Se wa aun awn nt 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 4 25 26 2 28 Gary Sherrer (SBN 113047) END BISA Isiand Deve, 403, Peee? Alameda, CA. 94502 ALAMEN® AA INTY Tele: (510) 421-2838 PAGE Attomey for Plaintiff, MEAGHAN KEEGAN (CLERK OF Thi a i By MARGARE 1-100 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA NORTHERN DIVISION Unlimited Civil Jurisdiction MEAGHAN KEEGAN, CASE NO. RG 15796301 Plaintiff, vs. MARCIA QUARLE, DANIEL KANER, and DOES 1 TO FIFTY, INCLUSIVE, Defendants. / ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS 1, Atall relevant times herein mentioned Plaintiff is, and was, an individual residing in Alameda County, California. 2. Atall relevant times herein mentioned Defendant MARICA QUARLE was a defendant in an underlying action, That action concluded in a judgment for Plaintiff. At all relevant times herein mentioned Defendant is, and was, a resident of Alameda County, California. 3. Atall relevant times herein mentioned, Defendant DANIEL KANER, is the son of CASE NO. RG 15796301 SECONDS AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR FRAUDULENT TRANSFER, CONSPIRACY TO ENGAGE IN A FRAUDULENT TRANSFER, FOR AIDING ABETTING A FRAUDULENT TRANSFER, FOR ALTER EGO AS TO PERSON AIDING, AND ABETTING FRAUDULENT TRANSFER, FOR EQUITABLE LIEN AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST OVER FUNDS SUBJECT TO THE FRAUDULENT. TRANSFER, FOR NEGLIGENCE, FOR CANCELLATION OF DEED, FOR COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES and FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS OF SUITwe a Awe wH 10 u 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 2 24 25 26 27 28 Defendant MARCIA QUARLE. The acts alleged as against Defendant DANIEL KANER occurred in Alameda County, California. 4. Jurisdiction is proper in California because the acts complained of herein occurred in the state of Califomia. Named Defendant is domiciled in the state of California. 5. Venue is proper in Alameda County because the named defendant is a resident of Alameda County and because all of the acts complained of herein occurred in Alameda County California. Also, the real property subject to fraudulent transfer is located in Alameda County. 6. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued herein as DOES I through 10, inclusive, and therefore sues these Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this complaint to allege their true names and capecities when ascertained. All named Defendants are the agents, employees, and/or assigns of the other Defendants identified herein as well as those Defendants yet to be identified. 7. On August 19, 2009, Defendant QUARLE initiated suit against Plaintiff for breach of contract asserting that she was an independent paralegel due fees for certain work she allegedly performed for Plaintiff. "Defendant's case was later dismissed on December 9, 2009 8. In the meantime, on September 9, 2010, Plaintiff sued Defendant QUARLE for, inter alia, multiple violations of Penal Code sections 638 et seq. Judgment was issued in Plaintiff's favor on or about December 12, 2014, 9. On December 19 2014, Plaintiff discovered that while her former action was pending, on cts 22, 2010 at “12:38 PM," Defendant QUARLE deeded her house located at 105 Starview Court, Oakland, Ca. to her son, Defendant DANIEL KANER, without consideration. 10. According to public records, On August 31, 2012, Defendant DANIEL KANER, recorded a “Power of Attomey - Special” wherein he appointed his mother, MARCIA CAMPBELL, (an alias for MARCIA QUARLE), as his attorney in fact giving Defendant QUARLE control over ' Itis the policy of escrow companies in this state to file deeds at 8:00 am. The “12:38 PM” recording establishes that the recording was not part of an escrow. CASE NO. RG 15796301 2the property thus acting as Defendant QUARLE’s alter ego or aider and abetter of a fraudulent transfer. 11. Defendant QUARLE’s house had a value of approximately $850,000.00 not subject to any loans. 12. A review of the public records also indicate that the transfer was not subject to an escrow or that title insurance was purchased at the time of transfer 13, On or about December 12, 2014, Plaintiff prevailed at trial obtaining a judgment against Defendant QUARLE. As to Defendant's Cross-Action, Plaintiff also prevailed rendering Defendant zero. 14, Since entry of judgment against Defendant, she has made no effort to pay the judgment. In fact, QUARLE has repeated stated that she will never pay that judgment. At all relevant times herein mentioned, Defendants QUARLE and KANER knew or reasonably should have known that the lawsuit pending against Defendant QUARLE had a high probability of culminating into a judgment against her. 15, Because Defendant QUARLE sought to thwart any effort at Plaintiff's collection of a money judgment, she and her son conspired to prevent any judgement lien from placement against Defendant QUARLE’s real property house located a 105 Starview Court, Oakland, CA. by QUARLE transferring said property to her son, DANIEL KANER, an insider. 16. Due to the above, Defendants QUARLE and KANER formed and:operatéd'a conspiracy. | 17. Defendant's QUARLE and KANER engaged in wrongful conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy by, inter alia, fraudulently transferring an asset in order to thwart Plaintiff from collecting the judgment award. 18. Defendant DANIEL KANER knew that his mother, Defendant MARCIA QUARLE, intended to commit a fraudulent transfer of a major asset to thwart collection activities. 19. Defendants DANIEL KANER and DOE defendants knew that Defendant MARCIA, QUARLE intended to commit a fraudulent transfer of a major asset in order to thwart collection activities. CASE NO. RG 15796301 31 20. All such Defendants acted in concert to commit the fraudulent transfer and acted with the 2 || intent of facilitating the commission of such fraudulent transfer. 3 21. Atall relevant times herein mentioned, Defendant KANER or Defendants KANER and DOES | to 10, had such a unity of interest in committing the acts complained of herein that such Defendant or Defendants that the separate personalities of the such Defendant or Defendants does not really exist. This is especially granted QUARLE a special 0 in her name and subject to a lien, oni Q intain actual control over the property. 22, IfDefendant KANER or Defendants KANER and DOES 1 to 10 are not treated as the alter ego or conspirators of Defendant MARCIA QUARLE an inequitable result will occur. 23. Due to the concert of action by and between Defendant MARCIA QUARLE and KANER or MARCIA QUARLE, KANER and DOES 1 to 10, Plaintiff has suffered damages. 24. A constructive trust should be imposed by operation of law as to the money represented by the judgment Plaintiff obtained against Defendant QUARLE Defendant(s) acquired such money So we aia 1 u 12 13 14 15 6 | 38 Such funds were obtained by a fraudulent transfer of a major asset. Further, given that the 1 underlying judgment is based on a statute which provides f ts, Plaintiff is 7 entitled te in the collection of the j i ineurred 1 19 2 © | unjust enrichment and to prevent Defendants from futher benefitting from their wrongdoing. au 26. KANER’s received money from QUARLE post sale of the asset as 2 consideration for 2 his pe nspiracy to defraud Plaintiff out of money represented by the underlying judgment 3) such that he should be ordered to:disgorge such funds and-pay the sae to Plaintiff. pt 27. Given the malice of QUARLE and KANER, in committing the fraudulent transfer, in addition to any other damages allowed by law, such Defendants should be subject to punitive 26 | damages. 27 (res) to which Plaintiff is justly entitled and to which Defendant(s) are not justly entitled, inasmuch 25. Such constructive trust and equitable lien upon such funds should be imposed to prevent 25 281 CASE NO, RG 15796301 4wea aw aw DH 10 rt 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 a 26 27 28 28. Asa result of the above, Plaintiff actually and proximately suffered damages in a sum according to proof to be presented at trial FOR THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (FRAUDULENT TRANSFER) [AS TO MARCIA QUARLE, DANIEL KANER and DOES] 29. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 28 as if fully set forth herein, 30. Under the Fraudulent Transfer Act (Civ. Code, § 3439-3439.12), a transfer of assets made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer, if the debtor made the transfer (1) with an actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor, or (2) without receiving reasonably equivalent value in return, and either (a) was engaged in ‘or about to engage in a business or transaction for which the debtor's assets were unreasonably small, or (b) intended to, or reasonably believed, or reasonably should have believed, that he or she would incur debts beyond his or her ability to pay as they became due. (Civ. Code, § 3439.04; Reddy v, Gonzalez.(1992) 8 Cal. App. 4th 118, 122-123 [10 Cal. Rptr, 2d 55).) A transfer by a debtor is fraudulent as to creditors whose claims arose before the transfer if the debtor made the transfer (1) without receiving reasonably equivalent value in exchange, [Emphasis added. Jand (2) either (a) was insolvent at the time of the transfer, or (b) became insolvent as a result of the transfer. (Civ. Code, § 3439.05.) [Emphasis added.] 31. " [P]roof of fraudulent intent often consists of "inferences from the circumstances surrounding the transaction." ' " (Annod Corp, v, Hamilton & Samuels (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1298.) In determining actual intent, the court may consider any relevant factors, including "(1) ‘Whether the transfer or obligation was to an insider. [{] (2) Whether the debtor retained possession ‘or control of the property transferred after the transfer. ({] (3) Whether the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed. [{] (4) Whether before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit. [{] (5) Whether the transfer was of substantially all of the debtor's assets. [{] (6) Whether the debtor absconded. [{] (7) Whether the debtor removed or CASE NO. RG 15796301 5Soe aan as ul 12 B 14 15 16 7 18 19 2 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 concealed assets. [f] (8) Whether the value of the consideration received by the debtor was teasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred. [1] @) Whether the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred. [{] (10) Whether the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred. [{] (11) Whether the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienholder who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor." (§ 3439.04, subd. (b).) 32. Defendant DANIEL KANER, as Defendant MARICA QUARLE’s son, is clearly an insider such that prong one is met. Defendant MARICA QUARLE, as her alias MARCIA CAMPBELL, via the Power of Attorney from her son, Defendant DANIEL KANER, clearly demonstrates that she has maintained control over her property such that prong two is met. Defendant MARCIA QUARLE attempted to conceal the transaction by having her son issue the power of attomey to one of her aliases thus meeting prong three, Defendant QUARLE had been actually sued prior to the transfer and knew or should have known of the great likelihood thet a Judgment would be issued against her such that prong four is met Because Defendant QUARLE is receiving SSI, obtained @ fee waiver on that basis from the Court, this is Defendant QUARLE’s major asset thus meeting prong five. Defendant QUARLE removed and concealed the asset by deeding the property to her son, Defendant DANIEL KANER and having him issue a power of atiomey to her under an alias thus meeting prong seven. As above, there is no record of any consideration paid by Defendant, DANIEL KANER for the initial transfer thus meeting prong eight. Defendant QUARLE as a debtor became insolvent by virtue of the transfer such that prong nine is met. It is obvious that Defendant QUARLE made the transfer while the instant action was pending against her thus meeting prong ten, And, Defendant MARCIA QUARLE, post sale of the asset, paid Defendant DANIEL KANER certain funds as remuneration for his part in the conspiracy which funds were not a reasonable equivalent of the value such that the initial transfer was a sham. 33. Out of the eleven factors considered by the Court in a fraudulent transfer matter, nine such factors exist here resulting in overwhelming evidence of the fraudulent transfer. 34. A claim under subdivision (a)(1) of section 3439.04 "does not require proof of anything CASE NO. RG 15796301 6‘more than actual intent to defraud." (Reddy v. Gonzalez, (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 118, 123.) 35. As above, Defendant QUARLE owned the property prior to the transfer and such property had equity of approximately $650,000.00 at that time. 36. Defendant QUARLE’s transfer of her house in Alameda County to her son, Defendant DANIEL KANER without consideration constitutes a fraudulent transfer. 37. KANER’s received money from QUARLE post sale of the asset as a consideration for his part in the conspiracy to defraud Plaintiff out of money represented by the underlying judgment such that he should be ordered to disgorge such funds and pay the same to Plaintiff. 38. Given the malice of QUARLE and KANER, in committing the fraudulent transfer, in addition to any other damages allowed by law, such Defendants should be subject to punitive damages. 39. Plaintiff has actually and proximately suffered damages by virtue of Defendant QUARLE?’s fraudulent transfer in an amount according to proof presented a trial. 40. Post sale of the subject real property to a third party, QUARLE paid KANER for his participation in the fraudulent transfer which placed the asset beyond Plaintiff's ability to collect the money awarded in the underlying judgment. WHEREFOR, Plaintiff prays for judgment as against Defendant QUARLE as hereinafter set forth. FOR THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (NEGLIGENCE) [AS TO KANER and all DOE Defendants] 41. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 42. Defendant KANER and all DOE Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty of due care which included not assisting Defendant MARCIA QUARLE in committing a fraudulent transfer. 43. Defendants KANER or Defendants KANER and all DOES, breached their respective duties of due care by facilitating Defendant MARCIA QUARLE’s fraudulent transfer of a major CASE NO. RG 15796301 7To: Marcia Quarle Page 9 of 11 2017-01-08 00:54:37 (GMT) 15102173930 From: Gary Sherrer ee ee asset in order to thwart collection activities 44, Defendant QUARLE paid money to KANER for his participation in the fraudulent transfer scheme. Such funds as ill-gotten gains are subject to disgorgement. 45, Due to the breaches of duty, as above, Plaintiff actually and proximately suffered injury and damages according to proof presented at tial. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as hereinafter set forth. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants and each of them, as follows: 1. For compensatory damages according to proof presented at trial; 2. For punitive and exemplary damnges-according to proof presented at trial. per Section 3294 of the Civil Code which permits an award of punitive damages “for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where itis proven by clear end convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice." ($3294, subd, (a).); 3, For ‘he imposition of « constructive rust and equitable lem: 4. For disgorgement of money obtained by KANER through his assistance in the fraudulent transfer; 5. For attomey fees and costs incurred in the prosecution of this ease; and, 6, For whatever and further relief the Court may deem proper. Date 1 2. (es jary Sherrer, altophey MEAGHAN KEFGAN, PlaintiiT CASE NO. RG 15796301 8To: Marcia Quarle Page 10 of 11 2017-01-08 00:54:37 (GMT) 45102173630 From: Gary Sherrer ae ARS 208.020 [Briony ox pant entnoat arcony Bma nwBarven a aa Fextounrise my GARY L. SHERRER (Stale Bar no: 113047) jLaw oflice of Gary Sherrer [875-A\ island Drive #403, |Alameda, Ca. 94502 ‘eusmHoueno: 510-421-2838 090. soveau 510-217-3930 ‘aa acon ous: shertlaw(@ao},com arraakty £03 itenay Plaintiff, Meaghan Keegan ‘SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ALAMEDA smecracoress 1295 Fatlon St covrangae case Oakland. Ca, 94610 saoenuve Rene C Davidson Courthouse PeTTonsrimamrire Meaghan Keegan {ESPONDENTIDEFENDANE-Marcia Quarle | i ar eases: L PROOF OF PERSONAL SERVICE—GIVIL RGIS796301 (@o not use this Prot af Service to show service of a Summons and Gompiaint) 4. Jamover 1B years of age and not a party te this action, 2. | sano she folowing dos splat (Il) The documents are listed in the Attectiment to Proof of Persontel Service— Civil (Documents Served) (farm POS-020(0)). Yoko at edoress. dete, nd * one BASEL ease Soto b Address 25S Fost St. Cary FPAseO © Sale: YARN 26 DEES Lf sts Sy Pee “The poisdns are listed in the Ailacment fo Fro of Personal Service—Civi (Persons Served) ‘frm POS. 2. (J nota registered Calitomia process server. & [7] siempioyee or independent contractor of a tb Eo) arepistered Galforia process server. istered Caltornia process earvar 4. [27 exernet rom registration undes Business & Professions ode section 2235040), 5. My nama, aédess;tekephane numberart, applicable, couity of registian anc member ate (Speci: Walt Stannard | Stannard and Son Investigations. Berkeley, Ca, 93703 i 6. [21 tcectare under pensly of penury under the jaws of the Stele of Calorie thal he foregoing i rue and correct 7. Cl Lams Calton sent r mara and certy hatte oreadng tuo we cae, Date RT ; sen Le camatis eteccae PROOF OF PERSONAL SERVICE—CIVIL RS eae ‘Sais sangee ee 10 u 12 1B 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 23 24 25 26 2 28 red e. P72 id Bees 403 Teles Sib) 312838 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA - NORTHERN DIVISION Unlimited Civil Jurisdiction MEAGHAN KEEGAN, CASE NO. RG 15-796301 Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT'S SPECIAL ve INTERROGATORIES MARCIA QUARLE, et al, Defendants. / Requesting Party: Defendant, MARCIA QUARLE Responding Party: Plaintiff, MEAGHAN KEEGAN, Set: One Plaintiff, MEAGHAN KEEGAN (“Plaintiff”), responds to Defendant's Special Interrogatories as follows: Special Interrogatory No. 1: “Have you ever been involved in any other legal actions as a plaintiff involving real estate? If so, state: a. Describe the nature of the lawsuits, the causes of action, and the result of each lawsuit. b. (Letter b was not propoiinded.) CASE NO. RG1474892 Plaintif’s motion to compel 1 afet [1610 n 12 B “4 15 16 17 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 a7 28 @ By CT00439 ©. Have you alleged claims of “conspiracy” and “elder abuser” in other lawsuits?” Response to Interrogatory No. : Within the last 10 years, yes. a. 1. In case Contra Costa County Case NO. CASE NO. C09- 02862 and in or about 2009, I sued:a.neighbor for the following! abatement of private Auisance, Statutory nuisance, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, adverse possession, prescriptive easement, injunctive relief and damages. ‘That matter settled in my-favor:a. 2. In 2010, in Contra Costa Case No. MSC10-03266 I cross-complained for breach of express contract, breach of implied contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent concealment, fraud in inducement, breach of fiduciary duties, intentional interference with Prospective economic advantage, intentional infliction of emotional distress, for an accounting, negligence, injunctive relief, rescission of contract, unjust enrichment, declaratory relief, elder financial abuse, and civil conspiracy. That matter settled in»my favors 3. In Contra CostalCouinty Casé NOUMSCI5.02160 | in or about 2010, I sued for breach of express contract, breach of implied contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent inducement, breach of Fiduciary duties, negligence financial elder abuse, an accounting, the imposition ofa constructive ‘trust and equitable lien, for rescission of contract, for unjust enrichment, declaratory relief, and for conversion of funds. ‘Thematter settled in my favor, a. 4. In Contra Costa County Case No. Ii'or about 2010, I sued for breach of contract express terms, breach of contract implied terms, negligence, ‘abuse, breach of fiduciary duties, fraudulent inducement and concealment, for an accounting, declaratory relief, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust entichment, constructive trust and equitable lien, declaratory relief, money had and received, breach of Buaranty, conversion, civil conspiracy, alter ego, account statedyand promissory estoppel. That matter was settled in my favor. a. 5. In Contra Costa County Case NOUMSC12 £7782, inr about 201 1 sued fr breach of express contact, breach of implied contac, breatvot the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duties, negligence, ae |ysiseanitecounting, rescission of contact, fraudulent inducement, constructive trust and equitable Hien, disgorgement of profits, unjust enrichment, declaratory relief, alteregos civil conspiracyyand-» CASE NO. RG1474892 Plaintiff's motion to compel 2son ee a aw 10 uN 2 B 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 sy CT004394 unfair competition. That iSMGOMOER Ey eee, Special Interrogatory No. “State in detail the fact or facts on which you based your claim at the Labor Board Hearing that Quarle won a lawsuit against Hardie Roof Shakes involving 105 Starview Court, Oakland, CA...” oo Response to Special Interrogatory No. 2: You.nformed meso. . Sp: Interrogatory No. “Did you respondto Quiles 13/9/2010 Petition to Stop Elder Abuse? \se to Special Inters tory No. 3: -oolbdo not recall such aipettion nor of any response. Special Interrogatory No. 4: “State when you first started investigating any part of the transaction involving the transfer of the subject property known as 105 Starview Court, Oakland. [question mark omitted in original] Response to ial Interrogatory No. 4: Immediately following the judgment inthe underlying ease, Special Interrogatory No. 5: “State the facts which led you to file the Complaint to Set Aside Fraudulent Transfer.” Response to Interrogatory No. 5: After researching the elements of fraudulent transfer, I determined that your conduct met conditions. yecial Interrogatory No. 6: “State whether you read the content of Quarle's Elder Abuse Action against you filed on 20105 ema, Response to Interrogatory No. 6: | am not-aware of such-an actions, was not served abuse. a complaint against me for elder CASE NO. RG1474892 Plaintiff's motion to compel 3Cer an een 10 B 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 2 23 24 25 27 28 SROs eee eee eee ee ee eee ee ) es CT004393 “What was the basis of your claim in Keegan v. Quarle RG10-53722 that “from August of 2009 until October 2010, you were unable to rent a vacant unit which earns you $26,000 a year at 2380 Ellsworth Berkeley (an “income property”)"?"* Response to Interrogatory No. 7: ‘was horror stricken and emotionally paralyzed due'to your Conduet aiid Was unable ondegeks acon torent she pegpes = Special Interrogatory No. 8: “Are you Solvent at the time you filed this lawsuit to set aside a fraudulent transfer? If so, state: A. The total value of your total assets and the B. The amount of your total liabilities. C. The Amount of money owed to you.” Response to Interrogatory No. 8: ‘Yes. 2.5 million. 1.0 million. $116, 000.00, Special Interrogatory No. 9: “Do you contend that the deed was executed through fraud in violation of UFTA, and if so, state each fact on which you base such contention.” Response to Interrogatory No. 9: Yes. You deeded the property to your son,aan insider. You did so in order to prevent me from placing a:jucigment lien-om the property. You actualy retained control over the property via a. special power of atfomey which your on gave yous Special Interrogatory No. Response to Interrogatory No, 10: No. Special Interrogatory No. 11: CASE NO. RG1474892 Plaintiff's motion to compel 4Os CT004394 1 “If so, state: 2 2. the act of which you were accused in each case. 3 ‘b. whether any refund or exchange of property was made as a result of such accusation.” 4] Response to Interrogatory No. 11: 5 Iwas no accused. 6 | Special Interrogatory No. 12: 7 “Do you contend that defendant received less than a reasonable equivalent value (or | “adequate consideration”) in exchange for the transfer of real estate in violation of the UFTA?” 9 Response to Interrogatory No. 12: 10 ‘Yes. I believe your son did not pay you a reasonable value for the property when you n ‘transferred it to him. 12] Special Interrogatory No, 13: B “Do you contend that Quarle was left:insolvent because of the transfer of 105 Starview — ; as Resi nterrogatory No. 13: contend that you became insolvent when you transferred the property to: yourS0H Without 16 17] ‘*ivingthereasonablevalueoFtHAE propery.” ‘Special Interrogatory No. 14: - “Do you at present claim any interest against Daniel Kanet? Ifso, state: . 4. the nature of the interest oe b. the basis of the interest.” a Response to Request No. 14.: 2 ‘Yes. I claim damages and punitive damages for fraudulent transfer. 251! Special Interrogatory No. 15.: 24 “Did you read the contents of Quarle’s Eder Abuse TRO Petition in Case RG10-5505842” 251 Response to Interrogatory No. 15: 26 No. Twas not served with any such documentation and I could not locate that case number a. 28 CASE NO. RG1474892 Plaintiff's motion to compel 5Seerauaeun u B 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 2 23 24 25 26 7 28 ar = eo 0., CT004395 on domain web. Special Interrogatory No. 16.: “What the basis for your claim for constructive fraudulent transfer pursuant Cal Civil Code Section 3439.05" Response to Interrogatory No. 16: ‘You made a transfer to an insider without adequate consideration to avoid a lien on the property following a judgment leaving you insolvent. Special Interrogatory No. 17.: “Having read the contents of Quarle’s Demurrer to your complaint, are you still seeking to avoid the transfer by Quarle to defendant Kener?” Response to Interrogatory No. 17: Yes. Special lo. 18.: “Having read the contents of Quarle’s Demurrer and the fact thatthe property was sold to Seifis on 8/23/12 what is the basis for your cause of action for constructive fraudulent transfer purstiant to Cal Civil Code Section 3429.05?” Response to Interrogatory No. 18: ‘You made a transfer to an insider without adequate consideration to avoid a lien on the property following a judgment leaving you insolvent. Special Interrogatory No. 19.: “Having read the contents of Quarle’s Demurrer to your complaint, are you stil seeking to avoid the transfer by Quarle to defendant Kaner™ Response to Interrogatory No. 19: oe Special Interrogatory No. 20.: “If you contend that you suffered ham/damages as a result of the transfer of 105 Starview Cour, please state each and every fact on which you base this contention?” CASE NO. RG1474892 Plaintiff's motion to compel 6So wesw au een 13 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 a 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 eo. @ a CT004394 Response to Interrogatory No. 20: You made a transfer to an insi +r without adequate consideration to avoid a lien on the property following a judgment leaving you insolvent. As a result I suffered damages in that you and your co-conspirator, Daniel Kaner, placed money represented by the underlying judgment out of my reach to satisfy that judgment causing me to incur the costs of the present lawsuit Special Interrogatory No. 21: “If you contend that the statute of limitations has NOT run on the claims in your lawsuit, please set forth all facts on which such claim is based?” Response to Interrogatory No. 21: | do,fot know to which statute you refer; Without the specific statute, I am unable to respond. “What evidence do you have that Defendant acted with fraudulent intent by transferring the property?” Response to Interrogatory No. 22: ‘You made a transfer to an insider without adequate consideration to avoid a lien on the Property following. a incamemsleenrieryosssaanivertiow = « Special Interrogatory No. 23: “What evidence to you have that the 8/31/12 Deed of Trust Recorded Document #2012286417 showing a transfer from Kaner to Diane and Majeed Seifi as an “improper transaction” by debtor Quarle to avoid your judgment?” Response to Interrogatory No. 23: ee Special Interrogatory No. “Do you contend that Quarle sent you an email on 9/28/09 stating: Keegan wanted proof of fraud on the part of Bruce Fonarow in order to back up a case with Dept. Of Justice regarding ACM CASE NO. RG1474892 PlaintifPs motion to compel 710 ul 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 2 23 24 25 26 2 28 @ sity CT004397, fraudulent loan activities... and violations of Investors’ Subscription Agreements”? [sic] Response to Interrogatory No. 24: ‘You gid not provide thejemail: Without the email, I do not have sufficient information with which to respond. Special Interrogatory No. 25: “Did you contend in your filed 11/1/10 Opposition to Quare's Durer to your 2010 Response to Interrogatory No. 25: Yes! ial Interrogatory No. 26: “What is the basis of you [sic] cause of action for Negligence against Kaner?” Response to Interrogatory No. 26: Either he knew that you placed the property in his name to avoid paying the judgment or he should have known in which case he is negligent in helping you avoid paying the judgment. Special tory No. 27: “On 11/23/15 did you testify under oath that Maricris Patrimionio admitted to Craig Rawson that she “used your ATM card without your permission?” Response to Interrogatory No. 27: Yes. ecial Interrogat 28: “What is the basis of your contention that Defendants engaged in certain financial transactions that violated the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA)?” Response to Interrogatory No. 28: a leaving you insolvent CASE NO. RG1474892 Plaintiff's motion to compel 8wea aween u 12 13 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 2 23 24 25 26 ou 28 CT004394 Special Interrogatory No. 29: “What is the basis of your claim that Daniel Kaner owes any duty to Meaghan Keegan?” Response to Interrogatory No. 29: Daniel Kaner had a duty not to tortiously assist you in avoiding paying the underlying judgment. He breached he duty set forth in Civil Code section 3439.04, “What evidence supports your claim that Daniel Kaner was the alter ego of Marcia Quarle?” Response to Interrogatory No. 30: ‘As between you and Daniel Kaner, there is a unity of interest and control over an asset such that the asset could not be reached to satisfy the judgment. You used Daniel Kaner to place your property in his name to avoid paying the judgment. Special Interrogatory No. 31: “How much have actually paid Paul Raymond Turley in attorney fees as of 2/27/2016?” Respons 31: $25,000.00. ec 32: “What is the basis of your contention that there was a “conspiracy” between Quarle and Kaner to avoid creditor Meaghan Keegan?” ‘You made a transfer to an insider without adequate consideration to avoid a lien on the property following a judgment leaving you insolvent. cial In 2 “When did you first discover the fraudulent nature of the trarisfer of the property?” Response to Interrogatory No. 33: ‘As soon as my appeal was dismissed as to the underlying lawsuit, I attempted to place a Judgment lien on your property and discovered that you had transferred the property to your son. ial Interrogatory No. 34: CASE NO. RG1474892 Plaintiff's motion to compel 91 ee YW AH kD 10 n rR 13 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 2 23 24 25 26 2 28 CT004399 Special Interrogatory No. 29: “What is the basis of your claim that Daniel Kaner owes any duty to Meaghan Keegan?” Response to h at 29: Daniel Kaner had a duty not to tortiously assist you in avoiding paying the underlying judgment. He breached he duty set forth in Civil Code section 3439.04. “What evidence supports your claim that Daniel Kaner was the alter ego of Marcia Quarle?” Response to Interrogatory No. 30: As between you and Daniel Kaner, there is a unity of interest and control over an asset such that the asset could not be reached to satisfy the judgment. You used Daniel Kaner to place your property in his name to avoid paying the judgment. “How much have actually paid Paul Raymond Turley in attomey fees as of 2/27/2016?” Response to Interrogatory No. 31; $25,000.00. ‘Special Interrogatory No. 32: “What is the basis of your contention that there was a “conspiracy” between Quarle and Kaner to avoid creditor Meaghan Keegan?” Response to Interrogatory No. 32: ‘You made a transfer to an insider without adequate consideration to avoid a lien on the property following a judgment leaving you insolvent. “When did you first discover the fraudulent nature of the transfer of the property?” sponse t tory No. ‘As soon as my appeal was dismissed as to the underlying lawsuit, I attempted to place a judgment lien on your property and discovered that you had transferred the property to your son. recial Interrogator CASE NO. RG1474892 Plaintiff's motion to compel 910 u 12 13 14 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 2 28 i | ef > CT004394 “What is the basis of your claim that Daniel Kaner is an “insider” who acted with the actual intent to prevent Keegan's collection of her purported judgment?” Response to Interrogatory No, 34: He is you son. His actions including granting you a power of attorney demonstrate that he intended to block my collection efforts, Special Interrogatory No. 35: “What is the basis of your claims Craig Rawson is Paul Raymond Turley’s law clerk?” Response to Interrogatory No. 36, 17:” Craig Rawson was Paul Turley’s law clerk, Date: 11/12/16 CASE 10 ORT Plaintiff's motion to compel 102c eryr aw eaen 10 u 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 2 23 m4 25 26 7 28 CT00440q pertains. I have reviewed the foregoing Responses to special interrogatories - set one and declare under penalty for perjury under the laws of the state of California that their substance is true of my ‘own personal knowledge, except where the Responses are stated under information and belief or are purely in objection form, and as for those Responses I believe them to be true. Date: 11/12/16 CASE NO. RG1474892 Plaintiff's motion to compel uwe ENDORSED “AtamE LED MARCIA QUARLE LAMEDA COUNT} 651 Addison Street Suite 210 JAN = 6 2017 Berkeley, California 94710 oe Telephone: (510) _ 621-9225 CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR ct Facsimile: (510) 66-1004 By: ERICA BAK Email: kanerassociatestgnail.com KER, Deput Attorney for DEFENDANT MARCIA QUARLE NS SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA UNLIMITED CIVIL JURISDICTION Case No.: RG15-796301 Complaint Filed 12/10/2015 FAC Filed 03/10/2016 Assigned to Judge Spain MEAGHAN KEEGAN, } d } vs. ) MARCIA QUARLE’S MOTION FOR d ) ) d Plaintifs, TERMINATING SANCTIONS OR MARCIA QUARLE, DANIEL KANER and) CONTEMPT, does 1-50;, ‘MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT, C.C.P. 2023.030(d) (1) (4) Defendants Reservation #/8/ 2Y OY Date: Time: 2:30 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on in Department 19 of the above-mentioned Court at 1221 Oak’ Street, Third Floor, Dept. 19, Oakland, California, MARCIA QUARLE, will and hereby does, move this Court pursuant of C.C.P. 2023.030(d) (1) & (4) for an Order for terminating sanctions, striking one or all of the pleadings and entering judgment against plaintiff MEAGHAN KEEGAN and her attorney, GARY LEE SHERRER, ESQ. in all proceedings in this action. This motion arises from KEEGAN’S VIOLATION OF THREE COURT ORDERS COMPELLING DISCOVERY INCLUDING THE ORDERS OF 5/26, 8/31 AND 11/30/16. Furthermore Quarle seeks the sum of $6,000.00... Associated with bringing this Motion. URT10 ua 2 a3 a4 as is nv 18 19 20 a 22 23 24 25 26 20 28 a na, This Motion is based upon this Notice and the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Declaration of Counsel, as well as the Request for Judicial Notice filed herewith, all [papers and pleadings on file in this action and such other oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at or before any hearing in this matter. Marcia Quarle MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION The sanctions motion now pending in this case raises significant issues of Rule 37c of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the standard of proof governing spoliation and the relief appropriate for destruction of electronically stored information (ESI). Keegan’s underlying complaint alleged violation of Penal Code 637. A statute subject to a one year statute of limitations. Defendant knows that Plaintiff Keegan altered certain emails relevant to the claims in the underlying case and in this case. These are emails that she actually [previously produced in a Motion for Summary Judgment in the underlying case. When Keegan first realized that the COA was subject to a one year SOL, she changed her story. based on emails purportedly sent by Quarle. Therefore when Keegan first became aware of her first COA was critical Quarle’s10 a a2 1B 4 as 16 rt 18 a9 20 a 22 23 24 28 26 27 28 affirmative defense that case was barred by the one year statute of limitations. On May 23, 2013 after Quarle paid $5000 to defeat Keegan’s MSJ, she first became aware that Keegan altered and fabricated the dates of critical emails. Quarle sought to explore the discrepancy and in this litigation Quarle demanded Keegan produce certain emails in native form. The emails were Keegan’s trial exhibits # 2 (email of 11/08/09 and # 24 (email of Marcia Quarle, dated 7/6/09). Keegan identified these exhibits as “an email dated 11/08/09 (trial exhibit # 2) which contains a two page excerpt of a separate recorded conversation between Defendant and Plaintiff recorded on 6/32/09” and “an email from Defendant sent to Plaintiff on November 26, 2009 (Reegan’s trial exhibit #24) wherein she quotes an excerpt of a recorded telephone conversation.” Keegan did not respond to Quarle’s discovery requests. On 5/26/16 she retained new counsel Gary Lee Sherrer. Keegan was ordered 3 times to provide “objection free responses to Quarle’s discovery requests”. She failed to respond in any meaningful way to a single discovery request. Defendant Quarle subjected the emails to a forensic analysis and it was determined that “Keegan’s email production revealed that the two emails appeared in two different versions within the underlying lawsuit. The “top” level version shows the message in full as well as sender and recipient information and the date and time each message was sent/received. However, behind each email message is a near-duplicate copy of the message containing the identical message with A DIFFERENT, DATE AND TIME AND TIME ZONE. Keegan deleted the original emails.10 uu a2 13 a4 as 16 nv 18 19 20 a 22 23 24 25 26 2 28 — —— However her deletions left a digital imprint. Fortunately, jquarle still retained the actual original emails. The anomaly of the difference between the two sets of emails is that Keegan “copied in word original emails, sent a forwarded copy of the emails to herself, and falsely claimed that the forwarded copy was the original and ONLY email at trial in Case RG10-537233. The original emails were then replaced with a second, obviously altered version of the email correspondence, which was then produced at trial on 7/23/14. For example Keegan's Trial Exhibit 2 was a purported email of 11/08/09. However it is clear that this email is a forgery. Mr. Shapiro gives one example an email from Marcia Tillen dated 9/28/09 at 11:48:55 PM from mtillen@sbeglobal net to mtillen@sbeglobal.net with a cc to meaghankeegan@gmail.vom. (Quarle produced the original email with the full header in discovery in this case. In discovery Quarle served Keegan with the 9/28/09 email with its full header information in native format. At trial Keegan claimed that a “forwarded” email dated 11/08/09 was the original. email and she deleted the original to send information. In the Verdict in Keegan v. Quarle, Judge Bereola mistakenly determined that the 11/08/09 email was the FIRST TIME Keegan became aware of her claim and therefore Keegan’s case was NOT barred by the one year SOL. This Decision resulted in a Verdict for Keegan in the sum of $6000.00. Quarle immediately recovered the underlying original email communication. This email was served on Keagan as a RFA and an RPD in this case and it was shown both to Keegan and her attorney Gary Sherrer. In Keegan’s trial exhibit she altered -410 a a2 13 4 15 16 rt 16 1s 20 a 22 23 24 25, 26 27 28 the underlying original to/from/date information and clumsily [produced a forwarded version with obvious errors such a: spelling the word “week” as “we” (See Trial Exh. # 2 the 11/08/09 purported email) Quarle is unaware of any reason the produced emails would show a different date and time unless it was altered and he concluded that the presence of the original emails is the result of intentional human action, and not an inadvertent process. Attached to this motion are the two versions of the same emails with the different dates. Quarle gives as a second example an email from Marcia “Paralegal2@me.com to meaghankeegan@comcast.net with a cc to Imtillen@sbcglobal.net sent on July 6, 2009 at 2:31 PM PDT. In this case Quarle served Keegan with RPDs and RFAs and included both versions of the 9/28/09 and the 7/6/09 emails and Keegan refused to respond to any discovery regarding the matter. In Response to Quarle’s RFA regarding the forged 11/08/09 email, Keegan's attorney stated it was “irrelevant to the current controversy.” Keegan denied that she had altered emails. See letter of 3/23/13 addressed to Quarle. But she did. Quarle’s attorney attempted to depose Ms. Keegan on 5/14/14. regarding the email but Keegan was a no-show and she claimed some “crime fraud exception”. What is worse is that Keegan sought over $345,000 from Quarle based on these altered emails. Defendant does not allege that Keegan has “destroyed the original email in its entirety.” In fact Quarle does not allege that the actual content of the two emails at issue is material to any claims or issues in the lawsuit. But the critical issue is Keegan’s false claim that “she was unaware of the emails at20 an 2 a3 rT 45 16 uv 18 19 20 aa 2 23 2 25 26 27 28 — _ issue until Dec. of 2009. Plus she sought punitive damages for Quarle’s concealment of emails, which never happened. This is ‘what happened in the famous case of Ceglia v. Zuckerberg. 600 F. |App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2015) “A court has inherent power to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” The evidence supports the defendant’s allegations that plaintiff intentionally altered the emails at issue. Defendant’s attorney Zadick Shapiro is well-qualified. He discovered that both versions resided on Quarle’s computer and on her iphone 4. He discovered that the original 7/6/09 email was actually [produced by Keegan but with a different date. In her Motion for Summary Judgment she produced the 7/6/09 email as her CE-6 and described it as “Defendant's Responses to Plaintiff’s RPDs including a transcribed surreptitiously taped recorded conversation between the parties which purports to have been transcribed on 1/14/09 and emailed to Plaintiff on 11/26/09”. In fact on 7/6/09 at 7:38 PM Keegan replied to Quarle’s 7/6/09 at 6:32 PM email with the SUBJECT: ‘PLEASE MARCIA NO MORE EMAILS.” See Email exhibits. Thus it is clear Keegan read and received the 7/6/09 email but in order to deceive the Court and extort money out of Quarle she claimed it was received by her only on 12/26/05 Keegan’s defense is less than compelling. Keegan claims the “underlying emails are irrelevant to the current controversy.” Sherrer ends his 12/30/16 letter with a threat “if lyou pursue a motion to compel, Plaintiff will oppose and seek sanctions.” But she does not admit that they are both the same -610 a 32 13 u 1s 16 u 18 as 20 a 2 23 24 25 26 27 28 ~~ an and that she deliberately lied about the dates she received them. In the words of attorney Deborah Levy, “Meaghan Keegan is a greedy liar.” At present, research discloses 18 lawsuits and one criminal case that Keegan initiated, involving the same basic fraud and the same species of failures to comply with court orders or discovery obligations at issue here. In failing to comply with this Court’s orders, KEEGAN has withheld evidence necessary to Defendant’s Affirmative Defenses of the 1) The Statute of Limitations in Case RG10-537233; 2) Lack of Damages 3) Contributory Negligence. Despite multiple warnings by this Court that non compliance with the Court’s orders would result in contempt or sanctions, Keegan did not waiver in her disrespect for this Court’s authority. In light of the significance of the materials withheld by Keegan, and Keegan’s continued recalcitrance, this Court is justified in determining that a terminating sanction is necessary to respond to Keegan’s persistent patter of discovery abuses. Defendant therefore xespectfully requests that this Court issue an order imposing sanctions, including monetary and terminating sanctions, striking Keegan’s Complaint(s) and entering a default in favor of Quarle. The record derived from these cases and the current case shows that Keegan consistently acts as a ser: 1 filer, a serial scofflaw, who will say or do anything to delay and obstruct the administration of justice, manipulating the system and violating court orders like the ones directly at issue here. -710 a 2 13 1 a5 16 uv 18 19 20 21 2 23 24 25, 26 20 28 —_ ~ L Judge Spain saw through Keegan’s deceit. See 3 court order attached hereto. Since May of 2016 Quarle has attempted to depose Ms. Keegan. She retained Gary Sherrer who consistently xefused to set a date for her deposition. In one conversation Mx. Sherrer claimed “he did not have his calendar with him”. In another she was unavailable for three months. On 5/13/14 Keegan was just a no-show claiming she did not want to “open up discovery with an old case” and the next day she filed an ex jparte Motion to Continue the Trial set for 7/18/14. Keegan’s Orig: Deposition Date Is Frustrated Quarle’s attorney served a Notice of Deposition on Keegan. Tt was set for May 13, 2014. In response to an inquiry by Quarle’s assistant Mark Michael, Keegan said to “contact her attorney.” On February 24, 2014 Quarle’s counsel wrote to Keegan reiterating his notice of taking her deposition on 5/13/14. on 5/12/14 Keegan wrote by U.S. Mail Mr. Shapiro that the “deposition had not been properly noticed and that there is no court order requiring it, so no date would be provided”. since then Gary Sherrer has given Quarle multiple poor excuses. When Sherrer claimed “he was busy” Quarle sent a meet and conf Jasking for alternative dates, as timing was one excuse but Sherrer declined, instead serving an “Objection to Notice of Taking Deposition” reiterating Keegan’s positon taken in 2014. Following that Quarle again attempted to meet and confer with Keegan’s attorney; Sherrer once again refused to provide available dates for his client’s deposition. In the underlying case, RG10-537233, Keegan claimed “Quarle admitting tape recording her 40 times” and she should be awarded20 a 12 3 u 45 16 a 18 a9 20 aa 22 23 24 28 26 27 28 $245,000 in “statutory damages”. Keegan lied and claimed she “first became aware of her cause of action for “tape recordings” in December of 2009, then in a 2/20/13 Motion for Summary Judgment she claimed it was October 27, 2009, and then on 11/10/10 she claimed it was on 9/13/10 “at a recent Labor Board Hearing”. Quarle insisted that she was aware of her “invasion of privacy” claims as early as June of 2009. In this case, IRG157962301 Keegan claimed that two critical emails pertaining to Keegan’s trial evidence “were not relevant for purposes of discovery” because “requests regarding the underlying matter are irrelevant to the current controversy.” (See Sherrer’s Letter of 12/30/16) Courts are vested with inherent powers “to manage their own jaffaizs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition ” Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F 2d 363, 368 (9 Circ. 1992). The Ninth Circuit has lof cases explicitly recognized that trial courts possess “inherent discretionary power to make appropriate evidentiary rulings in response to the destruction or spoliation of relevant evidence,” and that sanctions for spoliation of evidence may be imposed lunder the court’s inherent powers to manage its own affairs, Glover v BIC Corp., 6F.3d 1318, 1329 (9™ Cir. 1993). Inherent [powers must be used only with restraint and discretion. Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) DISCUSSION Keegan had a duty to preserve the documents especially since she filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for a New Trial of the underlying case.10 aa a2 13 aa a5 16 18 1 20 a 22 23 24 25 26 20 28 On December 30, 2016 Gary Lee Sherrer responded to Quarle’s RFAs stating: “in one RFA you specifically refer to an 11/08/09 email which she no longer has because the underlying matter was concluded. Without providing the email, Plaintiff cannot respond in the manner you wish. Even assuming that you had attached the document to which you refereed, requests regarding the underlying matter are irrelevant to the current controversy.” (See Exhibit fe Letter from Sherrer of 12/30/16). In response to RFA # 51 Sherrer wrote “you are mistaken the email is irrelevant to the instant matter and without such email Plaintiff cannot respond.” He wrote this despite the fact that all five emails were attached to Quarle’s RFAs. Defendant, Marcia Quarle, contends that Keegan engaged in the willful spoliation of email evidence when she responded to Quarle’s discovery requests. As a result of this conduct, Quarle requests that the Court give an adverse inference instruction in this lawsuit because it is clear that the 9/28/09 and the 7/6/09 emails would have been harmful to Keegan’s lawsuit. on 9/20/10 Plaintiff Meaghan Keegan filed her lawsuit in |Alameda County Superior Court for invasion of privacy based on certain emails Quarle allegedly sent to Keegan. In response to Keegan’s unsuccessful Motion for Summary Judgment, Quarle’s attorney, Paul Kleven, on pg. 26, filed Quarle’s Separate Statement of Undisputed and Disputed Material Facts that “The Statute of Limitations for Keegan’s claim is one year. (Code Civ. Proc. section 340, subd. (a). and “Keegan filed her complaint on 9/20/10.” and “Keegan made no allegations in her - 1010 a Fry 13 a4 as 16 ” 18 as 20 a 22 23 24 26 27 28 complaint regarding the time and manner of her discovery that Quarle taped conversations in violation of Penal Code Sections 632 and 637.2.” Quarle alleges that Keegan illegally discharged her in retaliation for refusing to participate in Keegan’s scheme to file an illegal lis Pendens on 8 propert: Keegan invested in. Quarle claims that, in sum, from 5/13/13 through the present, Keegan intentionally destroyed or altered over 150 relevant documents, electronic mail and other pieces of evidence in both the dismissed lawsuit, Case RG10-537233, and in the present case. Quarle moves for terminating sanctions and monetary damages due to Keegan’s spoliation of evidence. Prejudice + The imposition of a harsh sanction such as dismis: adverse inference instruction requires an analysis of the prejudice suffered by the non-spoiling party. See Anheuser- Busch, 69 F. 3d at 348. “The prejudice inquiry looks to whether the spoliation party’s actions impaired the non-spoiling party’s ability to go to trial or threatened to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” Quarle argues that Keegan’s spoliation has impaired her defenses. In particular it particularly damaged her first affirmative defense to Keegan’s Invasion of Privacy Claim that the Court ruled was “subject to a one year statute of limitations.” “Emails and other documents created by Quarle and Keegan from December of 2008 to 9/20/10 are highly relevant -n10 a a2 13 u as 16 u 28 19 20 2 2 23 24 25 26 20 28 as “a to the question of whether Keegan was first aware of her cause of action, or whether she was fabricating her ignorance. APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS The court is asked to find that sanctions are warranted... Here however, Keegan’s spoliation of evidence, particularly in June, July and August of 2009 was egregious. Keegan admitted to having this information because she actually produced it in her first Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 2/20/13. There was ill will between the parties and Keegan considered Quarle her “enemy”. See Keegan’s Admit you were arrested for Cocaine” RFA. This case is more egregious that in Leon.. Here, Keegan had received a letter specifically warning that she should “ensure no data is lost or corrupted so as to avoid any ponsible spoliation of evidence.” Leon, 464 F. 3d at 955 (9 Cir. 2006). Quarle was forced to spend $5000.00 to respond to Keegan's Motion for Summary Judgment in which she falsely claimed “In October of 2009 Plaintiff was informed for the first time that Defendant has secretly recorded their telephone calls. The source of this information was a telephone message from ‘Defendant that Defendant had taped over 40 telephone conversations between the parties”. She repeats this lie in item 9 “On October 27, 2009 Defendant left a message on plaintiff's answering machine.” Keegan is without remorse and her discovery responses in the current case have been “extremely levasive’. She has been unable to answer any “straight question that’s been posed.” The Relevance of the Destroyed Evidence to Quarle -1210 u 2 13 u 4s 16 a ae 19 20 aa 22 23 26 25 26 27 28 In March of 2014 Attorney Zadick Shapiro scheduled Keegan's [Deposition for May 13, 2014. She was a no-show. Quarle spent $875.00 in attorney fees, court reporter fees because of Keegan’s refusal to appear. ‘TERMINATING SANCTIONS MAY BE ISSUED BECAUSE KEEGAN DISOBJEYED THREE COURT ORDERS IN THE UFTA LAWSUIT In Dopes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4™ 967, the court discussed the incremental approach to discovery sanctions”. “The discovery statutes evince an incremental approach to discovery sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination. In this case there has been a history of extreme discovery abuse and the evidence shows less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules. In Ruvalcaba v. Government Employees Ins. Co, 222 Cal.App. 3d the court came to the conclusion that the continued discovery abuse by plaintiff and ox/her attorney for which sanctions had already been imposed and which had resulted in needles delays and courts. Other Decisions In Hausman v. Holland America Line U.S.A. et al case no 13- 0937 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 5 2016)after the court entered a $21 million judgment in plaintiff’s favor, a witness came forward to allege that plaintiff had willfully deleted a number of emails that supported his personal injury claims. After an evidentiary hearing, the judge vacated the $21 million judgment and ordered anew trial. In Herman v. Herman, 2015 NY Slipp. Op. 31205 (NYS, N.¥.Co 2015) the court entered a default judgment after the court found -a310 a az 13 a4 1s 16 a 18 19 20 2a 2 23 24 25 26 21 28 he purposefully destroyed an email in violation of the ESI stipulation. Requests for Admissions, Set One re Vexatious Litigant On 11/15/16 Keegan was served with RFAs set one # 1-7. RFA # No 1: Admit you received no money from Winthrop Jackman or Nancy Pryor as a result of your lawsuit. Keegan falsely claimed that she reached a “favorable settlement” in this “spite tree/neighbor lawsuit.” However Winthrop Jackman and Nancy Pryor both dispute this. Also the case was dismissed with prejudice. Her then attorney Bill Segesta also advised Quarle that the case was dismissed with prejudice. Therefore Quarle asks that this Case count towards the tally of Declaring Keegan a Vexatious Litigant. RFA # No 2: Admit you received no money from Raymond Vogt personally as a result of the two lawsuits you filed against Him. Case RG12-02723 RFA? 3: Admit that Joan Spengler died in September of 2013 and lyou never sued her estate. Case RG12-02732 was dismissed with [Prejudice on 6/6/14 and Keegan even signed a Declaration stating “under penalty of perjury” that she received nothing from the lawsuit. Without suing the estate Keegan could not have obtained any money from Joan Spengler. Keegan lost case RG11572940-dismissed with prejudice on 11/21/11. Likewise she lost case RG12-02732 and case BG09469911 Keegan v. Quarle filed on 8/21/09. Keegan lost her appeal in Case MSC10-3266 filed in April of 2016. Quarle seeks to deem Keegan’s non responses to RFAs 1-7 as deemed admitted for all purposes. These three unsuccessful10 un 12 13 ua 15 16 uv 18 as 20 a 22 23 24 25 26 2 28 lawsuits filed in pro per by Ms. Keegan should be added to Keegan’s list of unsuccessful lawsuits for purposes of declaring her a vexatious litigant. Request for Admissions Set Thro On 9/25/09 Keegan filed an Amended General Demurrer in Case RG09-469454 claiming “Quarle, a paralegal spent an outrageous and indefensible amount of time performing work for which there was no specific authorization nor any awareness on the part of Keegan until an invoice was submitted.” In {6 she wrote: “I checked over the work producd with another legal professional and was informed that a reasonable amount of time to produce the 45 pages of work is about 20 hours not 230.” Quarle was outraged by the pleading and she immediately emailed Keegan on 9/28/09 disputing her “lack of awareness.” In fact Keegan's lawsuit is inconsistent with this claim. She even claimed she “had not spoken to Quarle for days prior to 6/24/09.” RFA # 50: “Admit that on 9/28/09 Quarle sent Keegan an email attached as Exhibit 1, # 50: RFA # 56: Admit that Keegan falsely claimed the 9/28/09 and the 7/6/09 emails were sent in November and December of 2009. Admit that on July 6, 2009 at 6:32 PM Quarle sent Meaghan Keegan jan email that contained an excerpt of a conversation between Keegan and Quarle. Keegan claimed that the above email was sent on November 26, 2009. This was false and she should be sanctioned for this perjury.10 an 2 33 u as 16 a 18 as 20 a 22 23 24 25 26 2 28 ~~ ~~ Only A Terminating Sanction Against Keegan Can Possibly Prevent Quarle and Kaner from Being Prejudiced by Keegan’s Willful Refusal to Provide Court-Ordered Discovery. In determining what sanction to impose, the trial court should take into account the conduct being sanctioned, and the effect on the party requesting the discovery, and should “attempt to tailor the sanction to the harm caused by the withheld discovery.” Gilbert v.Van Sickle (2011) 196 Cal.App.4™, 1495, 1516. “Where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction. “ Doppes vw. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4h 967, 992. A terminating sanction is necessary. The information withheld by Keegan, included absolute proof that she lied at trial about when the critical 9/28/09 email was actually sent is vital to Quarle’s affirmative defenses. As succinctly stated by the plaintiff in Doe v. U.S. Swimming “logically the higher the incidence of prior wrongful conduct by [coaches] the more care that should be devoted to the problem” by U.S. Swimming” 2009 ‘Cal. App. 45h at 428.m Keegan's refusal to provide this information fundamentally impairs Defendant's ability to prove her position. Lesser sanctions cannot effectively remedy Kecgan’s refusal to provide the requested documents and to answer truthfully the RFAS. Mandatory Sanctions Should Be Imposed on Meaghan Keeg: Keegan files lawsuits, and then refuses to appear for depositions or to respond to discovery. Keegan's actions also10 a 2 3 “4 35 16 a7 18 19 20 a 22 23 24 25. 26 27 28 resulted in the expenditure of time and Quarle’s money in the underlying case. A court may impose both monetary and terminating sanctions on a non-compliant party. See R.S. Creative Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd (1999) 75 Cal. App. 4thy 486, 93.. For these reason Keegan should be assessed a monetary sanction in the amount of $7500. (See Quarle Declaration and Declaration of C. Zadick Shapiro) CONCLUSION As an additional reason for dismissing Keegan’s lawsuit, the Complaint she served on Quarle’s son, Daniel Kaner on 12/26/16 was Keegan’s Original Complaint filed on 12/10/15 and the 3/10/16 unsigned First Amended Complaint. Gary Sherrer’s name appears nowhere in ‘the pleadings served on Daniel Kaner. For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant Defendant's motion for sanctions against Meaghan Keegan and her attorney Gary Lee Sherrer, order monetary sanctions, strike Keegan's Complaint against Quarle and her son, Daniel. Dated: 1/3/17 MARCIA QUARLE Leone, yon Kttokney for Defendant.To:Faxand File Page 1027 PS 2017.01-122058:24 eM) 7 15102173830 From: Gary Sherer FILED BY FAX ‘ALAMEDA COUNTY: Gary Stet Sr 113047) January 12, 2017 SA Tele: Biya 12 si THE SUPERIOR COURT ia Esy Deputy for Plaiatit ‘CASE NUME NEXGTAN BEGAN RG15796301 es Oh me ey ‘SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. ‘COUNTY OF ALAMEDA -NORTHERN DIVISION © . Unlimited Civil Jurisdiction 11) MBAGHAN KEEGAN, CASENO. RG15-796301 ta Plaintiff ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO a 13} ys, DEPARTMENT 19 14} MARCIA QUARLE, et. al, DECLARATION OF GARY SHERRER_ IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION 15) Defendants, ‘TO.DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ORDER 7 DEMING REQUESTED ADMISSION AS "7 Date: fury 19,2017 ime: 2.00 Opa 18 : Dept: 19 f 20| DECLARATION OF GARY SHERRER IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO: DEFENDANT'S. MOTION TO DEEM REQUESTED ADMISSIONS AS ADMITTED: 2 1. 1, Gary Sherrer, am at attorney licensed to practice Jaw before all courts of ths state and 23} am the attomey for PaimifT herein, If called to testify, I would do so in conformity herewith. 1 244 declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of California that statemenits that follow 25 | are tue ofmy own knowledge except as to those matters sated under information and belief'and as Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. RG15-796301 27) Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant's motion deeming admission as admitted 2% 1To: Fax and File Page 11 of 27 - A pry 2017-01-12 2058.24 (GMT) 18102173830 From: Gary Sherrer 1} to such statements, | believe the same to be true. Also, the Exhibits attached hereto ore what they 2] purport to be. 3 2. Under information and belief on March 11, 2016, Plaintiff served her initial responses 4 is set ofrequsts for admisson-~Aethattimes>did not represent Plinif-Undernfematifon and ire ‘underlying motion ‘ovived any responses. Please see Ex! 3. Uni ie due Yo the death of my process server's jther, certain 9 i free responses on November 3, 2016, ~ 4. On December 18, 2016, I caused Sunnie Richorison to serve Plaintiff's amended objection-free responses to Defendant's requests for admission, set one, Please see Plaintiff's responses as Exhibit $A.” 5. Ithas been my experience inthis matter that Defendant makes statements whieh are patently untrue, exaggerated, ielevant, and/or mis-characterize events and purported facts. This declaration is executed on the date below in Alameda, CA. uy tit ‘Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. RG1S-796301 Plainti?’s opposition to Defendant's motion deeming admission as admitted 8 2To: Marcie Quarie Ss Q € ee yw ab awn Page 19 of 24 2017-01-12 01:14:31 (GMT) 45102173930 From: Gary Sherrer Gary Sherrer (SBN 113047) 875-A Island, Drive, 403 Alameda, CA. 94502 Tele: (510) 421-2838 Attomey for Plaintiff, MEAGHAN KEEGAN, SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA - NORTHERN DIVISION Unlimited Civil Jurisdiction MEAGHAN KEEGAN, CASENO. RG15-796301 Plaintiff, ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO JUDGE Julia Spain vs. DEPARTMENT 19 MARCIA QUARLE, et. al PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S EX PARTE AFFIDAVIT. Defendants. FOR OSC RE CONTEMPT Date: January 19, 2017 ‘Time: 2:00 p.m. Dept: 19 t PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S EX PARTE REQUEST FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: CONTEMPT FOR DISCOVERY ABUSE FACTS L As best as Plaintif?'s counsel can deduce from Defendant's ex parte application, it appears that she is using obsolete and superceded Exhibits to support a claim that Plaintiff failed to produce further responses and documents pursuant to her request for production of documents, set one. Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. RG15-796301 Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant's ex parte affidavit for an order to show cause re: contempt 1To: Marcia Quarle Page 20 of 24 2017-01-12 01:14:31 (GMT) 15102173830 From: Gary Sherrer 1 As such, Defendant’s ex parte application seeks an order to show cause why Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff's counsel should not be held in contempt for alleged discovery abuse. Defendant's application is not supported by any oath or affirmation, i.e, there is no evidence ‘that her purported affidavit was formally swom nor is there any ave'ment under penalty of perjury that the facts are true rendering her entire application fatally awed. Inher application, Defendant states that Plaintiff has sued her four times. Tn fact, Defendant sued Plaintiff twice, once in the Alameda County Superior Court for breach of an independent contractor agreement and once before the California Labor Board for failure to pay wages under the very sume agreement. This $ in fact Plaintiff's third lawsuit against Defendant. The first was for a restraining order for harassment, the second is the underlying action wherein judgment in Plaintiff's 11 } favor was issued and now the instant case wherein Plaintiff submits that Defendsnt entered into a 12] fraudulent transfer to avoid paying the underlying judgment, 4 Defendant alleged that Plaintiff has failed to obey “three” court orders regarding discovery. 14 According to the register of actions, this Court has issued two orders, the second was a clarification 15 of the first. 16 a Defendant disingenvously states that Plaintiff failed to produce “any discovery documents in 1g] iS UPTA litigation” (Defendant's affidavit, page 2 pangraph 6.) In fact, Plaintiff produced 19 | €ocuments and Defendant insists that Plaintiff produce more documents most of which are only relevant to the underlying lawsuit.” 20 2 ‘Defendant’s affidavit seeks $1,000.00 in sanctions without the specificity required by statute. 2 In paragraph 12 of Defendant’s purported affidavit she states that on 11/17/16 she emailed 2B * tis unclear from a ready of the purported affidavit whether she seeks an order to show cause 24) as against Plaintiff or Plaintiff's counsel. ? This Court has admonished Defendant against her continuing attempts to re-litigate the underlying lawsuit, Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. RG15-796301 Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant's ex parte affidavit for an onder to show cause re: contermpt 28 2To: Marcia Quarle Page 21 of 24 2017-01-12 01:14:31 (GMT) 15102173930 From: Gary Sherrer Soe a aw a wow u 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 a 2 23 4 28 26 27 ~ an Plaintiff's counsel asking whether he “personally reviewfed] ..[the] discovery responses which refers to Plaintiff's amended discovery responses served on November 13, 2016 and which included. responsive documents. : . OnNovernber 18, Plaintiff's counsel received a meet and confer email letter from Defendant asserting deficiencies in Plaintiff's amended discovery responses of November 124 and served on November 13" 2016. Plaintiff's counsel in fact sent a meet.and confer letter to Defendant addressing her concerns. In short, Defendant’ s‘allegetion that Plaintiff disobeyed discovery orders is totally ‘without merit nor probable cause. Assuming Defendant brings a legally cognizable motion regarding the discovery, e.g,, to compel further production, Plaintiff will respond accordingly. IL DEFENDANT'S EX PARTE APPLICATION MUST BE DENIED. Plaintiff opposes Defendant's request for an order to show cause.1e: contempt for discovery ‘abuse on ground inter alia that Defendant fails to. demonstrate any ground for an ex parte relief as required by statute. California Rules of Cou, Rule 3.1202 states as follows: “Contents of application - (a) Identification of attorney or party ‘Anex parte application must state the name, address, e-mail address and telephone numberof any stiomey knows to the applicant to be an altdmey for any party or, if ho such atorney is known, the name, address, e-mail address, and telephone Dumber of he party if known to the applicant. (Subd (a) amended effective January 1, 2016.) (b) Disclosure of previous applications Tfanex lication has been refused in whole or in part, any subsequent application of the Saupe chnracter or forthe same reich although made upon an alleged different state of fats, must ndlude a full disclosure of all previous applications and ofthe courts actions. (© Affirmative factual showing required An applicant must make an.affirmative: factual showing in a cecineticn. Sentaining competent testimony based on personal knowledge of ieparable Sanger, oF any other Statutory basis for granting vellef ex parte,” Alameda County Superior Court, Case’No. RG15-796301 Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant's ex parte affidavit for an order to show cause re: contempt :‘To: Marcia Quarle. Page 22 of 24 2017-01-12 01:14:31 (GMT) 15102173930 From: Gary Sherrer eerawraun 10 ul 12 B 14 15 16 "7 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ~ ~ First, Defendant's application (affidavit) does not contain the identification of attomey or Party. As above, an ex parte application must state the name, address, e-mail address, and telephone number of any attorney known to the applicant to be-an attomey.for any pary ot, if no such attorney is known, the name;-address, e-mail address, and telephone number of the party if known to the applicant. Given the above, her application is fatally defective. ‘Second, Defendant's application omits the department and the time of hearing. The register of actions does not specify the time of hearing. Third, at the time of this writing, January 8, 2017, there is no’praof of service on file and Plaintiff has not been served and. only discovered the affidavit from the domain web. Fourth and most importantly, Defendant failed to make any factual showing in a declaration ~containing competent testimony, under oath or affirmation, based on persona knowledge demonstrating irreparable harm, immediate danger, or any statutory basis for granting relief ex parte. Plaintiff submits that there is nothing contained in Defendant's “affidavit” demonstrating that her claims for discovery abuse could not be brought on the Court’s usual calendar, with appropriate notice, such that she will suffer irreparable harm or immediate danger if her ex parte application is not granted. Rale 3.1200 et seq. govern the procedural requirements of ex parte applications for relief. ‘These requirements include that the application be accompanied by a declaration stating the "notice given, including the date, time, manner, and name of the party informed, the relief sought, any. response, and whether opposition is expected and that, within the applicable time under rule 3.1203, ‘the applicant informed the opposing party where and when the application would be made{.]" (Rule > ‘Defendant's purported “affidavit does not contain any averment that the purported facts contained therein are true under penalty of perjury nor is there any evidence that it was made after she was formally swom, Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. RG1S-796301 Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant's ex parte affidavit for an order to show cause re: contempt :To: Marcia Quarle Page 23 of 24 2017-01-12 01:14:31 (GMT) 15102173930 From: Gary Sherrer De UD wa we 10 ul 12 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 23 24. 25 26 2 28 ~ ~ 3.1204(b)(1)) "If'an ex parte application has been refused in whole or in part, any subsequent pplication of the same character or for the same relief, although made upon an alleged different State of facts, must include a full disclosure of all previous applications and of the court'sactions,” Rule 3.1202(b),) The ex parte applicant “must make an affirmative factual showing in‘a declatation. Containing competent testimony based on personal knowledge of irreparable harm, immediate danger, or any other statutory basis for granting relief ex parte." (Rule 3.1202(c).) An ex parte application that fails to comply with these rules is properly denied. (Datig v, Dove Books, Inc. (1999) 73 Cal. App.4th 964, 977.) ‘Most importantly, Defendant did not "make an affirmative factual showing ... of reparable harm, immediate danger, or any other statutory basis for granting relief ex parte. (Rule 3.1202(¢),) Plaintiff deems It unlikely that Defendant could have made any such showing inasmuch as she have sought the very same relief in a noticed motion made with proper notice on the Court’s usual calendar. OL ALTERNATIVE, IF THE COURT TREATS HER EX PARTE APPLICATION AS A NOTICED MOTION, NOTICE IS INSUFFICIENT Section 1005, subdivision (b) states in pectinent part: "Unless otherwise ordered or specifically provided by law, all moving sind supporting papers shal be served and filed at least 21 calendar days'before the hearing... However, ifthe notice is served by mail, the required 21-day period of notice before the hearing shall be increased by five calendar days if the place of mailing and the place of address are within the State of California -. and if'the notice is served by facsimile transmission, express mail, or another method of delivery roviding for ovemight delivery, the required 21-day period of notice before the hearing shall be ereased by two calendar days! : Here, the purported affidavit was filed on January 6, 2017 for hearing scheduled on January 19, 2017; 13 days notice, Plaintiff submits that if'addressed as a noticed motion wherein declarations and Exhibits Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. RG15-796301 Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant's ex parte affidavit for an order to show cause re: contempt 5To: Marcia Quarie Page 24 of 24 2017-01-12 01:14:31 (GMT) wea Aw awn 10 u 12 “13 14 15, 16 17 18 19 20 21 2 23 24 25 26 27 28 18102173930 From: Gary Sherrer ee : AIS SOE LSS ‘ould be required to rebut the merits of Defeadent’s claims, there is insufficienttime within which, todo so,causing prejudice to Plaintiff, Iv, CONCLUSION For the reasons slated above, Defendant's application for an order to show cause for ‘contempt should summarily denied, Date: Yala Mit Alameda County Superior Court, Case No, RG15-796301 Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant's ex parte affidavit for an order to show cause re: contempt p18 19 20 21 22 23 MARCIA QUARLE 651 ADDISON Street Suite 210 Berkeley, CA 94710 ENDORS! Telephone: 510 621-9225 FILED Email: paralegal2@me.com ALAMEDA COUNTY JAN 17 2017 ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT: RIC OFFHESOPERIOR COURT LER 7 MARCIA QUARLE TRuET SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA UNLIMITED CIVIL JURISDICTION NORTHERN DIVIDION MEAGHAN KEEGAN, Case No.: RG15-796301 Complaint Filed 12/10/2015 FAC Filed 03/10/2016 SAC Filed 01/04/2017 Plaintiff, vs. MARCIA QUARLE, Assigned to Judge Spain DANIEL KANER et.al. William Henley Esq. emails to Gary Lee Sherrer re Time Line in Case RG15796301 Defendants Please see attached emails. Gary Lee Sherrer, Esq. advised Attorney William Henley that the transfers at issue in Case RG15796301 took place AFTER 12/19/2014.Page | of 4 -_ a : Cullen: SuperPrintUSA "Marcia Quarle" Tuesday, January 24, 2017 1:00 PM. Fwd: Keegan v. Quarle Marcia Quarle 510-621-9225 651 Addison Street, Suite 210 Berkeley, California 94710 Fax: 510-666-1004 Begin forwarded message: From: Gary Sherrer Date: January 12, 2017 at 7:44:15 PM PST ‘illiam Henley Cez paralegal2@icloud.com Subject: Re: Keegan v. Quarle Mr Henley Thank you for your input. I do disagree with your timeline and that the is no authority for an award of attorney fees in addition to punitive damages. You are completely incorrect in apuming my 24 hour “silence” av agecoment With Fou factual scenarios and analysis. [just didn't have time to review your email, the documents and prepare a written response. ‘Thank you for informing me you will not be involved further and I will proceed accordingly and not offer a response to your erroneous and inaccurate facts and analysis . Best Wishes >A Gary Sherrer Sent from my iPhone On Jan 12, 2017, at 6:35 PM, William Henley wrote: Dear Mr. Sherrer: This is to inform that I will not be representing Marcia Quarle (or Daniel Kaner for that matter). Ms. Quarle and Mr. Kaner have been and will 1/24/2017Page 2 of 4 ~~ ~~ continue to appear in pro. per. Thad hoped to help the parties find a path to settlement, focusing on the satisfaction of the judgment debt arising from Keegan v. Quarle J, and a negotiated settlement of Keegan's claim to post-judgment interest. (The maximum amount of that claim, counting all 771 days between 02-Dec-2014 and today, is $1,267.40.) If Ms. Keegan would drop her frivolous claim to attorney fees incurred in filing her ridiculously frivolous UFTA action (Keegan v. Quarle I), there would be no obstacle to such a path to settlement. I hope that this will be the case. Regarding Ms. Keegan's frivolous attorney fee claim, I stated in my email yesterday that I was in the dark regarding the source of that claim. The absence of a response on your part confirms that you likewise can cite no authority for an award of attorney fees to Ms. Keegan. After I sent that email, I reviewed both Penal Code section 632 ef seq., and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act ("UFTA"), and neither of these statutory schemes includes an attomey fee provision. Additionally, as every attorney knows, post-judgment collection efforts, in a case where the judgment creditor's underlying claim provides no basis for an award of attorney fees, do not give rise to a claim to attomney fees. In my research yesterday I did discover case law authority for an award of "public benefit” attomey fees under CCP 1021.5. But such awards are limited to class action cases where a commercial defendant - e.g. a collection agency == unlawfully tape records telephone conversations with members of the plaintiff class. There is no possibility that Ms. Keegan's purely private effort to win a judgment for a scant four violations of PC section 632, could qualify for an award under CCP 1021.5. Although I am no longer going to be involved in this action, if you would share with me your legal authority for a claim to attomey fees in this case, I would be grateful for the education. No attorney or judge knows everything, and I could be wrong about the abject frivolity of Ms. Keegan's attorney fee claim. Please let me know if this is the case. Also in yesterday's email I attempted to reach agreement with you as to the relevant chronology. Again your silence confirms that the chronology that I put together yesterday ~- and which I repeat in similar form below is in fact the undisputed sequence of events giving rise to the present frivolous UFTA action: 20-Sep-2010 -- Meaghan Keegan files Keegan v. Quarle J, alleging violations of PC 632 ef seg. See the attached copy of the ROA in the Keegan v. Quarle I case, that was printed on 17-Nov-2015 by Ms. Keegan's former attorney. He attached this printout as Exhibit B to a Motion to Set Aside Fraudulent Transfer, filed by him in the Keegan v. Quarle I case on 24-Dec-2015. 20-Oct-2010 -- Marcia Tillen (aka Quarle) executes Grant Deed to 105 Starview Ct, Oakland, APN 48H-7590-47, in favor of Daniel Kaner. See the attached copy of Grant Deed recorded 22-Oct-2010, a copy of which was attached as Exhibit C to Keegan's Motion to Set Aside Fraudulent Transfer, supra. 07-July-2012 -- Daniel Kaner executes Power of Attorney -- Special, appointing Marcia Campbell (aka Quarle) as his attomey in fact "as to ... 105 Starview 1/24/2017Page 3 of 4 a an Ct." including the power “to... . sell ... land[]. . . upon such terms and conditions . . . as said Attomney-in-fact shall think fit." See Power of Attomey -- Special recorded 31-Aug-2012, a copy of which was attached as Exhibit D to Keegan's Motion to Set Aside Fraudulent Transfer, supra. In short, papers filed on behalf of Ms. Keegan on 24-Dec-2015, in the Keegan v. Quarle I case, are sufficient to charge Ms. Keegan with actual knowledge that the Deed and the Power of Attorney, on which she solely relies in the present frivolous UFTA action, took place two years before the entry of Judgment in Keegan v. Quarle 1. 28-Aug-2012 —- Daniel Kaner executes a Grant Deed in favor of Majeed Seifi and Diane Seifi. See the attached copy of Grant Deed recorded 31-Aug-2012. Also attached is a screen shot of the County Assessor's 2016-2017 Property Assessment Information regarding this property, showing a current assessed valuation of about $780,000. This indicates that the sale price, four years ago, ‘was substantial, and well in excess of $6,000. Finally, itis "law of the case” in this matter ~ true as a matter of law -- that Mr. Kaner transferred these substantial proceeds of sale to Ms. Quarle, contemporaneously with the August 2012 sale to the Seifis. As the Judge Spain has put it, "it now appears undisputed that Kaner sold the property to the Seifis in August 2012 and transferred the proceeds of the sale to Quarle." (See the attached copy of Order to Grant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, entered 08-Dec-2016 in Keegan v. Quarle HI, at p. 1, final paragraph.) Judge Spain also wrote this: "As noted, Keegan's opposition asserts that '[Kaner] sold the property to the Seifis and then transferred the money to Defendant ." (Opp. at p. 6)" (Id., at p. 2, next to last paragraph (emphasis added).) In any event, Keegan's judicial admissions -- that the house at 105 Starview Ct was liquidated in or about August 2012, and that the proceeds were delivered to Quarle ~- submitted by Keegan to the Court in support of her Opposition to Quarle's MJOP, are now binding on Keegan as a matter of law. Keegan's admissions are also undisputedly true. 02-Dec-2014 ~- Judgment is entered in Keegan v. Quarle J. The Court finds Quarle liable for four instances of undisclosed recordings; awards damages of $500 per instance; and trebles that award, resulting in a $6,000 judgment in favor of Keegan. In conclusion, as of the date of entry of Judgment in December 2014,in Keegan v. Quarle I, Ms. Quarle had not held title to 105 Starview Ct for more than two years. It is also the case that, as the transferee of the proceeds of sale, as of December 2014 Ms. Quarle continued to retain at least $6,000 in asset value, that was reachable by levy and execution, but for Ms. Keegan's unilateral choice not to exercise her post-judgment right to levy and execute on Ms. Quarle's property. I surmise that Keegan, for tactical reasons, did not wish to enforce her Judgment while her appeal was pending. But her appeal certainly did not disable her to call Quarle in for an Order of Examination, to discover the locations of her assets. In any event, the appeal was disposed of in September 2015. It is a 1/24/2017Page 4 of 4 -_— -_— mystery why Keegan did not at that point commence to levy and execute on her $6,000 judgment at that point, rather than to file the present expensive, time- ‘consuming, and ridiculously frivolous UFTA action. However, at this point I don't want to get into arguments about disputed facts. ‘What I would like is to get agreement that this is the timeline: Keegan v. Quarle [filed September 2010. 105 Starview Ct sold to the Seiris August 2012, and net proceeds of sale delivered to Quarle. Judgment of $6,000 entered in Keegan v. Quarle Iin December 2014. No showing that Quarle lacked the assets to satisfy that judgment at that time, or at any time since then. By your lack of a response to this same showing, made by me in yesterday's email, you have confirmed that this is the undisputed chronology. These being the undisputed facts of the matter, there is no other reasonable path forward than to focus on the $6,000 principal amount of the Keegan v. Quarle J Judgment. If Ms. Keegan also wants post-judgment interest -- the high water mark of which now stands at a meager $1,300, give or take -- you and Ms. Quarle can talk about that as well. As already mentioned, I continue to be in the dark about the statutory source of any claim to attorney fees incurred in Keegan v. Quarle II. If there is a statute, they usually use the term "reasonable attorney fees." There is nothing reasonable about the filing of the ridiculously frivolous UFTA Keegan v. Quarle IT action, where as here the assets allegedly transferred in fact remain in the possession of the judgment debtor, and the judgment creditor has made zero efforts to pursue her normal post-judgment collection rights. William M. Henley Wild, Carey & Fife 100 Montgomery Street, Ste 1410 San Francisco CA 94104 415-837-3101 <151117-ROA Keegan v Quarle I-pdf> <101020-Grant Deed Marcia Tillen to Daniel Kaner.pdf> <120707-Power of Attomey.pdf> <161208-MJOP-Order to Grant.pdf> <120828-Grant Deed, Kaner to Majeed and Diane Seifi.pdf> 1/24/2017Page 1 o14 Cullen: SuperPrintUSA From: "Marcia Quarle" Date: Tuesday, January 24, 2017 1:00 PM. Fwd: Keegan v. Quarle Marcia Quarle 510-621-9225 651 Addison Street, Suite 210 Berkeley, California 94710 Fax: 510-666-1004 Begin forwarded message: From: Gary Sherrer Date: January12,.2017-at 7:44:15 PM PST To: William Henley Ce: paralegal2@icloud.com Subject: Re: Keegan v. Quarle Mr Henley Thank you for your input. I do disagree with your timeline and that the is no authority for an award of attorney fees in addition to punitive damages. You are completely incorrect in assuming my 24 hour "silence" as agreement with your factual scenarios and analysis. I just didn't have time to review your email, the documents and prepare a written response. Thank you for informing me you will not be involved further and I will proceed accordingly and not offer a response to your erroneous and inaccurate facts and analysis Best Wishes Gary Sherrer Sent from my iPhone On Jan 12, 2017, at 6:35 PM, William Henley wrote: Dear Mr. Sherrer: This is to inform that I will not be representing Marcia Quarle (or Daniel Kaner for that matter). Ms. Quarle and Mr. Kaner have been and will 1/24/2017Ye = Sherrer LAW Marcia Quarle ‘Atm: Sherrer, Gary L. 651 Addison Street S13 Aland bove Sue 210 aio. ‘Alameda, CA 94502 : a Superior Court of California, County of Alameda Rene C. Davidson Alameda County Courthouse Keegan ‘No. RG15796301 Plaititetitioae() ws. Order ~ ‘Motion for Admissions Deemed Admitted | Desde Renin (Abbreviated Tit) Phe Motion for Admissions Deemed Admitted was set for hearing on 01/19/2017 at 02:30 PM in Department 19 before the Honorable Julia Spain. ‘The Tentative Ruling was published and hes vot beon IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: ‘The hearings on the parties' respective motions to. is responses and deem matiers covery ‘Siunited are CONTINUED to 2:30 PM on January 26 in Department 19, Civil Law and Motion, Administration Building, 1221 Oak Street, Oakland. fesse Dated: 01/19/2017 SPA Judge Talia Spain OrderSuperior Court of California, County of Alameda Rene C. Davidson Alameda County Courthouse Keegan No. RG15796301 _ PlaintiPetiioners) Minutes Quarle ‘Defendant/Respondent{s) (Abbreviated Title) Department 19 Honorable _Julia Spain Judge (Cause called for Case Management Conference on January 31, 2017. Plaintiff Meaghan Keegan not appearing, Defendant Daniel Kaner not appearing. Defendant Marcia Quarle not appearing. Its hereby ordered that: Case dismissed by Court with Prejudice - Pursuant to Court Order. Minutes of 01/31/2017 Entered on 01/31/2017 Chad Finke Executive Officer / Clerk of the Superior Court » ALT Deputy Clerk 11130900SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA DEPARTMENT 19 RECEIPT Case: Keegan vs Quarle RG10537233 Amount Received: $__6,000 cashier’s check Date Received: Received from: Marcia Quarle Representing: defendant in pro per Receipt acknowledged by: ‘Ana Liza Tumoi 4 bh 10 *CHASE® Terms and Conditions (Remitter and Payee): * Please keep this copy for your record of the transaction * The laws of a specific state will consider these funds to be “abandoned” if the Cashier's Check is not cashed by a certain time ~ Please cash/deposit this Cashier's Check as soon as possible to prevent this from occurring ~ In most cases, the funds will be considered “abandoned” before the "Void After" Date * Placing a Stop Payment on.a Cashier's Check - Stop Payment can only be placed if the Cashier's Check is lost, stolen, or destroyed ~ We may not re-issue or refund the funds after the stop payment has been placed until 90 days after the original check was issued * Please visit a Chase branch to report a lost, stolen, or destroyed Cashier's Check or for any other information about this item FOR YOUR PROTECTION SAVE THIS.COPY Customer Copy CASHIER'S CHECK 9556609035 012612017 Remitten DANIEL KANER & MARCIA CAMPBELL ‘$** 6,000.00 ** Pay To The MEAGHAN KEEGAN Order Of: ‘mc JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, KA. NON NEGOTIABLE ene "Not: For information only. Comment has no effect on bank's payment. ‘2xzr107 New ove sercossae ~ “9556609035 © Date 017202017 eta ne Remitter. DANIEL KANER & MARCIA CAMPBELL Pay To The MEAGHAN KEEGAN Order Of: $* 6,000.00 ** Pay: SIX THOUSAND DOLLARS AND 00 CENTS Damen JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. Re i ‘Managing Dvector me | ‘Prep Choe Bk WA ae | oe Meme: 22200026 BOBO0 Ze 3kir* Please keep this copy for your record of the transaction * The laws of a specific state will consider these funds to be "abandoned" if the Cashier’s Check is not cashed by a certain time - Please cash/deposit this Cashier's Check as soon as possible to prevent this from occurring - In most cases, the funds will be considered “abandoned” before the "Void After" Date * Placing a Stop Payment on a Cashier's Check - Stop Payment can only be placed if the Cashier's Check is lost, stolen, or destroyed - We may not re-issue or refund the funds after the stop payment has been placed until 90 days after the original check was issued * Please visit a Chase branch to report a lost, stolen, or destroyed Cashier's Check or for any other information about this item FOR YOUR PROTECTION SAVETHISCOPY Customer Copy CASHIER'S CHECK 9556609036 011282017 Remitter: DANIEL KANER & MARCIA CAMPBELL $** 1,200.00 ** Pay To The MEAGHAN KEEGAN Order Of: Dorner JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. Me wenn nena NON NEGOTIABLE "Nol: For information only. Comment has no effect on bank's payment 22y1ss0r New ouneso1oo.908 “9556609036 | CHASE o Bees aei aia er i Remitten DANIEL KANER & MARCIA CAMPBELL t f Pay To The MEAGHAN KEEGAN i ‘Order Of: : i Pay: ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS AND 00 CENTS $** 1,200.00 i =I rawen_ JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA. Sravmononnnta S AQGOS746 SO /Roross7as33 KES ae ee ‘Managing Drector Nowe: For formation only. Comment has no effect on bank's paymen! {lorena NA W9SSEEO903G b22e000 2b BOBOOZ Zab= L a Ce J L INSTRUCTIONS TO RESPONDING PARTY: 1. As to these requests for admission, a response must be given to each interrogator). 2. Each response must be provided within 30 days or, if a response is not possible, the reason ‘tust be stated. If there is an objection to a particular request, such objection must be made within 30 days, 1 3. Each response must be complete and straight-forward and contain all responsive | information available to you-and which ‘you can make available within the thirty-day ‘period.Each Tesponse must contain either an unqualified admission, a denial, or a legally cognizable reaspa why such an admission or denial cannot be made. 4. WARNING! If you fail to respond to any of the requests for admission, you may be She (SBN 11304: ge sand, Ba Save, 403° n 3 FILED Tele: (510) 421-2838 ALAMEDA COUNTY At for it MEAGHAN KEEGAN FEB =9 2017 ‘OF THE Sups = a anil SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ! COUNTY OF ALAMEDA - NORTHERN DIVISION ‘Unlimited Civil Jurisdiction | MEAGHAN KEEGAN, CASE NO. RG16834413 | Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF'S ATTACHMENT 1 TO ! vs. REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION - ser ONE WILLIAM CASPARI, { i CASE NO. RG16834413wor an een 10 ul 12 1B 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 2 23 24 25 26 27 28 sanctioned by the court. Sanctions may include findings that such requests are deemed admitted by ‘you, issues being resolved in the asking parties favor, money being assessed against you, money being assessed against you and your counsel, money being assessed against your counsel, your request to enter such responsive information into evidence being denied, your objections to admission into evidence of such information being denied, or, you may be sanctioned by the|court. UL. DEFINITIONS: 1. “INCIDENT™ includes the circumstances and events surrounding the alleged accigent, injury, or other occurrence, or breach of contract giving rise to this action or proceeding. 2. “YOU OR ANYONE ACTING ON YOUR BEHALF” includes you, your agents, your employées, your insurance companies, their agents, their employees, your attorneys, your accountants, your investigators, and anyone else acting on your behalf. 3. “PERSON” includes a natural person, film association, organization, partnership, business, trust, corporation, or public entity. 4. “Document” means a writing, as defined in Evidence Code section 250, and inclulles the original or a copy of handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, and every other means of recording upon any tangible thing and form of communicating or representation, including letters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols, or combinations of them. 5. “ADDRESS” means the street address, including the city, state and zip code. 6. The response to this specially prepared interrogatories must be verified under the penalty of perjury. © REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 1: Please admit that you agreed to pay the judgment issued in Plaintiff's favor in Alameda County, Case No. RG15771630. Please admit that you paid Plaintiff the sum of $2,318.42 in 2016. REQUEST NO. 3; CASE NO. RG168344131 Please admit that you the payment of $2,318.42 was a partial payment of the judgment issued in Case No. RG15771630. REQUEST NO. 4: Please admit that you promised Paul Turley that you would pay the judgment issued in Case No. RG15771630. REQUEST NO. 5: Please admit that Daniel Kaner resides at 105 Starview Court, Oakland, CA. REQUESTNO.6; Please admit that Daniel Kaner received money generated from the sale of 105 Starview 10 Court, Oakland, CA. 11 | BEQUESTNO. 7: R Please admit that you informed Daniel Kaner that a lawsuit existed between you and Plaintiff. REQUEST NO. 8: Please admit that Daniel Kaner was aware of a lawsuit between you and Plaintiff at the time you transferred 105 Starview Court, Oakland, CA. to him. REQUEST NO. 9: Please admit that you deposited funds generated from the sale of 105 Starview Court! Oakland, CA into a financial institution. REQUEST NO.10: Please admit that a real estate broker was involved in the sale of 105 Starview Court) Oakland, CA. REQUEST NO.11: Admit that you did not receive reasonably equivalent value in return for your deed to}Co- Defendant, Daniel Kaner as to 105 Starview Couit, Oakland, CA. wow auaun B 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 24 25 26 27 28 RE 12: Please admit that you transferred 105 Starview Court, Oakland, CA in order to prevent ‘CASE NO. RG16834413woe r an aen 10 uw 12 1B 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 a 2 23 R 27 28 Plaintiff from placing a judgment lien on such property. REQUEST NO. 13: Please admit that you own real property located outside of the state of California. Date, CASE NO. RG16834413a MgB | Gary Sherrer (SBN 113047) 875-A Island, Drive, 40 Alameda, CA. Tele: (510) 421~ 2838 ENDORSED for Plaintiff, ALAMEDA COUNTY ‘MEAGHAN KEEGAN FEB 17 2017 By Tana THON SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA - NORTHERN DIVISION Unlimited Civil Jurisdiction MEAGHAN KEEGAN, CASE NO. RG15-796301 Plaintiff, ASSIGNED. FOR ALL PURPOSES TO vs. DEPARTMENT 13 MARCIA QUARLE, et. al., DECLARATION, OF ATTORNEY, GARY > SHERRER, IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S Defendants. SpHON To STRIKE DEFENDANT? MeMor’t JRANDUM OF COSTS, OR, NT THE FAX COSTS [CCP 1032, 1033.5] / i DECLARATION OF GARY SHERRER IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO TAX COSTS 1. L GARY SHERRER, am an attorney licensed to practice lew before all courts ofthis state and am the attorney for Plaintiff herein. If called to testify, I would do so in conformity herewith. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of California that the statements that follow are true of my own knowledge except as to those statements which are specifically made ‘Alameda County Superior Court Case No. RG15-796301 Plaintiff, MEAGHAN KEEGAN’s, motion to tax costs. 1oe a aw sz 10 i 12 13 4 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 25 26 7 28 ‘under information and belief and as to such statements, if any, I believe the same to be true. 2. On page 3, section 4 of her memorandum of costs summary, Defendant claims $475.00 for deposition costs which consists of attomey fees for Zadick Sharpiro, Esq. Separately, on her attachment of costs (unnumbered page 5) she claims $225.00 for Romona Rheinhardt CCR as a deposition cost. Defendant did not properly notice Plaintiff's deposition in this case. Defendant did not properly serve Plaintiff with a deposition notice in this case. Defendant did not take Plaintiff's deposition nor did Plaintiff take Defendant’s deposition such that no transcript was generated nor paid for. Further, have caused the issue of én attorney's fees award to be reseatthed afer receiving Defendant's memorandum...There s.no contract between the pasties relevant tothe instant action ‘hich provides an attorney fee provision. The Fatdulent transfer states do not provide for attomey | f2es an, insofar as Lcan determine; there i'n0 Taw whic ellows Defendants laim for ettomey fees ‘which Lintuit is Why Stel attomey fees are listed as deposition costs.» 3. Defendant claims $210.00 for service of process costs. Her daughter allegedly served Defendant's papers in the instant action, Due to the fact that Defendant was discovered to use fake processes server(s) in the underlying matter, I have my doubts as to whether or not her daughter actually served papers. Plaintiff believes that Defendant signed her daughter's name to each proof of service. This belief is reasonable because Defendant refused to produce her daughter’s address in discovery such that Plaintiff could subject her to a deposition. A motion to compel discovery including compelling Defendant to provide her daughter’s address for deposition purposes was pending when the Court unilaterally ordered Plaintiff to file a dismissal in this matter. 4, Defendant claims $901.78 for models blowup, and photocopies of exhibits. Her claim includes facsimile transmission costs. There is nothing in CCP Section 1033.5 which allows fax costs. Further, Defendant has a facsimile transmission machine which she has used to convey documents to Plaintif’'s counsel. Please see Exhibit “A” which is included in email messages sent from Defendant to Plaintiff's counsel. Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. RG15-796301 Plaintiff, MEAGHAN KEEGAN’s, motion to tax costs.ee a “A 5. Her claim also includes court fees. She has a fee waiver which the Court granted her even though, according to her, she has over a half million dollars in the bank and had over a half'a million dollars atthe time she obtained her fee waiver. Even assuming that she incurred such a cost, CCP Section 1033.5 limits recovery of court costs to “Filing, motion, and jury fees.” Defendant's claimed costs are none of the above. 6. Defendant claims $508.53 for office supplies from Office Depot. There is nothing in CCP Sections 1032 or 1033.5 which allows Defendant to recover the cost of office supplies. 7. Defendant claims $10.80 for postage (USPS) and $222.62 in photocopying, ($21.09 from “Sukam Copy Print,” $58.23 from “Super Print,” and $143.30, from “Copy World Berkeley.) CCP Section 1033.5, (b)(3) specifically disallows “Postage, telephone, and photocopying charges...” As photocopying exhibits, if any, the vast majority of the exhibits attached to her various moving and responding papers were irrelevant to the matter before the Court. Any copying of exhibits which ‘were actually relevant, the same are de minimis. 8. Defendant claims $10.00 for use of the “Alameda Cty Law Library.” There is nothing in CCP Section 1033.5 which allows such a cost. 9. Given that in the underlying case, Defendant was adjudged liable for multiple violations of PC 630 et seq,, that Plaintiff's claims therein included Defendants attempts to use secretly recorded telephone conversations for blackmail purposes, given that Defendant under penalty of ‘perjury stated that she had recorded Plaintiff over 40 times and then, at trial, she testified that she did not record Plaintiff at all, given her fraudulent statement under penalty of perjury in her application fora fee waiver that she did not have the money to pay court fees while possessing over a half million dollars, from an objective point of view, in my opinion Defendant’s veracity is sorely lacking. 10. Further, Defendant has alleged in this case, that I have personally lied to the Court, filed false documents, and committed perjury. represent Plaintiff in three other matters, and have not Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. RG15-796301 Plaintiff, MEA( KEEGAN’s, motion to tax costs.ao x been falsely accused of the things Defendant has accused me in this matter. 11. Tbelieve that Defendant’s memorandum of costs is as fictitious as the statements made under penalty of perjury in her application for a fee waiver. This declaration is executed on the date below in Alameda, CA. VE pate 207 Plaintiff. Alameda county Superior Court, Case No. RG15-796301 Plaintiff, MEA( KEEGAN’s, motion to tax costs.aA NA @ anf one Rates and Terms January 1, 2009 Click here to return to Home Page. 41. Rates $25.00 hour 2. Agreement of Legal Assistant Services between ~ Marcia Quarle and Meaghan Keegan. 3. Matter: To research and investigate all loan Transactions between Meaghan and ACM investor Services Inc: To obtain-copies. of all recorded liens secured by Brentwood, Shattuck, Clayton and.or. Las Quebradas, Tahoe Osage and other Shue owned properties in which Keegan is a Beneficiary or in which Keegan should be listed as a Beneficiary File Lis. Pendens on ail appropriate. properties Obtain Preliminary Titie Reports, and'Deeds of Trust.on all relevant pro} guess any and all copies of Notices of Default venty that ‘All services except patents and expert witness work $25.00 hour 2. Definitions (a) ‘T', "me", and "my" refer to Marcia Tillen Quarle. (b) "You", "your", and "yours" refers to Meaghan Keegan. (c) A“matter" is either: (2) one case ‘or pending case of yours, (2) a set of closely related cases involving one client of yours, (3) non-case issues involving one Glient of yours, or (4).one topic of work or research independent of any such case or client. _ (d) A “project” is a specific body of work related to one matter. For example, preparation of any one of the following would be considered a single project: (1) 2 pleading, (2).a-motion, (3) an opposition, (4) an Item of discovery propounded (e.g. special interrogataries), (5) 4 response to Aiscovery, or (6) 2 patent application. (€) An “authorized project” ié & project that you have ‘authorized me to undertake and for which you agree to pay under the terms specified hereiri, Your sending me (via fax, mail, attachment to an email, or Fe of delivery) documents related f0 the project your: - authorization. (A) "Passive time” is time am require to spend on an authorized project either: (3) driving, (2) research, or (3) emailing or writing 3. Charges and waiver of charges (@) Charges are waived for each of the following activities: anon16as Nm (1) initial conversation with you, by phone or in person, not exceeding 15 minutes, the very first time we talk; (2) social non business conversations. (b) Except for activities waived in (a), you will be charged at the applicable rate for any of the following activities in connection with an authorized project: (1) discussions (by phone, by email, in your office, or elsewhere); (2) intake of factual and/or legal information; (3) reading documents; (4) research; (5) writing and editing; (6) forms preparation; (7) interaction with your client(s); (8) investigation; (9) filing documents in court on ‘your behaif;.(10) visits to goverment offices and.other places on your behalf; (11) attendance at court hearings and depositions; and (12) driving. * (©) You will be charged for expenses incurred in connection with an authorized project, such as copying and. parking: 1 agree-to pay Narda for #96 Hewlett Packard Printer Cartridges and for Printing Paper 4. Authorization for Work (a) Prior to authorization, both the project and the matter it pertains to should be clearly and mutually understood both by you and by me. Such a mutual understanding is deemed to have occurred if either of us provides an oral or written description of the project and the other agrees to it. (b) Once a mutual understanding of a project is reached, your telling me ofally or In writing to proceed with the work éncompassed by the Broject causes It to become an authorized project: (c) You may terminate an authorized project, or put 2 project ‘of “hold, any time by noiying me. Upon such notice, hel stnp the work iavolce you for. the work thus far completed, which upon your request wil be deliverable to you to vnatev extent; and ina form, It exists at that time. §. Invoice and Payment (2) By authorizing 2 project, you agree to pay invoice(s) upon presentation for the work on that project. (b) For projects not exceeding 10 hours of work, you will be invoiced 00017a ol ae ‘serv 2 2544-3300 plvels ) -- i e e be devered with such an invie > eycmisn pment of sb ae prebeto Mars | Guate {e) E1ehnvtce wi india whether to mal the eck oto Rd Roe smo (ory esigee) ta pick ue. Agreod: January 1, 2009 Marcia Tlen Quarle 4), 9. Agreed: January 1, 261 an Keegi ane 510.91 1255 CE 4S ~ 4 hen, lane QO (lek hereto return to Home Pag. @ ‘mp1 apes alameds cours. gov/domsioweb/ sevice” I domaiwe/srieervcename.WebSerdcehPagtameimapebiD=246Parent=15900179EActI¢N=23351636 Page Left md‘/ tl ' - ga 1 Sherrer (SBN 113047 eee island Drive, 403" ENDORSED 2] Alameda, CA. 94502 FILED Tele: (510) 431-2838 ALAMEDA COUNTY 3 Attorney for Plaintiff, FEB 17 2017 4| MEAGHAN KEEGAN on SIEWOR COURT 6 7 ‘ SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 7 COUNTY OF ALAMEDA - NORTHERN DIVISION to Unlimited Civil Jurisdiction 11] MEAGHAN KEEGAN, CASE NO. RG15-796301 2 Plaintiff, ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO IUDGE Julia Spai 13} vs. DEPAR’ 19 14] MARCIA QUARLE, et. al PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE AND MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM 15 Defendants. OF COSTS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO : TAX COSTS 1 ie Fe ‘Marek 22.4817 ime: pet Bt 18 ) — ReeivetionNo. (889089 19 a Plaintiff, MEAGHAN KEEGAN, disputes costs claimed by Defendant MARCIA QUARLE 21} as the prevailing party in the instant action as follows: 22) L 23 FACTS 24 ‘This Court ordered Defendant to pay the judgment in the underlying case and then ordered 25) tha lan ass the instant svion resuling Court unilaterally mking Defendant th prevailing 261 Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. RG15-796301 a7 | Plaintift MEAGHAN KEEGAN's, motion to tax costs 28 11 ee aa wae 10 u 12 13 14 15 16 19 21 22 23 25 26 27 28 pa#fVin the lawsuit without the matter being tried on the merits. Defendant claims $475.00 for deposition costs which consists of attomey fees. Defendant did not take Plaintiff's deposition nor did Plaintiff take Defendant’s deposition such that no transcript was generated nor paid for. Defendant claims $210.00 for service of process costs. Her daughter allegedly served all papers in the instant action. Defendant claims $901.78 for models blowup, and photocopies of exhibits. nL. DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FOR DEPOSITION COSTS As above, Defendant did not take Plaintiff's deposition nor did Plaintiff take Defendant's deposition. There were no deposition transcripts to purchase. Defendant does not attach any evidence that she expended any deposition related money. Please note that on section 12 of the Defendant's memorandum of costs, court reporter fees are not claimed. Inasmuch as Defendant is claiming attomey fees as deposition costs, CCP Sections 1033.5 allows in relevant part, “(10) Attomey's fees, when authorized by any of the following: (A) Contract. (B) Statute. (C) LawSinthems|= instantacton He ne eontrt OME EROMEY Tees to the prevalling pany. The UFT stale Plaintiff considers Defendant's claim for deposition costs to be fectitious. mm. DEFENDANT’S CLAIM FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS COSTS Each proof of service by Defendant is allegedly signed by Defendant’s daughter. In discovery Plaintiff sought the address for Defendant’s daughter because Defendant had claimed that service of process occurred by a person named Ava Lon in the underlying lawsuit. Plaintiff later learned that Ava Lon did not exist and the Court in the underlying case ordered Defendant to Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. RG1S-796301 Plaintiff, MEAGHAN KEEGAN’s, motion to tax costs.ee produce Ava Lon. Defesidant could not produce Ms. Lon at the hearing and Defendant's proof of service was set aside, Plaintiff believes that Defendant signed her daughter’s name to each proof of service. This belief is reasonable because Defendant refused to produce her daughter’s address in discovery such that Plaintiff could subject her to a deposition. Plaintiff considers Defendant’s claim for service of process fees as fictitious. W. DEFENDANT’S CLAIM FOR PHOTOCOPIES AND THE LIKE First, Defendant does not attach any receipts in support of her alleged costs. Second, she is claiming $475.00 in attomey fees as deposition costs without a contract provision allowing the same nor a statute which would allow an award of attorney fees. ‘Third, Defendant has a facsimile transmission machine which she has used to convey documents to Plaintiff's counsel. Please see Exhibit “A” which is included in email messages sent from Defendant to Plaintiffs counsel. This fact notwithstanding, Defendant is claiming $78.43 for “fax changes.” Further, nothing in CCP Section 1033.5 allows fax charges. Fourth, notwithstanding that Defendant is sitting on over a half million dollars, she applied for and obtained a fee waiver by obvious fraud. The first question on the fee waiver asks if the applicant has sufficient money to pay court fees, She stated that she did not in order to obtain the waiver and cheat the County. Her fraudulent fee waiver notwithstanding, she claims $48.65 in costs as to “Superior Ct. of California.” Even assuming that she incurred such a cost, CCP Section 1033.5 limits recovery of court costs to “Filing, motion, and jury fees.” Defendant's claimed costs are none of the above. : Fifth, Defendant claims $225.00 in Court reporter fees from “Romona Rheinhardt even though Defendant never properly noticed Plaintiff's deposition and no deposition ever occured. Sixth, Defendant claims $508.53 for office supplies from Office Depot. ‘There is nothing in Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. RG15-796301 Plaintiff, MEA‘ KEEGAN’s, motion to tax costs. 3ee ee CCP Sections 1032 or 1033.5 which allows Defendant to recover the cost of office supplies. Seventh, Defendant claims $10.80 for postage (USPS) and $222.62 in photocopying, ($21.09 from “Sukam Copy Print,” $58.23 from “Super Print,” and $143.30, from “Copy World Berkeley.) CCP Section 1033.5, (b)(3) specifically disallows “Postage, telephone, and photocopying charges...” Eighth, Defendant claims $10.00 for use of the “Alameda Cty Law Library.” There is nothing in CCP Section 1033.5 which allows such a cost. ‘Thus, none of the costs claimed by Defendant under section 11 of her memorandum of costs, “Models, blownups and photocopies of exhibits are recoverable. Plaintiff considers Defendant's claim as specious and disingenuous ve CONCLUSION Given the above, none of the costs claimed by Defendant may be awarded. Defendant's memorandum of costs should be stricken in its entirety. And, the Court is asked to enter a finding that Defendant's submitted memorandum of costs is per se fijvolous. oa Hal ee County Superior Court, Case No. RG15-796301 Pianist MBAC HAN KEEGAN’s, motion to tax costs. 4wow awa N Gary Sherrer (SBN 113047) 875-A island Drive, Tele: (510) 421-2838 neo | ALAMEDA COUNTY * stom for Pain MEAGHAN KEEGAN FEB 17 2017 Ta THOUAS.Doncly SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA - NORTHERN DIVISION Unlimited Civil Jurisdiction MEAGHAN KEEGAN, CASE NO. RG15-796301 inti ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO ee TUDGE Julia S| vs. DEPAR’ MARCIA QUARLE, et. al, PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION ‘TO STRIKE DEFENDANT'S Defendants. MEMORANDUM OF COSTS, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TAX COSTS [CGP 1032, 1033.5] Date: MURz9, 267 Date: wher? 2017 | Reservation No.L@2gone_ NOTICE OF MOTION TO MARCIA QUARLE AND HER ATTORNEY OF RECORD, IF ANY: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the date, time and in the department captioned above, of the Alameda County Superior Court, Plaintiff will, and does hereby, move the Court to strike (Mise Defendant’s memorandum of costs or, in the alternative, to tax costs. This motion is based on CCP Sections 1032 - 1033.5, this notice, the accompanying Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. RG15-796301 Plaintiff, MEAGHAN KEEGAN's, motion to tax costs.ee ee under information and belief and as to such statements, if any, I believe the same to be true. 2. On page 3, section 4 of her memorandum of costs summary, Defendant claims $475.00 for deposition costs which consists of attomey fees for Zadiick Sharpiro, Esq. Separately, on her attachment of costs (unnumbered page 5) she claims $225.00 for Romona Rheinbardt CCR as a deposition cost. Defendant did not properly notice Plaintiff's deposition in this case. Defendant did ‘ot properly serve Plaintiff with a deposition notice in this case. Defendant did not take Plaintif?'s deposition nor did Plaintiff take Defendant's deposition such thet no transcript was generated nor aid for. Further, Ihave caused the issue of an attomey’s fees award to be researched afer receiving Defendant’s memorandum. There is no contract between the parties relevant to the instant action ‘which provides an attomey fee provision. The fraudulent transfer statutes do not provide for attorney fees and, insofar as I can determine, there is no law which allows Defendants claim for attomey fees which I intuit is why such attomey fees are listed as deposition costs. 3. Defendant claims $210.00 for service of process costs, Her daughter allegedly served. ‘Defendant's papers in the instant action. Due to the fact that Defendant was discovered to use fake ‘Processes server(s) in the underlying matter, Thave my doubts es to whether or not her daughter actually served papers. Plaintiff believes that Defendant signed her daughter’s name to each proof of service. This belief is reasonable because Defendant refused to produce her danghter’s address in discovery such that Plaintiff could subject her to a deposition. A motion to compel discovery including compelling Defendant to provide her daughtér’s address for deposition purposes was pending when the Court unilaterally ordered Plaintiff to file a dismissal in this matter. 4. Defendant claims $901.78 for models blowup, and photocopies of exhibits. Her claim includes facsimile transmission costs. There is nothing in CCP Section 1033.5 which allows fax costs. Further, Defendant has a facsimile transmission machine which she has used to convey documents to Plaintiff's counsel. Please see Exhibit “A” which is included in email messages sent from Defendant to Plaintif’s counsel. Alameda Cot ior Court, Case No. RG15-796301 Plait, MEAG KEEGAN’s, motion to tax costs. 2— ao CCP Sections 1032 or 1033.5 which allows Defendant to recover the cost of office supplies. Seventh, Defendant claims $10.80 for postage (USPS) and $222.62 in photocopying, ($21.09 rom “Sukam Copy Print,” $58.23 from “Super Print,” and $143.30, ftom “Copy World Berkeley.) CCP Section 1033.5, (6)(3) specifically disallows “Postage, telephone, and photocopying charges...” Fighth, Defendant claims $10.00 for use ofthe “Alameda Cty Law Library.” There is nothing in CCP Section 1033.5 which allows such a cost. ‘Thus, none of the costs claimed by Defendant under section. 11 of her memorandum of costs, “Models, blowups and photocopies of exhibits are recoverable. Plaintiff considers Defendant's claim as specious and disingenuous v. CONCLUSION Given the above, none of the costs claimed by Defendant may be awarded. Defendant's memorandum of costs should be stricken in its entirety. And, the Court is asked to enter a finding that Defendant's submitted memorandum of costs is per se fj County Superior Court, Case No. RG15-796301 MEAGHANK Alameda Plaintiff, KEEGAN’s, motion to tax costs. 4