The prosecution opposed the motion contending, among others, that the date of the dishonor of
the check, which is on September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense; and
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-62243 October 12, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  Resolving the motion, respondent judge granted the same and cancelled the bail bond of the
-versus-
HON. REGINO VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales and Olongapo City, Branch I, and BENITO GO BIO, JR.,respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Anacleto T. Lacanilao and Carmelino M. Roque for respondents.
 
RELOVA, J.:
Private respondent Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 in Criminal Case No. 5396 in the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, presided by
respondent judge. The information reads:
That on or about and during the second week of May 1979, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, guaranteeing the authenticity and genuineness
of the same and with intent to defraud one Filipinas Tan by means of false
pretenses and pretending to have sufficient funds deposited in the Bank of
the Philippine Island, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make and issue Bank of Philippine Island Check No. D-
357726 in the amount of P200,000.00 Philippine Currency, said accused
well knowing that he has no sufficient funds at the Bank of the Philippine
Island and upon presentation of the said check to the bank for encashment,
the same was dishonored for the reason that the said accused has no
sufficient funds with the said bank and despite repeated demands made by
Filipinas Tan on the accused to redeem the said check or pay the amount
of P200,000.00, said accused failed and continues to fail to redeem the
said check or to pay the said amount, to the damage and prejudice of said
Filipinas Tan in the aforementioned amount of P200,000.00 Philippine
Currency. (pp. 23-24, Rollo)
Before he could be arraigned respondent Go Bio, Jr. filed a Motion to Quash the information
on the ground that the information did not charge an offense, pointing out that at the alleged
commission of the offense, which was about the second week of May 1979, Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 has not yet taken effect.
that assuming that the effectivity of the law — Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 — is on June 29,
1979, considering that the offense was committed on September 26, 1979, the said law is
applicable.
In his reply, private respondent Go Bio, Jr. submits that what Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
penalizes is not the fact of the dishonor of the check but the act of making or drawing and
issuing a check without sufficient funds or credit.
accused. In its order of August 23, 1982, respondent judge said:
The Court finds merit to the contention that the accused cannot be held
liable for bouncing checks prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 although the check may have matured after the effectivity of the
said law. No less than the Minister of Justice decreed that the date of the
drawing or making and issuance of the bouncing check is the date to
reckon with and not on the date of the maturity of the check. (Resolution
No. 67, S. 1981, People's Car vs. Eduardo N. Tan, Feb. 3, 1981;
Resolution No. 192, S. 1981, Ricardo de Guia vs. Agapito Miranda,
March 20, 1981).
Hence, the Court believes that although the accused can be prosecuted for
swindling (Estafa, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code), the Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 cannot be given a retroactive effect to apply to the
above entitled case. (pp. 49- 50, Rollo)
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner submitting for review respondent
judge's dismissal of the criminal action against private respondent Go Bio, Jr. for violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
Petitioner contends that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was published in the April 9, 1979 issue of
the Official Gazette. Fifteen (15) days therefrom would be April 24, 1979, or several days
before respondent Go Bio, Jr. issued the questioned check around the second week of May
1979; and that respondent judge should not have taken into account the date of release of the
Gazette for circulation because Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that
for the purpose of ascertaining the date of effectivity of a law that needed publication, "the
Gazette is conclusively presumed to be published on the day indicated therein as the date of
issue."
Private respondent Go Bio, Jr. argues that although Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was published
in the Official Gazette issue of April 9, 1979, nevertheless, the same was released only on
June 14, 1979 and, considering that the questioned check was issued about the second week of
May 1979, then he could not have violated Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 because it was not yet
released for circulation at the time.
We uphold the dismissal by the respondent judge of the criminal action against the private
respondent.
The Solicitor General admitted the certification issued by Ms. Charito A. Mangubat, Copy xxx xxx xxx
Editor of the Official Gazette Section of the Government Printing Office, stating-
SECTION 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The
This is to certify that Volume 75, No. 15, of the April 9, 1979 issue of the making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by
Official Gazette was officially released for circulation on June 14, 1979. the drawee because of insufficient funds ... . (Emphasis supplied)
(p. 138, Rollo)
ACCORDINGLY, the order of respondent judge dated August 23, 1982 is hereby
It is therefore, certain that the penal statute in question was made public only on June 14, 1979 AFFIRMED. No costs.
and not on the printed date April 9, 1979. Differently stated, June 14, 1979 was the date of
publication of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Before the public may be bound by its contents SO ORDERED.
especially its penal provisions, the law must be published and the people officially informed of
its contents and/or its penalties. For, if a statute had not been published before its violation,
then in the eyes of the law there was no such law to be violated and, consequently, the accused Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
could not have committed the alleged crime.
TEEHANKEE, Actg. C.J., concurring:
The effectivity clause of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 specifically states that "This Act shall take
effect fifteen days after publication in the Official Gazette." The term "publication" in such I concur on the ground that actual publication of the penal law is indispensable for its
clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, that is, to make known to the people in effectivity (Pesigan vs. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174).
general. If the Batasang Pambansa had intended to make the printed date of issue of the
Gazette as the point of reference in determining the effectivity of the statute in question, then
it could have so stated in the special effectivity provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.

When private respondent Go Bio, Jr. committed the act, complained of in the Information as
criminal, in May 1979, there was then no law penalizing such act. Following the special
provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, it became effective only on June 29, 1979. As a
matter of fact, in May 1979, there was no law to be violated and, consequently, respondent Go
Bio, Jr. did not commit any violation thereof.

With respect to the allegation of petitioner that the offense was committed on September 26,
1979 when the check was presented for encashment and was dishonored by the bank, suffice it
to say that the law penalizes the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check
and not only the fact of its dishonor. The title of the law itself states:

AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK

WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

and, Sections 1 and 2 of said Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provide:

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. — Any person who makes

or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing
at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds ... shall be
punished ...

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws
and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a
credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of
ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is
dishonored by the drawee bank.
Republic of the Philippines  Petitioner failed to redeem the mortgaged property within the one-year redemption period and
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115068. November 28, 1996]
FORTUNE MOTORS (PHILS.) INC., Petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY, and THE COURT OF APPEALS,Respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
38340 entitled "Fortune Motors (Phils.) Inc., v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company et
al."[1] The appellate courts decision reversed the decision in Civil Case No. 89-5637 of
Branch 150 of the Regional trial Court of Makati City.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It appears that Fortune Motors (Phils.) Inc. obtained the following loans from the Metropolitan
Bank and Trust company: (1) P20 Million, on March 31, 1982; (2) P8 Million, on April 30,
1983; (3) P2,500,000.00, on June 8, 1983 and; (4) P3 Million, on August 16,
1983.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On January 6, 1984, respondent bank consolidated the loans of P8 Million and P3 Million into
one promissory note, which amounted toP12,650,000.00. This included the interest that had
accrued thereon in the amount of P1,650,000.00.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
To secure the obligation in the total amount of P34,150,000.00, petitioner mortgaged certain
real estate in favor of respondent bank.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Due to financial constraints, petitioner failed to pay the loan upon maturity. Consequently
on May 25, 1984, respondent bank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and in
effect, foreclosed the real estate mortgage.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The extrajudicial foreclosure was actually conducted by Senior Deputy Sheriff Pablo Y. Sy
who had sent copies of the Notice of Extrajudicial Sale to the opposing parties by registered
mail. In accordance with law, he posted copies of the Notice of Sheriffs Sale at three
conspicuous public places in Makati -- the office of the Sheriff, the Assessors office and the
Register of Deeds in Makati. He thereafter executed the Certificates of Posting on May 20,
1984. The said notice was in fact published on June 2, 9 and 16, 1984 in three issues of "The
New Record." An affidavit of publication, dated June 19, 1984,[2] was executed by Teddy F.
Borres, publisher of the said newspaper.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Subsequently, the mortgaged property was sold at public auction for P47,899,264.91 to the
mortgagee bank, the highest bidder.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
so, the titles thereto were consolidated in the name of respondent bank by which token the
latter was entitled to the possession of the property mortgaged and, in fact possessed the
same.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner then filed a complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure, which
covered TCT Nos. 461087, 432685, 457590, 432684, S-54185, S-54186, S-54187, and S-
54188.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On December 27, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment annulling the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On May 14, 1992, an appeal was interposed by the respondent to the Court of Appeals. Acting
thereon, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision rendered by the lower court. Subsequently,
the motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied on April 26,
1994.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Aggrieved by the decision rendered by the Court of appeals, petitioner appealed before this
Court. On May 30, 1994, however, we issued a Resolution denying said petition. Hence, this
motion for reconsideration.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner raises the following issues before us, to wit:
"Ichanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
PUBLICATION OF THE NOTICE OF EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
WAS VALID.[3]
IIchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT THE NOTICES OF EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE, AND SALE
WERE DULY RECEIVED BY THE PETITIONER.[4]
IIIchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO ADJUDGE THE
IRREGULARITIES IN THE BIDDING, POSTING, PUBLICATION, AND THE
SALE OF FORTUNE BUILDING.[5]
IVchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RENDERING
A JUDGMENT BASED ON PRESUMPTION."[6]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner contends that the newspaper "Daily Record"[7] where the notice of extrajudicial
foreclosure was published does not qualify as a newspaper of general
circulation.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It further contends that the population that can be reached by the "Daily Record" is only .004%
as its circulation in Makati in 1984, was 1000 to 1500 per week. Hence, it concludes that only
1648 out of a population of 412,069 were probable readers of the "Daily Record," and that this
is not the standard contemplated by law when it refers to a newspaper of general
circulation.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case of Bonnevie v. Court of Appeals,[8] we had already made a ruling on this
point:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"The argument that the publication of the notice in the Luzon Weekly Courier was
not in accordance with law as said newspaper is not of general circulation must
likewise be disregarded. The affidavit of publication, executed by the publisher,
business/advertising manager of the Luzon Weekly Courier, states that it is a
newspaper of general circulation in x x x Rizal; and that the notice of Sheriffs sale
was published in said paper on June 30, July 7 and July 14, 1968. This
constitutes prima facie evidence of compliance with the requisite publication.
(Sadang v. GSIS, 18 SCRA 491).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that it is published for the
dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide
subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals.
(Basa v. Mercado, 61 Phil. 632). The newspaper need not have the largest
circulation so long as it is of general circulation. (Banta v. Pacheco, 74 Phil.
67)."chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at bench, there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law
regarding publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation. This is evidenced by
the affidavit of publication executed by the New Records publisher, Teddy F. Borres, which
stated that it is a newspaper edited in Manila and Quezon City and of general circulation in the
cities of Manila, Quezon City et al., and in the Provinces of Rizal xxx, published every
Saturday by the Daily Record, Inc. This was affirmed by Pedro Deyto, who was the executive
editor of the said newspaper and who was a witness for petitioner. Deyto testified: a) that the
New Record contains news; b) that it has subscribers from Metro Manila and from all over the
Philippines; c) that it is published once a week or four times a month ; and d) that he had been
connected with the said paper since 1958, an indication that the said newspaper had been in
existence even before that year.[9]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Another contention posited by petitioner is that the New Record is published and edited in
Quezon City and not in Makati where the foreclosed property is situated, and that, when New
Records publisher enumerated the places where said newspaper is being circulated, Makati
was not mentioned.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This contention of petitioner is untenable. In 1984, when the publishers affidavit relied upon
by petitioner was executed, Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Paraaque et. al., were still part of
the province of Rizal. Apparently, this is the reason why in the New Records affidavit of
publication executed by its publisher, the enumeration of the places where it was being
circulated, only the cities of Manila, Quezon, Caloocan, Pasay, Tagaytay, et. al., were named.
Furthermore, as aptly ratiocinated by the Court of Appeals:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"The application given by the trial court to the provisions of P.D. No. 1079 is, to
our mind, too narrow and restricted and could not have been the intention of the
said law. Were the interpretation of the trial court (sic) to be followed, even the
leading dailies in the country like the Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, or The Philippine Star which all enjoy a wide circulation throughout the
country, cannot publish legal notices that would be honored outside the place of
their publication. But this is not the interpretation given by the courts. For what is
important is that a paper should be in general circulation in the place where the
properties to be foreclosed are located in order that publication may serve the
purpose for which it was intended."[10]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner also claims that the New Record is not a daily newspaper because it is published
only once a week.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A perusal of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1079 and Act 3135 shows that the said laws do not
require that the newspaper which publishes judicial notices should be a daily newspaper.
Under P.D. 1079, for a newspaper to qualify, it is enough that it be a "newspaper or periodical
which is authorized by law to publish and which is regularly published for at least one (1) year
before the date of publication" which requirement was satisfied by New Record. Nor is there a
requirement, as stated in the said law, that the newspaper should have the largest circulation in
the place of publication.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner claims that, when its representative went to a newspaper stand to look for a copy of
the new Record, he could not find any. This allegation can not be made a basis to conclude
that the newspaper "New Record" is not of general circulation. By its own admission,
petitioners representative was looking for a newspaper named "Daily Record." Naturally, he
could not find a newspaper by that name as the newspapers name is "New Record" and not
"Daily Record." Although it is the Daily Record Inc. which publishes the New Record, it does
not mean that the name of the newspaper is Daily Record.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner contends that, since it was the Executive Judge who caused the publication of the
notice of the sale and not the Sheriff, the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage should be
deemed annulled.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioners contention in this regard is bereft of merit, because Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1079 clearly
provides that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"The executive judge of the court of first instance shall designate a regular
working day and a definite time each week during which the said judicial notices
or advertisements shall be distributed personally by him[11] for publication to
qualified newspapers or periodicals xxx, which distribution shall be done by
raffle."chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The said provision of the law is clear as to who should personally distribute the judicial
notices or advertisements to qualified newspapers for publication. There was a substantial
compliance with the requirements when it was the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati who caused the publication of the said notice by the newspaper selected by
means of raffle.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
With regard to the second assigned error wherein petitioner claims that it did not personally
receive the notices of extrajudicial foreclosure and sale supposedly sent to it by Metrobank,
we find the same unmeritorious.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Settled is the rule that personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings is not necessary. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 governing extrajudicial foreclosure of
real estate mortgages, as amended by Act No. 4118, requires only the posting of the notice of
sale in three public places and the publication of that notice in a newspaper of general
circulation. It is pristine clear from the above provision that the lack of personal notice to the
mortgagor, herein petitioner, is not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale.
[12]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioners expostulation that it did not receive the mailed notice to it of the sale of the
mortgaged property should be brushed aside. The fact that respondent was able to receive the
registry return card from the mail in regular course shows that the postal item presented by the
return card had been received by the addressee. Otherwise, as correctly contended by
respondent, the mailed item should have been stamped "Returned to Sender," still sealed with
all the postal markings, and the return card still attached to it.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Apparently, this assigned error of petitioner is tantamount to a last ditch effort to extricate
itself from the quagmire it is in. Act 3135 does not require posting of the notice of sale on the
mortgaged property. Section 3 of the said law merely requires that the notice of the sale be
posted for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city
where the property is situated. The aforementioned places, to wit: the Sheriffs Office, the
Assessors Office and the Register of Deeds are certainly the public places contemplated by
law, as these are places where people interested in purchasing real estate
congregate.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
With regard to the fourth assigned error of petitioner, we do not subscribe to the latters view
that the decision of the Court of Appeals was mainly based on the presumption of the
regularity of the performance of official function of the officers involved. A perusal of the
records indubitably shows that the requirement of Act No. 3135 on the extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage had been duly complied with by Senior Deputy Sheriff
Sy.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision rendered in CA-G.R. CV No.
38340 is hereby AFFIRMED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As to the contention that the signature appearing on the registry return card receipt appears to SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
be only a dot and that the photostat copy does not contain a signature at all we find, after a
close scrutiny of the registry return card, that there are strokes before and after the dot. These Padilla, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
strokes appear to be a signature which signifies: a) that the registry claim card was received at
the given address; b) that the addressee had authorized a person to present the claim card at the
post office and receive the registered mail matter; and c) that the authorized person signed the
return card to acknowledge his receipt of the mail matter. Even the trial court in its decision
ruled that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"x x x the Court finds no cogent reason to overcome the presumption that Sheriff
Pablo Sy performed his task regularly and in accordance with the rules. A closer
look at the assailed xerox copy of the registry receipt and the original form which
said xerox was admittedly copied would indeed show that the xerox is not a
faithful reproduction of the original since it does not bear the complete signature
of the addressee as appearing on the original. It does not, however, follow that the
xerox is a forgery. The same bears slight traces of the signature appearing on the
original but, there is no indication that the one was altered to conform to the other.
Rather, there must have been only a misprint of the xerox but not amounting to
any attempt to falsify the same."[13]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner also claims that it had transferred to a different location but the notice was sent to its
old address. Petitioner failed to notify respondent of its supposed change of address. Needless
to say, it can be surmised that respondent had sent the notice to petitioners official
address.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Anent its third assigned error, petitioner assails the posting of the notices of sale by the Sheriff
in the Office of the Sheriff, Office of the Assessor and the Register of Deeds as these are not
the conspicuous public places required by law. Furthermore, it also questions the non-posting
of the notice of sale on the property itself which was to be sold.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary