlier.

16. With the help of the directions given by said person, I was able to locate the house of Justo J. Paras.

17. At the doorway of the said house, I called out if anybody was home while knocking on the door.

18. After a few seconds, Ma. Jocelyn Ching opened the door. Upon seeing the latter, I asked her if Justo J.
Paras was home. She then let me in the house and told me to sit down and wait for a while. She then
proceeded to a room.

19. A few minutes later, Justo J. Paras came out of the same room and sat down near me. I noticed that
the latter had just woke up from a nap.

20. We then started to talk about the matter involving my son and sometime later, Ma. Jocelyn Ching
served us coffee.

21. While we were talking and drinking coffee I saw a little girl, about three (3) years old, walking around
the sala, whom I later came to know as Cyndee Rose, the daughter of Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn
Ching.

22. After our conversation was finished, Justo J. Paras told me to see him at this office at San Jose
Extension, Dumaguete City, the following Monday to discuss the matter some more.

23. I then bid them goodbye and went home to Bindoy, Negros Oriental.

24. I am executing this affidavit as a supplement to my affidavit dated 22 July 1993." pp. 58-60, Records
(ibid., pp. 44-52)

The CBD likewise gave credence to the sworn affidavits and the deposition of two other witnesses,
namely, Salvador de Jesus, a former repairman of the Paras' household, and, Josie Vailoces, a working
student and former ward of the Paras' family, who both gave personal accounts of the illicit relationship
between respondent and Jocelyn Ching, which led to the birth of Cyndee Rose. De Jesus swore that
while doing repair works in the Paras' household he observed Ms. Ching and Cyndee Rose practically
living in the Paras' house (p. 85, Rollo, Annex "H"). Vailoces, on the other hand, deposed that she was
asked by respondent Paras to deliver money to Ms. Ching for the payment of the hospital bill after she
gave birth to Cyndee Rose.Vailoces was also asked by respondent to procure Cyndee Rose Paras'
baptismal certificate after the latter was baptized in the house of respondent; she further testified that in
said baptismal certificate, respondent appears as the father of Cyndee Rose which explains why the
latter is using the surname "Paras." (p. 87, Annex "I", Rollo)

The findings and the recommendations of the CBD are substantiated by the evidentiary record.
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANT'S SIGNATURE

The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation on the signatures of
complainant Rosa Yap Paras and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis--vis the questioned signature "Rosa
Y. Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan documents, contracts of mortgage and other related
instrument, yielded the following results:

CONCLUSION:

1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one and the
same person.

2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP PARAS were not written by one and the
same person.

(Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)

The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent forged the signatures of
complainant. However, an analysis of the above findings lead to no other conclusion than that the
questioned or falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paras were authored by respondent as said
falsified signatures were the same as the sample signatures of respondent.

To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by
complainant to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank of Bais City. Instead of
exculpating respondent, the presence of the SPA places him in hot water. For if he was so authorized to
obtain loans from the banks, then why did he have to falsify his wife's signatures in the bank loan
documents? The purpose of an SPA is to especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for and on
behalf of the principal using his own name.
ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE

The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-statements of his children and three
other persons who used to work with him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his infidelity more
than satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of
Cyndee Rose Paras where respondent was named as the father of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his
naming the child after his deceased first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn Ching and
the child to live in their house in Dumaguete City bolster the allegation that respondent is carrying on an
illicit affair with Ms. Ching, the mother of his illegitimate child.

It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law (People vs.
Tunda, 181 SCRA 692 [1990]; Leda vs. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]). In the case at hand, respondent
has fallen below the moral bar when he forged his wife's signature in the bank loan documents, and,
sired a daughter with a woman other than his wife. However, the power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar (Tapucar vs. Tapucar, Adm. Case No.
4148, July 30, 1998). Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired (Resurrecion vs. Sayson, 300 SCRA 129 [1998]).

In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents and other related loan
instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and
abandonment of his own family, the penalties to be served simultaneously.Let notice of this decision be
spread in respondent's record as an attorney, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 266 TOLEDO v. TOLEDO 7 SCRA 757

TOLEDO v. TOLEDO

7 SCRA 757

A.C. No. 266

April 27, 1963

FACTS: Paz Arellano Toledo, a dentist, alleged that she is the wife of Atty. Jesus Toledo, that she
supported and spent for his studies in FEU but after passing the bar, he abandoned. She also alleged that
he is cohabiting with another woman and borne him 3 children. She prayed for his disbarment from the
practice of law.

Upon the hearing conducted by the Solicitor General which his alleged wife presented pieces of
evidence, respondent was charged for abandonment and immorality and the Solicitor prayed that he be
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground "that the charges contained therein
are not based on and supported by the facts and evidence adduced at the investigation conducted by
the Office of the Solicitor General." Hence, the Court set the case for hearing. The respondent prayed
that his motion be first resolved or be denied, hence invoking Section 6, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.

However, instead of doing what the rule requires, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss without
stating that he intended to present evidence in his behalf, thereby waiving his right. The fact that at the
close of the hearing conducted by the Solicitor General, he made of record his desire to present evidence
in his behalf, is not sufficient. The correct manner and proper time for him to make known his intention
is by and in the answer seasonably filed in this Court.

Now, to resolve the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jesus Toledo be disbarred or suspended.

RULING: Yes. The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who
had borne him a child, has failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a
member of the Bar. Hence, he is disbarred from the practice of law.

Through a rigorous test by the Solicitor, the maid of respondent, Marina Payot, also testified that the
lawyer was living with a person named Corazon Toledo as wife of the respondent with a child of their
own, named Angie. Lino Domingo, operator-mechanic in the Bureau of Public Highways, also stated that
he knows the lawyer and her wife, Corazon, for he goes to the lawyers residence every now and then.

The testimony of these two witnesses are worthy of credence.

ROSARIO DELOS REYES vs. ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR (A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989)

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2013Labels: Disbarment, Lawyers, Legal Ethics

FACTS:

Complainant is a second year medical student of the Southwestern University in which

respondent Atty. Aznar is the then Chairman of the College of Medicine. Complainant was compelled to
go to Manila with respondent for three days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the
threat of respondent that if she would not give in to his lustful desires, she would flunk in all her subjects
and she would never become a medical intern. After due investigation, the Solicitor General found the
respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that since the complainant is partly to
blame for having gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married
man ,with children, a rich man and is not practicing his profession before the court, he should merely be
suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the imposition of the penalty is proper.

HELD: NO.

The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render
respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character precedes admission to
bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission
thereto. Good moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the
practice of law.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for disbarment or
suspension from his office as attorney, among others, by grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct has
been defined as that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. In the present case, it was highly
immoral of respondent to have taken advantage of his position in asking complainant to go with him
under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused

Respondent Jose B. Aznar is DISBARRED.

[A.C. No. 3249. August 9, 2004]

CORDOVA vs. CORDOVA

SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 9 2004.

A.C. No. 3249 (Salvacion Delizo-Cordova vs. Atty. Lawrence D. Cordova.)

In the Resolution of November 29, 1989, the Court indefinitely suspended Atty. Lawrence D. Cordova
from the practice of law after finding him guilty of immorality. The Court likewise resolved to consider
lifting the suspension upon submission by respondent of proof satisfactory to the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), that he has and continues to provide for the
support of his legitimate family and that he has given up his immoral course of conduct.

On January 15, 1992 and February 12, 1992, respondent and complainant, respectively, filed separate
petitions with this Court praying that the suspension of respondent be lifted. In his petition, respondent
explained that the allegations of maltreatment and failure to provide support were products of
complainant's imagination and were unsubstantiated. He alleged that his eldest daughter, Lorraine Salve,
who was living with him after complainant left their home in 1989, was enrolled in school and was
provided with material and emotional support. Respondent also submitted the affidavit of desistance
executed by complainant on December 27, 1991, attesting that he has reformed, living in the conjugal
home and provides love and paternal affection to his family. On the other hand, complainant contended
in her petition that she and respondent have reconciled, and that respondent has given up his immoral
conduct and is supporting his legitimate family. Appended to her petition is the affidavit of respondent
which was also executed on December 27, 1991. In the Resolutions of February 13, 1992 and March 5,
1992, these petitions were referred to the IBP for appropriate action and recommendation.

However, on March 17, 1992, complainant wrote separate letters to Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and
the IBP negating her earlier petition to lift respondent's suspension. Complainant claimed that
respondent still goes home to his live-in partner, Cita Magallanes; does not support his family, and made
it appear that he had changed his ways so she would sign an affidavit of desistance. [1]cralaw In the
months following, complainant sent two other letters of a similar tenor. [2]cralaw At about the same time,
Lorraine Salve Cordova wrote the Court in support of her father's petition. [3]cralaw

On January 30, 1998, the CBD received a Manifestation/Motion from respondent reiterating his plea that
his suspension be lifted. Respondent stated:

4. That on December 15, 1994, then Chapter President, Atty. MAMERTO B. ALCISO, JR., in compliance
with the directive, submitted with the Supreme Court for its consideration Resolution No. 6, Series of
1994 of the IBP Surigao del Sur Chapter recommending the Lifting of the Suspension of the herein
Respondent for having sufficiently proven to have regained the fitness to be allowed to resume the
practice of law as an officer of the Court by commendably supporting and taking care of his children
despite the absence, neglect and abandonment of his wife (Complainant) who is now living with another
man, not her husband in Cebu City....
5. That on February 18, 1995, the Honorable Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) passed Resolution No. XI- 95-293 ... resolving to adopt and direct the IBP Surigao del Sur Chapter to
report on the behavior and substantiation of Respondent's activities pending his indefinite suspension ....

6. That upon receipt of the copy of the above-cited notice, Respondent wrote a letter under oath to Atty.
Antonia C. Buenaflor, President of the IBP Surigao del Sur Chapter categorically explaining the details and
story about Complainant's continued clandestine extra-marital affair painfully kept secret by the herein
Respodnent in the hope of saving the shuttered [sic] marriage....

7. In compliance with the directive of the Board of Governors of IBP, a report of the Committee dated
August 31, 1996 chaired by Atty. Teresita P. Donasco was submitted to the Chapter President
Recommending that Respondent's Suspension from the practice of law be NOW LIFTED ... [4]cralaw

In a Report dated April 5, 2000, CBD Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo recommended that the suspension
of respondent be lifted, noting that:

... complainant has always informed the Supreme Court as well as this office of any further acts of
immorality committed by respondent. The latest letter from the complainant was received in June 1992.
Since then up to the present, complainant has been silent on her husband's conduct. The silence could
only be interpreted that respondent has made amends and has reformed.

It has been more than 10 years that respondent has suffered the effect of his suspension from the
practice of his legal profession. Such suspension has not only affected him but it has also an adverse
effect to [sic] his family particularly to [sic] his children.

This office is convinced that respondent has reformed as reported by his IBP Chapter. Furthermore, more
than ten years suspension from the practice of law appears to be sufficient penalty for the acts
complained of.[5]cralaw

On May 29, 2000, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIV-000-318, [6]cralaw adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of Commissioner Elamparo, lifting the suspension of
respondent, copy of which was furnished this Court.

In view thereof, the Court directed complainant to comment thereon. [7]cralaw In a letter dated January
18, 2002, complainant expressed disappointment over the move of the Surigao del Sur Chapter in
extending assistance to respondent. She contended that the Surigao del Sur Chapter is not in a position
to know that respondent has already reformed, and claimed that respondent is cohabiting with his
mistress, Isabelita Cinciro, with whom he has a seven-year old son. She also opined that all the
allegations in respondent's motion for early resolution were lies, and that in 1992, respondent tried to
reconcile with her so that his suspension would be lifted. Complainant thought that respondent had
turned in a new leaf but later discovered that this was not so. She also recounted the hardships that she
endured with respondent.

The Court referred this matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation. In its Report dated January 13, 2003, the OBC submitted that the Court is neither
bound by the findings of the IBP nor obliged to accept the same as a matter of course. It also considered
the protestation of respondent that the length of his suspension is more than sufficient punishment and
his insistence that he has fully reformed are not fully meritorious since respondent has not submitted
proof satisfactory to the Court that he has met the standards imposed in the Resolution of November 29,
1989.

On January 27, 2003, upon the recommendation of the OBC, the Court required respondent to comment
on the letter dated January 18, 2002 of complainant and to submit satisfactory proof that he has
continuously provided for the support of his family and that he has given up his immoral conduct.
Respondent received a copy of said resolution on March 21, 2003 but failed to comply therewith. In the
Resolution of October 8, 2003, respondent was required to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with for his non-compliance, a copy of which was received by respondent
on November 12, 2003.

Considering that up to this late date, respondent has neither commented on the letter dated January 18,
2002 of complainant by way of opposition to his motion to lift suspension nor submitted satisfactory
proof that he has continuously provided for the support of his legitimate family and given up his immoral
conduct, the Court Resolves to DENY the motion of respondent that his indefinite suspension from the
practice of law be lifted.

SO ORDERED.
Victoria Barrientos v. Transfiguracion Daarol Adm. Case 1512 29 January 1993

FACTS:Complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a college student,and was about 20 years and 7
months old during the time(July-October 1975) of her relationship with respondent,
whilerespondent Transfiguracion Daarol is married, GeneralManager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric
Cooperative, and 41years old at the time of the said relationship.Respondent is married to Romualda A.
Sumaylo with whom behas a son; that the marriage ceremony was solemnized onSeptember 24, 1955
at Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte by aCatholic priest, Rev. Fr. Anacleto Pellamo, and that saidrespondent had
been separated from his wife for about 16years at the time of his relationship with
complainant.Respondent had been known by the Barrientos family for quitesometime, having been
a former student of complainant'sfather in 1952 and, a former classmate of complainant's mother at the
Andres Bonifacio College in Dipolog City; that he became acquainted with complainant's sister, Norma in
1963and eventually with her other sisters, Baby and Delia and, her brother, Boy, as he used to visit
Norma at her residence; that healso befriended complainant and who became a close friendwhen he
invited her, with her parents' consent, to be one of theusherettes during the Masonic Convention in
Sicayab, DipologCity from June 28 to 30, 1973, and he used to fetch her at her residence in the
morning and took her home from theconvention site after each day's
activities;Respondent courted complainant, and after a week of courtship, complainant accepted
respondent's love on July 7,1973; that in the evening of August 20, 1973, complainant withher parents'
permission was respondent's partner during theChamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom in
theDipolog City, and at about 10:00 o'clock that evening, they leftthe place but before going home, they
went to the airport atSicayab, Dipolog City and parked the jeep at the beach, wherethere were no
houses around; that after the usual preliminaries,they consummated the sexual act and at about
midnight theywent home; that after the first sexual act, respondent used tohave joy ride with
complainant which usually ended at theairport where they used to make love twice or three times
aweek; that as a result of her intimate relations, complainant became pregnant;That after a conference
among respondent, complainant andcomplainant's parents, it was agreed that complainant woulddeliver
her child in Manila, where she went with her mother onOctober 22, 1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on
the 25th and,stayed with her brother-in-law Ernesto Serrano in Singalong,Manila; that respondent
visited her there on the 26th, 27th and28th of October 1973, and again in February and March 1974;that
later on complainant decided to deliver the child in CebuCity in order to be nearer to Dipolog City, and
she went there inApril 1974 and her sister took her to the Good ShepherdConvent at Banawa Hill, Cebu
City; that on June 14, 1974, shedelivered a baby girl at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in CebuCity and,
named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that about the lastweek of June 1974 she went home to Dipolog City;
that duringher stay here in Manila and later in Cebu City, the respondentdefrayed some of her expenses;
that she filed an administrativecase against respondent with the National ElectrificationAdministration;
which complaint, however, was dismissed; andthen she instituted the present disbarment proceedings
againstrespondent.In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfullyrecommend that after hearing,
respondent TransfiguracionDaarol be disbarred as a
lawyer.ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Daarol is grossly immoral.

Medina, L.O. XXIII. IX. MMX

Victoria Barrientos v. Transfiguracion Daarol Adm. Case 1512 29 January 1993

HELD:Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old, proposed loveand marriage to
complainant, then still a 20-year-old minor, knowing that he didnot have the required legal capacity.
Respondent then succeeded in having carnalrelations with complainant by deception, made her
pregnant, suggested abortion, breached his promise to marry her, and then deserted her and
the child.Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.By his acts of deceit
and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires,respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated
his moral delinquency. Hence, hisremoval for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar on the grounds
of deceitand grossly immoral conduct is in order. Good moral conduct is a condition which precedes
admission to the Bar and is not dispensed with upon admission there. It isa continuing qualification to
which all lawyers must possess. Otherwise, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred.

FACTS:

Samar Mining Company, Inc. imported1 crate of welded wedge wire sieves shipped
through Nordeutscher Lloyd

Bill of Lading No. 18:

transshipped at port of discharge: davao

Section 1, paragraph 3 of Bill of Lading No. 18

The carrier shall not be liable in any capacity whatsoever for any delay,
loss or damage occurring before the goods enter ship's tackle to be
loaded or after the goods leave ship's tackle to be discharged,
transshipped or forwarded ...

Section 11:

Whenever the carrier or m aster may deem it advisable or in any

case where the goods are placed at carrier's disposal at or
consigned to a point where the ship does not expect to load or
discharge, the carrier or master may, without notice, forward
the whole or any part of the goods before or after loading at the
original port of shipment, ... This carrier, in making
arrangements for any transshipping or forwarding vessels or
means of transportation not operated by this carrier shall be
considered solely the forwarding agent of the shipper and
without any other responsibility whatsoever even though the
freight for the whole transport has been collected by him. ...
Pending or during forwarding or transshipping the carrier may
store the goods ashore or afloat solely as agent of the shipper
and at risk and expense of the goods and the carrier shall not be
liable for detention nor responsible for the acts, neglect, delay
 or failure to act of anyone to whom the goods are entrusted or
delivered for storage, handling or any service incidental thereto

When the goods arrived in the port of Davao, it was delivered in good order and condition to the
bonded warehouse of AMCYL but it was not delivered and received by Samar Mining Company,
Inc.

Samar filed a claim against Nordeutscher and C.F. Sharp who brought in AMCYL as third party
defendant

RTC: favored Samar

Nordeutscher and C.F. Sharp laible but may enforce judgment against AMCYL

ISSUE: W/N the stipulations in bills of lading exempting the carrier from liability for loss or damage to the
goods when the same are not in its actual custody is valid

HELD: YES. Reversed

Article 1736. The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the
goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for
transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the
consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice to the provisions
of article 1738. - applicable

Article 1738. The extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be operative even
during the time the goods are stored in a warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination,
until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable
opportunity thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them. - no applicable
since article contemplates a situation where the goods had already reached their place of
destination and are stored in the warehouse of the carrier

Article 1884. The agent is bound by his acceptance to carry out the agency, and is liable for
the damages which, through his non-performance, the principal may suffer.

Article 1889. The agent shall be liable for damages if, there being a conflict between his
interests and those of the principal, he should prefer his own.

Article 1892. The agent may appoint a substitute if the principal has not prohibited him from
doing so; but he shall be responsible for the acts of the substitute:

(1) When he was not given the power to appoint one;

(2) When he was given such power but without designating the person and the person appointed was
notoriously incompetent or insolvent
 Article 1909. The agent is responsible not only for fraud, but also for negligence which shall
be judged with more or less rigor by the courts, according to whether the agency was or was not
for a compensation.

The records fail to reveal proof of negligence, deceit or fraud committed by appellant or by its
representative in the Philippines. Neither is there any showing of notorious incompetence or
insolvency on the part of AMCYT, which acted as appellant's substitute in storing the goods
awaiting transshipment