1.

Director of Lands v CA and Bisnar, GR 83609

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

Petitioner Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, seeks a review of the decision dated May 27, 1988, of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66426, entitled "Ibarra Bisnar, et al. vs. Director of Lands," affirming in totothe decision of
the Court of First Instance of Capiz, granting the private respondents' application for confirmation and registration of their
title to two (2) parcels of land in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256.

In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land filed on July 20,1976, the applicants Ibarra and
Amelia Bisnar claimed to be the owners in fee simple of Lots 866 and 870 of the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06-000869,
respectively containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq. m.) and 34 hectares (345,385 sq. m.) situated in barrio Gen.
Hizon, Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Capiz (p. 14, Rollo). The applicants alleged that they inherited those
parcels of land (p. 41, Rollo) and they had been paying the taxes thereon (p. 40, Rollo).

On December 16,1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, opposed the
application on the grounds that:

1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to acquire ownership in
fee simple of the land or lots applied for, the same not having been acquired by any of the various types of
title issued by the Spanish Government, such as, (1) 'titulo real' or royal grant, (2) the 'concession especial'
or special grant, (3) the 'composicion con el estado titulo' or adjustment title, (4) the 'titulo de compra 'or title
by purchase, and (5) the 'informacion possessoria' or possessory information under the Royal Decree of 13
February 1894, or any other recognized mode of acquisition of title over realty under pertinent applicable
laws.

2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application.

3. The properties in question are a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines,
not subject to private appropriation, (pp. 17-19, Record on Appeal). (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)

On February 24,1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which was approved on March 14, 1977, and included
the following allegation:

Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, they hereby apply for the benefits
of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as they and their predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession of the land as owners for more than fifty (50) years. (p. 16, Rollo.)

After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names of the applicants, herein private
respondents. It found that applicants and their predecessors- in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful
and adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than eighty (80) years
(not only 30) prior to the filing of the application for registration, introduced improvements on the lands by planting
coconuts, bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land into productive fishponds (p. 68, Rollo).

On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that the classification of the lots as timberland by
the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land
than as agricultural land, citing as authority the case of Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10). In
this petition, the government alleges that:

1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable agricultural land, mineral
land or forest land is a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not of the courts;

2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership; and

3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of
Section 48 of Com. Act No. 141, as amended. (p. 19, Rollo.)

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the lots in question may be registered under Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as
amended.

The petition is impressed with merit.

In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we ruled:
 As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act 2874, the
classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now
a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not the courts. With these rules, there
should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of the
public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the government, through the
Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for respondent court to ignore
the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area is within a timberland block, and (2) as certified to by the
then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes. (pp. 21-22, Rollo.)

It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless
and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs.
Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151
SCRA 679).

Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161
[1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]).

Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or
areas covered with forests are excluded (p. 26, Rollo). We reiterate our ruling in Amunategui that:

In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act 1942. He must
overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an
interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those
derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for
at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application. (Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry,
126 SCRA 69.)

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside. The application for registration in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256 of
the former Court of First Instance, is hereby dismissed without costs.

SO ORDERED.

2. Republic v CA, supra

3. Leonardo de Castro v Yap, 167707, supra

4. Republic v TAN Properties, 154953

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 21 August 2002 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
66658. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the 16 December 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan,
Batangas, Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Registration Case No. T-635.

The Antecedent Facts

This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-
B of the subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre.
The land, with an area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007 hectares, is located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing at 9:30 a.m. on 11 November 1999. The Notice of Initial
Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, 20 September 1999 issue, Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to 6794, 4 and in
the 18 October 1999 issue of Peoples Journal Taliba, 5 a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of
Initial Hearing was also posted in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the Municipal Building of Sto. Tomas,
Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place on the land. 6 All adjoining owners and all government agencies and offices
concerned were notified of the initial hearing. 7

On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for initial hearing, there was no oppositor other than the
Opposition dated 7 October 1999 of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands (petitioner). On
15 November 1999, the trial court issued an Order8 of General Default against the whole world except as against petitioner.

During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang (Carandang) appeared as oppositor. The trial court gave
Carandang until 29 November 1999 within which to file his written opposition. 9 Carandang failed to file his written
opposition and to appear in the succeeding hearings. In an Order 10 dated 13 December 1999, the trial court reinstated the
Order of General Default.

During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999, respondent presented three witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga
Torres (Torres), respondents Operations Manager and its authorized representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista
(Evangelista), a 72-year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since birth; and Regalado Marquez,
Records Officer II of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.

The testimonies of respondents witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse,
open, and continuous possession of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was
succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27 September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of Donation
covering the land in favor of one of his children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato
another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was
adjudicated to one of Antonios children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting). 11On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to
respondent.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor of respondent.

The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for registration of land provided such entity and its
predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30 years or more. The trial court ruled that the facts showed that
respondents predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which
possession converted the land to private property.

The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General Default, the Court hereby adjudicates and
decrees Lot 10705-B, identical to Lot 13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, on plan Csd-04-019741, situated in
Barangay of San Bartolome, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, with an area of 564,007 square
meters, in favor of and in the name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc., a domestic corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws with principal office at 19th Floor, PDCP Bank Building, 8737 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.

Once this Decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.

SO ORDERED.12

Petitioner appealed from the trial courts Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in granting the application for
registration absent clear evidence that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of
possession and occupation as required by law. Petitioner alleged that the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are
general in nature. Considering the area involved, petitioner argued that additional witnesses should have been presented
to corroborate Evangelistas testimony.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial courts Decision.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelistas knowledge of the possession and occupation of the land stemmed not only
from the fact that he worked there for three years but also because he and Kabesang Puroy were practically neighbors. On
Evangelistas failure to mention the name of his uncle who continuously worked on the land, the Court of Appeals ruled that
Evangelista should not be faulted as he was not asked to name his uncle when he testified. The Court of Appeals also
ruled that at the outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of Fortunatos relation to Kabesang Puroy, but this did not affect
Evangelistas statement that Fortunato took over the possession and cultivation of the land after Kabesang Puroys death.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that the events regarding the acquisition and disposition of the land became public
knowledge because San Bartolome was a small community. On the matter of additional witnesses, the Court of Appeals
ruled that petitioner failed to cite any law requiring the corroboration of the sole witness testimony.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent witness since he was only testifying on the fact that he had
caused the filing of the application for registration and that respondent acquired the land from Porting.

Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals Decision. Petitioner raises the following grounds in its
Memorandum:

The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing the grant of title to applicant corporation despite the following:

1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and

2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the subject tract of land. 13

The Issues

The issues may be summarized as follows:

1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;

2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier; and

3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land Act.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

Respondent Failed to Prove

that the Land is Alienable and Disposable

Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land
forms part of the public domain. Petitioner insists that respondent failed to prove that the land is no longer part of the public
domain.

The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the
State.14 The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant. 15

In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO),
Batangas City,16 certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No.
30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925." The second certification 17 in the form of a
memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the
DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto.
Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."

The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, 18 dated 30 May 1988, delineated the
functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates
of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices
(PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38,19 dated 19 April
1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO to issue
certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue
certificates of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. 20 In this case, respondent applied for
registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO
certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990,
is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.

The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land
classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:

1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except rattan;

2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;

3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects; and

4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and lumber dealers.
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:

1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits except rattan;

2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and lumber dealers;

3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;

4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity declared areas for public infrastructure
projects; and

5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure
projects.

Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial
court, has no probative value.

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present
a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of
the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed
to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.

Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The government
officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court
should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are
presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable
and disposable.

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody
of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the
DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official
publication21 of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date
of the latter.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public documents
contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the Civil Registrar 22in the books of
registries, or by a ship captain in the ships logbook. 23 The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated
reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records
of public documents.24 The certifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no probative
value.25 Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the
alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere
issuance, prove the facts stated therein. 26 Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents
contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of
their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof
of the facts stated therein.27 Here, Torres, a private individual and respondents representative, identified the certifications
but the government officials who issued the certifications did not testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the
certifications cannot be given probative value.28 The contents of the certifications are hearsay because Torres was
incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the certifications.29 Torres did not prepare the certifications, he was
not an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct any verification survey whether the land falls within the
area classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable.

Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly became alienable and disposable. The DENR
Secretary certified that based on Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31
December 1925. However, the certificate on the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31
December 1985.

We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent show that under the Land Classification Map
No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan states that it became
alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent alleged that "the blue print plan merely serves to prove the
precise location and the metes and bounds of the land described therein x x x and does not in any way certify the nature
and classification of the land involved." 30 It is true that the notation by a surveyor-geodetic engineer on the survey plan that
the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not sufficient proof of the lands
classification.31 However, respondent should have at least presented proof that would explain the discrepancy in the dates
of classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified that the documents submitted to the court consisting of the
tracing cloth plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan, and the Geodetic Engineers
certification were faithful reproductions of the original documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the discrepancy in
the dates. Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented to explain why the date of classification on the blue print plan was
different from the other certifications submitted by respondent.

There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious

Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner

Petitioner alleges that the trial courts reliance on the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres was misplaced. Petitioner
alleges that Evangelistas statement that the possession of respondents predecessors-in-interest was open, public,
continuous, peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a general conclusion of law rather than factual evidence of
possession of title. Petitioner alleges that respondent failed to establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the land
openly, continuously, and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared alienable and disposable.

We agree with petitioner.

Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked
on the land for three years. Evangelista testified that his family owned a lot near Kabesang Puroys land. The Court of
Appeals took note of this and ruled that Evangelistas knowledge of Kabesang Puroys possession of the land stemmed
"not only from the fact that he had worked thereat but more so that they were practically neighbors." 32 The Court of Appeals
observed:

In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, it is not difficult to understand that
people in the said community knows each and everyone. And, because of such familiarity with each other, news or
events regarding the acquisition or disposition for that matter, of a vast tract of land spreads like wildfire, thus, the
reason why such an event became of public knowledge to them. 33

Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato. However, he admitted that he did not know the
exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small community. He
did not also know the relationship between Fortunato and Porting. In fact, Evangelistas testimony is contrary to the factual
finding of the trial court that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not by Fortunato who was one of
Antonios children. Antonio was not even mentioned in Evangelistas testimony.

The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration.
However, in this case, we find Evangelistas uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that respondents predecessors-
in-interest had been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. We cannot consider the
testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the fact of respondents acquisition of the land.
While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their possession of the land was hearsay. He did not
even tell the trial court where he obtained his information.

The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership. 34 Respondent did not present any credible explanation why the
realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the
land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed
ownership or possession of the land only in that year.

Land Application by a Corporation

Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for registration of the land of the public domain in
this case.

We agree with petitioner.

Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements
of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be
acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.

The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,35 the Court traced the law on disposition of lands of the public domain.
Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against private corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The
1973 Constitution limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines.
Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino citizens, were no longer allowed to
acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution continues the prohibition against private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. 36 The Court explained in Chavez:

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution
allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. x x x x

[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have simply limited the size of
alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the
limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain
under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.

If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the name of a corporation
would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a
corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided
parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots
from one generation to the next.

In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more
than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who
already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to
acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him.
An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the
corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by
individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.

The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited area of
alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the
provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to
circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the
face of an ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional intent
is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical
benefit arising from the constitutional ban.37

In Director of Lands v. IAC,38 the Court allowed the land registration proceeding filed by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.
(Acme) for five parcels of land with an area of 481,390 square meters, or 48.139 hectares, which Acme acquired from
members of the Dumagat tribe. The issue in that case was whether the title could be confirmed in favor of Acme when the
proceeding was instituted after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which prohibited private corporations or associations
from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. The Court ruled that the
land was already private land when Acme acquired it from its owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired a registrable
title. Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations could acquire public agricultural lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares
while individuals could acquire not more than 144 hectares. 39

In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive, and undisputed possession of alienable land for the
period prescribed by law created the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction ceases to be public land and becomes private property. The Court ruled:
 Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of
the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the
dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) "x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x x." No proof being
admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length
of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion
already effected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete.

x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period of (30 years under The Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that
rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at
the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at
the time no prohibition against said corporations holding or owning private land. x x x.40(Emphasis supplied)

Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of Lands, the "land x x x was already private property
at the time it was acquired x x x by Acme." In this case, respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting,
who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and
adverse possession of the land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired the land from Porting,
the land was not yet private property.

For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration of alienable and disposable land, the
corporation must have acquired the land when its transferor had already a vested right to a judicial confirmation of title to
the land by virtue of his open, continuous and adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30
years since 12 June 1945. Thus, in Natividad v. Court of Appeals,41 the Court declared:

Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings, the parcels of land in question had already been
converted to private ownership through acquisitive prescription by the predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when the
latter purchased them in 1979. All that was needed was the confirmation of the titles of the previous owners or
predecessors-in-interest of TCMC.

Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against
corporations acquiring alienable lands of the public domain except through lease (Article XIV, Section 11, 1973
Constitution) did not apply to them for they were no longer alienable lands of the public domain but private property.

What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the corporate applicant for land registration to
establish that when it acquired the land, the same was already private land by operation of law because the statutory
acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed. The length of possession of the land by the corporation
cannot be tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of such
acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations from acquiring lands of the public
domain.

Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land under the doctrine in Director of
Lands. Republic Act No. 917642 (RA 9176) further amended the Public Land Act43 and extended the period for the filing of
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:

Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond
December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall
apply only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the
several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-five of this Act shall
apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed
as prohibiting any of said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the
President.

Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of this amendatory Act shall be treated as having been
filed in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable
land. Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an individual owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of land in
excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess area of 44.4007
hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying for land registration, a private corporation cannot have any
right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This assumes, of course, that the corporation
acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares, when the land had already become private land by operation of law. In the
present case, respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private land when respondent
acquired it from Porting in 1997.

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658 and the 16
December 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-635.
We DENY the application for registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

5. Republic v Santos, 160453

BERSAMIN, J.:

By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the water- belongs to
the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the
dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the
ownership in some other person.

Antecedents

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan)
applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque
City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio,
Paraaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio,
Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paraaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A
also owned by Arcadio Ivan. 1

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant
because of the latters co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and
had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years. 2

The City of Paraaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the property for its
flood control program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming
that the property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the
applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion. 3

Ruling of the RTC

On May 10, 2000, the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:
4

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR.,
both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied for which is situated in
the Barangay of San Dionisio, City of Paraaque with an area of one thousand forty five (1045) square meters more or less
and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Paraaque Cadastre,
LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of Lot 4998-B in their names with the following technical description, to wit:

xxxx

Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order for the Issuance of the Decree be issued.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.

Ruling of the CA

In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC, to wit:
5

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED IS AN ACCRETION TO
THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF APPELLEE ARCADIO C.
SANTOS JR. THAT THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL
THROUGH THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER.
II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE APPELLEES
FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF
LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THEIR CONTINUOUS,
OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN
THIRTY (30) YEARS.

On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC. 6

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on October 20, 2003. 7

Issues

Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that: 8

RESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO THEIR ADJOINING LAND THAT
WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS CONTRADICTED BY
THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.

II

ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE PARAAQUE
RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID PROPERTY IN FAVOR
OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE FAILURE OF
RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.

IV

THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY, PUBLICLY AND
ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.

To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein; and whether or not respondents
could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree).

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

I.

The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents benefit

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."

In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:

On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C.
Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this application which was previously a part of the Paraaque River which
became an orchard after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by
applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him through inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now
deceased. Conformably with Art. 457 of the New Civil Code, it is provided that:
"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters."
9

The CA upheld the RTCs pronouncement, holding:

It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan
Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which was previously part of the Paraaque River which
became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant
which was obtained by the latter from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo). 10

The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in
the face of the fact that respondents evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the Paraaque
River.

The Republics submission is correct.

Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish the merits of their application by
a preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than that
offered in opposition to it. They would be held entitled to claim the property as their own and apply for its registration under
11

the Torrens system only if they established that, indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered
12

accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking
place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers. 13

Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant the grant of their
application for land registration.

However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that
the property was the dried-up river bed of the Paraaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that
Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously part of the Paraaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up."

Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the original title of Lot 4 was issued in their
mothers name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter as the land formed between Lot 4 and the
Paraaque River, the unavoidable conclusion should then be that soil and sediments had meanwhile been deposited near
Lot 4 by the current of the Paraaque River, resulting in the formation of Lot 4998-B.

The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore that the effects of the current of the
river are not the only cause of the formation of land along a river bank. There are several other causes, including the drying
up of the river bed. The drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other
words, respondents did not establish at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible
deposit of soil by the effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the large volume of soil that
ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045 square meters had been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible
manner by the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years the span of time intervening between 1920, when
Lot 4 was registered in the name of their deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in existence) and the
early 1950s (which respondents witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew them to have occupied Lot
4988-B). The only plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the
Paraaque River. Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.s own testimony to the effect that the property was
previously a part of the Paraaque River that had dried up and become an orchard.

We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.s own Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 confirmed the uniform
conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B had been formed by the drying up of the Paraaque River. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 of the consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein
described, was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by Dried River Bed." 14

That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot 4998-B, which was described as "bounded
by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676), in the name of respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in
the Northeast."15

The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became respondents property
pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to
form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to
accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current.
In accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners
had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of
the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical
language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for
interpretation; there is only room for application. The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.
16 17
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code
expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State. It follows that the river beds that dry
18

up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the

State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should
belong to some other person. 19

II

Acquisitive prescription was not applicable in favor of respondents

The RTC favored respondents application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B also because they had taken
possession of the property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than 30 years based on their predecessor-
in-interest being the adjoining owner of the parcel of land along the river bank. It rendered the following ratiocination, viz: 20

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the owners thereof, they took possession of the
same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years because their predecessors-in-
interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river bank. Furthermore, the fact that applicants
paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land
Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OICChief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority,
made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Paraaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot
5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.

Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in view of the foregoing reports of the
Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration Authority and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
the Court finds and so holds that the applicants have satisfied all the requirements of law which are essential to a
government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title in their favor. So also, oppositor failed to
prove that the applicants are not entitled thereto, not having presented any witness.

In fine, the application is GRANTED.

As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.

Both lower courts erred.

The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), which
pertinently states:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxxx

Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following, namely: (a) that the land
forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership either
since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. 21

The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took possession of the same property continuously,
openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years." 22

Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded the
highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal, with such findings being binding and conclusive
on the Court, the Court has consistently recognized exceptions to this rule, including the following, to wit: (a) when the
23

findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the CA went beyond
the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are
not disputed by respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record. 24
Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; and that the inference
made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court should now review the
findings.

In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse possession of the land for more than 30
years, the RTC declared:

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners thereof, they took possession of the
same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty years because their predecessor in interest
are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river banks. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its
realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land
Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority,
made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Paraaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot
5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.

The RTC apparently reckoned respondents period of supposed possession to be "more than thirty years" from the fact that
"their predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated
what acts respondents had performed showing their possession of the property "continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely" in that length of time. The decision mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of
the property to be made. That, to us, was not enough to justify the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment of realty
taxes did not conclusively prove the payors ownership of the land the taxes were paid for, the tax declarations and
25

payments being mere indicia of a claim of ownership; and, secondly, the causing of surveys of the property involved was
26

not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse possession.

The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need to make an express
act of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that
pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of the water
becomes manifest has no applicability herein. This is simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion.
27

Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by respondents predecessor-in-interest did not translate to
possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.

On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse possession of Lot 4998-B was not
even validated or preponderantly established. The admission of respondents themselves that they declared the property
for taxation purposes only in 1997 and paid realty taxes only from 1999 signified that their alleged possession would at
28

most be for only nine years as of the filing of their application for land registration on March 7, 1997.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more than thirty years in the
character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other means without any competent
proof that the land was already declared as alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land
still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.

Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 of
the Civil Code lists the properties considered as part of public dominion, namely: (a) those intended for public use, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character; and (b) those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service
or for the development of the national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code declares that rivers and
their natural beds are of public dominion.

Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive prescription or not was a question that the Court resolved
in favor of the State in Celestial v. Cachopero, a case involving the registration of land found to be part of a dried-up
29

portion of the natural bed of a creek. There the Court held:

As for petitioners claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan Creek, based on
(1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to
October 22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370
of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same must fail.

Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an
imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government has
declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and
adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.

A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the
sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property
of the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And, absent any
declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.

xxxx
Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took effect, the subject land would
clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river
beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the
land occupied by the new course," and the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after paying
their value.

And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are applicable only when "river beds are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both
the Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject land became dry as a result of the
construction an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court
held:

The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is a natural change
in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to
lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of
Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the
case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the public domain which
cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the course of a river, not where the
river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a
situation, commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public dominion. (Bold emphases
supplied)

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
30

Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State. Occupation of public land in the
31

concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. 32

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that are abandoned through
the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new
course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto
belonging to the owners of the land affected by the natural change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all
river beds remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously
declared by the Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already
declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the property through
prescription.

Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable and disposable by the Government.
They cite as proof of the classification as alienable and disposable the following notation found on the survey plan, to wit: 33

NOTE

ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X 60CM

All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm

Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive Director issued by the CENR-
OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Devt. on
Jan. 3, 1968.

Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299

Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.

Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was "inside" the map "classified as alienable/disposable
by the Bureau of Forest Development on 03 Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the propertys nature as alienable and disposable
public land?

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the
existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation
of imperfect title do not apply.
As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, we said in Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap that: 34

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number
of years is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by
private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-
nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for
proof." (Emphasis supplied)

In Menguito v. Republic, which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento, we specifically resolved the issue of whether the
35 36

notation on the survey plan was sufficient evidence to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, to wit:

To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied
on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per
L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No.
Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x."

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated
to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept
of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains
inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was
inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the
classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By
relying solely on the said surveyors assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been
declared alienable. (Emphasis supplied)

In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we dealt with the sufficiency of the certification by the Provincial Environmental
37

Officer (PENRO) or Community Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the effect that a piece of public land was alienable and
disposable in the following manner, viz:

x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present
a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of
the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed
to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.

Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The government
1wphi1

officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court
should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are
presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable
and disposable.

xxxx

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the
alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere
issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents
contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of
their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
(Emphasis supplied)

These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to the effect that the
"survey is inside a map classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Devt" did not prove that Lot 4998-B was
already classified as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents could not validly assert acquisitive prescription of
Lot 4988-B.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on May 27,
2003; DISMISSES the application for registration of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot
4998-B with a total area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City, Metro
Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging to the State for being part of the dried--up bed of the
Parat1aque River.

Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.