Marcia Quarle's Respondent's Brief Case A150642

A 150642 Keegan v.
Quarie 1
Ai5o642
IN THE COURT OF APPEAI OF CALIFORNIA
1st APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
MEAGHAN KEEGAN
Plaintiff and Appellant
vs.
MARCIA QUARLE and DANIEL E. KANER
Defendants and Respondents
Appeal from Court Trial Judgment

Superior Court Judge: The Honorable JULIA SPAIN
Alameda County Superior Court Case RG15-796301
(Stayed With Original Case No. RG10-537233)
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF OF MARCIA QUARLE
MARCIA T. QUARLE
651 Addison Street, Suite 210

Berkeley, California 94710
Telephone: 510 6219225
comcast.net
Email: marcia.guarle@comcast.net
1
A 150642 Keegan v. Quarle 1
Ai5o65
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. 5
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 7
III. THE HEARING OF JANUARY 26, 2017. 8
IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES 15
V. DISCUSSION 16
VI. PROCEDUR.AL HISTORY OF CIPA LAWSUIT. :17
VI. TIMELINE OF CASE RG15796301 21
VIII. THE UFTA 23
IX. CIPA CCP 632.7 AND 340(A) STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS 24
X. ISSUE OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION 27
XI. APPEAL WAS FILED IN BAD FAITH. 29
Keegan v. Quarle A150642 1 Respondent's Brlef

G1 eoft~
XII. ATTORNEY FEE ISSUE 30
A MOTION FOR COSTS MUST BE MADE BEFORE THE

UNDERLYING JUDGMENT HA,S BEEN FULLY
SATISFIED. KEEGAN FILED A MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS ON JANUARY 9, 2015
XIII. FAILURE TO PROVIDE A REPORTER'S TX 33
XIV. THE OPENING BRIEF IS PLAGIARIZED. 34
XV. APPEAL IS RIDDLED WITH ERRORS AND

INACCURACIES 34
XVI. THE RECORD CONTAINS SUBSTANTIAL

EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE OF KEEGAN'S MERITLESS
UF"TA COMPLAINT 41
XVII. SANCTIONS PER CCP 907 43
XVIII. CONCLUSION
KEEGAN NEVER FILED A MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES IN CASE RG10537233 OR IN
CASE RG15796301
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COiJNT

PROOF OF SERVICE
Keegan v. Quarle 2 Respondent's Brief

Adams u. Bell
(1936) 5th Cal. 2d 697 25
Bermingham v. Roland
(2016) H041945 6th District 33
Carnes u. Zambian
(9th Cir. 2007) 488 F.3d. 1070
Conservatorship of McQueen
(2014) 59 Cal. 4th 602, 605 13
DanieIs v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.
(2o16) 246 Ca1.App.4th, 1150. 31
Dart Industries Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.
(2002) 28 Cal. 4th 1059 28
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic
Beverage Control Appeals Bd.
(2002)1oo Cal App. 4th 1o66,1078 36
Foust v. San Jose Construction Co, Inc
(2011) 198 Cal. APP.4h 181. 16
GrayY CPB, LLCc vs. SCCAcquisitions, Inc. et. al. 8, 10
(2015)
Guzman v. Evans Auto Care
(2o16) Cal. App. 2nd Appeal B 263378 40
Hasso u. Hapke
(2014) 227 Cal. App. 4th 1o7. 23
Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center
(2oo0) 78 Cal. App. 4th 498. 16
Huong Que, Inc. u. Luu
(2oo7) 15o Cal. App.4th 400, 40 9 41
In re EDP Inv. Co. (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2015) 23
(In re Marriage of Flaherty

(1982) 31 Ca1.3d 637 650; 44
In Re S.C.
(2oo6)138 Cal. App. 4th 396 34
Leuine u. McAvoy, Case No. D058894
(2004) (4th Dist, Div,, August 2, 2012) 12
Lucky United Properties Investment Inc us. Lee
(2010)185 Ca1.App. 4th 125,141 42
Keegan v. Quarie 3 Respondent's Brief

Kaufman v. Diskeeper Corp.

{2014} 229 Cal. App. 4th 30
Kleuland v. Siegel & Wolensky LLP
(2013) 215 Cal. App. 4th 537 43
Meaghan Keegan v.lVfarcia Quarle
(2o14) A144976
1Vleaghan Keegan v. All California Mortgage and Bruce Fonarow
(2015)
Lohan v. Perez 40
Lucky United Properties Investment Inc us. Lee
(2010) 185 Ca1.App. 4th 125,141
Maria P. u.Riles
(1987) 43 Cal. 3d 1281 31
1Vlejia U Reed
(2003) 31 Cal. 4th, 657 23
1Vlultani v. Witkin &Neal
(2013) 215 Cal. App. 4th 128 36
Pierotti u. Torrian
(2000) 81 Cal. App. 4th 17, 31) 44
Renda v. Nevarez
(2014) 223 Ca1.App.4th 1234-) 8, 23, 27
Rund v. Bank of Am. Corp. (In re EDP Inv. Co., LLC)
(Bank. gth Cir. 2015
US. u. Bowen
(2006) 194 Fed. Appx. 393, 402 (6th Cir.) 40
Warden u Kahn
99 Cal. App. 3d 805 24
CCP 128.5 or 128.7.
CCP 904
CCP 581 d et. see
CCP 904
CCP 1033 3042
CCPT[1717 30
CCP 632 et. al 30
CCP. 3439og(a) and (b) 22, 25
Rules of Court Rule 3.1700 iko

COURT OF APPEAL FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE
RE: A15o642
RG15796301
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES

INITIAL CERTIFICATE:
1. THIS FORIVI IS BEING SUBMITTED ON

BEHALF OF MARCIA QUARLE
1. DANIEL E. KANER IS AN INTERESTED PARTY
AND A CO RESPONDENT
2. THERE ARE NO OTHER INTERESTED
ENTITIES OR PERSONS THAT MUST BE
LISTED IN THIS CERTIFICATE UNDER RULE
$.208.
DATE: AUGUST 20, 2017
MARCIA QUARLE, RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT
MARCIA QUARLE/S/
Keegan v. Quarle '" Resporidellt's Brief
rOft
, ` /104~
I. FAC'TUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Keegan is a sophisticated investor in real estate. She was one of
several investors in a fractionalized note secured by a deed of trust. On
1/i/o9 Keegan hired Quarle to investigate her "rights" in various properties
she had invested in with ACM Investor Services and Bruce Fonar(jw. "In
December 2oo8 the parties agreed that Plaintiff Keegan would hire Quarle
as a paralegal to research and investigate all loan transactions between
Keegan and ACM, obtain copies of recorded liens, file lis pendens as
appropriate..(See page 2 of Statement of Decision of 12/2/14). Since 2008
Keegan has filed more than 21 (twenty one) lawsuits in pro per involving
"real estate": Cases RG11581713, Case RG11581786, MSCio-03266. She
routinely claims "conspiracy and elder abuse." Keegan is a serial litigant.
Keegan filed this lawsuit alleging that a quitclaim deed dated
10/22/10 signed by Quarle in favor of Daniel Kaner conveying Quarle's
interest in a residence (the home) to Kaner as a transfer in fraud of
creditors. Judge Spain disagreed. On 8/31/12 Daniel Kaner executed a
Grant Deed in favor of the Seifi's. Contemporaneously with the August
2012 sale to the Seifis Kaner transferred the proceeds of the sale to Quarle.
During the time that the August 2012 sale was recorded until Keegan
obtained her judgment in December of 2014 Quarle had approximately

, r"' ,~ ~,
$500,00o in retirement funds. (CT 12 and CT028) Kaner was unaware of
Keegan's underlying lawsuit filed on 9/20/10. In December of 2015 Keegan
filed the current action against Quarle and Kaner alleging that the transfer
of the title in 2010 accomplished by the recorded notarized quitclaim deed
was fraudulent and made to hinder and delay Keegan's collection of her
2014 judgment. The court found there was no intent to hinder or defraud
any creditor. The court credited the fact that Quarle had ample assets to
satisfy the judgment after the transfer, Keegan made no effort to collect her
judgment and that the transfer was unrelated to any effort to avoid
payment by Quarle to Keegan. The conveyance was for legitimate reasons
that had nothing to do with Keegan. Quarle did not remove or conceal the
asset in any way. Also the transfer was not set aside because Kaner sold the
property to third parties (the Seifis) in 2012 for $687,000 (CTooii) and no
recoverable value remained in the real property after deducting a Wells
Fargo Bank $58o,000 mortgage and the Seifis' senior homestead
exemption. The 8/31/12 transfer was recorded by Old Republic Title. The
trial court denied Keegan relief because there was a failure to demonstrate
any injury since there was no value or equity in the Oakland property that
Keegan could reach. The house was sold and all of the proceeds were

delivered to Quarle. Keegan for tactical reasons did not wish to enforce her
judgment while her prior appeal was pending.
There was no evidence that Keegan ever recorded an abstract of
judgment to obtain a lien securing her 2014 judgment. Therefore the
$58o,000 mortgage lien was prior in time to Keegan's $6000 judgrnent. In
addition at all times Quarle and both the Seifis were over 65 years old and
the sale of the building would be subject to a$125,0oo homestead
exemption and it was the dwelling of Quarle. Keegan never "attempted to
lien Quarle's rear property." (See AOB pg. 9). The instant action does not
have "viable" causes of action. They are all moot. K e e g a n' s o r i g i n a 1
complaint (CT ool-oolo)( "did not refer to the 2012 sale to the
Seifis" (CToo11). Keegan never tried to collect the judgment by securing a
writ of execution or applying for an OEX (CTo012). The 20io docket does
not reflect any collection efforts.
II. ISSLTES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Issues Pertaining to Appellant's Assignment of Error:
ISSUE NO. i: Was the trial court's Order of 1.26.17 supported by
substantial evidence in finding that Keegan failed to exhaust her remedies
in the underlying case given that she took zero action to protect herself or to
collect her judgment from 10/22/14 to the dismissal with prejudice? (See
Keegan made no effort to collect the $6000 judgment. (CTooi4).

ISSUE NO. 2: Did Keegan offer sufficient evidence to prove the
elements necessary to establish fraudulent transfer of 105 Starview Court ,
Oaldand to Kaner on 10/22/10?
ISSUE NO. 3: Did the trial court err in requiring Keegan serve Kaner
with her Complaint and did the trial court err in requiring Keegan join the
good faith buyers as persons needed for just adjudication in an UFTA
action? (See CToo13)
ISSUE NO 4: Did the Trial Court err in ruling that Keegan cannot
obtain a judgment under the UFI7A. against Quarle from the monetary
proceeds of the sale. (Renda v. Neverraz (2014) so a judgment against
Quarle in this case on Keegan's UFTA cause of action would entail a
double recovery." (See CToi3)
ISSUE NO 5: Did Keegan ever assert her "proper notice" argument to
the trial court? Gary Lee Sherrer was present at the 1.26.17 hearing.
III. THE HEAKING OF JANUARY 26 2017 BEFORE JUDGE
JLJLIA SPAIN DEPARTMENT 19
The Hearing of January 26, 2017
8 Respondent's Brief
r*~ r"04,
The record includes the following testimony and the trial court's
ruling on 1/26/17. At the 1/26/17 Hearing the following words were
exchanged:
THE COURT: "All I am doing is shutting down one avenue which I

think frankly is completely inappropriate because she has not exhausted
her underlying remedies before filing this case
SHERRER : "If she had exhausted her underlying remedies

before filing the instant action, it is highly likely that she would have missed
the statute of limitations for this action. As I understand the process she
just barely made it as it was and that is one of defendant's main arguments
that she did in fact "blow" the statute of limitations.
THE COURT: "No I am shutting down one avenue

SHERRER: "I understand the court's position and the plaintifPs
position is that this is an inappropriate denial of due process to the
plaintiff. Because I think by shutting down this action you do deny Ms.
Keegan the ability to seek and recover punitive damages, you deny her the
ability to seek and recover attorney fees. You essentially limit her to
whatever the judgment is and the interest that is accrued on the judgment
by staying these proceedings"
THE COURT: "Anything further?"
SHERRER: "I just want to point out that the court in making its
decision .that there is a proof issue with respect to money retained by Kaner
from the sale and I believe Defendant has filed all of her discovery
responses and in RFA # 6 she makes a statement that Mr. Kaner received a
portion of the proceeds from the sale and I don't believe this has been
addressed in any of the paperwork."
QUARLE: What amount?

THE COURT: Who cares if he got a portion as long as she's
got more than $6000.00 that is all you should care about.
RI,
'a0' /0%%
On 1/26/17 Keegan contested a TR staying the case. Quarle walked
into the hearing with two cashier's checks for $7200 plus cash covering the
entire judgment and all accumulated interest. Citing Grayl "Do you accept
the check or say, "No thank you I need to make a motion for attorney fees
first?" Put another way, is a bird in the hand worth two in the bush?
Keegan obtained a nominal $6000 judgment on 10/24/14. (See
CToo14 & CToo19) Two years later the outstanding judgment accrued
interest of $1291. In this appeal Appellant claims she incurred $70,000 in
attorney fees in an effort to enforce its judgment. The fees were incurred in
allegedly litigating Case RG15796301. Keegan was in pro per until5/31/16.
Keegan also claimed she paid Paul Raymond Turley $25,000 to represent
her while he was suspended from practicing law. Sherrer is being
investigated by the State Bar of California for "fee-splitting" with Craig
Rawson. Sherrer's services were worth no more than $5oo and his fee
requests are unreasonable and exaggerated.
On January 26, 2017 Judge Spain fixed the amount due Keegan at
$7291.00 and the court told Keegan's attorney that plaintiff's claim be
dismissed with prejudice upon Quarle's payment of that amount. In doing
so the court held that once Quarle paid this sum, the judgment would be
completely paid and Keegan's fraudulent transfer claim would be moot. On
f `-+` 1+1
~
1/26/17 Quarle tendered the $7291.00 to plaintiff and this amount
represented all additional funds owed to plaintiff under the 2014 judgment.
In March and April of 2017 Quarle wrote Keegan's attorney and demanded
the he dismiss the UFTA appeal asserting that she had now paid the entire
debt to Keegan and plaintiff no longer had a"claim" against her. By email
Gary Sherrer acknowledged that Keegan's debt/judgment under the
original judgment had been satisfied but Keegan maintained that she still
had a"claim" against Quarle under UFTA for "her legal fees and punitive
damages." This appeal does not arise from any breach of any agreement
rather it arises from Keegan's desire to get more money from Quarle.
Keegan believes she still has a"claim" against Quarle. Judge Spain
dismissed Keegan's lawsuit because she found there was no longer a
debtor/creditor relationship between the parties. Any claim for "costs or
fees" was resolved long ago in 2015 by Judge Bereola.
There is no statutory right to attorney fees. While Keegan has a right
to proceed through numerous appeals in what is becoming an unending
process, there is no basis upon which a potential attorney fee appeal should
impact Quarle. The debtor creditor relationship is over and any debt truly
at issue has fully been paid. UFTA defines a"creditor" as a person who has
a claim. Under a plain reading of the UFTA Keegan is no longer a creditor
À001N r1~
under the statute because she no longer has a legally recognized right to
payment from Quarle.
On 2/24/17 Keegan filed this Appeal seeking an "additional judgment
against Quarle." The appeal asserts that Quarle owes Keegan an additional
sum for attorney fees.
On 3/27/17 Sherrer requested a 2-3 week continuance of Keegan's
Motion to Tax Costs, claiming to Dept. 19 "I am otherwise engaged in a co-
defendant criminal matter."
There is no contract between Keegan and Quarle authorizing an
award of fees. In Leuine u. McAvoy, Case No. D058894 (4th Dist, Div,,
August 2, 2012) it was decided that fee exposure was correctly not visited
upon losing plaintiffs seeking to recoup money from third -party
transferees under UFTA. Because fraudulent conveyance was the theory of
the action, contractual fee exposure could not be imposed upon the non-
signatory plaintiffs. Also UFTA has no fee authorizing provision with the
"any other relief as the circumstances may require" language of Civil Code
343907 (a)(3) not being the equivalent of a legislative mandate on the
subject.
Keegan cites 68o throughout her AOB. She does not cite 685.040
or 685.070 which governs an award of post judgment costs. The case was
110~ 1
10kh,
dismissed with prejudice on 1/31/17 and now is August of 2017 and Keegan
never filed a Memo of Costs or a Motion For Attorney Fees. A motion for
post judgment costs (including fees) must be made before the judgment is
satisfied in full. Most notably not once in her authorities does she cite Civil
Code 343907 or 343904
In Grayi the DCA issued a published opinion holding Grayi's motion
for attorney fees was untimely because it was made after defendants gave
Grayl a cashier's check for the full amount of the judgment plus accrued
interest. Grayi then filed a petition for review. The Supreme Court granted
review and stayed further briefing pending its decision in Conservatorship
of McQueen (2oi4) 59 Cal. 4th 602, 605. The Supreme Court held attorney
fees on appeal from the underlying judgment are not subject to CCP
685.080 (motion for attorney fees must be brought before the judgment is
paid in full). After the Supreme Court decided McQueen, it transferred the
present case back to DCA to decide in light of McQueen. "We have and
conclude our earlier decision was correct."
The McQueen case pled a cause of action of financial elder abuse.
However in this Appeal, Keegan's EA abuse cause of action was dismissed
with prejudice on demurrer to Original Complaint. (CToo13) :
Citing Grayl "because Gray1's motion for attorney fees incurred in a
separate action to enforce its judgment in the underlying matter was not
filed before defendants paid Grayi with a certified cashier's check accepted
by Grayl, Grayi's motion for fees was untimely and properly denied." (Gray
Y citing opinion).
In this Appeal Keegan accepted Quarle's certified checks on 1/26/17,
filed an Acknowledgement of Payment in Full on 1/30/17 and the Court
(not Keegan) dismissed Case RG15796301 with prejudice on 1/31/17.
Keegan forfeited the issue of "attorney fees" by not raising it in the
trial court in February of 2017. The court is asked to ignore argument5
raised for the first time on appeal which were not litigated in the trial court.
Keegan's barebones argument is less sympathetic than Gray1's argument
for various reasons:
1. Keegan filed the Acknowledgement of Satisfaction of Judgment on
1/30/17 pursuant to court order.
2. Keegan never filed a Memorandum of Costs or an oral or a Noticed
written Motion for Attorney Fees in RG15796301.
3. Keegan's appeal is without just cause. There is no statute or
contract between the parties that provides for attorney fees in Case
RG10537233 (the underlying case). Keegan was not awarded attornay fees.
laoft~ ?Aft~l
4. On 2/17/17 Keegan filed a Motion to Tax Quarle's Costs and
admitted this fact. (See Appendix and Sherrer's Declaration)
5. Gary Sherrer never "objected" in writing to the order.
Keegan's brief in Section XII is entitled "Granting Relief Furthers
Police Favoring Trial on the Merits". She left out the fact that there was a
two day bench trial in July of 2014 and that she filed and lost a prior appeal
based on the same issues. (CToo12) "Keegan filed but later abandoned an
appeal"A144976 Keegan u. Quarle .
IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES INADEQUATE RECORD
Defendant moves to strike Keegan AOB, dismiss the appeal and
impose sanctions for filing a frivolous appeal. It must be dismissed due to
the lack of an adequate record. The appeal is taken from a judgment of
dismissal with prejudice in an UFTA action after the trial court granted
Quarle's motion for judgment on the pleadings. (See CToo13 & CTo020)
The record on appeal consists solely of the court's minute order and Order
of 1/26/17 and an Order dismissing the action with prejudice. Because the
record is so limited and the fact that it is a judgment role appeal without a
Reporter's Transcript, the DCA cannot "review the record" since it does not
exist. Following entry of an order dismissing Keegan's Second Amended
Complaint, Keegan appealed. In the notice designating the record on

0011, ,WAs,
appeal, Keegan designated only certain "required documents, " such as the
appealed order, the dismissal with prejudice but failed to designate any
crucial documents such as the operative Second Amended Complaint.
(SeeCToo14 & CTo021) Keegan filed her AOB on 8/2/17 and she added a
RJN of three items, but failed to include them. K e e g a n h a s f a i 1 e d t o
procure a sufficient record and has failed to support her factual assertions
with citations to the record. Quarle seeks sanctions for a frivolous appeal.
The Complaint and Appeal were filed to harass Quarle.
V. DISCUSSION
It is a fundamental rule of "appellate review that a judgment of the
trial court is presumed correct and prejudicial error must be affirmatively
shown." (Foust u. San Jose Construction Co, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal. App.4h
181." A necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate
for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial
court should be affirmed. It is Keegan's burden to provide an adequate
record. (Hernandez u. California Hospital Medical Center (2000) 78 Cal.
App. 4th 498. Inadequacy of the record warrants dismissal of an appeal.
In this case the appeal is clearly inadequate to allow appellate review of the
challenged trial court decision. The record does not contain the operative
2ND Amended complaint (See CT 0014 & CTo021), the papers supporting
1+'"s ?..,~
and opposing the discovery motions. As a consequence of the inadequate
record, Keegan's brief violates the California Rules of Court because it does
not support factual asserttions with citations to the record. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204Ca(1)(C). The record deficiency is not remedied by her
RJN because the record does not contain the filings necessary to evaluate
the order granting the MJOP. It is not the job of the DCA to inform a
litigant that the record is deficient.
Keegan's noncompliance extends beyond the content of her AOB. It
affirmatively misstates the record. Most import Keegan does not show how
the "errors" the "due process errors" were reasonably called to the
attention of the trial judge. Nor does she show where in the record she was
prejudiced by any error, with citations to the record where the resultant
prejudice was recorded. Trial judges are rarely found to have abused their
discretion and findings of fact are seldom contrary to the manifest weight
of the evidence.
VI. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF iJNDERLYING CIPA IAWSUIT
This case has a long and tortured procedural history. The parties
relationship began in 2oo8 when Keegan asked Quarle to help her with her
lawsuits. She has filed in pro per over 22 Unlimited Civil Actions or
Appeals since 2oo8. She also filed 9 small claims cases since 2oo8. Quarle
~ AMIN
believes Keegan is a vexatious litigant. On 1/1/o9 she agreed to pay Quarle
$25.00 an hour to research her issues with All California Mortgage. Keegan
breached the contract and Quarle filed a Labor Board Action. On
8/21/2oo9 Keegan filed BGo99469911 Keegan v. Quarle # Y.On 9/13/io at
the DSLE hearing Keegan claimed Quarle was an independent contractor
who had "won" four lawsuits on behalf of her neighbors at 105 Starview
Court Oakland in a construction deficit lawsuit. A week later she filed her
CIPA lawsuit. Keegan filed her Complaint for CIPA violations on 9/20/10
but she did not get a judgment until December of 2014. However on
10/22/10 Quarle had a pending Labor Board Case Against Keegan and
therefore Quarle was a creditor of Keegan's on 10/22/io. The DSLE
judgment was served on 10/28/Yo. Appellant sued Quarle in 2010 for tape
recording her without permission. (CTooi8) In discovery she claimed she
first became aware of the tapes at "a recent DSLE hearing on 9/13/10". On
5/13/14 Kegan was a no-show at her duly noticed deposition. On 5/8/14
Keegan filed a 600 page ex-parte motion to continue the trial because of her
stroke claiming she was unable to "write, drive, talk etc." On 10/27/14 she
was awarded $6000.00. On 5/27/14 Judge Bereola denied Keegan's
request to continue the trial because of her "stroke." On 5/24/14 Keegan
filed a false Berkeley Police Report claiming her "caregiver" embezzled
~ /01_~
$27,000 using her ATM card. (See email of 5/29/14 from caregiver
Maricris Patrimonio "Keegan then started to cry and got a blank face.:
(RA )
After a two-day court trial in July of 2014, the trial court (Judge Gail
B. Bereola) entered judgment against Quarle in the amount of $6000.00. A
SOD was issued on 10/27/14. (Respondent's Appendix ) A copy of the
12/2/14 Judgment is attached. It stated "damages are awarded to plaintiff
from defendant in the sum of $6000... that costs if any may be awarded
per code to plaintiff as the prevailing party and may be taxed by defendant
per code."
On 11/10/14 Keegan filed a Motion for a New Trial and Additur when
her attorney was Ineligible to Practice Law. (See In re Paul Raymond
Turley BAR # 17777). That motion was denied with prejudice.
The court granted Quarle's Motion to Tax Costs in RG10537233 The
Register of actions shows the following events relevant to the timeliness of
Ms. Keegan's memo of costs: On 10/27/14 the court issued a Decision After
Non-Jury Trial. On December ii, crucially, Ms. Keegan filed a Notice of
Entry of Judgment dated December 11, to which a copy of the judgment was
attached. On January 9, 2015 finally, Ms. Keegan filed her
Memorandum of Costs For some unknown reason the memo was added to
Alm*-, /"'N
the Register of Actions not in this case but in Case No. RG1158713 Keegan
u. All California Mortgage. The above chronology establishes that Keegan

did not timely file her costs memo in RG10537233
"Rule 3.170o requires a prevailing party to "serve and file a
memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of mailing of the notice
of entry of judgment ...or within 18o days after the entry of judgment which
ever is first." The memo was thus due by not later than Friday January 2
(the 2oth day after December 12, 2014 having been January 1). Keegan's
memo filed on January 9, 2015 was at least 7 days late. (See Appendix and
Order Granting Motion To Tax Costs of 2/19/15 in RG10537233)
In 2015 Keegan filed a Motion for Reconsideration which and the
Court struck again for the second time Keegan's costs memorandum. The
Order on Mot. for Reconsideration of 2/19/15 Order on Mot. To Tax Costs
states: "Rule 3.170o requires a prevailing party to serve and file a MOC
within 15 days after the date of mailing of the Notice of Entry f Judgment.
....The costs memo is stricken .(Dated 4/7/15 signed Judge Gail Bereola).
On 4/23/15 Keegan filed a Notice of Appeal, A 144976, and Motion
for a Settled Statement stating "plaintiff appeals from the calculation of
damages based on the number of violations of Penal code section 637.2 et
sec. "specifically the statement would include the memorandum of costs
edOON
pft*~
filed 1/15/15, the opposition filed on 1/29/15, the reply filed on 2/17/15 and
the Motion for Reconsideration and the Amended Notices filed on 3/2/15
and 3/9/15 and a"condensed version of the hearing on the merits on the
Motion for Reconsideration." Keegan withdrew her Settled Statement and
Quarle retained Allison Ehlert to defend in untimely appeal of the 2014
judgment. On 9/15/15 the Remittitur issued in favor of Respondent
Quarle. See ROA attached. On 12/24/15 Keegan filed a Motion to Set Aside
a Fraudulent Transfer in the 2010 case.
VII. TIMELINE OF CASE RG15796301
On 2/17/16 Judge Spain sustained in part Quarle's Demurrer to
Original Complaint (See CTo013 & CTo02o "after this court sustained a
demurrer to the original complaint."
On November 22, 2016 Quarle filed a Motion For Terminating
Sanctions, Reservation 18-02634 with a hearing date of 1/19/17. It was
based on Keegan's failure to comply with three prior discovery orders of
5/26/16, 8/31/16 and 11/3/16. (See Respondent's Appendix)
Keegan took zero effort to collect her judgment from 10/24/14 to
April of 2016 when she finally served post judgment interrogatories on
Quarle. (See CToi9) Quarle paid the underlying Judgment plus interest in
full on i/26/17. Now in Keegan's AOB she is seeking her attorney fees and
14~. ~"~~
costs in the underlying case, RG10537233 This case goes on and on. In her
latest action, Ms. Keegan never filed any costs memorandum and most
important she never filed a Noticed Motion for Attorney Fees in
RG10537233 or in RG157963o11. However Quarle did filed a Memorandum
of Costs. On 2/17/17 Keegan filed a Motion to Tax Costs and in Gary Lee
Sherrer's Declaration he states under penalty of perjury:
"Further I have caused the issue of attorney fees award to be

researched after receiving defendant's memorandum. The fraudulent
transfer statutes do not provide for attorney fees and, insofar as I can
determine, there is no law which allows for defendant's claim for attorney
fees which is why I intuit is why such attorney fees are listed as deposition
costs" (page 2 Dec. of 2/17/17). He repeats this in his Motion to Tax stating
on page 2: "in the instant action there is no contract providing attorney
fees to the prevailing party. The UFTA statue does not provide for attorney
fees and there is no applicable law which would allow Defendant attorney
fees." (SIGNED GARY LEE SHERRER, ESQ.)
( See Appendix with a copy of Sherrer's 2.17. 17 Declaration is attached to
this RB)
Quarle demurred to the complaint (See CTo02o)arguing the lawsuit
was barred by the four year statute of limitations and Kaner is missing from
her UFTA cause of action. Quarle pled statute of limitations as an
affirmative defense in her demurrer to Complaint. Lower courts in
California have been more careful when addressing section 343909's
different subdivisions. "Cal. Civ. Code Section 3439o9(a) and (b) are
statutes of limitations requiring a plaintiff to file a UFTA acton within four
r"~ eft~
years of the transfer or, for an intentional fraud, within one year after the
transfer was or could have been discovered. "(Rund v. Bank of Am. Corp.
(In re EDP Inv. Co., LLC) (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2015)
VIII. THE UFTA

UFTA permits defrauded creditors to reach property in the hands of a
transferee" (Mejia v Reed (2003) 31 Cal. 4th, 657.) Section 343907
provides the remedies available to a creditor in a UFTA action. A transfer
that would otherwise be voidable as intentionally fraudulent under section
343904, sued. (a)(i), is not voidable against a transferee who took in good
faith and for a reasonably equivalent value. (Civ.Code, 3439.o8, sued. (a)
See Hasso u. Hapke (2014) 227 Cal. App. 4th 1o7.
In claims under the UFTA, plaintiffs often allege the transfer at issue
was made by the debtor to a"sham" entity to hide assets from creditors.
(See e.g. Renda v. Nevarez (2014) 223 Cal.App4th 1234) CCP 337 Y5
prouides for shorter limitations in which the plaintiff must fiIe suit.
In this Appeal, Keegan did not serve the transferee Kaner until
12/24/2016 more than six years after the transfer. (See CTo02o "Keegan
apparently never served Kaner with original complaint or FAC") Also
Keegan did not become a creditor unti112/2/i4. While Keegan did file her
lawsuit less than seven years after the transfer was made, she did so in bad
IIMN
faith for the (See CToo13 "the court is dubious that Keegan's fraudulent
transfer cause of action has any merit") following reasons:
i) Keegan was aware of the transfer in December of 2010;
2) The transfer was disclosed in discovery in the 2010 case on 12/2/10
3) At the 6/9/14 Settlement Conference in Dept. 31, Keegan's limited
scope attorney Carlos Rolando informed Quarle that Keegan knew of the
transfer to "a relative."
4) Keegan's judgment was less than i% of the home's
value" (CTooi4}.
IX. The CIPA Statute of Limitations
Appellant failed to plead specific facts demonstrating an "inability to
have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence and she had a
duty to investigate her potential claims.
Keegan's first cause of action for violations of 631 and 632 of the
Cal. Penal Code are subjection to a one-year statute of limitations (Cal.
Code Civ. Pro. 340(a) Warden v. Kahn 99 Cal. App.3d 805) applying one
year statute of limitations to claims for violation of Penal Code. Keegan
also sued Quarle for negligence but she dismissed with prejudice that claim.
Each of Keegan's causes of action against Quarle is based on Quarle's
activities in 2oo8 and 2009. (CTo02 & Complaint 17 "on August 19, 2009
s~N ,'w*,
Quarle sued Plaintiff for breach of contract). Keegan alleges, however that
she did not have notice of her claims until December of 2014 (CTo02 and
Comp. 8 and 9). The discovery rule did not toll the Limitations from
8/2009 to 12/2014. Also See CTo046, Sherrer's email to the Court stating
"the Court is of the opinion that Keegan should have exhausted remedies in
the underlying case which would have risked waiving the UFTA cla;ms and
potentially bared the same by the statute of limitations."
The UFTA Statute of Limitations:
Under 343909 (a) a cause of action under the UFTA must be
brought within four years "after the transfer was made, or if later within
one year after the transfer could have reasonably been discovered." See
3439-09, subd. (b)
The Statute of Limitations Applicable to Common Law

Claims for Fraudulent Transfers.
Section 338, subdivision (d) of Code Civil Procedure provides for a
three-year statute of limitations applicable to "an action for relief on the
ground of fraud or mistake. In opposing Quarle's MJOP Keegan changed
her "discovery date" from December of 2014 to March of 2015 "after my
appeal was dismissed". In Adams v. Bell (1936) 5 Cal. 2d 697 plaintiff
sought to void the conveyance of real property to Bell' son. At the time of
the conveyance Adams had a pending action against Bell and later obtained
Pft1 /,*IN
a judgment for $4500.00. When Keegan obtained her Judgment, neither
Quarle nor Kaner had any interest in the properry at issue. Kaner sold the
property in August of 2012 for $687,000 (CTooi8) to BPV the Seifis. (See
CT 0014 & CToo19-CTo020). "By not naming the Seifis in the SAC Keegan
has implicitly conceded that she has no basis to dispute they were good
faith purchasers for value" (CTooi4)
Despite the fact that the transferee was a required party to an UFTA
complaint Keegan failed to serve Kaner for six years. While UFTA could
permit a judgment to be entered against the transferee of the fraudulently
transferred assets, it is clear that a debtor is not a necessary party. (See CT
0013 & CTo02o "a judgment for $6000 against Quarle in this case on
Keegan's UFTA action would entail a double recovery."
Keegan during the litigation and in this appeal seeks a duplicative
personal judgment against Quarle because she "is the person for whose
benefit the transfer was made." (3439o8 (b)(i) However Keegan cited
no case holding such a debtor is subject to a money judgment under the
UFTA. UFTA does not authorize entry of a judgment against a debtor. In
granting Quarle's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Judge Spain cited
Renda v Nevarez because the "money judgment Keegan sought under the
UFTA would duplicate the money (See CTo02o) judgment she had already
e"~ e"*
obtained against Quarle on 10/27/14 in the prior action, RG10537233 in
violation of the rule prohibiting double recovery y for the same harm.
Citing Renda, a creditor who attacks a transfer under the UFTA is not
automatically entitled to a money judgment against the person fo~ whose
benefit the transfer was made. On 12/8/16 Judge Spain ruled " Under
Renda, supra, 223 Cal. App. 4th 123 Keegan cannot seek a money judgment
for $6000 under the UFTA against Quarle as she already has a judgment
against Quarle for the $6000 debt at issue and Keegan must seek relief
against a transferee who retains the property or proceeds of the sale and
who is not a bona fide purchaser. (See CT0020) Judge Spain warned Ms.
Keegan loud and clear: "If Keegan amends without having a good faith
basis to believe such an allegation she may be subject to sancttions under
128.5 or 128.7". (See Order of 12/8/16) Citing the Order " the court is
extremely dubious that Keegan's fraudulent-transfer cause of action has
any merit". (CToo13 & CTo020). Also CToo15 "the court will not devote
further resources to overseeing a meritless action." (CTo013, CToo15 and
CT0022). "Keegan is consuming undue judicial resources in pursuit of a
$6000 debt."
X. The Issue of Abuse of Discretion
This AOB contains identical claims and is an almost verbatim
duplicate of Keegan's 2014 pro per AOB in Case MSCIo03266. .Almost
every case cited in Keegan's current AOB was cited in her 2014 earlier brief.
The lack of attention Keegan paid to her brief in this case can best be
illustrated by two things: Keegan includes the assertion in XII "Granting
Relief Further Policy Favoring Trial (sic) on the Merits" (See AOB p.23)
pages 17-19 are copied verbatim from an unrelated Opinion B26337$
However in 2014 she filed a CCP 473 declaration claiming she missed a
1/29/14 hearing because of her stroke claiming she was "unable to walk,
talk, drive and unable to perform most normal tasks rendering her
temporarily and totally disabled." (AOB P. 4 in 2014). The truth is on
1/29/14 she was in the City of Alameda at Craig Rawson's house. Keegan
was driving, walking talking a11 the time.
The applicable standard of review for an evidentiary ruling is well
-established. "An appellate court reviews any ruling by a trial court as to the
admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion" (Dart Industries Inc. u.
Commercial Union Ins. Co. (2002) 28 Cal. 4th 1059. Discretion is abused
only when in its exercise the trial court "exceeds the bounds of reason, all of
the circumstances being considered." There must be a showing of a clear
case of abuse and miscarriage of justice in order to warrant a reversal. In
f*'h /Oft~
appeals challenging discretionary. trial court rulings, it is appellant's
burden to establish an abuse of discretion.
Therefore Judge Spain correctly denied Keegan's request for entry of
a money judgment against Quarle under the UFTA. If Keegan believes the
result is unfair and additional remedies under the UFTA are needed she
should address her concerns to the Legislature not to this court.
XI. APPEAL WAS FILED IN BAD FAITH

Appellant attempts to create a record where none exists by claiming
"lack of notice" and by attaching to her Designation of Record emails
between Gary Sherrer and a non-attorney Craig Rawson
"skLkicksCa~hotmail.com."
, (See CTo045-0046)Most important is the
fact that the only email dated 1.27.17 that stated anything regarding
attorney fees was between Sherrer and Craig Rawson after the hearing.
(See CTo045)
By separate motion to be filed in the DCA Quarle will ask the DCA to
strike the emails as a violation of court rules. Rule 8.204(d) of the Calif.
Rules of Court permits a party filing an appellate brief to file "copies of
exhibits or other materials in the appellate record. There is thus, simply no
part of the record before this court that supports Keegan's claim that she
timely objected to the taking Quarle's money on 1/26/17. Appellant never
filed a CCP 473 motion or a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment. Nothing
~ ?M11A
prevented Gary Sherrer from filing a Costs Memo in the underlying case
between on 1/27 or on 1/30/17. Now it is more than six months after
1/31/17, any cost memo would be untimely under any circumstance. See
Grayl, supra.
Keegan asserts that CCP 637.2 authorizes attorney fees and punitive
damages. On page 9, first paragraph she merely states "the invasion of
privacy statutes provide for attorney fees in civil actions." She failed to even
attach a copy of her 2014 judgment to her AOB. And the reason is clear
why she did not: because she knows there is no statute or order that
awarded her one cent in attorney fees. Also Keegan's current appeal arose
from the Trial Court's dismissal of Keegan's UFTA Complaint. She never
filed any motion under CCP 473 to have the Order of Dismissal Set A.side.
As the Court in Kaufman v. Diskeeper Corp. (2014) 229 Cal. App. 4th
explained attorney fees under CCP 1717 are to be awarded only upon a
noticed motion. Section 10335(a) permits attorney fees under 1717 but
they must be fixed upon either a noticed motion or upon entry of a default
XII. ATTORNEY FEE ISSUE

UFTA DOES NOT AUTHORIZE ATTORNEY FEES
For the first time on appeal plaintiff asserts that the trial court had
implicit authority to award attorney fees under CIPA or under 10335,
68o and 425.16 which provides that a creditor may recover "any other
rO"N 14"~
relief the circumstances may require." The record shows that Judge Spain
did not abuse her discretion in dismissing the case for the following
reasons:
i. She never asked for attorney fees
2. She never explains why her counsel in the exercise of reasonable
diligence did not ask for attorney fees, via a noticed motion in Case
RG10537233 or in RG15796301.
3. Quarle was not rendered insolvent by the transfer. There is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Quarle was insolvent or became
insolvent as a result of the transfer. (See CToo12 "Quarle admits that she
put those proceeds in various bank and brokerage and CDs and that she
still owns a substantial portionapproximately $500,000 of the proceeds")
4. Keegan did not request leave to amend in her AOB. "We will not
consider an issue not mentioned in the briefs and raised for the first time in
an appeal."(Daniels u. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Ca1.App.
4th, 1150.
It is the burden of the party challenging a fee award on appeal to
provide an adequate record to assess error. (Maria P. v.Riles (1987) 43 Cal
3d 1281). She should have augmented the record with a settled statement or
transcript of any "fee" hearing. Here the lack of an adequate record
,^ /00%~
precludes the court from making an examination of Sherrer's claim of
$70,00o in attorney fees. The DCA is precluded from making a
determination that the court abused its discretion in making or not making
a specific award. Error must be affirmatively shown on appeal. In applying
the abuse of discretion standard of review, it is not the role of the appellate
court to substitute its own view as to the proper decision. Sherrer never
filed a Motion for Attorney Fees. Sherrer never claimed any attorney fees.
All he did is once admit his usual rate is $75.00 an hour and that he is
working for Keegan on a contingency basis and that he represents her in
three other cases: Keegan v. Patrimonio Case RG14748492 and Keegan u.
William S Caspari Esq. Case RG16834413
Appellant argues the court erred in dismissing her case and not
awarding her attorney fees in the CIPA action. The record on appeal does
not contain a copy of any "Order or Motion Concerning Attorney Fees" and
there is none. The DCA lacks jurisdiction to review `Keegan's fee issue"
because there is no copy of any "fee order" in the record. Also Keegan would
have had to file a separate appeal of the denial of any "fee order."
A review of the record shows the judgment was entered on 1/31/17.
Quarle filed a Memorandum of Costs. Keegan never filed a Memorandum
of Costs or a Motion for Attorney Fees. The NOA in this matter was
eAMNN /01b~
directed to the judgment. A post judgment order awarding or denying
attorney fees is separately appealable. Any challenge to that award
requires the filing of a separate notice of appeaL. The DCA has no
jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to her "lack of attorney fees argument".
Even if that were not the case, the DCA cannot consider Keegan's
argument. No copy of any order awarding or denying attorney fees is
contained in the record on appeal. The record does not even indicate
whether any such motion or order was ever filed. Keegan failed to provide
an adequate record. Keegan did not include a copy of the "fee order she is
challenging on appeal" A fatal huge flaw.
XIII. FAILURE TO PROVIDE REPORTER'S

TRANSCRIPT IN FEE DENIALAPPEAL
The lack of a reporter's transcript usually dooms an appeal of an
attorney's fee order, especially where evidence may have been challenged or
weighed. The lack of a RT makes it impossible to guage what was argued.
Keegan's failure to Appeal any Post-Judgment fee award renders the issue
moot. In Bermingham u Roland (H041945 6th District July 28, 2oi6) the
appellant appealed only the judgment and not a separate fee award. The
DCA said "no dice" because there was no appeal of the separate fee order.
XIIII. THE OPENING BRIEF IS PLAGIARIZED

Keegan's Opening Brief is rambling, disjointed with irrelevant claims,
most of which were lifted word for word from Keegan's prior pro per
Appellate AOB A141938 (Unpublished Opinion 3.18.15) none of which can
be considered "meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority
and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error in this
lawsuit." (In re S.C. (2oo6) 138 Cal. App. 4th, 396.) This is an appeal run
amok. It lacks merit and is a textbook example of what an AOB should not
be. Appellant's counsel violated rules of court; ignored standards of
review, misrepresents the record, bases arguments on matters not in the
record; fails to support arguments with any meaningful analysis and
citation to authority and Sherrer makes attacks on the trial judge with
unsubstantiated due process claims.
XV. KEEGAN'S APPEAL IS RIDDLED WITH ERRORS AND

INACCURACIES
Indeed the argument "Citation of Error" section contains no citations
to the record at all. And the section purporting to provide a"Summary of
the Significant Facts" (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C). "Procedural
History" (AOB pp. 10-11) provides no citations to the record. The
P"'~. ra'1
"introduction" is five lines, in minimalist fashion that affirmatively
misstates the record. For example, in her Introduction she asks the Court
to see the "Operative Complaint' which is contained in the Clerks'
transcript at pages, (CToo1-CTo012)." All points asserted in this appeal are
unsupported by any "adequate or legal analysis". This is the Original
Complaint that was overruled in part on Demurrer on 2/19/16. (CToo13
"after this court sustained a demurrer to ")
Then on page 9 she asserts "post judgment, Kaner sold the property
to a third party BFP and transferred the money generated from the sale to
his mother." (See CT 0013) This is absolutely false, the property was sold
on 8/31/12, more than two years before Keegan was awarded $6000.00.
Also the Limited POA was also dated 8/31/12. (CTo012 and CToo13)
On pg. 12 of Keegan's "summary of significant facts" she falsely claims
"Plaintiff brought two discovery motions: a motion to deem requested
admissions as deemed admitted for all purposes. Keegan brought one and
only one discovery motion, a Motion To Compel Better Responses to SPIs.

Quarle responded to each and every RFA on May 2, 2016 and Quarle filed
her responses. (See CToo11 "with regarding to the pending motton by
Plaintiff Meaghan Keegan to compel further responses ... and the pending
motions by Quarle" )Sherrer failed to even review the record and he
r"N !09%1
constantly asked Quarle to respond to RFAs that had already been
responded to. Then the appeal states "on 1/26/17 the trial court via email
ordered (sic) Quarle to bring funds sufficient to satisfy the judgment in
the underlying order." "The trial court then ordered, over Appellant's
objection to accept the payment." There is no record of Keegan's counsel
objecting to anything in CTo043. In 1Vlultani v. Witkin & Neal B237295
(2013) 215 Cal. App. 4th 128. Certified for Publication. "Mere suggestions
of error without supporting argument or authority other than general
abstract principles do not presents grounds for appellate review"'.
(Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control u. Alcoholic Beverage Control

Appeals Bd. (2002) ioo Cal. App.4th 1o66, 1078. "Hence conclusory
claims of error will fail. "(S.C. supra, 18 Cal App. 4th at P. 4o8.)
Although Keegan's Notice of Appeal references a discovery order, her
brief contains no legal analysis of Quarle's claims or the court's order
granting Quarle's MJOP. Plaintiff has therefore abandoned any claim of
error regarding the trial court's motion for Judgment on the pleadings. In
2015 the DCA, Ai44976, dismissed Keegan's first appeal of Keegan v.
Quarle for failure to comply with court rules. Her prior appeal was filed
weeks late. Here conclusory claims of error will fail. On information and
/A~ i+"b~
belief Gary Sherrer is not the author of this AOB. The AOB continuously
outright misrepresents the record.
Keegan's conclusory assertion that "the court abused its discretion in
ordering dismissal of the instant action in section IX, pp. 17-2o based on
CCP 581 et. seq. does not apply to this case. Keegan merely cites a list of
cases where discretionary dismissal was authorized. She failed to recognize
that Keegan abused the discovery process in an egregious fashion by failing
to respond to three prior discovery orders of 5/306, 8/31/16 and 11/3/i6.
(See Three Orders attached too this RA.) Quarle had filed a Motion for
Terminating Sanctions and in fact that the "discovery hearing" was
continued twice by the court. (See CToo14 "the partties have filed
numerous motions to compel initial and further responses" On 12/8/16 the
court continued "Keegan's Motion to Compel Further Responses" to
1/19/17 "to be concurrent with the hearing on a pending discovery-related
motion by Quarle in Depth 19" (See attached copy of 12/8/16 Order re
Discovery Continuance) The Ordered stated it was continuing the motion
for three reasons: (i) to enable it to consider the parties respective
allegations of discovery misconduct and (a) in light of its concurrent ruling
granting in part Quarle's MJOP, with leave to amend "given the r.eed for
Keegan to determine based on the directions in that ruling, whether she
1'"N P",
can in good faith continue to pursue this litigation despite the 2012 sale of
the property at issue and (3) to instruct Quarle to file a single code-
complaint opposition to Keegan's motion. On 1/12/17 Keegan filed
"Plaintiff s Opposition to Defendant's Mot for Order Deeming Requested
Admissions As Admitted" on calendar for 1/19/17. On 1/19/17 the Court
continued the hearing to 1/26/17. On January 17, 2017 Keegan's counsel
filed a"Declaration of Gary Sherrer In Opposition Defendant's Moicion For
Terminating Sanctions." (See Respondent's Appendix and Sherrer's Opp.)

Therefore Keegan's egregious actions provided the court authority to
dismiss her case. Keegan abused the discovery process three times. She lied
about what she knew when. On page 19 Keegan states incorrectly "the trial
court's sua sponte dismissal was not preceded nor accompanied by a
motion or an order to show cause." That is incorrect Keegan filed a
Opposition to a Motion for Terminating Sanctions and an Opposition to an
OSC. Plaintiff repeatedly cites 581, 10335, 68o and 425.16 but these
Codes of Civil Procedure are inapplicable to this case.
Keegan's discussion of 187 consists of little more than a"definition
of the CCP." She states on page 15 " the trial court acted in excess of its
jurisdiction in ordering Defendant to pay and Appellant to accept the
judgment during a hearing on discovery motions without such advance
notice of such an issue to be addressed." (pg.15). See (CTo015 re CCP 187)
Then on page 16 she repeats for the 6th time "CCPs 10335, 68o and
425 15" and states "absent the trial court's order that defendant pay the
underlying judgment plaintiff had ample opportunity to obtain
reimbursement of her cots and fees expended in this action added onto the
judgment in the underlying matter." She never explains why she was
prevented from doing so. To claim that "payment of the judgment" was not
"properly before the trial court" misstates the record. Although she cites
various holdings pertaining to different aspects of CCP 581, she fails to
explain how those holdings relate to Keegan's claims of error.
The 1/26/17 Order alluded to the trial court's order granting Quarle's
MJOP. (See CT 0013) This AOB fails to present any legal analysis of any of
the claims dismissed in that order. Plaintiff has therefore abandoned any
claim of error regarding the trial court's order granting defendant's motion
for judgment on the pleadings. (Reyes v. Kosha (1998 65 Ca1.App. 4th
451)-
APPELLANT MISSTATES THE FACTUAL RECORD

The Proper Standard for Review of Dismissal of Appellant's
Second Amended Complaint is Abuse of Discretion
r
110~ 0"WN
A 150642 Keegan v. Quarie 40
In her Opening brief in "Citation of Error and Statement of the Case
Section III, Keegan makes numerous unsupported statements.
Keegan's Appeal in Section IX of her AOB, pages 17-2o discusses CCP
581, 583-36o and 58340 The problems is that these three pages are
copied uerbattim from a recent Published Opinion in Guzman v. Euans
Auto, Appeal B263378

In Lohan u. Perez, the court sanctioned an attorney for plagiarizing
the majority of her brief from articles "without any acknowledgement of
identification of these sources. This type of conduct is unacceptable and
sanctionable. The only pages that refer to CCP 581 et. seq. are pages 17-20
and these three pages are copied verbatim from a recent published Opinion.
This turns what in the court's view should have been a fact-specific issue
into boilerplate. (See U.S. u. Bowen, 194 Fed. Appx. 393, 402 (6th Cir.
2oo6) (disapproving of the "outright plagiarism" of a recent judicial
opinion without citing the opinion)
The trial court did not enter any appealable orders on 1/26/17. The
only relevant events that occurred on that date were three discovery
motions and a court order staying the case. The minute order did state that
the case would be dismissed with prejudice. Pursuant to 581d all
dismissals must be in the form of a written order signed by the court
making minute orders ineffectual and non appealable. (Palazzi v. Air
Cargo Terminals Inc. (1966 244 Cal. App. 2d 19o. On 1/31/17 the Court did
not hold a CCMC. The Court did what it clearly advised Keegan's attorney
it would do: "after the Acknowledgement of Satisfaction of Judgment is
Filed and Served the Court will dismiss Keegan's latest action with
prejudice"
XVI. THE RECORD CONTAIN SUBSTANTIAL

EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S
DISMISSAL OF KEEGAN'S UF'I'A COMPLAINT
When an Appellant challenges the Trial Court's findings in the Order,
it is the Appellant's job to identify and establish the deficiencies in the
evidence and the DCA does not have to independently search the record.
Rather, it must presume that the record contains evidence to support the
findings of the Trial Court. Huong Que, Inc. u. Luu, (2007) 150 Cal. App.
4th 400, 409. This is because of the substantial evidence standard that all
presumptions are in favor of the Trial Court's action unless and until the
Appellant shows reversible error in the record.
In her brief, Appellant does not identify which finding in the Judge
Spain's Order of 1.26.17 she is challenging as unsupported by the evidence.
X'"'` r"'*-\
Further, and more importantly Keegan does not establish any evidence in
the record that contradicts or impugns the findings set out in the Order.
In her AOB she claims "The trial court over Appellant's
"objection" (sic) scheduled a CMC and made an order dismiss:ng the
instant and viable lawsuit". She does not state why it is viable. She
only claims she was deprived of "punitive damages as wells as attorney fees
and costs of collection in the underlying case under CCP 10335, 68o et
seq. and 425.16 over $70,000" (See AOB pg.11)
Quarle argued that Keegan's new attorney Sherrer was only a puppet
on plaintiff s string and that Keegan herself did the actual pleadings. The
UFTA action was filed in bad faith. She filed and maintained a frivolous
action in bad faith.
CCP 685.070(a) states that lawyer's fees are permitted if they are
allowed by both CCPs 685.04o and 10335 The most relevant part of CCP
10335 states that such fees may be authorized by either contract or statute.
Two cases that focus on lawyer fees is Lucky United Properties Inu. Inc. u.
Lee (2010) 185 CaI.APP.4th 125 and Jaffe u. Pacelli, 165 Ca1.App4th 927
(2oo8)
Keegan v. Quarle has been "litigated to the extreme" taking many

hours of the judge's and court staffs time to resolve the matter. (See
111~ i"%~
cTooi5 "the court will not devote further resources to overseeing a

meritless action involving voluminous motion practice that Keegan is
pursing instead of good faith collection efforts."
WILLFLTL IGNORANCE OF STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Klevland v. Siegel & Wolensky, LLP (2013) 215 Ca1.App.4th 534,
557-558, the appellate court noted that almost invariably, when complete
lack of inerit is present, so is evidence of improper motive. And in
Rouzbahan u. Fregoso (2014) Cal App. Unpub. 3351, the DCA observed
that the one way to demonstrate frivolity is to combine willful ignorance of
the standard of reviewsuch as ignoring the evidence supporting the

verdict, when arguing insufficient evidence--with defiant behavior such as
making demonstrably false assertions about the evidence in the appellate
brief.
First in this Appeal Keegan's attorney violates Rules of Court by
repeatedly and blatantly failing to provide record citations to the "factual"
statements in her AOB. Second Quarle contends this appeal was frivolous
and taken solely for the purpose of delay and to prevent Defendant Quarle
and William S. Caspari from filing a Motion to Declare Ms. Keegan a
Vexatious Litigant.
XVII. SANCTIONS
/19MII'`
There are two bases for imposing sanctions against appellant and her
counsel in this case. First this appeal is frivolous and, second Keegan and
her counsel are guilty of an unreasonable violation of the rules governing
appeals. 9o% of Keegan's AOB is copied uerbatim from her 2014 pro
per AOB.
Quarle asks this court to impose sanctions on Keegan for filing a
frivolous appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 26(a)(2) ["if the appeal is
frivolous or taken solely for the purpose of delay..the reviewing court
impose upon offending attorneys or parties such penalties, including the
imposing of costs, as the circumstances of the case and the discouragement
of like conduct in the future may require"[ Code Civ. Proc., 907 ["when it
appears to the reviewing court that the appeal was frivolous or taken solely
for delay, it may add to the costs on appeal such damages as may be just"].)
An appeal is frivolous and warrants the imposition of sanctions "when
it is prosecuted for an improper motiveto harass the respondent or delay
the effect of an adverse judgmentor here any reasonable attorney would
agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit." (In re
Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Ca1.3d 637 650; see also Pierotti u. Torrian
(20oo) 81 Cal. App. 4th 37, 3i.)
~ /AMN
Not one of the arguments advanced by Keegan in this case has
substantive merit. Indeed, her argument is so weak it compels the
conclusion that this appeal was filed solely for the purposes of delay.
Indeed Keegan seeks to "have a trial on the merits" in the underlying case.
She forgets that there was a two-day bench trial on 7/23 and 7/24/14.
The 1/26/17 Order is supported by sound legal authority. In contrast
the arguments advanced by Keegan to attack the order have no merits at all.
When deciding the amount of sanctions to impose, courts may
consider " the amount of respondent's attorney fees on appeal; the amount
of the judgment against appellant; the degree of frivolousness and delay
and the need for discouragement of like conduct in the future.
Both Keegan and Sherrer should pay sanctions. There is ample
evidence of bad faith. While Keegan's motive is clear (to prevent William
Sydney Caspari from filing a Motion to Declare Her a Vexatious Litigant in
Case RG16834413 Sherrer has a"professional responsibility not to pursue
an appeal that is frivolous.. just because the client instructs him to do
so." (Young u. Rosenthal (1982) 212 Cal. App. 3d 96.)
XVIiI. CONCLUSION
Keegan never filed a Motion For Relief Under CCP 473. There was
no "sua sponte" order. Keegan's clear misrepresentations are sanctionable.
In this AOB, there is nothing to support any "sua sponte" order beyond her

/0811 E'"~
own statements. The Trial Court was justified in dismissing a meritless
complaint filed only to harass Quarle and her family. While it is the general
rule that there is a preference for trial on the merits of a case, it is not
without exception. A plaintiff is required to pursue its case diligently and in
the face of a dismissal produce some showing for a excusable delay.
Appellant failed to that and failed to explain why she waited six years to
serve Daniel Kaner. Keegan's last MOC was filed on January 9, 2015.
This Court should dismiss Appellant's appeal because she Keegan has
failed to show that the Trial Court abused its discretion in (1) dismissing
Keegan's Second Amended Complaint, and or (2) staying the case per 187.
Keegan has failed to provide any facts or law that show the Trial Court
abused its discretion on 1/26/17 and (3) Keegan has forfeited any challenge
to the January 26, 2017 order because her Briefing challenges other issues
raised for the first time on appeal. Finally (4) Keegan never filed a Motion
for Costs or for attorney fees.
Quarle therefore requests that this Court deny the appeal. O n c e
Quarle paid the judgment in full plus interest the case is moot. K e e g a n' s
counsel does not provide an accurate statutory claim in support of the idea
that the judgment is appealable (Code Civ. Proc. 904.1) There was ample
warning that the case would be dismissed. She disobeyed three prior

1-00~~ 1.0%,
A 150642 Keegan v. Quart. 47
discovery orders. A reasonable investigation would have shown that the
property was sold in August of 2012. It appears that Keegan and her
attorney(s) were too eager to take their shot at collecting attorney's fees
when a minimal investigation would have shown the truth. There was no
evidence of aiding and abetting. Quarle asks the reviewing court to award
her reasonable request of $7500 in sanctions.
There was a motion for terminating sanctions on calendar. The AOB
does not satisfy counsel's duty to provide adequate legal authority to
support this appeal. The judgment must be affirmed and Appellant ordered
to pay Respondent's costs and fees. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).
Quarle also requests on appeal.
Respectfiilly submitted,
Date: August 20, 2017

Respectfully submitted
~ C~c c~ ~ V ~ By: NAR.C2Vl Q,I.[ARUE /S/
Att ney for Marcia Quarle

A 150642 Keegan v. Quarle .;
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COiJNT
Per Cal Rules of Court 8.204(c)(1)
This Respondent Brief contains 10937 words
THIS BRIEF CONSISTS OF 47 PAGES
c;Lc ~ a.. ~ ~~~

By: CL4 QUARLE
AUGUST 20, 2017

I
0, ?Oft\
RESPONDENT'S APPENDIX3e
Table 1 _
RA 001
CONTRA COSTA CASES FILED

BY MEAGHAN KEEGAN IN PRO
PER REGARDING REAL
PROPERTY
09-09-2009 TRO Petition Denied Judge Dawn RA001

B. Girard Case BG0946991
09-09-2009 Register of Actions BG0946991 RA003
Keegan v. Quarle, Case i
08-31-2009 Labor Board Complaint RA007 ;
10-28-2009 Request For Admissions RA008

09-13-2010 Notice of Labor Board Hearing RA009
09-20-2010 Complaint Filed in Pro Per RA010
10-22-2010 Grant Deed From Quarle to Kaner RA018
Recorded .... ... _
11-01-2010 Keegan's Opp To Demurrer "she RA025

learned for the first time at DSLE
hearing of 9.13.10
10-28-2010 SOD Case 07-67898 Labor Board RA
Quarle
_
v. Keegan
_
12-22-2010 RF10550584 POS Keegan's Resp RA030

11001\\

08-31-2012 Grant Deed from Kaner to Seifis RA032

with NDOT $500,000 (excerpt)
08-31-2012 IRS Form 1099S $751,000 RA044
08-31-2012 Settlement Statement $687,287.47
. .
RA039
07-14-2013 Reply Brief Re Accord and RA046
Satisfaction
06-23-2013 Order Denying Keegan's MSJ RA055
07-05-2013 Dismissal With Prejudice of COAs RA045
3, 4, 5 6 and 8
05-27-2014 Order Denying Keegan's Motion To RA063
Continue Trial Due to Her Stroke
05-29-2014 Email of 5/29/14 from Maricris RA062
Patrimonio, Keegan's caregiver
"because she started to cry. And
after that she got a blank face."
07-24-2014 Trial Exhibit Email of 7.6.09 with
full header from Quarle to Keegan
07-23-2014 Pltf. Exh. 2 email of 11 /08/09 RA072
7-23-2014 Full Header of 9/28/09 email which RA073
is identical to email of 11 /08/09
12-02-2014 Statement of Decision RA074
RG10537233 (11 pages)
12-18-2014 Order Denying Keegan's Motion RA086
For a New Trial / Additur
02-19-2015 Order Granting Quarle' Motion To RA087
Tax Costs

1
03-10-2015 Order Denying Motion to Seal RA099

Checks
04-07-2015 Order After Hearing on Keegan's RA091
Motion For Reconsideration of the
2/19/15 Order on Quarle's Mot To
Tax Costs Certified
_
04-07-2015 "Stricken First Page of Keegan's

MOC Filed 1.9.15 signed by
Sunnie Richordsen on behalf of
Paul Raymond Turley # 17777
05-20-2015 Motion For Settled Statement
A144976 Keegan v. Quarle Appeal
09-15-2015 Remittitur / Respondent to RA102
Recover Costs
12-24-2015 Declaration of Sunnie Richordson RA103
` 12-24-2015 Sworn Declaration of Meaghan RA106
Keegan under penalty of perjury
02-10-2016 Order Motion for UFTA in RA112
RG 10573233 Case
for Sanction
02-17-2016 Order Sustaining Demurrer in Part RA114
04-14-2016 Order Overruling Demurrer to FAC RA117
05-26-2016 Order Granting Quarle's Discovery RA122
05-02-2016 Quarle's Responses to RFAs
_ _ _ _ _
RA118
08-31-2016 Order Re Discovery RA123

10~ 14~
APPENDIX VOLUME II
08-31-2016 Order Re Discovery RA123
08-31-2016 Order Re Quarle's Mot To Compel RA127
09-08-2017 Order Denying Renewed Mot For RA129
Vexatious Litigant Determination
and copy of Prior Order
For Sanctions
12-08-2016 Order Continuing Discovery RF138
Motions to January 19, 2017
12-30-2016 Letter re 11.08.09 email :"the RF140
underlying matter are irrelevant to
the current controversy"
01-04-2017 Second Amended Complaint (8 RA143
pages
12-26-2017 Proof of Service of Unsigned FAC RA151
01-11-2017 Opp to Defendant's Ex-Parte
Affidavit for OSC Re Contempt
01-12-2017 Keegan's Opp to Mot to Deem RA154
RFAs Admitted
01-17-2017 Emails From Attorney William RA155
Henley to Gary Lee Sherrer re
frivolous UFTA Complaint
01-17-2017 Opp Mot Terminating Sanctions RA161
01-19-2017 Order Continuing Hearing to RA170
.. 1.26.17
_

e o"o, ?-`\ ?", ?011N
01-26-2017 Craig Ted Rawson PPSLLC and RA171

Keegan's emails
01-26-2017 Page One of Minute Order "Court RA179
Will Dismiss with Prej. Case
RG 15796301" and copies of
checks $6000 + $1200 + cash
; 01-30-2017 Acknowledgment of Sat. of RA182
Jugment
01-31-2017 Dismissal With Prejudice of RA184
Lawsuit
02-09-2017 Keegan v. Caspari (identical RFAs) RA184
Case RG 16834413
02-17-2017 Keegan's Motion To Tax Quarle's RA188
Costs
EXHIBIT COPY OF CONTRACT OF 1.1.09 RA198
03-01-2017 Letter From State Bar Re Gary L. RA201
Sherrer Case 17-0-01152

ENUORSJED
FILE[l
1 Gary Sherrer (SBN 113047) ALAMFpA COUNTY
875-A Island, Drive, 403
2 AIameda, CA. 94502 Nav 2 8 2016
Tele: (510) 421-2838 CLERK OF TNF. SUpFRIpR COURT
3 By STEFANJF JONROWF
Attorney for Plaintiff, Deputy
4 MEAGHAN KEEGAN,
8
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
9 COUNTY OF ALAMEDA - NORTHERN DIVISION
10 I Unlimited Civil Jurisdiction
MEAGHAN KEEGAN, CASE NO. RG15-796301
Plaintiff, ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO

JUDGE Gail Brewster Bereola
13 1 vs. DEPARTMENT 19
14 MARCIA QUARLE, et. al. PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO
DEFENDANT' S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
15 Defendants. ON THE PLEADTNGS Procedural grounds -
Carlton Quint, 77 Ca1.App.4th 690]
16
Date: December 7, 2016
17 Time: 2:00 p.m.
Dept: 19
18 / Reservation No. 1796678
19
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT'S
20
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
21
I.
22 FACTS
23
l. Defendant's memorandum is 18 pages exceeding the permissible page limit; it fails to
24
contain a table of authorities; it fails to include an opening summary; Defendant failed to seek leave
25
of Court and obtain permission to file an oversized brief. As such, Plaintiff objects to consideration
26
27 Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. RG16-796301

Plaintiff s Opposition to Defendant's
28 Motion to Cornpel 1
1 Gary Sherrer (SBN 113047)
875-A Island, Drive, 403
2 Alameda, CA. 94502
Tele: (510) 421-2838
3
Attorney for Plaintiff,
4 MEAGHAN KEEGAN
5 '! 1Z
6
7
8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10 Limited Civil Jurisdiction

MEAGHAN ICEEGAN, CASE NO. RG15-796301
11
Plaintiff, ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO
12 JUDGE Julia Spain
vs. DEPARTMENT 19
13
MARCIA QUARLE, DANIEL KANER, PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO
14 and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
ON THE PLEADINGS
15 Defendants.
16 Date: 12/07/16
Time: 2:00 p.m.
17 Dept: 19
Reservation No. R-1796678
18 rA
19 PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OFPOINTS & AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO
20 DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
21 I.
22 PLAINTIFF'S INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
23 If the Court considers Defendant's motion on the merits over Plaintiffs objections, Plaintiff
24 submits the following opposition as to the merits of Defendant's motion.

25 As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff submits that a parry appearing in propria persona "is to be
26 treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration tlzan other
27
Case No. RG16-796301; Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant's
28 motion for judgtnent on the pleadings. 1
~
too, /W11(01^k 'N
.
1 litigants and attorneys." (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th
2 1200, 1210.) "'[T]he in propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as
3 an attorney.' "(Bianco v. California Highwa, P~ol (1994) 24 Ca1.App.4th 1113, 1125-1126.)
4 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
5 II.
.1 FACTS
7 Insofar as Plaintiff can decipher from Defendant's brief, she moves this Court for judgment
8 on the pleadings on the following grounds:

1. "[P]laintiffhas not pled fraud with particularity;" 2. "[P]laintiffs claims for constructive
9
fraudulent transfer under the UFTA are legally insufficient;" 3. "Plaintiff failed "to join an
10
indispensable party, (page 7, lines 16 - page 8, linel4);" 4. Non-dismissal wiil result in a double
11
recovery, (paraphrased); and 5. "[P]laintifPs claims are time-barred." .
12
III.
13
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS STANDARDS
14
"'The motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the function of a general demurrer.' ...
15
The standazd of appellate review of a judgment on the pleadings is, therefore, identical to that on a
16
judgment following the sustaining of a demurrer. (Baillargeon v. Department of Water & Power
17
[(1977)] 69 Ca1.App.3d [670,] 675.)" (Barker v. Hull (1987) 191 Ca1.App.3d 221, 224.)
18
"' In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, [or a motion for
19
judgment on the pleadings] [the appellate Court is] guided by long-settled rules. It "treat[s] the
20
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or
21
conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] [It] also consider[s] matters which may be judicially noticed."
22
[Citation.] Further, [it] give[s] the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its
23' parts in their context. [Citation.] When a demurrer is sustained, [it] determine[s] whether the
24 complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.]"' (Blumhorst v. Jewish
25 Family Services of Los Angeles (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 993, 999.)
26 "[A]ny particular count which is well pleaded will not be affected by defects in a separate
27
28 motion for judgment on the pleadings. 2 -
cause of action, so long as inconsistent or antagonistic facts are not pled. [Citation.] The complaint
211 must be liberally construed and survives a general demurrer insofar as it states; however inartfiilly,
3 facts disclosing some right to relief." (Longshore v. Countv of Venture (1979) 25 Cal.3d 14, 21-22.)
4 An appellate court independently reviews the trial court's ruling on a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, because the trial court's "determination involves a purely legal question or a
6 predominantly legal mixed question." (Smiley v. Citibank (1995) 11 Ca1.4th 138, 146.) The trial
7 court may grant a defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, or may grant judgment on the
8 pleadings in favor of a defendant on its own motion, if "[t]he complaint does not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action against that defendant." (Code Civ. Proc., 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii),
9
(3)(B)(ii).) In considering the motion, the court deems all properly pleaded facts to be true; it may
10
also consider matters which may be judicially noticed, including court records, (Mack v. State Bar
11
(2001) 92 Ca1.App.4th 957, 961; Evid. Code, 452, subd. (d).)
12
IV.
13
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS THAT PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ALLEGED FRAUD
14
WITH PARTICULARITY IS NOT A BASIS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
15
While it is settled law that to plead a fra.ud claim, the plaintiff must allege with particularity
16
facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were
17
tendered, (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.), no such requirement applies to a
18
cause of action for fraudulent transfer and Defendant has not supported this argument with proper
19
authority.
20
Further, Defendant's assertion that Plaintiffs claim lacks particularity, if true and if required,
21
the complaint could easily be amended to include particularity.
22
If a motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted without leave to amend, the appellate
23
court must determine whether the complaint states a cause of action and, if not, whether the defect
24 can reasonably be cured by amendment. (Mack, supra, 92 Ca1.App.4th at p. 961.) "[I]t is an abuse of
25 discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend '"if there is any
26 reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action."' [Citations.]" Mudley v.
27
Case No. RG16-796301; Plaintiif's opposition to Defendant's
28 motion for judgment on the plead'uigs. 3
~
r,
M1
Department of Transportation (2001) 90 Ca1.App.4th 255, 260 (Dudley).) If there is such a

2 reasonable possibility and the opporhuiity to amend has been denied, the judgment must be reversed.
3 (Mack, supra, at p. 961.) Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the defect can be cured by
4 amendment. (Ibid.) Such a showing need not be made in the trial court, but may be made to the
5 reviewing court. (Dudley, supra, at p. 260.)
6 Thus, Defendant's motion seeking judgment on the pleadings for lack of particularity is
7 misplaced and firivolous, and as such, should be denied.
8
V.
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE LEGALLY
9
INSUFFICIENT IS NOT A BASIS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
10
Defendant argues that "plaintiff s claims for constructive ffraudulent transfer under the UFTA
11
are legally insufficient" but fails to state how and fails to cite any authority for her position as to
12
precisely how.
13
Under the UFTA, the constructive fraud element can be satisfied if any one of the following
14
circumstances exist: The debtor had unreasonably small remaining assets in relation to the
15
transaction, (at the time she transferred the subject real property to her son, it was her largest asset
16
and pre-transfer, was available for purposes of filing a lien to protect PlaintifPs interests); The debtor
17
intended to incur (or believed or reasonably should have believed it would incur) debts beyond its
18
ability to pay; or the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent due to the transfer or
19
obligation,(Defendant became temporarily insolvent at the time she transferred her asset to her son as
20
reflected in her fee waiver on file herein). ( 3439.04, subd. (a), 3439.05, 3439.08, subd. (a); e'ia
21
v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal.4th 657, 663 at pp. 664, 669-670; Annod CoLp. v. Hamilton & Samuels
22 (2002) 100 Ca1.App.4th 1286, 1294-1295; 16A Ca1.Jur.3d (2011) Creditors' Ritrhts and Remedies.
23 326, pp. 424-425, 402, pp. 495496.)
24 The fraudulent transfer provisions apply to creditors whose claims arose either before or after
25 the transfer or obligation ( 3439.04, subd. (a)), except for the provision concerning constructive
26 fraud based on the debtor's insolvency which applies only to creditors whose clainms arose before the
27
Case No. RG16-796301; Plaintiffs opposition to Defendant's
28 motion for judgment on the pleadings. 4
transfer or obligation ( 3439.05). [Emphasis added.]
2 Here, not only did Plaintiff sufficiently allege the elements of construct.ive fraudulent
3 transfer, but also, Defendant in her brief at page 10, lines 11 - 14, admits that "On 10/22/10 Quazle
4 quitclaimed [sic] to her adopted son Daniel Kaner her interest in their family residence at 105
5 Starview Court. Quarle received no consideration for the quitcliam [sic] and Kaner became the
6 record owner of the property." Her admission satisfies certain elements of the ca.use of action.
7 Further, Defendant's assertion that Plaintiffls claim is "legally insufficient," if true the
8 complaint could easily be amended to include any missing element.

If a motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted without leave to amend, the appellate
9
court must determine whether the complaint states a cause of action and, if not, whether the defect
10
can reasonably be cured by amendment. (Mack v. State Bar of California (2001) 92 Ca1.App.4th 957,
11
961at p. 961.) "[1]t is an abuse of discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings without
12
leave to amend '"if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good ca.use of
13
action."' [Citations.]" (Dudlev v. Department of Transportation (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 255, 260.) If
14
there is such a reasonable possibility and the opportunity to amend has been denied, the judgment
15
must be reversed. (Mack, supra, at p. 961.) Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the defect can
16
be cured by amendment. (Ibid.) Such a showing need not be made in the trial court, but may be made
17
to the reviewing court. (Dudley, supra, at p. 260.)
18
Thus, Defendant's motion seeking judgment on the pleadings on the basis that the claim is
19
legally insufficient is misplaced and frivolous, and as such, should be denied.
20
VI.
21
DEFENDANT'S ARGIIMENT THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED
22 TO JOIN .AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IS MISPLACED
23 Defendant argues that Plaintiff filed to join the Seifis as indispensable parties under Federal
24 Rules of Procedure, Rule 19(a). She cites one California authority, Diamond Heights Vill. Ass'n Inc.
25 v. Fin. Freedom Senior Funding Corp. (2011) 196 Ca1.App.4th 290.
26 It is clear that Daniel Kaner, as a transferee receiving no consideration for the transfer is an
27
Case No. RG16-796301; PlaintiTs opposition to Defendant's
~
indispensable party who is included in Plaintiff's suit.

2 As to the Seifis. from reading Plaintiffs complaint and Defendant's adrnission contained in
3 her moving papers, it is clear that she transferred her most valuable asset, her house on Starview
4 Court, to her son without consideration leaving her temporarily insolvent, (see Defendant's
5 application for fee waiver). Her son sold the property to the Seifis and then transferred the money to
6 Defendant who then moved the lion's share of the money to accounts on the east coast as admitted
7
by Defendant in her discovery responses. Thus, it is plain that her transfer to her son constitutes a
8
fraudulent transfer and it is plain that by his transfer to the Seifis, he was able to liquidate the asset
and get the money to Defendant placing the funds generated by the sale out of Plaintiffls reach; a
9
fraudulent transfer.
10
Under current California law, the Seifis are not indispensable parties as Defendant argues.
11
Where the plaintiff seeks some type of affirmative relief which, if granted, would injure or affect the
12
interest of a third person not joined, that person is an indispensable party." (Sierra Club. Inc. v.
13
California Coastal Coamm'n. (1979) 95 Ca1.App.3d 495, 500.) Where the party is indispensable
14
because the court is adjudicating that party's rights, the court is without jurisdiction to do so in the
15
absence of the party. E.g., Beyerbach v. Juno Oil Co., 42 Ca1.2d 11, 27-28, appeal dismissed,347
16
U.S. 985, 74 S.Ct. 853, 98 L.Ed. 1120 (1954) (court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate rights of
17
absent corporate defendant and action must be dismissed as to all other defendants); Sanders v.
18
Fuller. 45 Cal.App.3d 994, 995 (1975) ('It is the essence of the indispensable party concept that the
19
court is without jurisdiction to proceed until the indispensable party is brought into the action.')
20
(citations omitted.) While the foregoing may have been a correct statement of the law 30 years ago, it
21
is no longer accurate.
22
Prior to the 1971 revision to Code of Civil Procedure section 389, an "indispensable party"
23 was one who had to be joined in order that the court might proceed with the case. Such a person's
24 interest in the subject matter was such that final judgment could not be rendered without him. The
25 objection was not merely one of lack of jurisdiction of the absent party; the court could not even
26 proceed to adjudica.te the rights of the parties before it because personal jurisdiction over an
27
Case No. RG16-796301; Plainti#fs opposition to Defendant's
28 motion for j udgment on the pleadings. 6
~
indispensable party was necessary for jurisdiction of the subject matter. (See Bank of California Nat'1
2 Ass'n v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal.2d 516, 522.) Thus, in an action to set aside a fraudulent
3 conveyance, all persons claiming a present interest in the property had to be joined in order for the
4 court to acquire subject matter jurisdiction of the matter. (See Heffernan v. Bennett & Arnmour
5 (1952) 110 Ca1.App.2d 564, 586.)
6 In 1971, the Legislature amended section 389 to conform to the Federal Rules of Civil
7 Procedure. Rule
19 of the Federal Rules, concerning compulsory joinder, describes "persons to be
8
joined if feasible." Thus, revised section 389, effective July 1, 1972, limits compulsory joinder to
situations in which the absence of a person (a) would prevent complete relief among the existing
9
parties, or (b) might result in substantial prejudice to the absent person or to the parties before the
10
court. (Cal. Law Rev. Com. 1970 Report, p. 501 et seq.)
11
As a consequence of these revisions, "'a person is regarded as indispensable only in the
12
conclusory sense that, in his absence, the court has decided the action should be dismissed."' (4
13
Witkin, California Procedure (4th ed. 1997), Pleading 165, p. 223.) Where, the decision is to
14
proceed, "'the court has the power to make a legally binding adjudication between the parties
15
properly before it."' (Ibid.) Thus, failure to join an "indispensable parry" is not a"jurisdictional
16
defect" as Defendant contends.
17
Rather, although the court has no jurisdiction over the absent parties, and its judgment cannot
18
bind them, the court does have jurisdiction over the parties before it and has the power to enter a
19I
judgment affecting their interest. "It is for discretionary and equitable reasons, not for any want of
20~
jurisdiction, that the court may decline to proceed without the absent party." (Kraus v. Willow Park
21
Public Golf Course (1977) 73 Ca1.App.3d 354, 368.) This view has been endorsed by subsequent
22
appellate courts;
23 "We concur with the conclusion of the Kraus court that section 389 does not now provide,
and never has provided, that the absence of an indispensable party deprives a court of sub,lect matter
24 jurisdiction. Rather, the decision whether to proceed with that action in the absence of a particular
parry is one within the court's discretion, as ~governed by the various factors enumerated in
25 subdivision (b) of section 389, Code of Civil Procedure." (Sierra Club Inc. v. California Coastal
Commission, supra, 95 Ca1.App.3d at p. 500; see also Peo le ex rel Lun en v. Communi
26 Redevelo ment A enc (1997) 56 Ca1.App.4th 868, 876; Ursino v. Sugerior Court (1974) 39
Ca1.Ann. d 611. 616: Bank of Orient v. Sunerior Court (1977)67 Ca1.Ann.3d 588. 595.)
27
Case No. RG16-796301; Plaintiffls opposition to Defendant's
i-
1 In short, defendant is simply wrong when she states that Plaintiffs complaint is defective for
2 failure to join the Seifis as indispensable parties. The absence of the record owners of the property
3 does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to proceed and eventually enter judgment against Defendant
4 and her Co-Defendant son.
5 This writer could fnd no current California authority mandating suit against innocent BFPs,
91 (the Seifis as secondary transferees for full valuable consideration). Thus, in the Court's discretion,
7l the Seifis although unaware of the fraudulent transfer are required parties, the complaint can be
8
easily amended to add them for which Plaintiff seeks leave to amendm if the Court requires the
same. Otherwise, the Court has jurisdiction to adjudge the issues before the existing parties. The
9
trial court has the discretion to proceed without an indispensable party (K.raus v. Willow Park Public
10
Golf Course (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 354, 365).
11
VII.
12
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFF'S
13
ACTION WILL RESULT IN A DOUBLE RECOVERY IS MISPLACED
14
Defendant argues without citing any authority that if Plaintiff s success in this action will
15
lead to a double recovery. Plaintiff could not find a single California case concurring with
16
Defendant's position.
17
Defendant's argument is unsupported by authority, inane, frivolous and without merit.
18
VIII.
19
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFF'S ACTION IS TIME BARRED IS
20 '
MISPLACED IN HER MOTION FOR J[JDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
21
Defendant admits and official documents confirm that the transfer occurred in August of
22~
2012. Plaintiff obtained judgment against Defendant on Decernber 2, 2014; two years and four
23
rnonths after the tra.nsfer. Plaintif became aware of the transfer once her appeal was dismissed in
24 March of
2015 and filed suit on December 10, 2015; within four years of the transfer and within one
25 year of the discovery
of the transfer.
26 First, Defendant's argument goes far afield of the face of the complaint, (pleading) by relying
27
~.
r 1__,
~
1 limitations under the UFTA law, Plaintiff s claims are clearly within the
statutory period. As an ~
2 affirmative defense, it is Defendant's burden to prove that the statute of i
iimitations has lapsed. F
~
3 A iiberal interpretation of Cal. Civ. Code 3439.09(a) is consistent with
California case law ~
4 before the enactment of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, which applie
d the generic fraud
'
51 discov ery rule contained in Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 338(4) -- now 338(d) -- to pre-A f
ct fraudulent ~
,:i transfer actions. See Adams v. Be11.5 Ca1.2d 697, 703; 56 P.2d 208 (1936) (citing Cal. Code Civ.
I'
7 Proc. 338(4) and stating " if the creditor knows nothing about the fraudulent conveyance, the causc i
i
(in the absence of laches) does not arise until he discovers the fraud by f
8 which his rights have been i
invaded." )(emphasis added)_ The one-year period under Cal. Civ. Code ~
9 3439.09(a)'s discovery ~
rule does not commence until the plaintiff has reason to discover the fraudu
10 lent nature of the transfer, ~
Here, Plaintiff discovered the fraud once her appeal was dismissed and
11 she sought to lien
I Defendant's property with the underlying judgment.
12!
13 YX.
CONCLUSYON
Because Defendant failed to carry her burden in pointing out a defect on
the face of the
~ ading as to any cause of action stated, and because Defendant argued
16 underlying facts and
pofential defenses which are improper as to a motion for judgment on
17
the pleadings, Defendant's
motion should be ovemuled in toto.
18
If the Court determines that any pleaded cause of action is defective, Plaint
iff requests leave
19
to amend her pleading to cure the defect. Please see Atkinson v. Elk Corp.
(2003) 109 Ca1.App.4th
20
739, 760.
21
Respectfully submit-ted,
22
23 1(Iz r/i~,
24 Gary Sherrer,
Attomey for Plaintiff, Meaghan Keegan
25

motion for judgment on the pleadings. 10
To: Fax and File Page 10 of 27 P^ OOas 2017-01-12 20:59:24 (GM"F) 15102173930 From: Gary Sh arrer
~.
~
,, .. . .... . ,
...: . _ ..
FILED BY FAX'
ALAMEDA COUrJTY-
1 ~aty Sl~er>'er _ SBI~; 113i1~~7}
January 12, 2017
8'1S-A..L~and,: . rive, 403.
2 .Alameda, CA,: 94502 CCERK OF
Teie; THE SUPERIOR COURT
By Alicia Espinoza, Deputy
3
A,ttornev-forPlainta CASE NUMBER:
.. .4. ` IVIEAG_.........
~ HAN ~EEGAN
RG15796301
5
.. ......_.
...... ,.. . - .- .
6 ....
$ "ERIQR COURT OF THE STA'IÈ OF CAL.ffORMA.

9. COUNTY .qF A.L.AMEDA -N 0R"THF.RNI DIASIOhr
1Q' U~imited Ci vil Jurisdietion.
l l 1b1EAG-IA..~i KEEGAN,. C:A,SE.N0. RG15-7-96301
12 Plaii~tiff; A~SIGNED EQR ALL PfJRPaSES'T{)
~DOE Juli~ Sgain,
13 vs. DEPARTM~' 19
14 MARCi.A QUARLE; et. al. T3ECI.,ARA"1"I'ON, flP GA.RY SHMER
rN SUP,Poi~T.Or~ n.LAu~Fs oPPQSr~or~
l5. Dauts..
efe.~cl 'TODEF.~IDANT'S Ni0T.1DiV FQR{)RDER-.
DEEWNG IiEQiJESTED-ADIySISSYON AS
16 .zDlt41"I'TEjY
1.7 Date: Januarv 19,:2017 R
Time: 2:40:g:m.
18: Dept..19
/
i9*.
20'
D~Cl~lt~l~'ID.~1F O~F' ~Y,SbTE~:i~Eit ~N,SUPPi"31?~' (~F QPd'U.SIT1rQN TO DEFÈNDANT'$
21 .ih[OTIOlV TO.LtEEBI .REQUESTED ADWSSIQIYSASADMI?7ED.
22 1.. I, Gaq- Sherrei; ain an attorrneylicensed tQ practice.,law-befaire.all.courts offhis stale and
23 aru-the:atttrney for ~,laintiff herein, lf c4ed to testifv,_I Krouid do W.un cqitoxmitv herewith. 1
2~ declare:under:p.enaltyof;gerj.urytuidert.helawsof.the.stateaCalifomiatbatstatementsbatfollov,
25 sre 'tcue o:Czayy own lciaowleilge except -m to those znatters sWed ~uderinfamation and -beliefand-as
26.
Alameda t:ouaV Superior C-ou.r:t, Qase No. RC'r1S,7963D1
27. Plaintifi's_opposition to.Defenclant's motion deemii* adwission as.admitzed
28 1
To Fax and File Page 11 of 27 ~ 2017-01-12 20:59:24 (GMT) ~ 15102173930 From: Gary Sherrer
1 to. swh statements, I tieliev e the saine to 13e true. Also, tlte E,xhibits attached heretu :arc what they
~ pwport to be.
; 2. Under infoiiiiation and belief, on March 11; 201.6, i'iair~tift'served her ini[ial respotises tu
4 this set of requests for aclznissian. At that tinic, I did not represent 1'laintif Under infornlati9on and
~ belief. altiYough Defendaiit was served with such responses, she brought the undcriuing motion
6 stating tliat she had not received any responses. ,Flease see Exhihit.'`B,"
7 3. Under inforination atid belief; due to the death of c>ny process. server'ti.rrrQther, cer..tain
$ inatters where noi addre.ssc.-d timely as to Defenda.nt's uaderlying motion which cultzxinsted in a33
9 order directEng P3aintiff to provide objcctiort-free responses on Noveairber 3, 2016..
IQ
4. ()n Dec.ember 18,:2016, i eausecl Sunnie.RichQrdson to serve 1'laintiff's amenderl
]1
objectxon-fiec responsc:s to Defendant's requests for:admission, Set one. Rlease: see Plairtift's
12
responses as Exhihit "W'"
13
5. It has been my e-Vetictlee in tltis matter tlaat Defendan.t makes statements which are
14
patently unt-rue, exaZagzrated, irn;levant, andior iriis-charactc;rizc ever;l5 and purpartzd facts.
15
'1'his declaralioia is executed oRx the dAte!. below in Alameda, CA.
16
17
~
18 Date: t t
-/ aryrrer, De ;~rant and Attoreiev
19 for Ptaiatif~, ~r1I'AGHAN .LCEE-CiAN
20
21
22
2.1
1
24
25
26
Alanteda (:.oiinty Superior t;ourt, C:ase Nro. RGI 5-79630 L
27 Plai.fatift's oppo5itzion to Deferydant's motion dee .ming aftis.5iou:as admitted
28 2
To, Marcia QLjarle Page 19 of 24 2017-01-12 01:14:31 (GNAT) 15102173930 From: Gary Sherrer
1-
. Cl4ty
Sherrer (SBN'. 1 13047)
815--A .1slar 4& Drive, 403.
2 Alameda,,C-A. 94502
Tele:,(510) 421-2838
3
.Attome; :fqr-P-1aiaatiff,
4 MEA67. Al~, KEEGIP~. N
SUPIXIOR COURT OF TEE STATE OF CALMORNIA

9
COUTNTY OF ALAMEDA - NORTHERN DIV. ]SION
Untiniited Civil Jurisdiction
MEAQHAN.KEEGAN, CASE-NO.-IRG15-79630.1
12 PlAintiff, ASSIGNED FOR AJLFUR-?QSEST0.
jUDGE.ju"li-aSp
'ain
.13 vs. DE-PARTMENT 1.9
14 MARCIA QUARLE,et.- al. PLAR4TTFISORPOSITIONT TO.
DEFENDANT'S> EkPARTk F-FH)AVIT
15 Deferdants. FOR 0 S C 'RE: CONTEMPT
16 Date.: January 19,2017
Time, 2:00 P-rn.
17 Dept: 19
18
19 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFE11TD.4AT'S EXPARTE -REQUEST

20 FOR.0RDER TO,S 110W C, A US E Ar,- CON TENPT. ,rOR DISCOY.L;RYABUSE
,.
21 FACT&
22 I.
23 As best as Plainjiff's counsel can-deduce fi-om-Defendant's ex parte application, it appears
24 tbat slie i.s usiog obsolete and superceded E43ibils'tu support a clah-n thtLt PlaintifffM W
- to. produce
25 finther. response5 and documeiits p=uW to hcr mquest for production of dozUnlents,. set olle.
26
Alapieda-County 8uperior Court, C4se No. PG.15.-;796301.
27 'PlaintiW.s oppositioli to Derb4dwit's ex parrL
,affidavit
for an order to stiow tabse re: contempt
28
To: Marcia Quarle Page 20 Gf 24 2017-01-12 01:14:31 (GMT) 15102173930 From: Gary Sherrer
As such, DefendanVavxparte application seeks an order to show cause why. PI-ai.atiff.and/or
Plainti rs. zoxinsetshoqld riot bq held.imoontempt, far alleged discovery abuse.'
Dei.fendarit's appUcation is -uot supported -by any -oath or affirznatioh; 't.e., tlie-re is 46 Mdenec
that her,Pvoorled aff-idavit. wml6mially. swor~ -nor is~thert. Yan Avetmenunder. penalty 0
'f peduty
that thelact~: wo'. true mo(ieriiig herentire appticatiQn fatally ~lavved-
Iri hor applioAtioti, Defendantstate

s: th a"
jPlaiotiffh4s.sued her. fow-[imgs.. In. f4cl. De'Ve-ndm"t
7
stied Plaintifft_mrP,.,oaco in the Alameda. Comity Suporipr Qourt for. bre4p-h -of an 'independent
contractor agreement=d once bLfore the Califeriiia L41?or Board for foilur6'to pay wages uiider the
9 very same agrement. TI-iis is in fact.Plaintiff-s third lawsitit. against DefendEmt. The first was for a
10 restraining order-for harassment, the.second is the underlying 4etion whereinjudgment in. Plainti.ffs
1.1 favor was issucd and now the imtaiit case wherein.Plaintiff subxrxits thatDefenduntenlered:into a
fraudulent..traijsfer to 4vol4paying Ole undOrlyJi_ngjudgrjjpjitr

13
Deftdant alle.ed9 t4at:Flaintiff lias. failed to obey ``three" ord.regardiniz
m 4iscovery,
Acwrding. tc) the register -of actions, this Court,bas iss4O two orders, the. s~cond_ ~vas a clarifieakon:
of the first-,
Defeiidant disingeauovslyVlates thiit Plaintiff failed to produce "anY'dIsWvq-y.documeuts ih
this UFTA litigation.' (Pefewfant's a pagQ 2pwagraph:6.) IrI faci, Plajatifr produced
documents and.Defeudant in-qists that~Plaiatiff pxoduoo moredpzumonts

-- mo
st.Qfwhi
'ph 4rg only
releva.nt to the underfyiTig lawswt.
Defexidaig's affidavit seeks 31 Q00.00 -insaiiaio m wl 0 1 t.l. o. s . ..i

pe'Ur f,~i ity requir~d by statute.:
21
22. Tn paragraph 12 of Defendant's purporwd affidavit slie states that oti I I/ I 7i16 she emailed
23
'it is unclear &ormaxcadyL ofthe PLIrported affidavit whether. shc seeks an order- to. show cause
2.4 &s agai nst Plaintiffor Flaiatiff's cotinsel.
25 Wis.C-ourt :has qdmonislipd . Defeadont -ag4j.nsther qo4jinuj;ig, atte nipts to re-litigaW the
Lm&rlying'lawsuit.
26
Alameda Cdmity: Superior -C-ourt, Case No. R-015 -7963 01
17 Plaintiff s opposition to D&fwdant' s ex parte atTidavit
for -an orde-T to -,howcaus.e:xe; contempt
28 .2
To: Marcia Quarle Page 21 of 24 2017-01-12 01:14:31 (GMT) 15102173930 From: Gary Sherrer
I Plaintifrs c+aunsel:asking. vvhethez he `persQnWly review.[ed] ...:[the.] discov.ezy responses v+wkixch

refers.. to: PW.rttif`s' amended discovery.resppnses .s.erv.~d on blov..,ember 13, ~Ql h ap.d wl~ich.:included
, .. . ... _... .
responsive cl4cuments.
.On November 1$, Plaintiff s-counsel receirred .a rrieet and confer email letter: fr.om: Defendant
assertaiig deficieneies in Pla.intift.':s amended discU.very r.esponses of.N.o.vernber 1.20 and served on
1\lovember 1P 201 6. Plaiizti#fs coivasel in fact sent a meet.and con.fer 1.etter:to. Defen.dauit addressxng
hei conceras. ln short, Defendanit's. eb[legation #hat I'laintitl'dtsObeyed disGovery oxd.ezs xs t?atallx
vvithout merit norpro.bable cause.. Assuming Defertdatat brings a legally cogni2able mation regar.ding,
tlie.discoYer~+;:e.:g.,.to. ciimpel further- production, Plaintiff will.respo.ncl acccirdingly.
II.
DFFENDA,NT'S ]CXPARì'E APPiIICATYOM: MX.IST BE i3FNIFD
Pl.aintiffzppas.cs Deiendant:'s-recluest ior an.order to sltow calYse re. centernpt for iliscrivery.
abuse on grouztd fnte.r. alxiz that .t?efendant fails to: demonsqrnte ruly ground fQr an.ex prtrte relief as
. .
required by statute.
15
16 C:alifornla.Ru.les of Colu.-t, Rule:3..1202: stat,es as. follows:
17 ".Contents. of applicatian -(a) Identification of attorney or parih,

18 An ex.parte: applicatinn.mtisl. state the.iuune;:addressx e-rttaii: address. and telepliorie .nutiber of any
attorney known ta ~the applicant to be an attoi~ney for any party or, if iio such attorney is known, the
19 I name;. address, e-mail address;.and t.elephonc number :of tbe party~ if known to t,he. upplicant,
~
201 (Subd (a) atnendeci eflecfive JanEiary- 1, 201.6.)
(b) Disclosure of previoas $pplications
21
~ If an ex parte.application has been xefused :in. whole_ordn part::any subs~quent application :of the
22j same cha.r.acter oifor the same relief although.made upon an alleged ~iii~erent ~t,ate ~of facts, inust.
fnclude. a.fiill:diselosure af all previous applications:and oftue court-:s.ac.tions.
23- (c).A#lfirmative..factual showinb reqrtir.ed
24 An applicant inust make an: at'Firmative factual showin in a deelaw~ationi conta,uZing:con-~petent.
testimoxiybased:oii perso~l knowledge ofìrrepara.ble~iarrn, ~ediate danger, or:auy:o:ther
25 I statutory basis ,fox ~rantan,g xelie#':ex p~urEe"
26 _ .. .
A,lameda Cotuity. S.uperior Courl., Case No. RG15-79fi3.(l.l
27 Plaintiffs oppositioit to Defendant's ex:paupte afftdavit
for an order..to:sho~.0 cause.xe: contempt
28 3
~
First Defcndmi's appjicqLOoq..(affidgvit)4oe St-ootai

no n the idenfificatiog of attbmey. or
21 party. A-s Pbovc,. an =- parte- application. must 'state.the name e4jdress, e-mail a(tdiress,
. and-tel
ephone
3. number of -any att mey lwowntplhe appjicant to -be.aa

Attorney for any party cLr,--if no s attome
..Y
4 is koown, thq.tiarpe;:Address, e-mail addr0s,- and telephone. -number .of t:6 par-tYJf-knqwnAo the
appli,=nt-
6. Given the- abolvp, her-appjieation: is.-fatally defective.
Second,- Defendant's applieatipxt omits thedepat"xit anO the time0beam

."'g.'. TM register
8.
of actions dots. nbl..specify- thewtime, of-hearing..
9.:.
Thir4,at.the.-timo-of tWs writIng, 7anuary.8, 201.7,Ib6te is no.prd6f,of Semvice on -file and
M
Plaiiitiff has notbeen spTve ..ancLpnjY-'dj.s wvored tbe affidaVit from the domai n: -wieb
II:
Fourth -and most inipoi-tantly, Defendarit.failed to inake any factml sJiowing, in -a d"laradon
1-2.
.contabiing.competentìcstmony,,.unOer-oath-or-affirinatxQn,b;Ksa
,.oa,,porsonaknowledge
13
demonstrating.'irreparable,h4riii, immediate-danger., oriany stauit6ry basis for granting re!JO.exparto.
14
Plaijitiff submi L~ -that-tliere IN no.thin, g conA,
-iined in Defondant'..9-'taffida-vii'.'J'deiiions.trating t4at'h
I er
15
claims for diseovery abuse coula..not be: -bib-ught. on' the Court's usual calendar, uilh uppropriate
16
notice. mch that sliq wi I spffex ixre
.. parable. harm or: irnmedIate...dangcr
-if her-ex por~e applipation is
17
not granted.
is
'Rule 3J200 et,seq. goveni ihe.procedW requirqrnents ofexparte appLications f6r-relief.
19
These requirements ija6lude thai. the 4pptiqation bo accompariied,.by a4crularatioin sMting. ft "notice.
20
giYen,including. the. date,,-.1ime, manherl.and.. v.-.oftheparty.ipfbrniec the relief sought an
.y
21
response, and. whether opposition is expwed and tba.t, within' the applicable time. under rule 3.1203,
22
the Applicantinformed the qpposing:party tvliere and when ihe applicati-on would. be tnAd6[.]" (Rule
23
24
,3
Defeiidant's. purpoadd "affWavit" does -not conWo atiy iivennent that.- the purported facts:
25 contained therein are- true under penalty Gf per'mry'nor
g is there any evidepce that it was. made'after she,
was fom-lally.sworn,
.26.
Alamoda County Super-ior Court, Qtsp.W.RGI.5_796301
27 Plaintffs.o
pposition to De-fen 's oxporreaffidavit
for an.order to show cause., Te.- qpnteppt
28
4
^~
31204(.b)(1)) "if an ex.-partc appliC ation."hasbeenrdused~In-whoIe:orinpaM.

4ay..subseqtient:
13 -applicatiqn,Qf...thc:same-t-har.acter...or.:for the sme.reflef,.-although made upowan;dl.lqed different
3 state of facts,
.:must include a full. disclQsum. ofbill. previous 4pplications atidof the,equrt!s. --attions.
4 {Rule3,1_202(ii),) The px p.afte appjic-Ant "must make an dfiiynative facwal showingin a dmlaiation
5 containing tompetent testimony based on.personal.WoWle4ge: of irrepamble ba

i
.m mmed i
ate
6 d=pr;..or apy- Dther-statutory basis. for-granting reji~f ex -pg#e.".(Pt0g3.j.2,Q2(c);) An,exparte
7 application that fails to comply wit these rules is properly,denied,(Da0g v. Dqvc Bookj
(1999) 7.3 Qal-AppAth 964,977;).
tylost iniportantly.; Defendaiit did no't "make an Affirmati'e.

v facwa) shoNving ... pfirrepar4blo
10 haima, iiTffnediate danger, -or any other. statkitory basis for granting relief ex-parte, (Rule
ii Plaintiff.deems It. unlik-ely- that Defendant could havr, made ajiy spekshow
inginasmuch as *she.-hava
12 soughttlie:-.%,ery same-rpficf iri a nQliced niolionmade with-prpper notice.pn-the Cqurt'g -usual
13 calendar.
14
15
ALTERNATIVE, IF THE COURT TRXATS TJER EX PARI'E APPLI
CATION
1.6
AS. A NOTICED NOTION, NOTICE IS INSUFFICIENT
1-7
~.ectlion 1005,-subdi-vision (b.)states in pertinent part:
18
1.9 "Unless- otherwise- ordered or specifically provided- by law, all movins, a. nd "pporting papers
shall be, served:and filed afleast2l calendardays. before -thc. hearing ...'However, if
the tiotice4s
serl.,red.by niafl, the,required.21 -day period.of notice .1~pfbric0he hearin~-shall be increased
20 calendaf by- five
days'itthe plipe of mailing-and the place of address are-vvithin the State of Califlorn
and iflbe n*otice I$ served by facsirnile transdiission, express I maiLor another ia.....
p,row'din method of delivery
g t or-overnight delivery, ,. the,:-,reqWx!W.-2'1 -da~,period of notice before the hearing.,shall be
increased by tvvo. cAlen"- days."
22 I
23 Here, the purported-affidavit- was filed on January 6. 2017,fQr h!wing schedwed

on. January
24- 11% 20.17; 13 days liotice.
25 Plaindff submits that if.addressed as: a noticed mot ion Whemin declarations mid Exhibits
26
A]ameda, C-ounty -Suppri.or Ciourt-, Case..No- RO 15,4963 01
27 Plaintiff.s Opositio
n -to DeferidaiiVs:.- e_r parte affidavit
for an order-to show cause re* contenipt
28
5
To: Marcia Quarle Pi ige 24 of 24 2017-01 -12 01:14:31 (GMT) 15102173930 From: Gary Sher
.. . - .
.........
~. ,. ~. ..
. ... . ./'i+~''r~,~ , .:. /~ ....
- .: .. '~ . .... ,
r
~
~
:. 4~ 1~{l 4l a~l~{I ~I~I1 4~I~;~I1 ~I ,
14943316`
. 1 ~ Gary Sherrer (SBN 113047)

( 875-A Island, Drive, 403
2 Alameda, CA. 94502 ENgORSED
Tele: (510) 421-2838
3
:~iLED
rn Plaintiff, pLAMEDA CO''JNTY
4 W AGHAN KEEGAN
FE8 17 Z017
5 F ~~ R COURT
CURRMK 011 ~V,
6 BY ~Id1R~li.'C~FM~19, D9P~tY
7
8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNlA
9 COUNTY OF ALAIVMEDA - NORTHERN DIVISION
10 Unlimited Civil Iurisdiction
11 MEAGHAN KEEGAN, CASE NO. RGI5-796301
12 Plainti_ff, ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO
JUDGE Julia Spain
13 'vs. DEPARTIVIEN!' 19
14 MARCIA. QUARLE, et, al., DECLARATION OF ATTORNEY, GARY
SHERRER, IN SUPPORT OF PLAIlVTg'F'S
15 Defeza.dants. MOTION TO ST.RIKE DEFENDANT'S
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS, OR, IN TRE
16 I ALTERNATIVE, TO
TAX COSTS [CCP 1032, 1033.5]
17
Date: AU" Z?.,V r 7
18 Ti.me:
Dept: 19
19 / Reservation No.
20 DECLARATIONOF GARYSHERRER ZNSUPPORT OFMOTIONTO STRIKE
21 WMORANDUM OF COSTS OR, IN THEALTERNA7ZVE TO TAX COS3'S
22 i. I, GARY SHERRER, am an attorney licensed to practice law before all courts of ttiis state
23 ' and am the attomey for Plai.ntiffherein. If called to testify,-I would do so in conformity herewith. I
24 declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the siate of Cali.fomia that the statements that
25 f.ollow are true of my own lmowledge except as to those staternents which are specifically made
Plai.ntiff, MEAGHAN KEEGAN's, motion to tax costs.
27
28 1
1."
" c1 ~
~i I under i.nformation and belief and as to such statements, if any, I believe tb.e same to be true.
2 2. On page 3, section 4 of her menlorandum of costs summary, Defendant claims $475.00
3 for deposition costs v+Tluch consists of attorney fees for Zadick Sharpiro, Esq. Separately, on her
4 attachment of costs (unnumbered page 5) she claims $225.00 for Romona Rheinhardt CCR as a
5 deposition cost. Defendant did not properly notice Plainti:Ts deposition in, this case. Defendant did
6 not properly serve Piaintiff with a deposition notice in this case. Defendant did not take Plaintifl's
7
deposition nor did Plaintiff take Defendant's deposition such that no trauscript was generated nor
paid for. Further, I have caused the issue of an attorney's fees award to be researched afer receiving
8
Defendant's memorandum.. There is no contract between the parties relevant to the instant action
9
which provides an attorney fee provision. The fraudulent transfer statutes do not provide for attomey
10
fees and, insofar as I can determine, there is no law which allows Defenda.ut's claim for attomey fees
Il
which I intuit is why such attorney fees are Iisted as deposition costs.
12
3. Defenclant claims $210.00 for service of process costs. Her daughter ailegedly served
13
Defendant's papers in the instant action. Due to the fact that Defendant was cliscovered to use fake
14
processes server(s) in the underlying matter, I have my doubts as to whether or not her daughter
15
act-ua11y served papers. Plaintiff believes that Defendant signed her daughter's name to eaoh proof of
16
service. This belief is reasonable because Defendant refused to produce her daughter's address in
17
discovery such tliat Plaint.iff could subject her to a deposition. A motion to compel discovery
18
includiog compelling Defendant to provide her daughter's address for deposition purposes was
19 1
pending when the Court unilaterally ordered Plaintiff to file a dismissal in this matter.
20
4_ Defendant claim.s $901.78 for models blowup, and photocopies of exhibits. Her claam.
21
includes facsimile transznission costs_ There is nothing in CCP Secti.on 1033.5 which allows fax
22 costs. Further, Defendant has a facsi.ziile transmission machine which she has used to convey
23 documents to PlaiutifPs counsel. Please see Exhibit "A" which is included in email messages sent
24 from Defendant to Plainti.$'s counsel.
25
Plaintiff, MEAGHAN KEEGAN's, rnotion to tax costs.
27
28 2
\ C1 5
--I
F~
1 5. Her claim also includes court fees. She has a fee wa.iver which the Court granted her even
2 though, according to her, she has over a half million dollazs in the bank and had over a half a million
3 dollars at the time she obtai.ned her fee waiver. Even assuming that she incumed such a cost, CCP
4 Section 1033.5 limits recovery of court costs to "Filing, motion, and jury fees:' Defendant's claimed
5 costs are none of the above.
6 6.Defendant claims $508.53 for office supplies from Office Depot. There is nothing in CCP
7 I Sections
1032 or 1033.5 which allows Defendant to recover the cost of office supplies.
8
7. Defendant claims $10.80 for postage ([TSPS) and $222.62 in photocopying, ($21.09 from
"Sukam Copy Print," $58.23 from "Super Print," and $143.30, ffrom "Copy World Berkeley.) CCP
9
Section 1033.5, (b)(3) specifically disallows "Postage, telephone, and photocopying charges.." As
10
photocopying exhibits, if any, the vast majority of the exhibits attached to her various moving and
11
responding papers were irrelevant to the matter before the Court Any copying of exlu'bits wluch
12
were actually relevant, the same are de mrnimis.
13
8. Defendant claims $10.00 for use of the "Alameda Cty La.w Library." There is nothing.in
14
CCP Section 1033.5 which allows such a cost.
15
9. Given that in the underlying case, Defendant was adjudged liable for multiple violati.ons
16
of PC 630 et seq., that Plaintffs clai.ms therein included Defendant's attempts to use secretly
17
recorded telephone conversations for blackmail purposes, given that Deendaat under penaity of
18
perjury stated that she had recorded Plaintiff over 40 tunes and then, at trial, she testifi.ed that she did
19
not record Plaintiff at all, given her fraudulent statement under penalty of perjury in her application
20
for a fee waiver that she did not have the money to pay court fees while possessing over a half
21
million dollars, from an objective point of view, in my opinion Defendant's veracity is sorely
22
lacking.
23 10. Further, Defendant has alleged in this case, that I have personally lied to the Court, filed
24 false documents, and committed perj~. I represent Plaintaff in three other matters, and have not
25
26 . Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. RG15-796301
Plaintilf, MBAGHAN KEEGAN's, motion to tax costs.
27 '
28 3
\1 -6
(
-W-4261
- 1 been falsely accused of the things Defendant has accused me in this matter.
. 2 11. I believe that Defendant's memorandum of costs is as fictitious as the statements made
3 under penalty of perjury in her application for a fee waiver.
4 This declaration is executed on the date below in Alameda, CA.
5
6
Gary Sherrer, Attofmey for
7 Date MEAGHAN KEEGAN,
Plaintiff.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14 1
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23 ,
24
25
Plaintiff,lVIEAGHAN KEEGAN's, motion to tax costs.
27
28 ..~
\ e\ 7
~
"14943324'
Gary Sherrer (SBN 113047) ENJa0RSED

I 875-A Island, Drive, 403 MLSI?
2 Alameda, CA. 94502 ALtv.~IEDA COi.iN'I'Y
Tele: (510) 421-2838
3 FEB 17 201i
UR"
uOt~ C~
4 MEAGHAN KEEGAN CLERK O '
B A~ ..~~
5 y JAI~tE THoNIAS. Depu~Y
8 SUPERXOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

10 Unlimited Civil Jurisdiction
11 MEAGHAN KEEGAN, CASE NO. RG15-796301
12 I Plaintiff, ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO
JUDGE Julia Spain
13 vs. DEPARTMENT 19
14 MARCIA QUARLE, et. al. PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE AND MOTION TO
STRIKE DEFENDANT' S MEMORANDUNi
15 Defendants. OF COSTS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO
TAX COSTS
16
Date: z,,74 La t,
17 Time:
Dept: 19
18 Reservation No. 4d. D$
19
IA QUARLE
20
Plaintiff, MEAGHAN KEEGAN, disputes costs claimed by Defendant MARC
21 as the prevailing party in the instant action as follows:
22 i.
23 FACTS
and then ordered
24 This Court ordered Defendant to pay the judgment in the underlying case
dant the prevailing
25 I that Plaintiff dismiss the instant action resulting Court unilaterally making Defen
Plaintiff, MEAGHAN KEEGAN's, motion to tax costs.
27
28 1
.
1 party in the lawsuit without the matter being tried on the merits
ey fees. Defendant
2 Defendant claims $475.00 for deposition costs which consists of attorn
iff take Defendant's deposition such that no
3 did not take Plaintiff's deposition nor did Plaint
4 transcript was generated nor paid for.
allegedly served all
5 Defendant claims $210.00 for service of process costs. Her daughter
action.
6 I papers in the instant
its.
Defendant claims $901.78 for models blowup, and photocopies of exhib
7
L"
8
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FOR DEPOSITION COSTS
9
iff take Defendant's
As above, Defendant did not take Plaintiff's deposition nor did Plaint
10
does not attach any
deposition. There were no deposition transcripts to purchase. Defendant
11
that on section 12 of the
evidence that she expended any deposition related money. Please note
12
Inasmuch as Defendant is
Defendant's memorandum of costs, court reporter fees are not claimed.
13 s in relevant part, "(10)
claiming attomey fees as deposition costs, CCP Sections 1033.5 allow
14 (B) Statute. (C) Law. In the
Attomey's fees, when authorized by any of the following: (A) Contract.
15 iling parry. The UFT statute
instant action, there is no contract providing attorney fees to the preva
16I would allow Defendant
does not provide for attorney fees and there is no applicable law which
17 I
attorney fees.
18 ous.
Plaintiff considers Defendant's claim for deposition costs to be factiti
19 M.
20
DEFENDAN'I''S CLAIM FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS COSTS
21 daughter. In
~ Each proof of service by Defendant is allegedly signed by Defendant's
22 Defendant had clainaed that
discovery Plaintiff sought the address for Defendant's daughter because
23 service of process occurred by a person named Ava Lon in the underlying lawsuit. Plaintiff later
24 learned that Ava Lon did not exist and the Court i.n the underlying case ordered Defendant to
25
.
27
28 r7
/10~ Qo
Ms. Lon at the hearring and Defendant's proof of

111 produce Ava Lon. Defeiidant could not produce
211 service was set aside.
s name to each proof of service. This
3 Plai.ntiff believes that Defendant signed her daughter'
uce her daughter's address in discovery such
4 11 belief is reasonable because Defendant rehsed to prod
5 that Plaintiffcould subject her to a deposition.

ess fees as fictitious.
6 Plain.tiff considers Defendan.t's claim for service of proc
IV.
7
TH.E LIICE
DEFENDAN'r'S CLAIlVI FOR PHOTOCOPIES AND
8
of her alleged costs.
First, Defendant does not attach any receipts in support
9
sition costs without a contract
Second, she is claiming $475.00 in attomey fees as depo
10
allow an award of attorney fees.
provi.sion allowing the same nor a statute which would
11 which she .has used to convey
Third, Defendant has a facsimile transmission machine
12 "A" which is included in email messages sent
documents to PlaintifP s counsel. Please see Exhibit
13 anding, Defendant is claami.n.g $78.43 for
from Defendan.t to PlaintiTs counsel. This fact notwithst
14 .5 allows fax charges.
"fax changes." Further, nothing in. CCP Section 1033
15 a half million dollars, she applied
Fourth, notwitUstanding that Defendant is sitting on over
16 question on the fee. waiver asks if the.
for and obtained a fee waiver by obvious fraud. The first
17 s'tated ffiat she did not in order to obtaui the
applicant has sufficient money to pay court fees. She
lSl er notwithstanding, she claim.s $48.65 in costs
waiver and cheat the County. Her fra.udulent fee waiv
19 she incurred such a cost, CCP Section 1033.5
as to "Superior Ct of California." Even assuming that
20 jury fees." Defendaut's claimed costs are none
iimits recovery of court costs to "Filing, motion, and
21
of the above.
from `Romona Rheinlzardt event
22 Fiftby Defendant claims $225.00 in. Court reporter fees
23 though Defendant never properly noticed Plaantilfs deposition and no deposition ever occurred.
from Office Depot There is nothin$ in
24 Sixth, Defend.ant claim.s $508.53 for office supplies
25
.~ 1ViEAGHAN KEEGAN's, moiion to tax costs.
I Plaanti~
27
28 ~ 3
~...'~ " IRRMAR%111111111
24
149433
Y
1 Gary Sherrer (SBN 113047) ENAORSF.D
875-A Island, Drive, 403 FYI.Ez3
2 Alameda, CA. 94502 ,ALF'IVIEDA COiJNÌ'Y
Tele: (510) 421-2838
3 FEB 17 2017
4 MEAGHAN KEEGAN CLERK 0 fUOR CUUR'f
~c1
By JA THdMAS, DeputY
5
6'
7I
8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10 Unlimited Civil Jurisdiction
11 MEAGHAN KEEGAN, CASE NO. RG15-796301
12 Plaintiff, ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO
JU.DGE Ju1ia Spain
13 vs. DEPARTMENT 19
14 MARCIA QUARLE, et_ al. PL.AINTIFF'S NOTICE AND MOTION TO

STRIIKE DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM
15 Defendants. OF COSTS OR, IN TFE ALTERNATTVE, TO
TAX COSTS
16
Date: .2,17s aot'I
17 Time: 2, r pIri-
Dept: 19
/ Reservation No. $.t 6 $
18
19
20 Defendant MARCIA QUARLE
Plai.ntiff, MEAGHAN KEEGAN, disputes costs claimed by
21 as the prevaili_ng par(y in the instant action as follows:
22 ' I.
23 FACTS
lying case an.d then ordered
24 This Court ordered Defendant to pay the judgment in the under
ili.ng
25 that Plaintiff dismiss the instant action resulting Court unilaterally making Defendant the preva
27
28 1
,M&, /0"'~AOMb~
I'mo'1 /'m-O""~
1 memorandwn of points and authoriiies, the declaration of Gary Sherrer, attaehed as well as upon all
. 2 documents an fiile herein.

3
4
Gary , Atto ey or
5 N12~KEEGAN,
an ~
6
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21 i
22
23
24
25
26 Alameda. County Sugerior Court, Case No. RG15-796301
Plainliff, MEAGHAN KEEGAN's, moti.on to taX costs.
27
28 2
ra'tN
?0w\
COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT - DIVISION 1
MEAGHAN KEEGAN, APPELLATE CASE NO: A150642

ALAMEDA CASE NO:
Plaintiff/Appellant, RG15-796301
V.
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT,
MARCIA QUARLE, DANIEL KANER, RESPONDENT QUARLE'S
et al, MOTION TO STRIKE APPELLATE
BRIEF OR ORDER REVISIONS OF
Defendants/Respondents. NON-CONFORMING BRIEF
Alameda County Superior Court No. RG15-769301

Honorable Julia Spain
APPEAL FROM THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT

OF JANUARY 31, A.ND ORDERS OF JANUARY 24, 2017
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF, MEMORANDUM OF POINTS &
AUTHORITIES; RECORD ON APPEAL
Plaintiff/Petitioner MEAGHAN KEEGAN

Through her attorney of record, Gary Sherrer, (SBN 113047)
875-A Island Drive Alameda, CA ~h5 02
Tele: (516) 421-2838
Defendant/Res ondent, MARCIA QUARLE,
651 Addison Street Suite 210
Berkeley CA 4701
Tele: (516) 621-9225
Defendant/Respondent, DANIEL KANER

651 Addison Street, Suite 210
Berkeley CA 94701
Tele: (516) 621-9225
KEEGAN V. QUARLE, COURT OF APPEAlLS CASE NO. A150642

^001~ n
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S OPPOSITION TO
RESPONDENT, MARCIA QUARLE'S "MOTION FOR LEA.VE TO
STRIKE OR DIRECT CORRECTION OR
REVISION OF NONCONFORMING OPENING BRIEF AND
SLTPPORTING MEMORANDUM"
I.
RESPONDENT QUARLE'S BRIEF IS REPLETE WITH
MATTERS WHICH ARE OUTSIDE THE RECORD AND IMMATERIAL
Nearly all of Respondent's brief addresses matter outside the record.
California Rules of Court, Rule 8.54. Regarding motions filed in the Court
of Appeals requires that a motion based on matters outside the record must be
supported by a declaration or other supporting evidence. Please see Rule 8.54(2).
Here, Respondent has provide neither. As such, the Court may decline to
consider the motion in toto.
H.
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, QUARLE'S MOTION ASSERTS A FAILURE
TO CITE THE RECORD YET DEMONSTRATES MULTIPLE CITES TO
THE RECORD
Defendant/APPELLEE ,("QUARLE"), asserts without specifics a general
argument that Appellant failed to cite the record, yet lists Appellant's multiple
citations and assumes some type of defect therein.
QUARLE specifically lists Appellant's citations, i.e., CT001 to CT0012,
CT0011 through CT0030, and CT0043 to CT0045.
Appellant submits that her citation to the record is adequate.
//
//
//
KEEGAN V. QUARLE, COURT OF APPEAQS CASE NO. A950642

to~ n
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR

JUDICIAL NOTICE SHOULD BE OVERRULED
According to the Rules of Court, Rule 8.252 a motion for judicial notice
must be made separately, i.e., not contained within another document.
Appellant submits that any objection to a motion for judicial notice must
also be made separately. As such, Respondent's objection is defective and should
- be denied.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Given the above, Appellant asks that Respondent's motion be denied.
Alternatively, if the Court determines that Appellant's brief lacks sufficient
citations to the record, the. Court grant leave to revise Appellant's opening brief.
Date: g t5
IWQ~~
KEEGAN
KEEGAN V. QUARLE, COURT OF APPEARS CASE NO. A150642

."
Ink 6Q
Proof of Service Clerk stamps date here when form is frted.

(Appellate Division)
Instructions
This form is only for providing proof that a document has been served
(delivered) in a proceeding in the superior court appellate division. If you
are serving a document electronically, please use Proof ofElectronic
Service (Appellate Division) (form APP-109E).
The person who serves (delivers) a document in this case and who fills out
this form:
o Must be at least 18 years old You fi11 in the name and street address of the court
that issued the decision that is being chatlenged in
o Must NOT be a party in this case this case:
Before you fill out this form, read What Is Proof of Service? (fonn Superior Court of Califomia, County of
APP-109-INFO) to understand your responsibilities. ALAMEDA
O At the time I served the documents listed in , I was at least 18 years old.
O2 1 am not a party in the case identified in the box on the right side of
this page. You fitt in the number and name of the trial court
case in which the decision being chattenged was
issued:
3O My home nx business address is:
Trial Court Case Number:
651 ADDISON STREET #210 BERKELEY CA 94710 RG i 5796301
Street city state Zip
Court Case Name:
O4 I mailed or personally delivered the following document, as indicated

below (check or frll in the name of the document you are serving and
KEEGAN V. QUARLE & KANER
check and complete either a or b). You fill in the appettate division case number (if
you know it):
Notice ofAppeal/Cross Appeal (Limited Civil Case) Appellate Division Case Number:
A 150652
Notice Designating Record on Appeal (Limited Civil Case)
Proposed Statement on Appeal ( Limited Civil Case Misdemeanor Infraction)
Appellant's Opening Brief
F!] Respondent's Brief
Appellant's Reply Brief
Abandonment ofAppeal (Limited Civil Case)
Petition for Writ (Misdenteanor, Infraction, or Limited Civil Case)
Other (write in the name of the document):
a.
x Service by Mail
(1) I put one copy of the document identified in an envelope addressed to each person listed in (2),
sealed the envelope, and put first-class postage on the envelope.
JuAfciat Council of callfomla, www.couns.ca.gov

Proof of Service APP-109 Page 1 of 2
Rev. January 1, 2017, ODUwea1 Form
(Appellate Division) ~
Anik
Appellate Division Divison One, First District Conrt ofAppeals Appellate Division Case Number: I
Case Name: Keegan v, Quarle and KanerA150652
(2) The envelope or envelopes were addressed as follows:

(a) Name of person served: Gary Lee Sherrer, Esq.
Address on envelope: 875A ISLAND DRIVE # 403 ALAMEDA CA 94502
Streer City State Zip
(b) (Name of person served: JUDGE JULIA SPAIN DEPARTMENT 19

Address on enveiope: 1221 OAK STREET THIRD FL OAKLAND CA 94612
Street Crty State Zrp
Check here if you mailed copies of the document identified in to more people. Attach a
separate page listing the names and addresses on each additional envelope you mailed. Write
"APP-109, Item 4a" on the top of the page.
(3) 1 mailed the envelope or envelopes on (date): 8/21/2017 from (city): Berkeley
(state): by depositing the envelope or envelopes (check one):
(a)
x With the U.S. Postal Service or
(b) At an office or business rnail drop where I know the mail is picked up every day and deposited
with the U.S. Postal Service.
b. Service by Personal Delivery
I personally gave one copy of the document identified in to each of tlic following people:
(1) (a) Name of person served:
(b) {Address where you gave the documents to this person:
Slreet Cin> 5tpte Zip
(c) Date when you gave the documents to this person:

(d) Time when you gave the documents to this person:
(2) (a) Name of person served:
(b) (Address where you gave the documents to this person:
Slreet S1ate Zip
(c) Date when you gave the documents to this person:

(d) Time when you gave the documents to this person:
Check here if you gave copies of the document identified in to more people. Attach a separate
page listing the names of each of these people, the address where you gave each of them the
document, and the date and time you gave them the document. Write "APP-109, Item 4b" on the
top of the page.
t~
6 I declare under penalty of perjury under California state law that the information above is true and correct.
Date: AUGUST 21, 2017

SARAH L. KANER ,
7'ype or prrnt server's name ' erver signs here after serving
Rev, January 5, 2077
Proof of Service API'-109 Page 2 af 2
(Appellate IJivision)
For yoiir'protecti""on arid privacy, please press the C[ear
This Form hutton after you have printed the form. I Print this form Save this form Clear this forrra

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A 150642 Keegan v.

Appeal from Court Trial Judgment

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF OF MARCIA QUARLE

651 Addison Street, Suite 210

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. 5

II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 7

III. THE HEARING OF JANUARY 26, 2017. 8

IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES 15

VI. PROCEDUR.AL HISTORY OF CIPA LAWSUIT. :17

VI. TIMELINE OF CASE RG15796301 21

VIII. THE UFTA 23

IX. CIPA CCP 632.7 AND 340(A) STATUTE OF

X. ISSUE OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION 27

XI. APPEAL WAS FILED IN BAD FAITH. 29

Keegan v. Quarle A150642 1 Respondent's Brlef

XII. ATTORNEY FEE ISSUE 30

A MOTION FOR COSTS MUST BE MADE BEFORE THE

XIV. THE OPENING BRIEF IS PLAGIARIZED. 34

XV. APPEAL IS RIDDLED WITH ERRORS AND

XVI. THE RECORD CONTAINS SUBSTANTIAL

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COiJNT

Keegan v. Quarle 2 Respondent's Brief

(In re Marriage of Flaherty

Keegan v. Quarie 3 Respondent's Brief

Kaufman v. Diskeeper Corp.

Keegan v. Quarle 4 Respondent's Brief

COURT OF APPEAL FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES

1. THIS FORIVI IS BEING SUBMITTED ON

DATE: AUGUST 20, 2017

MARCIA QUARLE, RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT

A 150642 Keegan v. Quarle 5

I. FAC'TUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Keegan is a sophisticated investor in real estate. She was one of

several investors in a fractionalized note secured by a deed of trust. On

1/i/o9 Keegan hired Quarle to investigate her "rights" in various properties

as a paralegal to research and investigate all loan transactions between

appropriate..(See page 2 of Statement of Decision of 12/2/14). Since 2008

"real estate": Cases RG11581713, Case RG11581786, MSCio-03266. She

routinely claims "conspiracy and elder abuse." Keegan is a serial litigant.

Keegan filed this lawsuit alleging that a quitclaim deed dated

10/22/10 signed by Quarle in favor of Daniel Kaner conveying Quarle's

interest in a residence (the home) to Kaner as a transfer in fraud of

creditors. Judge Spain disagreed. On 8/31/12 Daniel Kaner executed a

Grant Deed in favor of the Seifi's. Contemporaneously with the August

obtained her judgment in December of 2014 Quarle had approximately

Keegan v. Quarle 5 Respondent's Brief

A 150642 Keegan v. Quarle 6

$500,00o in retirement funds. (CT 12 and CT028) Kaner was unaware of

Keegan's underlying lawsuit filed on 9/20/10. In December of 2015 Keegan

of the title in 2010 accomplished by the recorded notarized quitclaim deed

payment by Quarle to Keegan. The conveyance was for legitimate reasons

recoverable value remained in the real property after deducting a Wells

Fargo Bank $58o,000 mortgage and the Seifis' senior homestead

Keegan v. Quarle 6 Respondent's Brief

judgment while her prior appeal was pending.

There was no evidence that Keegan ever recorded an abstract of

judgment to obtain a lien securing her 2014 judgment. Therefore the

Marcia Quarle's Respondent's Brief Case A150642

Marcia Quarle's Respondent's Brief Case A150642

Marcia Quarle's Respondent's Brief Case A150642