Petitioner's counterclaim for commission, bonuses, and accumulated premium reserves is merely permissive.

The evidence required to prove petitioner's claims differs from that needed to establish respondent's demands
for the recovery of cash accountabilities from petitioner, such as cash advances and costs of premiums. The
recovery of respondent's claims is not contingent or dependent upon establishing petitioner's counterclaim,
such that conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort of the
court and the parties. One would search the records in vain for a logical connection between the parties'
claims. This conclusion is further reinforced by petitioner's own admissions since she declared in her answer
that respondent's cause of action, unlike her own, was not based upon the Special Agent's Contract. . . . In
order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay the
(Alday v. FGU Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 138822, [January 23,
prescribed docket fees.|||
2001], 402 PHIL 962-976)

Petitioners also question the trial court's ruling that their counterclaim is permissive. This Court has laid down
the following tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, to wit: (1) Are the issues of fact or
law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3) Will substantially the same evidence support
or refute plaintiff's claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim? and (4) Is there any logical relation between
the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties
would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court? 18

Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, this Court agrees with the view of the RTC that Rosita's
counterclaim for the recovery of her alleged share in the sale of the Morayta property is permissive in nature.
The evidence needed to prove respondents' claim to recover the amount of P3,000,000.00 from
petitioners is different from that required to establish Rosita's demands for the recovery of her alleged
share in the sale of the subject Morayta property. The recovery of respondents' claim is not contingent or
dependent upon the establishment of Rosita's counterclaim such that conducting separate trials will not result
in the substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and the parties.

In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion, 19 this Court laid down the rules on the payment of filing
fees, to wit:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment
of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not
be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may allow payment of
said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment
of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute
a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. 20

In order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim, Rosita is bound to pay the
prescribed docket fees. 21 Since it is not disputed that Rosita never paid the docket and filing fees, the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim. Nonetheless, the trial court ruled on the merits of
Rosita's permissive counterclaim by dismissing the same on the ground that she failed to establish that there is
a sharing agreement between her and Arturo with respect to the proceeds of the sale of the subject Morayta
property and that the amount of P3,000,000.00 represented by the check which Rosita and Alice encashed
formed part of the proceeds of the said sale.

It is settled that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time,
even on appeal before this Court. 22

In the present case, considering that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the permissive
counterclaim of Rosita, any proceeding taken up by the trial court and any ruling or judgment rendered
in relation to such counterclaim is considered null and void. In effect, Rosita may file a separate action
against Arturo for recovery of a sum of money.

However, Rosita's claims for damages and attorney's fees are compulsory as they necessarily arise as a result
of the filing by respondents of their complaint. Being compulsory in nature, payment of docket fees is not
required. 23 Nonetheless, since petitioners are found to be liable to return to respondents the amount of
P3,000,000.00 as well as to pay moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, it necessarily follows that
Rosita's counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees should be dismissed as correctly done by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA.

(Sandejas v. Spouses Ignacio, G.R. No. 155033, [December 19, 2007], 565 PHIL 366-387)

The rules on the payment of docket fees for counterclaims and cross claims were amended effective
August 16, 2004

KOGIES strongly argues that when PGSMC filed the counterclaims, it should have paid docket fees and filed a
certificate of non-forum shopping, and that its failure to do so was a fatal defect.

We disagree with KOGIES.

As aptly ruled by the CA, the counterclaims of PGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim dated July 17, 1998 in accordance with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the Answer with Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8 on existing
counterclaim or cross-claim states, "A compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim that a defending party has at
the time he files his answer shall be contained therein."

On July 17, 1998, at the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against KOGIES, it was
not liable to pay filing fees for said counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress, however, that
effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now
required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims.

As to the failure to submit a certificate of forum shopping, PGSMC's Answer is not an initiatory pleading which
requires a certification against forum shopping under Sec. 5 24 of Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. It is a responsive pleading, hence, the courts a quo did not commit reversible error in denying
KOGIES' motion to dismiss PGSMC's compulsory counterclaims.

Interlocutory orders proper subject of certiorari

Citing Gamboa v. Cruz, 25 the CA also pronounced that "certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to
question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial court." 26 The CA erred on its reliance
on Gamboa. Gamboa involved the denial of a motion to acquit in a criminal case which was not assailable in an
action forcertiorari since the denial of a motion to quash required the accused to plead and to continue with the
trial, and whatever objections the accused had in his motion to quash can then be used as part of his defense
and subsequently can be raised as errors on his appeal if the judgment of the trial court is adverse to him. The
general rule is that interlocutory orders cannot be challenged by an appeal. 27 Thus, in Yamaoka v. Pescarich
Manufacturing Corporation, we held:

The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits, incorporating
in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders. Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders
would result in the 'sorry spectacle' of a case being subject of a counterproductive ping-pong to and from the
appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its interlocutory rulings.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order was issued with grave abuse of discretion or patently
erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court
allows certiorari as a mode of redress. 28

Also, appeals from interlocutory orders would open the floodgates to endless occasions for dilatory motions.
Thus, where the interlocutory order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, the remedy is certiorari. 29

The alleged grave abuse of discretion of the respondent court equivalent to lack of jurisdiction in the issuance
of the two assailed orders coupled with the fact that there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law amply provides the basis for allowing the resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

(Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. v. Lerma, G.R. No. 143581, [January 7, 2008], 566 PHIL 1-39)