Blackmer v.

United States
Brief Fact Summary. For his failure to respond to subpoenas served upon him in France which required his appearance in the United States,
Blackmer (D) was found to be in contempt of court.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. There must be due process for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in personam.

Facts. Blackmer (D), a U.S. (P) citizen who was residing in France, was served subpoenas to appear in court as a witness in a criminal
trial in the U.S. Contempt proceedings were initiated against Blackmer (D) when he failed to respond to the subpoenas and he was
found guilty and fined. Blackmer (D) appealed on the ground that the federal statute was unconstitutional.

Issue. Must there be due process for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in personam?

Held. (Hughes, C.J). Yes. There must be due process for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in personam. The court may adjudge the
witness guity of contempt if the witness fails to comply with the court order. Congress acted pursuant to its authority in enacting the
statute and it could prescribe a penalty to enforce it. Affirmed.

Nottebohm Case
Facts:
Nottebohm (P), a German by birth, lived in Guatemala (D) for 34 years, retaining his German citizenship and family and business ties
with it. He however applied for Liechtenstein (P) citizenship a month after the outbreak of World War II. Nottebohm (P) had no ties
with Liechtenstein but intended to remain in Guatemala. The naturalization application was approved by Liechtenstein and impliedly
waived its three-year. After this approval, Nottebohm (P) travelled to Liechtenstein and upon his return to Guatemala (D), he was refused
entry because he was deemed to be a German citizen. His Liechtenstein citizenship was not honored. Liechtenstein (P) thereby filed a
suit before the International Court to compel Guatemala (D) to recognize him as one of its national. Guatemala (D) challenged the
validity of Nottebohms (P) citizenship, the right of Liechtenstein (P) to bring the action and alleged its belief that Nottebohm (P)
remained a German national.
Issue. Must nationality be disregarded by other states where it is clear that it was a mere device since the nationality conferred on a party
is normally the concerns of that nation?
Held. NO. issues relating to citizenship are solely the concern of the granting nation. This is the general rule. But it does not mean that
other states will automatically accept the conferring states designation unless it has acted in conformity with the general aim of forging
a genuine bond between it and its national aim. In this case, there was no relationship between Liechtenstein (P) and Nottebohm (P). the
change of nationality was merely a subterfuge mandated by the war. Under this circumstance, Guatemala (D) was not forced to recognize
it.
G.R. No. L-2855 July 30, 1949
BORIS MEJOFF, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the
Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands. Upon liberation he was arrested as a Japanese spy, by U. S. Army Counter
Intelligence Corps. He was handed by the government and later on ordered his release. But it was found out that he had entered the
Philippines illegally without inspection and admission by the immigration officials thus ordered his deportation on the first available
transportation to Russia. The petitioner was then detained while arrangements for his deportation are being made. Thereafter two boats
of Russian nationality arrived but their masters refused to take petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not too long detention of the petitioner was valid?
HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled against the petitioner.

Under section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 any alien who enters this country "without inspection and admission by
the immigration authorities at a designated point of entry" is subject to deportation within five years. In a recent decision of a similar
litigation (Borovsky vs. Commissioner of Immigration) we denied the request for habeas corpus, saying:
"It must be admitted that temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens and
that pending arrangements for his deportation, the Government has the right to hold the undesirable alien under confinement
for a reasonable length of time. However, under established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus.
"The meaning of "reasonable time" depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the availability
of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements concerned and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away. Considering that this
Government desires to expel the alien, and does not relish keeping him at the people's expense, we must presume it is making efforts
to carry out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land. On top of this presumption assurances were made during the oral
argument that the Government is really trying to expedite the expulsion of this petitioner. On the other hand, the record fails to show
how long he has been under confinement since the last time he was apprehended. Neither does he indicate neglected opportunities to
send him abroad. And unless it is shown that the deportee is being indefinitely imprisoned under the pretense of awaiting a chance for
deportation or unless the Government admits that it can not deport him or unless the detainee is being held for too long a period our
courts will not interfere.
Separate Opinion
"To continue keeping petitioner under confinement is a thing that shocks conscience. Under the circumstances, petitioner is entitled to
be released from confinement. He has not been convicted for any offense for which he may be imprisoned. Government's inability to
deport him no pretext to keep him imprisoned for an indefinite length of time. The constitutional guarantee that no person shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law has been intended to protect all inhabitants or residents who may happen to be under
the shadows of Philippine flag. Our vote is to grant the petition and to order the immediate release of petitioner, without prejudice for
the government to deport him as soon as the government could have the means to do so. In the meantime, petitioner is entitled to live a
normal life in a peaceful country, ruled by the principles of law and justice." (Perfecto, J.)
 Pena-Irala v. Filartiga
Brief Fact Summary. A suit against Pena-Irala (D) on the premise that he had tortured to death the decedent of Filartiga (P), was
filed by Filartiga (P).
Synopsis of Rule of Law. For purpose of the Allen Tort Statute, torture may be considered to violate law of nations.
Facts. A suit claiming that Pena-Irala (D) had tortured Filartigas (P) decedent to death while he was a police Inspector General, was
brought by Filartiga (P). All parties were Paraguayan citizens. Jurisdiction was based on the Allen Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. S 1350,
which provided jurisdiction for tort committed in violation of the law of nations. The case was dismissed by the district court for
lack of jurisdiction to which Filartiga (P) appealed.
Issue. For purpose of the Allen Tort Statute, may torture be considered as a violation of the law of nations?
Held. (Judge not stated in casebook excerpt). Yes. For purpose of the Allen Tort Statute, torture may be considered to violate law of
nations. The prohibition against torture has become part of customary international law. Various United Nations declarations such as
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1975 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Torture further portrays
the fact that prohibition against torture has become part of customary international law. Torture has been officially renounced in the
vast majority of nations and this is the reason why this court concluded that torture violates the law of nations.
Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann
Prior to the outbreak of World War II, the Accused was a member of the Austrian SS and later volunteered for a position with the
Head Office of the Security Service (SD) in Berlin (para. 59). When the SD merged with the State Secret Police (Gestapo) to form the
Head Office for Reich Security (RSHA), the Accused occupied the role of Special Officer of Zionist Affairs (para. 61). He was
transferred to Vienna in 1938 to administer the Central Office for the Emigration of Austrian Jews (para. 64). His success was such
that approximately 150,000 Austrian Jews were forced to emigrate and he was appointed head of the new Reich Central Office for
Jewish Emigration in October 1939 (para. 65).
From the outbreak of the War to mid-1941, the Accused devised and carried out the mass deportation of Jewish persons from his role
as the Special Referent for Emigration and Evacuation within the RSHA (paras. 71-75) and explored the possibility of setting up a
slave Jewish state in Madagascar (para. 76).
In early 1942, the Accused was appointed the Referant of the RSHA in matters connected to the Final Solution (para. 88). In
implementing the Final Solution, the Accused received information as to the number of persons to be expelled (para. 90), organised
the transfer of money from evacuated Jews for the disposal of the SS (para. 91), and oversaw the handling of the transport of Jews
(para. 93), not only in the Reich but also in other countries (para. 98). In particular, he headed the Eichmann Special Operations Unit
in Hungary and did his utmost to carry out the Final Solution (para. 111). These "Transport Jews" were taken to concentration camps
and those who were unfit for hard labour were exterminated immediately (para. 145).
In autumn 1942, a cover up effort was begun as bodies in mass graves were burned in an effort to hide the slaughter (para. 148). The
concentration camps were evacuated (para. 149) the Accused in particular was responsible for all administrative matters connected
with the Terezin Ghetto (para. 152) and the camp at Bergen-Belsen (para. 153).
Issues:
Does the District Court of Jerusalem have jurisdiction to try the case in light of the fact that Eichmann is a foreign national and
crimes were committed on foreign territory?
In the affirmative, is jurisdiction negated by the abduction of the Accused from a foreign country?
Is obeying superior orders a defence excluding criminal responsibility?
Courts Holding:
The Courts jurisdiction is founded upon it by the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law 5710-1950. This law does not
violate the principles of international law (para. 10). Israels right to punish is founded on two elements. First, the universal
character of the crimes in question, which are grave offences against the law of nations itself and, in the absence of an international
court, grant jurisdiction to any domestic court (para. 12). Second, the specific character of the crimes, which was the extermination of
the Jewish people, provides the necessary linking point between the Accused and the newly-founded State of Israel, a State established
and recognised as the State of the Jews (para. 34). The crimes committed by the Accused concern the vital interests of the State, thus it
has a right to punish the Accused pursuant to the protective principle (para. 35).

This jurisdiction is not negated by the manner in which the Accused was brought before the Court. It is an established rule of law that
a person standing trial for an offence against the laws of a State may not oppose his being tried by reason of the illegality of his arrest
or the means by which he was brought to the jurisdiction of the court (para. 41). This rule applies equally in cases where the accused is
relying on violations of international, rather than domestic, law (para. 47). Such a violation of international law constitutes an
international tort, which may be cured by waiver. In the present instance, the joint decision of the Governments of Argentina and
Israel of 3 August 1960 cured the international tort committed by Israel when it entered Argentinian territory to abduct the Accused
(para. 50).
Having examined the command structure in place at the SS and the scope of the Accuseds authority, the Court concluded that the
latter acted in accordance with general directives from his superiors but he retained wide powers of discretion (para. 180). Under
Section 8 of the Punishment Law, the defence of superior orders (contained in Section 19(b) of the Criminal Code Ordinance of 1936)
is not available in case of offences enumerated by the afore-mentioned Law but may be taken into account as a factor at sentencing
(para. 218).
The Accused was convicted on all fifteen counts and sentenced to death (para. 244).