MUNOZ vs.
COMELEC case:a pre-proclamation controversy; 2
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for mayor
of Camalig, Albay in the May 10,2004 election. Private resp
objected to the inclusion of 26 from various precincts because
of physicalirregularities and reasons of force and intimidation.
Despite the pendency of the appeal, petitioner was later proclaimed
by the MBC as the winning candidate. Private respondent then
filed with the COMELEC a petitionto annul the proclamation of the
petitioner for being premature and illegal-> GRANTED. MFR of
petitioner tothe En Banc-> DENIED.ISSUES:1) WON the COMELEC
First Division committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided
only the Petition to
Annul Proclamation despite the agreement of the parties to
consolidate private respondents appeal from the
ruling of the MBC since both cases were raffled to the same Division
and the issue in the latter case wasconnected to, if not
determinative of, the merits of the former case.2) WON the
COMELEC
En Banc
correctly ordered the new MBC to re-canvass all the ERs and to
proclaim thewinner on the basis thereof despite the pendency of
the appeal with the First Division.HELD:1.
No. COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that
when an action or proceeding involves a question oflaw and fact
which is similar to or common with that of another action or
proceeding, the same may beconsolidated with the action or
proceeding bearing the lower docket number
, ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party.
-> this rule is only permissive, not mandatory. Moreover, the two
cases involve different matters of fact and law. 1
st
nd
case: conduct of the MBC in proclaiming the petitioner
withoutauthority of the COMELEC -
> Hence, the rule isnt applicable. Mere pe
ndency of the two cases is nota ground for their outright
consolidation.2.
On Re-canvassing: No. It exceeded its authority by ordering the re-
canvass of all the ERs. TheCOMELEC
En Banc
in effect rendered a decision on the merits of SPC No. 04-087,
which up to
the present is still pending before its First Division, in violation of th
e rule that it does not have theauthority to hear and decide election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, at the
firstinstance3.
On Proclamation: Yes. Time and again, this Court has given its
imprimatur on the principle thatCOMELEC is with authority to annul
any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made.
Section 20(i) of R.A. No. 7166 reads:
Sec. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns. -
xxxx
(i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as
winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has
Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab
initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the
results of the election. (Emphasis supplied)

The phrase "results of the election" is not statutorily defined.
However, it had been jurisprudentially explained in Lucero v.
Commission on Elections[19] to mean:
[T]he net result of the election in the rest of the precincts in a given
constituency, such that if the margin of a leading candidate over
that of his closest rival in the latter precincts is less than the total
number of votes in the precinct where there was failure of election,
then such failure would certainly affect "the result of the
election."[20]
Although the Lucero case involves a failure of election, the
definition of "results of election" applies to the disposition of
contested election returns under Section 20(i) of R.A. No. 7166. In
both situations, the law endeavors to determine the will of the
people in an expeditious manner in that if the total number of votes
in the precinct where there is a failure of election or in case of the
contested ERs, is less than the lead of a candidate over his closest
rival, the results of the election would not be adversely affected.
Hence, a proclamation may be made because the winning candidate
can be ascertained. Otherwise, a special election must be held or an
authorization of the COMELEC is necessary after ruling on the
objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party in order to
determine the will of the electorate. Proclamation made in violation
of the rules is void ab initio as it would be based on an incomplete
canvass of votes. It is well settled that an incomplete canvass of
votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent
proclamation. A canvass is not reflective of the true vote of the
electorate unless the board of canvassers considers all returns and
omits none.[21]
In the case at bar, petitioner obtained a margin of 762 votes over
the private respondent based on the canvass of the uncontested
ERs whereas the total number of votes in the 26 contested ERs is
5,178, which is higher than the 762-lead of the petitioner over the
private respondent. Clearly, the results of the election would be
adversely affected by the uncanvassed returns.
As aptly held by the COMELEC First Division:
The votes obtained by petitioner and private respondent tallied in
the contested election returns can not be the basis of the partial
proclamation. The objected election returns cannot be considered,
even provisionally, as the true and final result of the elections in the
contested precincts. The possibility remains, remote thought (sic) it
may be that they could be excluded and the results reflected
therein disregarded. The contested election returns involved 5,178
votes as this is the number of voters who actually voted in the
precincts covered by the objections. The lead of [petitioner] over
[private respondent] as shown in the uncontested returns was less
than this number. Clearly, the results of the elections could be
adversely affected by the uncanvassed returns. Truly, the Board
erred in its perception that its partial proclamation was
warranted.[22]
While the COMELEC En Banc correctly affirmed the October 25,
2004 Resolution of its First Division in SPC 04-124 insofar as it
annulled petitioner's proclamation, however, we find that it
exceeded its authority and thus gravely abused its discretion when
it ordered the new MBC to re-canvass all ERs even before its First
Division could decide on SPC No. 04-087 filed by private respondent
assailing the ruling of the MBC to include the 26 contested ERs in
the canvass.
Section 3 of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions
shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
In Sarmiento v. Commission on Elections[23] and Zarate v.
Commission on Elections,[24] the Court similarly held that"election
cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the
Commission," and that the "Commission, sitting en banc, does not
have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first
instance."
Thus, in Acosta v. Commission on Elections,[25] the Court held that
the COMELEC En Banc violated the foregoing Constitutional
mandate when it affirmed the trial court's decision that was not the
subject of the special civil action before it, but of the appeal filed by
therein petitioner, which was still undocketed at the time and the
parties have not yet submitted any evidence in relation thereto.
Clearly, by ordering the re-canvass of all the ERs in SPC No. 04-124,
the COMELEC En Banc in effect rendered a decision on the merits of
SPC No. 04-087, which up to the present is still pending before its
First Division, in violation of the rule that it does not have the
authority to hear and decide election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies, at the first instance. As the
proclamation of the winning candidate has been delayed for more
than two years now due to these cases, the COMELEC First Division
is directed to expeditiously resolve SPC No. 04-087, which is
summary in nature.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The December 15, 2005 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc in SPC No. 04-124 which affirmed the annulment and setting
aside by its First Division of the proclamation of petitioner Rommel
G. Muoz as Mayor of Camalig, Albay for being premature,
is AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATION that the order to constitute a
new Municipal Board of Canvassers to re-canvass all the election
returns of Camalig, Albay; to prepare a new Certificate of Canvass;
and to declare the winning candidate for mayoralty position is SET
ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER issued on January 17, 2006 is
hereby SET ASIDE.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), Petitioner, versus
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION (ICC),
Respondent.
G.R. No. 141667 | 2006-07-17
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Republic, through the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC), seeks the annulment and setting aside of
the Amended Decision[1] dated September 30, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), setting aside the orders dated June 4, 1996 and June
25, 1997 of the NTC insofar as said orders required respondent
International Communications Corporation (ICC) to pay the amount
of P1,190,750.50 by way of permit fee as a condition for the grant
of a provisional authority to operate an international
telecommunications leased circuit service, and the Resolution[2]
dated January 24, 2000, denying NTC's motion for reconsideration.
There is no dispute as to the facts:
On April 4, 1995, respondent ICC, holder of a legislative franchise
under Republic Act (RA) No. 7633 to operate domestic
telecommunications, filed with the NTC an application for a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to install, operate,
and maintain an international telecommunications leased circuit
service between the Philippines and other countries, and to charge
rates therefor, with provisional authority for the purpose.
In an Order[3] dated June 4, 1996, the NTC approved the application
for a provisional authority subject, among others, to the condition:
2. That applicant [ICC] shall pay a permit fee in the amount of
P1,190,750.00, in accordance with section 40(g) of the Public
Service Act,[4] as amended;
Respondent ICC filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the
Order insofar as the same required the payment of a permit fee. In
a subsequent Order dated June 25, 1997, the NTC denied the
motion.
Therefrom, ICC went to the CA on a petition for certiorari with
prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, questioning the NTC's imposition against it of a permit
fee of P1,190,750.50 as a condition for the grant of the provisional
authority applied for.
In its original decision[5] dated January 29, 1999, the CA ruled in
favor of the NTC whose challenged orders were sustained, and
accordingly denied ICC's certiorari petition, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. In view thereof,
the assailed orders dated 4 June 1996 and 25 June 1997, requiring
the payment of permit fees in the amount of One Million One
Hundred Ninety Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty and 50/100 Pesos
(P1,190,750.50) as a condition for the grant of a Provisional
Authority to operate an International Circuit service, are hereby
AFFIRMED. ACCORDINGLY, the International Communications
Corporation is hereby ordered to pay the amount of One Million
One Hundred Ninety Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty and 50/100
Pesos (P1,190,750.50) to the National Telecommunications
Commission.
SO ORDERED.
In time, ICC moved for a reconsideration. This time, the CA, in
its Amended Decision dated September 30, 1999, reversed itself, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated 29 January 1999
including the imposition by the public respondent of permit fees
with respect to [ICC's] international leased circuit service is hereby
REVERSED. Judgment is hereby rendered, setting aside the
questioned orders dated 04 June 1996 and 25 June 1997, insofar as
they impose upon petitioner ICC the payment of the amount of One
Million One Hundred Ninety Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty and
Fifty Centavos (P1,190,750.50) by way of permit fees as a condition
for the grant of a provisional authority to operate an International
Leased Circuit Service. No costs.
SO ORDERED. (Word in bracket added).
Petitioner NTC filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion
was denied by the CA in its equally challenged Resolution dated
January 24, 2000. Hence, NTC's present recourse claiming that the
CA erred in ruling that:
1. NTC has arrogated upon itself the power to tax an entity;
2. Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act has been amended by
Section 5(g) of R.A. 7925;[6]
3. The imposition of permit fees is no longer authorized by R.A.
7925; and
4. The imposed permit fee in the amount of P1,190,750.50 for
respondent's provisional authority is exorbitant.
Before addressing the issues raised, we shall first dwell on the
procedural matter raised by respondent ICC, namely, that the
present petition should be dismissed outright for having been filed
out of time. It is respondent's posture that petitioner's motion for
reconsideration filed with the CA vis-a-vis the latter's Amended
Decision is a pro forma motion and, therefore, did not toll the
running of the reglementary period to come to this Court via this
petition for review.
Under Section 2 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a recourse to this
Court by way of a petition for review must be filed within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new
trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the
judgment. While a motion for reconsideration ordinarily tolls the
period for appeal, one that fails to point out the findings or
conclusions which were supposedly contrary to law or the evidence
does not have such an effect on the reglementary period as it is
merely a pro forma motion.[7]
In arguing for the outright dismissal of this petition, respondent ICC
claims that the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner NTC in
connection with the CA's Amended Decision failed to point out
specifically the findings or conclusions of the CA which were
supposedly contrary to law. Respondent contends that the issues
raised by the petitioner in its motion for reconsideration were mere
reiterations of the same issues which had already been considered
and passed upon by the CA when it promulgated its Amended
Decision. On this premise, respondent maintains that petitioner's
aforementioned motion for reconsideration is a mere pro
forma motion that did not toll the period for filing the present
petition.
Under established jurisprudence, the mere fact that a motion for
reconsideration reiterates issues already passed upon by the court
does not, by itself, make it a pro forma motion.[8] Among the ends
to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed is precisely to
convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper,
contrary to the law or evidence; and in so doing, the movant has to
dwell of necessity on issues already passed upon. If a motion for
reconsideration may not discuss those issues, the consequence
would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be
confined to filing only motions for reopening and new trial.[9]
Where there is no apparent intent to employ dilatory tactics, courts
should be slow in declaring outright a motion for reconsideration
as pro forma. The doctrine relating to pro forma motions has a
direct bearing upon the movant's valuable right to appeal. Hence, if
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was indeed pro forma, it
would still be in the interest of justice to review the Amended
Decision a quo on the merits, rather than to abort the appeal due to
a technicality, especially where, as here, the industry involved
(telecommunications) is vested with public interest. All the more so
given that the instant petition raises some arguments that are well-
worth resolving for future reference.
This brings us to the substantive merits of the petition.
In its Amended Decision, the CA ruled that petitioner NTC had
arrogated upon itself the power to tax an entity, which it is not
authorized to do. Petitioner disagreed, contending the fee in
question is not in the nature of a tax, but is merely a regulatory
measure.
Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act provides:
Sec. 40. The Commission is authorized and ordered to charge and
collect from any public service or applicant, as the case may be, the
following fees as reimbursement of its expenses in the
authorization, supervision and/or regulation of the public
services:
xxx xxx xxx
g) For each permit, authorizing the increase in equipment, the
installation of new units or authorizing the increase of capacity, or
the extension of means or general extensions in the services,
twenty centavos for each one hundred pesos or fraction of the
additional capital necessary to carry out the permit. (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act is not a tax measure
but a simple regulatory provision for the collection of fees imposed
pursuant to the exercise of the State's police power. A tax is
imposed under the taxing power of government principally for the
purpose of raising revenues. The law in question, however, merely
authorizes and requires the collection of fees for the
reimbursement of the Commission's expenses in the authorization,
supervision and/or regulation of public services. There can be no
doubt then that petitioner NTC is authorized to collect such fees.
However, the amount thereof must be reasonably related to the
cost of such supervision and/or regulation.[10]
Petitioner NTC also assails the CA's ruling that Section 40(g) of the
Public Service Act had been amended by Section 5(g) of R.A. No.
7925, which reads:
Sec. 5. Responsibilities of the National Telecommunications
Commission. - The National Telecommunications Commission
(Commission) shall be the principal administrator of this Act and as
such shall take the necessary measures to implement the policies
and objectives set forth in this Act. Accordingly, in addition to its
existing functions, the Commission shall be responsible for the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
g) In the exercise of its regulatory powers, continue to impose such
fees and charges as may be necessary to cover reasonable costs
and expenses for the regulation and supervision of the operations
of telecommunications entities. (Emphasis supplied)
The CA ratiocinated that while Section 40(g) of the Public Service
Act (CA 146, as amended), supra, allowed NTC to impose fees as
reimbursement of its expenses related to, among other things, the
"authorization" of public services, Section 5(g), above, of R.A. No.
7921 no longer speaks of "authorization" but only of "regulation"
and "supervision." To the CA, the omission by Section 5(g) of R.A.
No. 7921 of the word "authorization" found in Section 40(g) of the
Public Service Act, as amended, meant that the fees which NTC may
impose are only for reimbursement of its expenses for regulation
and supervision but no longer for authorization purposes.
We find, however, that NTC is correct in saying that there is no
showing of legislative intent to repeal, even impliedly, Section 40(g),
supra, of the Public Service Act, as amended. An implied repeal is
predicated on a substantial conflict between the new and prior
laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot
be construed as repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old
laws.[11] The two laws must be absolutely incompatible such that
they cannot be made to stand together.[12]
Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting
statutes or provisions, should endeavor to reconcile the same
instead of declaring outright the validity of one as against the other.
Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise policy is for the judge to
harmonize such statutes or provisions if this is possible, bearing in
mind that they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature,
and so give effect to both while at the same time also according due
respect to a coordinate department of the government. It is
this policy the Court will apply in arriving at the interpretation of the
laws and the conclusions that should follow therefrom.[13]
It is a rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are
not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is
convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws
are so clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent with each other
that they cannot co-exist. This is based on the rationale that the will
of the legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of
construction and interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of
Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize,
as much as possible, seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve
doubts in favor of their validity and co-existence.[14]
Here, there does not even appear to be a conflict between Section
40(g) of the Public Service Act, as amended, and Section 5(g) of R.A.
7925. In fact, the latter provision directs petitioner NTC to "continue
to impose such fees and charges as may be necessary to cover
reasonable costs and expenses for the regulation and supervision of
telecommunications entities." The absence alone of the word
"authorization" in Section 5(g) of R.A. No. 7921 cannot be construed
to mean that petitioner NTC had thus been deprived of the power
to collect such fees. As pointed out by the petitioner, the words
"authorization, supervision and/or regulation" used in Section 40(g)
of the Public Service Act are not distinct and completely separable
concepts which may be taken singly or piecemeal. Taken in their
entirety, they are the quintessence of the Commission's regulatory
functions, and must go hand-in-hand with one another. In
petitioner's own words, "[t]he Commission authorizes, supervises
and regulates telecommunications entities and these functions...
cannot be considered singly without destroying the whole concept
of the Commission's regulatory functions."[15] Hence, petitioner
NTC is correct in asserting that the passage of R.A. 7925 did not
bring with it the abolition of permit fees.
However, while petitioner had made some valid points of argument,
its position must, of necessity, crumble on the fourth issue raised in
its petition. Petitioner itself admits that the fees imposed are
precisely regulatory and supervision fees, and not taxes. This
necessarily implies, however, that such fees must be commensurate
to the costs and expenses involved in discharging its supervisory
and regulatory functions. In the words of Section 40(g) of the Public
Service Act itself, the fees and charges which petitioner NTC is
authorized to collect from any public service or applicant are limited
to the "reimbursement of its expenses in the authorization,
supervision and/or regulation of public services." It is difficult to
comprehend how the cost of licensing, regulating, and surveillance
could amount to P1,190,750.50. The CA was correct in finding the
amount imposed as permit fee exorbitant and in complete disregard
of the basic limitation that the fee should be at least approximately
commensurate to the expense. Petitioner itself admits that it had
imposed the maximum amount possible under the Public Service
Act, as amended. That is hardly taking into consideration the actual
costs of fulfilling its regulatory and supervisory functions.

Independent of the above, there is one basic consideration for the
dismissal of this petition, about which petitioner NTC did not bother
to comment at all. We refer to the fact that, as respondent ICC aptly
observed, the principal ground given by the CA in striking down the
imposition of the P1,190,750.50 fee is that respondent ICC is
entitled to the benefits of the so-called "parity clause" embodied in
Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925, to wit:
Section 23. Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications
Industry. - Any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity
granted under existing franchises, or may hereafter be granted,
shall ipso facto become part of previously granted
telecommunications franchises and shall be accorded immediately
and unconditionally to the grantees of such franchises x x x.
In this connection, it is significant to note that the subsequent
congressional franchise granted to the Domestic Satellite
Corporation under Presidential Decree No. 947, states:
Section 6. In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby
granted, the grantee shall pay to the Republic of the Philippines
during the life of this franchise a tax of one-half percent of gross
earnings derived by the grantee from its operation under this
franchise and which originate from the Philippines. Such tax shall be
due and payable annually within ten days after the audit and
approval of the accounts by the Commission on Audit as prescribed
in Section 11 hereof and shall be in lieu of all taxes, assessments,
charges, fees, or levies of any kind, nature, or description levied,
established or collected by any municipal, provincial, or national
authority x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The CA was correct in ruling that the above-quoted provision is, by
law, considered as ipso facto part of ICC's franchise due to the
"parity clause" embodied in Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925.
Accordingly, respondent ICC cannot be made subject to the
payment of the subject fees because its payment of the franchise
tax is "in lieu" of all other taxes and fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Amended Decision and Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Luis Marcos Laurel v Hon. Zeus Abrogar
Luis Marcos Laurel vs Hon. Zeus Abrogar
GR No. 155076
January 13, 2009
FACTS
Laurel was charged with Theft under Art. 308 of the RPC for
allegedly taking, stealing, and using PLDT's international long
distance calls by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) a
method of outing and completing international long-distance calls
using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency which
connect directly to the local/domestic exchange facilities of the
country where the call is destined. PLDT alleged that this service
was stolen from them using their own equipment and caused
damage to them amounting to P20,370,651.92.
PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of providing
telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties
capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft.
ISSUE
WON Laurel's act constitutes Theft
HELD
Art.308, RPC: Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to
gain but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor
force upon things, shall take personal property of another without
the latters consent.
Elements of Theft under Art.308, RPC:
1. There be taking of Personal Property;
2. Said Personal Property belongs to another;
3. Taking be done with Intent to Gain;
4. Taking be done without the owners consent;
5. No violence against, or intimidation of, persons or force
upon things
Personal Property anything susceptible of appropriation and not
included in Real Property
Thus, the term personal property as used in Art.308, RPC should
be interpreted in the context of the Civil Code's definition of real
and personal property. Consequently, any personal property,
tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of
appropriation may be the subject of theft (*US v Carlos; US v
Tambunting; US v Genato*), so long as the same is not included in
the enumeration of Real Properties under the Civil Code.
The only requirement for personal property to capable of theft, is
that it be subject to appropriation.
Art. 416 (3) of the Civil Code deems Forces of Nature which are
brought under the control of science, as Personal Property.
The appropriation of forces of nature which are brought under
control by science can be achieved by tampering with any apparatus
used for generating or measuring such forces of nature, wrongfully
redirecting such forces of nature from such apparatus, or using any
device to fraudulently obtain such forces of nature.
In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally
connecting various equipment or apparatus to PLDTs telephone
system, through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route
international long distance calls using PLDTs facilities
constitute Subtraction.
Moreover, interest in business should be classified as personal
property since it is capable of appropriation, and not included in the
enumeration of real properties.
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication or
telephone service are personal property which can be the object of
theft under Art. 308 of the RPC. The act of engaging in ISR is an act
of subtraction penalized under the said article.
While international long-distance calls take the form of electrical
energy and may be considered as personal property, the said long-
distance calls do not belong to PLDT since it could not have acquired
ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments,
enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex
communications infrastructure and facilities.
Since PLDT does not own the said telephone calls, then it could not
validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its
consent.
What constitutes Theft is the use of the PLDT's communications
facilities without PLDT's consent. The theft lies in the unlawful
taking of the telephone services & businesses.
The Amended Information should be amended to show that the
property subject of the theft were services and business of the
offended party.
An information or complaint for simple theft must allege the
following elements: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said
property belongs to another; (c) the taking be done with intent to
gain; and (d) the taking be accomplished without the use of violence
or intimidation of person/s or force upon things.[51]
One is apt to conclude that "personal property" standing alone,
covers both tangible and intangible properties and are subject of
theft under the Revised Penal Code. But the words "Personal
property" under the Revised Penal Code must be considered in
tandem with the word "take" in the law. The statutory definition of
"taking" and movable property indicates that, clearly, not all
personal properties may be the proper subjects of theft. The
general rule is that, only movable properties which have physical or
material existence and susceptible of occupation by another are
proper objects of theft.[52] As explained by Cuelo Callon: "Cosa
juridicamente es toda sustancia corporal, material, susceptible de
ser aprehendida que tenga un valor cualquiera."[53]
According to Cuello Callon, in the context of the Penal Code, only
those movable properties which can be taken and carried from the
place they are found are proper subjects of theft. Intangible
properties such as rights and ideas are not subject of theft because
the same cannot be "taken" from the place it is found and is
occupied or appropriated.
Solamente las cosas muebles y corporales pueden ser objeto de
hurto. La sustraccion de cosas inmuebles y la cosas incorporales (v.
gr., los derechos, las ideas) no puede integrar este delito, pues no es
posible asirlas, tomarlas, para conseguir su apropiacion. El Codigo
emplea la expresion "cosas mueble" en el sentido de cosa que es
susceptible de ser llevada del lugar donde se encuentra, como
dinero, joyas, ropas, etcetera, asi que su concepto no coincide por
completo con el formulado por el Codigo civil (arts. 335 y 336).[54]
Thus, movable properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code should be distinguished from the rights or interests to which
they relate. A naked right existing merely in contemplation of law,
although it may be very valuable to the person who is entitled to
exercise it, is not the subject of theft or larceny.[55] Such rights or
interests are intangible and cannot be "taken" by another. Thus,
right to produce oil, good will or an interest in business, or the right
to engage in business, credit or franchise are properties. So is the
credit line represented by a credit card. However, they are not
proper subjects of theft or larceny because they are without form or
substance, the mere "breath" of the Congress. On the other hand,
goods, wares and merchandise of businessmen and credit cards
issued to them are movable properties with physical and material
existence and may be taken by another; hence, proper subjects of
theft.
There is "taking" of personal property, and theft is consummated
when the offender unlawfully acquires possession of personal
property even if for a short time; or if such property is under the
dominion and control of the thief. The taker, at some particular
amount, must have obtained complete and absolute possession and
control of the property adverse to the rights of the owner or the
lawful possessor thereof.[56] It is not necessary that the property
be actually carried away out of the physical possession of the lawful
possessor or that he should have made his escape with it.[57]
Neither asportation nor actual manual possession of property is
required. Constructive possession of the thief of the property is
enough.[58]
The essence of the element is the taking of a thing out of the
possession of the owner without his privity and consent and
without animus revertendi.[59]
Taking may be by the offender's own hands, by his use of innocent
persons without any felonious intent, as well as any mechanical
device, such as an access device or card, or any agency, animate or
inanimate, with intent to gain. Intent to gain includes the unlawful
taking of personal property for the purpose of de++riving utility,
satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure.[60]
We agree with the contention of the respondents that intangible
properties such as electrical energy and gas are proper subjects of
theft. The reason for this is that, as explained by this Court in United
States v. Carlos[61] and United States v. Tambunting,[62] based on
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain and of the courts in
England and the United States of America, gas or electricity are
capable of appropriation by another other than the owner. Gas and
electrical energy may be taken, carried away and appropriated.
In People v. Menagas,[63] the Illinois State Supreme Court declared
that electricity, like gas, may be seen and felt. Electricity, the same
as gas, is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like
other personal property and is capable of appropriation by
another. It is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like
other personal property, susceptible of being severed from a mass
or larger quantity and of being transported from place to
place. Electrical energy may, likewise, be taken and carried away. It
is a valuable commodity, bought and sold like other personal
property. It may be transported from place to place. There is
nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating purposes which
renders it incapable of being feloniously taken and carried away.
In People ex rel Brush Electric Illuminating Co. v. Wemple,[64] the
Court of Appeals of New York held that electric energy is
manufactured and sold in determinate quantities at a fixed price,
precisely as are coal, kerosene oil, and gas. It may be conveyed to
the premises of the consumer, stored in cells of different capacity
known as an accumulator; or it may be sent through a wire, just as
gas or oil may be transported either in a close tank or forced
through a pipe. Having reached the premises of the consumer, it
may be used in any way he may desire, being, like illuminating gas,
capable of being transformed either into heat, light, or power, at
the option of the purchaser. In Woods v. People,[65] the Supreme
Court of Illinois declared that there is nothing in the nature of gas
used for illuminating purposes which renders it incapable of being
feloniously taken and carried away. It is a valuable article of
merchandise, bought and sold like other personal property,
susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity and of
being transported from place to place.
Gas and electrical energy should not be equated with business or
services provided by business entrepreneurs to the public. Business
does not have an exact definition. Business is referred as that which
occupies the time, attention and labor of men for the purpose of
livelihood or profit. It embraces everything that which a person can
be employed.[66] Business may also mean employment, occupation
or profession. Business is also defined as a commercial activity for
gain benefit or advantage.[67] Business, like services in business,
although are properties, are not proper subjects of theft under the
Revised Penal Code because the same cannot be "taken" or
"occupied." If it were otherwise, as claimed by the respondents,
there would be no juridical difference between the taking of the
business of a person or the services provided by him for gain, vis-a-
vis, the taking of goods, wares or merchandise, or equipment
comprising his business.[68] If it was its intention to include
"business" as personal property under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, the Philippine Legislature should have spoken in
language that is clear and definite: that business is personal
property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.[69]
We agree with the contention of the petitioner that, as gleaned
from the material averments of the Amended Information, he is
charged of "stealing the international long distance calls belonging
to PLDT" and the use thereof, through the ISR. Contrary to the
claims of the OSG and respondent PLDT, the petitioner is not
charged of stealing P20,370,651.95 from said respondent. Said
amount of P20,370,651.95 alleged in the Amended Information is
the aggregate amount of access, transmission or termination
charges which the PLDT expected from the international long
distance calls of the callers with the use of Baynet Super Orient
Cards sold by Baynet Co. Ltd.
In defining theft, under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, as the
taking of personal property without the consent of the owner
thereof, the Philippine legislature could not have contemplated the
human voice which is converted into electronic impulses or
electrical current which are transmitted to the party called through
the PSTN of respondent PLDT and the ISR of Baynet Card Ltd. within
its coverage. When the Revised Penal Code was approved, on
December 8, 1930, international telephone calls and the
transmission and routing of electronic voice signals or impulses
emanating from said calls, through the PSTN, IPL and ISR, were still
non-existent. Case law is that, where a legislative history fails to
evidence congressional awareness of the scope of the statute
claimed by the respondents, a narrow interpretation of the law is
more consistent with the usual approach to the construction of the
statute. Penal responsibility cannot be extended beyond the fair
scope of the statutory mandate.[70]
People vs. Mejeca GR 146425
Facts:
Proculo Mejeca et al were convicted with the crime of robbery and
homicide. Because of the aggravating circumstance of the use of
unlicensed firearm, among others, trial court sentenced them to the
penalty of death.
Issue:
WON the aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm
was properly appreciated in sentencing Mejeca et al to a penalty of
death.
Held:
No.
The second element to establish the crime of illegal possession of
firearm is the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the
guns did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it
outside his residence. Thus, it bears stressing that the essence of
the crime penalized under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, is primarily
the accuseds lack of license or permit to carry or possess the
firearm, as possession by itself is not prohibited by law. As such, it is
the duty of the prosecution not only to allege it but also to prove it
beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, either the testimony of a
representative of or a certification from the Philippine National
Police Firearms and Explosives Office attesting that a person is not a
licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the second element. There, likewise, has been no such proof
to show the existence of such element herein.
Thus, penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua.
****************
R.A. No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen days after its
publication on June 21, 1997.
Parayno vs Jovellanos
G.R. No. 148408
Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Police power
Facts:
Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao,
Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the
Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or
transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred
to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer
and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their
advise, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the
closure or transfer of location of petitioners gasoline station. In
Resolution No. 50, it declared that the existing gasoline station is a
blatant violation and disregard of existing law.
According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling station is in
violation of The Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44,
the nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary School
and church, the distances are less than 100 meters. (No neighbors
were called as witnesses when actual measurements were done by
HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June 1989); 2) it remains in
thickly populated area with commercial/residential buildings,
houses closed (sic) to each other which still endangers the lives and
safety of the people in case of fire; 3) residents of our barangay
always complain of the irritating smell of gasoline most of the time
especially during gas filling which tend to expose residents to illness,
and 4) It hampers the flow of traffic.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was
denied by the SB. Hence she filed a case before the RTC claiming
that the gasoline filling station was not covered under Sec 44 of the
mentioned law but is under Sec 21. Case was denied by the court
and by the CA. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling
station by respondent municipality was an invalid exercise of the
latters police powers
HELD:
The respondent is barred from denying their previous claim that the
gasoline filling station is not under Sec 44. The Counsel in fact
admitted that : That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a
gasoline filling station as defined in Article III, Section 21 of the
zoning code and not as a service station as differently defined under
Article 42 of the said official zoning code;
The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on
the municipality, the party making them. hence, because of the
distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the
zoning ordinance, respondents could not insist that gasoline
service station under Section 44 necessarily included gasoline
filling station under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in
a gas service station did not automatically embrace those in a
gas filling station.
As for the main issue, the court held that the respondent
municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the
closure/transfer of petitioners gasoline station. While it had, under
RA 7160, the power to take actions and enact measures to promote
the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should have
given due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner.
A local government is considered to have properly exercised its
police powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of
the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.
The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the
second, to the due process clause of the Constitution.
Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process
clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it maintained that
the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters
from the nearest public school and church, the records do not show
that it even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding
that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was an
actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices that
respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never
conducted such measurement either.
Moreover, petitioners business could not be considered a nuisance
which respondent municipality could summarily abate in the guise
of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance
without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se.
A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate
safety of persons and property, hence, it cannot be closed down or
transferred summarily to another location.
On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives
and properties of the people of Calasiao, we again note: Hence, the
Board is inclined to believe that the project being hazardous to life
and property is more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the
Fire Station Commander.. recommended to build such buildings
after conform (sic) all the requirements of PP 1185. It is further
alleged by the complainants that the proposed location is in the
heart of the thickly populated residential area of Calasiao. Again,
findings of the [HLURB] staff negate the allegations as the same is
within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning
Ordinance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
resolution of the Court of the Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and
desist from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as
it seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station to another
location.
THE PRINCIPLE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS
We hold that the zoning ordinance of respondent municipality
made a clear distinction between "gasoline service station" and
"gasoline filling station." The pertinent provisions read:
xxx xxx xxx
Section 21. Filling Station. A retail station servicing automobiles and
other motor vehicles with gasoline and oil only.[7]
xxx xxx xxx
Section 42. Service Station. A building and its premises where
gasoline oil, grease, batteries, tires and car accessories may be
supplied and dispensed at retail and where, in addition, the
following services may be rendered and sales and no other.
a. Sale and servicing of spark plugs, batteries, and distributor parts;
b. Tire servicing and repair, but not recapping or regrooving;
c. Replacement of mufflers and tail pipes, water hose, fan belts,
brake fluids, light bulbs, fuses, floor mats, seat covers, windshield
wipers and wiper blades, grease retainers, wheel, bearing, mirrors
and the like;
d. Radiator cleaning and flushing;
e. Washing and polishing, and sale of automobile washing and
polishing materials;
f. Grease and lubricating;
g. Emergency wiring repairs;
h. Minor servicing of carburators;
i. Adjusting and repairing brakes;
j. Minor motor adjustments not involving removal of the head or
crankcase, or raising the motor.[8]
xxx xxx xxx
It is evident from the foregoing that the ordinance intended these
two terms to be separate and distinct from each other. Even
respondent municipality's counsel admitted this dissimilarity during
the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Counsel in fact
admitted:
1. That there exist[ed] an official zoning code of Calasiao,
Pangasinan which [was] not yet amended;
2. That under Article III of said official zoning code there [were]
certain distinctions made by said municipality about the
designation of the gasoline filling station and that of the gasoline
service station as appearing in Article III, Nos. 21 and 42,
[respectively];
3. That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling
station as defined in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and
not as a service station as differently defined under Article 42 of
the said official zoning code;
4. That under Section 44 of the official zoning code of Calasiao, the
term filling station as clearly defined under Article III, Section 21,
[did] not appear in the wordings thereof;[9] (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on
the municipality, the party making them.[10] Respondent
municipality thus could not find solace in the legal maxim
of ejusdem generis[11] which means "of the same kind, class or
nature." Under this maxim, where general words follow the
enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general
words will apply only to persons or things of the same general
nature or class as those enumerated.[12] Instead, what applied in
this case was the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius which means that the express mention of one thing implies
the exclusion of others.[13] Hence, because of the distinct and
definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning
ordinance, respondents could not insist that "gasoline service
station" under Section 44 necessarily included "gasoline filling
station" under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a
"gas service station" did not automatically embrace those in a "gas
filling station."
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, rep. by SECRETARY
HERNANI A. BRAGANZA, Petitioner, versus PHILIPPINE
COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORP., Respondent.
EXEMPTION FROM CARP COVERAGE OF A LANDHOLDING DECLARED
AS A SECURITY ZONE
Department of Agrarian Reform rep. by Secretary Hernani A.
Braganza vs. Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. G.R. No.
152640 (June 15, 2006) Facts: The Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) is seeking the nullification of the Decision and
Resolution, dated November 23, 2001 and March 7, 2002,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57435,
entitled "Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT) v. DAR." The controversy involves a parcel of land
owned by respondent PHILCOMSAT situated within the area which
had been declared a security zone under Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, entitled "Declaring the
Area within a Radius of Three Kilometers surrounding the Satellite
Earth Station in Baras, Rizal, a Security Zone," which is subjected to
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the government.
Pursuant to the decree, the Ministry of National Defense
promulgated the Revised Rules and Regulations to Implement P.D.
No. 1845 dated 30 April 1982, as amended, Declaring the Philippine
Earth Station (PES) Security Zone. In view of this, the metes and
bounds of PHILCOMSAT's satellite earth station in Baras, Rizal, were
delineated. In 1992, a Notice of Coverage was sent to
PHILCOMSAT by petitioner DAR informing the former that the land
in question shall be placed under CARP's compulsory acquisition
scheme. On January 28, 1994, PHILCOMSAT wrote to DAR seeking
an exemption of the subject property from CARP coverage, insisting
that the land will be utilized for the expansion of its operations.
Respondent's application for exemption from CARP coverage was
evaluated by DAR. During the pendency of the application, then
DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, in a letter dated March 21, 1994,
suggested that respondent enter into a usufructuary agreement
with the occupants of the subject property until such time that it
will have to use the property for its planned expansion. The
occupants, however, refused to enter into such an agreement.
Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tanay, Rizal, in its Resolution
No. 65-94 that was endorsed to DAR, moved for the coverage of the
700-hectare PHILCOMSAT property within the security zone under
CARP. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Teresa, Rizal further
opined that subjecting the surrounding agricultural area within the
security zone under CARP will not be detrimental to the operations
of PHILCOMSAT. An Order was issued by then Secretary Garilao
rejecting PHILCOMSAT's application for exemption from CARP.
Having been denied, PHILCOMSAT filed a Petition for Review with
the Court of Appeals to which the appellate court granted.
Consequently, DAR moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the subject
property of PHILCOMSAT which had been declared a security zone
under P.D. No. 1845m as amended by P.D. No. 1848, can be
subjected to CARP. Held: P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No.
1848, was issued way before the effectivity of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. The same was issued in 1982
pursuant to an exigency to create a security zone in the surrounding
areas of PHILCOMSAT's satellite earth station in order to ensure its
security and uninterrupted operation considering the vital role of
the earth station in the country's telecommunications and national
development. P.D. No. 1848, amending P.D. No. 1845, subjected the
security zone to the authority of the Ministry of National Defense,
consequently conferring on the Minister of National Defense the
power and authority to determine who can occupy the areas within
the security zone, and how the lands shall be utilized. The area,
however, should be exempt from CARP coverage by virtue of P.D.
No. 1845, as amended, which, as stated earlier, declared the area to
be a security zone under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National
Defense. It is evident from the very wording of the law that the
government recognized the crucial role of PHILCOMSAT's
operations to national security, thereby necessitating the protection
of its operations from unnecessary and even anticipated disruption.
Thus, every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such
provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose,
or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which
it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences
as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Section 10
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or R.A. No. 6657, as
amended, provides that lands actually, directly and exclusively used
and found to be necessary for national defense shall be exempt
from the coverage of the Act. The determination as to whether or
not the subject property is actually, directly, and exclusively used
for national defense usually entails a finding of fact which this Court
will not normally delve into considering that, subject to certain
exceptions, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the Court is called upon to review only errors of law. Suffice it
to state, however, that as a matter of principle, it cannot seriously
be denied that the act of securing a vital communication facilities is
an act of national defense. Hence, the law, by segregating an area
for purposes of a security zone for such facilities, in effect devoted
that area to national defense.
We find it not necessary to determine whether or not the subject
property is actually, directly, and exclusively used for national
defense, to be exempted from the coverage of R.A. 6657. The law
which decreed the areas a security zone is very clear in its purpose.
It is a principle in statutory construction that where there are two
statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specifically
designed for the said case must prevail over the other (Lapid v.
Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 738). [14]
Section 10 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or R.A. No.
6657, [15] as amended, provides that lands actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense
shall be exempt from the coverage of the Act. The determination as
to whether or not the subject property is actually, directly, and
exclusively used for national defense usually entails a finding of fact
which this Court will not normally delve into considering that,
subject to certain exceptions, in a petition for certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, the Court is called upon to review only
errors of law. [16] Suffice it to state, however, that as a matter of
principle, it cannot seriously be denied that the act of securing a
vital communication facilities is an act of national defense. Hence,
the law, by segregating an area for purposes of a security zone for
such facilities, in effect devoted that area to national defense.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57435, dated November 23,
2001 and March 7, 2002, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SONIA MACEDA and GEMMA MACEDA-MACATANGAY v.
ENCARNACION DE GUZMAN VDA. DE MACATANGAY
481 SCRA 415 (2006), THIRD DIVISION
Spouses Sonia Maceda and Bonifacio Macatangay, executed a
Kasunduan whereby they agreed to live separately. Bonifacio soon
lived with his common law wife Carmen Jaraza. When Bonifacio
died, Sonia claimed for his Social Security System (SSS) benefit,
which was granted to her. However, the Social Security Commission
(SSC) later ordered Sonia to refund the benefits in favor of
Encarnacion De Guzman Macatangay, Bonifacios mother, and his
illegitimate children, on the ground that the Kasunduan is a proof
that Sonia is not dependent upon Bonifacio for support.
Sonia filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA).
However, the same was dismissed due to their failure to explain
why they failed to personally serve copies of the petition to
Encarnacion which is required in Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. In her affidavit, Sonia explains that they
resorted to service by mail due to the distant addresses of
Encarnacions lawyer in Lopez, Quezon and Sonias counsel in
Lucena City, thereby making personal service impracticable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the distant addresses made the personal service
impracticable making the service by mail valid
HELD:
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our
set of adjectiverules requiring personal service whenever
practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion
to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of
service or filing were not resorted to and no written explanation
was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place.
The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the
practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with
the clause whenever practicable.
The Court thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section
11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service
and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service
and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or
filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place
and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when
personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other
modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable
to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court
shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the
case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the
pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.
In the case at bar, the address of Encarnacions counsel is Lopez,
Quezon, while Sonias counsels is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83
kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes personal
service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation
why service was not done personally might have been
superfluous.
Without preempting the findings of the Court of Appeals on the
merits of Sonias petition, if Sonias allegations of fact and of law
therein are true and the outright dismissal of their petition is upheld
without giving them the opportunity to prove their allegations,
Sonia would be deprived of her rightful death benefits just because
of the Kasunduan she forged with her husband Bonifacio which
contract is, in the first place, unlawful. The resulting injustice would
not be commensurate to Sonia counsels thoughtlessness in not
explaining why Encarnacion were not personally served copies of
the petition.

As properly noted, CSC was only interpreting its own rules on leave
of absence and not a statutory provision in coming up with this
uniform rule. Undoubtedly, the CSC like any other agency has the
power to interpret its own rules and any phrase contained in them
with its interpretation significantly becoming part of the rules
themselves. As observed in West Texas Compress & Warehouse Co.
v. Panhandle & S.F. Railing Co. -
xxx
This principle is not new to us. In Geukeko v. Araneta this Court
upheld the interpretation of the Department of Agriculture and
Commerce of its own rules of procedure in suspending the period of
appeal even if such action was nowhere stated therein. We said -
xxx
x x x It must be remembered that Lands Administrative Order No. 6
is in the nature of procedural rules promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the power bestowed
on said administrative agency to promulgate rules and regulations
necessary for the proper discharge and management of the
functions imposed by law upon said office. x x x x Recognizing the
existence of such rule-making authority, what is the weight of an
interpretation given by an administrative agency to its own rules or
regulations?Authorities sustain the doctrine that the
interpretation given to a rule or regulation by those charged with
its execution is entitled to the greatest weight by the Court
construing such rule or regulation, and such interpretation will be
followed unless it appears to be clearly unreasonable or
arbitrary (42 Am. Jur. 431). It has also been said that:
xxx
The same precept was enunciated in Bagatsing v. Committee on
Privatization where we upheld the action of the Commission on
Audit (COA) in validating the sale of Petron Corporation to Aramco
Overseas Corporation on the basis of COA's interpretation of its
own circular that set bidding and audit guidelines on the disposal of
government assets -
The COA itself, the agency that adopted the rules on bidding
procedure to be followed by government offices and corporations,
had upheld the validity and legality of the questioned bidding. The
interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more
weight than the interpretation by that agency of the law it is
merely tasked to administer (underscoring supplied).
Given the greater weight accorded to an agency's interpretation of
its own rules than to its understanding of the statute it seeks to
implement, we simply cannot set aside the former on the same
grounds as we would overturn the latter. More specifically, in cases
where the dispute concerns the interpretation by an agency of its
own rules, we should apply only these standards: "Whether the
delegation of power was valid; whether the regulation was within
that delegation; and if so, whether it was a reasonable regulation
under a due process test." An affirmative answer in each of these
questions should caution us from discarding the agency's
interpretation of its own rules. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court holds that the interpretation of the NTC that Section
27 of NTC MC No. 11-9-93 regarding the escrow deposit and
performance bond shall pertain only to a local exchange operator's
original roll-out obligation under E.O. No. 109, and not to roll-out
obligations made under subsequent or voluntary applications
outside E.O. No. 109, should be sustained.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent's Motion for Partial Reconsideration
is GRANTED. The Court's Decision dated July 23, 2004 is AMENDED,
the dispositive portion of which should read as follows:
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, vs. AZUCENA
T. REYES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 159694 and G.R. No. 163581 | 2006-01-27
The Case
Before us are two consolidated[1] Petitions for Review[2] filed
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the August 8, 2003
Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 71392. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE without prejudice
to the action of the National Evaluation Board on the proposed
compromise settlement of the Maria C. Tancinco estate's tax
liability."[4]
The Facts
The CA narrated the facts as follows:
"On July 8, 1993, Maria C. Tancinco (or 'decedent') died, leaving a
1,292 square-meter residential lot and an old house thereon (or
'subject property') located at 4931 Pasay Road, Dasmarias Village,
Makati City.
"On the basis of a sworn information-for-reward filed on February
17, 1997 by a certain Raymond Abad (or 'Abad'), Revenue District
Office No. 50 (South Makati) conducted an investigation on the
decedent's estate (or 'estate'). Subsequently, it issued a Return
Verification Order. But without the required preliminary findings
being submitted, it issued Letter of Authority No. 132963 for the
regular investigation of the estate tax case. Azucena T. Reyes (or
'[Reyes]'), one of the decedent's heirs, received the Letter of
Authority on March 14, 1997.
"On February 12, 1998, the Chief, Assessment Division, Bureau of
Internal Revenue (or 'BIR'), issued a preliminary assessment notice
against the estate in the amount of P14,580,618.67. On May 10,
1998, the heirs of the decedent (or 'heirs') received a final estate tax
assessment notice and a demand letter, both dated April 22, 1998,
for the amount of P14,912,205.47, inclusive of surcharge and
interest.
"On June 1, 1998, a certain Felix M. Sumbillo (or 'Sumbillo')
protested the assessment [o]n behalf of the heirs on the ground
that the subject property had already been sold by the decedent
sometime in 1990.
"On November 12, 1998, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (or
'[CIR]') issued a preliminary collection letter to [Reyes], followed by
a Final Notice Before Seizure dated December 4, 1998.
"On January 5, 1999, a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy was served
upon the estate, followed on February 11, 1999 by Notices of Levy
on Real Property and Tax Lien against it.
"On March 2, 1999, [Reyes] protested the notice of levy. However,
on March 11, 1999, the heirs proposed a compromise settlement of
P1,000,000.00.
"In a letter to [the CIR] dated January 27, 2000, [Reyes] proposed to
pay 50% of the basic tax due, citing the heirs' inability to pay the tax
assessment. On March 20, 2000, [the CIR] rejected [Reyes's] offer,
pointing out that since the estate tax is a charge on the estate and
not on the heirs, the latter's financial incapacity is immaterial as, in
fact, the gross value of the estate amounting to P32,420,360.00 is
more than sufficient to settle the tax liability. Thus, [the CIR]
demanded payment of the amount of P18,034,382.13 on or before
April 15, 2000[;] otherwise, the notice of sale of the subject
property would be published.
"On April 11, 2000, [Reyes] again wrote to [the CIR], this time
proposing to pay 100% of the basic tax due in the amount of
P5,313,891.00. She reiterated the proposal in a letter dated May 18,
2000.
"As the estate failed to pay its tax liability within the April 15, 2000
deadline, the Chief, Collection Enforcement Division, BIR, notified
[Reyes] on June 6, 2000 that the subject property would be sold at
public auction on August 8, 2000.
"On June 13, 2000, [Reyes] filed a protest with the BIR Appellate
Division. Assailing the scheduled auction sale, she asserted that x x x
the assessment, letter of demand[,] and the whole tax proceedings
against the estate are void ab initio. She offered to file the
corresponding estate tax return and pay the correct amount of tax
without surcharge [or] interest.
"Without acting on [Reyes's] protest and offer, [the CIR] instructed
the Collection Enforcement Division to proceed with the August 8,
2000 auction sale. Consequently, on June 28, 2000, [Reyes] filed a
[P]etition for [R]eview with the Court of Tax Appeals (or 'CTA'),
docketed as CTA Case No. 6124.
"On July 17, 2000, [Reyes] filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction or Status Quo Order, which was granted by
the CTA on July 26, 2000. Upon [Reyes's] filing of a surety bond in
the amount of P27,000,000.00, the CTA issued a [R]esolution dated
August 16, 2000 ordering [the CIR] to desist and refrain from
proceeding with the auction sale of the subject property or from
issuing a [W]arrant of [D]istraint or [G]arnishment of [B]ank
[A]ccount[,] pending determination of the case and/or unless a
contrary order is issued.
"[The CIR] filed a [M]otion to [D]ismiss the petition on the grounds
(i) that the CTA no longer has jurisdiction over the case[,] because
the assessment against the estate is already final and executory;
and (ii) that the petition was filed out of time. In a [R]esolution
dated November 23, 2000, the CTA denied [the CIR's] motion.
"During the pendency of the [P]etition for [R]eview with the CTA,
however, the BIR issued Revenue Regulation (or 'RR') No. 6-2000
and Revenue Memorandum Order (or 'RMO') No. 42-2000 offering
certain taxpayers with delinquent accounts and disputed
assessments an opportunity to compromise their tax liability.
"On November 25, 2000, [Reyes] filed an application with the BIR
for the compromise settlement (or 'compromise') of the assessment
against the estate pursuant to Sec. 204(A) of the Tax Code, as
implemented by RR No. 6-2000 and RMO No. 42-2000.
"On December 26, 2000, [Reyes] filed an Ex-Parte Motion for
Postponement of the hearing before the CTA scheduled on January
9, 2001, citing her pending application for compromise with the BIR.
The motion was granted and the hearing was reset to February 6,
2001.
"On January 29, 2001, [Reyes] moved for postponement of the
hearing set on February 6, 2001, this time on the ground that she
had already paid the compromise amount of P1,062,778.20 but was
still awaiting approval of the National Evaluation Board (or 'NEB').
The CTA granted the motion and reset the hearing to February 27,
2001.
"On February 19, 2001, [Reyes] filed a Motion to Declare
Application for the Settlement of Disputed Assessment as a
Perfected Compromise. In said motion, she alleged that [the CIR]
had not yet signed the compromise[,] because of procedural red
tape requiring the initials of four Deputy Commissioners on relevant
documents before the compromise is signed by the [CIR]. [Reyes]
posited that the absence of the requisite initials and signature[s] on
said documents does not vitiate the perfected compromise.
"Commenting on the motion, [the CIR] countered that[,] without
the approval of the NEB, [Reyes's] application for compromise with
the BIR cannot be considered a perfected or consummated
compromise.
"On March 9, 2001, the CTA denied [Reyes's] motion, prompting her
to file a Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam. In a [R]esolution
dated April 10, 2001, the CTA denied the [M]otion for
[R]econsideration with the suggestion that[,] for an orderly
presentation of her case and to prevent piecemeal resolutions of
different issues, [Reyes] should file a [S]upplemental [P]etition for
[R]eview[,] setting forth the new issue of whether there was already
a perfected compromise.
"On May 2, 2001, [Reyes] filed a Supplemental Petition for Review
with the CTA, followed on June 4, 2001 by its Amplificatory
Arguments (for the Supplemental Petition for Review), raising the
following issues:
'1. Whether or not an offer to compromise by the [CIR], with the
acquiescence by the Secretary of Finance, of a tax liability pending
in court, that was accepted and paid by the taxpayer, is a perfected
and consummated compromise.
'2. Whether this compromise is covered by the provisions of Section
204 of the Tax Code (CTRP) that requires approval by the BIR
[NEB].'
"Answering the Supplemental Petition, [the CIR] averred that an
application for compromise of a tax liability under RR No. 6-2000
and RMO No. 42-2000 requires the evaluation and approval of
either the NEB or the Regional Evaluation Board (or 'REB'), as the
case may be.
"On June 14, 2001, [Reyes] filed a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings; the motion was granted on July 11, 2001. After
submission of memoranda, the case was submitted for [D]ecision.
"On June 19, 2002, the CTA rendered a [D]ecision, the decretal
portion of which pertinently reads:
'WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant [P]etition for
[R]eview is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, [Reyes] is hereby ORDERED
to PAY deficiency estate tax in the amount of Nineteen Million Five
Hundred Twenty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Nine and 78/100
(P19,524,909.78), computed as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
'[Reyes] is likewise ORDERED to PAY 20% delinquency interest on
deficiency estate tax due of P17,934,382.13 from January 11, 2001
until full payment thereof pursuant to Section 249(c) of the Tax
Code, as amended.'
"In arriving at its decision, the CTA ratiocinated that there can only
be a perfected and consummated compromise of the estate's tax
liability[,] if the NEB has approved [Reyes's] application for
compromise in accordance with RR No. 6-2000, as implemented by
RMO No. 42-2000.
"Anent the validity of the assessment notice and letter of demand
against the estate, the CTA stated that 'at the time the questioned
assessment notice and letter of demand were issued, the heirs
knew very well the law and the facts on which the same were
based.' It also observed that the petition was not filed within the 30-
day reglementary period provided under Sec. 11 of Rep. Act No.
1125 and Sec. 228 of the Tax Code."[5]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In partly granting the Petition, the CA said that Section 228 of the
Tax Code and RR 12-99 were mandatory and unequivocal in their
requirement. The assessment notice and the demand letter should
have stated the facts and the law on which they were based;
otherwise, they were deemed void.[6] The appellate court held that
while administrative agencies, like the BIR, were not bound by
procedural requirements, they were still required by law and equity
to observe substantive due process. The reason behind this
requirement, said the CA, was to ensure that taxpayers would be
duly apprised of -- and could effectively protest -- the basis of tax
assessments against them.[7] Since the assessment and the demand
were void, the proceedings emanating from them were likewise
void, and any order emanating from them could never attain
finality.
The appellate court added, however, that it was premature to
declare as perfected and consummated the compromise of the
estate's tax liability. It explained that, where the basic tax assessed
exceeded P1 million, or where the settlement offer was less than
the prescribed minimum rates, the National Evaluation Board's
(NEB) prior evaluation and approval were the conditio sine qua
non to the perfection and consummation of any compromise.[8]
Besides, the CA pointed out, Section 204(A) of the Tax Code applied
to all compromises, whether government-initiated or not.[9] Where
the law did not distinguish, courts too should not distinguish.
Hence, this Petition.[10]
The Issues
In GR No. 159694, petitioner raises the following issues for the
Court's consideration:
"I.
Whether petitioner's assessment against the estate is valid.
"II.
Whether respondent can validly argue that she, as well as the other
heirs, was not aware of the facts and the law on which the
assessment in question is based, after she had opted to propose
several compromises on the estate tax due, and even prematurely
acting on such proposal by paying 20% of the basic estate tax
due."[11]
The foregoing issues can be simplified as follows: first, whether the
assessment against the estate is valid; and, second, whether the
compromise entered into is also valid.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is unmeritorious.
First Issue:
Validity of the Assessment Against the Estate
The second paragraph of Section 228 of the Tax Code[12] is clear
and mandatory. It provides as follows:
"Sec. 228. Protesting of Assessment. --
xxxxxxxxx
"The taxpayers shall be informed in writing of the law and the facts
on which the assessment is made: otherwise, the assessment shall
be void."
In the present case, Reyes was not informed in writing of the law
and the facts on which the assessment of estate taxes had been
made. She was merely notified of the findings by the CIR, who had
simply relied upon the provisions of former Section 229[13] prior to
its amendment by Republic Act (RA) No. 8424, otherwise known as
the Tax Reform Act of 1997.
First, RA 8424 has already amended the provision of Section 229 on
protesting an assessment. The old requirement of
merely notifying the taxpayer of the CIR's findings was changed in
1998 to informing the taxpayer of not only the law, but also of the
facts on which an assessment would be made; otherwise, the
assessment itself would be invalid.
It was on February 12, 1998, that a preliminary assessment notice
was issued against the estate. On April 22, 1998, the final estate tax
assessment notice, as well as demand letter, was also issued. During
those dates, RA 8424 was already in effect. The notice required
under the old law was no longer sufficient under the new law.
To be simply informed in writing of the investigation being
conducted and of the recommendation for the assessment of the
estate taxes due is nothing but a perfunctory discharge of the tax
function of correctly assessing a taxpayer. The act cannot be taken
to mean that Reyes already knew the law and the facts on which the
assessment was based. It does not at all conform to the compulsory
requirement under Section 228. Moreover, the Letter of Authority
received by respondent on March 14, 1997 was for the sheer
purpose of investigation and was not even the requisite notice
under the law.
The procedure for protesting an assessment under the Tax Code is
found in Chapter III of Title VIII, which deals with remedies. Being
procedural in nature, can its provision then be applied
retroactively? The answer is yes.
The general rule is that statutes are prospective. However, statutes
that are remedial, or that do not create new or take away vested
rights, do not fall under the general rule against the retroactive
operation of statutes.[14] Clearly, Section 228 provides for the
procedure in case an assessment is protested. The provision does
not create new or take away vested rights. In both instances, it can
surely be applied retroactively. Moreover, RA 8424 does not state,
either expressly or by necessary implication, that pending actions
are excepted from the operation of Section 228, or that applying it
to pending proceedings would impair vested rights.
Second, the non-retroactive application of Revenue Regulation (RR)
No. 12-99 is of no moment, considering that it merely implements
the law.
A tax regulation is promulgated by the finance secretary to
implement the provisions of the Tax Code.[15] While it is desirable
for the government authority or administrative agency to have one
immediately issued after a law is passed, the absence of the
regulation does not automatically mean that the law itself would
become inoperative.
At the time the pre-assessment notice was issued to Reyes, RA 8424
already stated that the taxpayer must be informed of both the law
and facts on which the assessment was based. Thus, the CIR should
have required the assessment officers of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) to follow the clear mandate of the new law. The old
regulation governing the issuance of estate tax assessment notices
ran afoul of the rule that tax regulations -- old as they were --
should be in harmony with, and not supplant or modify, the
law.[16]
It may be argued that the Tax Code provisions are not self-
executory. It would be too wide a stretch of the imagination,
though, to still issue a regulation that would simply require tax
officials to inform the taxpayer, in any manner, of the law and the
facts on which an assessment was based. That requirement is
neither difficult to make nor its desired results hard to achieve.
Moreover, an administrative rule interpretive of a statute, and not
declarative of certain rights and corresponding obligations, is given
retroactive effect as of the date of the effectivity of the statute.[17]
RR 12-99 is one such rule. Being interpretive of the provisions of the
Tax Code, even if it was issued only on September 6, 1999, this
regulation was to retroact to January 1, 1998 -- a date prior to the
issuance of the preliminary assessment notice and demand letter.
Third, neither Section 229 nor RR 12-85 can prevail over Section 228
of the Tax Code.
No doubt, Section 228 has replaced Section 229. The provision on
protesting an assessment has been amended. Furthermore, in case
of discrepancy between the law as amended and its implementing
but old regulation, the former necessarily prevails.[18] Thus,
between Section 228 of the Tax Code and the pertinent provisions
of RR 12-85, the latter cannot stand because it cannot go beyond
the provision of the law. The law must still be followed, even though
the existing tax regulation at that time provided for a different
procedure. The regulation then simply provided that notice be sent
to the respondent in the form prescribed, and that no consequence
would ensue for failure to comply with that form.
Fourth, petitioner violated the cardinal rule in administrative law
that the taxpayer be accorded due process. Not only was the law
here disregarded, but no valid notice was sent, either. A void
assessment bears no valid fruit.
The law imposes a substantive, not merely a formal, requirement.
To proceed heedlessly with tax collection without first establishing a
valid assessment is evidently violative of the cardinal principle in
administrative investigations: that taxpayers should be able to
present their case and adduce supporting evidence.[19] In the
instant case, respondent has not been informed of the basis of the
estate tax liability. Without complying with the unequivocal
mandate of first informing the taxpayer of the government's claim,
there can be no deprivation of property, because no effective
protest can be made.[20] The haphazard shot at slapping an
assessment, supposedly based on estate taxation's general
provisions that are expected to be known by the taxpayer, is utter
chicanery.
Even a cursory review of the preliminary assessment notice, as well
as the demand letter sent, reveals the lack of basis for -- not to
mention the insufficiency of -- the gross figures and details of the
itemized deductions indicated in the notice and the letter. This
Court cannot countenance an assessment based on estimates that
appear to have been arbitrarily or capriciously arrived at. Although
taxes are the lifeblood of the government, their assessment and
collection "should be made in accordance with law as any
arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government itself."[21]
Fifth, the rule against estoppel does not apply. Although the
government cannot be estopped by the negligence or omission of
its agents, the obligatory provision on protesting a tax assessment
cannot be rendered nugatory by a mere act of the CIR .
Tax laws are civil in nature.[22] Under our Civil Code, acts executed
against the mandatory provisions of law are void, except when the
law itself authorizes the validity of those acts.[23] Failure to comply
with Section 228 does not only render the assessment void, but also
finds no validation in any provision in the Tax Code. We cannot
condone errant or enterprising tax officials, as they are expected to
be vigilant and law-abiding.
Second Issue:
Validity of Compromise
It would be premature for this Court to declare that the
compromise on the estate tax liability has been perfected and
consummated, considering the earlier determination that the
assessment against the estate was void. Nothing has been settled or
finalized. Under Section 204(A) of the Tax Code, where the basic tax
involved exceeds one million pesos or the settlement offered is less
than the prescribed minimum rates, the compromise shall be
subject to the approval of the NEB composed of the petitioner and
four deputy commissioners.
Finally, as correctly held by the appellate court, this provision
applies to all compromises, whether government-initiated or
not. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. Where the
law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, versus
THE CITY ASSESSOR OF ILOILO CITY, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
ILOILO CITY and ROSALINA FRANCISCO, represented by her
attorney-in-fact, SALVADOR PAJA I,* Respondents.
G.R. No. 147192 | 2006-06-27
Assailed in this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court are the decision[1] and resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dismissing a petition for annulment of judgment[3]
filed by petitioner, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), in Cadastral Case No. 84 and another unnumbered cadastral
case decided by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branches 36 and 31,
of Iloilo City, respectively.
In the two cadastral cases, private respondent Rosalina Francisco
petitioned for the issuance of new transfer certificates of title (TCTs)
in her name over two parcels of land, to wit:
TCT No. 41681
A parcel of land known as Lot No. 6, Block 2, of the Subdivision Plan
(LRC) Psd-184005 being a portion of Lot 2214-B, Jaro Cadastre, LRC
(GLRO) Record No. 8 situated in the District of Jaro, Iloilo City, Island
of Panay, registered in the name of GSIS c/o Baldomero Dagdag, of
legal age, Filipino citizen and resident of Jaro, Iloilo City, Philippines
on June 28, 1991.

TCT No. 48580
A parcel of land known as Lot No. 22, Block 2, of the Subdivision
Record No. 8 situated in the District of Jaro, Iloilo City, Island of
Panay, registered in the name of GSIS c/o Rodolfo Ceres, of legal
age, Filipino Citizen and a resident of Iloilo City, Philippines, with an
area of Two Hundred Ninety Four (294) square meters, more or less.
Private respondent Francisco purchased the subject properties in
the auction sales held for the satisfaction of delinquent real
property taxes. After the lapse of the one-year redemption period
and the failure of the registered owner or any interested person to
redeem the properties, the Iloilo City Treasurer issued the
corresponding final bill of sale to private respondent. The sales were
later on duly annotated on the certificates of title on file with the
Register of Deeds. However, the final bill of sale could not be
registered because the owner's duplicate certificate of title was
unavailable at that time.
To effect registration in her name, private respondent instituted
separate petitions for the entry of title in her name over the two
lots with the RTCs of Iloilo City. Both petitions were unopposed.
Finding merit in her petitions, the RTCs, in separate orders issued on
separate dates, directed the issuance of new duplicate TCTs. The
dispositive portion of the April 29, 1993 order of RTC Branch 36 in
Cadastral Case No. 84 read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Register of Deeds of the
City of Iloilo is hereby ordered to issue new owner's duplicate copy
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-41681 in the name of GSIS c/o
Baldomero Dagdag, upon payment of the required legal fees.
Accordingly, the lost copy of the subject title is hereby declared as
NULL and VOID.[4]
On the other hand, RTC Branch 31 also issued an order, dated
November 8, 1994, in the other (unnumbered) cadastral case, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, the Register of Deeds, City of Iloilo is
hereby directed to issue a new owner's duplicate certificate of Title
No. T-48580 in the name of the G.S.I.S. C/O RODOLFO CERES, the
registered owner, basing the same on the Original Certificate of
Title found intact and existing in the Office of the Register of Deeds
and the latter to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-48580
together with the encumbrances therein and to issue a new
Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of ROSALINA FRANCISCO of
legal age, single, Filipino Citizen and resident of Brgy. Tacas, Jaro,
Iloilo City, Philippines. The owner's duplicate certificate of title No.
T-48580 which was not surrendered is hereby declared null and
void.[5]
No appeal was made from both orders of the courts a quo, hence,
they became final and executory.
In a petition to annul the judgment of the trial court, petitioner, as
the alleged previous owner of the parcels of land sold at public
auction, assailed the orders of the RTCs of Iloilo City before the CA.
It claimed that the assessment of real property taxes on it (GSIS)
was void since, under its charter (RA 8291), it was exempt from all
forms of taxes (including real property taxes on the properties held
by it) that were due to the local governments where such properties
were located. Furthermore, it claimed that the proceedings in the
assessment and levy of said taxes, as well as the sale of the
properties at public auction, were held without notice to it, hence,
its right to due process was violated.
The appellate court gave no credence to the arguments of
petitioner and dismissed its petition. According to the CA, the
exemption of GSIS under its charter was not applicable pursuant to
Section 234(a) of RA 7160, otherwise known as The Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC). Under that law, the tax-exempt
status of GSIS cannot be invoked where the actual use or beneficial
ownership of the properties under its title has been conveyed to
another person.[6] The CA added that there was also no basis for
GSIS's claim that it was denied due process.[7]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by
the CA, hence, it brought this case to us via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In this petition, petitioner essentially faults the CA for ruling that its
properties were not exempt from all forms of taxes under its
charter (RA 8291) and that the proceedings on the assessment and
levy of its properties were legal.
In support of its position, petitioner points to Section 39 of RA 8291
which reads:
Section 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. - It is
hereby declared that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS
shall be preserved and maintained at all times and that the
contribution rates are necessary to sustain the benefits under this
Act shall be kept low as possible in order not to burden the member
of the GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to
impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the
contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits of this
Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the GSIS,
its assets, revenues, including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid
shall be exempt from all taxes, assessment fees, charges or duties of
all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and
specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the
approval of this Act are hereby considered paid. Consequently, all
laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions, or jurisprudence
contrary to or in derogation of this provision are hereby deemed
repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective and without legal
force and effect.
xxx xxx xxx
The funds and/or properties referred to herein as well as the
benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under this
Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy
or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or
administrative bodies including the Commission on Audit (COA)
disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members,
including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or
occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions or
duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or
otherwise, is in favor of GSIS.[8] (italics supplied)
We find no reversible error in the decision and resolution of the CA.
Even if the charter of the GSIS generally exempts it from tax
liabilities, the prescription is not so encompassing as to make the
tax exemption applicable to the properties in dispute here.
In the early case of City of Baguio v. Busuego,[9] we held that the
tax-exempt status of the GSIS could not prevent the accrual of the
real estate tax liability on properties transferred by it to a private
buyer through a contract to sell. In the present case, GSIS had
already conveyed the properties to private persons thus making
them subject to assessment and payment of real property taxes.[10]
The alienation of the properties sold by GSIS was the proximate
cause and necessary consequence of the delinquent taxes due.

The doctrine laid down in City of Baguio is reflected in Section 234
(a) of the LGC,[11] which states:
Section 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. - The following
are exempted from payment of the real property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of
its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has
been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable
person. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, however, claims that RA 8291, which took effect in 1997,
abrogated Section 234 (a) of the LGC of 1991.
We disagree.
The abrogation or repeal of a law cannot be assumed; the intention
to revoke must be clear and manifest.[12] RA 8291 made no express
repeal or abrogation of the provisions of RA 7160, particularly
Section 234 (a) thereof.
Repeal by implication in this case is not at all convincing either. To
bring about an implied repeal, the two laws must be absolutely
incompatible. They must be clearly repugnant in a way that the later
law (RA 8291) cannot exist without nullifying the prior law (RA
7160).[13]
Indeed, there is nothing in RA 8291 which abrogates, expressly or
impliedly, that particular provision of the LGC. The two statutes are
not inconsistent on that specific point, let alone so irreconcilable as
to compel us to uphold one and strike down the other.
The rule is that every statute must be interpreted and brought into
accord with other laws in a way that will form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.[14] The legislature is presumed to have known
existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting
laws.[15] Thus, the legislature cannot be presumed to have
intended Section 234 (a) to run counter to Section 39 of RA 8291.
This conclusion is buttressed by the Court's 2003 decision
in National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan[16] where we
declared that the tax provisions of the LGC were the most
significant provisions therein insofar as they removed the blanket
exclusion of instrumentalities and agencies of the national
government (like petitioner) from the coverage of local taxation. In
that case, petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) claimed that
it was an instrumentality of the government exempt under its
charter from paying franchise tax. The Court overruled NPC and
upheld the right of respondent city government to impose the
franchise tax on its privilege to transact business in its area.
Again, in the 2004 case of Rubia v. Government Service Insurance
System,[17] the Court declared that any interpretation that gave
Section 39 an expansive construction to exempt all GSIS assets and
properties from legal processes was unwarranted. These processes
included the levy and garnishment of its assets for taxes or claims
enforced against it. The Court there ruled that the exemption under
Section 39 of the GSIS Charter should be read consistently with its
avowed purpose - the maintenance of its actuarial solvency to
finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of its
members. The Court meant that the tax-exempt properties and
assets of GSIS referred to those that remained at its disposal and
use, either for investment or for income-generating purposes.
Properties whose actual and beneficial use had been transferred to
private taxable persons, for consideration or otherwise, were
excluded and were thus taxable.
In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos,[18] the
Court ruled that the exemption of a government-owned or
controlled corporation from taxes and other charges was not
absolute and could be withdrawn, as in fact certain provisions of the
LGC, including Section 234 (a), were deemed to have expressly
withdrawn the tax-exempt privilege of petitioner as a government-
owned corporation.
Lastly, even if we were to construe that RA 8291 abrogated Section
234(a) of the LGC, still it cannot be made to apply retroactively
without impairing the vested rights of private respondent. The
appellate court thus correctly stated:
xxx it has been the courts' consistent ruling that a repealing statute
must not interfere with vested rights or impair the obligation of
contracts; that if any other construction is possible, the act should
not be construed so as to affect rights which have vested under the
old law. Private respondent[s], we reiterate, have become the
private owner[s] of the properties in question in the regular course
of proceedings established by law, and after the decisions granting
such rights have become final and executory. The enactment of the
new GSIS Charter cannot be applied in a retroactive manner as to
divest the private respondent[s] of [their] ownership.[19] (citations
omitted)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Twin Ace Holding Corporation v. Rufina and Company
490 SCRA 368
Facts:
Twin Ace is a private domestic corporation engaged in the
manufacture of rhum, wines and liquor under the name and style
"Tanduay Distillers." It has registered its mark of ownership of its
bottles with the Bureau of Patent, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer under Republic Act No. 623. In the conduct of its business,
it sells its products to the public excluding the bottles. It makes
substantial investments in brand new bottles which it buys from
glass factories and which they use for about five times in order to
recover the cost of acquisition. Twin Ace thus retrieves its used
empty bottles, washes and uses them over and over again as
containers for its products. On the other hand, Rufina is engaged in
the production, extraction, fermentation and manufacture of patis
and other food seasonings and is engaged in the buying and selling
of all kinds of foods, merchandise and products for domestic use or
for export to other countries. In producing patis and other food
seasonings, Rufina uses as containers bottles owned by Twin Ace
without any authority or permission from the latter. In the process,
Rufina is unduly benefited from the use of the bottles. Twin Ace
filed for recovery of possession of personal property, permanent
injunction and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
replevin, TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction against Rufina and
Company. Rufina interposed that they bought it from a junk dealer
and that they are owners thereof. RTC granted and CA affirmed.
Issue: whether sec. 6 of R.A. 5700 (An Act to Regulate the Use of
Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and
Other Similar Containers) which exempts those who use the bottles,
etc. as containers for "sisi," "bagoong," "patis," and similar native
products is applicable to Rufina 2) whether this exemption applies
to small-scale businesses only
HELD: YES it is applicable to Rufina. No, it applies not only to small-
scale but even to large scale businesses such as the defendant.
We find and so hold that the exemption contained in Section 6 of
Rep. Act No. 623 as amended by RA 5700, applies to all
manufacturers of sisi, bagoong, patis and similar native products
without distinction or qualification as to whether they are small,
medium or large scale. In the case of Twin Ace v. Lorenzana Food
Corp., it is worth noting that Lorenzana Food Corporation which
prevailed is certainly not a small scale industry. Just like Rufina,
Lorenzana Food Corporation also manufactures and exports
processed foods and other related products, e.g., patis, toyo,
bagoong, vinegar and other food seasonings. As to the issue on
recovery of possession, wrongful detention by the defendant of the
properties sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactorily
established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the
writ should not be issued. In this case, Twin Ace has not shown that
it is entitled to the possession of the bottles in question and
consequently there is thus no basis for the demand by it of due
compensation. Petition DENIED.
Francisco vs. House of Representatives
TOPIC: Political Question
GR 160261
10 November 2003
Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July
2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which
directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph
E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of
the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."
The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was
referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The
House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to
dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the
House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the
Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme
Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5
of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year."
Issue: Whether or not the petitions are plainly premature and have
no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of filing of the
petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it.
Held: The courts power of judicial review, like almost all powers
conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations,
namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as
the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. The Court
found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its
exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of the judicial
review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the
construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law
of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional
material which only this Court can properly and competently
address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation
of powers under our system of government.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and
resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar
rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it
had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of
decidedly political questions. Because it not at all the business of
this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great
branches of the government.
Political questions are those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Citing Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner: The powers of government are generally
considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the
Executive, and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own
sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy
power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in
courts of justice courts of justice determine the limits of powers of
the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. The judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or
not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but also a
duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature a duty which
cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of the political law
doctrine.
The determination of a truly political question from a non-
justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our
courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.
The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes
into the merits of the second impeachment complaint. More
importantly, any discussion of this would require this Court to make
a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such
a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution
has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
Lambino Vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006
Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures
for an initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed
a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the
petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was
provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the
1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-
4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the
present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral-
parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling
law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs.
Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the
initiative petitions.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies
with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to
the Constitution through a peoples initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago
declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential
terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition.
Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with
the basic requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The
Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on
dismissing the Lambino petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer
must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and
effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders
the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between
amendment and revision, it is intended that the third mode of
stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only
amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the
executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result
because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid
initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying
with RA 6735
Petition is dismissed.
Orceo VS COMELEC
GR 190779, March 26, 2010
Petition:
Certiorari questioning the validity of Resolution No.
8714 insofar as it provides that the term firearm includes
airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations, which results in
their coverage by the gun ban during the election period this year.
Petitioner:
Atty. Reynante B. Orceo
Respondent:
COMELEC
Ponencia:
J. PeraltaDOCTRINE: ART II Section 12 Family Life; Mother; Unborn
FACTS:
Petitioner prays that the Court render a decision as follows:
(1) Annulling Resolution No. 8714 insofar as it includesairsoft guns
and their replicas/imitations within the meaning
of firearm, and declaring the Resolution as invalid; : We adhere to theaforementioned state policies, but even
(2) ordering the COMELEC to desist from further implementing constitutionalfreedoms are not absolute, and they may be abridged
Resolution No. 8714 insofar as airsoft gunsand tosome extent to serve appropriate and importantinterests.
their replicas/imitations are concerned;(3) ordering the COMELEC to ISSUE:
amend Resolution No. 8714 by removing airsoft guns and their WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion inincluding airsoft
replicas/imitations within guns and their replicas/imitations in the term
the meaning of firearm; and firearm in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 8714.
(4) ordering the COMELEC to issue a Resolution directingthe Armed
Forces of the Philippines, Philippine NationalPolice and other law PROVISIONS:
enforcement agencies deputized by theCOMELEC to desist from Resolution No. 8714 is
further enforcing Resolution No.8714 insofar as airsoft guns and entitled Rules and Regulations on the:(1) Bearing, Carrying or
their replicas/imitations areconcerned. Transporting of Firearms or
other Deadly Weapons; and (2) Employment, Availment or Engage
Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bondingmoments ment of the Services of Security Personnel or Bodyguards, During
among family members. Families are entitled the Election Period for the May
to protection by the society and the State under the UniversalDeclar 10, 2010 National and Local Elections
ation of Human Rights. They are free to choose andenjoy their . It contains the implementingrules and regulations of Sec. 32 (Who
recreational activities. These liberties, petitioner contends, cannot May Bear Firearms) andSection 33 (Security Personnel and
be abridged by the COMELEC. Bodyguards) of RepublicAct (R.A.) No. 7166, entitled
Thus, petitioner contends that Resolution No. 8714 is not inaccorda An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and
nce with the State policies in these constitutional provisions: for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
(1) Art. II, Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social RULING+RATIO:
institution. x x x(2) Art. XV, Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino NO. The Court holds that the COMELEC did notgravely abuse its
familyas the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it discretion in including airsoft guns and
shallstrengthen its solidarity and actively promote its airguns in the term firearm in Resolution No. 8714 for
totaldevelopment.(3) Art. II, Sec. 17. The State shall give priority to x purposes of the gun ban during the election period. The
x xsports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate COMELECs intent in the inclusion of airsoft guns in the
social progress, and promote total human liberation termfirearm and their resultant coverage by the election gun ban
anddevelopment. is to avoid the possible use of recreational guns in sowing
fear,intimidation or terror during the election period. An
COMELEC ordinarycitizen may not be able to distinguish between a real gun
s response andan airsoft gun. It is fear subverting the will of a voter,
whether brought
about by the use of a real gun or a recreational gun,which is sought
to be averted. Ultimately, the objective is toensure the holding of
free.However, the replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and
airguns are excluded from the term firearm in Resolution No.
8714.
DISPOSITION:
1. PARTLY GRANTED insofar as the exclusion of replicasand
imitations of airsoft
guns from the term firearm is
concerned. Replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns
are hereby declared excluded from the term firearm in
Resolution No. 8714.2. The petition is DISMISSED in regard to the
exclusion of airsoft guns from the
term firearm in Resolution No. 8714.
Airsoft guns and airguns are covered by the gun ban during
theelection period.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential
elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen
from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno
on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election.
Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also considering that
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from making
appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously
agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically
considered for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of
the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate
Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.
However, the last two declined their nomination through letters
dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the
next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article
VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the
Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court
must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to
Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers
intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments,
they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which
explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department);
and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint
members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from
political vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures,
such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment
of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall
appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the
JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from
some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so
once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process
until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section
4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to
appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days
from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor
of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:
Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself,
most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents
or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself,
most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents
or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same
character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint.
The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments
within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15
also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is
consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must
be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume
that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section
14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear,
would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article
VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
 TEOFILO MARTINEZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
G.R. No. 132852 | 2000-05-31
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, erroneously filed as a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. But this procedural
infirmity notwithstanding, we have decided to give it due course to
resolve the question whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused
its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to appeal as a pauper
litigant.1 [Rollo, p. 5.]
The antecedents: Petitioner was accused of homicide in Crim. Case
No. 5753 before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City.2 [The case
was raffled to RTC-Br. 4, Butuan City.] During the hearing on 23 June
1994 petitioner represented by Atty. Jesus G. Chavez of the Public
Attorney's Office of Butuan City objected to petitioner's motion to
be allowed to litigate as pauper and moved instead to strike out the
entire testimony of the first witness for the prosecution on the
ground that it was inadmissible for being violative of the testimonial
privilege afforded to children in cases involving their parents. The
Presiding Judge3 [Judge Cipriano B. Alvizo, Jr.] deferred his ruling on
the objection and allowed the testimony to be continued.4 [Original
Records, p. 6.] On 21 July 1994 the trial court issued an order
overruling the objection. On 8 August 1994 the court denied the
motion for reconsideration.5 [Id., pp. 10-11, 14.] This prompted
petitioner to go to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for
certiorari alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued the
assailed orders.6 [Id., p. 5.]
On 23 August 1994 petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a
Motion to Litigate as Pauper attaching thereto supporting affidavits
executed by petitioner himself and by two (2) ostensibly
disinterested persons attesting to petitioner's eligibility to avail
himself of this privilege.7 [Id., p. 2.] The appellate court
subsequently issued its resolution dated 21 March 1997 denying the
motion and directing petitioner to remit the docketing fees in the
total amount of P420.00 within five (5) days from notice.8 [Penned
by Associate Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros, with Associate
Justices Emeterio C. Cui and Romeo A. Brawner concurring; id., p.
102.] On 7 April 1997 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the order denying his motion to litigate as a pauper, but this was
similarly denied in the resolution of 8 October 1997.9 [Id., p. 120.]
Petitioner then filed a Manifestation on 28 October 1997 wherein
he stated through counsel that he was transmitting the docket fees
required of his client "under protest" and that the money remitted
was advanced by his counsel, Atty. Jesus G. Chavez himself.10 [Id.,
p. 123.] The transmittal of the amount was evidenced by two (2)
postal money orders attached to the Motion to Litigate as
Pauper.11 [See Note 5.]
In the assailed Resolution of 10 November 1997 the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition, citing petitioner's failure to pay the
required docket fee.12 [Penned by Associate Justice Lourdes K.
Tayao-Jaguros, with Associate Justices Ricardo P. Galvez and
Oswaldo D. Agcaoili concurring; Original Records, p. 122.] Petitioner
moved for reconsideration citing his compliance with the docket fee
requirement as alleged in his Manifestation adverted to above.13
[Id., p. 127.] However, the Court of Appeals in the second assailed
Resolution of 21 January 1998 denied this latest motion on the
ground that, per verification by the Judicial Records Division, the
amount remitted by petitioner as docket fee was short of 150.00.14
[Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, with Associate
Justices Ricardo P. Galvez and Omar D. Amin concurring; id., p.
130.]
The only issue expressly raised by petitioner is whether a motion to
litigate as pauper can be entertained by an appellate court. When
petitioner filed on 23 August 1994 his original motion to appeal as
pauper before the appellate court the applicable rule was the
second paragraph of Sec. 16, rule 41, of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court, which provides-
Sec. 16. Appeal by pauper - Where a party desiring to appeal shall
establish to the satisfaction of the trial court that he is a pauper and
unable to pay the expenses of prosecuting the appeal, and that the
case is of such importance, by reason of the amount involved, or the
nature of the question raised, that it ought to be reviewed by the
appellate court, the trial judge may enter an order entitling the
party to appeal as pauper. The clerk shall transmit to the appellate
court the entire record of the case, including the evidence taken on
trial and the record on appeal, and the case shall be heard in the
appellate court upon the original record so transmitted without
printing the same.
A petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be
entertained by the appellate court.
Even prior to the adoption of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, the
Court had uniformly frowned upon appellate courts entertaining
petitions to litigate as pauper, holding that the question of whether
a party-litigant is so poor as to qualify him to litigate as pauper is a
question of fact which is best determined by the trial court. The trial
court is the court which may properly decide or pass upon the
question of fact which may require presentation of evidence
whether the appellant is an indigent and may appeal as such, and
whether the case is of such importance that, by reason not only of
the amount involved but of the nature of the question raised in the
court below, it ought to be reviewed by the appellate court.15
[Narito v. Carrido, No. L-27792, 28 July 1969, 28 SCRA 824.]
When the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure came into effect on 1 July
1997 the provision abovequoted was not reenacted. Section 21 of
Rule 3, as now worded, outlines the procedure for, as well as the
effects of, the grant of a motion to litigate as pauper -
Sec. 21. Indigent party. - A party may be authorized to litigate his
action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte
application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no
money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and
basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket
and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes
which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the
docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from
paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case
favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any
time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court
should determine after hearing that the party declared as an
indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the
proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected
by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed
by the court, execution shall issue or the payment thereof, without
prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.
On the other hand, Sec. 18 of Rule 141 prescribes the evidentiary
requirements for the exemption of pauper litigants from payment
of legal fees -
Sec. 18. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. -
Pauper-litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate
family do not exceed four thousand (P4,000.00) pesos a month if
residing in Metro Manila, and three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos a
month if residing outside Metro Manila, and (b) who do not own
real property with an assessed value of more than fifty thousand
(P50,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from the payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case
favorably to the pauper-litigant, unless the court otherwise
provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall
execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn
the gross income abovementioned, nor do they own any real
property with the assessed value aforementioned, supported by an
affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the
litigant's affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of a litigant or disinterested person shall
be sufficient cause to strike out the pleading of that party, without
prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.
It cannot be inferred from any of the aforementioned provisions
that the restrictive policy enunciated by Sec. 16, Rule 41, of the
1964 Revised Rules of Court was carried over to the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Nowhere can we find a provision to the effect that
"(a) petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be
entertained by the appellate court."
We resolve to apply the present rules on petitioner retrospectively.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. In that sense and to that extent procedural laws are
retroactive.16 [Diu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115213, 19
December 1995, 251 SCRA 472, citing People v. Sumilang, 77 Phil.
764 (1946).] We therefore hold that a motion to litigate as an
indigent can be made even before the appellate courts, either for
the prosecution of appeals, in petitions for review or in special civil
actions.
We believe that this interpretation of the present rules is more in
keeping with our Bill of Rights, which decrees that, "(f)ree access to
the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance
shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty."17 [Art. III,
Sec. 11, 1987 Constitution.] Our espousal of the democratization of
appellate remedies is shared by the United States Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black -
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny
the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one
which effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review
accorded to all who have money enough to pay the costs in advance
x x x x Such a denial is a misfit in a country dedicated to affording
equal justice to all and special privileges to none in the
administration of its criminal law. There can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money
he has.18 [351 US 12 (1956), 100 L ed. 891, 76 S Ct. 585.]
A perusal of the records shows that petitioner has complied with all
the evidentiary requirements for prosecuting a motion to appear in
court as a pauper. He has executed an affidavit attesting to the fact
that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income of
more than P3,000.00 a month, and that their only real property, a
hut, cannot be worth more than P10,000.00.19 [Original Records, p.
4.] He has also submitted a joint affidavit executed by Florencia L.
Ongtico and Helen Maur, both residents of Butuan City, who
generally attested to the same allegations contained in petitioner's
own affidavit.20 [Id., p. 2.] Based on this evidence, the Court finds
that petitioner is qualified to litigate as an indigent.
WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated 10 November 1997 dismissing the petition for certiorari of
petitioner Teofilo Martinez and its Resolution dated 21 January
1998 denying reconsideration are SET ASIDE for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, this case is REMANDED
for appropriate action to the Court of Appeals which is further
ordered to allow petitioner to litigate as pauper and to return to
him the amount of P420.00 representing the docket fees he paid.

SO ORDERED.

SARMIENTO vs. MISON

GR No. 79974December 17, 1987 4th group:

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of

the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers
are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. 5

The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone
of contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or
without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and
statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects
excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require
the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
But we need not rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional
construction. We can refer to historical background as well as to the
records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to determine, with
more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the framers of the
1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the
appointments by the President, under the second, third and fourth
groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief
Justice J. Abad Santos in Gold Creek is apropos:
"In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a
constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed
and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing
laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to presume
that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the
previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions
relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in
its adoption." (Barry vs. Truax, 13 N.D., 131; 99 N.W., 769; 65 L. R.
A., 762.) 6 "
It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935
Constitution, it is provided that
xxx xxx xxx
"(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus, officers of the army from the
rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain
or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress
may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.
"(4) The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
xxx xxx xxx
"(7) . . ., and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls . . ."
Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides that
"Section 10. The President shall appoint the heads of bureaus and
offices, the officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from the
rank of Brigadier General or Commodore, and all other officers of
the government whose appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in the
Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet, the Executive Committee,
Courts, Heads of Agencies, Commissions, and Boards the power to
appoint inferior officers in their respective offices."
Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments
required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political history that the
power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under
the 1935 Constitution, transformed that commission, many times,
into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar malpractices.
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the
authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by
successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment
in the President with hardly any check on the part of the
legislature.
Given the above two in extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and
the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to
state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people
adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first
group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such
confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the
second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e.,
officers of lower rank.
The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this
conclusion. The original text of Section 16, Article VII, as proposed
by the Committee on the Executive of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, read as follows:
"Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a
Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments" 7 [Emphasis
supplied.].
The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its counterpart
provision in the 1935 Constitution. When the frames discussed on
the floor of the Commission the proposed text of Section 16, Article
VII, a feeling was manifestly expressed to make the power of the
Commission on Appointments over presidential appointments more
limited than that held by the Commission in the 1935 Constitution.
with particular reference to the word "also," implies that the
President shall "in like manner" appoint the officers mentioned in
said second sentence. In other words, the President shall appoint
the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner
as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence, that is, by
nomination and with the consent (confirmation) of the Commission
on Appointments.
Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second sentence
is not necessarily supportive of the conclusion he arrives at. For, as
the Solicitor General argues, the word "also" could mean "in
addition; as well; besides, too" (Webster's International Dictionary,
p. 62, 1981 edition) which meanings could, on the contrary, stress
that the word "also" in said second sentence means that the
President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated
in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent
(confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence.
Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings
of the word "also" as used in the context of said second sentence,
the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the
first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and
appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of
appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in
two (2) sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference
in message conveyed and perceptions established, in line with
Judge Learned Hand's observation that "words are not pebbles in
alien juxtaposition" but, more so, because the recorded proceedings
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission clearly and expressly justify
such differences.

As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the

1987 Constitution, there are officers whose appointments require
no confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if such
officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose
appointments have to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments under the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII.
Thus, to illustrate, the appointment of the Central Bank Governor
requires no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
even if he is higher in rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service.

But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore

the purposive intention and deliberate judgment of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution that, except as to those officers whose
appointments require the consent of the Commission on
Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec., 16,
Art. VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President
without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that
the framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of what
they were doing and of the foreseable effects thereof.

Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or

presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such
power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But,
it is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly
stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein
enumerated require the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.